The culminating point: the lessons of Clauswitz and operation TORCH.
September 3rd was the 66th anniversary of the allied invasion of Sicily. With that historic event in mind, I would like to discuss some of the operational art in WWII that led up to the invasion.Probably, no concept of operational art is as complex as culmination. Culmination did not receive proper attention until operational art was revived during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The notion of a culmination point is identified with Carl yon Clausewitz. This is what 19th century strategist and military theorist Carl yon Clausewitz says about culminating points:
"Beyond that point the scale turns, there is a reaction, the violence of such a reaction is commonly much greater than the force of the blow. This we call the culminating point of the attack.--As the object of the attack is the possession of the enemy's territory, it follows that the advance must continue till the superiority is exhausted," this cause, therefore, impels us towards the ultimate object, and may easily lead us beyond it.--If we reflect upon the number of the elements of which an equation of the forces in action is composed, we may conceive how difficult it is in many cases to determine which of two opponents has the superiority on his side. Often all hangs on the silken thread of imagination.
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Everything then depends on discovering the culminating point by the fine tact of judgment. Here we come upon a seeming contradiction. If the defense is stronger than the attack; one would think that the latter can never lead us too far, for as long as the weaker form remains strong enough for what is required, the stronger form ought to be still more so."
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Clausewitz saw the diminishing force of the attack, the culminating point of the attack, and the culminating point of victory as related concepts. Anticipating the modern concept of strategic consumption, Clausewitz wrote: "All attackers find that their strength diminishes as they advance."
He then went on to identify seven factors which cause the depletion of the attackers strength:
1) occupation of the enemy's country;
2) the need to secure lines of communication;
3) losses incurred through combat and sickness;
4) the distance from replacements of both material and personnel;
5) by sieges and investment of fortresses;
6) by a reduction of effort (moral and physical)
7) by the defection of allies.
Yet, he was also quick to point out that "a weakening of the attack may be partially or completely cancelled out ... by a weakening of the defense." Thus, the depletion of the attacker's strength, while demonstrably true, has no meaning unless it is considered in relation to the strength of the defender.
Arrival at the point of culmination can be caused by various factors. Attack or defense can be temporarily overextended by exhaustion on the part of commanders and their forces or depletion of supplies. Among other things, this problem could be solved by simply replacing the commander or entire units, sending reinforcements, or rushing in provisions. Terrain, time and distance are also factors. Another contributor is the reduction of combat power through attrition, possibly exacerbated by fatigue and disadvantage in position, terrain, or weather. Another factor could be the inability to protect friendly forces.
As logisticians, we must understand how a lack of logistical support can also cause culmination; for instance, poor organization of the forward movement of supplies and lack of transportation, ammunition, fuel, or food.
Constant combat and overextension of supply lines aggravate the problem.
Ever-lengthening supply lines and corresponding sustainment difficulties were principal reasons for the failure by German General Erwin Rommel to continue his offensive in North Africa, beyond El Alamein in 1942. The drive into Egypt culminated in late June because of exhaustion after almost five weeks of continued combat that began at Gazala. By early July 1942, German forces were woefully short of manpower, especially infantry. Their line of supplies was some 1,600 miles while that of the Allies from Egypt was roughly 100.
Also, both attackers and defenders can reach culminating points because of a lack of intelligence. For example, during the first battle of El Alamein in July 1942, Rommel lost his intelligence assets, making it more difficult to determine an accurate picture. A culmination for attackers can also occur when their forces move faster than intelligence support. Commanders and their staffs can reach wrong operational conclusions, although they are otherwise in possession of good intelligence.
In Operation TORCH, Generals Bernard Montgomery and Rommel had earlier provided examples of not anticipating culmination points, by simply chasing each other's armies around the desert in 1941-42.
During TORCH, there were two allied culmination points. The first was the seizure of beachheads during the assault landings and subsequent operational pause for logistical consolidation prior to moving to the east. The second allied culminating point occurred when the British First Army was unable to break Axis defenses in Tunisia in December of 1942. Without sufficient combat power and logistics support, the second phase of the North Africa campaign came to a halt.
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The Axis also reached culmination as a lack of supplies prevented further offensive operations. The lack of synchronization of logistics with operations hampered both forces, and forced them to culminate.
With the successful North Africa TORCH landings behind them and the gradual clearance of Axis forces from Tunisia underway, the resources were becoming available to undertake a series of amphibious landings in the Mediterranean.
The ambitious "Round Up" (Normandy) was still not feasible so the objective of the next phase in the conduct of the war was to tie down Axis forces, thus relieving pressure on the Eastern (Russian) front, and to force Italy out of the war. This was agreed at the Casablanca conference of January 1943.
For a while, the Americans were inclined toward increasing pressure in the Pacific and attacking Germany directly later in the war. In the end, it was agreed to plan for a large scale assault via the periphery of Europe, or as Churchill preferred to call it "the soft underbelly of Europe," initially Sicily.
from the archives
40 years ago
An article titled "Gourmet Gimmicks of the Airlines," by Nancy L. Ross, details food and beverage services commercial airlines used to draw customers. Menu items included six-course meals, hand-tossed salad, steak and free beer.
Transportation Proceedings, September, 1969
30 years ago
"Government studies show life expectency among Americans improved by 1.7 years from 1972 to 1976, an increase greater than in the previous ten years. Insurance companies credit the 55 mph speed limit as a leading cause to that extension."
Newsreview, TRANSLOG, September 1979
20 years ago
An article by Charles Woolf details the first time commercial storage was used for cadets at the U.S. Military Acaademy at West Point. Approximately 350 Cadets pre-packed their belongings, which were picked up in containers.
TRANSLOG, August, 1989
10 years ago
feed this data into the Worldwide Port System ... we'll really see a dramatic improvement of real-time updates into the WPS."
Robert Shepherd, DSC G6, on the new use of RFID tags, TRANSLOG, Fall, 1999
Col. Michael Sean Tuomey
Commander, 1398th DSB
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| Title Annotation: | military theorist Carl yon Clausewitz |
|---|---|
| Author: | Tuomey, Michael Sean |
| Publication: | Translog |
| Geographic Code: | 4EUIT |
| Date: | Sep 22, 2009 |
| Words: | 1197 |
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