Saudi Arabia toughens money laundering and terror finance procedures.
SAUDI Arabia, the Middle East's largest economy and a major political player internationally, has been linked to terrorist financing, but despite AML and CTF measures put in place by the kingdom, very little is known about the country's implementation and adherence to regulations. In fact, the kingdom is so secretive that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and regional body MENA-FATF have been unable to shed any light on the country's recent compliance.According to the US State Department's 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Saudi Arabia lacked specific money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) legislation as recently as 2003, and only implementing laws that year, following terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda in May 2003, which galvanised Saudi authorities to make ML and TF criminal offences (Royal Decree No. M/39). This was followed by new banking regulations that prohibited private charities and relief groups from transmitting funds abroad, as well as financial regulations that required charities to have single disbursement bank accounts and an authority to enact tighter controls over charity accounts and transactions.
Charities were singled out in particular as they were--and indeed still are--suspected of financing Islamic terrorist groups around the world, with some 26 Islamic charities worldwide on the US Senate Committee on Finance's scrutiny list.
The kingdom's central bank the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) also issued guidelines in 2003 that require banks to have mechanisms to monitor "specially designated nationals" as listed by SAMA; to use software to profile customers to detect unusual transaction patterns; fund transfer systems capable of detecting specially designated nationals; adhere to SAMA circulars on opening accounts and dealing with charity and donation collection; provide the remitter's identification information for all outgoing transfers; and establish a monitoring threshold of SR100,000 (US$26,670) by developing internal control systems and compliance systems. SAMA also issued "know your customer" (KYC) guidelines requiring banks to freeze accounts of customers who do not provide updated account information, and required all banks to have AML units with specialised staff to work with SAMA and the authorities.
Other laws were also enacted, including bans on cash collections at mosques, unlicensed money exchangers were forced to close, and alternative remittance systems (ARS), such as hawala, were required to be better regulated. To further regulate hawala, a popular way for sending money home by the kingdom's approximately six million expatriate workers--with remittances amounting to some US$16 billion every year according to the US State Department report. SAMA in 2005 consolidated the eight largest money exchangers into a single bank, the Bank Al-Bilad. That year, stricter regulations on cross border movement of cash and precious metals in excess of US$16,000 were also implemented. However, the US State Department noted this year, "While the regulations were effective immediately, Customs has not issued new declaration forms, and therefore cannot enforce the current regulation." Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has adopted FATF's 40 Recommendations and 8 Special Recommendations, and in 2004 joined the newly established Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF), a regional body based in Bahrain. SAMA also created a Permanent Committee of Banks' compliance officers to review SAMA's regulations and guidelines, and established a Permanent Committee on Combating the Financing of Terrorism to coordinate its CTF policy efforts.
In 2005, the Saudi Anti-Financial Crime Unit (SAFCU) was designated as the kingdom's financial intelligence Unit (FIU), staffed by officers from the Mabahith (Saudi secret service) and SAMA officials. The US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has indicated it is willing to sponsor the SAFCU for membership in the Egmont Group this year.
Despite this, one of the main concerns of Washington regarding Saudi controls of illicit finances includes the exploitation of charities for terrorist financing. According to the US State Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, "the money laundering and terrorist financing that does occur in Saudi Arabia are not primarily related to narcotics proceeds." The area of greatest concern is terrorist financing, but data on how much money flows through or from Saudi Arabia is difficult to ascertain. This is primarily due to the small amounts of money that can be deposited towards funding terrorist groups, the fact that personal income records are not kept for tax purposes and that the kingdom is a largely cash-based society, and that Islam requires believers to contribute money to charity (zakat), which is often done anonymously.
Such donations can be, wittingly or unwittingly, used to finance terrorist organisations. According to a 2002 UN secretariat report to the United Nations Security Council, in the decade prior to the report Al Qaida and other jihadist organisations collected between US$300-US$500 million, mainly from Saudi charities and private donors. This practice is still occurring, with Saudi Arabia linked to funding Sunni insurgents in Iraq, according to the December 2006 Iraq Study Group report.
Stuart Levey, the US Treasury's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, told the Senate Banking Committee last year there were concerns over so-called "deep-pocket donors" and the abuse of charities to fund militants. Speaking to a US Senate earlier this year, Democratic Senator Ron Wyden quoted US treasury under secretary Stewart Levey saying: "Is money leaving Saudi Arabia to fund terrorism abroad?
Yes. Undoubtedly some of that money is going to Iraq, it's going to Southeast Asia, and it's going to other places where there are terrorists. There is money leaving Saudi Arabia." Several multilateral charities based in Saudi Arabia are under scrutiny by the US government, such as the Muslim World League (WML), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) for donations to Palestinian group Hamas, and the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), which has been linked to TF for Al Qaeda, Islamic groups in Chechnya and the Philippines, and Hamas. Only one major multilateral charity, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, which had links to the Saudi royal family, has been dissolved, in late 2004.
Saudi Arabia has been directly linked to the funding of Hamas, with Israel issuing indictments in June claiming that millions of shekels were transferred from the Charity Coalition--an umbrella organisation that encompasses Hamas charitable societies in Saudi Arabia--to operatives in Jerusalem. However, although the USA and Israel consider Hamas a terrorist organization, Hamas is widely viewed in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East as a legitimate resistance group and political party. This in part explains why, according to the 2004 FATF report on Saudi Arabia that the kingdom's legal definition of terrorist financing "does not conform to international standards as expressed in the UN International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing."
Furthermore, the 2003 banking regulations that prevented domestic Saudi charities from transmitting funds abroad does not apply to the operations of such multilateral charities, although Saudi officials claim these charities are subjected to the same scrutiny as domestic ones.
According to a US Senate report, assets of formerly suspected Saudi-based charities were slated to be merged into a new organisation in 2006, the Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad in an effort "to ensure that the charity of citizens goes to those who need it," but as of September 2007, the Commission has still not been established. The US Treasury department has urged the Commission to include MWL, WAMY and the IIRO under its jurisdiction.
Despite all these regulations that are now in place, Saudi Arabia's willingness to clamp down on TF was brought into doubt earlier this year after the arrest of 10 Saudi individuals said to be involved in TF outside the kingdom were alleged to be political dissidents, according to human rights groups.
Transparency is a problem generally regarding assessing Saudi performance in AML and CTF. In a wide ranging inquiry, finding out how Saudi Arabia is complying with FATF recommendations as well as UN and US regulations proved to be frustratingly difficult for the Money Laundering Bulletin, with regional bodies, banks and independent institutions unable to provide any information on the kingdom's progress in tackling ML and TF.
On contacting the head of financial crime investigations at a leading Saudi bank to discuss the issue, the MLB was told: "rules within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia prevent me from discussing what Saudi Arabia or the bank has achieved in relation to AML and CTF." A further contact at a company specialising in financial intelligence said his firm constantly drew a blank when trying to find data on the kingdom.
The US Department of the Treasury was unavailable for comment, as were the IMF, and FATF, which said: "We don't have any current information" on Saudi Arabia, adding that the last assessment of the kingdom was carried out in 2004. The report, which dealt only with the adequacy of legal and regulatory provisions, did not assess the degree to which these provisions were being implemented, stating the kingdom's legal and regulatory systems are "compliant or largely compliant with most of the FATF 40+8 Recommendations" on terrorist financing.
On top of this, the fact that MENA-FATF was not able to provide any information--even a phone number--on Saudi Arabia's AML and CTF operations, does not help create confidence in the organisation's claim that ML and TF have declined by 90% in the Middle East in recent years. As the US State Department recommended in a 2007 report, "Saudi Arabia's unwillingness to publicly disseminate statistics regarding money laundering prosecutions impedes the evaluation and design of enhancements to the judicial aspects of its AML system."
BY PAUL COCHRANE, in Beirut
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| Author: | Cochrane, Paul |
|---|---|
| Publication: | International News Services.com |
| Date: | Sep 1, 2007 |
| Words: | 1584 |
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