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Disregarding the Atlantic "special relationship": the Eden Cabinet in the lead-up to the invasion of the Suez Canal zone.

I. British policy in the Middle East and growing strains in the Anglo-American partnership in the mid-1950s

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the United Kingdom played a major military and strategic role in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Its military presence extended from southeast Asia to Libya, with a large base in the Suez Canal zone as its principal stronghold. By the end of the war, France, Britain's traditional rival in the Middle East, had been unceremoniously expelled from Syria and Lebanon. Yet British hegemony was more apparent than real in both economic and military terms. As early as 1947, in Greece, American influence replaced that of Britain, which lost the Indian subcontinent in the same year, with its human and geographical assets. Grappling with the insoluble Jewish problem in Palestine, the British government, strongly encouraged by Washington, left the territory, experiencing its first important defeat in the Arab world. After the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the American-engineered coup against Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq resulted in a new setback, as Iran, a former client state, became an American satellite. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone represented a major turning point in British Middle Eastern policy as Britain, in 1954, relinquished the keystone of its military operation in the region, yielding to hostile action by the nationalist Egyptian regime and, again, strong American pressure. Yet, Anthony Eden and the Foreign Office were striving to adapt British policy in the Arab world to their country's diminished means without sacrificing what were considered vital national interests, particularly oil assets. (1)

After 1954, the main foundation for a strong British presence or influence in the region was based on Britain's close relations with the conservative monarchies, particularly Libya, Jordan, and, above all, Iraq. In London, ministers saw Saudi Arabia, a close American ally and Iraq's dynastic rival, as an adversary, but the main enemy was nationalist Egypt, whose anti-imperialist rhetoric and actions were directed specifically against Britain. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office attempted to lower the degree of hostility in Cairo, even though, somewhat inconsistently, the Cabinet was striving to develop the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO, also called the Baghdad Pact), a diplomatic arrangement particularly infuriating to the Egyptians. To the British, the Baghdad Pact, which comprised Iraq, Turkey, Britain, Iran, and Pakistan, was the ideal umbrella under which they would be able to protect their regional system of alliances and their programs of military and economic aid from being criticized as simply a continued imperial presente. (2) But two difficulties stemmed from this diplomatic endeavour: Egypt would retaliate with increased anti-British subversive action and propaganda, and Britain became further dependent on the political and economic support of the United States. Indeed, one of the major weaknesses of this policy was that the US did not want to be bound to the course of British policy in the Arab world, even refusing to consider Egypt a hostile power after the large Czech arms deal in the fall of 1955. Thus, several causes of tension in the so-called "special relationship" derived from the rival Middle Eastern designs of the two partners. This study will concentrate on the way the Suez Crisis brought about a spectacular if temporary rejection of the Anglo-American partnership on Britain's part. More specifically, in the context of a diplomatic triangle, it will shed light on France's important symmetrical role, in opposition to that of the United States, until its influence prevailed in October 1956 thanks to both British domestic factors and international circumstance.

II. Diplomatic setbacks in the Middle East and the growth of anti-Americanism in the Conservative Party (December 1955--June 1956)

In the six months before Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the Eden Cabinet suffered several reversals which provoked a great deal of exasperation. In particular, the March 1956 dismissal of Sir John Glubb, the British Commander of the Arab Legion, by King Hussein of Jordan seemed proof that British influence in the Middle East was waning. In the Conservative Party, a small but vocal and active faction that had strenuously opposed the evacuation of the Suez base in 1954, earning the nickname of Suez Group (or "Rebels"), felt vindicated. These neo-imperialists opposed a policy of withdrawal from the Middle East, which they regarded as the jewel of an informal British empire, with the great prize of oil, to be secured and controlled. (3) The Suez rebels considered the US Britain's main rival in this region and they demanded an independent policy to preserve national interests. Even though they remained a minority in a party committed to Anglo-American cooperation, they gained considerable influence in the first half of 1956, thanks both to the Cabinet's difficulties in the Middle East and the apparent unwillingness of the United States to support Britain there. (4)

The Suez Rebels saw, wrongly, the hand of Egypt behind Glubb's dismissal and attacked the Cabinet for appeasing Nasser's regime. They also demanded strong measures against Jordan, which the Prime Minister could not take. Eden opted for a strong stand against the Cypriot nationalists instead, stopping the negotiations and deporting their leaders. Thereafter the situation in Cyprus became closely enmeshed with that in the Middle East as the Suez Rebels acknowledged that at last firm action was being taken to retain a military position essential to the defence of British Middle Eastern interests. (5) At the same time these Conservatives, backed by influential newspapers like The Daily Telegraph and The Daily Mail, kept demanding strong action against Egypt, which was seen as the main anti-British troublemaker in the Middle East. Yet, at least officially, the Cabinet stuck to the policy of conciliation advocated by the Foreign Office, for instance by allowing General Robertson to represent the country in Egypt during the celebrations of the British forces' departure from the Suez Canal Zone. (6)

At the beginning of July, the Cyprus issue remained much discussed within the Conservative Party because the Suez Group regarded a firm stand there as the first step towards an assertive policy in the Arab world. Indeed, according to The Daily Mail, nearly one hundred Tory MPs expressed their determination to maintain British sovereignty over the island. Clearly, an influential and significant faction in the party was able to foster a sense of urgency concerning the Middle East and a considerable sentiment of dissatisfaction towards the US, Britain's traditional partner. For instance, Sir Robert Boothby, a Conservative MP staunchly in favour of close cooperation between London and Washington, echoed his party's sentiment in an open letter to The Times. The United States bore considerable responsibility for Britain's deteriorating position in the Middle East, mainly because it did not back Britain in its conflicts with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or in the construction of a regional defence organization. (7) Furthermore, Anthony Eden's suspicions about American aims in the world made close collaboration difficult. (8) On the eve on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the British Cabinet seemed committed to a vigorous defence of national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Arab world, and its neo-imperialist critics were temporarily silenced.

III. From the first Tripartite Talks to the Menzies Mission (29 July--9 September 1956)

The British government reacted vigorously to the dramatic nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Nasser on 26 July 1956. The ministers endorsed Eden's extreme view that unless the Western powers wrestled back control over the canal, they would lose their interests and assets in the Middle East, and their prestige as well. The preservation of this vital waterway, essential for oil traffic, would justify threats to use force and, if necessary, recourse to force. (9) The Cabinet was ready to take military action alone but decided in favour of cooperation with the Americans and the French to bring maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt. Under Eden's chairmanship, the Egypt Committee, a small team of senior ministers, was appointed to determine policy in the Suez crisis. The official Cabinet stand was that no solution would be acceptable that left the canal under the "unfettered control" of a single power, but the Egypt Committee secretly adopted the short-term aim of overthrowing Nasser and the long-term one of placing the Suez Canal under international control. (10) The ministers also decided to call up reservists as a sign that Britain meant business.

Between 29 July and 2 August, the British, the Americans, and the French held talks in London to define a common position on the canal issue. For completely different reasons, and contrary to Britain's wishes, the French and the Americans agreed on the necessity of an international conference on the Suez Canal involving every interested party. Yet, from the first, Robert Murphy, the American Undersecretary of State, hastily dispatched by President Eisenhower, expressed strong reservations to Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, and Christian Pineau, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He spoke against the inflexible stand taken in London and Paris, insisting that the possibility of resorting to force had to be left in the background. (11) Almost immediately, the Egypt Committee started to worry about Britain's differences on almost every major point with the Americans, who objected to military preparations, required that the USSR be invited to the Suez Canal users' conference, disagreed about economic sanctions against Egypt, and, in the end, watered down the tripartite communique drafted by the British and the French. (12) John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, participated in the discussions on 1-2 August. The British and the French agreed to invite the USSR to the international conference only on the condition that the US would fully back them and consent to a strong tripartite declaration. Moreover they had to promise to favour the adoption by the forthcoming conference of an Anglo-French resolution for the internationalization of the Suez Canal, though this pledge was limited to the duration of the international congress on the Suez waterway. Seemingly more amenable, Dulles still kept a moderate line, speaking about the disastrous effects on world opinion of a military solution without first trying every peaceful avenue. (13) If the withdrawal of the Suez Company's pilots on instructions by the British and French governments brought the traffic through the canal to a halt, the United States would find it difficult to provide emergency oil supplies. (14) Annoyingly from the British and French perspective, Dulles refused to go further in the way of pressure or sanctions than freezing Egyptian assets in the United States, and, he ruled out withholding fees for the passage of American ships through the canal. As a matter of fact, the only concession Dulles made was merely rhetorical, with a strongly-worded tripartite statement in public, and in private, by speaking of his desire for a way to make Nasser "disgorge" what he was trying to swallow. (15) Yet here the American Secretary of State, who seemed prepared not to exclude the use of force if all else failed, was deliberately misleading his colleagues to keep them on a generally cooperative course and to delay any rash action.

Thus, at the beginning of the Suez crisis, American diplomacy was responding to pressures exerted by the British ministers who insisted on the necessity of opposing the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, at the price of a war if need be, as Eden said to Eisenhower in a telegram on 31 July 1956. (16) The American President made clear in his answer that he ruled out military action except as a last resort. He had mentioned his hope for a satisfying outcome of the maritime powers conference and indicated that American opinion could be marshalled into taking a conciliatory but strong position. (17) Yet, in a new message, on 5 August, Eden tried to impress Eisenhower with his resolution to act vigorously, stating that the Cabinet had made every last concession possible in the tripartite talks, comparing Nasser to Hitler, and stressing that the demise of his regime had to be among their two countries' primary aims. Of course, the French and the British had also emphatically conveyed these exaggerated views to Dulles to no avail. On 4 August, Dulles publicly echoed the British and French theses but also warned that military action would run against the United Nations Charter and thus threaten world peace. (18) Four days later, Eisenhower indirectly answered Eden when he again stressed his "desire for a peaceful solution to the conflict with Egypt and his hope that common sense would prevail on all sides. (19) Therefore, the British ministers could not really have entertained any misconceptions about the US position on the Suez Canal issue in spite of Dulles's occasional use of strong words.

Contrary to the United States, France appeared immediately as a faithful ally, fully sharing the United Kingdom's determination to deal a decisive blow to Nasser and his nationalist regime. Christian Pineau offered unqualified French support, saying that both powers need not be detained by American reluctance and hesitations. Indeed, his government proposed to send military units at once to Tobruk as a show of force. (20) The British ministers decided to accept the French offer of close cooperation, though they suspected that the wily French wanted to use Nasser's downfall to make a comeback in the Middle East. Nevertheless, as Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, observed, the crisis provided a golden opportunity to coordinate both countries' policies, in particular concerning Israel, the question of a possible union of Iraq and Syria, and, of course, the Baghdad Pact, which until then had been much criticized in Paris. (21)

"Exploratory" Anglo-French talks about the Middle East and Suez took place in Paris on 11 and 13 August 1956. They showed that, on most points, the would-be associates did not see eye-to-eye and that, for the most part, there was real agreement only on Egypt. The French willingly endorsed the political aims and military terms of a scheme already prepared in London but, contrary to the British, they spoke as if the coming London Conference was a formality before an unavoidable resort to force. (22) The protocol of the Paris talks of 11 and 13 August demonstrated the narrow basis of this Anglo-French entente. Both governments agreed that joint military action would aim at insuring freedom of passage through the canal, which would be captured and held until an internationally satisfactory agreement with Egypt was obtained. In the event that the government fell, the two powers would support a democratic and non-military one. Contrary to French wishes, Israel was to remain uninvolved at all cost. (23) Conscious of the relative moderation of the Foreign Office, the French had achieved what they saw as a welcome hardening of the British position during the tripartite talks. For instance, in order to show a united front to the Americans, the Cabinet had finally endorsed France's decision to deny transit fees to the new Egyptian Canal Authority. (24) In spite of their diplomatic prudence in dealing with the French, the Egypt Committee included them in the military planning as early as 5 August, in a significant reversal of the decision it had taken two days before. (25) When ministers in Paris learnt that the planning staff in London ruled out any military operation for a three-week period after the international conference, they started to grumble, and Jean Chauvel, the French ambassador to London, told Selwyn Lloyd of his efforts to prevent his superiors from concluding that Britain was dragging its feet. Indeed, military planning gave the French a good vantage point from which to watch and apply pressure on the British government.

Some members of the Egypt Committee strongly advocated a large-scale assault on Egypt to overthrow Nasser and his regime. However, the ministers had to take into account constraints like the Suez Canal users conference, due to take place from 16 to 23 August in London, and the obligation to allow some time for Egypt to respond to it. After that, parliament would have to be consulted. Therefore, military action had to be postponed at least until September. For the British and the French, the conference had only two purposes: to give a widely backed ultimatum to Egypt and to impose an international administration for the Suez Canal. The United States loyally backed the two European powers, but despite the large majority that approved the Anglo-French motion, 18 nations out of 22, a broad compromise was obviously widely wanted, and both partners would be isolated if they wanted to use force against the Egyptians. Even the Dominions would align themselves with the United States. (26) After the First London Conference, Britain and France had only three options: make counter proposals to possible Egyptian offers; set up an international authority outside Egypt to coordinate the actions of the user nations; or launch military operations immediately after the Egyptians rejected the conference demands. (27) It was immediately decided to send to Cairo a mission headed by Sir Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, to "present" the Nasser government with the conference decisions, though without negotiating powers. This would expose Egyptian obduracy, allow time for military preparations, and possibly open the way for further collective action by the users. Of course, one of the main underlying surmises then was that Nasser could be driven to take the rash step of stopping the traffic going through the canal, thus providing an internationally acceptable casus belli. (28) However, the Americans were bent on preventing this, which explains why Dulles declined to head the Cairo Mission.

The British ministers soon realized that the diplomatic background and domestic political circumstances might render a military solution quite difficult, particularly with Labour's growing opposition to force. Actually, since the middle of August, they had started to think more in terms of economic action against Egypt, which might also goad Nasser into retaliating. Their aim was now to deprive Egypt of 40 to 50 per cent of the lees still paid by canal users, which could be construed by the French as evidence of the strong policy that they were more and more impatiently requesting. (29) Yet, such a course demanded the support of the United States, as the bulk of canal revenue depended on the payments still being made by American shipowners. On 23 August, in private talks during the London Conference, Dulles adamantly refused to freeze Egypt's current revenues or to prevent American ship owners from paying fees, which he considered as acts of war. He also reserved future US decisions on the Suez problem, but cleverly added that later, when American public opinion was sufficiently prepared, joint economic action might be possible. However, the Secretary of State's most significant statement related to the United States' stand if Cairo barred the Suez waterway to non-paying users: the latter would then have to take the Cape route. (30) Obviously, Washington wanted a compromise between Egypt and the two European powers and did not intend to support the latter's extremist policies.

Since mid-August, Eden had understood that an appeal to the United Nations Security Council would have to precede any resort to force, both for diplomatic and domestic reasons. After the London Conference, the Egypt Committee reaffirmed this position even though it could not satisfy British claims and was aware that this would involve the further postponement of military action. In New York, France and Britain would plead their case before international opinion. (31) The French saw this as mere procrastination, and only with great reluctance accepted the bringing of the matter before the Security Council, where the USSR would veto any resolution adverse to Egypt. However, they insisted that the resolution submitted to the Council had to conform to the London Conference's demand about the international administration of the Suez Canal. (32) Here again, the French government followed Britain's lead, but increased pressure on their associates, crucially limiting their freedom of action. On 28 August, the British Cabinet acknowledged that national interests relating to Britain's position in the Middle East and the threat to its oil supplies demanded that Colonel Nasser's designs be thwarted, if necessary by force after having tried every peaceful means. (33) That same day, Lloyd advised Dulles that his government would proceed with their plan of going to the Security Council if Nasser did not yield in the Cairo talks with the Menzies Mission. At the same time, he requested US backing in order to achieve the best position in New York for the "forcible action" that would possibly be necessary. (34) With the concurrent official announcement of the dispatching of military units to Cyprus and advice to British citizens to leave Egypt, Lloyd's strong message was also meant to impress leaders in Washington, and to get more cooperation in the Security Council proceedings. Of course, it also satisfied the Suez Rebels who were increasingly critical of the Cabinet's procrastination.

The Americans gave a twofold answer. First, they obviously tried to damp down their too independent-minded ally's resolution to hurry things up and to bind them to their policy. In a conversation with the British ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, Dulles stressed that the Soviet Union would reject any proposal reiterating the London Conference decisions, so that a more "general" appeal to the conclusion of effective international agreements for the freedom of traffic would be more productive. (35) On 3 September, Eisenhower reasserted his opposition to war in a letter to Eden. Not only were British military steps strengthening support for Nasser, but American opinion "flatly" rejected the idea of resorting to force. (36) In London, William Clark, Eden's Public Relations Officer, construed Eisenhower's firm and unambiguous message as tantamount to a ban on military action and noted Eden's feeling of near despair. (37) When the British ambassador asked again for American help in the Security Council on 9 September, Dulles refused to promise not to support a motion straying from the London Conference demands or one that would forbid the use of force. Two days later, he revealingly added that such a prohibition would no more curtail the United Kingdom's freedom of action than the UN Charter already did. (38) At the same time, Sir Pierson Dixon, head of the British delegation to the United Nations, warned the Cabinet that the United States could take an unsympathetic stand, particularly about the use of force, if the British referred the Suez problem to the Security Council without its consent. (39)

As a second part of their response to the apparent hardening of British policy, the Americans suggested another way of dealing with Egypt. On 4 September, Dulles explained that the Suez Canal user countries' association would provide a better avenue than the threat of resorting to force, which placed Britain in a legally weak position. In his opinion, the Convention of 1888 gave every right to set up such an organization, which would employ the Canal workforce and take charge of technical management. Three days later, the American Secretary of State spoke of "the superior merits" of a Canal Users' Association that would do more than just collect the passage fees. (40) On 6 September, Eden answered the presidential letter with a grandiloquent message comparing Nasser to Hitler and stressing the dire consequences of his victory. In a second letter, Eisenhower rejected Eden's "too dark and severely distorted" picture, and again underlined that the use of force, unacceptable to American public opinion, could "cause a serious misunderstanding" between the two countries. The President also supported the Canal Users' Association as a means of developing de facto coexistence with Egypt that would leave the users with the rights they wanted. (41)

In the face of this determined American opposition, the Egypt Committee abandoned its decision to appeal to the Security Council and agreed to set up a canal users' club on 10 September. Yet, the ministers were quite uneasy about Dulles's proposals, some of which were worryingly vague, and which might be mere temporizing. In their eyes, the main merit of the association was the possibility that it would collect almost all the transit fees, thus affording the means of control and pressure sought after since the beginning of the crisis. (42) The committee took care to ask for assurances about US willingness to have their shipowners pay the fees to the new organization. Dulles pledged that they would do so, but added that except for covering the operating costs of the Users' Association, all the money collected would have to be paid to Egypt for its contribution. (43) In spite of that, the British hoped that US participation in the setting up of an international body would eventually lead the US to back up a policy of compelling the Egyptian government to accept international control. Furthermore, US goodwill and cooperation was essential in case the oil supplies to Europe had to go round Africa if the Canal were to be closed. In spite of Dulles's threat about emergency oil assistance on 2 August, the American government promised to help if Europe became unable to access its usual sources. (44) Nevertheless, Washington had decided to play on the major problem that buying "dollar oil" would create, and, on 6 September, the British Cabinet concluded that the Americans would not make any commitment on that. When discussing the Users' Association plan with them, the Egypt Committee attempted to obtain such a pledge, but to no avail. (45) Its decision to subscribe to Dulles's canal users' organization indeed marked the peak of Washington's leverage on British policy on Suez. However, France's diplomatic pull kept growing in London, and American attempts to sway the British leadership were regarded with impatience and dismay. Indeed, for this reason, Dulles asked the British not to inform Paris of the users' club project before the two countries had reached an agreement on i that issue.

A blatant sign of increasing French influence was the significant decision, on 7 September, to remove the Suez Canal Company employees who were still on duty, a point which most historians have overlooked or misunderstood. (46) Since the beginning of the crisis, the British Cabinet had consistently opposed French requests for their withdrawal on the grounds that Britain and France would be accused of disrupting navigation. (47) Nevertheless, in London and Paris, leaders had some doubts about the Company's claims that its pilots played an essential role, and US insistence that they be kept in service on the canal was probably decisive. Already on 23 August, at the end of the London Conference, Sir Harold Caccia, assistant undersecretary at the Foreign Office, warned the ministers that to pressure the Suez Company against French opinion would be most "impolitic." (48) At the time, Eden already knew that the French alignment with British policy was causing increasing exasperation in Paris. On 28 August, he told the Cabinet that the French allies would be "quick to place an unfavourable interpretation on anything which could be construed as [British] hesitancy." (49)

Two weeks later, following an Anglo-French summit in London, Eden would bring up before the Egypt Committee the considerable role played by the French in policy-making considerations. To decide when to resort to force was difficult because the government had to take not just American public opinion into account, but France's growing impatience and eagerness to take firm action. (50) Opting for the withdrawal of the Suez Canal Company pilots not only satisfied the French with a gesture of firmness, but also showed that the British were taking a stand independent from the Americans. (51) Sir Roger Makins, the ambassador in Washington, warned against this step since it would be seen as an attempt to stop traffic in the canal. Moreover, the diplomat stressed that the users' club cooperation with Egypt implied that the company's employees should stay at their posts. (52) The growing rift between London and Washington made the coalition with France valuable, as the United Kingdom could rely on a staunch if difficult ally, as well as one that could contribute militarily. However, every French concession was binding. For instance, when the British ambassador, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, informed the French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, of his government's backtracking on an appeal to the Security Council, the latter ironically reminded him that France had been rather opposed to this step and had only agreed to it because of British domestic reasons. Then Pineau went on to say that he accepted the new British decision as long as it "did not deflect [the two powers] from their chosen course of inducing Nasser to reason." (53) At the beginning of September 1956, when the discussions about the Suez Canal Users' Association took place, only France stood by Britain. The possibility of a military solution seemed remote unless Nasser obliged with a reckless action, and the official goal of putting the canal under international administration appeared unattainable. On the domestic front, the Labour Party had finally officially abandoned the patriotic bipartisan stance unwisely adopted by its leader Hugh Gaitskell. Britain's situation had markedly weakened during August, along with that of the Eden Cabinet.

IV. From the Second London Conference to the Anglo-Franco-Egyptian talks in the Security Council (10 December--14 October 1956)

The anti-American faction in the Conservative Party certainly felt vindicated by the course of events since the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The Suez Group in particular vocally demanded that the government stick to its official strong policy. Except for the liberal and, later, the Labour press, most newspapers supported the Cabinet with the same tough rhetoric even as they secretly expected a compromise solution. This certainly made any open retreat for ministers much more difficult. In the Conservative Party, the divide increased between moderates and neo-imperialists, the first favouring a solution through the UN and close Cooperation with the United States, while the latter saw the crisis as a decisive test for Britain's future as a great power. (54) The main Tory newspapers unreservedly supported the Cabinet decision to insist on an international administration for the Suez Canal, comparing the canal issue with the Munich Crisis and Nasser with Hitler. (55) Very vocal and active in the Conservative organization, the neo-imperialists tended to monopolize their party's voice, and they had assuredly now gained more credit than before among other more usually obedient backbenchers. (56) Obviously, they took the ministers at their word and intended not only to support them but also to push them into strong action if need be. They soon put forward two principles: Britain's pre-eminent responsibility in the crisis and the necessity for an association with France. (57)

Indeed, as time passed, the relationship with France became the barometer of the Eden Cabinet's resolution in the eyes of the Suez Group. Actually, the desirability of an Anglo-French partnership in world affairs grew in proportion to the rise of anti-Americanism, and The Daily Telegraph published a significant editorial entitled "[Anglo-French] Entente beyond Europe." (58) Of course, the war in Algeria and Nasser's standing as a rallying point for Arab nationalism insured that the French were also eager for a victory of a sort over Egypt. Some of the Suez Group leaders even had personal contacts with French ministers or politicians who defended "French Algeria." (59) The Suez Rebels also expressed their mistrust of the Americans, stating that they did not share the same interests in the Middle East, and that Britain had to prepare for independent action. (60) The results of the London Conference did not impress the neo-imperialists, who continued to wait for firm action or at least some prior coercive economic measures. (61) The despatch of military units to Cyprus did not allay their doubts, and, from the beginning of September, the radical Tory press started to denounce the appeasers most violently and to make a critical and pointed reappraisal of the country's Arab policy since the Second World War. As the main architect of that policy since 1951, Eden found himself under attack, even more so because of the persistent references made to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. (62) The neo-imperialists saw both an appeal to the Security Council and the Suez Canal users' club initiative as temporizing moves, not as substitutes for strong steps. The Cabinet answered these demands with the removal of the Suez Company pilots and an ostentatious show of Anglo-French solidarity after the 10-11 September summit. This meeting of the Prime Ministers and foreign ministers of the two countries indeed served domestic needs as much as diplomatic aims. The French had been to some extent fooled into coming to London with the promise of a meeting with Sir Robert Menzies after his return from Cairo, and they made much difficulty before agreeing to an official communique expressing both governments' identical views and their desire to see "international law" respected. (63) This allowed the neo-imperialists to regard the setting up of a Suez Canal users' organization as a new way to bring international pressure to bear on Nasser's regime. The reluctant and skeptical acceptance of the canal users' club scheme by the French enabled Eden to announce a new development to the House of Commons, where Labour, the Liberals, and the moderate Tories expected to hear that Britain would appeal to the United Nations.

A second conference was held in London to set up the Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) between 18 and 21 September 1956. Any teeth this institution might have would depend on its ability to collect navigation fees and whether Nasser would agree to deal with it. Already, on 13 September, Dulles had publicly declared that Egypt would retain the canal's revenue and that if it rejected the Users' Association and closed the canal, American ships would take the route around Africa. (64) For a few days, the British and the French acted as if they could convince the Americans to participate in their scheme of using the collection and retention of fees to force Egypt to negotiate or to breach the Convention of 1888 on freedom of navigation. (65) The French seemed strangely positive about this prospect, but they bluntly warned their ally that if the SCUA failed to obtain and control at least 80 per cent of the fees, a resort to force would be unavoidable. (66) At the Second London Conference, the Egypt Committee wanted the users to show their determination to cooperate and secure their rights. Another goal was to bring pressure to bear on Egypt and test its readiness to cooperate with the new organization. Most importantly, the ministers hoped to get the support of as many powers as possible for the First London Conference resolution on the international administration of the Suez Canal. (67) However, none of these aims was achieved, as the various user states were divided over various solutions and steps, and Pineau had to work very hard to get a reference to international management for the waterway. Moreover, Britain and France could not get a binding agreement on the payment of navigation fees to the SCUA, as every country wanted to keep its options open. In consequence, the French Foreign Minister warned that his government's position towards the association would be "reserved." (68) The failure of the conference had varying effects in Britain. Advocates of a compromise solution thought the Cabinet would now give up its intransigent policy to seek an agreement through the United Nations. Conversely, the neo-imperialists saw it as a severe setback for British diplomacy. In the words of The Daily Telegraph words, "the situation had clearly changed and for the worst" since the Cairo talks. (69)

The impact of the Second London Conference was so negative that Britain rushed to appeal to the UN Security Council, a unilateral decision by Eden and Lloyd on 22 September. (70) They wanted to dispel the impression of wavering over the UN, and also wanted to help the French Government, which found itself having to contend with hostile public opinion. (71) The Egypt Committee meeting of 25 September sheds more light on the motivations for this hasty choice. Lloyd stated that there would be pressure for talks with Egypt in New York, where it would impossible to maintain the demands of the First London Conference because of the USSR's veto. Perhaps something in the plan presented by Krishna Menon, the Indian minister for foreign affairs, might provide the basis for the setting-up of a supervisory arbitral institution, which would afford a measure of control, although not international administration, over the waterway. Such a settlement would also ensure Egypt's recognition of the SCUA and its function as a fees collector. In conclusion, the ministers asked the Foreign Secretary to explore this avenue in more depth, perhaps letting a third party, like Belgium, or a negotiating commission, put forward such a solution. (72) On 25 September, therefore, the Egypt Committee had strikingly revised its position and now secretly accepted to settle for less than international management. In other words, it had renounced the idea of scoring a decisive victory against Egypt and, indeed, followed the path recommended by the Americans since the beginning of the crisis. Still, the French attitude represented a major hurdle.

After the Second London Conference, Anglo-American relations, already cool, deteriorated markedly. Eden's decision to go to the United Nations without any prior consultation hurt American feelings, particularly those of Dulles, who wanted a postponement in order to establish the SCUA. The Secretary of State declared that the United States would not join in an appeal to the Security Council as it might later "[apply] the brakes in away which would embarrass [Lloyd] and Pineau." (73) This showed that the Americans wanted to dissociate themselves from the two European powers, and were prepared to take an independent stand at the UN if necessary. In addition, the issue of fee collection by the SCUA further soured the relationship between Washington and London. Contrary to their promise, the Americans delayed the payment of fees to the Users' Association. They also stuck to their refusal to grant financial assistance in the event the Europeans had to substitute dollar oil imports for their usual supplies, when the Foreign Office assumed that accepting US leadership implied that such aid would be forthcoming. (74) Of course, the British were then ignoring how they themselves had decided to withdraw the canal pilots and to appeal to the Security Council against American advice. On 25 and 26 September, during talks in Washington with Harold Macmillan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, American leaders tried to separate the canal issue from the Nasser problem. Dulles declared that his country would to do whatever it took to get rid of the Egyptian leader, but in six months or more, not immediately. The British minister answered that Britain could not wait unless Nasser lost face during this time. Of course, this remark referred to the withholding of the canal navigation fees by the SCUA. (75)

Thus, Anglo-American relations were unusually strained by the last third of September. An obvious sign of this was the indirect answer made by Dulles in a press conference on 2 October, to Eden's message to Eisenhower, clumsily brandishing the spectre of the Soviet threat in the Middle East. The Secretary of State pointed out the "differences of a fundamental nature between the United States and their European allies over the Suez Canal question," stemming from his country's "independent position" on colonial questions. (76) The British ambassador in Washington, Sir Roger Makins, reassuringly interpreted this as a "subconscious reaction" caused by Britain's decision to go to the UN. (77) Yet, on 4 October, The Washington Post, often a mouthpiece for the State Department, portrayed the USA as an arbitrator between the so-called colonial powers and those who only wanted speedy independence. Eden annotated it as follows: "this article describes the most dishonest policy I have ever read." (78) Undoubtedly, Dulles's strong comments, for instance about the SCUA never having been meant to have teeth, and The Washington Post's article served to goad the British into their policy of a negotiated settlement, but at the price of much bitterness and distrust in London. (79) At the time of the Security Council proceedings, Eisenhower and Dulles again expressed their wish for a peaceful or compromise solution, even though Dulles was prepared to go as far as comparing the exclusive control of the Suez Canal by a hostile power to an "economic sword of Damocles." (80) In his contacts with the British and French foreign ministers in New York, Dulles took a much more moderate attitude than he had at the Second London Conference. On 5 October, he told them that his government agreed to some international participation in the Suez Canal administration, but rejected the solution of international management. The Americans agreed to support the demands of the First London Conference as requested by Paris and London but, as explained by The Washington Post, only to induce the Europeans to negotiate with the Egyptians. (81) In addition, Dulles and Eisenhower repeated several times that the situation did not warrant a military solution, and that force could only be a "desperate remedy." (82)

Solidarity with France had become the keystone of British policy in the Suez Crisis, and the French leaders had accepted Britain's leadership only because of the latter's constant reaffirmation of unity of views and purposes. They had chafed at several of London's decisions, for instance on the Suez Company's pilots or on the steps taken after the First London Conference. In mid-September, their concern about any softening of the British position increased. When Eden tried to postpone his visit to Paris, scheduled for 26 September, Christian Pineau sent a "special message" through Ambassador Jebb about the "unfortunate effects" such a delay would have in France: "rightly or wrongly," said the Minister, "people would come to the conclusion that [the two countries] were drifting apart." (83) This warning left no doubt about French restlessness. Indeed, Jebb called the ministers' attention to one or two recent "disquieting indications" that, even if "hitherto, the Americans had been blamed" for the turn of events, henceforth in some quarters, "including certain unspecified sections of the [French] government, [British] internal dissent and hesitations [were] also held partly responsible." (84) After the pitiful results of the Second London Conference, the French seem to have attributed the common difficulties to the British, who, after all, had run the show. As Clark recalled, to calm the French Foreign Minister, Eden and Lloyd had to make a public statement that they would go to Paris the following week. (85) Unsurprisingly, the British ministers did not look forward to an Anglo-French summit because they had modified their own stand on a solution to the Suez crisis. Yet, the French suspected that much, and Chauvel, the ambassador in London, informed Paris of the Foreign Secretary's worrying inclination to replace "international management" with "international control," a much more "ambiguous" phrase. (86)

The second Anglo-French summit on Suez took place in Paris on 26-27 September 1956 in a difficult environment. The British were now considering a compromise solution based on international supervision of the waterway, whereas the French remained committed to their initial aim of defeating Egypt, diplomatically if possible, or by force if necessary. On 25 September, the Egypt Committee decided that the Paris talks would aim at getting French assent to negotiations with Egypt under UN aegis, on the grounds that it would be highly impolitic to reject any such recommendations or resolutions. Of course, the ministers considered it "unwise" to attempt to persuade them to accept the Indian plan for a settlement before the debates in the Security Council: only then would it be opportune to have it put forward by a third power. However, besides asking the French to accept discussions with Egypt, the British would renew their pledge about not leaving the canal "under the unfettered control of one country" and about creating an international system for the purpose. (87) In case the UN remained powerless to enforce respect for international obligations, Britain would take whatever steps would be necessary, including force. (88) This last statement was certainly meant to sugar the pill for the French.

Altogether, the policy guideline adopted before the Paris meeting showed how much the two allies now diverged and that the British were aligning themselves with the US, mainly because of the international situation and deep divisions within both public opinion and the Cabinet. Not only was there no more reference to the First London Conference demands, but the notion of supervisory control met the requirement of preventing Egypt from having unlimited control of the Suez waterway. As expected, the Paris talks were very difficult. Mollet and Pineau even asked whether Britain's policy on Suez had changed, and they found British proposals highly unpalatable. They very grudgingly accepted negotiations with the Egyptians on the strict condition that they would remain within the framework of the proposals of the First London Conference (i.e. international administration of the canal). Back in London, Eden told the Egypt Committee that the Mollet government was determined to defeat Nasser in order to prevent the collapse of other Arab regimes. Above all, he added that if Anglo-French solidarity had to be preserved during the debates in the Security Council, the British would have to stand firmly by the principles adopted by the eighteen powers at the First London Conference. Yet, on 1 October, the Egypt Committee opted for the Foreign Secretary's suggestion that the Egyptian counter proposals should form the basis for negotiations, on condition that they offered both international supervision and some effective sanctions for any future violation of agreements. However, conscious of the difficulty of including a clause providing for the use of force in a treaty, the Cabinet accepted that an Anglo-Franco-American declaration reserving the right to take steps through the UN or not would be enough. (89)

The public debate in the Security Council started on 5 October, followed by private tripartite talks with Egypt's Foreign Minister, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi. Privately, Dulles encouraged the Europeans to negotiate. In these discussions, Lloyd and Fawzi worked hard to come to a compromise agreement while Pineau did his best to prevent progress. As surmised by the British Cabinet, the Egyptians made offers based on the Indian plan. Egypt would recognize the SCUA and consent to its collecting the navigation fees. Fawzi even went as far as agreeing to the French and British request that the canal administration should be insulated from the politics of any one country. On 11 October, the Egyptian minister submitted six principles to his colleagues that essentially gave the guarantees publicly demanded by the French and British. (90) Eden, who found Egypt's consent to the collection of navigation fees by the SCUA surprising, wrote to Lloyd that the Egypt Committee was "delighted" to see how hard he had worked. (91) Later on the same day, Eden summed up progress in the New York negotiations with only two ministers, those of Defence and Transport, and three senior officials. The small team obviously saw the possibility of a settlement that would provide safeguards for the maintenance and free use of the canal. Moreover, the proposed role of the Users' Association both as the agency for the collection of transit dues and as a supervisory body "satisfied up to some extent the requirements for an international authority postulated by the 18 powers" (at the first Conference of London). (92) However, the whole scheme depended on the effectiveness of the SCUA. Significantly, the small ad hoe committee gave permission to the Foreign Secretary to continue the tripartite talks beyond the weekend, contrary to the previously set time limit.

V. The weight of the "Entente Cordiale of 1956" and Eden's about-face in mid-October

The British Foreign Secretary's principal instruction was "to keep in line with the French," both in the public debates of the Security Council and the private discussions, and not to meet Fawzi without Pineau. (93) Eden repeatedly reminded Lloyd of this strict requirement, and, after the New York discussions, Lloyd insisted that "Pineau [had] not the slightest ground for saying that we did anything to disturb Anglo-French unity." As the French ambassador pointed out, the British leaders feared international isolation because of the Americans' behaviour, particularly after Dulles's words about colonialism, so they valued the determination of the French. (94) Furthermore, they thought that their association with France would goad the Americans into being more amenable. (95) Yet, the priority assigned to the Anglo-French alliance gave the French decisive control over British resolve in the Suez crisis. Pineau could easily frustrate his British colleague's effort to get an agreement in New York and Lloyd complained about his tactics. (96) Indeed the French minister's departure on 13 October compelled the British to stop what might have been promising talks with the Egyptians. After that, the Security Council accepted the first part of the Anglo-French resolution on the six principles approved by Egypt and rejected the second part relating to the demands of the First London Conference demands. Lloyd thought that he could then start discussing "the Heads of [a future] Agreement" with Fawzi. (97) The French influence on the British benefited largely from the precarious situation of Eden and his Cabinet. In the Conservative Party, the radical Tories continued to attack the government for its weak policies, while the opposition condemned its sabre-rattling. Eden obviously played on the Anglo-French partnership as a guarantee of his Cabinet's determination. After the Paris summit of 26-27 September, Chauvel noticed how the British leaders needed to use the Entente Cordiale, particularly in the context of the careful wording of the final communique. (98) After the Paris meeting, The Daily Telegraph described Anglo-French solidarity as the only aspect of the Suez crisis that remained constant, except for Nasser's obduracy. (99) Nevertheless, this important Tory newspaper also launched a campaign against the United States, accusing it of having misled the two European countries, and reacted strongly to the public statements of Eisenhower and Dulles. (100) So strong was anti-American feeling in the Tory party that Sir Robert Boothby expressed again his deep disappointment about US policy in an open letter on 5 October. (101) Significantly, on 6 October, another Tory MP, Sir Ted Leather, made a violent indictment of the American attitude since the beginning of the Suez crisis. Eden, he said, had been "time and again betrayed by Mr. J.F. Dulles." Leather also denounced the concerted action of the State Department and the American oil companies to undermine the British position in the Middle East. (102) Of course, American diplomats in London guessed correctly that 10 Downing Street had authorized that speech. (103)

Thus, at the moment when an agreement with Egypt appeared to be close, Eden and his colleagues in the Cabinet faced the twin problems of the alliance with the French and a party torn in two about the idea of acting strongly in defiance of the United States. They particularly dreaded the possibility that, if they lost control of the situation, being "misled" again by Dulles, they would "justifiably be accused by the French of betraying them." (104) Furthermore, the settlement outlined during the tripartite talks in New York depended on the SCUA proving an effective organization. Yet, the United States had postponed taking any steps in that direction despite many entreaties by the British. Dulles only promised to have the transit fees paid to the association if both European countries would do so, making Lloyd remark: "With regard to the payment of dues, I have never seen anyone so anxious to denigrate his own child as Dulles with SCUA." (105) Of course Britain and France wanted to hold back most of the money collected, whereas the United States wanted almost all of it to be handed over to Egypt. Thus, even the solution found in New York remained very uncertain. The "special relationship" had proved non-existent, and France, no longer a junior partner, decisively steered British policy towards military action. Desperate for an initiative that could help him push the Suez issue into the background and, at the same time, appease the French, Eden even asked his senior civil servants to study the possibility of a political union with France. (106) After two and a half months of pugnacious posturing but ineffective diplomacy, he was under enormous pressure and at the mercy of the French. Stuck in a no-way-out situation, both international and domestic, Eden clutched at a straw on 14 October when Guy Mollet's envoys came in London with a scheme for a so-called police operation on the canal. (107)

(1) Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956 (London, 1978), p. 36; cf. Jacob Abadi, Britain's Withdrawal from the Middle-East, 1947-1971 (Princeton, New Jersey, 1982), pp. 61-63, 71.

(2) Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London, 1965), p. 191.

(3) David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961: From Colonial Development to the Winds of Change (Oxford, 1971), pp. 286-88, 290, 298; Robert J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips (London, 1968), pp. 111-13, 149; and Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues, pp. 290, 298. For a general study of the Suez Group's crucial action see my book, La genese de l'expedition franco-britannique de 1956 en Egypte (Paris, 2003).

(4) Leon Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, (Urbana, 1964), p. 41; Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues, p. 168.

(5) House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates [hereafter cited as CD], Vol. 549, 7 March 1956, G. Longden, Debate on Foreign Policy, col. 2190; "Exeunt the Bishops" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 10 March 1956.

(6) "Not the Man to Flatter" (editorial), The Daily Mail, 20 June 1956; "Fleshpot of Egypt" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 22 June 1956.

(7) "Out of steps over Middle-East," open letter from Sir Robert Boothby, The Daily Telegraph, 14 April 1956.

(8) Anthony Adamthwaite, << Eden, le Foreign Office et l'elaboration de la politique etrangere >>, Relations Internationales, No 55, automne 1988, pp. 286-87.

(9) National Archives (TNA): Public Recrod Office (PRO), Cabinet (CAB) 128/30, CM (56) 54th Conclusions, 27 July 1956, pp. 469-70.

(10) CAB 134/1216, EC (Egypt Committee) (56) 3rd Meeting, 30 July 1956, 23.

(11) Documents diplomatiques francais [hereafter cited as DDF], Nouvelle serie, Tome II: 1955-1958, ministere des Affaires etrangeres, Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques, (Paris, 1989), document [Doc.] 94, telegrams [tel.] 3132-140; Pineau, London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter cited as MAE], 30 juillet 1956, Conversations tripartites du 29 juillet 1956 entre Messieurs Lloyd, Murphy et Pineau, pp. 186-88; CAB 21/3092, Record of a Meeting between Messrs. Pineau, Lloyd and Murphy on 30 July 1956.

(12.) CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 6th Meeting, 31 July 1956, 47; DDF, doc. 99, tel. 3188-92, 31 July 1956, Pineau (London), to MAE., Entretien tripartite a Londres, 31 July 1956, pp. 195-97; CAB 21/3092, Summary Record of the Tripartite Conference Held in London from 29 July to 2 August 1956; Second Meeting, 30 July, 1956.

(13) TNA: PRO, PREM 11/1098, Record of a meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr. Dulles on 1 August 1956, pp. 183-85.

(14) CAB 21/3092, Summary Record of the Tripartite Conference, Seventh Meeting, 2 August 1956; PREM 11/1098, Memo from Foreign Office [hereafter cited as FO] to PM, "Suez Canal Company: Instructions to Employees," 2 August 1956, p. 154.

(15) PREM 11/1098, Record of a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Dulles on 1 August 1956, p. 184.

(16) PREM 11/1098, tel. 3358, Sir Anthony Eden to President Eisenhower, 27 July 1956, p. 371.

(17) PREM 11/1098, Letter from President Eisenhower to PM, 31 July 1956, pp. 218-19.

(18) "Eisenhower's Remarks and Secretary Dulles' Report on the Suez Situation," New York Times, 4 August 1956.

(19) President Eisenhower's Press Conference, New York Times, 9 August 1956.

(20) CAB 21/3092, Record of a meeting between Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Pineau held in the Secretary of State's room in the House of Commons, 30 July 1956; CAB 134/1216, EC(56) fourth meeting, 30 July 1956, p. 33.

(21) CAB 21/3092, Summary Record of the Tripartite Conference ... conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr. Pineau [before the first tripartite meeting], 29 July 1956; CAB 134/1216, EC(56) fourth Meeting, 30 July 1956; TNA: PRO, FO 371/118871 JE 1073/1, "France and the Middle-East", note of the FO for the Cabinet, 3 August 1956; FO 371/118871 JE 1073/1, Record of a meeting at No 11 Downing Street, 3 August 1956.

(22) FO 371/118871 JE 1073/14, "The Suez Canal Crisis" and "Anglo-French talks on the political aspects of possible intervention in Egypt," and 11 August 1956, talks held in Paris between Ambassador Jebb and Louis Joxe, Secretary- General of the French ministry of Foreign Affairs; FO 371/118871 JE 1073/4, tel. 224, Jebb to FO, 11 August 1956, Report on the meeting with the French held on 11 August 1956 in Paris; FO 371/118996/34, tel. 240, Jebb to FO, "Report on the Meeting with the French held on August 13, 1956, in Paris."

(23) FO 371/118871 JE 1073/16, "The Suez Canal Crisis" and "Conclusions reached at the Anglo-French talks held at the Quai d'Orsay on August 11 and 13 on the political aspects of possible intervention in Egypt" (undated).

(24) 52 J/l17, Fonds Paul Ramadier, tel. 832, 3 August 1956, the Financial Attache in London to the French Minister of Economy and Finance.

(25) FO 371/118996 JE 11924/9, Instructions to Major-General W. G. Stirling and Major General J.H.N. Poett, 5 August 1956.

(26) PREM 11/1094, pp. 211-13, Memorandum, "The use of force over Suez: possible Commonwealth attitudes," Commonwealth Relations Office, 9 August 1956.

(27) CAB 134/1216, EC(56)18th Meeting, Annex, 20 August 1956, p. 141.

(28) CAB 134/1216, EC(56)13th Meeting, 9 August 1956, pp. 101-2.

(29) CAB 134/1217, EC(56), 94, "Brief to the British Delegation to the London Conference," point 24; CAB 21/3092, Suez, Doc. 33, "Note on a meeting of the British Delegation to the London Conference," by H. Caccia; PREM 11 1099, CM(56) 59th Conclusions, Minute 2, 14 August 1956, p. 116.

(30) CAB 21/3092, Suez: Doc. 26, "Record of a meeting between the Secretary of State [Lloyd] and M. Dulles and their advisers at Lancaster House," 21 August 1956; DDF, doc. 143, << Compterendu de la reunion tripartite du 23 aout 1956 apres la cloture de la Premiere Conference de Londres >>, pp. 294-96.

(31) CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 20th Meeting, 23 August 1956 (Annex), pp. 155-56 and twenty-first Meeting 24 August 1956, p. 160.

(32) DDF, doc. 147. Compte-rendu de l'entretien franco-britannique du 24 aout 1956 a Londres, pp. 303-304.

(33) CAB 128/30, C.M (56) 62nd Conclusions, 28 August 1956, pp. 526, 528.

(34) PREM 11/1100, tel. 3931, 28 August 1956, message from the Foreign Secretary to J.F. Dulles, pp. 253-54.

(35) PREM 11/1100, tel. 633, 29 August 1956, p. 222. Sir Roger Makins, Washington, to FO, Report on a conversation with Mr. Dulles about the British request for support before the Security Council.

(36) PREM 11/1100, Letter from the President of the United States to the PM, 3 September 1956, p. 190.

(37) William Clark, From Three Worlds (London, 1986), pp. 185-86.

(38) PREM 11/1100, tel. 1828, 7 September 1956, pp. 66-64, and tel. 1833, 8 September, 52; Sir Roger Makins to FO, Report on a conversation with Mr. Dulles.

(39) PREM 11/1100, tel. 650, 8 September 1956, Sir Pierson Dixon, Head of the British Delegation to UNO to FO, p. 47.

(40) CAB 21/3093, tel. 1804, 4 September 1956, "Mr. Dulles' ideas about the user's club," Sir Roger Makins to FO; PREM 11/1100, tel. 1826, 7 September 1956, Sir Roger Makins to FO, Report on a conversation with Mr. Dulles.

(41) CAB 124/1210, tel. 4061, 6 September 1956, PM to President Eisenhower. PREM 11/1100, letter, 8 September 1956, President Eisenhower to PM, pp. 27-30.

(42) CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 26th Meeting, 10 September 1956, p. 203.

(43) PREM 11/1175, Note on the evolution of the American position on the Suez Canal Users Association, 26 September 1956, points 1 and 6.

(44) CAB 21/3092, "Summary Record ...", eleventh tripartite meeting, 2 August 1956; DDF, doc. 143, << Compte-rendu de la reunion tripartite du 23 aout 1956, apres la cloture de la Conference de Londres >>, pp. 294-96. M. Venkataramani, "Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy during the Suez Crisis 1956-1957," International Studies, II, (October 1960), pp. 107-08, 111, 132.

(45) CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 26th Meeting, 10 September 1956, p. 204.

(46) For example, Keith Kyle, Suez (London, 1991), pp. 144, 147, 188; Barry Turner, Suez 1956 (London, 2006), pp. 227, 252.

(47) PREM 11/1098, "Suez Canal Company's Instructions to Employees," Note, 2 August 1956, FO to PM, 154; DDF, doc. 107, tel. 3259-68, compte-rendu des discussions tripartites du 2 aout a 16 heures, point 2, 211-213; CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 12th Meeting, August 9 1956, 97; DDF, doc 147, Compte-rendu des entretiens franco-britanniques du 24 aout 1956 a Londres, pp. 303-04.

(48) CAB 21/3092, Suez, doc. 33, "Note of a meeting of the British Delegation to the London Conference in Sir Harold Caccia's Room at the F.O. on August 23rd 1956."

(49) CAB 128/30, CM(56) 62nd Conclusions, Minute 2, 28 August 1956, p. 528.

(50) PREM 11/1101, EC(56) 27th Meeting, 12 September 1956, p. 443.

(51) DDF, doc. 164, tel. 3820-3825, 4 September 1956, Jean Chauvel, French ambassador, to MAE. << Propositions britanniques [...] notamment a l'egard des pilotes >>, pp. 340-41.

(52) PREM 11/1101, EC(56) 27th Meeting, 12 September 1956, p. 443.

(53) PREM 11/1100, tel. 294, 9 September 1956, Jebb, Paris to FO, p. 23.

(54) Open letter from Julian Amery, The Times, 30 July 1956.

(55) See for instance, the leaders in The Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph, at the end of July and in August 1956.

(56) Conservative Party Archives (Bodleian Library, Oxford), Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, Middle-East Sub-Committee [hereafter cited as CRD] CRD/34/2, 30 July 1956; CRD2/34/2, Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee, 31 July 1956.

(57) CD, Vol. 557, 2 August 1956, Debate on Suez, Julian Amery, col.1701.

(58) The Daily Telegraph, 4 August 1956.

(59) FO 371/124443 WF 1051/64: Note of a conversation with Mr. Pineau, 3 June 1956; Note of a conversation with Mr. Lacoste, 4 June 1956 (notes sent to FO by J. Amery, 15 June 1956); open letter from Charles Waterhouse, Carrefour, 15 August 1956.

(60) CD, Vol. 557, 2 August 1956, Debate on Suez, Julian Amery, col.1700-1701. Also see H. Fraser, col. 1717.

(61) "Mr. Dulles Sees It Through" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 21 August 1956; and "Gleam of Sense from Nasser" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 29 August 1956.

(62) "Force in the Modem World" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 1 September 1956; "Cairo Prospects and After" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 6 September 1956; "Escapers' Club" (editorial), Time and Time, Vol. 37, No. 35, 1 September 1956; "The Simmering Cauldron" (editorial), 8 September 1956, Time and Time, Vol. 37, No. 35; "Lesson from the Rhineland," open letter from Sir Beverley Baxter, The Daily Telegraph, 11 September 1956.

(63) The Daily Telegraph, 12 September 1956; Clark, From Three Worlds, pp. 185-86.

(64) The New York Times, 14 September 1956; also see Eisenhower's press conference of 12 September (13 September).

(65) PREM 11/1102, Note from the Secretary of State, FO, 18 September 1956, p. 487.

(66) PREM 11/1102, tel. 308, 17 September 1956, Jebb to FO, note on a conversation with the French Foreign Minister before the Second Conference of London, p. 476.

(67) CAB 134/1217, EC(56) 49th Paper, Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet: Brief for the Suez Conference meetings, pp. 232-33.

(68) CAB 21/3093, Proceedings of the Second London Conference: 19 September 1956, p. 448; 20 September, p. 20; 21 September, 12, pp. 48-49.

(69) "Where Do We Go from Here," (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 22 September 1956.

(70) Lord Home, interview, 14 June 1988, DDF, doc. 212, tel. 4094-96, Chauvel to MAE, << Raisons de la decision britannique de saisir le Conseil de Securite dans l'affaire de Suez >>, 24 September 1956, pp. 445-48.

(71) Sir Anthony Nutting, interview, 14 June 1988; PREM 11/1102, tel. 1829, Foreign Secretary to Jebb (Paris), 22 September 1956, p. 421.

(72) CAB 134/1216, E.C.(56) 31st Meeting, Min. 2, 25 September 1956, 1-2, points a) and b).

(73) PREM 11/1102, tel. 1979, 22 September 1956, Makins (Washington) to FO, note on a discussion with J.F.Dulles about the appeal to the Security Council, p. 338; PREM 11/1102, note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer about a private conversation with J.F. Dulles the day before, 26 September 1956, p. 302.

(74) CAB 134/1216, E.C.(56) Fifty-fifth Paper, 22 September 1956, pp. 232-33.

(75) PREM 11/1102, tel. 2003, Makins to FO, 25 September 1956, note on a conversation between Messrs Dulles, Macmillan and Makins, p. 359; Tel. 2004, Macmillan to PM, 25 September 1956, note on a discussion between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and President Eisenhower, p. 354; Ibid., Macmillan, Report on a discussion with President Eisenhower held on 25-26 September 1956, p. 299.

(76) PREM 11/1102, tel. 4540, 1 October 1956, Message from the PM to President Eisenhower, p. 262; Press conference, Secretary Dulles, 2 October 1956 (unrevised oral version). The New York limes, 3 October 1956.

(77) PREM 11/1102, Letter from Sir Roger Makins to PM, 2 October 1956, pp. 248-49.

(78) PREM 11/1174, The Washington Post, 4 October 1956, p. 2.

(79) Press conference, Secretary Dulles, 2 October 1956. The New York Times, 3 October 1956.

(80) President Eisenhower's Press Conference held on 5 October. The New York Times, 6 October 1956; "Justice on Suez Urged by Dulles," Secretary of States' declaration to the press on 6 October 1956, 7 October 1956.

(81) The New York Times, 7 October 1956.

(82) PREM 11/1102, tel. 800-801, Note on a discussion held on October 5, 1956, in New York, between Messrs. Dulles, Cabot-Lodge, Phleger, Lloyd, Dixon, Laskey; Pineau, Cornut-Gentile, and Alphand, pp. 190-92.

(83) PREM 11/1549, Letter, Jebb to PM, 17 September 1956.

(84) PREM 11/1549, Dispatch, Jebb to FO, 17 September 1956.

(85) Clark, From Three Worlds, p. 191. Eden's public relations officer mentioned that after the Second London Conference, "Pineau seemed almost on the edge of dissolving the alliance."

(86) DDF, doc. 212, tel. 4090-4096, Chauvel to MALE, << Raisons de la decision britannique de saisir le Conseil de Securite dans l'affaire de Suez >>, 24 September 1956, pp. 445-48.

(87) CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 31st Meeting, Minutes. 2, 25 September 1956, p. 238.

(88) CAB 128/30, CM(56) 67th Conclusions, Minutes. 5, 25 September 1956, pp. 561-62.

(89) CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 32nd Meeting, Minutes 1, 1 October 1956, pp. 246-47; CAB 128/30, CM(56) 58th Conclusions, Minutes 11, 3 October 1956, p. 576.

(90) PREM 11/1102, tel. 1076, 8 October 1956, PM to Foreign Secretary (New York), "The Menon Plan," 162-69; tel. 1086, 9 October 1956, PM to Foreign Secretary, 149; tel. 814 and 819, 9 and 10 October, Foreign Secretary to PM, notes on the tripartite talks.

(91) CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 34th Meeting, 10 October 1956, p. 258; PREM 11/1102, tel. 1125, PM to Foreign Secretary, 11 October 1956, pp. 87-88.

(92) CAB 134/1216, EC(56) 58th Paper, "Record of a meeting held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.I., on Thursday, 11th 1956, at 12.30 PM," pp. 270-72; PREM 11/1102, note to Sir Guy Millard (Eden's Private Secretary), 12 October 1956.

(93) PREM 11/1102, tel. 1103, 10 October 1956, PM to Foreign Secretary, p. 107.

(94) DDF, doc. 229, tel. 4246-4251, 1 October 1956, Chauvel (London) to MAE, << La position du gouvernement britannique sur l'affaire de Suez >>, pp. 482-84.

(95) PREM 11/1102, tel. 1078, 8 October 1956, PM to Foreign Secretary (New York), p. 153.

(96) PREM 11/1102, tel. 854, 14 October 1956, Foreign Secretary to PM. Lloyd wrote: "but for his [Pineau] earlier attitude, we might have got an agreement by Friday [12 October] on a basis for negotiation," p. 16.

(97) PREM 11/1102, tel. 852, 13 October 1956, Foreign Secretary to PM, p. 12; tel. 854, 14 October 1956, p. 18.

(98) DDF, doc. 229, tel. 4246-51, 1 October 1956, Cahuvel (London) to MAE, "La position du gouvernement britannique sur l'affaire de Suez," pp. 482-84.

(99) "London, Paris and Washington" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1956.

(100) "London, Paris and Washington" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1956; "Communism in the Middle-East" (editorial), The Daily Telegraph, 6 October 1956; "45 Locomotives from U.S." (article), The Daily Telegraph, 8 October 1956; R.H.C. Steed, "Keeping up with Mr. Dulles" (article), The Daily Telegraph, 9 October 1956.

(101) Open letter from Sir Robert Boothby (dated from 5 October), The Daily Telegraph, 6 October 1956.

(102) Speech made in Chester by Sir Edwin Leather on 5 October. The Daily Telegraph, 6 October 1956; Clark, From Three Worlds, p. 194.

(103) Hugh Gaitskell, (ed. Philip M. Williams), The Diaries of Hugh Gaitskell (London, 1983), p. 618.

(104) PREM 11/1102, tel. no 1078, 8 October 1956, PM to Foreign Secretary (New York), p. 153.

(105) PREM 11/1102, tel. 847, 13 October 1956, Foreign Secretary to PM, point 2, p. 29.

(106) PREM 11/1352, GEN 552/second Meeting, Cabinet Meeting on Franco-British Union, 1 October 1956; PREM 11/1352, GEN 553/Official Committee/first Meeting, meeting on "Political Association with Europe," 4 October 1956.

(107) Christian Pineau, interview, 19 April 1988; Maurice Challe, Notre revolte (Pads, 1968); No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (London, 1967), p. 93.

Jean-Yves Bernard is an Associate Professor in the Department of History at Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Ontario. He received his PhD from Universite de Montreal. He has published works on Britain and France in 1950s international relations, particularly with respect to bilateral relations and to their policies in the Suez crisis. His current research project is an examination of the economic background of the Anglo-French wrangle regarding British entry into the EEC in the 1960s.
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Author:Bernard, Jean-Yves
Publication:Canadian Journal of History
Article Type:Report
Geographic Code:4EUUK
Date:Mar 22, 2009
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