A visionary ahead of his time: Howard Hughes and the U.S. Air Force--Part I: The Air Corps Design Competition.
Howard Hughes, was one of the greatest aviation personalities of the 20th Century. He was the only American to win the Harmon Trophy twice as the world's most outstanding aviator in an age when the public was captivated by airplanes and airmen. Hughes set a number of aviation records in planes that he built or modified, pioneered transcontinental air routes, was a major force behind one of the world's great airlines, and established an aircraft manufacturing concern that became one of the leading aerospace companies in the 20th Century. Though he won many awards and received numerous accolades from the aviation community, he is usually remembered as an eccentric, philandering billionaire who built the Spruce Goose.In 2004, The Aviator, released by the Miramax Film Corporation, re-awakened the public's interest in Howard Hughes. Some of the most spectacular scenes of this popular movie involved the crash of the XF-11, an experimental photo-reconnaissance plane built for the United States Army Air Forces by Hughes Aircraft. Howard Hughes was at the controls of the XF-11 on its maiden flight and was severely injured when it smashed into a residential area in Beverly Hills, California, while Hughes was attempting to make an emergency landing on a nearby golf course.
While information on the development of the XF-11 and the events leading up the crash are readily available, very little has appeared in print on Hughes earlier attempts to secure a production contract for a military version of the H-1 Racer or the privately funded D-2, which served as the prototype for the notorious XF-11. Even less has been written on how Hughes transformed Hughes Aircraft from an unsuccessful airframe manufacturer to a leading supplier of radar, electronic fire-control systems, and air-to-air guided missiles.
As the title suggests Howard Hughes was a visionary ahead of his time. Although he was a self-taught engineer with little if any formal training, Hughes embraced a broad range of cutting edge technologies that he applied in his various aviation projects. He was obsessed with streamlining and the need to fly ever faster, was enamoured with high altitude flight, and made use of the latest oxygen gear and meteorological expertise in his transcontinental record breaking flights. Hughes led the way in intercontinental air travel, pioneered the use of composite materials for aircraft construction, built the first "wide body" transport, and always made use of the latest in radio technology. In just twelve years--from 1935 to 1947Howard Hughes built and flew the fastest landplane in the world, set three transcontinental speed records, established a new record for around-the-world flight, and built and flew the largest airplane in the world. Along the way Howard Hughes garnered enough accolades for a lifetime including: two Harmon International Trophies, a Collier Trophy, the Ghanute Award, a Congressional Medal, the keys to several cities, and a ticker-tape parade down New York's Broadway.
But this story is about Hughes involvement with the U. S. Air Force, a relationship that spanned seventeen years. It began in 1935 when he submitted the design for the XP-2 pursuit plane and ended in 1953 when he gave all the patents, trademarks, and goodwill of the Hughes Tool Company's Aircraft Division, along with all of the stock of the newly established Hughes Aircraft Company to the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. In the interim Hughes Aircraft proposed four different aircraft designs to the Air Force, obtained a contract to develop the Falcon air-to-air missile, supplied the radar for the first all-weather Air Force jet interceptors, and build the first totally integrated airborne fire control system.
The article that follows is divided into three parts: Part 1, which appears in this issue of Air Power History, will discuss Hughes attempts to enter the military airframe business by entering the design competitions sponsored by the Army Air Corps in the 1930s. Part 2, which will appear in a future issue, will discuss Hughes attempts to sell high performance military aircraft to the Army Air Forces. A venture that culminated in the development of the XF-11, which some claim to be one of the most beautiful piston powered airplane ever flown even though it was obsolete by the time it was finally accepted by the Air Force in 1947. Part 3, will discuss how Howard Hughes's life-long interest in radio electronics led to the establishment of the electronics laboratory that laid the ground work for transforming Hughes Aircraft into the Air Force's premier supplier of radar, guided missiles and fire-control systems.
Part 1: The Air Corps Design Competitions
Howard Hughes involvement with the Air Force began in the spring of 1935 when he decided to enter the design competition for an experimental single-seat fighter. In January of that year, the Material Division of the Army Air Corps (predecessor to the U.S. Air Force), circulated proposals inviting the aviation industry to submit designs for one and two-place pursuit planes having an all-metal monocoque fuselage with cantilever monoplane wings. (1) The submittals were divided into two categories: a design competition to produce a concept aircraft that would form the basis for a long term development project, and a production contract competition to provide a sample aircraft that would become the prototype for the production of new Air Corps fighter. Entrants in the design competition did not have to build an aircraft. They only had to submit engineering data and preliminary drawings based on a comprehensive set of the specifications established by the Material Division for each type. Bids for the design portion of the competition were to be opened on May 6, 1935.
The design submitted by the Hughes team was a variation on the H-1 racer then under construction by another team of Hughes engineers working out of a leased warehouse building across the street from the Grand Central Airport in Glendale, California. (2) The idea for the H-1 was conceived while Hughes was attending the All-American Air Races in Miami, Florida, in mid January 1934. James R. Wedell, holder of the world's land plane speed record of 305 mph was there too. On January 12th, Wedell gave an exhibition flight in his record setting airplane, the Wedell-Williams 44, that involved three circuits of the event's 5-mile pylon racecourse. (3) Hughes was scheduled to fly the course himself in a few days and it is inconceivable that he would not have wanted to be present for the exhibition. Howard Hughes had an insatiable interest in the latest advances in aviation and would not have passed up an opportunity to observe Wedell's demonstration flight and examine the Model 44 up close. As will shortly become evident, Hughes was not impressed.
Two days after Wedell's flying exhibition, Hughes flew his highly modified Boeing 100A in the Sportsman Pilot Free-For-All race. Hughes won handily, nearly lapping his nearest competitor averaging 187.5 miles per hour over the 20-mile triangular course. (4)
Glenn Odekirk, Hughes' mechanic, was on hand to congratulate him. It was the first aviation prize to be won by Hughes.
"Hell Glenn, there isn't a decent plane in the lot," Hughes was purported to have said after the meet. (5)
"Howard," Odekirk responded, "you won't be satisfied until you build your own plane ..."
In the months that followed, Hughes studied the technical data flowing out of the aviation industry on proposed inventions and designs for increased speed. As Paul Matt, the noted aviation historian explained in his classic article on Howard Hughes and his racer, these "were busy months, with visits to Hartford to see what Pratt & Whitney had in the latest engines and a similar assessment at the Wright Aeronautical plant in Patterson, New Jersey." (6) While still in the East, Hughes sent a telegram to Dick Palmer in California asking the 30-year old engineer if he was willing to take on the task of designing the "fastest plane in the world."
Palmer, known for his advanced theories in aeronautical engineering, had further streamlined Hughes Boeing 100A after the Douglas Aircraft Company had finished modifying the plane to Hughes' specifications in 1931. Unhappy with Douglas's work, Hughes had taken it to the Lockheed Aircraft Company where Palmer was assigned the task of "cleaning it up." Palmer, who was now working for the Aircraft Development Corporation, agreed to take on the project on a part-time basis working in the evenings and during weekends. As the project progressed and the amount of work increased, Palmer chose to leave the Airplane Development Corporation in order to devote his full attention to the Hughes project.
In the early part of February, Palmer hired a small team of airplane designers and engineers to begin work on the wind tunnel models that he would use to validate the design for Hughes' Racer. Palmer had already discussed the choice of power plants with Hughes. Both men had agreed to use the new twin-row, 14-cylinder R-1535 Twin Wasp Junior engine developed by Pratt & Whitney. The engine, rated at 750-hp, had a relatively small frontal area that would significantly reduce the amount of drag produced by the engine.
In mid-April, Palmer and his six-man team were ready to begin testing the wind tunnel models that now included two different set of wings, two aft fuselage sections and tail surfaces, four mid-ship fuselage sections and five engine cowls. Palmer loaded the models in his old Ford and drove over to his alma mater, the California Institute of Technology, for testing in the Institute's 10-foot wind tunnel. The tests, which began on April 20, 1934, were conduced under the title of Palmer Racing Plane, assigned to the Hughes Development Company of Glendale, California, and continued until July 31, 1934. The results were checked by Dr. Theodore Von Karman, head of the Caltech Guggenheim's Aeronautical Laboratory and one the leading aerodynamicists in the world. (7)
By then Palmer's design team had moved into a warehouse building leased from aircraft dealer Charles Babb by the Hughes Aircraft Company. Hughes Aircraft had been formed in 1932 to provide a convenient means of funding the expenses associated with Hughes' personal aircraft and his interest in flying. (8) The company was a division of Hughes Tool Company, the cash cow that permitted Hughes to indulge in his various aviation endeavors and owned all of his aircraft. Hughes assigned Glenn Odekirk as shop superintendent and, in keeping with his well known penchant for secrecy, had a temporary plywood wall constructed around the work area and saw to it that an armed guard protected the building at night. (9)
The H-1 racer was still under construction when the Material Division released its circular letter of January 15, 1935, announcing the pursuit plane design competition. Without notifying Dick Palmer or his team, Hughes quietly gathered another small group of aviation experts to draw up a proposal for a military version of the H-1. By the end of April, Hughes' second team had prepared the preliminary drawings and a detailed set of specifications. It was similar to the H-1, except it was of all metal construction and had a higher aspect ratio, longer span, elliptical shaped wing. (10) The new design was designated the Hughes XP-2 for experimental pursuit, model 2. It had provisions for two machine guns in each of the wing fillets, which were larger than those on the H-1, and conformed to the military equipment requirements listed in Army Specification No. X-603 (Table I). (11)
When the bids were opened on May 16, 1934, the Hughes proposal (submitted under the Hughes Tool Company name) was one of sixteen designs offered to the Material Division by various firms. During the next five months several evaluating boards were convened at Wright Field to assess the merits of each design. The outcome remained in doubt until October 1, 1935, when the Wedell-Williams company was declared the winner of the design competition and awarded a study contract for a 4,350 pound fighter powered by a Pratt & Whitney R-1535 engine capable of 286 mph at 10,000 ft. (12)
The design submitted by the Wedell-Williams Air Service Corporation was based on the Model 45 racer, which had been enthusiastically endorsed by Capt. Claire L. Chennault, then an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School. Chennault inspected the new plane in February. He was impressed by "its extraordinary speed" and by the fact that it appeared to be readily adaptable as an interceptor. (13) No details of the Wedell-Williams design have survived and no records of the evaluations conducted by the Material Division been found, making it impossible to determine why the Wedell-Williams design--with a minimum speed contract requirement of 286 mph--was selected over the XP-2.
In all likelihood, the Material Division felt that the Wedell-Williams company was a more qualified airframe manufacturer. It had already built several successful racers and had been exchanging technical data with the engineers at Wright Field, whereas the Hughes Tool Company (at the time the evaluation was conducted) had never constructed a single airplane. In short, the Air Corps' engineers may have concluded that the Wedell-Williams design was more attainable. Ironically, the XP-34 never came to fruition, whereas the H-1, upon which the XP-2 was based, set new speed records under Hughes airmanship. (14)
While the Material Division was deciding against the XP-2, Hughes' team of engineers was secretly putting the finishing touches on the H-1 racer. On Friday, September the thirteenth-Hughes wasn't superstitious--Hughes piloted the H-1 to a new landplane speed record of 352 miles per hour. He made seven passes through the timing gates of the three-kilometer timing course that had been set up alongside the Eddie Martin Flying Field near Santa Ana, California, before his engine cut out for lack of gas. Hughes make a wheels up, dead stick landing in a nearby beet field that the official observers deemed sufficiently controlled for the record to stand.
The similarity between the XP-2 and the H-1 has never been fully understood, nor the reasons why the Army rejected the Hughes' design. Some writers have suggested that the H-1, like other racers of the era, where not designed for the high stress maneuvers required of Army fighters and "couldn't carry the weight of a combat type." (15) But the H-1 was "stressed for pursuit work," and was reported to be able to take 9 Gs in a dive. (16) It is true that R-1535 Twin Wasp Junior had been specially tuned to burn 100 octane gasoline boosting the engine's horsepower to between 900-1,000 horsepower, but engine technology was advancing rapidly and there is no reason why a military version of the H-1 built to the XP-2 design could not have been powered by the same R-1830 that was subsequently selected for the XP-34. (17)
One can only speculate as to the possible outcome had Hughes been selected in the design competition and then given the go ahead to develop a military version of the H-1 using the more powerful R-1830 engine. The design would have been finished well before the end of fiscal year 1936, giving the Material Division sufficient time to award Hughes a construction contract for an experimental model (XP) or service test model (YP) based on the XP-2 design. Had this aircraft proved successful, which is highly likely given quality of Hughes design team and the proven performance of the H-1, the Air Corps would have had its first 300 mph fighter a year earlier (Table II).
Having accomplished his goal of building the fastest airplane in the world, Hughes now set out to break Roscoe Turner's transcontinental speed record using a redesigned version of the H-1 modified with larger wings and a greater fuel capacity. (18) It would take several months, however, before the H-1 could be fitted out with the new wing. In the interim Hughes decided to attempt the record using Jackie Cochran's Northrop Gamma, leased at a price that Cochran could not to refuse.
The Gamma was taken over by Hughes in November and trundled into the "secret" hangar that housed the H-1. There, Palmer's crew went to work installing new gas tanks and a new 850-hp Wright R-1820-G5 Cyclone engine with a three-bladed constant speed propeller. The R-1820-G5 engine, which had a special high altitude supercharger under development for the Army, had not been released to the public and Hughes had to get special permission to use it. (19)
Hughes began the record-breaking transcontinental flight at 12:15 p.m. on January 13, 1936, when he took off from Burbank airport. Nine hours and 15 minutes later, he landed the Gamma at Newark Airport breaking Roscoe Tanner's transcontinental mark by 47 minutes. When interviewed by the press, Hughes, who was very modest about his flying achievements, refused to talk about himself referring only to the equipment he used and the results obtained.
He continuously gave credit to the United States Army Air Corps for permitting him to use the 1,000 hp Wright Cyclone engine, which was then on the restricted list, and insisted that the credit for the successful flight was due to his chief engineer, Richard Palmer, his factory superintendent, G. E. Odekirk, his meteorologist, W. C. Rockefeller, and his other employees. (20)
Hughes sought the Air Corps' help again in July when Albert Lodwick, Hughes' flight manager, requested the services of Lt. Thomas Thurlow to serve as the navigator on a flight that Hughes planned to make from Shanghai to New York in the DC-1 that he had recently purchased from Transcontinental and Western Air. (21) Thurlow, an expert in celestial navigation had just reported to Wright Field for assignment to the Instrument and Navigation Unit and could not be spared. (22)
On August 9 Hughes sent a wire to Brig. Gen. Austin W. Robbins, chief of the Material Division asking permission to land the next day at Wright Field so that he could stop and see him. (23) Hughes landed the DC-1, dubbed the "flying laboratory," at Wright Field at 5:44 p.m. on August 10 accompanied by a five man team that included Harry Conner, navigator: Richard Stoddard, radio operator: Harry Lund, flight engineer: W. C. Rockefeller, meteorologist: Al Lodwick, flight manager. (24) Hughes meet with General Robbins the next day to talk about the equipment that Hughes wanted for the long distance flight. (25) We don't know the details of their discussions, but it seems likely that Hughes requested Thurlow's assistance along with the use of the latest radio and navigation aids being developed by the Air Corps. The flight from Shanghai never took place, but Thurlow, with the Air Corps' permission, was part of the crew that participated in Hughes' record-breaking around-the-world flight of 1938. Hughes must have had very good relations with the folks at Wright Field, because they let him take along the Fairchild Maxon Line of Position Computer; the first time this confidential device had been permitted for civilian use. (26)
The August meeting with General Robbins is significant because it illustrates the close relationships that existed between Army aviators and their civilian brethren. There were relatively few people in aviation at this time and "direct communications and mutual trust were normal and instinctive." (27) As Brig. Gen. Benjamin S. Kelsey pointed out in his book The Dragon s Teeth, patriotism and integrity were the guiding principles behind the cooperation between the military and the civilian sectors. (28)
Although Hughes was busy preparing for both another transcontinental record and a future flight of long duration, he had not given up on getting the Army to accept a militarized version of the H-1. He justly claimed that it was the most aerodynamically efficient airplane ever built. "It has the lowest 'drag' any ship in the air," he explained to the press, adding that they were making changes to the H-1 that would make it more suitable for military use. (29)
Hughes had not given up on the aircraft business. He had assigned the task of managing Hughes Aircraft to J. B. Alexander. Alexander had given Hughes some of his first flight lessons before managing the air force that Hughes assembled to make Hells Angels. At the end of March 1936, Alexander wrote to Wright Field requesting "recent design studies of pursuit types ... in connection with investigations which we are making, particularly any multi-engined studies that might be available." (30) Lt. Col. Oliver P. Echols, chief of the Engineering Section responded on April 22, 1936, forwarding Alexander a series of Army design studies "selected because they indicate the trend in present day thought." (31)
Within a month, Hughes' team of engineers came up with the design for a two-engine pursuit that was good enough to be of interest to the Army. On May 26, Alexander went to Wright Field to brief Maj. J. G. Taylor on the Hughes Aircraft Company's proposal to build a twin-engine pursuit plane. Hughes Aircraft, Alexander stated, was ready to proceed with the final wind tunnel model testing and to undertake construction of a development prototype if the Army would give the go ahead. (32)
Major Taylor believed the design was good enough to warrant a development contract. "It would be to the advantage of the Government to enter into a limited competition development with this Company and one other," he wrote in a memorandum addressed to Echols. (33) Taylor felt that it was a waste of time and money for the Air Corps to issue a circular design proposal as planned. Design competitions in the past had "amounted to absolutely nothing," and would only result in the "Hughes's design ... being thrown into competition with many sketchy designs with unwarranted performance claims." (34)
Unfortunately for Hughes, the Air Corps had no money. In a long distance telephone call made on July 31, 1936, General Robbins informed Alexander that the President had impounded $250,000 of the Air Corps' development program. It was unlikely, he informed Alexander, that the Air Corps would be able to act on any development proposal until 1938 [fiscal year of]. (35)
If Hughes Aircraft wanted to produce a twin-engine pursuit for the Air Corps it would have to wait for the next year's design competition. In the interim the engineering staff continued to work on the design the Air Corps was now calling an "interceptor" airplane. The initial design developed by Hughes Aircraft incorporated two Curtiss V-1570 inline engines rated at 700 hp each. (36) It had an estimated top speed of 375 mph at 20,000 feet (310 mph at sea level) and would climb to 20,000 feet in 5 minutes. Although the design team had made "several reductions in the performance estimates based upon conferences with the Material Division," the Air Corps believed that the theoretical gross weight calculated by the Hughes engineers was over optimistic and that more reductions were necessary. (37)
Before these changes could be submitted for comment however, the engineers at Hughes began to make the changes that would be necessary for the new 1000-hp Allison V-1710 inline engine that the Material Division had decided to include in the circular proposal that they were planning to issue in January 1937. Lockheed and Vultee were developing their own proposals around this engine and had also submitted their designs to Wright Field for comment. Although the Lockheed Aircraft design, which was based on their Model 12 airplane, required "considerable modification in details to conform to Air Corps standards," it, like the designs from Hughes and Vultee were considered feasible and had performance characteristics that fell within the bracket considered satisfactory.
In January 1937, the Material Division issued Circular Proposal X-608 for a high-altitude interceptor, capable of 360 miles per hour at an altitude of 20,000 feet that could to 20,000 ft. in 6 minutes. The Allison V-1710, an inline liquid cooled V-12 engine, equipped with the new General Electric turbocharger for high altitude performance, was specified along with a tricycle undercarriage, large internal fuel capacity and a very heavy armament that included a 37 mm cannon and four 50-cal. machine guns.
After the bids were received, it became clear that the most promising design was that submitted by Lockheed Aircraft, with Hughes coming in a close second. Primary source records documenting how the evaluation was conducted have never been located, but other sources show that the Technical Subcommittee of the Board evaluating the twin-engine fighter interceptor design competition awarded the Lockheed Aircraft design a figure of merit of 65 percent, while the Hughes design received only 47.3 percent. The difference was attributed to " the greater high speed and shorter time of climb, which could be expected from the Lockheed design." (38) Lockheed Aircraft had won the competition and with it a contract to build one prototype (later designated as the XP-38).
In later years he would accuse Lockheed of stealing his design, but there is no evidence for this. (39) Even his design team felt that the Lockheed design was far superior. (40) After losing the interceptor design competition Hughes became obsessed with the idea of designing an airplane that "would be so sensational in its performance that the Army would have to accept it," but for the time being he was too busy pursuing other projects. (41)
That summer, Hughes quietly applied to the Bureau of Air Commerce in Washington, D.C. for permission to circumnavigate the globe. Not convinced that there was any scientific merit in such a flight, the Bureau turned him down. Characteristically, Hughes was not easily dissuaded, and with the help of Al Lodwick, continued to pester the Bureau for the needed approvals. (42) While he was waiting, Hughes continued to prepare his Sikorsky S-43 for the world flight that he planned to make at the end of May 1938. Always current on the latest aircraft developments, Hughes became interested in a new transport airplane, the Model 14 Super Electra that had just been introduced by Lockheed Aircraft. He had Hughes Aircraft order one of the planes on November 3, 1937. (43) Hughes took delivery of the plane on April 2, 1938.
Preparations for the world flight shifted to the Lockheed after the Bureau of Air Commerce declined to approve the Sikorsky for safety reasons. (44) With the scheduled time of the flight fast approaching, Hughes began to devote a great deal of time to the project. He usually arrived around noon, spent the entire afternoon working on the airplane, and continued long into the night, taking care of the many details that were associated with the forthcoming flight. (45)
The details of Howard Hughes' record setting round-the-world flight would fill many pages (see Howard Hughes: An Airman, His Aircraft, and His Great Flights by Thomas Wildenberg and R. E. G. Davies) and are beyond the scope of this article. It suffices to say that the flight, which took place between July 10-14, 1938, generated worldwide attention and acclaim for Hughes and his four-man crew that included Lt. Thomas L. Thurlow, co-navigator.
Thurlow, a recognized authority on aerial navigation, was a 33-year old Army flyer on leave from the Material Division at Wright Field where he was in charge of the Instrument and Navigation Unit. (46) A graduate of the Air Corps Technical School at Chanute Field, Illinois, he had taught navigation at Rockwell Field, California, and was the inventor of a number of navigation aids including a periscope drift indicator.
The Fairchild-Maxson Line of Position Computer used during the flight was developed and manufactured for the Army Air Corps by the Fairchild Aerial Camera Corporation and was used to simplify the calculations needed "for the reduction of celestial observations." (47) Thurlow described its use in a two page article that appeared in the Air Corps News Letter published on November 1, 1938.
As a result of the flight, Howard Hughes and the members of his crew were honored recipients of Collier Trophy for 1938. The highly prestigious award was bestowed for having made the most significant achievement in the advancement of aviation in that year. The citation accompanying the award stated that:
Their around-the-world flight involved notable advances in aerial navigation, communication and engineering; demonstrated the value of organization; and planning in long range aircraft operation and a world wide demonstration of the superiority of American aviation products and techniques. (48)
Although Howard Hughes had won worldwide acclaim as an aviator who had made notable contributions to aeronautical progress, Hughes Aircraft had yet to produce a commercially viable aircraft design. Howard Hughes was still searching for the proper mix of technology and market readiness needed for economic success.
As Charles Barton noted in Howard Hughes and His Flying Boat, "aviation success was an economic matter; an aircraft had to be marketable, which meant that it had to be useful to a significant number of aircraft buyers." (49) By 1939 it was apparent that such success in the near future would depend almost exclusively on building aircraft useful in war.
Still riled by the Army's selection of the Lockheed twin-engined interceptor, Hughes "decided to build from the ground up with my own money an entirely new airplane, which would be so sensational in its performance that the Army would have to accept it." This was to be the D-2.
NOTES
Note on Sources: Much of the information in published sources on Howard Hughes is contradictory, misleading, incorrectly dated, or taken out of context. I have tried to use primary source material whenever possible. There are many gaps in the official record however, and much of the most interesting and informative material on Howard Hughes' aviation career is anecdotal. I have selectively included such information only when it is in agreement with the historical record and Hughes persona.
(1.) Irving B. Holley Jr., Buying Aircraft: Material Procurement for the Army Air Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1964), p. 139; Ray Wagner, American Combat Planes of the 20th Century (Reno, Nevada: Jack Bacon & Co., 2004), pp. 274-75. In 1941 the U. S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) became the U. S. Army Air Forces, which in turn became the U. S. Air Force in 1947.
(2.) Paul R. Matt, "Howard Hughes and the Hughes Racer," Historical Aviation Album, Vol. XVI, (Temple City, California: Historical Aviation Album, 1980), pp. 9-10.
(3.) Reginald M. Cleveland, "Plane Hits Ground," The New York Times, December 13, 1934. [6th Annual All-American Air Races File, National Air and Space Archives, Washington, D.C.]
(4.) Charles Barton, Howard Hughes and His Flying Boat (Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.: Tab Aero, 1982), p. 34.
(5.) Matt, "Howard Hughes and the Hughes Racer," p. 9.
(6.) Ibid.
(7.) Telegram from Howard Hughes to Dr. Theodore Von Karman, dated September 18, 1935, thanking Von Karman for his cooperation and the wind tunnel predictions that agreed with the speed attained by the H1, Von Karman Papers, Institute Archives, California Institute of Technology; Charles Hoppe, "Breaking the Record," Aero & Airways, November, 1935, P.30-31 (copy in Howard Hughes File, American Institute of Aeronautics Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
(8.) Peter Mitcel, "Hughes Aircraft and Electronics," An exhibition from UNLV Special Collections, UNLV Libraries, Las Vegas, Nevada, http://www.library.unlv.edu/ hughes/pages/aircraft.html.
(9.) No outsiders were allowed in the hangar, neither was nay information given out. Hughes was extremely security-minded since Clarence Reed, an engineer employed by Hughes Tool Company, had walked out one day with some company blueprints and set up a rival drill bit manufacturing company (See Barton, Note 12, page 252).
(10.) Matt, "Howard Hughes and the Hughes Racer," p. 10.
(11.) "Detailed Specification for Model XP-2 Airplane Type Single-Engine, Single Place Pursuit," dated April 28, 1935, Hughes Collection, Florida Air Museum (hereafter XP-2 specification).
(12.) Ray Wagner, American Combat Planes (New York: Hanover House, 1960), p. 275; Birch Matthews, Race with the Wind: How Air Racing Advanced Aviation (Oscela, Wis.: MBI Publishing, 2001), p. 105. The alleged visit by J. B. Alexander to Wright Field in August 1935 has numerous errors and is unlikely to have occurred as described. Instead, its likely that those relating the event, as described in Matt's article, had in mind the visit made the following year. There is no evidence that the so-called misunderstanding caused a rift between Howard Hughes and Lt. Col. Oliver P. Echols, then chief of the Engineering Section at Wright Field. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that Howard had very good relations with Echols, otherwise he would not have gotten the Army's cooperation in his future flights, nor would Echols have later recommended the procurement of the D-2 (see Echols to Arnold memo of May 27, 1942 in official project history).
(13.) Claire L. Chennault to Chief of the Air Corps, February 14, 1934, Wedell-Williams Folder, RD-3284, U.S. Army Air Forces Research and Development Files, National Archives, College Park, Md. (hereafter Sara Clarke Collection).
(14.) Jimmy Wedell was a seat-of-the-pants designer, engineer and builder who had long term financial backing from Louisiana millionaire Harry Williams. Jimmy, his brother Walter and Harry Williams were all killed in airplane crashes before the XP-34 design could be brought to fruition.
(15.) Ray Wagner, American Combat Planes of the 20th Century, (Reno, Nevada: Jack Bacon & Co., 2004), p. 275.
(16.) Hoppe, "Breaking the Record," p. 31.
(17.) After awarding the contract to the Wedell Williams company, the Army realized that the performance of the Wedell plane would be inferior to either the Seversky Sev-1 or the Curtiss Model 75 that had been submitted in the production competition. This led to a negotiated contract calling for the use of the 850-hp Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp R-1830 twin-row radial engine and a speed of 308 mph. The death of Harry Williams, the sole survivor of the Wedell-Williams team, on May 19, 1936, forestalled further work on the XP-34 and the company was unable to complete the contract.
(18.) According to The New York Times article "World Speed Mark Set by Coast Flier," of September 14, 1935.
(19.) The New York Times, January 15, 1936; New York American, January 15, 1936.
(20.) U.S. Air Services, April 1937, p. 26.
(21.) A1 Lodwick to Brigadier General A. W. Robins, telegram dated July 7, RD-3277, Sara Clarke Collection.
(22.) Transcript of long distance call to Washington dated July 8, 1936, Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3277, Sara Clarke Collection; "Hughes' Flight Navigators and Navigation Procedure," Aero Digest, August 1938, p. 63.
(23.) Howard Hughes to General A. W. Robbins, telegram dated August 9, Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3277, Sara Clarke Collection.
(24.) "Hughes Lands in Ohio Non-Stop From Coast," The New York Times, August 11, 1936.
(25.) Flight Tribune, August 11, 1932.
(26.) "Hughes' Flight Navigators and Navigation Procedure," Aero Digest, August 1938, p. 63; "Hughes Tested Army Robot Navigator; First Use of Device on a Civilian Plane," Army Times, July 15, 1938.
(27.) Benjamin S. Kelsey, The Dragon s Teeth (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Press, 1982), p. 94.
(28.) Ibid., p. 107.
(29.) The New York Times, April 26, 1936.
(30.) J.B. Alexander, Manager, Hughes Aircraft Company, to Wright Field, March 31, 1936, Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3406, Sara Clark Collection.
(31.) Oliver P. Echols to J. B. Alexander, April 12, 1936, Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3406, Sara Clark Collection.
(32.) J. G. Taylor to O. P. Echols, Conference on Two-Engined Pursuit Airplane Design, May 27, 1936, Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3406, Sara Clark Collection.
(33.) Ibid.
(34.) Ibid.
(35.) Transcript of long distance telephone call between General Robbins and Mr. Alexander, July 31, 1936, Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3406, Sara Clark Collection.
(36.) A.W. Robins to Chief of the Air Corps, Two-Engine Interceptor Designs, November 11, 1936, Twin Engine Interceptor Folder, RD-3305, Sara Clark Collection.
(37.) Ibid.
(38.) Barton, Howard Hughes and His Flying Boat, p. 49.
(39.) In the four-month period between the Alexander's telephone conversation with General Robbins and the circular proposal, Hughes was forced to lay off some of his engineers who then went to work for Lockheed. In 1947 while testifying before Congress, Hughes insinuated that Lockheed had gotten the idea for two-engine fight from his former employers.
(40.) Untitled manuscript, Project III Binder [hereafter D2 Project Book], no page numbers, Howard Hughes Collection, Florida Air Museum, Lakeland, Florida
(41.) U.S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program Hearings. 80th Congress, 1st Session, Part 40: Aircraft Contracts (Hughes Aircraft Co. and Kaiser-Hughes Corp.), p. 24370.
(42.) Donald L. Bartlett and James B. Steele, Empire: The Life, Legend, and Madness of Howard Hughes (W.W. Norton, 1979), p. 89.
(43.) Robert E. Gross, President to Hughes Aircraft Company, confirmation letter signed by Noah Dietrict, November 3, 1937, Hughes Collection, Florida Air Museum.
(44.) Bartlette and Steele, Empire, p. 90.
(45.) "Round-the-World Flight," p.3, Project II Notebook, Howard Hughes Collection, Florida Air Museum, Lakeland, Florida.
(46.) "Hughes' Flight Navigators and Navigation Procedure," Aero Digest, August 1938, p. 63.
(47.) "Hughes Tested Army Robot Navigator; First Use of Device on a Civilian Plane," Army Times, July 15, 1938, p.2; John D. Peace, Jr., "The Fairchild-Maxon Line of Position Computer," Aero Digest, August 1938, p. 67.
(48.) New York Times, November 17, 1939.
(49.) Barton, Howard Hughes and His Flying Boat, p. 45.
Thomas Wildenberg is the co-author of Howard Hughes: An Airman, His Aircraft and His Great Flights (Paladwr Press, 2006). He is a former Smithsonian Fellow having served successive terms as a Ramsey Fellow at the National Air and Space Museum in 1998 and 1999. Mr. Wildenberg is the recipient of a number of awards recognizing his scholarship. These include the Surface Navy Association Literary Award, the Edward S. Miller History Award, and the John Laymen Award.
Table 1 SPECIFICATIONS X603 Desired Minimum (1) High speed at 10,000 feet 325 260 (Design useful load) m.p.h. (2) Operating speed, 285 225 at 10,000 ft, m.p.h. (3) Endurance at operating speed at 10,000 ft (with design useful load and 1/3 of the full 3 hours 3 hours load required for the specified endurance, as an overload (4) Take off characteristics to clear a 50 ft obstacle with design useful load within, feet 500 1500 (5) Service ceiling 30,000 25,000 (design useful load) feet (6) Time to climb 10,000 ft (with 3 min. 5 min. design useful load) (7) Stalling speed Time 60 65 to climb 10,000 ft (8) Path angle 10 ° 10 ° (9) Rate of climb (sea level) 2200 2200 Source: "Detailed Specification for Model XP-2 Airplane Type Single-Engine, Single Place Pursuit," p. 21A. Table II Hughes Tool Co. Ltd. Model XP-2 PERFORMANCE Full speed at 10,000 feet 347 mph Stalling speed at sea level 70 mph Climb in 10 minutes from sea level 22,000 ft. Service ceiling 31,000 ft. Endurance at full speed 1.61 hrs. Endurance at (economical) cruising speed 2.57 hrs Range at full speed 560 miles Range at economical cruising speed 1,553 miles High speed at 10,000 ft. 347 mph Endurance at operating speed at 10,000 ft. with design useful load and 1/3 of the full load required for the specified endurance, as an overload, in hours Max. Min. 5.67 2.57 Take off characteristics to clear and land over a 50 ft. obstacle with design useful load within 541 ft. (no wind) Service ceiling (design useful load) 31, 700 ft. Time to climb to 10,000 ft. 4 min. Stalling speed 70.5 mph Path angle 17 degrees Rate of climb at sea level 2500 ft. per minute. Source: "Detailed Specification for Model XP-2 Airplane Type Single-Engine, Single Place Pursuit," p. 21.
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| Author: | Wildenberg, Thomas |
|---|---|
| Publication: | Air Power History |
| Article Type: | Biography |
| Geographic Code: | 1USA |
| Date: | Sep 22, 2007 |
| Words: | 6531 |
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