Metaphysics and Contingency: Borges, Schopenhauer, Heidegger.

In the well-known story by Jorge Luis Borges about the library of Babel, an unnamed protagonist finds himself existing in an infinite library. Or at least it is ostensibly infinite; there is no way to empirically prove its endlessness; on the contrary, William Goldbloom Bloch argues that given the parameters established by Borges, one can quite easily calculate the number of distinct individual books at a minimum of 251,312,000 books (17). Whilst unimaginable, the number of distinct books itself is finite. If the library is infinite, then it necessarily repeats itself, as the number of distinct books cannot be infinite. Borges's narrator himself ventures this hypothesis at the end of the story that "La biblioteca es ilimitada y periodica," but neither is there any way to prove this thesis, as to do so would require a subject to reach the end of one entire iteration of the library. In other words, empiricism becomes insufficient and any understanding of the nature of the library becomes metaphysical. The library consists of hexagonal rooms stacked on top of one another, as far as can be perceived and is illuminated by the light proceeding from spherical fruits bearing the name of lamps. "Hay dos en cada hexagono: transversales. La luz que emiten es insuficiente, incesante" (1: 866). These last two words--insufficient and incessant--used to describe the light illuminating the library are symptomatic of the problem of metaphysics developed throughout the story. Moreover, they are symptomatic of post-Kantian metaphysics in general.

Metaphysics (specifically I am referring to metaphysica generalis), at least as it is conceived within the Western tradition since Kant, has always been insufficient in providing us with any real understanding of the world, and yet despite this it has also been incessant. Even the post-Kantian philosophers who hope to bring an end to metaphysics often find themselves trapped within it. Heidegger writes that Nietzsche brought about the "completion of metaphysics" (Vollendung der Metaphysik), but even Heidegger's own philosophy will struggle at times to rid itself of the yoke of metaphysics {Poetry, Language, Thought 98). Metaphysics is simultaneously impossible and yet so deeply ingrained that it seems we cannot even think without involuntarily presupposing it. The purpose of the following inquiry is to explore, through Borges, how we arrived at this paradox, what it means, and whether or not there is a way forward beyond metaphysics. As such it will draw upon the philosophies of Kant, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, and also more contemporary responses to this crisis in metaphysics such as that of Quentin Meillassoux.

As Borges continues his description of the library of Babel, he arrives at the actual content therein stored: "A cada de los muros de cada hexagono corresponden cinco anaqueles; cada anaquel encierra treinta y dos libros de formato uniforme; cada libro es de cuatrocientas diez paginas; cada pagina, de cuarenta renglones; cada renglon, de unas ochenta letras de color negro. Tambien hay letras en el dorso de cada libro; esas letras no indican o prefiguran lo que diran las paginas" (1:861). The content of these books, in turn, consists of spaces, periods, commas, and the twenty-two letters of the Spanish alphabet. Additionally, no two books are identical. The purpose of the library, it is therefore alleged, is to register every possible combination of letters and words. "De esas premisas incontrovertibles dedujo que la Biblioteca es total y que sus anaqueles registran todas las posibles combinaciones de los veintitantos simbolos ortograficos (numero, aunque vastisimo, no infinito) o sea todo lo que es dable expresar: en todos los idiomas" (1:863). This is merely the interpretation of one of the librarians, and it is entirely possible that he errs. One might retort that if indeed the library is not infinite, then it does not truly express everything there is to express. Another might retort that expressions of other languages are not fully translatable into the Spanish alphabet and punctuation. Even if these criticisms of the librarian's theory were to be true, they do little, if anything, to solve this more pressing epistemological question: How are we to navigate between information that is actually true and that which is simply white noise? Regardless of whether or not the library is truly infinite, it contains a massive amount of systematically produced information, so much so that it effectively behaves as if it were infinite. Here, the words as if (als ob) are emphasized because of their relation to the philosophy of Hans Vaihinger, by whom Borges was considerably influenced. So, some of the information systematically produced by the books in the library will, by sheer chance, correspond with the world. In other words, the information contained by these books is entirely contingent, and represents every possible entelechy of this contingency. The question is: How may the librarian distinguish the contingent information that describes reality from the contingent information that does not?

At first glance this question is, as mentioned, epistemological. It seeks to determine what information is knowable and how knowledge is to be organized. Yet, upon closer examination of this question, we perceive that in order to engage with it epistemologically we must first address a more foundational metaphysical question, namely: What system, beyond that which we may perceive by empirical standards, might allow us to decipher the riddle of the library? The reason this question becomes metaphysical, at least in the case of the library, is because there is no empirical structure inherent to the library that allows people born into that system to decipher it from within. The only thing that exists is clues, and these clues take the form of what is immediately perceivable at-hand in the library, particularly what is written within the books.

Before restating this question, let us first examine why it is necessary that we even speak of a system beyond empirical standards being necessary for the deciphering of the library. We can do this by examining the deficiencies of those empirical standards. The narrator gives us some indication as to why. "En algun anaquel de algun hexagono (razonaron los hombres) debe existir un libro que sea la cifra y el compendio perfecto de todos los demas: algun bibliotecario lo ha recorrido y es analogo a un dios" (1: 864). But there is a problem with this book. The problem is not whether or not it exists, although this too could be placed in doubt based on the presuppositions made about the essence of the library. Rather, the problem would be how one is even able to locate this book, and subsequently how one would know that it is true and not coincidence or deception. In other words, since the information provided by all books is contingent, how can we determine that the contingent information in one specific book is veridical or at the very least more plausibly veridical than the equally contingent information of other books. Well, goes the logic, if another book exists that corroborates the validity of that book, or at the very least tells where it is located, then this is a start. Of course this soon becomes a regressus ad infinitum, as the narrator indicates. "Alguien propuso un metodo regresivo: Para localizar el libro A, consultar previamente un libro B que indique el sitio de A; para localizar el libro B, consultar previamente un libro C,y asi hasta lo infinito..." (1:864).

Additionally, we may add, how are we to know with certainty that these books claiming to be the keys to deciphering the library are true? Perhaps they merely have the outward appearance of a deciphering code but contain a few small inconsistencies that invalidate it (again, how would we be able to know these inconsistencies are inconsistencies?). It is worth remembering that the library may contain every combination of letters. Thus, if it contains a book with the correct code, it certainly contains a book with an incorrect code that nevertheless has incredible verisimilitude. So, one must corroborate the code in order to eliminate verisimilar facsimiles. In order to corroborate the apodicticity of the code, it is necessary to check it against some other standard, which itself is confronted with the same problems. Regarding verisimilitude, Borges writes in the essay "La postulacion de la realidad," that "la imprecision es tolerable o verosimil en la literatura, porque a ella propendemos siempre en la realidad" (1: 395). The heart of this is a very Kantian thesis. Our conceptions of reality itself are, by nature, verisimilar postulations of reality. If we could perceive reality in its totality, it would not correspond to our verisimilar postulations of it, which are the phenomenological world. The plausibility of these code books in the library is based on their verisimilar, not their necessary, articulation of the order of the library. In other words, they lack apodicticity.

It is impossible, by definition, to corroborate apodicticity through empiricism, as apodicticity refers to necessary logical structure. The modality of the judgment of the truth of the book is, in Kantian terms, at best assertoric and at worst problematic. But what is demanded of the book is that it be necessarily true. For Kant himself, apodictic is only that which refers to necessary laws and forms of the mind {Gesetze des Verstandes) and not to exterior, metaphysical structures (110-15). The problem of the library is that it demands an apodictic metaphysics in order to be navigable, which cannot be deduced from the interiority of the mind of the subject.

METAPHYSICAL PREPARATION

In order to best situate ourselves in what we mean by metaphysics, it is necessary to locate the metaphysical tradition from which Borges is writing. In his essay on William Henry Hudson (or Guillermo Enrique Hudson), he writes how "Hudson refiere que muchas veces en la vida emprendio el estudio de la metafisica, pero que siempre lo interrumpio la felicidad" (2:102). Commenting on this, Zulma Mateos writes that "Borges, evidentemente, no tuvo la misma suerte" (78). For David E. Johnson, "Borges underscores the importance of the problem of time and identity by repeatedly insisting that time is the fundamental problem of metaphysics" (25). His analysis focuses mainly on "Funes el memorioso," however the emphasis on time and metaphysics sets up for the discussion of Heidegger here. Carlos Ulises Moulines supports this, explaining how Borges's metaphysics on time is drawn through Schopenhauer, and through Schopenhauer, Calderon de la Barca (182-87). And so despite the point of view of Cordua--which is corroborated by Balderston--that "el estudio de la obra de Borges confirma que alli no se trata de filosofia" (118), it is evident that an understanding of Borges's text is only made possible through an engagement with metaphysics. As Julio Prieto would retort, "el gesto de devaluar la metafisica y subordinarla a la literatura invierte con exactitud el hecho de que la literatura fantastica de Borges es facilmente concebible como una ramificacion de la metafisica de Macedonio" (198).

The importance of Schopenhauer in Borges studies is well known; even to write this sentence is already effectively redundant. However, most if not all critics have failed in truly exploring the philosophical consequences of Schopenhauer's metaphysics in Borges, likely because they do not know where to begin. The most pertinent clue, if we are to speak of writings as clues to influence, comes from a minor story from El libro de arena entitled "Undr." The story, in a sentence, is about a poet of the Germanic tradition who learns that all the events that the poets sing about are encoded into a single word. He is told: "Ahora no definimos cada hecho que enciende nuestro canto; lo ciframos en una sola palabra que es la Palabra" (3: 51). The narrator searches for this word for years. Eventually he returns to the skald that told him about this Word, who finally tells him that the word is "Undr, que quiere decir maravilla" (3:52). Outside of Borges, this word appears in at least one fundamental text of post-Kantian metaphysics that we know Borges read with utmost attention: Schopenhauer's essay in the second volume of The World as Will and Representation entitled "On Man's Need of Metaphysics" (Das metaphysiche Bedurfnis des Menschen). Admittedly, this essay by Schopenhauer, much like his entire philosophy, is not without contradiction. Nevertheless, within the essay--and even within the very contradictions of the essay--there is revealed something quite interesting about the post-Kantian's relationship with metaphysics.

First is the discussion of Wander. Little imagination is required to understand that the word Undr, in Borges, is extracted from Schopenhauer's use of the word Wunder. Schopenhauer writes that the will-to-live in its objectification (which is to say, reflective human consciousness) "[m] arvels at its own works, and asks itself what itself is. And its wonder is the more serious, as here for the first time it stands consciously face to face with death, and besides the finiteness of all existence, the vanity and fruitlessness of all effort force themselves on it more or less. Therefore with this reflection and astonishment arises the need for metaphysics that is peculiar to man alone; accordingly he is animal metaphysicum" (2:160). Being a disciple of Kant, Schopenhauer of course rejects the possibility of an apodictic metaphysical doctrine. Still, he recognizes quite astutely that in the face of death and the finiteness of existence man is overcome by a sense of wonder that causes him to interpret the world in metaphysical terms, even if this metaphysics cannot be logically supported. He draws upon the Greek [phrase omitted] through Plato to support this claim of Wunder being the road to metaphysics. In his assertion that this emotion is linked with time, the finiteness of existence, and death, he even seems to preempt Heidegger. As a result, there is presumably no need for an objective or apodictic system of metaphysics to exist for Schopenhauer's claim to be true. Man ineluctably thinks the world metaphysically, regardless of whether or not there is any ground to thinking the world metaphysically.

This metaphysical impulse, as Heidegger will later mention, is rooted in the need to provide a ground for experience. Schopenhauer says succinctly: "By metaphysics I understand all so-called knowledge that goes beyond the possibility of experience, and so beyond nature or the given phenomenal appearance of things, in order to give information about that by which, in some sense or other, this experience or nature is conditioned, or in popular language, about that which is hidden behind nature, and renders it possible" (2:164). Again, this does not mean that such an order behind things actually exists, only that the presupposition of such an order exists within our perception of our being-in-the-world. Indeed, Schopenhauer seems to acknowledge this when he states that "no one metaphysical system can suffice at all." Ultimately, Schopenhauer does believe that the Will is both knowable and also metaphysical, so he does not necessarily support this thesis that metaphysics is inherently self-contradictory and inexistent.

The ultimate reason why Schopenhauer thinks that metaphysics is actually viable beyond just an epistemological presupposition is due to his reading of Kant. In his interpretation of Kant, the difference between metaphysics and physics

rests on the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself. Just because Kant declared the thing-in-itself to be absolutely unknowable, there was, according to him, no metaphysics at all, but merely immanent knowledge, in other words mere physics, which can always speak only of phenomena, and together with this a critique of reason which aspires to metaphysics. (2:173)

Schopenhauer, by contrast, believes the phenomenological world to flow from the Will, and that the Will is the thing-in-itself, which the intellect is capable of shining a light upon. The rationale for this is not always clear and oftentimes contradictory, so it need not be elaborated here, as Schopenhauer's important contributions to metaphysics contradict his ultimate desire to establish the Will as a metaphysical ding-an-sich.

Grammar may be a useful comparison. There is no apodictic grammar, and yet, in order for our sentences to be understood, we must presuppose some form of grammar, otherwise they would be indecipherable. But grammar is evasive and, much like metaphysics, it is impossible to pin down anything apodictic about it. In this way grammar is contingent, meaning that it can manifest itself in any number of equally valid ways, but none of these ways are necessary. At the same time, it is presupposed in our use of language. One may ask, what is the grammar (metaphysics), presupposed in what I am saying, that allows what I am saying to even be articulable at all? The question itself is evasive, circular. Metaphysics (or grammar) does not precede speech, yet upon speaking it becomes presupposed, which is to say it is treated as if it did in fact precede speech. The problem here is entwined with the metaphysical problem of post-Humean causality. Just because language presupposes grammar, this does not mean grammar precedes language.

The last major concept that appears in Schopenhauer to be introduced here is that of contingency, as hinted at in the preceding paragraph.

The contradictory opposite, in other words, the denial of necessity, is contingency. The content of this concept is therefore negative, and so nothing more than absence of the connexion expressed by the principle of sufficient reason. Consequently even the contingent is always only relative; thus it is contingent in relation to something that is not its ground or reason. Every object, of whatever kind it be, e.g., every event in the actual world, is always at the same time both necessary and contingent; necessary in reference to the one thing that is its cause; contingent in reference to everything else. For its contact in time and space with everything else is a mere coincidence without necessary connexion; hence also the words chance, contingency, [phrase omitted], contingens. Therefore an absolute contingency is just as inconceivable as an absolute necessity, for the former would be just an object that did not stand to any other in the relation of consequent to ground. The inconceivability of such a thing, however, is precisely the content of the principle of sufficient reason negatively expressed. This principle, therefore, would first have to be overthrown if we were to conceive an absolute contingency. (1:463)

The word in German, it ought to be noted, is Zufalligkeit, and not Kontingenz. Kontingenz, or Contingens, only appears when Schopenhauer lists the synonyms and related words. This may be important because Heidegger will later employ the word Zufdlligkeit in his writings, and in Heidegger the distinction between Latin and Germanic words is always of crucial importance.

The importance of this passage on contingency brings us back to Borges. As before, I propose that Borges takes this as the basis for the fantastic worlds that he writes, however, unlike Schopenhauer, he goes beyond the principle of sufficient reason into a world of absolute contingency. Let us take Quentin Meillassoux's definition of contingency:

the term "contingency" refers back to the Latin contingere, meaning "to 
touch, to befall," which is to say, that which happens, but which 
happens enough to happen to us. The contingent, in a word, is something 
that finally happens--something other, something which, in its 
irreducibility to all pre-registered possibilities, puts an end to the 
vanity of a game wherein everything, even the improbable, is 
predictable. (108)

The German Zufalligkeit shares this sense of "befalling to us" with its Latin counterpart. As such, both represent that which is possible--but by no means necessary--that finally befalls. This befalling happens to some subject, as indicated by Meillassoux. Such contingency is everywhere in Borges; though our purpose mostly concerns "La biblioteca de Babel," "El jardin de senderos que se bifurcan" is likewise an apposite text. Ts'ui Pen, the author of the eponymous book,

creia en infinitas series de tiempos, en una red creciente y 
vertiginosa de tiempos divergentes, convergentes y paralelos. Esa trama 
de tiempos que se aproximan, se bifurcan, se cortan o que secularmente 
se ignoran abarca todas las posibilidades. No existimos en la mayoria 
de esos tiempos; an algunos existe usted y no yo; en otros, yo, no 
usted; en otros, los dos. En este, que un favorable azar me depara, 
usted ha llegado a mi casa; en otro, usted, al atravesar el jardin, me 
ha encontrado muerto; en otro, yo digo estas mismas palabras, pero soy 
un error, un fantasma. (1:1067)

These possible worlds are contingent, or rather, the one that finally befalls is contingent because it could have been otherwise than it is. This paradigm of possible realities is the same as the contingency in "La biblioteca de Babel." Let us remember that the books contained in the library contain--at least in theory--every possible expression that language can fabricate. Any one book can contain any one combination of letters, but it is not necessary that any one book be limited to a reduced set of combinations of letters. We remember that many, nay countless, books in the library are filled with gibberish. The infinite possibilities of the books in the library represent every possible contingency. Even those books which contain only gibberish are possibilities that can be found within the library. Necessity does not regulate that only those books which are decipherable may exist. The books which are read by the librarians represent those which finally "befall." No law of necessity demands that any one particular book be read, or that any one particular book be discarded or overlooked. Ultimately, each book is selected randomly. Even if a librarian selects a book on purpose, that purpose is grounded in information supplied by other books, which are equally contingent. Therefore each book, regardless of whether or not it accurately represents the code to decipher the library, has an equal chance of being picked up and beheld as true. This is absolute contingency.

ONTO-THEO-LOGY

As a result of this metaphysics and contingency we can return to the problem articulated above pertaining to how one may know whether a given book in the library of Babel contains the keys to deciphering the library. Again, this problem is metaphysical insofar as the apodicticity of a given book, supposing it is indeed the book to "befall," cannot be deduced from within the world (Welt) that the metaphysics contained in the book would then theoretically describe. As Borges describes, this process becomes regressive. We recall, in order to prove the contents of book A, one would have to verify this with book B and so on. This process goes on until we arrive at the fundamental problem of not only metaphysics but also of ontology. Specifically, the problem of ontology posited by Heidegger. It is also why, for the German ontologist, metaphysics becomes onto-theology.

First, let us cover the problem of ontology. In no place is the problem more succinct than in his lecture on Identity and Difference, although it is necessary to read this in conjunction with all of his writings in order to grasp the profundity of this problem.

Metaphysics thinks of beings as such, that is, in general. Metaphysics think of beings as such, as a whole. Metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the ground-giving unity of that is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that accounts for the ground, that is, of the All-Highest. The Being of beings is thus thought of in advance as the grounding ground. Therefore all metaphysics is at bottom, and from the ground up, what grounds, what gives account of the ground, what is called to account by the ground, and finally what calls the ground to account. (58) (1)

From this Heidegger goes on to explain how the -logy, and Logia from which it is derived,

is the totality of a nexus of grounds accounted for, within which nexus 
the object of the sciences are represented in respect of their ground, 
that is, are conceived. Ontology, however, and theology are "Logies" 
inasmuch as they provide the ground of beings as such and account for 
them within the whole. They account for Being as the ground of 
beings... Thus they are more precisely called onto-logic and 
theo-logic. More rigorously and clearly thought out, metaphysics is: 
onto-theo-logic. (59) (2)

Ontology thinks the ground of beings and therefore must presuppose Being as the ground of beings. This does not mean, we must reiterate, that it is at all logically valid to affirm the Being behind beings. It means only that this is the way in which thought organizes itself, and that this presupposition must be made in order for it to maintain its logical validity. The whole problem with ontology, particularly after Heidegger, is how to bring those presuppositions into unconcealment, and, moreover, what to do when those presuppositions are proven to be themselves ungrounded. In other words, how do we, firstly, meaningfully come to understand that our metaphysical way of interacting with the world is fraught with onto-theo-logical bias, and, secondly, what do we do when that onto-theo-logical ground for beings is itself proven to be groundless; is itself proven to be an abyss (Abgrund)?

The librarians of Babel encounter this same problem and their responses, predictably, are onto-theo-logic in nature. The narrator provides a list of the various superstitions that are presupposed in order to provide order to the library. "Durante mucho tiempo se creyo que esos libros impenetrables correspondian a lenguas preteritas o remotas" (1: 862). Later came the idea, as mentioned, that "la Biblioteca abarcaba todos los libros" (1:863). It is no coincidence that this theory, metaphysical because it asserts a fact about the structure of the library, is then immediately met with theological jubilation: "El universo estaba justificado, el universo bruscamente usurpo las dimensiones ilimitadas de la esperanza. En aquel tiempo se hablo mucho de las Vindicaciones: libros de apologia y de profecia, que para siempre vindicaban los actos de cada hombre del universo y guardaban arcanos prodigiosos para su porvenir" (1: 863). The notion of a metaphysical order provides ontological justification for the universe (which is synonymous with the library). This ontological justification of the universe becomes theological, almost out of necessity, because ostensible access to these ontological codes inscribes a prophetic ordering to the library; it inscribes in it theological purposiveness. This onto-theological justification of the library leads to the hope of "la aclaracion de los misterios basicos de la humanidad: el origen de la Biblioteca y el tiempo" (1:863). There is something Heideggerian about this sentence. The reason for this is because it prefigures the tautology that rests at the bottom of every ontology. Now that a metaphysical order has been assumed to be discovered, the question then turns towards the origin of this metaphysical order. Now that God has been presupposed to absolve us of our epistemological uncertainties, we must now posit some origin to God, and so on. The other mystery is time, because time is the horizon behind which Being is concealed.

Eventually, however, like all theological pursuits, the librarians come up short, inaugurating "una depresion exesiva." Such was the depression that "una secta blasfema sugirio que cesaran las buscas y que todos los hombres barajaran letras y simbolos, hasta construir, mediante un improbable don del azar, esos libros canonicos" (1: 864). It is possible, no doubt, that this blasphemous sect actually does hit upon the solution to the riddle of their existence. But even if they were to randomly create the correct code, their artificial book, written by human hands, would then be subjected to the same uncertainties to which the other books of the library are subjected. How would one prove it does contain truth ? Ultimately, this would be impossible, and the truth would have to be taken on faith, as metaphysical standards continue to fail us. This is effectively the beginning of religion, or more accurately, the doctrine of faith necessary for the justification of Western religions. A strange paradox has here arisen regarding the emergence of religion. This paradox is that faith (religious onto-theo-logy, i.e. metaphysics) has emerged precisely as a result of the impossibility of any metaphysics. Quentin Meillassoux, who is critical of this tradition, writes that

the end of metaphysics, understood as the doctrine of 'de-absolutization' of thought, is thereby seen to consist in the rational legitimation of any and every variety of religious (or poetico-religious) belief in the absolute, so long the latter invokes no authority beside itself. To put it in other words: by forbidding reason any claim to the absolute, the end of metaphysics has taken the form of an exacerbated return of the religious. Or again: the end of ideology has taken the form of the unqualified victory of religiosity. (45)

It would be a mistake to equate Meillassoux's philosophy to that of Heidegger, as we shall later see. But here there is overlap. The end of apodictic metaphysics paves the way for theology because every metaphysical doctrine has, in the end, the same probability of being valid, precisely because there is no empirical way to verify the validity of such metaphysical doctrines. Meillassoux will seek to overcome this by proposing an end to correlationism, but for now this can be put aside. The importance of the above quote is that it shows how metaphysical skepticism makes way not for empiricism, but rather for fideism. We see this not only in the turn to religion within the Borges's account of the library of Babel, but also in our own world.

But let us continue with the doctrines that arise within the "La biblioteca de Babel."

Afirman los impios que el disparate es normal en la biblioteca y que lo razonable (y aun la humilde y pura coherencia) es una casi milagrosa excepcion. Hablan (lo se) de "la Biblioteca febril, cuyos azarosos volumenes corren el incesante albur de cambiarse en otros y que todo lo afirman, lo niegan y lo confunden como una divinidad que delira". Esas palabras que no solo denuncian el desorden sino que lo ejemplifican tambien, notoriamente prueban su gusto pesimo y su desesperada ignorancia. En efecto, la Biblioteca incluye todas las estructuras verbales, todas las variaciones que permiten los veinticinco simbolos ortograficos, pero no un solo disparate absoluto. (1:865)

In the light of every contingency, which is to say every combination of letters, being equally possible in the library, no one combination can be deemed nonsense. The labyrinth of the post-metaphysical (and potentially postmodern) era is such not because we have lost Theseus's string (which is a metaphor for metaphysics), but rather because every path seems to contain this clue (one recalls that clue originally meant the thread used to guide Theseus out of the labyrinth). It's not that we haven't a clue, to use the turn of phrase, but rather that everything is a clue. Alfonso de Toro writes about Borges in conjunction with postmodernism, and he makes brief mention of the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo (42-43). Vattimo writes that the history of western philosophy is the weakening of metaphysics, but it is possible to go further follow this line of thought through to its logical end, paralleling the above analysis of Borges. This means that in the ultimate weakening of metaphysics, everything becomes metaphysical. The last of the doctrines that emerges in the library is the one shared by the protagonist. Faced with the twin absurdities that the library can neither be limited nor infinite, he suggests that "La biblioteca es ilimitada y periodica. Si un eterno viajero la atravesara en cualquier direccion, comprobaria al cabo de los siglos que los mismos volumenes se repiten en el mismo desorden (que, repetido, seria un orden: el Orden). Mi soledad se alegra con esa elegante esperanza" (1: 866). Various possibilities can be ascribed to this doctrine. For one, it corresponds to the doctrine of eternal return, to which, even for all of its contradictions, Borges eternally returns ("Yo suelo regresar eternamente al Eterno Regreso") (1:727). But there is a logic at the base of this doctrine that is even more fundamental, and that is the logic of the tautology. This is prefigured by the narrator's statement that "[h]ablar es incurrir en tautologias" (1:865). Indeed, the tautology is everywhere in Borges's writing. In "Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote" it is described that Menard is able to premediate the (re)writing of the Quijote, and even write it, "sin incurrir en tautologia" (1: 845). The logic of the tautology is linked to the ontology of the text itself.

The fact that the library repeats itself tautologically is crucially important for its identity. Borges says that the library repeats itself (se repite), and this is important if we continue to consider Heidegger. For Heidegger, the problem of identity is also this repetition of the same to itself. His point of departure is Plato's sophist. This is particularly important after Kant. "Since the era of speculative Idealism, it is no longer possible for thinking to represent the unity of identity as mere sameness, and to disregard the mediation that prevails in unity" (Identity and Difference 25). (3) The repetition of something to itself or the thinking of something to itself is important because it posits that identity (the repetition of Being to itself) is not a characteristic of Being, but rather the grounds on which Being thinks itself to itself. This ground is itself not grounded ontologically but rather is emergent from an event, i.e. the event of identity. "The doctrine of metaphysics represents identity as a fundamental characteristic of Being. Now it becomes clear that Being belongs with thinking to an identity whose active essence stems from that letting belong together which we call the appropriation. The essence of identity is a property of the event of appropriation" (Identity and Difference 39). (4) In the context of the library, we can think it this way: the essence of the library is not its repetition (identity), but rather it is its repetition (identity) that makes the library thinkable. In other words, the identity of the library is not the metaphysical ground for its existence, but is instead contingent upon the iterability of thought and language. Its identity is contingent, because any one doctrine could plausibly describe the library, and thus there is no apodeictic identity. Thought is the ground for this contingency because it thinks Being to itself; it thinks the library to itself. This tautology (of the thing thought to itself), also called identity, is emergent from the library, but is not itself its fundamental characteristic because it is contingent and therefore not necessary.

In review, metaphysics arises out of the sense of wonder (Wunder) produced by the sense of groundlessness of the world into which Dasein is thrown (geworfen). Metaphysics then immediately becomes onto-theo-logy, not necessarily because there is any validity to theology, but rather out of compulsion. Dasein is not able to grasp the totality of beings (Seiende), because it is trapped within the horizon of time, which is the horizon of Being. The totality of Being cannot be grasped by beings as this would require transcending the temporal dimension in which being finds itself. If it is to grasp the totality of beings, it must reach out beyond this horizon, beyond death itself, and posit an entity, outside of beings (Seiende), that transcends the temporal dimension to provide a synthetic totality to Being (Sein). In no place is this entity born of logical necessity. Indeed, there is no logical foundation or grounding for the existence of such an entity. It is born as a presupposition in order for our Western metaphysics to have a ground upon which it may base itself. Thus it is necessary for any subsequent claims of logical necessity but is not itself born of logical necessity. In Borges this is the library, which ideates and reiterates itself as Being, the ground for beings. The logical identity of the library is tautological. As it is tautological, it is therefore contingent upon thought and language, which always may be otherwise than they are. The Being of the library (Being is synonymous with the library; the phrase is itself tautological) is therefore itself fundamentally contingent.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTINGENCY

What are the consequences of such a radical contingency? The most immediate effect has been the destabilization of metaphysics. With the loss of metaphysics, we find ourselves lost in a labyrinth typical of Borges in which every contingent possibility becomes equally possible and undecipherable; unverifiable. The minotaurs that we face in this labyrinth are relativism, cynicism, and nihilism. Relativism, because each contingent possibility seems to be equally true; cynicism, because there is no way to prove or disprove any of these contingent possibilities through experience; nihilism, because these two preceding animals have shown us the groundlessness of Being and brought us face to face with the abyss. What can our response to this be? For Borges, as for Schopenhauer before him, the only response that one can have when faced with this abyss is pessimism. Pessimism is the doctrine that they are inevitable. One may try to fight them as a tragic hero would, but cannot ultimately triumph. The only thing that truly awaits is oblivion.

But is this the only possible response to the completion of metaphysics and the world of absolute contingency? Quentin Meillassoux attempts to point to a way out. Whether or not he is correct is too great a task for the remainder of this essay, and will need to be further explored in continuation, however it would be a disservice to omit mention of it as a possible alternative.

Meillassoux's position centers upon abandoning the correlationism of the post-Kantian epistemologies. "Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another. Not only does it become necessary to insist that we never grasp an object 'in itself, in isolation from its relation to the subject, but it also becomes necessary to maintain that we can never grasp a subject that would not always-already be related to an object" (5). He astutely refutes the notion that this is a Copemican revolution in philosophy, as a Copernican revolution would affirm the existence of the outside object independent from the subject. Instead, he calls this a Ptolemaic counter-revolution. But how does he hope to accomplish this? The first step is in proving the absolute contingency of the world. This is entirely in line with what I have suggested in my analysis of "La biblioteca de Babel," although the way by which he arrives at the contingency of the world is considerably different. Likewise, he identifies the same problem in metaphysics that is present in my analysis of Babel. Namely, that the destruction of metaphysics has led to fideism and the current epistemological crisis. By proving the absolute contingency of the world, he hopes to move through facticite (a word imbued with the philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre) and towards factualite (a neologism) as the new limit of thought.

our abolition of metaphysics will only have served to resuscitate religiosity in all its forms, including the most menacing ones. So long as we construe facticity as a limit for thought, we will abandon whatever lies beyond this limit to the rule of piety. Thus, in order to interrupt this see-sawing between metaphysics and fideism, we must transform our perspective on unreason, stop construing it as the form of our deficient grasp of the world and turn it into the veridical content of this world as such--we must project unreason into things themselves, and discover in our grasp of facticity the veritable intellectual intuition of the absolute. "Intuition", because it is actually in what is that we discover a contingency with no limit other than itself; 'intellectual' because this contingency is neither visible nor perceptible in things and only thought is capable of accessing it, just as it accesses the chaos that underlies the apparent continuity of phenomena. (Meillassoux 82)

This would, at least in theory, paint a way out of the era of speculative idealism of which Heidegger speaks, and instead point towards a speculative materialism.

It seems likely that this debate in philosophy will be fundamental for its future. Whether Meillassoux is correct, and whether Borges's fictions offer support or resistance for his rethinking of epistemology after the completion of metaphysics, is yet to be seen.

In light of this crisis in metaphysics, which is also a crisis in onto-theo-logy, Meillassoux's assertion that we must find some way beyond metaphysics seems more pertinent than ever. Indeed, at least in the ivory tower of the philosophers, the inability to overcome this need, Bedufnis, of metaphysics seems to allow only for skepticism and its more serious deformations of relativism and cynicism. Yet the question remains: is going beyond metaphysics possible by postulating the absolute contingency of the world. It is true that we must overcome metaphysics if we are to avoid a new epoch of relativism and nihilism, but, as Kant proved regarding Descartes's ontological argument, we cannot impose existence upon something born of thought, as thought itself is contingent (for the same reason that the identity of the library is contingent: it could be otherwise, or not at all). The fact that we need a way beyond metaphysics does not a fortiori make this way extant. And so here more work must be done to ascertain whether there is a way out of this crisis of metaphysics and our pensiero debole, as Vattimo calls it. Yet we cannot disregard that perhaps the pessimism of Schopenhauer and of Borges is well founded, and that in the end there may be no way out of metaphysics, even if this signals our oblivion.

"La biblioteca de Babel," like many of Borges's stories, is grounded in his skepticism, which, in turn, is deeply rooted in his pessimism. It is a revenge of Berkeley's philosophy in which only what is perceived is what exists, but in which everything has an equal chance of being perceived. The ultimate skepticism that results renders all information useless, as all order corresponds to the transcendental analytic, rather than metaphysics proper. What the story demonstrates is that modernity, despite existing in a world of post-Kantian metaphysics, is unable to establish order without recurring to metaphysics, resulting in absolute skepticism. While this might not be immediately dangerous to those in scientific disputes, it is something that seems inevitable in the study of phenomenology and also rhetoric. The only escape from this skepticism would be to go beyond the physical dimension entirely. I repeat the words that close "La biblioteca": "Si un eterno viajero la atravesara en cualquier direccion, comprobaria al cabo de los siglos que los mismos volumenes se repiten en el mismo desorden (que, repetido, seria un orden: el Orden). Mi soledad se alegra con esa elegante esperanza" (1: 866). Our only hope is metaphysical, and yet metaphysics is inaccessible for Dasein, which, simply put, would cease to be Dasein were it to go beyond its physical limitations. Our only hope is metaphysics, and yet, for us, metaphysics can never exist.

Alexander James Gannuscio

Cornell University

WORKS CITED

Balderston, Daniel. Borges: realidades y simulacros. Buenos Aires: Editorial Bilbos, 2000.

Borges, Jorge Luis. Obras completas. 3 vols. Edicion critica, edited by Rolando Costa Picazo e Irma Zangara, Buenos Aires, Emece, 2011.

Bloch, William Goldbloom. The Unimaginable Mathematics of Borges' Library of Babel. Oxford, Oxford UP, 2008.

Cordua, Carla. Luces oblicuas. Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Nacional Andres Bello, 1997.

Heidegger, Martin. Poetry, Language, Thought. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

__. Identity and Difference. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

Johnson, David E. Kant's Dog: On Borges, Philosophy, and the Time of Translation. Albany: SUNY Press, 2012.

Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990.

Mateos, Zulma N. "Raices filosoficas en la obra de Jorge Luis Borges". Iberoromania 41 (1995): 66-78.

Meillassoux, Quentin. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Translated by Ray Brassier. New York: Bloomsbury, 2008.

Muolines, Carlos Ulises. "El idealismo mas consiguiente segun Borges: La negacion del tiempo." Jorge Luis Borges: Pensamiento y saber en el siglo XX, edited by Alfonso de Toro y Fernando de Toro. Frankfurt/Main: Klaus Dieter Vervuert, 1999.179-87.

Prieto, Julio. "'Viajeras razones': metafisica y fantasia o el extrano caso de Macedonio y Borges." Variaciones Borges 20 (2005): 197-213.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Translated by E.F.J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications, 1969.2 vols.

Toro, Alfonso de. Borges infinito. Borges virtual. Hildesherm: Georg 01ms Verlag, 2008.

(1) "Die Metaphysik denkt das Seiende als solches, d. h. im Allgemeinen. Die Metaphysik denkt das Seiende als solches, d. h. im Ganzen. Die Metaphysik denkt das Sein des Seienden sowohl in der ergriindenden Einheit des Allgemeinsten, d. h. des uberall Gleich-Gultigen, als auch in der begriindenden Einheit der Allheit, d. h. des Hochsten uber all em. So wird das Sein des Seienden ais der grundende Grund vorausgedacht. Daher ist alie Metaphysik im Grunde vom Grund aus das Grunden, das vom Grund die Rechenschaft gibt,ihm Rede steht und ihn schliefilich zur Rede stellt" (125).

(2) "ist jeweils das Ganze eines Begrundungszusammenhanges, worin die Gegenstande der Wissenschaften im Hinblick auf ihren Grund vorgestellt, d. h. begriffen werden. Die Ontologie aber und die Theologie sind "Logien", insofern sie das Seiende als solches ergriinden und im Ganzen begrunden. Sie geben vom Sein als dem Grund des Seienden Rechenschaft... Demgema[beta] hei[beta]en sie genauer Onto-Logik und Theo-Logik. Die Metaphysik ist sachgema[beta]er und deutlicher gedacht: Onto-Theo-Logik" (126).

(3) "Seit der Epoche des spekulativen Idealismus bleibt es dem Denken untersagt, die Einheit der Identitat als das blo[beta]e Einerlei vorzustellen und von der in der Einheit waltenden Vermittelung abzusehen" (ID 88).

(4) "Die Lehre der Metaphysik stellt die Identitat als einen Grundzug im Sein vor. Jetzt zeigt sich: Sein gehort mit dem Denken in eine Identitat, deren Wesen aus jenem Zusammengehorenlassen stammt, das wir das Ereignis nennen. Das Wesen der Identitat ist ein Eigentum des Er-eignisses" (ID 103).

[Please note: Some non-Latin characters were omitted from this article]

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Title Annotation:	Jorge Luis Borges' "The Library of Babel"; Arthur Schopenhauer, Martin Heidegger
Author:	Gannuscio, Alexander James
Publication:	Variaciones Borges
Article Type:	Critical essay
Geographic Code:	1USA
Date:	Jan 1, 2021
Words:	7649
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