Operation Dixie: labor and civil rights in the Postwar South.
Supporters of segregation did not usually defend the racial system before the white public in these terms. Appeals to white fears of the "mongrelization" of the "races" that would result from "social equality" between white and black, or accusations that civil rights supporters were closet communists, made far more unifying themes than did drawing the attention of the white population to the question of who had what economic stake in the racial system, as journalist Wilbur J. Cash pointed out.(2) Many white workers did believe they had a stake in segregation, for this system placed black workers at their disposal as "helpers," reserved the best-paid jobs for whites, and generally placed whites in a position of social superiority over blacks. At the same time, however, it could be well demonstrated that the racial division of labor, far from enriching the white worker, undermined unions, pulled down wages for everyone, and helped to keep Southern workers among the poorest in the United States. Economic elites did not draw attention to the economic basis of segregation for the very reason that some whites did much better than others by keeping black people down, and some whites did not seem to benefit from it at all.(3)
Industrial unionists had long sought to convince white workers that they had more to gain by joining together with black workers than by trying to keep them down, but egalitarian organizing efforts had been repeatedly defeated by appeals to whites to place their supposed racial interests above their class interests. During the 1930s, under auspices of the CIO, Southern workers engaged in unionization drives which often brought blacks and whites together in support of common economic demands, usually within and sometimes outside the normal confines of segregation. During these years, blacks often joined the CIO with little hesitation, while black churches provided a meeting place and organizing base for the CIO when many whites turned it away; such experiences caused many in the CIO to conclude that the cause of civil rights for black people and the right of workers to organize were inseparably bound in the South.(4) White working-class understanding of the economic costs of segregation, however, remained key to union success or failure.
In the postwar era, historic possibilities for breaking down the color barriers which divided Southern industrial workers seemed to be at hand. Previous experiences set the stage for the development of an interracial labor movement, but World War 11 had established the practical basis for organizing success. The war significantly interrupted the assault of Southern employers against unionization, particularly in growing urban manufacturing centers such as Birmingham and Memphis. Industrialization and urbanization changed the economic face of the South, along with the depression-era collapse of cotton tenancy and the increasing displacement of cotton as king." The number of Southern industrial workers jumped from a pre-war 1.6 million to 2.4 million in August 1945. Under the sponsorship of the War Labor Board and other federal agencies, the government enforced minimum wages, union security and minimal job rights for the first time. Southern CIO membership expanded to 400,000 by the war's end, and for the first time at least some Southern politicians and members of the news media treated the organization with respect and courtesy. The CIO at the national level also had more power than ever before, as the result of massive membership gains, the election of a number of Democratic candidates thought to be sympathetic to labor, and unprecedented federal enforcement for the right of unions to exist.(5)
Based on war-time developments, the CIO and its allies in the liberal community envisioned the postwar period as one of rapid advances in living standards, education, economic security, political rights and union organization for Southern workers. Former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt felt "the era of the low standard of living and low labor costs is probably rapidly drawing to an end." Lucy Randolph Mason, a publicist and civil rights trouble-shooter for the CIO, thought many Southern white workers had come to accept blacks into their unions as equal partners. Southern liberals and civil rights leaders recognized the CIO as the most promising vehicle for the achievement of black rights prior to the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education, Topeka, Kansas decision to breach the walls of segregation. Already, Mason remarked, "the CIO has brought more hope for progress to Negroes than any other social institution in the South." Mason and other Southern liberals saw the CIO as the key to expanding the New Deal's agenda and to the creation of a New South, one that would be unionized and free of segregation.(6)
A second Southern "popular front," extending from the war into the postwar years, seemed to place labor and liberal organizations in a position to implement such dreams. The interracial and liberal Southern Conference for Human Welfare, a staunch CIO ally, had its most rapid expansion in 1945-1946, and in coalition with the CIO's Political Action Committee mapped a postwar strategy to bring organized workers, the African-American community, and liberals into a majority coalition. This formation would eliminate the poll tax, enfranchise blacks and poor whites, and remove the Southern bourbons who held back developments in the South and, together with the Republicans, blocked progressive legislation in Congress.(7) Highlander Folk School in Tennessee had experienced a doubling of the number of workers in its courses in the last year of the war and had trained thousands of CIO members in trade union philosophy and action. After the war, Highlander boldly determined to hold all its programs on an interracial basis and continued to expand its operations. The Southern Conference, Highlander and the CIO all enjoyed a solid partnership in 1946.(8)
For their support for labor rights and interracialism, Highlander and the Southern Conference had been continually attacked in the media as "communist," but the CIO repeatedly defended both organizations against such attacks. War-time unity had deflated the "communist" charge; as one Georgia worker at Highlander's 1945 session commented, "we used to fall for this redbaiting stuff, but now we know what it's used for" - to divide the labor movement. All three organizations were also moving toward more open resistance to segregation at the end of the war, as Allan S. Haywood, Director of Organization for the CIO, indicated at the closing session of Highlander's CIO summer school in 1945. "We must stamp out all forms of discrimination," he said, for "only with a unified movement based on equal rights" could labor's attempt to organize the South succeed.(9)
In short, many industrial union supporters envisioned a movement to overturn the old order in the South in the immediate postwar years, and they had built the institutions that could make that happen. Such plans were by no means completely divorced from the realities of working-class consciousness. Returning enlisted men expected better wages and working conditions and improved standards of living. Black veterans especially fought back against the daily discrimination of Jim Crow and armed themselves for defense against police and vigilante violence, as in the Columbia, Tennessee, race not in February 1946. White veterans likewise expressed hostility to prevailing conditions in the South. In Athens, Tennessee, the GI Non-Partisan League ran a slate of candidates to oust the corrupt city machine allied with political boss Edward H. Crump in Memphis. After a six-hour gun battle over impoundment of the city's election ballots by the authorities, white GI's nearly lynched the sheriff and his men for having shot in the back a black supporter of the GI ticket. Many white veterans supported the CIO, and together with black veterans they formed a strong basis for the CIO's plans to organize the South.(10)
Thc CIO in early 1946 attempted to bring together the forces for change in the South under the banner of its Operation Dixie campaign, the single largest labor organizing drive ever undertaken in the South. Operation Dixie made rapid and considerable gains in the years immediately following the war. In the summer of 1946 the CIO reported ten new locals affiliating per week and twenty affiliating per week by September; the CIO reported enrolling 280,000 new members at the end of the first year of the campaign, and 400,000 new members by the end of the first year and a half. Tennessee led the way with 70,000 to 85,000 new members by February 1947. Some 22,000 new members were reported in North Carolina, 15,000 in Alabama, 14,500 in Texas and 7,000 in Virginia. The CIO also made important breakthroughs in Arkansas, where membership doubled, and in Mississippi, where the CIO took the important Masonite plant away from the American Federation of Labor with the aid of black workers.(11)
Under the leadership of the Food, Tobacco and Agricultural (FTA) workers' union, the CIO organized among the poorest and most neglected Southern workers, namely the tobacco and cotton-press workers of the Carolinas, West Tennessee, and Arkansas. In the second year of Operation Dixie, FTA won 111 elections covering 15,000 workers in the South, second only to the International Woodworkers in the number of organizing victories in the early months of the Southern campaign. Besides making major organizational advances, in the postwar years CIO voters contributed to the election of Estes Kefauver in Tennessee, Jim Folsom in Alabama, Frank Porter Graham in North Carolina, and other progressive Democrats.(12)
The CIO's initiative in taking advantage of the demands of the working class for organization and political change had also spurred the AFL to undertake its own Southern drive, which focused heavily on blacks. The AFL stressed cooperation between employers and unions and the "communist" domination of the CIO as its two main themes, and its red-baiting had a serious impact with many Southern white workers, if not with blacks. But the AFL's own Southern campaign lasted little more than a year. (13) The CIO Executive Board took pains to note that, in contrast to the AFL, it neither recognized nor practiced segregation and united workers on the basis of full equality. The CIO claimed great membership gains, and advertised Operation Dixie not only as a campaign for trade union rights, but as a crusade against poverty, racism, and bigotry.(14)
Unfortunately, neither Operation Dixie's gains nor its record on anti-discrimination proved to be as great as official statements implied. Postwar unemployment and the drain on the treasuries of CIO unions during the national strike wave of 1946-1947 undermined financial support for the Southern drive and at the same time set off a barrage of anti-unionism. If blacks and liberal whites recognized the importance of the CIO to the fight against segregation, Southern business and landed interests did so as well. Labor's use of the picket line, marches, boycotts and the joining of white and black workers as allies threatened the social and economic basis of segregation. If the CIO achieved some of its political objectives - ending the poll tax, passing social legislation for the masses, removing reactionary Southern political leaders - segregationists understood that their system would be doomed. Hence, when the postwar strike wave and Operation Dixie both hit in 1946, they re-invigorated attacks on the CIO which had been dormant during the war.
Supporters of the old order emphasized not simply the race issue, however, but the CIO's supposed threat to the nation as a "communist" organization. In the euphoria over the defeat of Nazism, pounding on the racial issue would not necessarily gain Southern leaders allies at the national level, but it quickly became apparent that the communist issue might. Southern Democrats had joined with Republicans in Congress to establish a permanent House Un-American Activities Committee in 1945, and HUAC and employer organizations unleashed a frantic propaganda barrage to convince public opinion that the CIO, Highlander, and the Southern Conference were all subversive.15 Both on a national level and in the South, the intensifying red-baiting campaign intended to divide the labor movement internally and from its allies as well as to isolate the CIO from the general public.
Stetson Kennedy, a CIO publicist, documented in great detail the collaboration of employers, various elements of the right wing, and segregationists in circulating racist and anti-union propaganda in the South. The Southern States Industrial Council distributed its "Militant Truth" newspaper in a special "labor edition" of 100,000 copies. This publication not only harped on the subversion question, but raised the specter of black domination in the South, with one of its leaflets attacking fair employment proceedings under the heading "Shall We Be Ruled By Whites or Blacks?" Hardin College in Arkansas planned in 1946 to spend $450,000 to spread anti-labor propaganda, while Texas lumber and oil barons funded "Christian American," probably the most well-endowed anti-union organization in the South.(16)
With racist and anti-union propaganda circulated in the millions and filtered as well through the Southern news media, state legislatures and city councils passed a raft of anti-union ordinances, requiring organizers to have a "license," outlawing picketing, or implementing "right to work" laws banning the union shop. The effects of the anti-union barrage could be brutal. In Arkansas, an anti-union militant killed a black member of the Food, Tobacco and Agricultural workers' union on picket duty, but the state exonerated his attackers and sentenced his fellow picketers to the penitentiary for violating the state's "anti-violence" law. The re-emergence of the Ku Klux Klan also indicated the ferocity of the anti-union campaign. In 1946 the KKK engaged in beatings and murders of black workers in Georgia, burned crosses in Chattanooga and South Carolina, and ran a candidate for Congress in Birmingham.(17)
Well-funded attacks on the right of labor to organize and a wave of terrorism against blacks and unionists only escalated after passage of the Taft-Hartley anti-labor law in the summer of 1947. The new law, which allowed states to ban the union shop, required union leaders to sign an anti-communist oath, allowed greater government intervention against strikes, and limited union political contributions, threw Southern organizing into disarray. In August a five-month campaign to bring the East Tennessee textile industry into the CIO stalled because of the refusal of the CIO to comply with the anti-communist affidavits required by Taft-Hartley, thus virtually destroying the CIO's effort to unionize the most heavily industrial portion of the state. In Nashville the steelworkers likewise lost a plant because the union had not filed anti-communist affidavits with the National Labor Relations Board. Similar cases appeared across the South. By 1949 the NLRB had such a massive backlog of cases that the certification process took a year or more, and numerous organizing efforts were ruined.(18)
Taft-Hartley encouraged anti-labor legislation, and virtually every Southern state passed "right to work" laws, which further encouraged blacklisting and other means of repression against union organizers. In Tifton, Georgia, twenty-nine workers found themselves fired from their jobs and blacklisted everywhere in town for their organizing activities, forcing the president and vice-president of the local packinghouse union to resign their positions. Police arrested workers and beat them up in the middle of the night, and attempts to stir up racial antagonism among the workers occurred continually. Although the packinghouse union won this strike, many other unions lost in similar situations.(19)
The labor movement, particularly in the South, had always been confronted with repression, racism and red-baiting. However, as the Cold War accelerated in 1947 and 1948, the CIO found its allies in the Democratic party moving to the right, with federal protections for organizing such as the Wagner Act emasculated by Congress. In the South, the accelerating anti-communist rhetoric of the Cold War cloaked segregationist and anti-union appeals with a new degree of respectability. Backed by the accusations of HUAC, Southern Congressmen, and the news media, segregationists could argue more convincingly than ever before that groups organizing for labor and civil rights were subversive. Anti-communism and Cold War patriotism in effect gave segregation a new lease on life.(20)
The most damaging effect of the Cold War for the CIO was the splitting of the labor movement itself, and the undermining of its efforts at interracial organizing. The Operation Dixie organizing campaign actually had reflected this division from its inception. Southern Organizing Committee Director Van Bittner, an adamant anticommunist, by excluding left-wing activists from Operation Dixie, removed from the campaign those most ideologically committed to the principle of black-white unity. The labor movement drew little on the left-liberal community of the South, and under the pressure of segregation's counter-offensive, the CIO'S detachment from the progressive movement eased the way for the organization of segregated locals and discriminatory practices. In line with the trend established at the CIO Convention in 1946, which passed a resolution strongly censuring the Communist party, Bittner openly attacked CIO supporters on the left, including the Southern Conference, which he claimed was "living off the CIO." Due primarily to the red scare, the CIO Executive Board removed the Conference from its list of approved organizations. With CIO funding and political support gone, the Conference went into decline.(21) By 1948, relations between the CIO and Southern leftists all but evaporated during the Presidential elections. While the CIO supported Harry Truman in his bid for re-election, the remnants of the Southern Conference, along with Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, and FTA union activists organized a civil rights-style Southern speaking tour for third-party Presidential candidate Henry Wallace, supporting the Progressive party ticket.(22)
With relations already disrupted between an important segment of liberal Southern activists and the CIO, white Southern CIO representatives also pressed for Highlander to adopt an exclusionary anticommunist policy. Highlander's founder, Myles Horton, not only resented this political intrusion, but thought this demand reflected growing opposition to the increasing use of Highlander's facilities by black workers and its policy of holding all meetings on an integrated basis.(23) The national CIO also began to pressure Highlander to establish a policy of political orthodoxy, asking it to exclude the Mine Mill and Smelter Workers union, long a participant at Highlander sessions, which had one of the more integrated leaderships in the South. In July 1949, the CIO informed Highlander that no Southern school would be held that year because Highlander refused to place an anti-communist provision in its statement of principles. As segregationist accusations of "communism" against Highlander accelerated, the school's formal relations with the CIO came virtually to a halt.(24)
During the course of Operation Dixie, the CIO not only severed its connections with two leading interracial Southern organizations but also attacked its own member unions. With Operation Dixie Director Van Bittner an active participant, the 1948 and 1949 CIO conventions proscribed unions whose programs were supposedly directed toward achievement of the Communist party program, action that led to the expulsion of eleven CIO unions with close to one million members. Among them were the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers union, and the Food, Tobacco and Agricultural workers union, both mainstays of interracial Southern organizing since the 1930s and important elements in the Operation Dixie drive. The CIO deemed the leaders of the expelled unions "unfit to associate with decent men and women in free democratic trade unions."(25)
The CIO's attacks on its member unions gave credence to the segregationist charge that union organizers who insisted on black-white equality were actually trying to stir up sedition and bring about communist revolution. Mill owners and segregationists in the Birmingham area leveled this charge against the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers union. The Mine Mill union there had a history of struggle against the exclusion of black workers and segregation of union affairs that went back to the 1930s. In 1949 it suffered heavy attacks by a secessionist movement of white racists, many of them members of the Ku Klux Klan, who wanted to put union affairs into their own hands. At the same time, vigilantes and the local police subjected black people in the Birmingham area to an increasingly virulent campaign of bombings, beatings and murders. In a narrowly won victory, the Steelworkers took over the Bessemer jurisdiction from Mine Mill by a vote that proceeded strictly along racial lines, following a number of confrontations and assaults on Mine Mill members. Yet both the Steelworkers' David McDonald and the CIO Executive Board claimed that it was the Mine Mill union, using the "Communist weapon of fear" and "racial hatred," that had split white and black workers. The CIO continued to support the USWA local, which became the preserve of a lily-white leadership with strong ties to the Ku Klux Klan.(26)
Similarly, the CIO's attack on "communist" unions aided efforts by the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, the local segregationist establishment, and the House Un-American Activities Committee to destroy a strong black-led local of the Food, Tobacco and Agricultural Workers union in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. FTA's Local 22 gained representation of some 7,000 tobacco workers in 1941 and obtained widespread support from the CIO and Southern liberals in its 1947 strike. Local 22's successes, the result of its strong support from black tobacco workers, made it a base for civil rights and labor organizing in the state and led to the election of the first black alderman in Winston-Salem since Reconstruction. HUAC's investigation," aided by a redbaiting campaign in the press, and CIO challenges to Local 22 in a National Labor Relations Board election in 1949 resulted in a majority vote for "no union." The CIO tried to set up another union, which obtained support from white workers but virtually none from black workers, leaving the huge Reynolds plant unorganized.(27) As in Birmingham, the CIO lent its support in North Carolina to the destruction of a militant, blackled union actively involved in the fight for black civil rights.
Many factors account for the ultimate inability of the CIO to overcome the obstacles it faced in the South, as Barbara Griffith's account of the Operation Dixie drive suggests.28 But certainly the Cold War and its consequences played a critical role in Southern union defeat. CIO leaders and Southern liberals, white and black, had expected the wartime coalition of interests between their own organizations and the federal government, via the Democratic party, to continue and to implement a serious program of reform in the postwar South. Instead, the war-time coalition stumbled on Cold War anti-communism and the virulent counter-attack of the South's segregationist leaders, as an increasingly violent clash between the established ruling class and the labor, liberal and black constituencies of the South emerged. Instead of expanded labor rights and a decline in segregation, night riders, bombings and lynchings, and the Dixiecrat segregationist movement of 1948 answered the demands of workers and African-Americans for greater justice. The postwar expansion of the economy ultimately provided many Southern workers with an improved economic status. Such progress, however, was overladen with a deadly anti-communist and racist orthodoxy which stifled all freedom of thought and movements for change.
The exclusion of the left from the CIO did not stop disastrous faction fights within the CIO unions, nor did it stop an equally disastrous period of raiding between AFL and CIO unions in the early 1950s. The national CIO's efforts to extirpate supposed communists from the labor movement signalled not only a turn to the right but a failure to focus on the battle of organizing the unorganized in the South. The result of such diversions became especially apparent in the South's dominant textile industry, where factional fighting and anti-union hostility destroyed organizing efforts. Although Operation Dixie leaders had seen textiles as key to organizing the South, by 1952, only fifteen percent of Southern textile workers were organized as compared to twenty percent prior to Operation Dixie, and by the mid-1960s, this dwindled to eight percent, one measure of the ultimate failure of Operation Dixie.(29)
In 1953, the CIO dismantled Operation Dixie, and hopes for a new opening on racial and labor issues died. With textile unionism in decline, black-led unions smashed, and the bulk of Southern-based industries still untouched by labor organization, the end of Operation Dixie set the tone for a period of disorganization and decline in the 1950s and 1960s. The Southern labor movement has yet to recover.
(1) Most scholars of segregation note the importance of the economic factor, but agree that segregation was not simply economically determined. See for example John W. Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 142-143, or George Frederickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), chapter five. See James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936-1980 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), and Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 1986), on Southern leaders, low wages, and unions. (2) W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (1941; rpt. New York: Random House, 1969). (3) On black-white relations at the point of production, see Michael Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), chapter one, and Wright, New South, Old South, pp. 177-197. (4) Horace R. Cayton and George S. Mitchell, Black Workers and the New Unions (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939). See Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights, Robin D.G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), and Eric Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class and Politics, 1863-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). (5) F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 225-227. (6) Eleanor Roosevelt, "The South in Postwar America," Southern Patriot, June 1944 (Nashville); Lucy Randolph Mason, "The CIO in the South," The South and World Affairs, April 1944 (Chapel Hill); and Mason, To Win These Rights: A Personal Story of the CIO in the South (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), p. 30. On Mason, see John A. Salmond, Miss Lucy of the CIO: The Life and Times of Lucy Randolph Mason (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988). (7) "CIO," a pamphlet of the Department of Education and Research, Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1945, in the CIO Secretary-Treasurer Files, Part 2, George Weaver files, box 212, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit; and see the Southern Patriot, 1945-1946. See also Thomas A. Krueger, And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 1938-1948 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967). (8) See the union newspaper UAW, July 15, 1942, and Federated Press news release, August 10, 1945, Highlander clippings on microfilm, and the Southern Patriot, 1944-46, also on microfilm, Wisconsin Historical Society (WHS), Madison. On Highlander, see John M. Glen, Highlander, No Ordinary School, 1932-1962 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988). (9) Quoted in International Oil Worker, July 1945, Highlander Clippings File, WHS microfilm. (10) Southern Patriot, March and August 1946 (Nashville); also see Tennessee edition, CIO News (Memphis), in 1946. Columbia race-riot files are in Region 8 files, Paul Christopher Papers, Southern Labor Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta. (11) Joseph Yates Garrison, "Paul Revere Christopher: Southern Labor Leader, 1910-1974," Diss., Georgia State University, 1976, p. 161; F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South, pp. 264-266. For a detailed account of the Operation Dixie campaign, see Barbara S. Griffith, The Crisis of American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat of the CIO (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988). (12) As Steven F. Lawson notes, however, unionized whites at best proved uncertain allies of blacks in electoral politics: Black Politics: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 127-128. Allan S. Haywood to C. W. Fowler, Press and Publicity Director, Food Tobacco and Agricultural Workers Union, March 28, 1947; and Donald Henderson to Allan S. Haywood, August 18, 1947, both in Philip Murray papers, box 25, Catholic University, Washington, D. C. (13) Some 450,000 of the AFL's 650,000 black members in 1946 were Southerners and the CIO threatened to take away many of them. F. Ray Marshall, The Negro & Organized Labor (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 42-43, and Labor in the South, p. 247. (14) "The Southern Organizing Drive," press release from CIO Executive Board, August 31, 1948, box 50, Office of the President, United Packinghouse Workers of America, WHS manuscripts, 118. (15) Wayne Addison Clark, "An Analysis of the Relationship Between Anti-Communism and Segregationist Thought in the Deep South, 1948-1965," Diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1976, pp. 183-184. Southern Patriot, January 1945. (16) Southern Patriot, June 1946; Stetson Kennedy, Southern Exposure (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1946). (17) Southern Patriot, May 1946 and July 1946. See also Robert G. Corley, "The Quest for Racial Harmony: Race Relations in Birmingham, Alabama, 1947-63," Diss., University of Virginia, 1979. (18) See the correspondence of W. A. Copeland, August 1947, in the Operation Dixie files, Tennessee Organizing Committee, Perkins Library manuscripts collection, Duke University; Garrison, "Paul Revere Christopher," p. 166; and Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights, chapter eight. (19)J. C. Bradshaw to Lewis J. Clark, September 19, 1948, and Grover Hathaway to Ralph Helstein, August 10, 1948, United Packinghouse Workers files, Office of the President, box 49, WHS MS, 118; and L. R. Mason, To Win These Rights, pp. 114-117. (20) See Clark, "Anti-Communism and Segregationist Thought." The Southern Patriot in the postwar years provides many examples of the violent conjunction of anti-communism and racism. See also Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights, chapter nine, and "Labor, the Left, and Civil Rights in the South: Memphis During the CIO Era, 1937-1955," in Judith Joel and Gerald M. Erickson, eds., Anti-Communism: The Politics of Manipulation (Minneapolis: MEP Publications, 1987). (21) Krueger, And Promises to Keep, pp. 140, 142. (22) Patricia Sullivan, "Gideon's Southern Soldiers: New Deal Politics and Civil Rights Reform, 1933-1948," Diss., Emory University, 1983, chapter seven. (23) "Author's interview with Myles Horton, June 1, 1983, and "CIO controversy" file, Highlander Research and Education Center Archives, New Market, Tennessee. (24) Interracial Education Comes to Dixie," The Carolinian, December 28, 1946; St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 10, 1949, both on WHS microfilm. On the controversy with the CIO, see notes on the meeting of Tennessee State Industrial Union Council representatives with the Highlander staff, no date; Stanley Ruttenberg to Myles Horton, July 5, 1949; and Horton to J. Lewis Henderson, February 25, 1950, "CIO controversy file." Frank Adams, Unearthing Seeds of Fire: The Idea of Highlander (Winston-Salem, North Carolina: John F. Blair, 1975), pp. 86-87. (25) "Official Reports on the Expulsion of Communist Dominated Organizations from the CIO," September 1954, Publicity Department, Congress of Industrial Organizations, p. 32, in CIO Secretary-Treasurer's files, box 109, Reuther Archives; "CIO Rules Governing Councils Issued by the CIO Executive Board," November 5, 1949, UPWA Office of the President, box 53, WHS Ms., 118. (26) Southern Patriot, October 1946; Marshall, Labor in the South, pp. 259-263, 276; Horace Huntley, "Iron Ore Miners and Mine Mill in Alabama: 1933-1952," Diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1977. (27) "Philip S. Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1973 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 282; Akosua Barthwell, "Trade Unionism in North Carolina: The Strike Against Reynolds Tobacco, 1947," AIMS occasional paper No. 21 (New York: American Institute for Marxist Studies, 1977); and Robert Rogers Korstad, "Daybreak of Freedom: Tobacco Workers and the CIO, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 1943-1950," Diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1987. (28) The Crisis of American Labor, passim. (29) Southern Patriot, October 1946; Marshall, Labor in the South, pp. 259-263, 276.