Eisenhower and Ballistic Missile Defense the formative years, 1944-1961.
Behind all these other changes in the middle years of the 1950s loomed the changes of science, remaking the world and bringing new problems. More and more, the jet aircraft, the nuclear power plant, the hydrogen bomb, the ballistic missile were coming into the consciousness of all of us.Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1963. (1) Introduction
Although the United States started an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program shortly after World War II, it was conducted with minimal funding and with a low priority for the first decade. As a result, developments were still in the conceptual phase in 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became the thirty-fourth President of the United States. However, by the time Eisenhower left office eight years later, the U.S. was pursuing a major ABM program and had established a firm conceptual foundation for future ballistic missile defense (BMD) developments.
America's postwar ABM program was a direct response to the German rocket program of World War II, which produced the world's first long-range ballistic missile, the V-2. (2) While used only during the final months of the war, the V-2 and its airbreathing cousin the V-1 made a strong impression on Allied leaders, including Eisenhower.
Eisenhower and the Dawn of the Missile Age, 1944-1945
As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Dwight Eisenhower witnessed the dawn of the missile age and was duly impressed by the destructiveness of the V-2 rocket. Indeed, while overseeing the preparations for Overlord, Eisenhower received "alarming intelligence reports concerning the progress of the Germans in developing new long-range weapons of great destructive capacity." He considered these warnings serious enough to give them as one reason for launching Overlord at the earliest possible moment. (3)
Eisenhower's sense of urgency was not misplaced. About a week after D-Day, German V-1 "buzz bombs" began falling on London. Three months after D-Day, the Germans ushered in the ballistic missile age when they began launching V-2 rockets against key Allied targets, especially London and the port city of Antwerp, Belgium. (4)
V-weapon attacks against England had "a very noticeable effect upon morale," according to Eisenhower. The successful lodgment of Allied armies on the continent in June 1944 had given the British "a great sense of relief." However, "their hopes were dashed" when the missile attacks started. Moreover, Eisenhower pointed out, it was not just civilian morale that was affected. "Soldiers at the front began again to worry about friends and loved ones at home, and many American soldiers asked me in worried tones whether I could give them any news about particular towns where they had previously been stationed in southern England." (5)
Eisenhower understood the operational characteristics of Germany's "V" weapons. The V-2, he noted, "was a rocket, shot into the air to a great height, which fell at such high speed that the first warning of its coming was the explosion. During flight it could not be heard, seen, or intercepted." Because of its velocity, the V-2 tended to penetrate whatever it hit before exploding. If it struck in the open and penetrated the ground, the missile's explosive forces were channeled upward, causing little damage to surrounding structures. However, if it hit a building within a cramped urban area, the V-2 detonated inside the building so that its explosive forces were coupled to the structures around it. In this case, Eisenhower wrote, "the destruction was almost complete." (6)
Between September 8, 1944, and March 27, 1945, the Germans aimed 1,359 V-2s against London; 1,190 of these attempted launches were successful. The V-2s which struck England destroyed or damaged thousands of homes and buildings. They also killed 2,724 civilians and seriously injured another 6,467 civilians. On the average, according to Sir Winston Churchill, England's wartime prime minister, each V-2 killed twice as many people as did a V-1. The main reason for this disparity was the fact that the sound of the approaching V-1 warned people to take cover; there was no such warning in the case of the hypersonic V-2. (7)
While these losses were small compared to overall wartime casualties, the impact of the V-2 on morale was serious enough to justify a search for countermeasures. This search spawned the world's first missile defense architecture, which included the same basic components that still make up today's architectures: weapons, sensors, and a command and control system.
The London missile defense system called for the city to be laid off in a grid and surrounded by anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Radar would pick up the V-2s once they reached an altitude of 5,000 feet. Radar data would then be used to calculate the missile's trajectory and determine which square in the grid it would hit. At the right moment, the AAA guns would fire a barrage of shells timed to go off at the optimum altitude over the proper square. In theory, the V-2 would have to fly through this barrage and be destroyed. To be sure that the barrier of shell fragments was in place to meet the approaching V-2, the guns would have to be fired while the missile was still thirty miles away. Before advocates of the missile defense concept could secure permission to test their ideas, Allied ground forces had overrun the last launching sites within range of London, ending the V-2 attacks. (8)
The final Allied drive that resulted in the occupation of the last V-2 launch sites had depended to a great extent on supplies entering the continent through the port of Antwerp. According to General Eisenhower, Antwerp became a sine qua non for the final all-out battle to overthrow Hitler's Third Reich. Churchill expressed similar views: "Without the vast harbour of this city no advance across the lower Rhine and into the northern plains of Germany was possible." (9)
Not surprisingly, then, once the Allies gained control of Antwerp, the Germans launched a major V-weapons campaign against the port. Indeed, Allied records show that more V-2s (1,712) struck the Antwerp area than hit London and its surroundings (1,190). In addition to the V-2s, the Germans hit Antwerp and the area around the city with 4,248 V-1s. More than 150 V-2s and a similar number of V-1s hit Antwerp's dock area. Because of these attacks, the port's handling capacity was reduced by as much as a third, due in part to the fact that stevedores were routinely forced to abandon their work and seek shelter. Furthermore, because of the dangers posed by the V-weapons, the Allies placed severe restrictions on the shipment of ammunition through Antwerp. As a result, "most of the ammunition for the theater had to be transported the 500 miles from Cherbourg or 275 miles from Le Havre." Finally, Antwerp was the scene of the single worst V-2 attack--on December 16, 1944, a lone missile struck a crowded theater killing 567 and seriously injuring another 291. By end of March 1945 when the V-weapon attacks stopped, 3,752 civilians had been killed and 6,072 seriously injured. (10)
The Antwerp experience may explain Eisenhower's sobering assessment of how the V-2 might have changed the course of the war had it been developed earlier. In his memoir, Crusade in Europe, the general wrote:
It seemed likely that, if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible. I feel sure that if he had succeeded in using these weapons over a six-month period, and particularly if he had made the Portsmouth-Southampton area one of his principal targets, Overlord might have been written off. (11)
Beginnings of the U.S. Missile Defense Program, 1946-1948
Eisenhower's experience with the V-2 and other World War II weapons impressed upon him the vital role science and technology had come to play in national security. However, these experiences did not make of him an uncritical supporter of new weapon systems. In 1946, while serving as Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower visited Fort Bliss, Texas, where some of the earliest work on missile defense was taking place. During a briefing on this work, Eisenhower expressed skepticism about the idea of intercepting a missile with another missile. This, he said, was tantamount to hitting a bullet with a bullet, a feat that was too difficult to accomplish. (12)
Eisenhower's skepticism was not shared by other American officials who reviewed Germany's rocket program after the war. These officials were impressed by the challenges the new weapon posed for defenses. Given the potential of the long-range rocket, especially if it should be combined with an atomic warhead, these investigators believed the U.S. had little choice other than to pursue the development of ballistic missile defenses. (13)
Perhaps the most disturbing discovery made by these officials was that the Germans had plans for an ICBM that might have been used against New York City had the war continued long enough. Report number 237-45 of the United States Naval Technical Mission stated:
There is little of humorous nature in the statement so often heard that the Germans intended to bombard New York from launching sites in Europe, as two missiles, the A-9 and A-10 [which would have been combined into a two-stage missile] were under development for use against the U.S. in the early months of 1946. This contemplated use was scientifically possible and undoubtedly would have been realized had time permitted. (14)
Concern with the future threat of missiles was a major theme in a post-war study completed by the War Department's Equipment Board, which was chaired by General Joseph W. Stilwell, legendary commander of American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. Completed in January 1946, the Stilwell Report concluded that "guided missiles, winged or non-winged, traveling at extreme altitudes and at velocities in excess of supersonic speed, are inevitable." Among these new weapons would be missiles with "intercontinental ranges of over 3,000 miles and pay load sufficient to carry [an] atomic explosive." (15)
The lethality of such weapons revolutionized the requirements for effective defenses. In the past, the major goal of air defense was to simply make air attacks so costly that an enemy air force could not sustain the effort long enough to produce decisive results. "In future wars," the report noted, "no single airplane or bomb-carrying missile should be permitted to penetrate the defenses of a vital area because of the possibility that it might be carrying an atomic bomb." While no such defense was then possible, the report said, it was "imperative" to improve defenses "until the ultimate obtainable [effectiveness] is reached." (16)
To meet that part of the new threat posed by "V-2 type missiles traveling at very high altitudes at speeds greatly in excess of the sonic," the United States had to develop "a guided missile of the greatest attainable speed." This interceptor "should have a range of at least 100,000 yards and possess the greatest accuracy of control and maneuverability commensurate with the speed of the missile." This missile must also offer "a high probability of destroying any aerial target that comes within its operating range." (17)
The recommendations of the Stilwell Board and other studies helped spawn a number of conceptual missile defense programs. The earliest of these were two programs started by the Army Air Forces (AAF) in March 1946 using funds that General Arnold had set aside for the pursuit of promising technical developments. One of these was Project Wizard, which was to lay the foundation for developing an interceptor that could destroy a missile traveling at speeds of up to 4,000 miles per hour at altitudes between 60,000 and 500,000 feet. (18)
The second AAF missile defense program was known as Thumper. This program was to explore the interception of a number of different types of high-speed aerial vehicles, including ballistic missiles. Unlike Wizard, Thumper specified several flight tests using the Army's two-stage Bumper missile, which used a variant of the German V-2 rocket for its first stage and a WAC Corporal as its second. Like Wizard, Thumper specifications called for destroying targets traveling at 4,000 mph at altitudes as high as 500,000 feet. (19)
None of these early BMD programs moved much beyond the conceptual stage of development before the second half of the 1950s; and one of them, Thumper, was cancelled in 1948. (20) The relative low interest in missile defense before 1955 stems from the fact that America's leaders viewed nuclear-armed Soviet bombers, not ballistic missiles, as the principal strategic threat.
Emergence of the ICBM Threat, 1949 to 1955
From World War II until late August 1949, the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. This, American analysts believed, gave the United States a decisive edge against the Soviet Union, an edge that was reflected in a U.S. strategy emphasizing the deterrent power of nuclear-armed bombers. This strategy also happened to be the least expensive defense option in the post-war world and therefore was in consonance with President Harry Truman's policy of squeezing the armed forces to help pay for the Marshall Plan and economic assistance for West Germany and Japan. Strengthening these and other American allies all along the periphery of the Soviet Union was central to Truman's strategy of containment. (21)
Of course, America's nuclear monopoly could not last forever. And once it ended, the United States and Soviet Union could be expected to move to the next level of their nuclear competition. The Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb on August 29, 1949. Five months later, President Truman decided that the U.S. should develop the hydrogen bomb. This was about three months after Joseph Stalin had given a similar order in the Soviet Union. (22) These decisions would later prove crucial to both the American and Soviet ballistic missile programs, since small, powerful thermonuclear warheads were crucial to the development of the ICBM. (23)
But in 1950 the first operational ICBMs were still a decade away, and the threat American analysts most feared was a surprise attack by nuclear-armed Soviet bombers. On February 10, 1950, the CIA issued its latest assessment of Soviet capabilities. While acknowledging the absence of hard data, the agency predicted that the Soviets would have a stockpile of 100 Nagasaki-size bombs by 1953 with this number rising to 200 by 1955. Additionally, the CIA believed that the Soviets would have enough Tu-4 bombers to get these weapons to U.S. targets and noted that the delivery of 200 atomic bombs against key targets could defeat the United States. However, the Soviets were unlikely to be able to launch a major surprise attack before the 1956-1957 timeframe. (24)
As late as 1955, the national security establishment was still more concerned about manned Soviet bombers than long-range Soviet missiles. At least part of the reason for this fixation was concern about a "bomber gap" that was created in part by Soviet manipulation of the sightings of its latest aircraft. (25)
The existence of this gap was questioned as early as June 1956. By early 1960 President Eisenhower was able to say that the "bomber gap" had evaporated. However, by this time it was being replaced by equally disturbing charges of a "missile gap." (26) Indeed, as early as 1954, events had begun to push ballistic missiles toward the center of national security concerns.
Like the U.S. ballistic missile program, that of the Soviet Union emerged from the German program of World War II. The first stage of the Soviet program actually took place on German soil, as Soviet rocket experts like Sergei P. Korolev, who had been named the chief designer for all Soviet long-range missiles, went to Germany where they worked with German scientists and technicians to assemble eighteen V-2s. In October 1946, these rockets, along with about 150 German rocket experts, were shipped to the Soviet Union. Here, the Germans continued to work in the Soviet long-range rocket program, while the Soviets test-fired their V-2s at Kapustin Yar, launching the first one on October 18, 1947. (27)
Even before leaving Germany, the Soviets had begun work on the R-1, a Soviet copy of the V-2. From the R-1, which was first tested in September 1948, the Soviets moved forward steadily, incrementally in developing their own missiles until they reached the R-5, a missile that was to be capable of hurling a one-ton warhead for a distance of 1,200 kilometers. It was successfully tested in the spring of 1953. (28)
Encouraged by Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, who expressed interest in an ICBM as early as 1947, Korolev and his Soviet colleagues had begun laying the groundwork for a Soviet ICBM while still developing the shorter range missiles. By early 1953, they had settled on a design that would have two stages--a central core that would fire throughout the missile's boost phase and four strap-on rockets that would fire until their fuel was exhausted and then be jettisoned. The missile was to weigh 190 tons, develop 270 tons of thrust at liftoff, and throw a 3-ton warhead seven to eight thousand kilometers. On February 13, 1953, less than a month before his death, Stalin approved the development of an ICBM blueprint that would be based on previous research work. (29)
In October 1953, after learning from Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov of the probable dimensions of a thermonuclear warhead, Soviet leaders ordered Korolev to increase the size of the ICBM's warhead; it was now to weigh five to six tons. Work on the required changes to the rocket's design began in November 1953, by which time the missile had been designated R-7. The redesign was completed in February 1954 and officially approved on November 20, 1954. (30)
Meanwhile, in the United States, long-range ballistic missiles were moving into the limelight of national security. Near the end of March 1954, President Eisenhower met with a select group of scientists to discuss the problem of a possible surprise attack against the United States. After presenting some of the latest intelligence information on new Soviet bombers, the President asked for advice on the situation. This meeting spawned the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP). Headed by James R. Killian, Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the TCP was expected to evaluate how America's technological capabilities might be used to cope with crucial security issues and report its findings to the President in February of the following year. (31)
While the TCP was completing its work, the National Security Council (NSC) was considering NSC 5440, a proposed revision of America's basic national security policy. Reflecting the growing concerns about the Soviet ICBM program as it was understood at the end of 1954, this document included the following statement:
The Soviet guided missile program, over the next few years, will bring increasingly longer-range missiles into production. Assuming an intensive effort, the USSR may develop roughly by 1963 (1960 at the earliest) operational intercontinental ballistic missiles. The US. program for missiles of this type should approximate this timetable, provided that intensive effort continues. There is no known defense against such missiles at this time. (32)
This ominous statement about the Soviet ICBM threat survived the NSC's review and appeared in NSC 5501, which Eisenhower approved on January 7, 1955. Among its important provisions was a softening of the truculent massive retaliation doctrine that had been a hallmark of America's national strategy since the early days of Eisenhower's presidency. The new policy recognized the need to accept a long-time standoff once the Soviets achieved nuclear parity. (33)
On February 15, 1955, a little over a month after the promulgation of NSC 5501, the TCP submitted its findings. Known as the Killian Report, it noted the dangers posed should the Soviets be the first to achieve an operational ICBM force and recommended assigning the highest possible national priority to America's ICBM program with the goal of achieving a full-scale test of an ICBM by 1958. The report also recommended the development of an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) that could be both land- and sea-based. Moreover, since bombers would continue to be needed after ICBMs became operational, the panel supported the development of a nuclear-powered bomber. (34)
Where defensive measures were concerned, the Killian Report called for the rapid completion of the Distant Early Warning line to provide the earliest possible warning of an approaching attack. It also called for a strong, balanced R&D program on the interception and destruction of ballistic missiles. (35)
The Killian Report indicates that by the beginning of 1955, the level of interest in ballistic missile defense was starting to rise as the implications of the Soviet missile program seeped into the consciousness of America's national security leadership. It was not long before this awareness reached down into the defense establishment where weapons programs are generated.
In March 1955, the Army asked Bell Laboratories to conduct an eighteen month study of an advanced interceptor system that could deal with the highly capable air-breathing threats of the 1960 to 1970 timeframe. In light of the growing interest in BMD, Bell suggested expanding the study to include ballistic missile targets, thereby turning the new interceptor concept into a step toward effective missile defenses. The Army agreed and in June 1955 directed Bell Laboratories to make ballistic missile defense the study's central focus. (36)
At the start of the Nike-II study, as the Bell project came to be known, a number of American leaders agreed with Eisenhower's 1946 assessment that missile defense was not technically feasible. The Bell study went far toward dispelling this view by completing 50,000 computer-simulated interceptor-ICBM engagements which indicated that a "bullet" could indeed hit another "bullet." (37)
By the time the Nike-II study was completed, Eisenhower had won re-election in a landslide victory over Adlai Stephenson. During his second administration, the ballistic missile would emerge from the world of intelligence estimates and become an operational reality, further increasing the interest in ballistic missile defense. As a result, BMD achieved a position of increasing importance so that the latter part of Eisenhower's second term would be marked by Army efforts to secure a decision to deploy the Nike-Zeus (hereafter Zeus) system that emerged from the Bell Laboratories study.
Laying the Foundation: The Second Eisenhower Administration, 1956-1961
The final version of the Nike-II study was briefed to the Army staff in October 1956. It proposed a system that would consist of a forward acquisition radar to secure early information on the track of incoming missiles, a local acquisition radar to control the ABM battle, an interceptor missile that carried a 400-pound nuclear warhead and was capable of 10-g maneuvering at 100,000 feet, and a communications system to tie all components together. Also included in the final study was a six-year development plan that would extend from initial development to the demonstration of system performance against a simulated ICBM warhead. (38)
In February 1957, the Army selected Western Electric/Bell Laboratories to serve as prime contractor for Zeus. For the first year, the contract called for an R&D effort valued at about $12 million. (39)
Two months after the contract for Zeus was let, the Eisenhower administration established the Security Resources Panel to investigate the relative merits of active and passive defenses against ballistic missile attacks. Because the panel was chaired by H. Rowan Gaither, chairman of the board of Ford Motor Corporation, its report came to be known as the Gaither Report. (40)
Before the panel could complete its work, the Soviet Union shook the West by successfully testing the world's first ICBM, the R-7 (SS-6 NATO), on August 26, 1957. Just six weeks later, on October 4, the Soviets launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite, driving home the point first made in the August 21, R-7 test: the Soviet Union had developed a rocket with sufficient range and payload to strike America with a nuclear weapon. A measure of the impact that Sputnik had upon the American public is a comment that appeared in Life magazine, which stated that the Soviets had "burst upon the world as the infinitely sinister front runners in the sophisticated and perilous science of space." (41)
Eisenhower remained calm and took measured steps to deal with the Sputnik crisis. One of the earliest indications of the changes he would make came in his first meeting with Neil McElroy, who had been sworn in as secretary of defense shortly after the launch of Sputnik. In their October 11, meeting, Eisenhower and McElroy decided to apply a single-manager concept to missile defense and other long term projects that cut across service boundaries. Service missile programs that were already well along in the development cycle were excluded from this initiative. (42)
The idea of a single manager for advanced projects squared nicely with views expressed in the Gaither Report, which was submitted to Eisenhower on November 7, 1957. This report questioned DOD's management of new weapon systems that cut across "traditional Service lines" and recommended concentrating R&D responsibilities for major weapons systems in "manageable organizational units." (43)
The Gaither panel also made several other points about the state of U.S. security. Since America's current defenses could not stop a Soviet nuclear attack, U.S. security rested on the deterrent power of Strategic Air Command (SAC). Therefore, SACs forces should be protected against missile strikes. Also, since the vulnerability of the American people could restrict America's strategic options during a future crisis, the U.S. should begin developing missile defenses for its cities at the "earliest possible date." (44)
Where active missile defense was concerned, the report noted that several systems based on air defense interceptors like the Army's Nike-Hercules and the Navy's Talos could become the basis of missile defenses for SAC bases. Since this form of missile defense would be assembled from modified existing components, it could be available in limited form as early as 1960. However, the system developed to protect SAC bases could not be used to defend cities, since it would intercept incoming missiles at altitudes as low as 30,000 feet and even lower. At such altitudes, the nuclear warheads of the interceptors themselves would pose a serious threat to the cities being defended. (45)
Given the limitations of Hercules and Talos and the importance of protecting America's cities, a missile defense system that destroys incoming missiles at much higher altitudes should be developed. Since distinguishing decoys from real warheads would be a major challenge, the report called for a high priority R&D program on discrimination. In spite of the difficulties, a city-defense system should be deployed as soon as possible, even if it were to be deployed in an early limited form and then upgraded. (46)
As 1957 came to a close, it was apparent that the situation with regard to missile defense had changed markedly. In the words of the official DOD history of defense policies during Eisenhower's second administration:
By the end of 1957[,] piecemeal decisions, together with technological progress, had rendered obsolete the priority list of missile projects established by the president and the NSC in December 1955.... The same held true of the antimissile missile, the importance of which the Gaither panel had noted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed in December 1957 that an anti-ICBM system was urgent, though they could not agree that it deserved the highest priority.
In short, the Gaither Report and Sputnik provided the impetus for expanding extant missile defense efforts and establishing an agency to provide centralized management of advanced missile defense research. (47) The new oversight agency emerged in early 1958.
After the October 11, 1957, meeting at which Eisenhower and McElroy agreed on the single-manager approach for advanced R&D projects, McElroy worked with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles to prepare a charter for the "Special Projects Agency." After coordinating the charter with the Joint Chiefs, McElroy selected Roy W. Johnson, a vice president of General Electric, as the agency's first director. Johnson's appointment was announced on February 7, 1958, the day on which the directive establishing the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was issued. (48)
Soon after its establishment, ARPA launched Project Defender "to establish an adequate research foundation upon which to build militarily effective and economic [missile] defense systems." (49) Defender was to become one of ARPA's largest and longest running programs.
Although directed energy devices were in their infancy when Defender started, project leaders showed interest in its military applications almost immediately. ARPA/Defender money began supporting laser research as early as 1959, with possible applications including laser-based radar and communications systems, as well as anti-missile weaponry. Defender also supported work on particle beams that could be used to destroy enemy missiles. (50)
Defender participants were quick to recognize the importance of destroying enemy missiles while they were still in the boost-phase. During the second annual Project Defender conference in the summer of 1960, the following view of the advantages and disadvantages of boost-phase intercept was presented.
A ballistic missile is more vulnerable in its propulsion or boost phase than in any subsequent part of its trajectory. At the same time, its identity is most difficult to conceal. These circumstances immediately suggest an early intercept system as an ideal solution to the defense problem. Unfortunately, enemy missiles are relatively inaccessible during this phase. So far, the only promising defense system concept has been a space based or satellite borne interceptor. Such a system requires many thousands of interceptors in space, but at a given instant only a small fraction will be in a position to attack. The economic feasibility of such systems is heavily dependent upon equipment reliability and upon enemy countermeasures.
Collectively, boost-phase kill concepts were referred to by the acronym BAMBI, which stood for Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept. (51)
At first, the participants in Project Defender were not optimistic about this approach. In 1960, scientists and engineers believed that missile defense interceptors would require nuclear warheads because of their limited accuracy. Such interceptors would have been very heavy, and deploying a constellation of these weapons would have required orbiting such a large mass that the scheme was considered "implausible." (52)
However, as Defender proceeded, there were "dramatic changes in attitude toward reducing achievable intercept miss distances." One of these changes was "a growing feeling" that the use of nuclear warheads should be avoided. This transformation in thought and the new interceptor concept it spawned were described as follows during the July 1960 Defender review:
Intuitively, one feels, that in trying to intercept anything traveling at ICBM velocities, the resultant miss distance would be large. Until recently, systems considerations have been based on the premise that miss distances would be of the order of one or two hundred feet. This dictated the use of a nuclear warhead with its attendant high cost and weight, and other disadvantages. During our space based interceptor studies, consideration of a light weight, 300 lb., interceptor using an IR [infrared] seeker led to the conclusion that miss distances of 10 to 30 feet could be achieved. At these distances, fragment type warheads exploiting hypervelocity impact for kill appeared reasonable against tankage, motors, and other parts of the ICBM in boost. Further study indicated that a cheap effective warhead could be built weighing as little as 2 lbs.
Further investigations led to the conclusion that hit-to-kill (HTK) interceptors were feasible:
Computer simulation runs on several types of interceptors weighing about 50 lbs., and using IR homing have resulted in miss distances of one or two feet. This certainly indicates hypervelocity impact kill could be employed. Incidentally, a nose cone traveling at ICBM velocities in collision with one pound of material releases the energy equivalent of 6 pounds of TNT. In a word, the kinetic energy at that velocity exceeds the chemical energy available at that mass. (53)
The results of these ARPA system studies pointed "directly to the possibility of miss distances two orders of magnitude less than were generally considered possible a year or so ago. This is highly significant because it removed the necessity of using a nuclear warhead and replaces it with a simple, cheap, lightweight mechanical device." Eliminating the nuclear warheads from a space-based constellation of interceptors would reduce on-orbit weight requirements by "about two orders in magnitude." For ARPA this indicated that boost-phase intercept of an ICBM was no longer a fanciful idea; it had become a concept "sufficiently promising to warrant increased study efforts." (54) Later, when MIRVing (55) ballistic missiles became standard practice, boost-phase kill offered the defense a substantial advantage, since a single interceptor could destroy an ICBM's multiple warheads (ten in the case of the Soviet Union's large SS-18 ICBMs) along with its decoys.
Defender explored a number of BAMBI concepts. One of these was SPAD (Space Patrol Active Defense), which envisioned a 60,000-pound satellite that would carry an IR scanner to pick up boosters, a computer to calculate their tracks, and 140 interceptors, each of which would have weighed 300 pounds. These interceptors would be fired at attacking missiles as they rose from launch pads or silos. As an interceptor approached its target, a wire web with a radius of 15 to 50 feet would be spun out from the interceptor. Embedded in this web would be a number of one-gram pellets. Although the pellets were designed specifically to wreck the booster's vulnerable tankage, their high velocity (they would hit the ICBM at velocities between 6 and 60 thousand feet per second) would also allow them to score attacking warheads, causing them to incinerate on re-entry. A constellation of more than 500 satellites, in orbits 250 miles above the earth, would have been required to provide adequate coverage of the Soviet Union. (56)
Another interceptor concept to emerge from Defender was ARPA Terminal (ARPAT), a hit-to-kill system for use against ICBMs during the terminal phase of their flight. ARPAT's booster was to loft five carrier missiles to an altitude of 100,000 to meet the approaching threat cloud of warheads, decoys, booster tankage, etc. Each carrier would contain ten interceptors. As atmospheric friction stripped away tankage and decoys, uncovering the warheads, each of the fifty interceptors would be targeted against a warhead. Equipped with optical sensors for terminal guidance, these interceptors would "kill [their targets] by direct impact." (57)
Devising concepts like ARPAT and SPAD was one thing, developing them was something quite different. The technology base of the late fifties and early sixties was incapable of reifying the advanced concepts that emerged from Project Defender. Computer technology was still in an early stage of development, and the highly sensitive infrared sensors needed for acquiring and tracking ballistic missiles and warheads were just starting to be developed in conjunction with programs like MIDAS (Missile Defense Alarm System). (58) In 1960, Defender experts believed the detection of rocket plumes against background radiation was manageable. However, the same was not true of using infrared radiation to guide an interceptor during the end game when the interceptor must make its final maneuvers to collide with its target. "Several magnitudes of improvement" were required before this could be achieved. Also, launch costs had to be significantly reduced. Because of limitations such as these, the Army continued its work on the nuclear-tipped, ground-based Zeus. (59)
While the Army pursued its Zeus program, the Air Force--perhaps interested in gaining a role in the expanding, high priority BMD agenda--improperly expanded its own missile defense activities. Specifically, the Air Force diverted some FY1958 funds to its Project Wizard, which by this time had become a full-fledged missile defense program. This expansion of Wizard violated an earlier DOD-service agreement on the division of labor in the missile defense arena. (60)
The origins of this agreement may be traced to a March 1956 Defense Department review of the feasibility of ballistic missile defenses. Conducted by a committee headed by Hector R. Skifter, the review concluded that developing active missile defenses at that time would be prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the U.S. should confine its missile defense efforts to research. (61)
The Skifter report was then reviewed by a higher level DOD committee chaired by Eger V. Murphree, DOD's special assistant for guided missiles. Murphree's panel, which included Air Force and Army representation, recommended proceeding with a joint R&D program for missile defense. In this program, the Air Force would develop the forward acquisition radar system, while the Army developed the weapon system and its associated equipment. In November 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson approved this arrangement and ordered the services to proceed under DOD supervision. In June 1958, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles established a steering committee chaired by Skifter to execute the BMD oversight function. (62)
On March 21, 1957, the Murphree committee refined the agreement on the division of labor. Now, in addition to developing the forward acquisition radar, the Air Force would also develop the means of transmitting acquisition radar data to the Army. At same time, the Army's responsibilities were expanded to include developing the target acquisition and tracking radar. Wilson, who was later succeeded by Neil McElroy, also approved the modified agreement. (63)
Secretary of Defense McElroy learned of the Air Force violation of the refined BMD agreement in January 1958. Since the Zeus missile was well along in the development stage and the Air Force had no missile suitable for the ABM mission, McElroy decided on January 16 that the Army would have primary responsibility for the ABM system. However, he directed the Air Force to continue working on the radar system and the command and control electronics that were under development in the Wizard program and to ensure that the equipment developed was compatible with Zeus. (64)
During the remaining years of the Eisenhower administration, the Army conducted a vigorous campaign to begin production of Zeus. This campaign began in October 1958, about a year before the first successful flight test of the Zeus interceptor. In its budget submission, the Army requested $875 million as the initial outlay for a Zeus defense system that would eventually include 58 batteries. DOD's ABM steering committee reduced this to $708 million for a system that would include only 29 batteries. Another DOD review reduced this figure to $40 million for pre-production expenses and $300 million for R&D. Secretary McElroy approved only the $300 million for R&D, a position that was accepted by President Eisenhower in November 1958. However, based on testimony from Army officials, Congress offered to allocate to the Army an additional $200 million, which could be used either for the Zeus program or to upgrade Army ground equipment. The additional funding was dependent on acceptance of the offer by the Eisenhower administration. (65)
In the midst of the Army's campaign to get Zeus into production, President Eisenhower received two reports that undercut the Army's position. On March 4, 1959, the President's science advisor, James Killian, submitted a report from a science advisory panel; it concluded that an effective Zeus system could not be deployed before 1964 at the earliest. This report was followed by a more detailed review that was briefed to Eisenhower on June 3. (66)
The second report concluded that active BMD systems could best be used to defend hardened sites such as bomber bases and missile silos. Even in this more limited role, Zeus was not expected to be deployed in an effective posture before the 1964-1965 period. Furthermore, Zeus was very complex and would probably have difficulty distinguishing warheads from advanced decoys. Nevertheless, the report recommended proceeding with the Zeus program, since it would provide at least some protection and could serve as the foundation for a later, more advanced system. (67)
Some support for the Army's position came from Dr. Herbert York, former ARPA chief scientist, who had become the Defense Department's first director of defense research and engineering (DDR&E) in December 1958. In a March 21, 1959, discussion with Secretary McElroy, York explained that pre-production funding could be used to develop techniques for mass producing the large numbers of transistors and other components that would be required once Zeus began full-scale production. Allocating $150 million to $200 million in the FY1960 budget for this purpose would allow the Defense Department to postpone the full production decision another year without delaying Zeus's activation date should the decision be made the following year to begin production. Recognizing the significance of pre-production funding, on June 9, 1959, President Eisenhower decided to accept the extra money offered by Congress and chose to allocate $137 million of this money to the Zeus program. (68)
During the fall of 1959, while drawing up the FY 1961 budget, the administration decided to delay the production decision on Zeus for a period that was long enough to obviate the need for the special $137 million for pre-production work. This decision was apparently based on the recommendations of another review group, this one headed by Hector Skirter and George Kistiakowsky, who had replaced Killian as Eisenhower's science advisor earlier in the year. On December 1, 1959, Secretary McElroy informed the Army that funding for Zeus pre-production work would not be available. This decision notwithstanding, DOD's budget request for FY1961 included $287 million for Zeus research and another $15 million for constructing test facilities. (69)
While the FY 1961 budget process was underway, the Army was testing the Zeus missile at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), New Mexico. The first tests failed because of poorly designed control fins on the missile's upper stage. After fixing this problem, the Army completed Zeus's first successful flight test on October 14, 1959. All told, over seventy missiles were fired at WSMR, with nineteen more launched from the Naval Test Range at Point Mugu, California. (70)
These tests masked the fact that neither White Sands nor Point Mugu could support complete testing of the Zeus system, since full testing required the missile to be pitted against the warhead of a long-range ballistic missile. To keep Zeus within the one hundred mile limit of the White Sands Range, the missile could not be fired to an altitude in excess of 100,000 feet. While the interceptor could be fired to an altitude outside the atmosphere at Point Mugu, severe range restrictions meant that range safety destruction systems were on a hair trigger. As a result, several good rockets were destroyed because of minor flight anomalies. Had the terminated tests been conducted on a larger, more isolated range, the rockets could have been allowed to complete their missions. Because of these limitations, the Army was forced to seek another range to complete Zeus testing. (71)
The principal requirement for the new test facility, known as Site X, was a geographical location under U.S. control that could be "bombarded" with long-range target missiles from another U.S. base. After examining possible locations in the Atlantic Ocean down range from Cape Canaveral, the team searching for Site X switched its focus to the Pacific where Kwajalein, the world's largest atoll, became the prime candidate. The atoll's ninety-plus islands surround the world's largest lagoon, which contains about a thousand square miles of water that is shallow enough to permit recovery of test debris. Furthermore, the atoll is 4,800 miles from the Vandenberg Air Force Base test complex--the range that an ICBM would be expected to traverse. Finally, the U.S. Navy had a base on Kwajalein that it had placed on the list of surplus bases in 1958. In early 1959, the Defense Department approved the selection of Kwajalein as the home of the new missile defense test facility. (72)
About a year later, the Army caused a dustup when it proposed testing Zeus against thirty Army Jupiter missiles that would be fired at Kwajalein from Johnson Island, which is located about 1,300 miles northeast of Kwajalein. Although this plan was approved on February 12, 1960, by the deputy secretary of defense, it was greeted in other quarters with suspicion that prompted opposition. For one thing, the use of Jupiter as the Zeus test target was seen by DDR&E York and others as a transparent Army ploy to keep its Jupiter missile program alive. It also seems to have raised concern in York's mind that a test program completely controlled by the Army might produce questionable test results. In April, the DDR&E proposed testing Zeus against ICBMs fired by the Air Force at Vandenberg. York claimed that his proposal would save $75 million dollars by eliminating the requirement to finish the Johnson Island launch facility. (73)
When the Army challenged York's proposal, the issue was reviewed by an ad hoc panel selected from members of the President's Science Advisory Committee. The panel's May 26, 1960 report supported York's position, as did President Eisenhower when the issue was put to him. (74)
Based on the president's decision, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., who had replaced McElroy in 1959, ordered the Army to procure eighteen Atlas ICBMs for tests against Zeus. He also instructed the Air Force to modify at least two of Vandenberg's launch pads to support Zeus testing. On September 22, 1960, the Army and Air Force signed an agreement to execute the secretary's instructions. (75)
In addition to supporting the Army's Nike Zeus test facilities, the Kwajalein atoll provided a base for a Project Defender program known as PRESS for Pacific Range Electromagnetic Signature Studies. The objective of PRESS was to gather information on the behavior of missile warheads during re-entry. In support of this program, ARPA constructed an extensive radar facility on RoiNamur, another of the major islands in the atoll. (76)
Epilogue: Foundation for the Future
Dwight Eisenhower had been present at the dawn of the missile age and was sensitive to the implications of the ballistic missile as a military weapon. Nevertheless, he remained skeptical of ballistic missile defense: hitting a bullet with a bullet seemed too difficult a task.
Without strong presidential support, America's missile defense efforts floated to the top of the defense establishment buoyed upward by a growing awareness that the principal Soviet threat was not the manned bomber, but the ICBM. Eisenhower tended to remain above the bureaucratic fray as officials and advisers sorted through the issues and then generally supported the positions of his senior subordinates. Only in establishing the Advanced Research Projects Agency did he take the lead in an initiative that advanced missile defense developments.
Eisenhower's ARPA decision, which clearly envisioned an agency that would take the lead in advanced BMD research, was vital to the future of missile defense. Project Defender continued until March 1968, when the secretary of defense ordered it transferred to the Army where it became an element in the Army's new Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency. (77) In its decade of existence, Defender originated the concept of the hit-to-kill interceptor and established the general parameters for boost-phase interception; both of these developments figured prominently in the SDI program launched by Ronald Reagan in 1983. Furthermore, Defender launched the homing interceptor technology (HIT) program that fed into the development of the Air Force ASAT that was tested in September 1985. (78) HIT also provided a starting point for SDI's LEAP (Lightweight ExoAtmospheric Projectile) interceptor. Finally, soon after the invention of the laser, Defender took the first look at directed energy weapons as a possible defense against ballistic missiles and carried out pioneering work in the development of lasers. Arguably, ARPA's laser work set a course that led to today's Airborne Laser, the YAL--1A. Already, the Air Force has begun ground testing the system's laser and flight testing the Boeing 747 aircraft that will carry the laser.
More immediate to Eisenhower's own day, the Zeus program that originated in the Bell Laboratories study initiated in 1955 set the U.S. missile defense program on a path that led directly to the Safeguard missile defense system. Safeguard was deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and was operational from October 1975 to February 1976 when Congress ordered the system closed. To the date of this writing, Safeguard remains the only missile defense system the U.S. has deployed that was capable of defending any part of its home territory.
Finally, the Kwajalein Missile Range, established in 1960 and renamed after President Ronald Reagan in 2001, has continued for more than four decades as America's principal BMD test facility. Only recently with the Bush administration's decision to deploy a missile defense system that will provide limited protection for the entire United States has there been a need to expand the Vandenberg-Kwajalein complex to assure adequate testing of missile defense systems.
The role Eisenhower played in the development of missile defenses contrasts sharply with that played by Reagan. Just over two decades after Eisenhower left office, Reagan resurrected ballistic missile defense through a Presidential initiative and made it the centerpiece of America's strategic relations with the Soviet Union. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) drew heavily on developments that flowed from the groundbreaking work of Eisenhower's ARPA and Project Defender, just as today's missile defense program draws on the advances produced in the SDI program.
NOTES
(1.) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 491.
(2.) Though popularly known as the V-2 for Vergeltungswaffe--2 (Vengeance Weapon--2), the name given the rocket by the Nazi propaganda ministry, the long-range German missile was officially developed as the A-4 (Aggregat--4), the fourth model in a series designed and built by Wernher von Braun and his German development team. The A--4 first proposed in 1936, was designed in 1939-1941, and was first launched in June 1942. See Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. 281-82. I have chosen to use the popular designation V-2.
(3.) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1948), p. 229. Eisenhower claimed that his intelligence staff was able to provide "remarkably accurate estimates of the existence, characteristics, and capabilities of the new German weapons." (p. 230) Operation Overlord was the Allied invasion of continental Europe in June 1944.
(4.) The first V-1 attacks against England occurred early in the morning of 13 June 1944. The first V-2s were launched in anger on 7 Sep 1944, but these failed during launch. The next day, one was launched at Paris and hit in the vicinity of that city at eleven in the morning. The first missile to strike a city hit London at 6:43 pm the evening of 8 Sep. For information on these launches, see Neufeld, Rocket and Reich, pp. 245, 327 (n. 13) and Benjamin King and Timothy J. Kutta, Impact: The History of Germany's V-Weapons in World War H (Rockville Centre, N.Y.: Sarpedon, 1988), p. 157 (hereafter cited as King and Kutta, Impact).
(5.) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 259-60.
(6.) Ibid., p. 258. Much of the destructive force of the V-2 was generated by the kinetic energy of the missile's fourton airframe smashing into its target at hypersonic speeds. See King and Kutta, Impact, p. 322, and Neufeld, Rocket and Reich, pp. 220-22. Neufeld noted that to preserve the destructive forces of kinetic energy, the Germans worked hard to overcome a problem with the V-2's breaking upon re-entry, even though the warhead usually survived breakup and struck the target.
(7.) Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy (New York: Bantam Books, 1953), p. 45 (hereafter cited as Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy). While the numbers given for rockets fired and people killed and injured vary from source to source, I have used the figures provided by Churchill. For examples of other numbers on casualties and rockets fired, see Norman Longmate, Hitler's Rockets: The Story of the V-2s (London: Hutchison & Company, 1985), pp. 337, 349, and Basil Collier, The Battle of the V-Weapons: 1944-45 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964), p. 136.
(8.) The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Antiaircraft Artillery Section, "V-2 Rocket Attacks and Defense," Study 42, n.d. [late 1945 or early 1946], document 502.101-42 in the Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, pp. 17-19 (hereafter cited as General Board, "V-2 Rocket Attacks and Defense"); Ronald W. Clark, War Winners (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1979), p. 102; David Irving, The Mare's Nest (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1965), p.280; Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain's Defence Against Air Attack during the Second World War (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1949), pp. 386-388; King and Kutta, Impact, pp. 3, 125. An excellent summary of the Allied defensive effort against the V-2 is contained in W[illiam] S. Mark, Jr., Joseph P. D'Arezzo, R. A. Ranson, and G. D. Bagley, "Detection and Plotting of the V-2 (Big Ben) Missile as Developed in ETO," 4 July 1945, document AFHRC 142.0423-16 Jul-Sep 1945, in the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (hereinafter cited as Mark, "Detection and Plotting of the V-2"). Pile (p. 388) noted that devising this first missile defense architecture involved making "more than 25,000 complicated mathematical calculations."
(9.) Eisenhower is quoted in King and Kutta, Impact, p. 263. For Churchill's assessment, see Triumph and Tragedy, p. 165.
(10.) King and Kutta, Impact, pp. 3,278-82,313.
(11.) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 260.
(12.) B. Bruce-Briggs, The Shield of Faith: A Chronicle of Strategic Defense from Zeppelins to Star Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1988), pp. 102, 271 (hereafter cited as Bruce-Briggs, Shield of Faith). The account of the briefing given here is apparently based on the memories of Lt. Gen. C. J. LeVan, who spent much of his Army career working in the missile defense area. LeVan shared this story with the author in a 1991 interview.
(13.) Theodore von Karman, Science the Key to Air Supremacy, a volume in Theodore von Karman, report director, Toward New Horizons: A Report to General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Dec 1945, pp. 2-3, 13, 47-48, 74-75; The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Antiaircraft Artillery Section, "V-2 Rocket Attacks and Defense," Study 42, n.d. [late 1945 or early 1946], document 502.101-42 in the Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, pp.18-19 (hereafter cited as General Board, "V-2 Rocket Attacks"); United States Naval Technical Mission, Report Number 237-45, as quoted in General Board, "V-2 Rocket Attacks," p.18. See also John B. Medaris, with Arthur Gordon, Countdown for Decision (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), p. 39 (hereafter cited as Medaris, Countdown). For a more accessible edition of von Karman's Science the Key to Air Supremacy, see Michael H. Gorn, ed., "Prophecy Fulfilled: Toward New Horizons" and Its Legacy (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1994). The Gorn volume includes Von Karman's Where We Stand, an interim report he submitted to General Henry H. Arnold on 22 Aug 1945 after a whirlwind tour of German research facilities that included meetings with top German engineers and scientists. Von Karman's comments on rockets and missile defense may be found on pp. 30-35, 165-167 of the Gorn edition.
(14.) Quoted in General Board, "V-2 Rocket Attacks," p. 18. See also Medaris, Countdown, p. 39.
(15.) Joseph W. Stilwell, et. al., Report of War Department Equipment Board, 19 Jan 1946, pp. 1-2, 11 (hereafter cited as Stilwell Report).
(16.) Idid., p. 30.
(17.) Idid., pp. 11, 68-69.
(18.) Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, Vol. I, 1907-1960 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, Dec 1989), pp. 478-79; Headquarters United States Air Force, the Air Force Technical Committee, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, Semi-annual Progress Report of the Guided Missiles Program, Department of the Air Force (31 Oct 1949), Case No. 13-2, Report No. 10, pp. 49-51 (hereafter cited as Air Force Technical Committee, Progress Report, Oct 49). This document was found in the Redstone Scientific Information Center (RSIC), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. During the late 1980s, when I visited the center, over a hundred of the Wizard studies were available in the RSIC. Additional information on Wizard may be found in T. C. Tennant, Survey of Guidance Systems, Part 1, United States Missiles, 31 Mar 1957, pp. III-AC-1--III-AC-3 (hereafter cited as Tennant, Survey). This document is also known as the Gilfillan Report after Gilfillan Brothers, Inc., of Los Angeles, Calif., the company that contracted with the U.S. Army to complete the survey.
(19.) Air Force Technical Committee, Progress Report, Oct 49, pp. 54-56; Tennant, Survey, pp. III-AA-1--III-AA-7. Thumper and Wizard are also discussed in Max Rosenberg, The Air Force and the National Guided Missile Program, 1944-1950 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Air Force, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, June 1964), pp. 75-79.
(20.) Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI: 1944-1983 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), p. 6.
(21.) Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years: 1947-1950, Vol. I, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Alfred Goldberg, gen. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1984), pp. 542-544 (hereafter cited as Rearden, Formative Years); Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year War." Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 123, 127 (hereafter cited as Friedman, Fifty-Year War). Proposed in 1947 by Secretary of State George C. Marshall and implemented in 1948, the Marshall plan provided economic assistance to help European nations recover from the ravages of World War II. The Soviet Union refused to participate in the plan.
(22.) Paul N. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision--A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 91 (hereafter cited as Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost); John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press; Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 98 (hereafter cited as Gaddis, We Know Now).
(23.) Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.:Office of Air Force History, 1990), pp. 94, 102. Contrary to what one might believe, the real importance of the advent of thermonuclear weapons was not that they made possible weapons of virtually unlimited explosive power. Strategic analysts considered one megaton the optimum size for a warhead. The key point is that hydrogen is an abundant and therefore cheap fuel. Thus, the real significance of thermonuclear weapons is that they ushered in the era of nuclear plenty. For a discussion of this point, see Edward Teller, Memoirs: A Twentieth-Century Journey in Science and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Publishing, 2001), p. 346.
(24.) Rearden, Formative Years, pp. 525-26.
(25.) Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956, Vol. III, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Alfred Goldberg, gen. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), pp. 379-398 (hereafter cited as Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look); Derek Leebaert, The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), p. 182 (hereafter cited as Leebaert, Fifty Year Wound); Gaddis, We Know Now, p. 239. One example of this manipulation occurred during the Tushino Air Show of July 1955. Before the show, the Soviets painted over the tail numbers on their Bison bombers. During the show, they first flew ten Bisons over observers. The ten planes then circled outside the view of people on the ground and were joined by eight other Bisons for a second pass over the observers. These Bison sightings suggested that the Soviets might have the ability to deliver a major nuclear attack on the U.S. as early as 1958.
(26.) Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age: 1956-1960, Vol. IV, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Alfred Goldberg, gen. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), pp. 315, 349, 351 (hereafter cited as Watson, Missile Age).
(27.) Asif A. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974, NASA SP-2000-4408 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, History Office, 2000), pp. 8, 40-42, 55 (hereafter cited as Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo).
(28.) Ibid., pp. 41, 62, 71, 83. In 1947, Stalin was interested specifically in the German concept of an antipodal bomber, a piloted rocket glider. (See Siddiqi, pp. 50-51.)
(29.) Ibid., pp. 73-75, 87, 97, 105-108.
(30.) Ibid., pp. 129, 132-133. Sakharov was the Soviet equivalent of Edward Teller, who has been called the father of the American hydrogen bomb.
(31.) Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, p. 287.
(32.) Walter A. McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp. 117-18 (hereafter cited as McDougall, Heavens); Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, p. 348.
(33.) Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, p. 353-56; McDougall, Heavens, pp. 117-18.
(34.) Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, pp. 423-25, 433-36, 677; McDougall, Heavens, p. 116.
(35.) McDougall, Heavens, p. 116.
(36.) Bell Laboratories, ABM Research and Development at Bell Laboratories: Project History, 1975 (Study completed for the U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command under contract DAHC60-71-C-0005), p. I-1 (hereafter cited as Bell Labs, ABM Project History).
(37.) Ibid., p. I-11.
(38.) Ibid., pp. I-12, I-14.
(39.) Ibid., pp. I-15--I-16.
(40.) Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, Deterrence & Survival in the Nuclear Age, Washington, D.C., 7 Nov 1957, p. iii, reprinted in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (The "Gaither Report" of 1957) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) (hereafter cited as Gaither Report); Watson, Missile Age, pp. 136-37.
(41.) McDougall, Heavens, pp. 60-61, 250; Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, p. 160. Life is quoted in Gaddis, We Know Now, p. 241. McDougall mistakenly gives the date of 3 Aug 1957 for the first successful R-7 launch.
(42.) Watson, Missile Age, pp. 129, 133, 187-88, 247.
(43.) Gaither Report, pp. 8-9.
(44.) Ibid., pp. 5-8.
(45.) Ibid., p. 28.
(46.) Ibid., p. 29. Defense against submarine launched missiles is also briefly discussed here.
(47.) Watson, Missile Age, pp. 179-86. For the quoted material, see p. 186.
(48.) Ibid., p. 189. Some in Congress doubted that McElroy had the authority to establish ARPA. Supporters of the new agency secured passage of a bill that removed any doubt about the secretary's authority. Although this legislation was apparently unnecessary, Eisenhower signed the bill into law on 12 Feb 1958.
(49.) G.P. Sutton, "Summary of 1960 Defender Program," in Ballistic Missile Defense Program of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, A Review of Project Defender for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 2529 July 1960, Volume II, p. 907 (hereafter the article is cited as Sutton, "Summary" and the volume as Defender Review, 1960, Vol. II). Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970; A Clarion Book), p. 118 (hereafter cited as York, Race to Oblivion), stated that Project Defender was "a collection of new ideas, proposals, and research programs related to missile defense."
(50.) Robert W. Seidel, "How the Military Responded to the Laser," Physics Today, Oct 1988, pp. 36-37; Bruce-Briggs, Shield of Faith, pp. 224-25; R. C. Weidler, "Kill Mechanisms--Introduction," in Defender Review, 1960, Vol. II, pp. 793-94; Sutton, "Summary," pp. 913-14.
(51.) Harold N. Beveridge, "Defender Introduction," in Ballistic Missile Defense Program of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, A Review of Project Defender for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 25-29 July 1960, Volume I, pp. 8-9, 18 (hereafter, the article is cited as Beveridge, "Defender Introduction," and the volume is cited as Defender Review, 1960, Vol. I).
(52.) Ibid., p. 18.
(53.) Ibid., p. 17-18.
(54.) Ibid., pp. 18-19.
(55.) In the early sixties, U.S. missile designers developed the concept of placing multiple warheads on each ICBM giving rise to the term multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle or MIRV. See Friedman, Fifty-Year War, p. 294.
(56.) Everett T. Welmers, "BAMBI: Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept," Defender Review, 1960, Vol. I, pp. 36-41, 46-47 (hereafter cited as Welmers, "BAMBI").
(57.) Beveridge, "Defender Introduction," pp. 20-23.
(58.) MIDAS, an early-warning satellite that used an infrared sensor to detect the launch of rockets, was first orbited in 1960. For the story of MIDAS, see R. Cargill Hall, Missile Defense Alarm: The Genesis of Space-Based Infrared Early Warning, (Washington, D.C.: NRO History Office, June 1999).
(59.) Welmers, "BAMBI," pp. 48-65; Sutton, "Summary," p. 914. Welmers made an interesting remark about the development of countermeasures: "Although it is often easier to conceive of countermeasures than to create effective hardware for their accomplishment, there are very serious aspects of BAMBI countermeasure[s] which must be considered." Sutton noted that the "nuclear kill scheme [was] still a favorite mechanism" in the summer of 1960. For a discussion of efforts to develop the means of detecting a rocket plume against background radiation, see Hall, MIDAS, pp. 3-22.
(60.) Watson, Missile Age, p. 189.
(61.) Ibid., pp. 170-71.
(62.) Ibid., pp. 171, 197, 379.
(63.) Ibid., p. 171.
(64.) Neil H. McElroy to Secretary of the Air Force, Memorandum, Subject: "Program for Defense Against the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile," 16 Jan 1958; Neil H. McElroy to Secretary of the Army, Memorandum, Subject: "Program for Defense Against the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile," 16 Jan 1958. A copy of each letter was printed in U.S., House, Committee on Armed Services, Investigation of National Defense Missiles: Hearings before the Committee on H.R. 67, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1958, pp. 4196-97.
(65.) Watson, Missile Age, pp. 379-80.
(66.) Ibid., p. 380.
(67.) Ibid., p. 380.
(68.) Ibid., pp. 288, 380-381.
(69.) Ibid., pp. 326, 381.
(70.) Eugene M. Emme, compiler, Aeronautics and Astronautics: An American Chronology of Science and Technology in the Exploration of Space, 1915-1960 (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1961), p. 114; Bell Labs, ABM Project History, pp. I-22--I-23.
(71.) Bell Labs, ABM Project History, p. I-21.
(72.) Bruce-Briggs, Shield of Faith, pp. 142-44.
(73.) Ibid., p. 144; Watson, Missile Age, p. 382; York, Race to Oblivion, p. 140.
(74.) Watson, Missile Age, p. 382.
(75.) Ibid., p. 382.
(76.) Bruce-Briggs, Shield of Faith, p. 144.
(77.) James A. Walker, Frances Martin, and Sharon S. Watkins, Strategic Defense: Four Decades of Progress (Huntsville, Ala.: Historical Office, U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 1995), pp. C-7 - C-8.
(78.) For a recent article on the Air Force ASAT, see Robert Kilgo, "The History of the United States Anti-Satellite Program and the Evolution to Space Control and Offensive and Defensive Counterspace," Quest, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2004, pp. 30-39. Kilgo does not discuss the Defender roots of the miniature homing vehicle that became the heart of the AF ASAT system tested in 1985.
Donald R. Baucom is a 1962 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He earned his Ph.D. in the History of Science from the University of Oklahoma in 1976. Dr. Baucom's federal service includes twenty-eight years as an officer in the Air Force and thirteen years in the civil service. Between 1987 and 2003, he was the historian for DoD's missile defense program. His book, Origins of SDI: 19441983, won the 1994 Leopold Prize of the Organization of American Historians.
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| Author: | Baucom, Donald R. |
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| Publication: | Air Power History |
| Geographic Code: | 1USA |
| Date: | Dec 22, 2004 |
| Words: | 11171 |
| Previous Article: | From the editor. |
| Next Article: | Lt. Gen. Forrest S. McCartney: the first space professional. |
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