Workplace partnerships in the United States and Europe.
Technological innovations, major improvements in the speed and nature of mass communications, regulatory reform, and other factors have made the work force a valuable and, at times, essential analytical tool in the work process. However, low skilled and labor intensive jobs have been transferred to countries with lower labor costs, although many of these countries face a serious social and economic future, and some mass assembly operations may remain in the United States to take advantage of its highly educated labor supply. In addition, jobs requiting specific skills will be of even greater value in the delivery of domestic goods and services.
Some in businesses, government, academia, and organized labor have touted worker-employer partnerships as the key to future economic survival. For example, at the 1992 convention of the United Steel Workers union, the dominant theme and aspiration of the delegates was "employee empowerment"; a few months later, the union withdrew from early negotiations with usx Corp. because the company did not make employee empowerment a priority.(1) The Journal of Commerce, a business periodical, noted that 80 percent of Fortune 500 companies, union and nonunion, have established worker involvement programs.(2) Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich, while an instructor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, told a labor-management conference in 1988 that labor is a participant in the "new American enterprise" and that workers are the entrepreneurs of the future.(3) MIT industrial relations professor Tom Kochan has noted that changes in the workplace stem, in part, from the "rising expectations of workers for increased influence over their immediate work environment and their long term careers."(4) Even in collective bargaining involving our national pastime, Major League Baseball Players union representative Donald Fehr has said that if club owners "want a true partnership, then we want to be co-owners of the business."(5)
But to some, participation programs have negative connotations. Most trade unionists may have accepted the premise that workplace structures such as quality circles, worker committees, and joint decisionmaking will be a part of nonunion and mixed union operations. But many unionists balk at conceding power they have won in collective bargaining--increased flexibility in union work rules, job classifications, seniority provisions-for a more decentralized employee-controlled system in which management may want to return to a type of workplace domination that Henry Ford introduced in the 1920's and 1930's.(6) Despite the absence of empirical data, unions often perceive such employer driven experiments as schemes to bust or avoid unions.(7) In fact, a minority segment of the United Auto Workers vows to oppose all "jointness" programs as destructive of hard-won bargaining rights.(8)
Even scholars who disagree with that premise are concerned about the low unionization rate in the United States, compared with rates in other nations that have strong joint labor-management programs. Only 15.8 percent of American workers are union members--with approximately half that proportion in public sector unions.(9) In comparison, Denmark's unionization rate is 85 percent, Germany and Canada, 40 percent each, and the Netherlands, 25 percent.(10) Critics of some American programs argue that strict government legislation protecting union rights in these countries ensures the success of worker participation programs.
In 1989, the Department of Labor issued a four-volume report on U.S. labor law, examining legal impediments to labor-management cooperation.(11) Labor Secretary Reich and Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown appointed a committee of labor, management, and academic experts to further study these and other related issues.(12) Some business interests challenge the formation and intent of the commission, claiming that government wants to tilt the playing field of industrial relations in favor of organized labor. Partisans of several union and non-union plans are preparing an agenda for any proposed changes in labor laws affecting labor-management cooperation.
Despite the criticism of workplace participation proposals, a consensus has formed, predicting that such models will be part of the U.S. business landscape well into the 21st century. At a recent seminar on the German workplace participation model, known as "co-determination," one participant noted that there is no real paradigm applicable to the United States.(13)
What type of programs or paradigms can be implemented? American concepts designed by Edwards Deming, and several other efficiency experts, are the building blocks of the so-called Japanese model of worker empowerment.(14) The German system is a hybrid of its own traditional "codetermination," with standards the U.S., British, and French administrators established in occupied Germany following Word War II. The British historically practiced "joint consultation," a form of participation that evolved from 19th century guild socialism, Fabian socialism, and "job control" concepts of trade unionism forged during World War I.(15)
The highly publicized German model is just one concept that may have some qualities adaptable to a U.S. model. Barry Bluestone and Irving Bluestone noted that the work structure at the Spring Hill, TN, Saturn production facility, a subsidiary of General Motors, bears a strong resemblance to the German model.(16)
This brief examination of "workerempowerment" concepts does not intend to refute other theories, such as UCLA professor Sanford Jacoby's contention that the U.S. and Japanese systems have more in common with each other (work force, contractual heritage, political and economic structure) than with systems in Europe.(17) Nor does this report attempt to address the concerns of trade unionism that an industrial democracy program already has a foundation in the collective bargaining process. This report examines one of many ideas to maintain quality workplaces while providing for a competitive system of delivering goods and services.
Everything old is new again
Worker participation innovations touted today have their origins in the 19th century. The National Labor Union in the 1870's advocated producer cooperatives that were roughly comparable to present-day employee stock ownership plans designed to gain economic power from employer-capitalists and their political allies in the production process. By the 1890's, some disciples of Frederick Taylor's "scientific management" theories advocated industrial democracy based on the tenets of representational democracy. Power, however, was endowed to employers. For example, the Colorado Fuel & Iron Representation plan of John D. Rockefeller was an afterthought to the bloody massacre in 1914 of union coal miners and their families at the company's Ludlow, co, mines.
The B&O railroad plan, designed by efficiency expert Otto Beyer in the 1920's, was more equitable, giving control of the work process at the railroad's maintenance facilities to teams of union machinists. UAW leader Walter Reuther advocated a similar collective bargaining approach for "team concept" manufacturing of airplanes by workers during World War II. Probably the closest comparison to a "codetermination" model was the jointly operated program in the 1920's and 1930's of garment industry employers and the needle-trades workers in the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union led by Sidney Hillman.
Following World War II, CIO leaders, in particular, CIO President Philip Murray, promoted a corporate-style model of workplace partnership using "industry councils." Employers and union leaders would share industry decisionmaking on a domestic and global scale. Employer representatives at President Harry Truman's 1947 conference on labor-management relations firmly informed political and union leaders that decisionmaking power was a management prerogative. Capping the major changes in postwar industrial relations, the Taftf-Hartley Act of 1947 reshaped New Deal industrial relations from a cooperative approach to collective bargaining rooted in conflict.
However, that model has changed and past theories, once ignored, now have greater meaning as the U.S. economy becomes more closely tied with other national economies. The United Steel Workers of America, for example, advocates worker empowerment schemes that originated with Murray's "industry council" concept at the time he was president of the union.
The rising popularity of worker partnership and worker control in the United States paralleled economic changes around the world at the turn of the century. The rise of industrial capitalism that spawned employer-worker conflict resulted in numerous attempts to maintain a balance of economic and social power between management and workers. In France, Marxist influenced syndicalists preached total worker control of the means of production as did the Industrial Workers of the World in the United States. In Great Britain, "joint consultation" emerged from World War I in labor-management "Whitley" councils. This power-sharing arrangement allowed union shop stewards and employers to collaborate on issues but gave management ultimate decisionmaking power. Sweden, Austria, Holland, and Japan, among other industrialized nations, codified worker-manager cooperation through legislation in the early 1920's.
German works councils
Germany established the real framework for worker-employer "codetermination" of industry. The revolutionary upheavals of 1848 in which democratic impulses revolted against centralized autocratic authority paved the way for producer cooperatives among the printers and cigar makers unions; many founders of the modern American labor movement, such as Samuel Gompers, Adolph Strasser, and William Sylvis derived their collective bargaining theories from these experiences.(18)
While status quo governments crushed the European revolts, the trade union movement grew, counteracting the accumulation of economic and political power by industrial capital. In Germany under Otto yon Bismarck, union influence led to the Betrieb (works council) Act of 1891.(19) This improvement of the German Industrial Code gave workers committees advisory rights to draw up factory regulations; its intent was to prevent social unrest by the working class by offering a collective bargaining grievance system to work out differences between employers and workers.
The revolutionary fervor that led to the collapse of Czarist rule in Russia was spreading across Europe, and political leaders sought to quell that force in Germany with further advances in worker copartnership. The Weimar government's Codetermination Act of 1920 was of limited success, due not to inherent weaknesses in the council system, but to the serious postwar economic conditions of Germany; this would have a similar impact on labormanagement cooperation in the depression-tom United States.(20) Due to the worldwide economic depression, labor conflict, not worker participation, contributed to the social upheavals that led to the cataclysm of World War II. With that in mind, Allied administrators in postwar Europe viewed the anti-Nazi German Trade Union Federation (DGB-- Deutsche Gewerkschaftbund) as a foundation for a new democratic industrial society.
In its least complicated interpretation, German "codetermination" consists of power sharing in a "works council" system. Employees in establishments of five or more workers elect representatives to a "works committee" usually with a specific agenda or function to monitor. Work committee representatives at larger facilities serve on "works councils" (the number of representatives is proportionate to the enterprises' size), which share decisionmaking with management representatives on a "supervisory board" roughly comparable to a board of directors of a U.S. company.
Several legislative acts codify the role trade unions play in the process, and the Works Constitution Act of 1952 specifies that in the second level of the "works council" process, labor representatives must account for one-third of the members of the supervisory board of firms with between 500 and 2,000 employees. The Codetermination Act of 1976 supplements that law, providing for an equal number of trade union representatives from inside the firm and outside the German Labor Federation. Legislation does not require trade union membership on smaller works councils, but approximately 80 percent of those elected are union members.
The German system is divided into two branches, with special regulations that govern labor-management relations in the coal, iron, and steel industries. The supervisory board of the works council is comprised of an equal number of shareholder and labor representatives, in addition to a neutral member. A "labor director" serves on a management board with rights equal to others. This "super-codetermination" differs from general worker participation because most of the firm's power lies with the management board, which usually consists of three or four members, although the board selects the representatives. As one of the most powerful members of company management, the Labor Manager, who is selected by the trade union in consultation with the workers and managers, is considered one of the key elements in this "super-codetermination."
In either general worker participation or general codetermination system, but particularly with the latter, a works council at the plant level has the right to help determine wages and working conditions; hours, including overtime; holidays and working schedules; introduction and use of new technologies; and safety and health. A works council also has extensive rights to participate in matters concerning the organization of workplaces, work sequences, and the work environment as well as in staff planning and vocational training matters. A separate youth and trainee delegation also is elected to the works council.
In general, the laws direct the works councils to cooperate with the unions and employers for the "well being of the establishment and its employees with due consideration for the general welfare." But the council functions similarly to American local trade unions in handling grievances, administering plant welfare agencies, and monitoring labor laws and collective bargaining agreements, such as concluding supplementary agreements on wages and working conditions. Strikes and other disputes are referred to arbitration during the life of the contract.
The general view is that trade unions are fairly weak at the local level: real influence in shared decisions is wielded by the works councils. But the DGB's influence, among workers and in the political system, has strengthened as a result of codetermination. U.S. union officials have expressed concern that German workers place more importance on their works councils than on local unions, and in a U.S. system of decentralized employee-controlled decisionmaking, workers' power and influence would diminish further. U.S. unionists believe that this factor would win management's favor.
But the overall policy aspects could signal an increase in international and national power and influence wielded by international unions and the AFL-CIO. Just as importantly, workers would obtain a say and not merely a consultative role in the direction of the U.S. economy. And in mixed union-nonunion settings, the trend has been for union leaders to assume representation roles in German and U.S. workplace partnerships.
What degree of power or say would unions have in the United States? The Steelworkers union, for example, seems to be heading in the direction of full codetermination. But could corporations silence the workers' voice on the boards of directors by not seating a union representative on the board? Would legislation protect this voice?
Whatever the answers might be, the German system warrants consideration because it appears to establish a framework for a European system of employer-employee partnership in the single economic market of the European Community. While that system slowly evolves, with competing forces pulling policymakers in different directions, it will have a distinct German flavor.
The European model
On January 1, 1993, the 12 nations in the European Community, culminating a 40-year effort, officially became a single economic market. The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted by ministers of the European Community countries in December 1989, authorized national representatives to issue ground rules, or "directives," for the European organization. A particular directive provides for "information, consultation, and participation for workers ." It would require multinational corporations operating in more than one member country of the European Community to form works councils. All member nations except the United Kingdom have approved this directive, but disagree over the details, according to Danish Labor Minister Jytte Andersen.
The difficult details of employee involvement standards have so far been avoided. Firms will have to adopt one of three models of industrial democracy: the German codetermination model with workers on supervisory boards; the Italian-Franco model, involving worker councils in a consultative role; or the Swedish model in which rules for participation are made by special agreement between employers and trade unions, but are similar to the German concepts. The test cases are Volkswagen of Germany, Airbus Industrie of France, the European social dialog assembly of the French-based Saint-Gobain, and the world council of Wade union representatives of Thomson Consumer Electronics of Britain.
Except for Volkswagen, these organizations are different from the German works council as defined by the Works Constitutional Acts of 1952 and 1972. But German ideas and experience will continue to influence the debate on suitable approaches to increased participation of workers in enterprise decisionmaking, according to Johannes Schregle, former director of the International Labor Organization's Industrial Relations and Labor Administration Department.(21) To allay fears of some trade unionists, employees across Europe may unite in pan-European works councils as some wade unions take advantage of the councils to form the foundation of a fledgling system of pan-European industrial relations, according to some observers.
Britain is the only member country without legal provisions for employee representation. British industrial relations have gone from historical consultation to conflict. Other nations such as the United States, Canada, and even South Africa, are headed in the opposite direction. For example, the Swedish Parliament reorganized the Center for Working Life into a research institute focusing on worker participation and power relationships in the labor market and work life in general.(22) The Netherlands welcomes business initiatives from other countries with the understanding that its laws require partnership decisions by works councils.(23)
In Britain in the 1980's, it was clear that management needs were the driving objectives of industrial relations. The approaches to labor issues devised by Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford dominated over democratic, participatory, or quality of working life objectives. According to several British experts, "It may be that the British evidence reflects an unusually laggardly or blinkered response to the opportunities for flexible production systems."(24) A report to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development expressed concern that conflict in Britain may lead to inferior product quality in the competitive marketplace. As a consequence, British capital will continue "to emigrate to survive."(25) In the United States, the United Auto Workers, with strong global ties, reported that 20,000 Otis Elevator workers are pressing the company to recognize a European Works council for workers in Britain, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Finland. How that will be organized in Britain remains to be seen.(26)
Ironically, while some American trade unionists fear that worker representation plans and other workplace partnership arrangements threaten to reduce their power and influence, many European companies worry that works councils could be used to orchestrate European strikes. The European Trade Union Congress supports the European Community directive requiring works councils and other forms of worker participation in the managerial process. Because European Community legislation requires a three-step approval by the Council of Ministers, observers cannot yet distinguish which model will emerge as the standard. What is certain is that Britain 's minister of industry and European employers will mount strong opposition to the directives mandating German codetermination.
Some form of works council structure will dominate labor relations in the European Community, leaving open the question about the implications this will have for the United States. University of Pennsylvania economist Duncan Colin Campbell, who has examined the European Community work arrangements and its implications for the United States, contends that a totally corporatist plan--union-management decisionmaking tempered by a bureaucratic government--is as unworkable as the plan based on complete decentralization, deregulation, and competition along Fordist lines.
If I were an American trade unionist, I would take something of a "worker rights" perspective on the social dimension and particularly on the Social Charter's action program [works councils and shared decisionmaking]... If I were an employer, I would be supportive of a range of social dimension initiatives, the many that promote freedom of movement, or competitive efficiencies through vocational training, as well as those that set standards in occupational safety and health.(27)
Similar arguments could be raised regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement. (NAFTA) Job flexibility, worker rights, and worker partnerships are important aspects of current debate. While such discussion generates heated arguments when made in reference to the European model of codetermination, NAFTA parties will not likely require the participating nations to follow models now in effect. But some type of hybrid solution, based more on voluntarism than on legislation, may be possible to allay labor's concerns and help ensure ratification of the treaty.
The North American plan
Considerable media and print attention has been devoted to comparisons between the U.S. and European models, overlooking Canada and its role in NAFTA. Giving employees the right to participate in decisions that affect their work is a fundamental premise of Canadian and U.S. labor policy. The New Deal model of industrial relations in the United States was copied closely by the Canadian Legislature and has served Canada's social and economic needs for more than 50 years.
Industrial relations developments in Canada suggest that a statutory works council option may work in the United States. According to Roy Adams, professor of industrial relations at McMaster University, "Although not called works councils, recent initiatives have characteristics very similar to European works councils." For example, Canadian law mandates occupational health and safety committees for all establishments, with the number of employees depending on the size of a firm and the particulars established by provincial legislatures. The legislation intended that decisionmaking within the committees be cooperative rather than adversarial.(28) For example, one Canadian study found that the province of Ontario "automatically gave workers a legislated right to participate in management of the workplace...(29)
Voluntary works councils already are functioning in Canada, including one at the Chrysler Motor Co.'s Bramalea, Ontario, plant. "After decades of fighting, Chrysler and its union are united, brought together by a brutal recession and a common foe," said one Canadian observer. "The success of the plant will depend on a cultural revolution and the ability to truly empower workers."(30)
South of the border, similar labor-management workplace partnerships are anything but new. "Team concept" work organization has been a staple of the Shreveport, LA, General Motors-UAW program since the 1970's. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers and the Xerox Corp. have used an employee involvement program since 1980, featuring "autonomous and semi-autonomous" work groups. The success of that joint labor-management program was recognized by the Malcolm Baldridge Quality Award in 1992. Still another workplace model receiving attention is by some accounts the closest to a "codetermination" model. This joint labor-management effort functions in the incongruous setting of a right-to-work sunbelt State.
The United Auto Workers (UAW) and the management of General Motors' (GM) Saturn auto production plant in Spring Hill, TN, have entered a new form of work organization based on copartnership. The Saturn work process is designed to stimulate information sharing and group decisionmaking by eliminating bureaucratic approaches to labor relations. The Saturn Action Council, consisting of the company president, his staff, and the UAW local president replaces an executive staff traditional at most GM plants.
Three advisory councils provide a forum for shared decisionmaking between company officials and UAW representatives in areas such as product engineering; manufacturing; and sales, service, and marketing. The Manufacturing Action Council has taken on the production manager and general superintendent functions. In addition, an integrated group of company representafives and elected union advisers, known as Business Units, monitor the manufacturing and assembly process. These units assume the roles usually reserved to general plant supervisors. "Management rights" clauses in the uAw-Saturn compact, the local collective bargaining agreement, are absent from this hierarchy. Job classifications at Saturn are limited to one production classification for unskilled tasks and three for specific skills-based jobs. The "team concept," which consists of 6 to 15 workers called a "work unit," decide all production line tasks, including inventory needs, leave and vacation schedules, and similar operations of first-line supervisors.
The purpose of this operation is to provide consensus decisionmaking. Originally, the Saturn was planned as a subcompact car: in a consensus labor-management decision, the prototype was upgraded to a sporty larger car to compete with the Nation's top-selling Honda Accord. This "team approach" even set car pricing and selling standards. Consumer satisfaction also is a joint goal: when improper coolant was used in one batch of cars, Saturn work unit members voted to replace the entire auto, not just the cooling systems. The best description of Saturn production is the concept of codetermination: the yaw is involved in all stages of production--design, participating in strategic and leadership sessions that form and shape corporate directions, and post-delivery efforts to ensure customer satisfaction.
In their blueprint for labor relations in the coming decade, Barry Bluestone and Irving Bluestone cited Saturn as the workplace model to be emulated.(31) The action councils at Saturn are compatible with the works council concept in German industry, and the presence of the local UAW president on the Saturn Action Council resembles the labor manager in one of the German iron, coal, and steel production facilities. The difference, however, is that the Saturn production system is voluntary.(32)
The system is not without problems or critics. UAW local president Mike Bennett narrowly won re-election in April 1993 because of some rank-andfile complaints about traditional overtime incentives and other benefits, even though local union members approved the collective bargaining agreement only a month before. "New Directions," a dissident group in the UAW, has targeted the Saturn agreement as the source of many problems related to union security and maintenance of membership issues.
Yet it is suggested that Saturn will change entirely industrial labor relations in the United States. Fears of employer domination of works councils appear to have diminished following the ruling by the National Labor Relations Board in the Electromation and DuPont cases, which prevents management domination of labor-management committees, not their formation.
Moving beyond slogans
Empowerment, codetermination, consensus decisionmaking, and other terms are of no value if they merely are hollow slogans.(33) Labor and management must be committed to the new work culture of shared decisionmaking, with risks viewed as part of the process. Considering past experiences with labor law reform, any structural changes in work organization along the lines addressed in this report will more likely be arranged at the enterprise or industry level in private negotiations. Legal reform may follow the examples set in the private and even public sectors, or even emulate State paradigms.
Labor's fears of these programs circumventing collective bargaining are not unreasonable, but a careful consideration of European and Canadian models, and what labor and management are achieving at Saturn, demonstrates that those fears can be overcome. A survey of 20 Canadian companies found that in mixed union-nonunion settings, union members assumed responsibility for operating involvement groups.(34) Other studies conclude that difficulties between companies and unions over employee involvement programs usually can be traced to a history of poor labor-management relations. This may not be a surprise due to a declining unionization rate and efforts by employers to further reduce union strength.
But there are risks for management also. Consensus decisionmaking, such as at Saturn, tend to yield long-run, not short-run, benefits.(35) Some employers fear that relocating to areas of cheap, abundant labor is easier than investing in expensive programs while competitors surge forward, operating in traditional adversarial systems.
These designs lead to a genuine and deserved skepticism among labor, management, government, and academia.(36) Yet these risks--participating in the process of industrial democracy--may be and probably are no greater than those in a political democracy. Despite the beliefs by some to the contrary, employee empowerment has a clear historical record in the United States. Programs have often emerged as a reaction to a crisis and disappeared under a similar cataclysm. We need to let the lessons of history work and understand their social and economic consequences.
1 Henry P. Guzda, "Report of the United Steel Workers Convention," Monthly Labor Review, December 1992, pp. 46-48.
2 Editorial, Journal of Commerce, Mar. 26, 1993.
3 Robert B. Reich, "The New Enterprise." Keynote address to Governor's Conference, St. Paul, MN, Nov. 21, 1988.
4 Thomas Kochan and Robert McKersie, "Future Directions for American Labor and Human Resource Policy." Address to 1st Industrial Relations Conference of the Americas, Quebec City, Canada, Aug. 25, 1988.
5 "Baseball's Owners Are Finally Taking a Whack at the Ball," Business Week, Apr. 12, 1993, pp. 66-67.
6 Sanford Jacoby, "Enterprise Unions in the United States," Industrial Relations, Winter 1992, pp. 137-40.
7 Daily Labor Report, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Dec. 22, 1992, p. A7.
8 Henry P. Guzda, "Report on the 30th Constitutional Convention of the taw," Monthly Labor Review, September 1992, pp. 41-42.
9 "Union Membership Continues to Drop," USDL 93-43 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), Feb. 8, 1993.
10 Daily Labor Report, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Feb. 9, 1993, pp. A1, B3.
11 "U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor Management Cooperation: Final Report," U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Management Cooperation, June 1989.
12 "Brown and Reich Announce Worker-Management Commission," USDL 93-105 (U.S. Department of Labor), Mar. 24, 1993.
13 Malcolm Lovell, "Address before the Industrial Relations Research Seminar on German Works Councils." Mar. 17, 1993.
14 C.D. King and M. van de Vail, Models of Industrial Democracy (The Hague, Mouton Publishers), 1978, pp. 3-44.
15 Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell Harris, Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise (Boston, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-20; Milton Derber, The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865-1965, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 5-50; Henry P. Guzda, "Industrial Democracy: Made in the USA," Monthly Labor Review, May 1984, pp. 26-34.
16 Barry Bluestone and Irving Bluestone, Negotiating the Future: A Labor Perspective on American Business (New York, Basic Books, 1992), pp. 194-95.
17 Lichtenstein and Hams, Industrial Democracy in America, pp. 206-15.
18 Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Trade Union Movement in the FRG--Fact Sheet," November 1992.
19 Heinz Mathiessen, "Address Before the Industrial Relations Research Seminar on German Works Councils." March 17, 1993; Johannes Schregle, "The German Model of Worker Participation," World of Work, January 1992, pp. 22-24; Sylvia Schloss, "Carrot or Club?" Industrial Society, September 1990, pp. 9-13.
20 Walther Muller-Jentasch, Katharina Rehermann, and Hans Sperling, "Experts Report on Labour Market Flexibility and Work Organisation in Germany," OECD document, Paris, Sept. 17-19, 1990.
21 Schregle, "The German Model of Worker Participation," January 1992, p. 24.
22 J.R. Schaafsma, "The Netherlands," International Financial Law Review, April 1989, p, 56; Vasso Papandreou, "Flexible Approach to Involvement,'' Personnel Management, May 1991, p. 19.
23 Berger Viklund, "Arbetslivscetrum Reorganized," Economic and Industrial Democracy, August 1992, p. 437.
24 Harvie Ramsay, Anna Pollert, and Helen Rainbird, "Experts Report on Labor Market Flexibility and Worker Organization in the United Kingdom", OECD document, Paris, Sept. 17-19, 1990, pp. 20-27.
25 P.B. Beaumont, P. Cressey, and P. Jacobson, "West German Subsidiaries in Britain," Employee Relations Journal, June 1990, pp. 3-7; "Europe's Trade Unions: Unite and Rule," Economist, Oct. 31, 1992, pp. 70-72.
26 Geoffrey Furlonger, "Multinational Companies Contemplate Creation of European Works Councils," Benefits Quarterly Review, Winter, 1992, pp. 36-39.
27 Duncan Colin Campbell, "The Social Dimension and 1992." Paper presented at conference on the European Community and its implications for U.S. workers, U.S. Department of Labor and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mar. 19-20, 1990, Washington, DC.
28 Roy Adams, "Should Works Councils Be Used as Industrial Policy?" Monthly Labor Review, July, 1985, pp. 25-28; Robert Gordon, "Paper on Labour Market Flexibility and Work Organization." OECD document, Paris, Sept. 18, 1990.
29 Gordon Brockhouse, "Can this Marriage Succeed?" Canadian Business, October 1992, pp. 128-30.
30 Brockhouse, "Can this Marriage Succeed?" pp. 128-30.
31 Batty Bluestone and Irving Bluestone, Negotiating the Future, pp. 191-201.
32 Hank Guzda, "Saturn: The Sky's the Limit," Labor Relations Today, March/April 1990, pp. 1-3.
35 Joy K. Reynolds, "A Perspective on the Electromation Case from the U.S. Department of Labor," Labor Law Journal, June 1992, p. 402; News Release, National Planning Association, "Labor-Management Innovations Critical to U.S. Competitiveness," p. 2.
34 Phil Alexander, "Empowerment... Slogan or Operating Principle," Journal for Quality and Participation, October/November 1992, pp. 26-28.
35 Nicholas Baloff and Elizabeth Doherty, "Potential Pitfalls in Employee Participation," Organizational Dynamics, Winter 1989, pp. 51-62.
36 Bernard Portis and Neil Hill, "Improving Organizational Effectiveness Through Employee Involvement,'' Business Quarterly, Winter 1989, pp. 58-61.
Henry P. Guzda is a senior industrial relations specialist in the Office of the American Workplace, U.S. Department of Labor.
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|Title Annotation:||employee participation in management|
|Author:||Guzda, Henry P.|
|Publication:||Monthly Labor Review|
|Date:||Oct 1, 1993|
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