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Why Gender Matters to the Euthanasia Debate.

On Decisional Capacity and the Rejection of Women's Death Requests

The euthanasia debate has typically addressed the tension between patient autonomy and physician obligations. Where physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia are concerned, ethicists balance a patient's request to die against both the physician's role as healer and her duty of nonmaleficence. The physician is seen to be in a moral dilemma in which her commitments to healing and saving lives conflict with her commitment to serving her patients' needs, respecting their autonomy, and maintaining their trust. The focal question for ethical debate has thus been: how much should patient autonomy govern the practices of physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia?

Such questions are too narrowly formulated because they fail to address the background conditions that may affect a patient's death request. Besides individual agency, we must take into account the ways gender roles and social circumstances affect patients' requests to die; and the way those requests are received by our culture. Feminist approaches raise such contextual and cultural questions, yet there is little available feminist literature on physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. Although feminists are concerned about the cultural context within which women make medical decisions, they have primarily focused on women's reproductive decisions; only recently have feminist bioethicists turned to issues beyond reproduction.

Susan Wolf offers one of the few feminist treatments to date of euthanasia. She argues that women are more likely to request euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in an attempt to avoid burdening their families--a perversion of the feminine ethic of care that takes women's caring for and about others to the extreme--and that physicians are simultaneously more likely to fulfill women's death requests, based on "the same historical valorization of women's self-sacrifice and the same background sexism."[1] In a culture that valorizes their altruism and caring for others, women who suffer from severe pain or terminal illness may perceive themselves as failing in their appointed duties; unable to care for others, they may see themselves as actually burdening them. For Wolf, the authenticity and rationality of a woman's request to die seems suspect at the very least, given the extent to which cultural expectations about not burdening others have likely affected her. Indeed, Wolf chastens physicians "not to accede to the request for assisted suicide and euthanasia" for this very reason (p. 308).

Wolf also discusses the unequal social conditions that may encourage women to seek death, such as poverty, higher incidences of depression, poor pain relief, lack of good medical care, and poor social support networks--essential topics in any ethical analysis of physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia. While other feminists have shared these concerns for women's social conditions, Wolf is the first to relate them to the issue of euthanasia. Her analysis thus ushers in important theoretical and practical concerns regarding women's death requests and their implementation.

I have isolated Wolf as an influential feminist voice because she brings depth to a debate that has, until recently, focused almost exclusively on the issue of patient autonomy. I suggest, however, that Wolf's reasoning may actually lead to very different conclusions. While some women in particular can exhibit a preoccupation with and overemphasis on relationships, terminally ill women's death requests can also, like men's, stem from basic personal concerns for pain, psychic suffering, and the determination that their lives have become meaningless or burdensome to them. In taking Wolf's feminist account seriously, I suggest that women's requests to die may be discounted, trivialized, and ignored for the same reasons that Wolf claims they are too likely to be heeded. By virtue of the expectation that women will be altruistic, self-abnegating caregivers, women's own voices, and their claims to autonomy in requesting death, are easily dismissed. I conclude that women's choices, their capacity to reason, and their ability to accurately represent their own interests are undermined in our culture and as a consequence that women's claims to pain and suffering are often disregarded. Yet in cases of intolerable pain and suffering, a woman's request to die should not be questioned on the grounds that she is incapable of determining her own good; women, like men, should be extended the right to decide when their life is burdensome, meaningless, and no longer worth living.

Some Background

Both in Canada and the United States there has been growing support for social policies that would legalize active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. This increasing support is not surprising given North Americans' commitment to an individualistic ethic: the primary focus, socially, politically, and medically, is on the individual, and the protection of his or her autonomy. Ethicists are also primarily concerned with the individual and his rights: their debates largely concern the conflict between patient and physician and how to navigate the tensions between these two parties and their conflicting goals. For example, Dan Brock argues that the patient has a right to choose active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide because, "If self-determination is a fundamental value, then the great variability among people on this question makes it especially important that individuals control the manner, circumstances, and timing of their dying and death."[2]

Conversely, arguments against euthanasia have also taken the individual's self-governance to be the main issue. Gay-Williams argues against euthanasia on the ground that, "Because death is final and irreversible, euthanasia contains within it the possibility that we will work against our own interest if we practice it or allow it to be practiced on us."[3] Plainly, traditional liberal concerns for protecting individual autonomy remain the primary focus of debates over euthanasia.

Autonomy is valued in a liberal society because it secures the interest that each citizen has in directing her life; it dominates liberal theories because self-government is an essential feature of a nonoppressive society. Autonomy is a cornerstone of the euthanasia debate because our interest in directing our own lives has special force when it comes to determining our mode and time of death. The choice of how and when to die is indeed a deeply personal decision. As Wolf critically states,
 Advocacy of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia has hinged to a great
 extent on rights claims. The argument is that the patient has a right of
 self-determination or autonomy that entitles her to assistance in suicide
 or euthanasia. The strategy is to extend the argument that
 self-determination entitles the patient to refuse unwanted life-sustaining
 treatment by maintaining that the same rationale supports patient
 entitlement to more active physician assistance in death. Indeed, it is
 sometimes argued that there is no principled difference between termination
 of life-sustaining treatment and more active practices[4]

On the autonomy model, if the rights-bearer asserts her right to die, then the appropriate response is to secure her death. And while this model intends the positive goal of individuals pursuing their own good as they see fit, the liberal conception of the individual as a rational, independent, rights-bearing agent choosing her own time and mode of death is impoverished. By contrast, a feminist approach to the euthanasia debate regards women's experiences in a gendered culture as relevant to determinations regarding the legitimacy of their death requests.

The Importance of Context

The demand for euthanasia, and the interaction between the patient requesting death and the physician considering the request, is largely understood as a private matter. Timothy Quill, for example, relates a case involving Diane, a patient who is dying of cancer and who is requesting his assistance in securing a painless death. He entitles this case "Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision-Making."[5] But feminist ethicists argue that practices like active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are not merely cases of individualized decisionmaking: such individual decisions are made within a social context that informs and affects individuals' choices. Thus unlike liberal accounts of the self, feminist approaches view the individual as a socially embedded, interdependent, relational subject whose choices are made within a complex web of social relationships. Where the euthanasia debate is concerned, the situated subject is not an isolatable, independent, atomistic subject: her choice to die has implications for both self and society, and her choices can be either upheld or undermined by the prevailing social ethos[6]

That gender matters where physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia are concerned is contentious. The individual expression of autonomy is held to be a right in which we all share an objective, equal interest. Thus the particular features of a patient's life are considered irrelevant once we have determined that her choices are unconstrained by coercion, irrationality, ignorance, or the limited options available to her. But here a feminist account of euthanasia departs from traditional liberal accounts; feminists assert that deep social inequalities affect individual agents in ways not recognized on traditional liberal approaches to autonomy. For example, liberal accounts of euthanasia fail to address the widespread sexism that serves to undermine respect for women's choices.

It is imperative that a feminist account of euthanasia consider the feminine ethic of care to which women have been held, an ethic that requires women's unselfish commitment to the nurturance and care of others, especially their husbands, children, and elderly parents. The imperative to care for others--to the point of giving up their sense of self completely--encourages people to dismiss women's self-concerns, and it makes society less willing to consider euthanasia for women. A liberal, rights-based account of euthanasia fails to account for such difficulties because it does not countenance contextual features of this sort. A feminist account, however, can show how sexism may lead to the medical and social rejection of a woman's request for death.

As Wolf indicates, the valorization of women's self-sacrifice and self-abnegation has been criticized by feminist ethicists. Bonnelle Lewis Strickling, for example, argues that women's self-abnegation is such that there is often no "self" beyond their identification with others. Strickling recognizes two forms of self-abnegation: in its virtuous form, it accomplishes a "sympathetic understanding between and among persons" in which both parties' interests and feelings are taken into consideration.[7] In its negative form, the self-abnegator abandons any sense of being a particular self outside of her relationships with others. Self-abnegation in this form demands no less than that women renounce, discount, and deny the self: only if one has no self (or no conception of self) can one commit entirely to the service of others. And service to others is exactly what is expected of women in our culture. As Strickling claims,
 traditionally women have been asked to be helpful, loving without
 expectation of return, emotionally dependable, supportive, and generally
 nurturing to both children and husband both physically and in the sense of
 nurturing their respective senses of self, all without complaining ...
 taken together, these expectations comprise the expectation of
 self-renunciation on an extremely large scale. (p. 197)

Furthermore, women have been held to a feminine ethic of care, a conception of "womanly" virtues according to which it is part of women's moral obligation to care for and nurture others. This feminine ethic is rooted in women's traditional roles of homemaking, child-bearing and rearing, and the care and nurturing activities that accompany these roles.

That "womanly" virtues require caring for and nurturing others to the detriment of women's self-concern relates to my worries about gender and euthanasia. For if women are expected to be deferential to others, self-effacing, and caring to the point of sacrificing their own happiness, then any self-interested and self-directed claims they make (in this case, the request to die) may be more easily discounted or dismissed as irrational. A woman's capacity for reason and self-determination is not validated in our culture (since women have been historically viewed as emotional, not rational, beings); the presence of severe pain or terminal illness may be used as further support for the view that women are particularly incompetent when it comes to making even deeply personal life and death decisions.

For Daniel Callahan, the acceptance of voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide minimally requires that the physician fulfilling or denying the patient's request have her own moral grounds for helping (or refusing to help) a patient to die. As Callahan states,
 If doctors, once sanctioned to carry out euthanasia, are to be themselves
 responsible moral agents--not simply hired hands with lethal injections at
 the ready--then they must have their own independent moral grounds to kill
 those who request such services.... The doctor would have to decide, on her
 own, whether the patient's life was "no longer worth living."[8]

If doctors have their own independent moral grounds for implementing euthanasia then we must question what those moral grounds are and whence they stem. On a feminist account, physicians' values are informed by a social context within which the undermining of women's self-regarding choices has a long history. One might expect physicians' judgments about patient competence to be more objective because of their medical training, but this is not so. Valerie Hartouni has recently offered an account of the subtle ways in which our vision is "trained," "impaired," and "partial." What we see, and the way we see it, is not merely a physiological event or a mechanical process, but is learned. As she claims, "Seeing is an act of immense construction.... Seeing is a set of learned practices and processes that allow us to organize the visual field and that engage us in producing the world we seem to greet and take in only passively"[9] On this account, our view of euthanasia, and those who have a legitimate claim to it, is not objectively determined, but is strongly influenced by the preorganized world through which our social and ethical vision is trained. The apparent illegitimacy of a woman's claim to euthanasia is effected by a social world in which her voice is silenced and her capacity for self- or other-regarding choices is questioned.

So a physician's moral grounds for rejecting euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide will--at least partially--reflect a social refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of such feelings of burdensomeness and meaninglessness in a culture that denies women's competency. Not only does our culture view women as self-abnegating caregivers who lack reason and autonomy: physicians discount or dismiss women's reasoning capacity and ability to govern themselves, making it easier for them to reject women's death requests. For determining that a patient's life has become "meaningless" or "burdensome" involves making a value judgment that, like most value judgments, reflects dominant cultural prejudices, among them (in our society) the assumption that women are primarily nurturers and caregivers who lack the competency to self-govern. That a man may experience his life as "meaningless" or "burdensome" is considered a rational self-evaluation so long as his life is marked by intolerable pain, personal suffering, or terminal illness. But women's similar experiences are much more likely to be rejected, discounted, or unheeded because their capacity for such determinations of personal suffering are questioned. Perhaps, as Kathryn Morgan claims, the denial of women's full moral agency stems from the view that, "simply by virtue of their embodiment as women, women just are closer to nature and, hence, not capable of the kind of thought that is necessary for human moral life."[10]

Further Considerations

I have offered some theoretical worries about the background inequalities that lead doctors to discount or dismiss women's death requests. These worries lead in the opposite direction of Wolf's concerns that women are more likely to be euthanized in our gendered society.

Wolf's feminist account is also not supported by strong empirical evidence, although, as she points out, research on gender and euthanasia remains in its infancy.[11] Until we have strong empirical data relating to gender and euthanasia, and given that the theory alone can lead in different directions, we have equally good reason to suppose that women's legitimate death requests (that is, requests stemming from experiences of intolerable pain, human suffering, and negative experiences of terminal illness) are likely to go unheeded.

In support of her women-at-risk thesis Wolf cites the case of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, an American pathologist who has helped a prepronderance of women to die, and the recent data from the Netherlands that has been collected from the Dutch experience with euthanasia. Kevorkian helped eight women to die before fulfilling a man's death request. That a large number of Kevorkian's "patients" have been women is telling on Wolf's account: Kevorkian may be acting out a cultural stereotype that demands women's commitment to care-giving and that rejects women's claims to be cared for in times of sickness or terminal illness. Kevorkian's actions are particularly heinous, then, when placed in the context of women's traditional role expectations as caregivers, nurturers, and self-abnegators.

Like Wolf, I have concerns about Kevorkian's actions and the context within which he is helping people to die. The demand for Kevorkian arises because individuals are not receiving help from a trusted physician in securing their deaths. Kevorkian-esque deaths do not derive from a longstanding relationship with one's physician. On the contrary, what the Kevorkian deaths indicate is not that women in particular are at a high risk of being put to death, but that social conditions for a socially accepted, dignified death through physician-assisted suicide or active euthanasia do not obtain, either at home or in care facilities. Kevorkian's practice does not provide evidence of a widespread social bias in favor of killing women; rather, his actions are witness to the sad position into which both women and men who are seeking death are placed.

Furthermore, the Dutch data that support her women-at-risk thesis are problematic; Wolf indicates that available data from the Netherlands are not decisive and may not be generalizable to the United States. Nevertheless, Wolf argues that the Dutch data indicate a slightly greater percentage of women than men being euthanized, and that we ought to be concerned about the difference since "the differences in Dutch demographics and health care would be reasons to expect no gender differential in the Netherlands in the practices we are examining" (p. 296). Given the differences in health care systems and demographics between the two counties, however, we can draw no conclusions from the Dutch data that would be relevant to the context of the United States. Furthermore, the Dutch data in fact neither support nor undermine Wolf's claim.

Wolf is justified in her concern that gender role socialization and ubiquitous cultural stereotypes may lead women to define themselves-and be defined by others--according to their caregiving role. Yet she errs in concluding that women are therefore more likely than men to have their death requests fulfilled when they are terminally ill or suffering and no longer capable of fulfilling their caregiving duties. On the contrary, a woman's death request based as it is on her own knowledge claims and experiences of her own pain and suffering--is more easily dismissed. Evidence both inside and outside the medical arena indicates that women's knowledge claims and their claims to self-concern tend to be denied, not (as Wolf argues) too easily upheld. This evidence stems from a variety of sources; and while the data is not entirely conclusive, it suggests that for social reasons, physicians are less likely to heed women's death requests than those made by men.

Our social rejection of women's knowledge has a long history, a history too long to account for in this paper. But consider an early indicator that a female's attempts at independence and independent thinking is socially rejected: the American classroom. A report by Myra and David Sadker indicates that as early as preschool, sexism prevails in the classroom. As they note in their survey of studies done on classroom dynamics,
 teachers gave boys more attention, praised them more often and were at
 least twice as likely to have extended conversations with them ...
 [T]eachers were twice as likely to give male students detailed instructions
 on how to do things for themselves. With female students, teachers were
 more likely to do it for them instead. The result was that boys learned to
 become independent, girls learned to become dependent.[12]

The import of such a study is difficult to overestimate. It addresses a concern that feminists have been voicing for a very long time: that women's knowledge, independence, and self-promotion are systemically undermined in our culture. From an early age females are denied the opportunity to think and act independently. It would be unsurprising, then, if later in their lives women's death requests, which would be based on their own perspectives and experiences, were rejected because they were denied the capacity to make such determinations.

Consider also the case of abortion, where women's decisional capacity, their right to self-regarding choices, and their personal experiences have been questioned. Arguments against a woman's right to abortion turn on her alleged moral responsibility for others and her incapacity for rational decisionmaking at a time of great distress. Both nonfeminists and pro-life feminists alike have argued that pregnant women are not entitled to consider only themselves as the subjects of concern: they are chided to place their families, their communities, and in particular their fetuses at the center of their moral deliberations. In the case of abortion, we again see a cultural predilection for imposing an other-oriented ethic on women that is not extended to men: a woman's right to make a self-regarding decision based on her own experiences (for example, her claim that she cannot financially or emotionally support a child at this particular time) comes under heavy attack. As Sidney Callahan claims, "A woman, involuntarily pregnant, has a moral obligation to the now-existing fetus whether she explicitly consented to its existence or not."[13]

In addition, critics of abortion argue that a pregnant woman has questionable decisionmaking capacities and should not be the final arbiter of her own good. Again, to quote Callahan, "It also seems a travesty of just procedures that a pregnant woman now, in effect, acts as the sole judge of her own case under the most stressful conditions" (p. 13).

Commentators on the abortion debate have perverted the ethic of care in order to deny women the right to place their interests ahead of others and to have their decisions respected. A woman's knowledge about her body, her financial situation, her social context, and her own emotional state--knowledge claims that find counterparts in the claims made by terminally ill women requesting death--are dismissed or discounted.

Even women's reports of coronary pain have, until fairly recently, been dismissed as being "all in their heads," resulting in many unnecessary deaths because of late detection of heart disease. Indeed, coronary research (like most other medical research) has targeted white men to the serious detriment of women. Heart disease has historically been understood as a man's affliction, and with physicians guiding their thinking on the subject, women have misunderstood their own symptoms. Since there has been little study of women's own particular experiences with heart disease, their reported symptoms have gone largely unrecognized. Instead, women's knowledge about their condition, their experiences of symptoms, and their request for medical attention tend to be rejected, and their complaints set aside as hyperbole or attributed to emotional causes.[14] If this conception of women is operating in the area of heart disease, one can only imagine how it affects consideration of women's requests to die.

That women have been treated differently from men is borne out by some directly relevant statistics. In a review of "right to die" cases, researchers found that courts honored the death requests of men in 75 percent of reported cases but respected similar requests by women in only 14 percent of reported cases.[15] More recently, the New England Journal of Medicine cites a national study of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in the United States, according to which men largely outnumber women in receiving undercover prescriptions for lethal doses of medication.[16] The survey reveals that 97 percent of those receiving undercover prescriptions were men, while of those who received an undercover lethal injection--active euthanasia-57 percent were men and 43 percent women. Significantly, in 95 percent of cases in which patients received the means for physician-assisted suicide it was the patient himself who made the request for the prescription (in the remaining 5 percent the request came from a family member or partner); by contrast 54 percent of all active euthanasia requests were made by family members. Such data suggest that in cases of physician-assisted suicide, where the patient characteristically makes the request and terminates his life at a time and place he deems appropriate, men are deemed capable of making such significant choices while women are not. Conversely, in cases of active euthanasia, which usually take place within institutions and are requested by family members, women are far more likely to have death requests fulfilled.[17]

Interestingly, the national survey supports both the thesis that women's death requests are less likely to be heeded than those of men and Wolf's claim that women are typically viewed as "expendable." It is largely when the death request is made for women by their family members that the request is fulfilled by physicians. Arguably, when family members request active euthanasia for a kinswoman, the broader society might understand that she is no longer capable of providing the care, nurturing, and self-sacrifice that is expected of women.

Dismissing Suffering

While Wolf's feminist account provides a foundation for a rich ethical analysis of euthanasia, it is not clear that women are more likely than men to be euthanized or extended the means for physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, there is reason to think, and statistical evidence to support the thought, that women are far less likely to be taken seriously, listened to, and supported in their end of life choices than are their male counterparts. While I share Wolf's concern for the way in which the debate over euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide has been decontextualized and governed by an individualistic model, I believe that contextual considerations should lead us to question why women's death requests are taken less seriously and acted on less often than those of men.

Wolf acknowledges that some feminists "will see this problem differently. That may be especially true of women who feel in control of their lives, are less subject to subordination by age or race or wealth, and seek yet another option to add to their many."[18] She makes an important point: contingencies such as poverty, poor education, age, and race are important to a feminist account of euthanasia. But rather than making a woman's death request more likely to be respected, these contingencies make it less so: the less social weight a woman carries, the less likely she is to have her death requests taken seriously. A woman who is white, well educated, articulate, wealthy, or politically powerful is far less likely to be denied decisionmaking capacity than is her uneducated, poor, powerless counterpart. The more a woman is like the autonomous, rational, independent agent that is the traditional focus of the euthanasia debate, the more likely her death request will be taken seriously.

A person's access to euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should not be affected by conditions over which she has no control: it is alarming to think that in a sexist society, only some members' claims to pain and psychic suffering will be taken seriously.


[1.] S. Wolf, "Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia," in Feminism & Bioethics: Beyond Reproduction, ed. S. Wolf (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 282-317, at 284.

[2.] D. Brock, "Voluntary Active Euthanasia," Hastings Center Report 22, no.2 (1992): 11-21, at 11.

[3.] J. Gay-Williams, "The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia," reprinted in Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics, ed. Ronald Munson, 5th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 168-71, at 170.

[4.] See ref. 2, Wolf, "Gender, Feminism, and Death," p. 298.

[5.] T. Quill, "Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision-Making," reprinted in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, ed. J. D. Arras and B. Steinbock, (London: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1991), pp. 292-95.

[6.] Note, however, that feminists are concerned with both under-contextualizing and over-contextualizing women's lives. While ethicists should not ignore the situational aspects of women's lives, they also should not subordinate women's self-regarding choices to the requirements of maintaining social relationships.

[7.] B. L. Strickling, "Self-Abnegation," in Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method and Morals, ed. C. Overall, L. Code, and S. Mullet (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 190-201, at 194.

[8.] D. Callahan, "When Self-Determination Runs Amok," in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, ed. J. Arras and B. Steinbock, 4th ed. (London: Mayfield Publishing Co, 1996): 295-309, at 311.

[9.] V. Hartouni, Cultural Conceptions: On Reproductive Technologies and the Remaking of Life (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 12-13.

[10.] K. Morgan, "Women and Moral Madness," in Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method and Morals, ed. C. Overall, L. Code, and S. Mullet (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 146-67, at 150.

[11.] See ref. 2, Wolf, "Gender, Feminism, and Death," p. 294.

[12.] M. Sadker and D. Sadker, "Sexism in the Schoolroom of the '80s," Psychology Today 19, no. 3 (1985): 54-57, at 55.

[13.] S. Callahan, "Abortion and the Sexual Agenda: A Case for Prolife Feminism," Commonweal, 25 April 1986: 9-17, at 15.

[14.] E. Nechas and D. Foley, Unequal Treatment: What You Don't Know About How Women are Mistreated by the Medical Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 66.

[15.] S. H. Miles and A. August, "Courts, Gender and the `Right to Die'," Journal of Law, Medicine and Health Care 18 (1990): 85-95.

[16.] D.E. Meier et al., "A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States," NEJM 338 (1998): 1193-200.

[17.] This study also indicates that when patients received a prescription for a lethal dose of medication (that is, the means to implement physician-assisted suicide), 90 percent of lethal prescriptions were given to patients who were at home, and only 5 percent were given to patients in nursing homes. However, in cases of active euthanasia, 99 percent of patients were hospitalized at the time of lethal injection (p. 1197).

[18.] See ref. 2. Wolf, "Gender, Feminism, and Death," p. 308.

Jennifer A. Parks, "Why Gender Matters to the Euthanasia Debate: On Decisional Capacity and the Rejection of the Woman's Death Request," Hastings Center Report 30, no. 1 (2000): 30-36.

Jennifer A. Parks teaches philosophy and women's studies at Loyola University of Chicago. Her interests include traditional and feminist moral theory, feminist bioethics (with a special interest in reproductive technologies), and ethical issues in home health care. She is writing a book on women, ethics, and home health care.
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Author:Parks, Jennifer A.
Publication:The Hastings Center Report
Date:Jan 1, 2000
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