What next for the Indonesian Navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the Minimum Essential Force by 2024.
Several new policy developments in Indonesia pertain to some of the GMF pillars, including, for instance, efforts undertaken by the Jokowi government to tackle illegal fishing in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). However, except for occasional press reports, the modernization of the Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia --Angkatan Laut, TNI-AL) has elicited little attention in scholarly circles. This is reflective of the dearth of scholarship on Southeast Asian navies in general despite some recent scholarship. (2) Hence, the focus of this article is on the fifth GMF pillar--building maritime defence--and, in particular, the navy's modernization efforts, especially its quest to achieve, by 2024, a Minimum Essential Force (MEF) which allows for a minimum capacity to cover selected geographical areas of interests across the Indonesian archipelago while projecting limited force beyond it. Given Indonesia's extensive maritime interests, this article does not question Indonesia's quest for a greenwater navy. But such ambitions warrant attention because the navy has been plagued by chronic deficiencies while being saddled with enormous maritime responsibilities. Yet, at the same time, despite those constraints, the Indonesian political leadership has called for the country's armed forces to be strengthened beyond the MEF level. (3)
This article first examines Indonesia's maritime interests, especially how the GMF may define its aspirations towards "maritime medium-ness". It then highlights the constraints faced by the navy given the country's vast maritime expanse and diverse maritime interests, which then gives rise to the MEF blueprint as part of its long-term greenwater ambitions. It is pertinent to ask whether the TNI-AL will be able to achieve its MEF goals by 2024 given the ongoing capacity-building efforts including equipment modernization. To address this question, the article models the navy's MEF projections up to 2024. It shows that the MEF targets cannot be attained across all categories by 2024. Therefore, this article proposes recalibrating the navy's MEF specifications to overcome persistent budgetary constraints and to minimize the risks of project overruns commonly associated with complex naval systems.
"Maritime Medium-ness" and a Greenwater Navy
The GMF's aim is for Indonesia to achieve medium maritime power status. This "medium" status, according to John Richard Hill, "lies in between the insufficient (small states generally) and self-sufficient (great powers generally)" capacity and where a state has more national power at its disposal compared to small states, thus permitting it a modicum of strategic autonomy. (4) Hill goes on to explain that "if a medium power is a state that prizes autonomy and is able to manipulate power in order to preserve it, then a medium maritime power will aim to use the sea in order to enhance this ability". (5) Sam Bateman expounds this concept thus:
medium-ness implies a certain level of development and size (economy, population, geographical area, military strength, etc.), as well as the state's self-perception. Meanwhile, maritime-ness is based on the state's dependence on the sea which may be seen as an amalgamation of factors such as maritime tradition, size of navy and merchant fleet, dependence on seaborne trade, size of the EEZ, value of offshore resources, and the capabilities of domestic shipbuilding industry. (6)
What Dewi Fortuna Anwar, then Deputy for Political Affairs at the Vice Presidential Office, said in September 2011--three years before the GMF was first mooted--is instructive: "Indonesia is the [sic] middle power country right now meaning that we are in the moderate position between major powers; traditionally, Indonesia does keep distance from major powers and doesn't let herself to be co-opted by one side." (7) The GMF imbues this "medium power" self-consciousness with a maritime flavour. Consequently, this "maritime medium-ness" makes it imperative to build a greenwater navy by 2024, an ambition that was outlined in a ten-year naval development plan, entitled Cetak Biru TNI-AL 2013 [Navy Blueprint for 2013] released in 2002. This was not just motivated by the necessity of modernizing an antiquated navy, but also to attain a level of naval power commensurate with Indonesia's stature as a medium maritime power. According to then Navy Chief-of-Staff Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, the greenwater navy represented a level of sea power higher than that of a brownwater (coastal) navy, but below that of a fully operational, ocean-going bluewater navy. (8) As such, one may observe the connection between "maritime medium-ness" and greenwater navy within the Indonesian discourse. But what exactly is a greenwater navy? Navies may be classified into global, bluewater, greenwater and brownwater categories. (9) As the name suggests, global navies have a worldwide presence and can operate independently on a continuous basis in more than one regional ocean basin. Bluewater navies possess open-ocean capability (beyond the EEZ) and external support (for short durations), and they are capable of extra-regional deployments. Brownwater navies (excluding riverine forces) are essentially coastal defence forces largely limited to operations in a state's territorial waters.
A greenwater navy falls in between bluewater and brownwater, and is primarily oriented towards operating within the EEZ while possessing a limited, secondary ability to conduct "out-of-area" operations. Seen through this lens, Indonesia's greenwater navy aspiration is two-fold: effective EEZ policing and limited regional, and occasionally even international, force projection capabilities. The TNI-AL presently exhibits some greenwater characteristics because of its "out-of-area" experience, most notably as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon since 2009. But it has yet to attain true greenwater stature. For one, being effective within the EEZ requires the TNI-AL to effectively safeguard the Indonesian archipelago--totalling 93,000 square kilometres of water and 54,716 kilometres of coastline (10)--in accordance with the country's Archipelagic Sea Defence Strategy (Strategi Pertahanan Laut Nusantara or SPLN). However, it does not help that the State Defence Policy 2014 outlined such a diverse array of traditional and non-traditional maritime challenges, ranging from military conflict (especially over disputes in West Kalimantan and the South China Sea) to illegal fishing. (11) This broad range of maritime challenges, and hence responsibilities, consequently overstretches the navy's available capacity.
The TNI-AL's envisioned force structure revolves around a three-dimensional Integrated Navy Fleet System [Sistem Armada Terpadu or SSAT) concept--comprising vessels as the basic asset, together with aircraft, marines and naval bases. (12) To this end, in October 2011, the navy considered creating a third fleet, to be known as Central Fleet Command, to complement the existing Western and Eastern Fleet Commands so as to effectively safeguard the three strategic sea corridors through the Indonesian archipelago and existing conflict-prone areas which come under each fleet's responsibility. (13) But the required size of an effective greenwater navy has long been a matter of discussion. Since the early 1990s, Indonesian policymakers have estimated the "ideal" fleet size to be between 300 and 600 vessels, (14) plus 75 maritime patrol aircraft. (15) But the navy's effectiveness in projecting power throughout the archipelago, while performing limited overseas missions, depends on its flexibility. This "flexibility" can be defined as the navy's ability to conduct multiple missions simultaneously in more than one geographical area; the greater the number of ships and aircraft it possesses, the greater its ability to undertake varied missions concurrently in dispersed areas. (16) In view of budgetary and resource realities, the navy does not have surplus ships and aircraft. It could only economize its limited capacity by conceiving of a MEF that can plausibly cover selected geographical areas of interests across the archipelago while projecting limited force beyond. The navy's MEF blueprint for 2024 envisages 274 vessels and 137 aircraft (including 35 maritime patrol aircraft and 30 helicopters), three Marine Corps (Korps Marinir, or KORMAR) forces adding up to a division-sized formation, 890 marine combat vehicles and 11 primary naval bases. (17) The vessels are divided into: Combat Strike Force (110 vessels), including 10-12 submarines, 56 frigates/corvettes and 26 fast attack craft; Patrol Force (66 vessels); and Support Force (98 vessels) including 18 mine countermeasures vessels, 45 large amphibious assault landing ships and 6 replenishment oilers/tankers. (18)
This force structure corresponds with what Hill proposed as a blueprint for medium power navies: first, constabulary forces for EEZ policing and short-reach low-intensity operations; second, long-reach surface forces optimized to low-intensity operations; and third, a strictly limited number of long-reach surface, air and submarine forces optimized for higher-level operations. (19) More importantly, it also resonates with what John Mearsheimer calls "defensive sea control" which he deems as less demanding than offensive sea control underpinned by aircraft carrier battle groups, nuclear-powered submarines and cruise missile platforms. Instead, defensive sea control emphasizes conventional attack submarines, land-based patrol aircraft, destroyers and frigates. (20) However, it is important to point out that the navy's MEF blueprint is not merely a technological shopping list. Though far from an "ideal" greenwater navy, the blueprint is designed to allow the TNI-AL to accomplish various types of operations ranging from low (naval military operations other than war, such as counter-illegal fishing) to high-intensity (naval military operations for war, such as repelling foreign military aggression) that align with Indonesia's diverse threat perceptions. (21)
In view of its present capacity, the navy's anticipated tasks should be conceived with the objective of being primarily effective within the Indonesian archipelago while demonstrating limited ability for overseas missions. The primary focus on Indonesia's immediate waters, especially its EEZ from where the country partially derives its wealth in line with the GMF vision, cannot be understated. During an interview with Tempo in October 2010, then Indonesian military chief Admiral Agus Suhartono noted: "Our defence strategy, as much as possible, is preventing [foreign] encroachment on our [EEZ], If we underperform in the regions and in the EEZ, we are unlikely to effectively defend our marine territories." (22) Even if one concedes that the strategic focus is on Indonesia's immediate waters, the wide range of missions and operational capability requirements expected of the navy means an across-the-board modernization effort becomes necessary. But can the MEF goals be met by 2024?
Modelling the TNI-AL's MEF Projections Until 2024
The MEF blueprint is divided into three phases known as Strategic Plans (rencana strategis or renstra): Renstra I (2010-14), Renstra II (2015-19) and Renstra III (2020-24). Following the completion of Renstra I in 2014, and to give impetus to Renstra II, President Jokowi outlined several defence policy priorities, including intensifying the acquisition of main weapon systems [alat utama sistem senjata, heretofore referred as alutsista) and promoting defence self-sufficiency through domestic defence industrial development so as to reduce reliance on foreign imports. (23) Using MEF budgetary allocations to gauge the navy's prospects of attaining its MEF targets may not be accurate, not only because of the difficulty in obtaining official data, but also because such statistics may not indicate specifically how various alutsista projects are being managed. Therefore, a more suitable alternative is to model the alutsista projections from 2015 to 2024. While data is available for pre-Renstra (the year 2008 is utilized here as a snapshot) and Renstra I, "guesstimate" projections for Renstra II and III have to be based on various sources (often fragmentary reports augmented by open-source databases). To model Renstra II and III projections, the following are considered. First, like its sister services, the navy has adopted a three-pronged MEF implementation strategy: first, procuring new systems by prioritizing domestic production, failing which the plan will be joint production with foreign vendors through transfer of technology (ToT); second, refurbishing existing alutsista; and third, phasing out obsolete alutsista, (24) In this regard, the lifecycle of alutsista warrants consideration. The lifecycle of a weapon system generally covers the period it was procured, in service and finally withdrawn. (25) Age constitutes a crucial factor because it directly influences its lifecycle, which translates into operational effectiveness, safety and economic viability of its continued operation as well as of implementing service life extension programmes. For this study, the Standard, Optimistic and Austere Scenarios are projected. Under a Standard Scenario, the lifecycle of a particular alutsista may last up to thirty years, given that the average warship hull life is at least twenty or sometimes thirty years. (26) Airframe lifecycles may be shorter because of the imposed aerodynamic stress. Typically, warships that serve over twenty and nearing thirty years can be regarded as uneconomical to operate, maintain and even upgrade.
However, the Standard Scenario is insufficient in the Indonesian context, given that the navy traditionally operates assets well past their twenty to thirty years' useful lifecycles. Hence this modelling also assumes an Optimistic Scenario, under which alutsista aged up to forty years remain in service and undergo upgrades. However, this assumes that the Indonesians can properly maintain ageing alutsista. Finally, the modelling assumes an Austere Scenario whereby the navy is compelled to retain alutsista aged up to seventy years because budget constraints prevent block replacement of obsolete equipment. This is not uncommon for the TNI-AL. For example, many World War Two vintage US-built landing vessels remained in service past 2010 before they were finally discarded. Of course, they would be uneconomical and even unsafe for regular operation and maintenance. This means new replacements become a more cost-effective option even though that requires funding.
Renstra II and III scenarios modelled here assume no short-cuts through the acquisition of second-hand alutsista, which require shorter induction times and are also cheaper compared to acquiring brand-new equipment. For example, the three British-built Multi-Role Light Frigates would have cost Brunei--their originally intended owner--US$600 million in the early 2000s, but Jakarta acquired them in 2013 for just US$380 million. (27) Having relied in part on second-hand alutsista for decades, the navy is not averse to purchasing used equipment, as do many other navies worldwide. (28) But the Indonesians should have learned hard lessons from this practice. The first concerns false economies. Buying second-hand equipment at prices lower than that for newbuilds (i.e. newly built equipment) does not necessarily translate into overall cost-savings. The navy's purchase of thirty-nine former East German Navy warships in the early 1990s is a prime example. Even though the vessels cost only US$468 million, Jakarta had to spend an additional US$800 million to refurbish them and develop the requisite support infrastructure. (29) The second problem concerns operational inefficiencies. In 2007 a government audit found that in 2004-5, the navy wasted Rp64 billion (US$6.96 million) in POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) consumption because of the age of some of its warships. (30) Such wastage compounds the navy's chronic fuel shortages. (31) In all, these factors compel the navy to adapt in order to cope with austerity. For instance, warships would use a "waiting point" pattern to conserve fuel i.e. idling in strategic locations while naval aircraft patrolled the waters, and only got underway when an incident was reported. (32)
Finally, second-hand alutsista can potentially be more accident-prone. In April 2014, one of the twenty-four second-hand F-16 fighter jets Indonesia received under a US grant scheme malfunctioned, leading to a runway accident. As a result, Jakarta pledged to review its policy on obtaining alutsista through external grants. (33) Even though in the foreseeable future it will continue to buy second-hand equipment whenever expedient, the navy may start to prioritize newbuilds. In recent years, it has tried to avoid purchasing second-hand equipment even if the price was attractive. Examples include Jakarta's rejection of ageing and unseaworthy Libyan warships. (34) Submarines provide another interesting example. In March 2014, the navy declined Moscow's offer to sell secondhand Kilo-class submarines because of their poor condition. (35) In September 2015, however, Jakarta revived its interest in purchasing Russian Kilos. (36) The move originated from an official Russian visit to Indonesia in October 2014 aimed at eliciting Jakarta's interest in Russian shipbuilding capabilities, including submarines. (37) Yet, soon after, Indonesia began talks with France for the possible purchase of brand-new Scorpene-1000 submarines. (38) This suggests that Indonesians may not buy the Kilos because what Moscow was offering were essentially second-hand boats since the Russians reportedly announced that the Kilo production line would be closed after the last boat was completed. (39)
Therefore, Jakarta may increasingly prioritize newbuilds through domestic production or ToT-based joint production with foreign vendors. This study assumes an optimistic production rate, especially for domestically-built warships. But lead time for a particular alutsista depends on the technical complexities involved. Within each class of weapons system, higher performance levels increase both unit production cost and lead time. Generally, more sophisticated and expensive weapon systems demand more extensive development and trials programmes using expensive prototypes, more expensive spare parts required to repair them in service and more rigorous and costly personnel training. (40) Typically four to five years are required from project conceptualization to construction (keel-laying, module assembly and systems fitting-out), followed by mandatory equipment trials and basic personnel training before the asset can be deemed operational. (41) The navy's first Sigma-class corvettes took around five years to build and thus offer a useful yardstick. Therefore, a low production rate is assumed for high-capability alutsista such as the Sigma since they comprise various sensors, weapons, as well as command, control and communications (C3) sub-systems (which may be obtained from various sources) that require complex systems integration. (42) By contrast, an annual production rate of five to six vessels per year, as elucidated by the navy authorities, (43) is assumed for low-capability alutsista such as patrol craft given their simpler systems integration needs. Finally, this modelling considers all planned and reported alutsista procurements up to 2024 (see Table 1) in order to derive projections for Renstra II and III. Tables 2 to 5 present the navy's projected inventories under the three modelled scenarios when compared against stated MEF quantitative requirements over four studied periods. Some technical abbreviations require clarifications. MCM refers to mine countermeasures vessels; large amphibious assault landing ships (AALS) include landing ship tank (LST) category, but exclude inshore and coastal landing craft. KORMAR brigades are fighting formations and not alutsista, but are included as part of the modelling since they constitute an MEF component. Finally, the modelling also calculates the average percentage of MEF requirements fulfilled for each scenario.
The modelling results appear to corroborate with general estimates recently made by Indonesian policymakers regarding the military as a whole. For instance, in January 2014, then military chief General Moeldoko opined that 40-42 per cent of the MEF (i.e. force levels) would be attained by the time Renstra I was completed in 2014, since 28.7 per cent had been met in 2013. (44) However, in July 2015, he admitted that only 34 per cent of Renstra I MEF had been attained, though he pointed out that the military is in a better shape compared to when he first assumed the post, because of better personnel remuneration and the purchase of new equipment. Moeldoko further predicted that his successor could increase the figure to 68 per cent. (45) This is partly true. As Table 3 shows, by the end of Renstra I, the number of alutsista aged ten years or less had experienced an almost 200 per cent increase over the pre-Renstra I figure. However, during the same period, those aged 11-40 years decreased significantly, with the bulk of the alutsista entering 41-50 years. Gains achieved in Renstra I can be attributed to several new purchases. These include new domestically-built fast attack craft and maritime patrol aircraft, but most significantly KORMAR's fifty-four new Russian-built BMP-3F combat vehicles. Under a Standard Scenario for Renstra I, the navy fulfils 34 per cent of the MEF requirements, whereas the Optimistic Scenario derives 42 per cent (coinciding with Moeldoko's initial "optimistic" estimate in January 2014), and the Austere Scenario derives 63 per cent. Based on this outlook, Renstra II and III projections warrant closer attention.
Notably, in January 2013, then Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro announced plans to reduce the renstras from three to two, targeting MEF fulfilment by 2019 instead of 2024. (46) A year later, Jakarta remained optimistic that MEF objectives could be met by Renstra II. (47) However, the modelling shows that it will not be possible to fulfill the MEF requirements by 2019. Even going by the Austere Scenario, only 84 per cent will be fulfilled, and this decreases to 63 per cent and 54 per cent for the Optimistic and Standard Scenarios respectively. Nonetheless, new alutsista aged ten years or less are projected to increase by more than 100 per cent compared to the Renstra I figures. The projected gains for Renstra II can be attributed to sustained efforts in domestic production of fast attack and patrol craft. Again, KORMAR's projected fifty-five new Ukraine-built BTR-4 amphibious troop carriers may contribute significantly to these projected gains modelled in this study. Marginal increases can be observed in the area of frigate/corvette, large AALS and maritime patrol aircraft. The key reason has to do with cost and the time required since they are larger and have more complex systems integration needs.
Finally, Renstra III modelling postulates that under an Austere Scenario, the MEF requirements will be virtually completed (99 per cent). However, this means that a significant bulk of the alutsista --especially KORMAR's old, mainly Soviet-era combat vehicles--have entered the 51-60 years bracket, making them uneconomical and even unsafe to operate, maintain and upgrade. In other words, achieving MEF requirements going just by numbers on paper will inevitably come at the expense of operational effectiveness and safety. The Optimistic and Standard Scenarios--at 70 per cent and 61 per cent respectively--represent more prudent and realistic projections. These fall short of the required MEF targets. In other words, unless the navy retains all alutsista that have been in its inventory since 2008 regardless of their lifecycles, there is no way the MEF requirements can be met by 2024 for all alutsista categories. However, there is a silver lining: assuming all projects proceed as scheduled without delays and cost overruns, the required quantities of each type of alutsista will most likely meet in-service dates. For that, fast attack and patrol craft as well as maritime patrol aircraft may exceed MEF targets, thereby translating into surplus capacity and enhanced operational capabilities for the navy.
However, based on this modelling, excess gains in these categories come at the expense of certain key capability areas which will potentially undermine the navy's greenwater aims. Accomplishments in the frigate/corvette category--suitable assets that can allow effective force projections into the EEZ and beyond--actually pale in comparison. If one goes by the Standard Scenario without any prior plans made within the next five years, the navy may even lose its MCM capabilities, thus producing a force imbalance. Moreover, this modelling adopts a "bean-counting" approach which considers alutsista lifecycles while neglecting intangible indicators of military effectiveness such as the platform's inherent sensor and weapons capabilities, the maintenance state (data which is not easily obtainable and, even when available, should be regarded with some scepticism) and capital investments in terms of fiscal, human and material resources which include not just the platforms but also the associated infrastructure, logistics and training support. (48) Furthermore, for high-capability alutsista, two challenges, namely risks of project overruns and persistent budget constraints, may undermine the already conservative projections reached in this modelling exercise.
The Risk of Project Overruns
The modelling of the navy's MEF projections does not consider the risk of project overruns and assumes implementation according to schedule. In reality, however, this is seldom the case. Other countries have often experienced serious project overruns (e.g. Australia's Air Warfare Destroyer project). Moreover, foreign ToT is not risk-free. Indonesia is slated to build its own submarines under a ToT deal with South Korea for three boats. In February 2014, the House of Representatives Commission I, which oversees defence and security affairs, approved a US$250 million disbursement to state-owned shipbuilder PT Penataran Angkatan Laut (PT PAL) to prepare building a third vessel. (49) Though work was slated to begin in 2015, and scheduled for completion by 2018, delays pushed the expected in-service date to 2023. (50) This possibly compelled Jakarta to consider Germany and Russia as alternative sources. (51) The much-touted Sigma-10514 light frigate programme (designated Perusak Kawal Rudal or PKR-10514)--critical alutsista that enables Indonesia's realization of a greenwater navy--is another example. In 2007, when the TNI-AL received its first Dutch-built Sigma corvette, there was optimism that as many as forty such ships could be acquired by 2015. (52) However, by 2014 only four vessels had been completed, and construction on the newer, more capable PKR-10514 only began recently and is expected to be completed in 2016-17.
Another assumption is that actors throughout the domestic supply chain, such as shipbuilders and steel producers, are able to synergize with sufficient government support. Yet government support is often lacking. In an interview with the Jakarta Post in October 2011, the head of PT PAL, Harsusanto revealed that the navy usually pays only 20 per cent of the total production costs upfront, thus compelling the shipyard to seek alternative resources to support its working capital. He lamented: "I think there's a lack of appropriate spirit to revive the strategic industry. Maybe the authorities do not understand how a strategic company works. Perhaps they refuse to help the industry, thinking it is costly and useless." (53) This problem persists notwithstanding the official rhetoric about prioritizing domestic production over foreign imports. (54) For example, Indonesian officials have opined that the domestic shipbuilding industry is not strong enough to support the country's GMF vision. They have also urged agencies such as the navy to purchase locally-made products, which implies a still stronger domestic preference towards foreign products. (55) Despite having earlier emphasized "buy Indonesian first", Moeldoko subsequently remarked that "weapons systems that have a high level of competitiveness" have to be imported, indicating his personal inclination towards foreign-made weapons. (56)
This calls into question the ability of domestic industries to meet the navy's requirements especially for hi-capability alutsista such as the PKR-10514. There may be better prospects for KORMAR, Patrol Force and naval aviation since domestic industries are able to produce those platforms, though of course critical components such as propulsions, sensors and weapons may have to be sourced abroad which again subjects the navy to risks if foreign vendors fail to deliver them on time or at all. In this regard, whether the navy receives the PKR-10514 is dependent on consistent foreign, in this case Dutch, technical support. In December 2010, the Indonesians called on The Netherlands to render consistent support for PT PAL's PKR-10514 programme. The head of the military's Information Centre, Commodore Iskandar Sitompul, said: "Yes, we have asked the Dutch to be more consistent in supervising the development of the ship as there are things that PT PAL cannot yet do." (57)
Persistent Budget Constraints
As Indonesian policymakers freely admit, budget constraints have been a recurrent problem, and which is widely acknowledged in the existing scholarship on Indonesian military affairs. (58) According to Indonesian policymakers, ideally defence spending needs to reach 1.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in order to address long-term military requirements, especially alutsista recapitalization. Yet, as Table 6 shows, it has remained below the desired target. The year 2013 marks the only time in the 2007-14 period when defence spending reached even 1 per cent of GDP.
Persistent budget constraints is a problem that affects the navy's sister services. The situation was at its worst in the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, and the initial economic bounce-back after 1999 did not improve the military's budgetary situation because Jakarta's priority was economic recovery and not raising defence spending. Since 2004, except for a dip in 2009 due to the Global Financial Crisis, Indonesia has enjoyed steady GDP growth of 5-6 per cent per annum. (59) But defence spending has not experienced a corresponding increase. In fact, despite the decrease in GDP growth in 2009, the government increased the state budget to Rp1,000 trillion (US$105.7 billion), but the defence budget remained unchanged at Rp33.6 trillion (US$3.3 billion). (60)
Nevertheless, Jakarta resolved to recapitalize its increasingly decrepit arsenal. Following the promulgation of the MEF Blueprint in 2008, there has been some progress. In September 2011, a total of Rp99 trillion (US$11.09 billion) for alutsista, comprising Rp32.5 trillion (US$3.64 billion) for maintenance and another Rp66.5 trillion (US$7.45 billion) for new equipment, was included in the 2010-14 National Mid-Term Development Plan. (61) This figure was later raised in January 2012, when Rp150 trillion (US$16.4 billion) was earmarked for alutsista modernization over 2010-14 (Renstra I). (62) The navy benefitted from these defence allocations, even if the increases fell short of desired levels. Especially since Renstra I began in 2009, the government has resolved to allocate more of the defence budget on new navy and air force procurements. (63) For example, in the 2012 state budget allocated for alutsista, the navy was given Rp20 trillion (US$2.13 billion), whereas the army received Rp14 trillion (US$1.49 billion) and the air force Rp22 trillion (US$2.35 billion). (64) Nevertheless, the advantage enjoyed by the navy over the army should not be exaggerated. (65) Considering that the navy is a more capital-intensive service compared to the army, the 2012 budget advantage of Rp8 trillion (US$640 million) may not actually amount to much, and was perhaps only sufficient to cover the unit production cost for five PKR-10514s (each estimated to cost at least Rp1.6 trillion or about US$110 million, equivalent to two Sukhoi multi-role fighters or twenty Leopard-II main battle tanks). (66) Where state defence funding is insufficient, the navy may count on direct domestic bank loans which can be settled via multi-year payments. However, such loans may have little effect. For example, in May 2010 the navy received an annual allocation of Rp200 billion (US$22 million) through a five-year loan from the Mandiri Bank for the period 2010-14. (67) This loan, amounting to just US$110 million, was perhaps sufficient for up to eight KCR-60M fast attack craft (each costs US$13.75 million excluding weapon systems) but barely enough for one PKR-10514. In any case, such cost differentials was one reason why projections derived by the modelling were easier to attain for smaller fighting vessels but not larger, high-capability platforms such as the PKR-10514.
Although Jokowi's GMF vision offers promise to maritime defence capacity-building efforts, he cannot afford to sideline the army, which has held a privileged position in Indonesia since independence. Jokowi's decision to appoint Army Chief-of-Staff General Gatot Nurmantyo as the new military chief in June 2015 ran counter to the post-Soeharto tradition of rotating the post between three service chiefs. (68) Undoubtedly the army is seeking to stay relevant and not be sidelined by the GMF vision which favours the air force and navy. The army's push to purchase 100 Leopard-II tanks, notwithstanding domestic criticism in 2012, underscores a desire not to lag behind the other services in terms of budgetary allocations. (69) As such, the only way to ameliorate inter-service rivalry while attaining MEF goals will be to raise defence spending. But raising it to the desired 1.5 per cent GDP or more is only possible if economic growth reaches 7 per cent per annum. In October 2014, Jokowi, echoing his predecessor, remarked: "I have said on many occasions that when the economic growth reaches 7 per cent, the military budget could be increased two to three times." (70) Yet, in December 2014, the World Bank reduced its projections for Indonesia's economic growth in 2015 from 5.6 to 5.2 per cent, and in July 2015, adjusted growth forecast downwards to 4.7 per cent for 2015. (71) Such gloomy economic forecasts portend a situation in which the navy continues to endure persistent budgetary constraints.
Recalibrating MEF Specifications to Meet the TNI-AL's Greenwater Ambitions
In order for the TNI-AL to align Renstra II and III with its eventual greenwater goal, it may become necessary to recalibrate the original specifications for certain alutsista categories. The frigate/corvette category fronted by the PKR-10514 programme represents a particularly challenging gap to fill, going by existing MEF requirements. Indeed, PKR-10514s are considered the most ideal platform, allowing the navy effective force projection into the EEZ and beyond--and therefore represent a key component of its greenwater ambitions. Larger than patrol and fast attack craft, a PKR-10514 possesses the requisite physical size for long endurance, reduced reliance on home bases and good seakeeping quality in open waters. With a larger physical capacity, it is also more flexible in handling a range of low-to high-intensity operations. Besides being capable of combating multi-dimensional wartime threats, the PKR-10514 is also expected to perform peacetime EEZ policing. This notion relates to mainstream thought that modern warships are so increasingly expensive that they can only be procured in limited numbers, hence they ought to be bigger and flexible enough to perform the full spectrum of low-(i.e. military operations other than war, such as EEZ policing) to high-(i.e. naval military operations for war) intensity missions. (72) This also matches Indonesia's diverse threat perceptions which thereby dictate that the navy fulfil this full operational spectrum. However, as earlier discussed, project overruns and budgetary constraints may stand in the way of meeting the MEF target for fifty-six frigates/corvettes optimized for high-intensity operations, which means vessels equipped with the full suite of sensors, weapons C3 systems so as to be capable of sinking enemy warships. (73) This article thus proposes a Hi/lo-Lo/hi dual configuration to recalibrate requirements for the frigate/corvette category. The Hi/lo configuration is tailored for high-intensity missions dictating a reduced quantity of high-capability PKR-10514s. Conversely, the Lo/hi configuration tailors for low-intensity missions dictating an increased quantity of low-capability PKR-10514s (dubbed here as "PKR-minus").
The following reasons underpin this proposed Hi/lo-Lo/hi configuration. First, high-intensity threat scenarios such as military confrontations in the South China Sea remain a possibility. But Indonesia's immediate maritime challenges stem mainly from extant, frequently recurring, low-intensity threats such as illegal fishing which costs Jakarta Rp300 trillion (US$24.27 billion) in lost revenue annually. (74) Second, persistent budgetary constraints, coupled with the costs (including lifecycle) and time associated with such complex alutsista as PKR-10514, may prevent the navy from acquiring the desired quantity. Finally, it makes little economic sense to operate combat-configured vessels for low-intensity missions where a larger number of less sophisticated, cheaper assets can act as an effective deterrent. As Harold Kearsley has written,
Although patrolling the EEZ is a new and important task, states feel traditional naval ships can do the job and still cover their wartime roles, thus killing two seagulls with one stone. In reality, however, an effective ship for patrolling the EEZ is not necessarily a modern frigate, or even a fancy and impressive fast attack craft no matter what arms salesmen may say; it may look very different. (75)
Indeed, in the early 2000s, due to a shortage of patrol vessels, the navy was compelled to deploy combat ships whose operating costs for such missions were, according to the TNI-AL authorities, "far greater than operating costs for patrol boats". (76)
The PC-43, which is destined to become the backbone of the Patrol Force, is far from adequate for effective EEZ duties. Derived from the KCR-40 fast attack craft, the 250-ton PC-43 is optimized for inshore and coastal patrol work. But because of its small size and lower freeboard, it is less suited for sustained operations in the open EEZ where rough seas during inclement weather may be expected. An intermediate alutsista, between a patrol craft and a corvette/frigate, optimized for effective EEZ duties is thus necessary. A "PKR-minus" may utilize the same hull but initially configured with less complex sensors, weapons and C3 suite. This configuration still offers the requisite characteristics suitable for EEZ duties--visible weaponry, high speed, good seakeeping, manoeuvrability and hull strength--yet still be reasonably priced. (77) Of all the components required in a warship, the hull is not as expensive as the installed systems. (78) As such, a common PKR-10514 hull configured as an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) is certainly cheaper because it lacks high-powered combat systems. Notably, this "PKR-minus" is not permanently OPV-configured; it possesses sufficient physical capacity for subsequent retrofits or other capability upgrades, including the installation of warfighting systems whenever economically expedient. This is made possible by exploiting modular mission payload technologies, such as the Royal Danish Navy's STANFLEX concept. (79)
The Polish Navy's Project 621 Gawron II (modified German MEKO A100) programme is one noteworthy example that could be emulated for this proposed "PKR-minus" programme. Conceived in the early 2000s, it originally specified a high-capability, multi-purpose corvette. However, following its launch, the programme suffered over a decade of delays due to financial constraints, competing operational needs and debts incurred by the shipyard. (80) By early 2012, a total of US$118.5 million had been spent just on hull construction and basic essential work for the first ship, whereas US$295 million was needed to install the required combat systems, according to the original corvette configuration. This is despite fitting out the hull as an OPV requiring just a quarter of the cost at US$73.75 million. (81) The sole vessel, ORP Slazak, was finally launched in July 2015 and slated to enter service by December 2016. If Warsaw had not decided to adapt flexibly to budget realities, the hull could have continued to lay idle in dry dock, inflicting needless costs on the Polish government.
This article has examined the TNI-AL's prospects of attaining its MEF targets by 2024 as part of its long-term greenwater naval ambitions commensurate with Indonesia's "maritime medium-ness". By definition, a greenwater navy should be effective within its immediate waters, especially the EEZ, while possessing a limited extra-regional force projection ability. However, the TNI-AL does not adequately perform this dual role, even though it is working towards achieving this aspiration. While Jokowi's GMF vision gives its long-term greenwater ambitions greater traction, the navy still faces an uphill task in building its capacity. The MEF blueprint is a step in the right direction, but it is designed primarily to first address the navy's longstanding capacity shortfalls and obsolete inventory. With this MEF goal in mind, the navy is expected to perform a spectrum of low-and high-intensity operations.
To accurately gauge the navy's prospects for attaining its MEF goals by 2024, this article modelled its Renstra I and II projections, taking into account planned procurements, the alutsista lifecycle and duration of production until in-service time. The study put forward three scenarios--Standard, Optimistic and Austere--to identify capacity gaps, and demonstrated that unless the TNI-AL retains all existing alutsista from 2008 and augments them with new ones under an Austere Scenario, there is little chance it can achieve MEF targets across all alutsista categories by 2024. The Optimistic and Standard Scenarios are more conceivable as alutsista aged well past their useful lifecycles should be discarded and only newer ones retained, safely operated and properly maintained. The modelling demonstrated gaps in certain alutsista categories, primarily the PKR-10514 programme which forms a key facet of a greenwater TNI-AL. The risks of project overruns commonly associated with such complex weapon systems, as well as persistent budget challenges, are factors that may undermine even those modest projections derived from this modelling exercise.
Therefore, this article proposes a recalibration of the MEF specifications in order to align the goals closer to the eventual aim of a greenwater TNI-AL. This calls for reducing the number of high-capability PKR-10514S in exchange for a bigger force of low-capability "PKR-minus" optimized for the more salient peacetime missions of EEZ policing. Several strategic, fiscal and technical factors justify this recalibration, further enabled by contemporary warship technologies and proven by existing examples found elsewhere. But certainly, this article does not claim to offer a panacea to the problems the navy faces in fulfilling its MEF goals. However, it does highlight the common challenges many navies face in an era of competing requirements for defence budgets, geopolitical uncertainties and growing strategic pressures. These challenges are amplified when one considers Indonesia's vast geographical expanse and its maritime responsibilities. With political will and a viable strategic vision, being flexible and taking advantage of modern technological innovations, it may be after all possible for the navy to overcome its hurdles and fulfil its MEF goals, with an eye to realizing its long-term greenwater aspirations.
KOH SWEE LEAN COLLIN is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Postal address: Nanyang Technological University, Block S4, Level B4, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore, 639798; email: firstname.lastname@example.org.
The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful insights and comments.
(1) Joko Widodo, "The Seas Should Unite, Not Separate Us", Jakarta Post, 14 November 2014 [Excerpt of President Joko Widodo's address at the East Asian Summit in Myanmar], Also see Aaron L. Connelly, "Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges", Contemporary Southeast Asia 37, no. 1 (April 2015): 1-28.
(2) Some of the most recent works include James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2013) and Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan, eds., Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences (London and New York: Routledge, 2014).
(3) President Jokowi advocated ramping up military capabilities beyond MEF levels in August 2015, repeating a similar call made in December 2014. His predecessor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, once envisioned Indonesia as an "Asian Tiger" within the next ten years, a timeline which coincides with the MEF's envisaged completion by 2024. Yeremia Sukoyo, "SBY Tells Troops: Indonesia an Asian Tiger in Ten Years", Jakarta Globe, 7 October 2014; Ina Parlina, "Jokowi wants RI Military to be Strongest in the Region", Jakarta Post, 31 December 2014; "Indonesia to build Defense Force More than Minimum Level: President", Xinhua News Agency, 14 August 2015.
(4) John Richard Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 20-21, 27.
(5) Ibid., p. 48.
(6) Sam Bateman, "Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers: An Australian Perspective", in Maritime Forces in Global Security: Comparative Views of Maritime Strategy as We Approach the 21st Century, edited by Ann L. Griffiths and Peter D. Haydon (Halifax, Canada: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1995), p. 242.
(7) "Indonesia Fits as a Middle Power Country: Official", Asia Pulse, 16 September 2011.
(8) Jun Honna, "Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi", Indonesia 86 (October 2008): 71.
(9) Thomas J. Hirschfeld, Multinational Naval Cooperation Options (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1993), p. 12; James L. Lacy, Between Worlds: Europe and the Seas in Arms Control (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, August 1990), p. 22.
(10) There are just only 229 surface vessels and 28 maritime surveillance aircraft belonging to the military and civilian enforcement agencies available to police the Indonesian archipelago. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-worldfactbook/>; International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2015 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 253-55.
(11) Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara Tahun 2014, Lampiran Keputusan Menteri Pertahanan RI, Nomor: KEP/25/M/I/2014, 7 Januari 2014, pp. 9-15 [State Defense Policy 2014, Decree of the Ministry of Defence, Republic of Indonesia (RI), No. KEP/25/M/I/2014, 7 January 2014, pp. 9-15].
(12) Andi Widjajanto, "Budget Creativity Needed in Building a Future Navy", Jakarta Post, 3 March 2008.
(13) The first corridor passes through the South China Sea, Karimata Straits, Java Sea and Sunda Straits. The second corridor crosses the Sulawesi Sea, Makassar Straits, Flores Sea and Lombok Straits. The third corridor passes through the Pacific Ocean, Maluku Straits, Seram Sea and Banda Sea. "Navy to Add Third Fleet by 2014", Jakarta Post, 4 October 2011; "Navy Hopes Navy's Third Fleet to be Operational in 2014", ANTARA News, 23 January 2013. Even though official approval has yet to be given, recent developments such as the inauguration of a new main TNI-AL base in West Kalimantan in August 2015 signals a step towards realizing the plan for a third fleet. "Navy Chief Inaugurates Naval Base XII in West Kalimantan", Tempo, 7 August 2015.
(14) This wide bracket is based on TNI-AL statements in the following reports: "Indonesian Navy Says It Needs More Warships", Reuters, 18 April 1994; "Indonesian Admiral Says 400 More Warships Needed", Agence France Presse, 1 February 1995; "Navy Needs More Ships, Aircraft to Safeguard Waters", Jakarta Post, 5 May 2000; "Navy Needs More Warships", Jakarta Post, 22 September 2000; "Indonesian Navy to Modernize Warships, Weaponry", Xinhua News Agency, 13 November 2000; "Indon Navy Needs 75 More Warships", ANTARA News, 30 January 2002; "Indonesian Navy Needs 113 Ships up to 2013--Minister", Xinhua News Agency, 24 February 2003; "Navy Needs 200 Patrol Boats, Shortfall due to Lack of Funding", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 8 April 2003; "Indonesia's Navy Says It Needs Hundreds of Boats to Keep Out Terrorists", Associated Press, 6 September 2003; "Indonesian Navy Needs At Least 302 Warships: Naval Officer", ANTARA News, 11 February 2005; and "Indonesia Short Of Warships: Navy Chief", Jakarta Post, 2 August 2007.
(15) The 75 planes comprise 54 medium-range NC-212s and 21 long-range CN-235PATMARs, built locally but fitted with foreign-sourced components. "Maritime Patrol to Track Boat People", Jakarta Post, 4 October 2013.
(16) Daniel Todd and Michael Lindherg, Navies and Shipbuilding Industries: The Strained Symbiosis (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), p. 54.
(17) Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2008, Departmen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2008 [Indonesian Defense White Paper 2008, Department of Defence, Republic of Indonesia, 2008], pp. 127-28; Evan A. Laksmana, "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force", in Till and Chan, Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia, op. cit., p. 189; and "TNI Expects Stronger Navy Fleet by 2024", Jakarta Post, 30 August 2012.
(18) Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, "Minimum Force: TNI AL Tackles the Essentials", Jane's Navy International, 19 September 2012.
(19) Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, op. cit., p. 209.
(20) John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe", in Naval Strategy and National Security, edited by Steve E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 56-57, 88, 99.
(21) For a detailed exposition of the basic operational capabilities and requirements matched to the number of vessels specified under the MEF Blueprint, see Laksmana, "Rebalancing Indonesia's Naval Force", op. cit., p. 191.
(22) "Indonesian Magazine Interviews New Forces Commander", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 25 October 2010.
(23) "President Jokowi Outlines Four Priorities of Defense Policy", ANTARA News, 30 December 2014; "Indonesia Set to be Self-supporting in Defense Industry in 2015", ANTARA News, 27 February 2015.
(24) Novan Iman Santosa, "Navy Ready to Modernize Warship Fleet", Jakarta Post, 30 December 2009.
(25) David L. Kirkpatrick, "Life Cycle Costs for Decision Support--A Study of the Various Life Cycle Costs used at Different Levels of Defence Policy and Management", Defence and Peace Economics 11, no. 2 (2000): 333-68.
(26) Department of Disarmament Affairs, The Naval Arms Race, Report to the Secretary-General, A/40/535 (New York: United Nations, 1986), p. 16.
(27) "Purchase Confirmed, Navy Waits for Three New Ships", Tempo, 11 December 2013. However, the MRLFs are not fully combat-capable when commissioned in July 2014 because they lacked key anti-air and anti-submarine systems. Ridzwan Rahmat, "Indonesia Commissions First Two of Three Bung Tomo-class Corvettes", Jane's Navy International, 24 July 2014; Ridzwan Rahmat, "Indonesian Navy to Equip Bung Tomo Corvettes with Panther ASW Helicopters", Jane's Navy International, 7 October 2014.
(28) For example, despite a generous defence budget exceeding Indonesia's, Singapore also purchases second-hand equipment, such as refurbished ex-Swedish submarines.
(29) The refurbishment was partially financed by a $235 million German government loan. "Germany Loans 235 Million for Indonesian Naval Repairs", Agence France Presse, 10 July 1993; and "Indonesia to Modify Warships for $800 Million", Reuters, 7 December 1993. In June 1994, Indonesian defence authorities stated the total cost at about $1.1 billion, which actually exceeded the navy's estimates of $300 million, on which the Finance Ministry's allocations were based. "Minister Explains Cost of Purchase of 39 Warships from Germany", BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 6 June 1994.
(30) According to a navy official, ageing warships drastically increase POL consumption by two to three times that of new vessels; and these vessels include the 1960s-vintage ex-East German ships. "Indonesia: Aging Warships Waste Too Much Fuel", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 17 April 2007.
(31) Then Navy Chief-of-Staff Admiral Marsetio said that government allocations for just 27 per cent of the navy's total fuel requirements remain far from optimal. "Limited Fuel Supply Hampers National Maritime Security", Tempo, 3 December 2014.
(32) "Naval Base Lacks Fuel, Uses New Strategies to Guard Waters", Jakarta Post, 7 November 2009.
(33) "National Scene: Govt to Review Weaponry System Grant", Jakarta Post, 29 April 2015.
(34) TNI-AL authorities recounted the "bad experience" and "headache" they had with the ex-East German warships. "Indon Navy Rejects Nine Warships to be Offered by Lybia [sic]", ANTARA News, 27 January 2004.
(35) According to the navy, the boats had idled for two years and their damaged engines and other components were too costly to repair. Wahyoe Boedhiwardhana, "RI passes on Unseaworthy Russian Subs", Jakarta Post, 13 March 2014.
(36) "National Scene: House Support Plans to Buy Russian Submarine", Jakarta Post, 30 September 2015.
(37) The visit sought closer bilateral trade and industrial cooperation and the prospect of building Russian submarines in Indonesia was being discussed. "Trade Between Russia, Indonesia to go to $5bln, Plans Include SS100, New Submarines--Ministry", Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 22 October 2014.
(38) Ridzwan Rahmat, "Pacific 2015: Indonesia in Talks with France over Possible Sale of Scorpene 1000 SSK", Jane's Navy International, 6 October 2015.
(39) "Construction of Diesel Electric Submarines of Project Varshavyanka 636 is Stopped", WPS: Defense & Security, 7 September 2015.
(40) Juha-Matti Lehtonen and Jukka Anteroinen, "The Capability Factors as Explanatory Variables of Equipment Unit Cost Growth: A Methodological Proposal", Defence and Peace Economics (April 2015): 1-19.
(41) This timeframe takes reference from Clark G. Reynolds, History and the Sea: Essays on Maritime Strategies (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 11-12.
(42) For example, one KCR-40 fast attack craft requires twelve months to construct because it has more complex systems integration requirements, compared to its derivative PC-43 patrol craft which is equipped with simpler systems. "Defense Minister Receives Beladau Warship", Tempo, 25 January 2013.
(43) Then Navy Chief-of-Staff Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh remarked about the ideal situation of acquiring five to six new patrol vessels annually, contingent on Indonesia's economic growth. "Indonesian Navy Needs At Least 302 Warships: Navy Officer", ANTARA News, 11 February 2005.
(44) "Indonesian Defense Force Sets Targets of 42% MEF", ANTARA News, 8 January 2014.
(45) "Moeldoko Boasts of Feats During Tenure", Jakarta Post, 8 July 2015.
(46) "Indonesia Speeds Up Military Modernization", Xinhua News Agency, 9 January 2013.
(47) Syaiful Hakim, "Kekuatan alutsista TNI yang mulai diperhitungkan" [TNI to Begin Accounting for the Strength of Primary Armament Systems], ANTARA News, 23 February 2014.
(48) Ian Anthony, The Naval Arms Trade, SIPRI Strategic Issue Papers (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 165; Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1992), p. 179; Joseph R. Morgan, Porpoises among the Whales: Small Navies in Asia and the Pacific, East-West Centre Special Reports No. 2 (March 1994), p. 12.
(49) Novan Iman Santosa, "Local Weapons Ramped Up", Jakarta Post, 20 February 2014.
(50) Jon Grevatt, "IndoDefence 2014: PT PAL, DSME Submarines Negotiations Continue", Jane's Defence Industry, 6 November 2014.
(51) "Indonesia Plans to Purchase Russian Submarines", ITAR-TASS World Service, 21 October 2014; "President Jokowi Discusses Defense Industry with Angela Merkel", Tempo, 17 November 2014.
(52) Jon Grevatt, "Indonesia Plans to Acquire up to 40 Corvettes", Jane's Navy International, 1 October 2007.
(53) Nani Afrida and Hasyim Widhiarto, "Wayward Policies Plague Shipyard: PAL President", Jakarta Post, 5 October 2011.
(54) "TNI Prioritizes Local Military Weapon System", ANTARA News, 6 November 2014; see also "Joint Chief of Staff Candidate Promises Weapons Improvement", Tempo, 2 July 2015.
(55) "Shipyards Not Yet Strong Enough to Support Maritime State; Official", ANTARA News, 11 September 2014; "Best Opportunity for Shipbuilding Industry: Minister", ANTARA News, 4 August 2015.
(56) "TNI Still Needs Imported Weapons", Jakarta Post, 14 January 2015.
(57) "Indonesia asks Dutch for More Consistent Support with Guided Missile Frigate", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 15 December 2010.
(58) Read for example, Benjamin Schreer, "Moving Beyond Ambitions? Indonesia's Military Modernisation", Strategy (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), November 2013; and Yuddy Chrisnandi and Leonard C. Sebastian, "Defence Budgeting in Indonesia: Some Policy Options", RSIS Commentaries, No. 126/2007, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 21 November 2007.
(59) The World Bank, World Development Indicators Database: Indonesia, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia>.
(60) "Indonesian Defence Department Seeks Additional Funds for 2009 Budget", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 14 January 2009.
(61) "Indonesian President Earmarks 11 Billion Dollars to Modernize Defence Systems", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 21 September 2011.
(62) Kebijakan Penyelarasan Minimum Essential Force Komponen Utama, Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan Republik Indonesia 2012, Nomor 19 Tahun 2012 [Policy on the Alignment of Primary Components of the Minimum Essential Force, Regulation of the Minister of Defence, Republic of Indonesia, No. 19, 2012], p. 27.
(63) "Govt Eyes Used Weapons From Europe", Jakarta Post, 11 November 2011.
(64) "Army Receives the Lowest Budget Allocations for Its Armament System", ANTARA News, 4 October 2012.
(65) This point was particularly emphasized by Ms Curie Maharani, who is faculty member at Binus University and consultant for the Indonesian Department of Defence. The author thanks Ms Maharani for her valuable insights on the TNI-AL's budget allocations vis-a-vis its sister services. Email interview on 1 October 2015, Singapore.
(66) "Indonesia to Purchase Three More Corvettes from Netherlands", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 22 June 2010.
(67) "Indonesia Navy Receives Funding for Defence Equipment", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 26 May 2010.
(68) The Air Force Chief-of-Staff was expected to take over following the retirement of Moeldoko, formerly an Army Chief-of-Staff. "Indonesian President Breaks Tradition in Picking New Military Chief", Reuters, 10 June 2015.
(69) "House says TNI's Priorities Wrong in Leopard Tank Procurement", Jakarta Post, 18 January 2012.
(70) "Jokowi Committed to Improving Military Weapons Defense System", ANTARA News, 7 October 2014.
(71) "World Bank cuts Indonesia 2015 Growth Projection to 5.2 Percent", Reuters, 8 December 2014; "Slower Gains", Indonesia Economic Quarterly, The World Bank, July 2015, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/ document/EAP/Indonesia/IEQ-JUL-2015-english.pdf>.
(72) Todd and Lindberg, Navies and Shipbuilding Industries, op. cit., p. 15; Rear Admiral N.D.H. Hammond, RAN, "Technological Change and Surface Forces", in Naval Power in the Pacific: Toward the Year 2000, edited by Hugh Smith and Anthony Bergin (Colorado and London: Lynne Reiner, 1993), p. 102.
(73) "Indonesian Navy Chief Outlines New Maritime Defence Blueprint", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 9 December 2004.
(74) "Minister Susi: Our Losses Are Not Made Up Numbers", Tempo, 23 June 2015.
(75) Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century, op. cit., p. 46.
(76) "Navy Needs 200 Patrol Boats, Shortfall due to Lack of Funding", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 8 April 2003.
(77) Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan Press, 1984), p. 186.
(78) Michael A. Morris, Expansion of Third-World Navies (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1987), p. 43.
(79) STANFLEX was first pioneered by the Danish Flyvefisken class multi-role vessels built in 1987-96. This concept uses a standard hull with containerized mission modules to allow the vessel to change role quickly for surveillance, surface combat, anti-submarine, and MCM, minelayer or pollution control. STANFLEX continues to be employed by the Danish Navy, such as the current Absalon class Flexible Support Ship.
(80) "Polish Navy 'Gawron' in Financial Trouble?", Naval Forces 24, no. 4 (January 2003): 103; Tim Fish, "Poland Plans to Resurrect Corvette Programme", Jane's Navy International, 14 June 2010.
(81) Remigiusz Wilk, "Poland Awards Contracts to Complete Former Gawron Corvette as an OPV", Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 December 2013; "Poland Decides to Discontinue Work on Partially-built Corvette for Navy", BBC Monitoring European, 28 February 2012; Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, "Polish Corvette Project Axed Amid Rising Costs", Jane's Navy International, 2 March 2012.
Table 1 Projected TNI-AL Alutsista Procurements for Renstra II and III In- Service Year Alutsista Qty Builder(s) (est.) SS209 Chang Bogo submarines 2 South Korea 2019 1 Local (with 2023 South Korean help) 2000 to 3000-ton submarines of 5 Russian 2020-24 unspecified class Federation or France PKR10514 frigates 2 Netherlands 2016-17 and local 9 2020-24 Klewang corvettes 4 Local (with 2020-24 Swedish help) KCR-40 missile fast attack craft 10 Local 2015-19 6 2020-24 KCR-60M missile fast attack craft 13 Local 2015-18 PC-43 patrol craft 30 Local 2015-19 33 2020-24 Teluk Bintuni landing ship tank 4 Local 2015-19 2 2020-24 Tarakan fleet oiler 1 Local 2015-16 Rigel research/survey vessels 2 France 2015-16 10,000-ton fleet auxiliaries, possibly 1 Local/foreign 2015-19 oilers, of unspecified class 1 2020-24 1,500-ton fleet auxiliaries, possibly 2 Local/foreign 2020-24 research/survey vessels, of unspecified class BTR-4 amphibious armored vehicles 55 Ukraine 2015-19 Maritime patrol aircraft of 10 Local 2015-19 unspecified type, either the CN-235 6 2020-24 PATMAR, NC-212 or N-219 AS565MBe Panther ASW 11 France 2016-17 helicopters Source: Compiled by the author using figures and estimated timelines adapted from the summary of Naval Systems Projections Database (NSPD), American Maritime International (dba AMI International), available at <http://www.amiinter.com/>. The author thanks AMI International for the data.These figures are also corroborated with data from IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security. Table 2 TNI-AL Inventory Compared to MEF Requirements, pre-Renstra I (2008) Age Group (year) Force Alutsista MEF Organization Category Qty 61-70 51-60 41-50 31-40 Combat Strike Submarines 12 0 0 0 0 Frigates/ 56 0 0 6 1 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 0 0 0 0 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 0 0 1 7 Support MCM 18 0 0 0 9 Large AALS 45 7 0 1 6 Fleet oilers/ 6 0 0 3 2 tankers Survey/ 8 0 0 3 0 research General 22 0 0 2 0 support KORMAR Brigades 3 NA Combat 890 0 0 0 176 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 0 0 0 16 patrol Helicopters 30 0 0 0 0 Total 7 0 16 217 Age Group (year) Force Alutsista MEF 10 or Organization Category Qty 21-30 11-20 less Combat Strike Submarines 12 2 0 0 Frigates/ 56 19 0 2 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 4 2 0 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 0 7 23 Support MCM 18 2 0 0 Large AALS 45 10 0 3 Fleet oilers/ 6 0 0 0 tankers Survey/ 8 0 4 1 research General 22 5 0 5 support KORMAR Brigades 3 Combat 890 0 34 0 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 4 0 9 patrol Helicopters 30 12 6 0 Total 58 53 43 Austere Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 2 17 Frigates/ 56 28 50 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 6 16 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 38 58 Support MCM 18 11 61 Large AALS 45 27 60 Fleet oilers/ 6 5 83 tankers Survey/ 8 8 100 research General 22 12 55 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 210 24 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 29 83 patrol Helicopters 30 18 60 Total 397 Ave: 59 Optimistic Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 2 17 Frigates/ 56 22 39 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 6 16 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 37 56 Support MCM 18 11 61 Large AALS 45 19 42 Fleet oilers/ 6 2 33 tankers Survey/ 8 5 63 research General 22 10 45 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 210 24 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 29 83 patrol Helicopters 30 18 60 Total 374 Ave: 41 Standard Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 2 17 Frigates/ 56 21 38 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 6 16 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 30 45 Support MCM 18 2 11 Large AALS 45 13 29 Fleet oilers/ 6 0 0 tankers Survey/ 8 5 63 research General 22 10 45 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 34 4 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 13 37 patrol Helicopters 30 18 60 Total 157 Ave: 28 Source: Data compiled and corroborated by the author using multiple sources, including the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2009 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 389-90; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database online, available at <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/databases/ armstransfers>; Werner Globke, Weyers Flotten Taschenbuch 2008/2010 [Warships of the World Fleet Handbook 2008/2010] (Bonn, Germany: Monch Publishing Group and Oxford: Casemate UK Ltd., 2008); and IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security (formerly Jane's) databases, primarily Jane's Navy International and Jane's World Navies. Table 3 TNI-AL Inventory Compared to MEF Requirements, Renstra I (2010-14) Completed Age Group (year) Force Alutsista MEF Organization Category Qty 61-70 51-60 41-50 31-40 Combat Strike Submarines 12 0 0 0 2 Frigates/ 56 0 0 6 15 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 0 0 0 6 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 0 0 8 0 Support MCM 18 0 0 9 0 Large AALS 45 2 0 0 17 Fleet oilers/ 6 0 1 4 0 tankers Survey/ 8 0 1 2 0 research General 22 0 1 1 2 support KORMAR Brigades 3 NA Combat 890 0 0 176 0 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 0 0 16 1 patrol Helicopters 30 0 0 0 0 Total 2 3 222 43 Age Group (year) Force Alutsista MEF 10 or Organization Category Qty 21-30 11-20 less Combat Strike Submarines 12 0 0 0 Frigates/ 56 4 0 7 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 0 0 11 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 9 3 28 Support MCM 18 2 0 0 Large AALS 45 0 0 6 Fleet oilers/ 6 0 0 1 tankers Survey/ 8 3 2 0 research General 22 3 4 0 support KORMAR Brigades 3 Combat 890 0 34 54 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 2 1 19 patrol Helicopters 30 7 0 0 Total 30 44 126 Austere Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 2 17 Frigates/ 56 32 57 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 17 45 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 48 73 Support MCM 18 11 61 Large AALS 45 25 56 Fleet oilers/ 6 6 100 tankers Survey/ 8 8 100 research General 22 11 50 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 264 30 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 39 111 patrol Helicopters 30 7 23 Total 473 Ave: 63 Optimistic Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 2 17 Frigates/ 56 26 46 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 17 45 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 40 61 Support MCM 18 2 11 Large AALS 45 23 51 Fleet oilers/ 6 1 17 tankers Survey/ 8 5 63 research General 22 9 41 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 88 10 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 23 66 patrol Helicopters 30 7 23 Total 246 Ave: 42 Standard Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 0 0 Frigates/ 56 li 20 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 li 29 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 40 61 Support MCM 18 2 11 Large AALS 45 6 13 Fleet oilers/ 6 1 17 tankers Survey/ 8 5 63 research General 22 7 32 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 88 10 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 22 63 patrol Helicopters 30 7 23 Total 203 Ave: 34 Source: Data compiled and corroborated by the author using multiple sources, including the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2015 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 253-55; SIPRI Arms Transfers Database online, available at <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/databases/ armstransfers>; Werner Globke, Weyers Flotten Taschenbuch [Warships of the World Fleet Handbook] 2013/2015 (Bonn, Germany: Monch Publishing Group and Oxford: Casemate UK Ltd., 2011); Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 16th Edition: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013); and IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security (formerly Jane's) databases, primarily fane's Navy International and fane's World Navies. Table 4 Projected TNI-AL Inventory Compared to MEF Requirements, Renstra II (2015-19) Age Group (year) Force Alutsista MEF Organization Category Qty 61-70 51-60 41-50 31-40 Combat Strike Submarines 12 0 0 0 2 Frigates/ 56 0 0 6 15 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 0 0 0 6 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 0 0 8 0 Support MCM 18 0 0 9 0 Large AALS 45 2 0 0 17 Fleet oilers/ 6 0 1 4 0 tankers Survey/ 8 0 1 2 0 research General 22 0 1 1 2 support KORMAR Brigades 3 NA Combat 890 0 0 176 0 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 0 0 16 1 patrol Helicopters 30 0 0 0 0 Total 2 3 222 43 Age Group (year) Force Alutsista MEF 10 or Organization Category Qty 21-30 11-20 less Combat Strike Submarines 12 0 0 2 Frigates/ 56 4 0 9 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 0 0 34 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 9 3 58 Support MCM 18 2 0 0 Large AALS 45 0 0 10 Fleet oilers/ 6 0 0 3 tankers Survey/ 8 3 2 2 research General 22 3 4 0 support KORMAR Brigades 3 Combat 890 34 0 109 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 2 1 29 patrol Helicopters 30 7 0 11 Total 64 10 276 Austere Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 4 33 Frigates/ 56 34 61 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 40 105 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 78 118 Support MCM 18 11 61 Large AALS 45 29 64 Fleet oilers/ 6 8 133 tankers Survey/ 8 10 125 research General 22 11 50 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 319 36 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 49 140 patrol Helicopters 30 18 60 Total 614 Ave: 84 Optimistic Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 4 33 Frigates/ 56 28 50 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 40 105 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 70 106 Support MCM 18 2 11 Large AALS 45 27 60 Fleet oilers/ 6 3 50 tankers Survey/ 8 7 88 research General 22 9 41 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 143 16 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 33 94 patrol Helicopters 30 18 60 Total 387 Ave: 63 Standard Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 2 17 Frigates/ 56 13 23 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 34 89 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 70 106 Support MCM 18 2 11 Large AALS 45 10 22 Fleet oilers/ 6 3 50 tankers Survey/ 8 7 88 research General 22 7 32 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 143 16 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 32 91 patrol Helicopters 30 18 60 Total 344 Ave: 54 Source: Data compiled and corroborated by the author using multiple sources, including the summary of Naval Systems Projections Database (NSPD], American Maritime International (dba AMI International), available at <http://www.amiinter.com/>; and IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security (formerly Jane's) databases, primarily Jane's Navy International and Jane's World Navies. Table 5 Projected TNI-AL Inventory Compared to MEF Requirements, Renstra III (2020-24) Age Group (year) Force Alutsista MEF Organization Category Qty 61-70 51-60 41-50 31-40 Combat Strike Submarines 12 0 0 2 0 Frigates/ 56 0 6 15 4 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 0 0 6 0 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 0 8 0 9 Support MCM 18 0 9 0 2 Large AALS 45 0 0 17 0 Fleet oilers/ 6 1 4 0 0 tankers Survey/ 8 1 2 0 3 research General 22 1 1 2 3 support KORMAR Brigades 3 NA Combat 890 0 176 0 0 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 0 16 1 2 patrol Helicopters 30 0 0 0 7 Total 3 222 43 30 Age Group (year) Force Alutsista MEF 10 or Organization Category Qty 21-30 11-20 less Combat Strike Submarines 12 0 0 8 Frigates/ 56 0 7 15 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 0 11 29 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 3 28 63 Support MCM 18 0 0 0 Large AALS 45 0 6 6 Fleet oilers/ 6 0 1 3 tankers Survey/ 8 2 0 4 research General 22 4 0 0 support KORMAR Brigades 3 Combat 890 34 54 55 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 1 19 16 patrol Helicopters 30 0 0 11 Total 44 126 210 Austere Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 10 83 Frigates/ 56 47 84 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 46 121 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 111 168 Support MCM 18 11 61 Large AALS 45 29 64 Fleet oilers/ 6 9 150 tankers Survey/ 8 12 150 research General 22 11 50 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 319 36 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 55 157 patrol Helicopters 30 18 60 Total 681 Ave: 99 Optimistic Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 8 67 Frigates/ 56 26 46 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 40 105 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 103 156 Support MCM 18 2 11 Large AALS 45 12 27 Fleet oilers/ 6 4 67 tankers Survey/ 8 9 113 research General 22 7 32 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 143 16 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 38 109 patrol Helicopters 30 18 60 Total 413 Ave: 70 Standard Scenario Force Alutsista MEF Total % MEF Organization Category Qty Qty Fulfilled Combat Strike Submarines 12 8 67 Frigates/ 56 22 39 Corvettes Fast Attack 38 40 105 Craft Patrol Patrol Craft 66 94 142 Support MCM 18 0 0 Large AALS 45 12 27 Fleet oilers/ 6 4 67 tankers Survey/ 8 6 75 research General 22 4 18 support KORMAR Brigades 3 3 100 Combat 890 143 16 vehicles Naval Aviation Maritime 35 36 103 patrol Helicopters 30 11 37 Total 383 Ave: 61 Source: Data compiled and corroborated by the author using multiple sources, including the summary of Naval Systems Projections Database (NSPD), American Maritime International (dba AMI International), available at <http://www.amiinter.com/>; and IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security (formerly Jane's) databases, primarily fane's Navy International and fane's World Navies. Table 6 Indonesia's Defence Spending 2007-14 2007 2008 2009 2010 Defence Spending in 3.35 3.23 3.30 4.66 Current US$ billion Defence Spending as 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 Share of GDP (%) Defence Spending 3.8 3.0 3.4 3.7 as Share of Govt Spending (%) 2011 2012 2013 2014 Defence Spending in 5.84 1.77 8.36 7.02 Current US$ billion Defence Spending as 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8 Share of GDP (%) Defence Spending 3.7 4.5 4.8 4.1 as Share of Govt Spending (%) Source: Data compiled by the author using 2008-15 editions of the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Military Balance (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press); and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditures Database, available at <http://www.sipri.org/research/ armaments/milex/milex_database>.
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|Author:||Collin, Koh Swee Lean|
|Publication:||Contemporary Southeast Asia|
|Date:||Dec 1, 2015|
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