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Walter Benjamin and psychoanalysis: on dream and revolution in Benjamin.


This article deals with Walter Benjamin's interpretation of psychoanalysis. Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) is known as a member of Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School is sometimes considered as a research group that attempted the synthesis of Marxian social theory and Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse are especially among the famous members of Frankfurt School who studied the psychoanalysis as a tool for the critique of modern society. Then, Benjamin, another member of Frankfurt School, is normally not considered as such a thinker of Freudo-Marxism. It is because it appears that his approach to Freud is limited. He wrote only one essay where he handled explicitly Freud: On Some Motifs in Baudelaire (1939). Normally the students of Benjamin refer to nothing but this essay, when they discuss the relation between Benjamin and Freud. In consequence, Freud is considered as a secondary theme for Benjamin. But we would like to demonstrate that Freud occupies an important position in Benjamin's thought. This demonstration is not only based on his essay On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, but also on the fact that Benjamin studied the thinkers who were influenced by Freud: surrealists and Marcel Proust. In 1929 he wrote two important essays: 'Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia' and 'The Image of Prous't. The essay 'Surrealism' allows us to understand what he wanted from the psychoanalysis. That is why, we will start with this essay, Surrealism. Next, we would like to analyse the essays 'The Image of Proust' and 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire'.

In this regard, we aim to answer the following question: how did Benjamin receive the psychoanalytic theory in his sociological and philosophical thought? This question is well worth consideration, because it allows us to understand how an intellectual of the twentieth century wanted to use the psychoanalysis for his own aim. Here the validity of Freudian psychoanalysis is not the issue. We know that there were, on the one hand, a lot of criticisms against it as soon as Freud presented his psychoanalytic theory. On the other hand, there were many intellectuals who were intoxicated with it. What did some intellectuals of the twentieth century want from psychoanalysis? Who wanted psychoanalysis? While today few people accept it as it is, those questions are still worth consideration, because they are concerned with its socio-historical problem: its social appreciation and identity in the twentieth century. This paper aims to offer one of the visions on those socio-historical problems of psychoanalysis.

Dream in Surrealism

We start with the essay Surrealism. This essay does not aim to introduce surrealism to the Germans objectively and neutrally. In fact, Benjamin thinks that the essence of surrealism is far from neutrality, and that, therefore, we must not 'take the movement for the "artistic", "poetic" one it superficially appears' (Benjamin 1991b: 295). Surrealism is considered as a political movement and Benjamin thinks that it is an important political movement as it is able to contribute to the revolution.

At first, we must address Benjamin's political vision. We cannot think about it without consideration of the context of his era, that is, the era of the Weimar Republic. The fact is that the parliamentarianism of Weimar Republic did not function well. Carl Schmitt, with whom Benjamin sympathises, problematises the political structure of Weimar Republic. Schmitt opposes democracy to parliamentarianism. If democracy is defined as the sovereignty of the people, that is, as the identity between the will of the state and the will of its people, it is incompatible with the pluralism of parliamentarianism. Parliamentarianism presupposes that the discussion, in which each representative represents particular interests of his supporters, leads to the conclusion which satisfies everyone. But, when these interests clash incompatibly, this humanistic idea of discussion cannot function as discussion cannot lead to conclusion. Carl Schmitt sees this situation in the parliamentarianism of Weimar Republic (and we know that the same problem of parliamentarianism emerges in French Fourth Republic). There is no point for mutual agreement between moderate party, which preserves the constitutional order, and communism and extreme right party like Nazism, which both hope to destroy it. Each will of the people is not able to be identified with the parliamentarianism, which means the heterogeneity of incompatible wills. Therefore, we cannot realise the democracy in the pluralism of parliamentarianism. Then Benjamin 'is long acquainted with the crisis of the intelligentsia, or, more precisely, with that of the humanistic concept of freedom; and he knows how frantic is the determination that has awakened in the movement to go beyond the stage of eternal discussion and, at any price, to reach a decision' (Benjamin 1991b: 295). Decision means the manifestation of the will of people. So, if we reach a decision, we realise the perfect democracy, that is, the perfect identity between the will of the state and the will of its people. This allows us to reach the radical freedom. Then Benjamin thinks that, while left-wing French intellectuals are obstacles to this decision, surrealism can serve it. Benjamin says that it is only in contrast to left-wing French intellectuals that central features of surrealism can be understood. Left-wing French intellectuals believe in the universality of law, and they attempt to actualise their idea based on the rule of law. Benjamin thinks that their attitude does not contribute to anything but the conservation of the actual order insofar as the law aims to hold the status quo: 'Their collective achievement, as far as it is positive, approximates conservation. But politically and economically they must always be considered a potential source of sabotage.' (1991b: 304) Then, surrealism rejects this sabotage, and insists on total freedom. Therefore, Benjamin considers the psychoanalytic theory as an important element that supposes the surrealism.

When Benjamin says that surrealist works are political, it does not mean that they function as propaganda, which is used in order to gain support for a specific political party. Benjamin appreciates Aragon's Paysan de Paris (1926) and Breton's Nadja (1928). For example, Nadja describes an interaction between Breton and a mysterious young woman (Nadja). This description cannot function as propaganda. Nadja's politics is different from the politics of propaganda. The latter does not hope anything but the change of the ruling party thus parliamentarianism remains intact. However, the former hopes for the more radical political change, which is the suspension of the actual juridical order or the parliamentarianism. Benjamin understands the surrealist movement as a movement against the rule of the law. Then, surrealist politics is based on the attempt of experimenting language and image. 'Automatic writing', which is announced by Andre Breton in the first Manifeste du surrealisme published in 1924, is defined as an unmotivated writing, where the hand takes a sort of unmediated dictation from psychic activity itself. It is directed towards the liberation of language and image from rational control and social convention so that it can be placed in a state of total liberty. Such an idea of liberation of language and image penetrates all the activity of surrealism which seeks this liberation from social convention. This anti-conformism is a political element of surrealism.

Then the surrealists presuppose that social convention is identified with the rational, and that the freedom must be situated out of the rational thought and the consciousness. For them, freedom is situated in the unconscious. Therefore, they consider Freudian psychoanalytic theory as a pillar of their activities, because the research on the unconscious is considered as the research on the liberty. This surrealist idea of freedom is comprehensible for the philosophers, because they also search the liberty out of the rational thought since Kant, who situated the freedom out of the theoretical reason, where the causality reigns. Liberty is situated in the unconscious insofar as the unconscious is out of the consciousness which makes rational thought possible.

When surrealism searches the liberty, it searches also the irrational and the unconscious. Then it appears that surrealism is close to romanticism, which emphasises intuition, imagination and feeling, which are not able to be reduced in the deductive reason. However, Benjamin thinks that we must distinguish surrealism from romanticism, because, while the latter values the irrational, the former places an emphasis on the interaction between the rational and the irrational rather than on the irrational itself. While romanticism is not dialectical, surrealism is dialectical:

"Any serious exploration of occult, Surrealistic, phantasmagoric gifts and phenomena presupposes a dialectical intertwinement to which a romantic turn of mind is impervious. For histrionic or fanatical stress on the mysterious side of the mysterious takes us no further; we penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognize it in the everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the impenetrable as everyday." (Benjamin 1991b: 307)

In this way, surrealism aims to elucidate the interaction between rational and irrational, consciousness and unconscious, or necessity and freedom. Benjamin finds this dialectic in surrealist terms like dream or intoxication, where the threshold between waking and sleeping is worn away.

'To win the energies of intoxication for the revolution - this is the project about which Surrealism circles in all its books and enterprises.' (Benjamin 1991b: 307) The interaction between consciousness and unconscious leads to the revolution. Then, what is revolution? It is the state where actual juridical order is suspended and freedom is realised. However, Benjamin thinks that we must not confuse revolution and anarchism. Anarchism believes that the law is not necessary, while revolution does not aim to abolish the law in general: 'an ecstatic component lives in every revolutionary act. This component is identical with the anarchic. But to place the accent exclusively on it would be to subordinate the methodical and disciplinary preparation for revolution entirely to a praxis oscillating between fitness exercises and celebration in advance.' (Benjamin 1991b: 307) Method or discipline, that is, the rational, is an integral part of revolution. In this way, the revolution is considered as the state of interaction between law and freedom, rational and irrational, or consciousness and unconscious. Therefore, for Benjamin, the surrealist idea of dream can contribute to the revolution and this idea that Benjamin clarifies is surrealist interpretation of the Freudian theory of dream. Surrealists and Benjamin understand Freudian notion of dream as the site of intertwining of two incompatible concepts: law and freedom.

Dream in Proust

Benjamin was interested in the psychoanalysis as the theory of interaction between consciousness and unconscious and he found the same motif in Proust's works too. While his essay on 'Surrealism' was published in the journal Die literarische Welt at the beginning of 1929, the essay 'The Image of Proust' was published in the same journal at the end of 1929. Ten years after the essay, 'Surrealism', the essay 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire' was published in the journal Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung. In this essay, Benjamin again discussed Proust. When Benjamin discusses Proust, his interest is always his notion of 'involuntary memory' (memoire involontaire). Benjamin understands it as the memory that belongs to the unconscious and finds in Proust's works, the opposition between involuntary memory and voluntary memory. In 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', he analyses Proust as following:

"Immediately, he [Proust] opposes the voluntary memory, which is commanded by the intelligence, to this involuntary memory. The first pages of his huge work exhibit their relation. Regarding to the introduction of the term, Proust ascertains that nothing remained for him through the years, but poor memories of this city of Combray where a part of his childhood glided by. Before the taste of the Madeleine, which he will then often refer to, had brought him back to the ancient times on an afternoon, Proust was confined to what a soul left on standby for him, compliant to the appeal of attention. That was the voluntary memory, which declares that the data that it gives on the past do not conserve any past. "Such is our past. It is vain to seek to evoke it. All the efforts of our intelligence are useless."

Therefore Proust does not hesitate to summarise his thought declaring that this past 'is hidden out of the domain of intelligence and its field, in some material object [...] that we do not suspect. [...]'.' (Benjamin 1991a: 609-610) Benjamin finds in Proust's idea the opposition between involuntary memory and voluntary memory. The consciousness is not able to assimilate the involuntary memory and the authentic past that belongs to it. The involuntary memory always

clashes with the consciousness and excludes it. If the consciousness wants to assimilate the involuntary memory; it must lead to the destruction of this memory. It is also in his essay on 'The Image of Proust' that Benjamin also draws from Proust this motif of the opposition between consciousness and unconscious. He says:

"The important thing for the remembering author is not what he experienced, but the weaving of his memory, the Penelope work of recollection. Or should one call it, rather, a Penelope work of forgetting? Is not the involuntary recollection, Proust's involuntary memory, much closer to forgetting than what is usually called memory? And is not this work of spontaneous recollection, in which remembrance is the woof and forgetting the warp, a counterpart to Penelope's work rather than its likeness? For here the day unravels what the night has woven. When we awake each morning, we hold in our hands, usually weakly and loosely, but a few fringes of tapestry of lived life, as loomed for us by forgetting. However with our purposeful activity and, even more, our purposive remembering each day unravels the web and the ornaments of forgetting". (1991b: 311)

The involuntary memory is understood, in the usual term, as forgetting, because it is out of the conscious memory. All that consciousness can do is to unravel what the involuntary memory has woven. The consciousness is incompatible with the involuntary memory.

Then what makes the intertwining between these incompatible things possible? Proust responds: it's the dream. And the notion of resemblance characterizes it. Resemblance (Ahnlichkeif) is distinguished from the identity. The notion of resemblance indicates that the dream does not make possible the identity between consciousness and involuntary memory but their interaction where they remain irreducible to one anther: 'The resemblance of one thing to another which we are used to, which occupies us in a wakeful state,

reflects only superficially the deeper one of the dream world in which everything that happens appears not in identical but in similar guise, opaquely similar one to another.'(Benjamin 1991b: 314) In the dream world the consciousness and the involuntary memory appears not in identical but similar guise. And in this similar guise, they interact with one another. And this interaction distorts the world that we know with the consciousness. It is this distorted world that Proust seeks. He is 'homesick' for it: 'Torn by homesickness, he [Proust] has lain in his bed, homesick for the world distorted in the state of resemblance where the true surrealist face of existence arises.' (Benjamin 1991b: 314) Like surrealists, Proust considers the dream as the site of intertwining between unconscious and consciousness. So, Benjamin finds both in Proust's and surrealists' works the same idea: dream as the site of interaction between unconscious and consciousness, and we cannot illuminate this idea of dream without referring to Freud.

Dream in One Some Motifs in Biudelaire

Of course, we cannot say that Benjamin is faithful to Freud. Obviously, he simplifies the Freudian psychoanalysis, because, for him, the structure of unconscious like id or superego is not the issue. He is not interested in anything but the interaction between unconscious and consciousness. His interest in psychoanalysis is its applicability to his sociological and philosophical thought. While he does not explicitly refer to Freud in the essays on "Surrealism" and "The Image of Proust", in On Some Motifs in Baudelaire he treats Freud's Beyond the pleasure principle. Then, his attitude toward Freud is obvious when he says:

"In his essay published in 1921, Beyond the pleasure principle, Freud establishes a correlation between the memory (understood as involuntary memory) and the consciousness. The author presents this correlation in the title of hypothesis. The reflections that we will attach to it do not aim to demonstrate it. They are meant only to test its fertility, concerning certain facts much distant from the ones of which Freud thought presenting his view". (Benjamin 1991a: 612) Benjamin is not interested in the validity of psychoanalysis. All he wants is to use Freud for his concern. Then how does Benjamin read Beyond the pleasure principle? There are two theses that he draws from this essay: the first is the protection of the memory against the consciousness; the second is the protection of the consciousness against the memory. The first thesis is based on the Freudian hypothesis: 'consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace' (Freud 1955a: 25). According to Freud, 'becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory-trace are processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system.' (1955a: 25) The less the consciousness intervenes in the unconscious, the better the memory-traces are preserved as he says, 'Such memory-traces, then, have nothing to do with the fact of becoming conscious; indeed they are often most powerful and most enduring when the process which left them behind was one which never entered consciousness.' (Freud 1955a: 25). The consciousness is so destructive to the memory that the latter must be protected from the former. Next, about the second thesis the stimuli from the external world are the issue. They form the memory-traces in the unconscious since he states that, 'all excitatory processes that occur in the other systems leave permanent traces behind in them which form the foundation of memory.' (Freud 1955a: 24-25). Furthermore, they are considered as something so destructive to the living organism that it needs the protective shield against them as he says:

Protection against stimuli is an almost more important function for the living organism than the reception of stimuli. The protective shield is supplied with its own store of energy and must above all endeavour to preserve the special modes of transformation of energy operating in it against the effects threatened by the enormous energies at work in the external world--effects which tend towards a leveling out of them and hence towards destruction.(Freud 1955a: 27)

Then Benjamin insists that the consciousness is this protective shield against stimuli: 'It would figure as the protection against stimuli.' (1991a: 613) (1).

The motif that Benjamin draws from Beyond the pleasure principle is as follows: the consciousness and the memory (unconscious) are to destroy one another so, they are to protect themselves from one another. These two are also always in conflict between each other. The relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness is always the issue for Benjamin. In On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, he considers this motif of conflict between consciousness and unconsciousness as the theory of experience, especially modern human experience. If, like consciousness, the experience must protect itself from external stimuli, it must be isolated from the external world. If it is the case, the experience must be also isolated from others' experience, that is, from the collective experience. Benjamin thinks that the isolation of individual experience marks the modern society. In other words, there was no isolation of experience in the pre-modern society. While Proust says that the fact that we can reach the involuntary memory is just chance, Benjamin thinks, 'It is not self-evident at all that we depend on chance in this case. The inner nature. They do so only when the chances diminish to see external events assimilated to his experience.' (1991a: 610) The diminishment of these chances marks the modern society. Then, we can remark that Benjamin refers implicitly to Freud's psychology of child. According to Freud, there is no difference between consciousness and unconscious in child as he says that, 'In the psychology of adults we have fortunately reached the point of being able to divide mental processes into conscious and unconscious and of being able to give a clearly-worded description of both. With children this distinction leaves us almost completely in the lurch. It is often embarrassing to decide what one would choose to call conscious and what unconscious. Processes which have become the dominant ones, and which from their subsequent behaviour must be equated with conscious ones, have nevertheless not been conscious in child.' (Freud 1955b 104-105). Benjamin thinks that, in the premodern society, there is no difference between consciousness and unconsciousness?? Mauro to clarify, in consequence, no isolation of experiences. So, the collective experience was possible in the premodern society, it is impossible in the modern society. In this way, Benjamin understands the transition from the pre-modern society to the modern one as the transition from childhood to adulthood in Freud.

Benjamin's sociology aims to clarify what causes the transition from the pre-modern society to the modern one and he finds two elements: the transfiguration of media and the one of human community. The first indicates the transition from oral communication to journalistic media. In the pre-modern society the vehicle of intelligence is nothing but the oral communication. The latter tends to form the collective experience. The teller tells his experience to his listeners and makes them assimilate it to their proper experiences. So, the collection of experiences is formed. However, in the modern society, according to Benjamin, the press consists in the destruction of this collectivity of experiences: 'Its intention is to present the events so that they cannot penetrate into the domain where they would concern the experience of the reader. The principles of the journalistic information (novelty, brevity, clarity and especially absence of the correlation between pieces of news) contribute to this effect' (1991a: 610-611). So, Benjamin finds a separation between the events of the external world and the individual proper experience. This separation is a character of the modern society. Next, the second element is based on the social fact of mobility and concentration of population. The facilities for travel give a lot of people access to the big cities, and lead the concentration of population in the big cities. In consequence, in the daily life, we meet less of our neighbours or friends than strangers from whom we sometimes must be conscious of protecting ourselves. Benjamin says: 'It is clear that the eye of the dweller of big cities is overloaded with security functions.' (1991a: 649) If we live among the crowd in the big cities, we need the look that insures safety. We cannot form the collective experience among the crowd where we must protect ourselves from the others. So, the transfiguration of media and human community produces the isolation of individual experiences in the modern society. Today, everyone, without exception, is excommunicated from any community. Benjamin understands as this excommunication the motif of incompatibility between consciousness and memory that he draws from Freud's Beyond the pleasure principle.

How can we solve the problem of this excommunication in the modernity? In On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, Benjamin finds the solution in Baudelaire's notion of 'correspondence' and Freudian theory on anxiety dreams. Like repression, anxiety constitutes the protective shield against stimuli: 'preparedness for anxiety and the hypercathexis of the receptive systems constitute the last line of defence of the shield against stimuli.' (Freud 1955a: 31) Traumas and shock are caused by lack of anxiety and therefore, it is anxiety dreams that help to cure the patients suffering from traumatic neuroses as he says, 'These dreams are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis.' (Freud 1955a: 32) If the consciousness masters the unconscious effect, the latter is no longer destructive for the former. 'If the shock is so eased, so parried by the consciousness, it would give to the event that provoked it the character of a lived experience (Erlebnis) in the precise sense.'(Benjamin 1991a: 614). So the dreams make it possible that the unconscious coexist with the consciousness. Thereby we can understand Benjamin's revolution as follows: it substitutes the armistice for the antagonism between the individual experience and the politics.

However, this armistice is well distinguished from the identity and Baudelaire's notion of correspondences indicates this distinction. Benjamin explains this notion by saying, 'The correspondences are the data of remembrance - not historical data, but data of prehistory. What makes festive days great and significant is the encounter with an earlier life.' (1991a: 639). This distinction between history and prehistory is then parallel to the distinction between conscious and unconscious. The correspondences indicate the state where the consciousness encounters the unconsciousness??. However, it does not mean that the former can assimilate the latter as he says, 'There are no simultaneous correspondences, such as they were cultivated by the symbolists later. The murmur of the past may be heard in the correspondences, and the canonical experience of them has its place in a previous life' (1991a: 640). While the murmur of the unconscious can be heard, this voice is too small to understand. The unconscious appears as a canon illegible for the consciousness, something irreducible to the consciousness. In the correspondences the consciousness encounters the irreducibility of the unconscious. This encounter is different from the identity where the unconscious is reducible to the consciousness.


The psychoanalytic motif of dream is always the issue in Surrealism, The Image of Proust and On Some Motifs in Baudelaire. This motif is understood as the interaction where the consciousness and the unconscious remain irreducible to one another. Precisely speaking, it is understood as the revolution in Surrealism, the resemblance in The Image of Proust and the correspondences in On Some Motifs in Baudelaire. In Surrealism, Benjamin understands the revolution as a key concept for the criticism against modern society. Baudelaire, whom he treats in On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, is a modern person who criticises the modern society. Baudelaire is angry at the modernity: 'For someone who is past experiencing, there is no consolation. Yet it is this very inability to experience that lies at the heart of rage.' (1991a: 642) So, his notion of correspondences consists in the criticism against the modern society. Therefore, we can understand that Baudelaire's notion of correspondences is parallel to the revolution in the surrealist sense, and that the essay On Some Motifs in Baudelaire presents the idea of revolution by the notion of correspondences. In this essay, the modern society is characterised by the isolation of individual experiences: we are excommunicated from any collectivity. This excommunication is understood as the excommunication from the politics. If the democracy is defined as the identity between the individual will and the politics, the democracy is not realisable in the modern society. Therefore, Benjamin aims to realise not the identity but the interaction or 'resemblance' between the individual will and the politics. What we must realise is not the democracy but the revolution. In this way, he introduces the psychoanalytic idea of dream to his social theory.


Many thanks are due to Gerard Bensussan for always giving me many philosophical inspirations and teaching me the German, as well as to this journal's anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to Jacob Rogozinski for making me interested in Freud by his seminar. This article is an offshoot of my PhD research.


Raulet, G. (1998) 'Choc, memoire involontaire et allegorie', in Gerard Raulet, Uwe Steiner, Walter Benjamin : Asthetik und Geschichtsphilosophie, Bern : P. Lang.

Walter, B. (1991a) Gesammelte Schriften Band I, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Walter, B. (1991b): Gesammelte Schriften Band II, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Freud, Sigmund, The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, translated from the German under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, London: Hogarth press and Institute of psycho-analysis.

- 1955a: Vol. XIII (1920-1922), Beyond the pleasure principle, Group psychology and other works, 1955

- 1955b: Vol. XVII (1917-1919), An infantile neurosis and other works, 1955

- 1959: Vol. XX (1925-1926), An autobiographical study, Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety, The question of lay analysis and other works, 1959

(1) About this insistence, Gerard Raulet, a French philosopher, considers it as 'what Freud assuredly has never formulated' (126). Certainly, Freud has never explicitly presented this formulation, but it seems that it is possible as one of the readings of Freud. It is clear that Freud thinks that the repression is caused by the breaking through of the protective shield: 'the immediate precipitating causes of primal repressions are quantitative factors such as an excessive degree of excitation and the breaking through of the protective shield against stimuli.' (Freud 1955a: 94) In In autographical study (1925), the repression is considered as the self-defence of the consciousness: 'The ego drew back, as it were, on its first collision with the objectionable instinctual impulse; it debarred the impulse from access to consciousness and to direct motor discharge, but at the same time the impulse retained its full cathexis of energy. I named this process repression'. (Freud 1959: 29-30) In the repression, the consciousness protects itself from stimuli. For this protection the consciousness makes the energy that can counter the unconscious energy: 'the ego was obliged to protect itself against the constant threat of a renewed advance on the part of the repressed impulse by making a permanent expenditure of energy, an anticathexis, and it thus impoverished itself.' (Freud 1959: 30) So, the repression is considered as the countermeasure against the breaking through of the protective shield. If the protective shield is broken through, the consciousness must make the energy for protecting itself from stimuli. Therefore, the consciousness can be considered as, at least, a part of the protective shield. If we generalize the notion of repression, it corresponds to Benjamin's interpretation of the consciousness as the protective shield.

Ryohei Kageura

University of Strasbourg

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Date:Jan 1, 2009
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