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WHY ARTICLE 25 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE EXPLICITLY EXCLUDED FROM DEROGATION UNDER ARTICLE 4.

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 15, 2016, a coup d'etat was attempted in Turkey. (1) The Turkish government swiftly suppressed the coup with military force, but declared a state of emergency regardless. (2) Allegedly reacting to the coup, Turkey seized upon the derogation provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), one of the touchstone international agreements protecting human rights, and asserted its intent to suppress its citizens' participation in government until the "emergency" was under control. (3) United Nations experts question the validity of the "coup" because of the Turkish government's use of "coups" in the past to suppress opposition, and Turkey's response to the alleged coup has garnered condemnation from the international community. (4) What has not been addressed, however, is whether Turkey is in fact authorized to forgo its ICCPR obligations and why the ICCPR would authorize Turkey to suppress its citizens' involvement in government at all. (5)

This Note explores Article 25 of the ICCPR with its guarantee of citizen participation in government, and why Article 4 of the ICCPR should explicitly prohibit states from derogating Article 25. (6) Part II of this Note details the history and contemporary interpretations of the ICCPR, Article 4, and Article 25. (7) Part III of this Note discusses how the Human Rights Committee and other human rights commissions define, explain, and apply Article 25 and Article 4. (8) Part IV of this Note analyzes the hypocrisy of allowing derogation of Article 25 under Article 4, the parallels between Article 25 and the non-derogable ICCPR articles identified in Article 4, and why derogating Article 25 should be prohibited under Article 4. (9) Part V of this Note concludes by highlighting how state derogation of the rights enumerated in Article 25 is an inherent threat to all human rights. (10)

II. HISTORY

A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

1. The History of the ICCPR

In 1945, the allied powers assembled in San Francisco, California for the founding of the United Nations. (11) This conference resulted in the drafting of the United Nations Charter, but pressure from the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, all resistant to a human rights-centric organization possessing binding authority, systematically diminished the Charter's focus on human rights. (12) As a concession for diminishing the Charter's emphasis on human rights, Article 68 was incorporated into the Charter, requiring the formation of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights charged with "promoting" human rights. (13) By 1948, the Commission formulated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and, by 1954, the Commission codified the provisions of the UDHR in two treaties: the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). (14) The United Nations General Assembly adopted the ICCPR in 1966, and in 1976 the treaty entered into force. (15) Since then, 168 states have become parties. (16)

2. Applying the ICCPR Today

The purpose of the ICCPR is to protect "traditional human rights," commonly defined as civil and political rights, as enumerated under the UDHR. (17) Both the UDHR and the ICCPR are built on a foundation of pro-democratic institutions, considered one of the "universal core values and principles of the United Nations." (18) The ICCPR operates as a support mechanism for the international spread of democracy, reinforcing its tenants, and operating with the understanding that democracy best secures and protects human rights. (19)

The ICCPR is principally enforced and interpreted through the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as established in Article 28 of the ICCPR. (20) An ICCPR Member State undertakes to provide regular reports to the HRC summarizing the state's human rights situation, and the HRC in response provides detailed assessments of states' adherence to the ICCPR and suggestions on remedying any deficiencies. (21) The ICCPR's assessments carry no binding authority, though states are expected to remedy deficiencies as they are identified by the HRC. (22) Additionally, the HRC formulates and distributes general comments, wherein the scope and meaning of the ICCPR and its articles are expounded and explained. (23) While the ICCPR is intended to expand human rights, it also embraces certain limitations under specific circumstances: the ICCPR expressly allows Member States to restrict citizen's freedom of expression; prohibit war propaganda and advocacy of discrimination based on race, nationality, or religion; and impose reasonable restrictions on participation in public affairs. (24) The most expansive restriction allowed under the ICCPR is contained in Article 4 which allows Member States to forgo a majority of the ICCPR obligations. (25)

B. Article 4: The Derogation Provision

1. The History of Article 4

Article 4 of the ICCPR authorizes states to derogate certain rights under certain circumstances. (26) First appearing in a 1947 United Kingdom proposal to the Drafting Committee of the UDHR and the ICCPR, the inclusion of a derogation clause generated immediate debate. (27) Original proposals for a derogation clause expressly identified war, natural disasters, internal public unrest, and other national emergencies as justifications for derogation, generating the question of whether the ICCPR should only enumerate positive rights with a general limitations clause like in Article 29 of the UDHR, or precisely define both rights and limitations. (28) Proponents of precise definition asserted that, lacking explicit allocation of rights and limitations, the ICCPR would be vague and fail to protect rights from arbitrary suspension. (29) Opponents contended that explicitly granting states authority to suspend rights set a negative tone and a U.N. treaty should not "contemplate and make provisions for war." (30) Ultimately, France proposed the compromise that is manifest in Article 4 today: the derogation article would include a general limitation on state's power to derogate rights, coupled with expressly defined controls on states, such as listing non-derogable rights, requiring notification, and nondiscrimination. (31)

2. Applying Article 4 Today

The purpose of Article 4 is to provide states with a means to preserve themselves in emergencies but control how states can derogate their ICCPR obligations in pursuit of this goal. (32) Article 4's purpose is intended to reinforce the overarching purpose of the ICCPR as a whole. (33) For a state to properly exercise a valid Article 4 derogation: (1) the provision to be derogated cannot be identified as non-derogable, and the state must (2) experience an emergency that threatens the life of the nation; (3) officially proclaim an emergency, and define what rights will be derogated and why; and, (4) ensure the derogation is proportional to the emergency, while adhering to all other international obligations and the non-discrimination requirements of the ICCPR. (34)

a. Non-derogable Provisions

Article 4(2) expressly identifies eight provisions of the ICCPR that a state cannot derogate, regardless of circumstances. (35) The HRC asserts that the non-derogable provisions identified in Article 4(2) are non-derogable because "their suspension is irrelevant to the legitimate control of the state of national emergency." (36) While Article 4(2) does contain several peremptory norms, the HRC asserts that the expressly identified non-derogable rights are not comprehensive of all peremptory norms, nor are all the identified provisions peremptory norms. (37) The HRC states that the identification of a narrow list of non-derogable provisions under Article 4(2) does not imply that all unidentified provisions are subject to derogation. (38)

In addition to the expressly identified non-derogable provisions of the ICCPR, the HRC extends non-derogation status to several other provisions of the ICCPR. (39) Member states are prohibited from derogating provisions of the ICCPR pertaining to non-discrimination, including Article 4(1) that bars discrimination during the derogation process. (40) Article 2(3), which requires Member States to remedy their violations of the ICCPR, is also non-derogable as it is a fundamental obligation associated with membership in the ICCPR. (41) Article 10, which guarantees incarcerated individuals are treated with dignity and respect, is non-derogable because the provision expresses a norm of general international law and is closely tied to the non-derogable Article 7. (42) As forced or coercive displacement of lawfully present individuals is considered a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute, Article 12 is also considered non-derogable by the HRC. (43) The HRC also bars derogation of Article 20, stating that no state of emergency justifies war propaganda or advocacy of hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence. (44)

b. Emergency Threatening the Life of the Nation

Expressly stated in Article 4(1), derogation of an ICCPR provision requires that a state experience such a catastrophe that its very "life" is threatened. (45) Following the drafting of Article 4, the Chilean representative noted that "it was difficult to give a precise legal definition of the life of the nation [but it] was significant that the text did not relate to the life of the government or of the state." (46) Article 4 allows for states to respond to threats, but simultaneously narrows what constitutes an "emergency" for the purpose of derogation. (47) To qualify as a life threatening catastrophe, an emergency (1) must be extraordinary and not a matter of habit or a symptom of chronic government tension; (2) the emergency must be a threat to the nation as a whole and the nation's democratic basis of government; and (3) the threat must be actual or exceedingly imminent, and cannot be merely speculative, potential, latent, lingering, or theoretical. (48)

c. Proclamation and Definition

To ensure and protect the rights of individuals, Article 4 requires states to officially proclaim a state of emergency and inform the HRC when exercising Article 4. (49) The purpose of these requirements is two-fold: (1) to provide the HRC with notice needed to assess whether the state is in--and remains in--compliance with the ICCPR and other international obligations; and (2) to provide Member States with awareness of derogation so they may monitor the derogating state's compliance with the ICCPR. (50) Under Article 4, a state's assertion of a state of emergency must be in compliance with the state's law relevant to asserting a state of emergency. (51) A derogating Member State is required to immediately inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any official state of emergency and provide an accounting of what rights are derogated and why. (52) The HRC requires a derogating state provide all relevant information about the derogation, including "measures taken and a clear explanation of the reasons for them." (53) A list of derogated ICCPR provisions with no description of "extent, duration, or scope of limitations" is insufficient. (54)

d. Proportionality, International Obligations, and Non-discrimination

Article 4(1) requires that any derogation be proportional in its application to the circumstances. (55) Demonstrating that a derogation is permissible based on exigent circumstances is, alone, inadequate to justify the proportionality of a derogation; the specific measures employed pursuant to the derogation must also be warranted by the exigent circumstances. (56) Similarly, a state's derogation is invalid if the derogation is inconsistent with the state's other international obligations. (57) A state is also barred from derogating from a provision of the ICCPR if its derogation violates the non-discrimination clause of Article 4(1), or any of the other non-discrimination provisions contained in the ICCPR. (58)

C. Article 25: Citizen Participation in Government

1. The History of Article 25

Article 25 of the ICCPR guarantees citizens the right and opportunity to influence and participate in public affairs. (59) Unlike Article 4, the drafters of the ICCPR experienced little debate over the formation of Article 25; the ICCPR was intended to support democracy, thus citizen participation in government was an expected provision. (60) The drafters elected to not expand citizen's right to exercise political power in "all organs of authority," instead trusting in appointed officials so long as they were "in some way responsible to elected officials." (61) Ultimately, the drafters spent little time on Article 25, generally accepting that universal and equal suffrage, coupled with secret ballot, results in democratic institutions wherein each vote counts equally. (62)

2. Article 25 Applied Today

The purpose of Article 25 is to secure individuals' democratic representation within their governmental organizations. (63) Three principal guarantees are contained in Article 25: (1) the right to participate in public affairs; (2) the right to free elections, and; (3) non-discrimination in the participation of public affairs and free elections. (64) The major provisions of Article 25 are not identified as non-derogable under Article 4, nor has the HRC explicitly extended non-derogation status to Article 25 as a whole. (65)

a. Participation in Public Affairs

Article 25 guarantees citizens the rights to "take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives," "to vote and to be elected," and "to have access [...] to public service in his [or her] country." (66) Article 25, however, includes a limiting provision, whereby states are authorized to reasonably restrict citizens' participation in public affairs if such restrictions are based on "objective and reasonable criteria." (67) The HRC acknowledges that age limitations for election or appointment to office are objective and reasonable, but restrictions suspending or excluding citizen's rights may only be proper if established by law. (68) "Public affairs" extends to the exercise of political power, specifically in the exercise of legislative, executive, and administrative powers. (69)

b. Free Elections

The ICCPR does not require any particular electoral system; however, any system operating within a Member State must secure and abide by the rights enumerated in Article 25. (70) As such, genuine periodic elections--held at intervals not unduly long--that keep government authority bound to the will of the electorate are required under Article 25. (71) States must implement effective measures to ensure all citizens are able to vote and are not restricted by unreasonable registration laws, unreachable voting stations, or intimidation from participating. (72)

c. Non-discrimination

Like the rest of the ICCPR, Article 25 is bound by Article 26, whereby "all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law." (73) Article 25, however, frees itself from the Article 2 restriction wherein states are prohibited from discriminating "against citizens on the basis of an explicitly prohibited characteristic." (74) Restrictions on voters, such as age requirements for voting or holding office, violate Article 2, thus Article 25 suspends the application of Article 2, instead requiring restrictions be only "objective and reasonable." (75)

III. CONTEMPORARY RELATION BETWEEN ARTICLE 4 AND ARTICLE 25

The HRC provides little direct guidance on how Article 4 and Article 25 interact. (76) The relationship between Article 4 and Article 25 is, in a limited capacity, explained and expounded upon in the HRC's and U.N. experts' responses to alleged state violations of the ICCPR. (77) The HRC's concluding observations on state's periodic reports adds some further definition of how Article 4 and Article 25 relate, but the nature of their relationship is not firmly established. (78) Contemporary parallels to Article 25 and Article 4, however, are found across several international agreements, and provide examples of how these two provisions are interpreted and interact on the international stage. (79) Exploring and comparing international parallels to Article's 25 and 4 before addressing the HRC's actual treatment of Article 25 provides much need context in the discussion of the latter. (80)

A. Contemporary International Agreements Including Parallels to Article 25

1. The American Convention on Human Rights

Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights guarantees all citizens the right and opportunity to participate in public affairs, vote for and be elected into public office, and to access the public service of the state. (81) The language of Article 23 actually parallels the language of Article 25 in the ICCPR. (82) The American Convention also provides for the derogation of rights in its Article 27, once again in language exceedingly similar to that employed in Article 4 of the ICCPR. (83) The primary difference between the two derogation clauses lies in the threshold of what justifies state derogation: the American Convention allows state derogation "[i]n time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State," whereas the ICCPR allows derogation "[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation." (84) While the language used is different, the language patterns of and purposes behind Article 4 and Article 27 are so similar that it has been concluded that the two provisions share "the same textual and procedural limitations." (85)

Unlike the ICCPR, the American Covenant includes a more extensive list of non-derogable rights, including Article 23. (86) Unlike the HRC, the Inter-American Commission defines and narrows Article 27, declaring that a situation needs to be "sufficiently grave and constitute 'a threat to the organized life of the state'" to qualify for derogation. (87) The Inter-American Commission provided its most significant interpretation of Article 23 in its 1990 review of Mexico's election, wherein the Commission asserted that "states should strive to prevent 'a disproportionate presence of the government' in electoral activities." (88) The Commission emphasized that "authentic" elections occur in the context of "a legal and institutional structure conducive to election results that reflect the will of the voters." (89)

2. The European Convention on Human Rights

Article 15 of the European Convention allows Member States to derogate obligations in language paralleling that used in Article 4 of the ICCPR, save for the European Convention specifically acknowledging that war inherently threatens the life of a nation. (90) The similarities between Article 4 and Article 15 imply that explanations and limitations on one are relevant in the interpretation of the other. (91) The European Commission, in interpreting the application of the European Convention in The Lawless Case, provides insight into what constitutes an emergency "threatening the life of the nation." (92) The Commission concluded that threats to the "life" of a nation involve situations affecting the entirety of a state's population and threaten "the organized life of the community of which the state is composed." (93)

Unlike the ICCPR and the American Convention, the European Convention does not require states to guarantee citizen participation in public affairs. (94) Only through Article 3 of the First Protocol does the European Convention require "free elections," though acquiescence to the First Protocol is voluntary and its extent is limited. (95) Though expressly limited, Article 3 is interpreted by the European Commission and European Court of Human Rights far more broadly, reflecting more the guarantees contained in Article 25 of the ICCPR. (96) The European Commission and European Court of Human Rights justify interpreting Article 3 more in accordance with Article 25 of the ICCPR due to the "common democratic heritage" of European states. (97) The European Conventions' non-derogable right provision is exceptionally narrow and does not include Article 3 of the First Protocol. (98)

B. Human Rights Committee Decisions Regarding State Derogation of Article 25

1. Uruguay

In 1978, the HRC received individual communications alleging that the Uruguayan government was restricting its citizens' human rights, specifically the right to political participation. (99) The individual communications contended the Uruguay government violated Article 25 of the ICCPR by enforcing an executive order that barred individuals from participating in "any of the activities of a political nature" for fifteen years. (100) The targeted citizens were those who ran for elected office from 1966 to 1971 as representatives of opposition political parties. (101) On July 30,1979, the Uruguayan government filed a notification with the U.N. Secretary-General asserting an "emergency situation" threatening "the life of the nation" was underway, and Uruguay was invoking Article 4 to derogate from Article 25 of the ICCPR. (102) Lacking an explanation for why Uruguay declared itself in a state of emergency, the HRC determined that Uruguay's derogation of Article 25 was improper under Article 4. (103)

While the HRC determined Uruguay's derogation was improper because it was inadequately declared, the HRC also questioned whether satisfactory grounds could exist for derogating Article 25 as alleged by the government of Uruguay. (104) The HRC failed to see how depriving citizens any political rights for fifteen years could possibly "restore peace and order." (105) The HRC noted that the government's restriction on participation in public affairs applied to all candidates from specific political parties, regardless of whether the former-candidates pursued their political influence peacefully or through the use or advocacy of violence. (106) In failing to show how restricting political dissent would protect Uruguay from its alleged emergency situation, the HRC determined that Uruguay failed to adhere to Article 4 and its derogation of Article 25 was unlawful. (107)

2. Turkey

On July 21, 2016, the Government of the Republic of Turkey alerted the Secretary-General of the United Nations that Turkey was in a state of emergency following an attempted coup d'etat and was exercising its derogation powers under Article 4 of the ICCPR. (108) Turkey's notice indicated that Articles 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27 may all be derogated for a period of ninety days. (109) Though Turkey's derogation notice identifies the rights it may derogate, it provides no explanation or method for why and how these rights may be derogated. (110)

To date, the HRC has not published a response to Turkey's notice; however, multiple United Nations experts have spoken out against Turkey's broad derogation language and failure to adhere to Article 4. (111) The United Nations experts contend that Turkey's state of emergency does not qualify as "a threat to the life of the nation," and even if it did, Turkey's derogation of so many rights is facially overbroad. (112) Regardless of the current derogation asserted by Turkey, the HRC has repeatedly condemned Turkey's use of Article 4 because of the unnecessary nature of such derogations "in a democratic society," as Turkey uses its Article 4 power to target dissidents and critics of the regime thereby undermining freedoms necessary for democratic governance. (113)

C. Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations Regarding Article 25

In response to Member States' Article 40 reports, the HRC provides concluding observations wherein the Committee details how and to what extent a given state adheres to or violates the ICCPR. (114) Since 1992, concluding observations have noted state violations of Article 25. (115) The HRC consistently disavows depriving voting rights to convicted felons both in the United States and the United Kingdom as unreasonable and therefore in violation of Article 25. (116) Furthermore, the United States has been chastised by the HRC for not extending full representation to the U.S. citizens residing in the District of Columbia without reasonable justification. (117) In 1999, the HRC reproached Hong Kong for limiting citizens' access to government participation by abolishing municipal courts, thereby violating Article 25. (118) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in its only concluding observation from the HRC, was rebuked generally for violating Article 25 of the ICCPR by not having a democratic government. (119)

Though concluding observations are not binding on members, they publicize a state's deficiencies and request information on states' measures to remedy identified deficiencies. (120) Consistent recognition of a state's failure to adhere to Article 25, or misuse of Article 4 to derogate from Article 25, aims to draw attention to the state's lack of adherence to the ICCPR and pressures the state to remedy said deficiencies. (121) The 2014 United States concluding observation applauded the United States' attempt to remedy the deprivation of convicted felon's voting rights, but emphasized the continued practice as violating Article 25, as did the failure to extend full representation to the U.S. citizens residing in the District of Columbia, and further emphasized how voter identification laws may be disenfranchising citizens' involvement in government unreasonably. (122) The 2006 Hong Kong concluding observation also further reinforced that the abolishment of municipal courts was still an unreasonable restriction on citizens' participation in government. (123)

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Derogating Article 25 is Contrary to the Purpose of Article 4

To allow derogation of Article 25 via Article 4 creates a conflict of purposes, because Article 4 is intended to protect the very institutions that the derogation of Article 25 would suspend. (124) The ICCPR is a pro-democracy agreement, with Article 25 as the cornerstone provision regarding the proliferation and protection of democratic institutions. (125) For Article 4 to allow the derogation of Article 25 results in a conflict of purposes between the ICCPR, Article 4, and Article 25. (126) To illustrate this conflict of purposes, the purpose of Article 4 is analyzed, specifically what the "life of the nation" encompasses when determining whether an emergency justifies derogation. (127) The breadth of the term "life of the nation" is unpacked to reveal it includes a community's political structure. (128) When coupled with the democratic purpose of the ICCPR, Article 4 is found to be a means for protecting Member State's democratic institutions as they manifest in the community's political structure, and as such Article 4 cannot be exercised to suppress democracy. (129)

1. Defining "Life of the Nation"

"Life of the nation," as used in Article 4, encompasses a community's political structure; this definition, however, does not directly stem from the HRC. (130) The stated purpose of Article (4) is to provide a nation with a means to preserve itself in an emergency when the nation's "life" is threatened. (131) The HRC, however, fails to provide a firm definition of what constitutes the "life of the nation." (132) The above presented definition may be inferred though when one compares the drafting language of Article 4, the HRC's explicit statements regarding Article 4, and the definitions offered by the Inter-American Commission and European Commission regarding the Article 4-like language contained in their respective human rights agreements. (133)

The HRC openly acknowledges not every disturbance qualifies as a public emergency amounting to a threat to the "life of a nation." (134) In the drafting phase of Article 4, war, natural disasters, and internal public unrest were contemplated as examples of emergencies threatening the life of a nation, but these specific terms were purposefully excluded from the final draft. (135) Following the drafting of Article 4, the Chilean representative expressly acknowledged the difficulty of defining "life of the nation," but emphasized that the text of Article 4 does not equate "life of the nation" with the "life of the government or of the state." (136) Furthermore, the HRC asserts that armed conflict, whether national or international, does not inherently threaten the life of a nation, implying that armed conflict requires some additional threat to qualify as an emergency threatening the "life of the nation." (137) The dissociation between the "life of the nation" and those emergencies that would generally be considered threats to a nation, supports the inference that the "life of the nation" referenced in Article 4 relates to a facet of the nation's community not entirely encompassed in said nation's government or state entity. (138)

Both the Inter-American Commission and the European Commission provide further detail on what "life of the nation" encompasses. (139) The Commissions both assert the life of a nation is threatened when "the organized life" of the community is threatened. (140) This definition expands "life of the nation," en compassing the means by which the entire population of a nation organizes its community life and stating that a valid emergency will threaten this means. (141) As the language utilized in the American Commission and the European Commission relating to derogation is almost verbatim the language used in Article 4 of the ICCPR, it may be inferred that the interpretation of one agreement provides insight into the interpretation of the others. (142)

The above interpretations of what composes a nation's "life" results in the inference that "life of the nation" includes the political process by which a nation's population organizes the state. (143) Records of the drafting of Article 4 indicate that a nation's "life" is separate from its government and state identity. (144) The HRC explicitly denies armed conflict, alone, as a qualifying threat to the "life" of a nation, thereby expanding a nation's "life" to include non-physical aspects of the state. (145) International agreements utilizing and interpreting language exceedingly similar to that used in Article 4 defines a nation's "life" as the means by which the community is organized. (146) While these sources do not provide a complete definition of what the "life of the nation" fully encompasses, they do provide enough evidence to support the conclusion that the "life" of a nation, at a minimum, includes the political process a community exercises for its organization. (147) Such an interpretation also aligns with the overall purpose of the ICCPR to protect civil and political rights. (148)

2. The ICCPR and its Individual Provisions Support Democratic Institutions

The ICCPR is fundamentally committed to democratic governance, and the ICCPR's individual provisions should reflect this purpose. (149) Article 1 secures the right of self-determination and Article 25 guarantees the right to participate in public affairs, to vote, and be elected at genuine periodic elections. (150) Multiple ICCPR provisions limit their exercise in furtherance of maintaining a "democratic society." (151) The HRC consistently enforces the ICCPR as supporting democratic institutions, as evidenced by its numerous concluding observations chastising states' failures to support democratic institutions. (152)

Due to the integrated nature of the ICCPR's purpose and its provisions, Article 4 of the ICCPR must be read in the context of the ICCPR as a whole. (153) As such, any exercise of Article 4 must be "clearly aimed in good faith at the preservation of democratic institutions and a return to their full operation at the earliest opportunity." (154) As Article 4 reflects the pro-democratic stance of the ICCPR, it may be concluded that Article 4 specifically protects the democratic institutions that compose the political organization contained in the "life of the nation." (155) While the "life of the nation" is not limited to just democratic institutions, Article 4 is most aimed at securing democratic institutions, as failing to protect these democratic institutions would undermine the pro-democracy basis of the ICCPR. (156) Accordingly, Article 4 authorizes a state to derogate provisions for the protection of the "life of the nation," but, because of the pro-democracy purpose of the ICCPR, any exercise of Article 4 is impliedly required to protect, or at least not harm, democratic institutions even if they are not directly threatened. (157)

3. Why Derogating Article 25 is Contrary to the Purpose of Article 4

In exercising Article 4 to derogate Article 25, Member States create a conflict of purposes because Article 4 is intended to protect the very institutions that the derogation of Article 25 would suspend. (158) As with all ICCPR provisions, Member States are expected to adhere to the rights contained in Article 25; accordingly, a Member State properly adhering to the ICCPR will have democratic institutions reflecting the requirements of Article 25 composing its community organization. (159) Under Article 4, if an emergency threatens these democratic institutions (i.e., the "life of the nation") Member States should be authorized to derogate these democratic institutions, and yet the HRC has refused to legitimize the derogation of Article 25. (160)

Only two countries have attempted to derogate Article 25 in the history of the ICCPR, and in both instances the HRC has offered no explanation of what could justify the derogation of Article 25. (161) The Uruguay government sought to impliedly derogate Article 25, denying certain citizens participation in government because of their past involvement with opposition parties to the then-in-power civic-military dictatorship. (162) The HRC denied the validity of this derogation because Uruguay failed to provide an explanation for why their alleged emergency justified the given derogation, but the HRC also intoned that it could not foresee an emergency in Uruguay that could justify depriving citizens' right to participate in government. (163)

Similarly, in response to the attempted coup in Turkey and the subsequent derogation of Turkish citizens' participation in government, United Nations experts chastised Turkey's claims for derogation, asserting how unnecessary such derogation is in a democratic society. (164) Prior to Turkey's most recent attempted derogation of Article 25, the HRC has consistently rebuked Turkey for its misuse of Article 4 to suppress critics and dissidents, actions inconsistent with a democratic society. (165)

For both Uruguay and Turkey, the states' powers to derogate Article 25 is questioned, as derogating Article 25 seems to conflict with the pro-democracy purpose of the ICCPR and Article 4. (166) While the HRC does not directly bar the derogation of Article 25, it provides no indication that any emergencies can qualify for the derogation of Article 25.167 From the HRC's treatment of state's attempts to derogate Article 25, it may be inferred that derogating Article 25 conflicts with the purpose of Article 4, as further explained below. (168)

Article 4 only allows for the derogation of ICCPR provisions when the "life of the nation" is threatened. (169) As the "life of the nation" includes the democratic institutions enforced by Article 25, Article 4 cannot derogate Article 25 without itself "threatening the life of the nation." (170) The "life of the nation" includes the democratic institutions by which a community governs; for an ICCPR Member State, these democratic institutions are detailed in Article 25. (171) In derogating Article 25, a Member State creates a conflict within the ICCPR: how can Article 4 protect democratic institutions if it is the means for suspending the very basis for said institutions? (172) Derogating Article 25 inherently undermines the foundation for the democratic institutions that Article 4 is intended to preserve. (173) This conflict of purposes results in the conclusion that Article 4 should not allow for the derogation of Article 25 because such derogation results in a political structure antithetical to the purpose of the ICCPR, and thus Article 4. (174)

Though the derogation of other provisions of the ICCPR may suppress pro-democratic facets of the nation, the ICCPR acknowledges that such suspensions may occur in democratic societies. (175) The derogation of Article 25 alone, however, completely undermines the pro-democracy foundation of Article 4 and the ICCPR. (176) This conflict results in the conclusion that Article 25 should be considered non-derogable; otherwise, states may release themselves from the pro-democracy purpose of the ICCPR, in direct violation of the ICCPR's enforcement provision in Article 2. (177) As such, Article 25 should be considered non-derogable to preserve the pro-democratic principles of Article 4 and the ICCPR. (178)

B. The Justifications Offered by the HRC for Why Specific Rights are Non-derogable Apply to Article 25

The fact that Article 25 protects foundational democratic institutions within the "life" of a nation qualifies Article 25 for non-derogable status just as much as, if not more than, the provisions expressly identified as non-derogable. (179) Comparing and analyzing the expressly identified non-derogable provisions of the ICCPR results in the conclusion that these provisions are non-derogable for a singular reason: derogation of the given provision is not deemed necessary during an emergency threatening the life of a nation. (180) By exploring how Article 25 is the foundation for democracy in ICCPR Member States, it is demonstrated that there is no justification to derogate from Article 25 during an emergency, just like the expressly non-derogable provisions. (181)

Article 4 expressly distinguishes between derogable and non-derogable provisions of the ICCPR. (182) The HRC asserts that the eight provisions identified in Article 4(2) as non-derogable are considered as such because "their suspension is irrelevant to the legitimate control of the state of national emergency." (183) Article 20, prohibiting war propaganda and the advocacy of hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence, though not expressly identified as non-derogable under Article 4(2), is considered non-derogable by the HRC because the HRC cannot foresee any state of emergency that would justify such state-sanctioned actions. (184) Similarly, Article 2(3), requiring members remedy their violations of the ICCPR, is identified as non-derogable because it is a "fundamental obligation" of the ICCPR, the derogation of which would conflict with the object and purpose of the treaty. (185)

Article 4, by its very nature, allows State Parties to avoid some ICCPR obligations in emergencies. (186) As Article 4's power is invested in the State Party, non-derogable provisions are deemed non-derogable because the State Party-suspension of said rights cannot serve a relevant purpose in aiding the State Party preserve the "life" of the state during a public emergency. (187) No emergency justifies a state arbitrarily denying a person's right to life, thus Article 6 is non-derogable, but an emergency may justify restricting people's right to peacefully assemble, thereby justifying derogation of Article 21. (188) The distinction between derogable and non-derogable provisions lies in the relevancy of the provisions to the control of the state; if suspension of a right will not aid a state during an emergency, it is non-derogable. (189)

Article 25 is a unique provision in the ICCPR, as it is the only provision that guarantees individuals direct influence in the community; all other provisions secure individuals from interference from the community. (190) Unlike a majority of the rights contained in the ICCPR, Article 25 rights directly relate to the "legitimate control of the state," because the ICCPR supports and requires citizen participation in the control of Member States. (191) While suspension of the enumerated non-derogable rights is "irrelevant to the legitimate control of the state of national emergency," suspension of Article 25 directly interferes with the legitimate control of the state regardless of an emergency. (192) Unlike the other derogable rights of the ICCPR, the derogation of Article 25 inherently inhibits the democratic functioning of a state, thereby conflicting with the pro-democratic purpose of the ICCPR. (193)

The HRC impliedly endorses that there are no justifications for derogating from Article 25 by not articulating any justification for a nation to derogate from Article 25 when circumstance arises. (194) In response to Uruguay's attempt to derogate from Article 25, the HRC questioned the very possibility of Uruguay satisfactorily justifying Article 25 derogation. (195) Turkey, also failing to provide justification for its derogation of Article 25, is treated with similar incredulity by the United Nations experts who chastise Turkey for its misuse of Article 4 to stifle political dissent and criticism, therein undermining democratic rule. (196) In both of these instances, no justification is offered by the HRC, U.N. experts, or the participating nations for the derogation of Article 25; instead, the very possibility of a state of emergency justifying the derogation of Article 25 is questioned. (197)

Like the enumerated non-derogable provisions of the ICCPR, there seems to be no justification for derogating Article 25. (198) The rights in Article 25 are inherent to the proper functioning of an ICCPR Member State; suspension of these rights undermines the legitimate control of the state by removing citizen participation. (199) To suspend Article 25 is to suspend adherence to the ICCPR, because part of the ICCPR's purpose is to respect and support democratic participation in government. (200) Like the expressly identified non-derogable provisions, Article 25 encompasses rights the derogation of which does not aid in protecting the life of a nation during an emergency. (201) In fact, the derogation of Article 25 undermines said life of the nation as well as the purpose of the ICCPR, just as the derogation of the expressly non-derogable provisions would. (202) As such, Article 25 contains rights of equivalent, if not superior, import as those identified as non-derogable by the HRC, and thus Article 25 should be extended the same non-derogable status. (203)

C. Allowing the Derogation of Article 25 Benefits Non-democracies and Harms Democracies

Allowing Article 25 to be derogated by Article 4 harms democracies, because anti-democratic forces are the only parties that will exercise this derogation power and these anti-democratic forces will exercise this derogation power to undermine democratic institutions. (204) The "life of the nation" includes democratic institutions and any Member State properly adhering to the ICCPR will contain democratic institutions, but there is no guarantee that a Member State will only have democratic institutions or that all parties within a Member State support democracy. (205) The possibility that anti-democratic powers may come to power within a Member State illustrates the danger of allowing for the derogation of Article 25: anti-democratic forces may utilize Article 4 to justify suppressing citizen participation in government. (206) When coupled with the conclusion that derogating Article 25 serves no purpose in securing the legitimate control of a Member State, the possibility of anti-democratic forces exercising Article 4 to derogate Article 25 results in a singular conclusion: allowing the derogation of Article 25 only benefits non-democratic institutions. (207) Exploring and analyzing a hypothetical derogation of Article 25 illustrates the danger to democratic intuitions allowing the derogation of Article 25 creates. (208) The actual derogations of Article 25 that have occurred and the anti-democratic motivations of such derogations further reinforce this conclusion. (209)

First and foremost, no justifications are forthcoming validating a state's derogation of Article 25. (210) Assuming arguendo that an emergency can and does occur, and a state properly derogates Article 25 in response, the Member State is inherently suspending the cornerstone of its democratic institutions. (211) This suspension consolidates governmental power in some entity other than the citizenry for the purpose of protecting the nation from the emergency. (212)

The derogation of Article 25 inherently usurps a percentage of governmental power in a Member State and invests it in a non-democratic entity. (213) This process may effectively protect a state from an emergency, but consolidating state power in a non-democratic entity is a poor guarantee that state power will be returned to the people. (214) One may contend that the ICCPR protects individuals from such state abuses of power: Article 5 asserts the ICCPR does not authorize destroying any rights or freedoms guaranteed under the ICCPR, and Article 2 requires Member States adhere to all ICCPR provisions. (215) These provisions, however, are subject to derogation, which means the power controlling a state can derogate from them in accordance with Article 4, just as it derogated from Article 25, once again based on a claim of "emergency." (216) Once state power is no longer under citizen control, the state falls under the control of someone or something else. (217)

Free from citizen oversight, our hypothetical Member State is suddenly free to exercise state power according to whatever policies it wishes; a truly nefarious state may forgo all democratic institutions in the name of protecting the citizenry, thereby becoming a state antithetical to the purpose of the ICCPR. (218) There is also the possibility of a state not returning the full democratic institutions it derogated from in an emergency, but still seemingly adhering to the ICCPR. (219) Russia's single party system is a prime example of a state adhering to the ICCPR, but possessing democratic institutions less democratic than other states. (220) Upon derogating the rights contained in Article 25, a state opens itself to the possibility of losing some, if not all, of its democratic institutions because the democratic institutions are the primary means of securing democratic institutions. (221)

Lacking citizen oversight, non-democratic states are free to determine when emergencies occur, even when such emergencies are merely the resurgence of citizens seeking participation in government. (222) In Uruguay and Turkey, both states notorious for human rights abuses, the governments utilized their consolidated, non-democratic governmental power to keep critics and dissidents of their regimes under control. (223) Though neither state's derogation of Article 25 was deemed justified, both states still exercised Article 4 and restricted citizen rights. (224) As the HRC has no direct authority to control or stop ICCPR Member States, Uruguayan and Turkish citizens' rights were still infringed, even though the HRC disavowed the misapplications of Article 4 (225) Both Uruguay and Turkey, however, were able to "hide" their intentions of suppressing democratic institutions by claiming that they were justified and allowed to derogate Article 25 according to the ICCPR, obscuring outside observers view on the legitimacy of the states' actions and therefore slowing international action. (226)

In allowing states to derogate Article 25, the ICCPR is providing a means for states to circumvent their democratic institutions. (227) Thus far there have been no authorized derogations of Article 25 under Article 4, and two attempts by non-democratic states to further reduce their citizen's participation in government. (228) If Article 25 is explicitly identified as non-derogable, states lose their ability to justify circumventing their democratic institutions via the ICCPR. (229) For states with democratic institutions, this would result in citizen participation in government remaining relevant, even in times of emergency. (230) For states with few, if any, democratic institutions, this would result in depriving said states of a loophole by which to further consolidate governmental power. (231)

V. CONCLUSION

Citizen participation in government is the foundation of democratic society and it cannot be simply pushed aside during times of emergency. (232) Citizen participation in government is fundamental to ensuring state power does not supersede the citizenry, thereby resulting in human rights abuses. (233) The incidents in Turkey and Uruguay illustrate the nature of those regimes that attempt to derogate Article 25: undemocratic and notorious for violating human rights. (234) For the ICCPR to guarantee civil and political rights to individuals, it must continue to guarantee democratic institutions by making Article 25 non-derogable. (235)

Those who would see democratic governance repressed constantly seek means and methods to legitimize their rule and inhibit the rights of individuals. (236) The ICCPR, a bastion of protection for human rights, inadvertently provides a means for the suppression of citizen participation in government. (237) If the ICCPR is to achieve its purposes, it can only do so by securing citizen participation in government from derogation. (238) Failing to do so places all human rights in jeopardy. (239)

(1.) See Gerry Holt and Ronald Hughes, As It Happened: Turkey Coup, Bbc News (July 16, 2016), http://www.bbe.com/news/live/world-europe-36811357 (recording full extent of attempted coup). See Gul Tuysuz and Eliott C. McLaughlin, Failed Coup in Turkey: What You Need to Know, Cnn (July 18, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/ 2016/07/18/middleeast/turkey-failed-coup-explainer/ (explaining alleged causes, actual repercussions, and projected results of coup). A military sect allegedly struck out against the Turkish government, deploying tanks in the capital, Ankara, seizing key infrastructure, and forcing media outlets off air. Id. Via the phone application Face-Time, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed the nation as the coup occurred, encouraging the population to resist the military uprising. Id. The Turkish government maintains that the coup was instigated by Fethullah Guien, Edrogan's primary rival in Turkish politics. Id.

(2.) See McLaughlin, supra note 1 (detailing death and injury results of coup). Two-hundred and ninety people were killed in the attempted coup, more than 1,400 were injured, and a few thousand civilians, military personnel, and government officials were arrested. Id. See Holt, supra note 1 (noting political repercussions of coup). Several hundred judges across Turkey were also dismissed in the wake of the coup. Id. See Finnuala Ni Alomain, Turkey as a "Serial" Human Rights Derogator, Hizmet Movement News Portal, (Sept. 22, 2016), http://hizmetnews.com/19859/ turkey-serial-human-rights-derogator/#.WAefUuArL!U (emphasizing seemingly irrelevant exercise of Turkish state power in light of "coup"). Turkey's emergency measures also include closing institutions allegedly connected to Fethullah Guien and the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO), including 1,043 private schools; 1,229 charities/foundations; 19 trade unions; 15 universities; and 35 medical institutions. Id.

(3.) See Turkey: Notification Under Article 4(3), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, C.N.580.2016.TREATIES-IV.4 (Aug. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Turkey: Notification] (notifying Secretary-General of state of emergency and intent to derogate rights'); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 4 [hereinafter ICCPR| (allowing states to derogate certain rights under ICCPR under certain emergencies); ICCPR, art. 25 (guaranteeing citizen participation in government). See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Comment No. 29, Derogations During a State of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/ Add. 11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment No. 29] (discussing application of Article 4 and justifications for derogating rights). See also Timothy G. Joseph, A Brief History of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, J.L. & Int'l Affairs (2015) (identifying ICCPR as initial and primary instigating agreement on human rights).

(4.) See McLaughlin, supra note 1 (detailing turbulent political history of Turkey). Turkey has a history of executing coups for political gain, and in this instance it is speculated that the coup was a means for the current President Recep Tayyip Edrogan to purge the military of supporters of Fethullah Guien. Id. See Alomain, supra note 2 (contending Turkey's "coup" is merely power play). Turkey is notorious for violating human rights and alleging a "coup" would provide the Turkish government the "justification" necessary to further abrogate citizen's rights. Id. See U.N. Experts Urge Turkey to Adhere to Its Human Rights Obligations Even in Time of Declared Emergency, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner News, (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx ?NewsID=20394 [hereinafter U.N. Experts] (condemning Turkey's seemingly unjustified exercise of Article 4).

(5.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to address why Article 25 is subject to derogation). While General Comment No. 29 addresses much of Article 4's breadth and restrictions, including the applicability of Article 4 to specific provisions of the ICCPR, it fails to address the relationship between Article 4 and Article 25. Id. See Human Rights Committee, International Justice Resource Center, http://www.ijrcenter.org/un-treaty-bodies/human-rights-committee/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2018) (describing purpose of general comments). The Human Rights Committee defines and explains the ICCPR by issuing general comments. Id. These general comments are intended to clarify ambiguities surrounding specific parts of the ICCPR while providing details on how separate ICCPR provisions interact and relate with other ICCPR provisions. Id.

(6.) See infra Parts II.-V. (supporting evidence for why Article 25 should be excluded from derogation under Article 4).

(7.) See infra Part II. (establishing history and purpose of ICCPR, Article 4 and Article 25).

(8.) See infra Part III. (expounding on contemporary extent and limitations of Articles 4 and 25 respectively).

(9.) See infra Part IV. (justifying Article 25 exclusion from state derogation).

(10.) See infra Part V. (concluding Article 25 rights are critical for protecting human rights from state abuses).

(11.) See Joseph, supra note 3, at 1 (describing origin of U.N. Charter and ICCPR). The atrocities committed during WWII provided the impetus for a global discussion on securing and preserving human rights. Id. The purpose behind the 1945 assembly was to create a multi-national organization "to prevent future aggression, assure the stability of frontiers, and provide a means for resolving disputes among nations." Id. See Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, The Formation of the United Nations, 1945, United States Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un (last visited Mar. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Formation of the U.N.] (chronicling history of United Nations prior to formation in 1945). The first official mention of a "United Nations" organization occurred in 1943 during the meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in Tehran, Iran. Id. This United Nations concept was proffered as an international organization to enforce global peace and address social and economic issues. Id. In 1944 representatives of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C. with the intent to draft a charter for this United Nations with a strong emphasis on collective security. Id.

(12.) See Formation of the U.N., supra note 11 (detailing major world powers' emphasis on mutual security over human rights in U.N. Charter development). The Dumbarton Oaks meeting solidified the major Ally Powers desire for an international organization more concerned with security than economic and social issues. Id. See Joseph, supra note 3, at 1 (recording influence exerted by major world powers on U.N. Charter). The pressure exerted by the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union ultimately enhanced the Security Council, diminished the General Assembly, and reduced the mention of human rights in the Charter to vague descriptions. Id.

(13.) See Joseph, supra note 3, at 1 (describing formation of Commission on Human Rights). The Commission on Human Rights was originally presided over by representatives from sixteen Member States and chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, and it is this assembly that established the international basis for human rights today. Id. See generally, U.N. Charter art. 68 (providing basis for Commission on Human Rights).

(14.) See Joseph, supra note 3, at 2 (detailing results of Commission on Human Rights). As the first true international human rights body, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights became the backbone for the promotion of human rights the world over. Id. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHRJ (providing basis for rights contained in ICCPR).

(15.) See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev.I), The International Bill of Human Rights, June 1996, No. 2 (Rev.l), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/479477480.html (last viewed Oct. 8, 2015) (recording dates of deposit, ratification, and entry into force of ICCPR); Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights in Geneva (May 2015) [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 75] (recording relevant ratification information for ICCPR). Thirty-five states were required to become parties to the ICCPR before it was formally entered into force, which required ten years. Id.

(16.) See U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2018) (detailing state's relations to ICCPR). As of January 13, 2016, there are 168 state parties and seven signatories to the ICCPR; twenty-two states have taken no action regarding the ICCPR. Id.

(17.) See Christian Tomuschat, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1-2 (2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/iccpr/iccpr_e.pdf (explaining basis for ICCPR). The ICCPR is a means for some of the rights under the UDHR to be legally binding. Id. The ICCPR specifically encompasses the "traditional human rights," such as those identified in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights and the French Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. Id. the economic and social rights identified in the UDHR, considered non-traditional human rights as they do not relate to citizen-government interaction, are absent from the ICCPR, instead being protected under the ICESCR. Id. The ICCPR has become the natural reference point for nations when drafting legislation and constitutions regarding civil and political rights. Id. at 3. While some states have declared the ICCPR not self-executing within their domestic jurisdiction, other states have recognized the legal force of the ICCPR as quasi-constitutional. Id.

(18.) See U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Rule of Law--Democracy and Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/ Pages/ Democracy.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Democracy] (describing United Nations support of democracy). See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections (Ist ed. 1994) (detailing international efforts to encourage democracy and free elections); Liberia: Stressing Importance of Elections, Security Council Extends Life of UN Force, U.N. News Centre (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.un.org/ apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39586#.V-5_XvArLIU (evidencing United Nations willingness to dedicate troops to ensure democratic institutions). See also American Convention on Human Rights, art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention] (guaranteeing citizens' right to participate in government); Protocol (No. 1) to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, art. 3, Europ.T.S. No. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter European Protocol] (supporting citizens' right to free elections); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13, June 26, 1981, art. 13(1), O.A.U.Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 9 I.L.M. 58, 61 (1981) [hereinafter African Charter] (securing citizens' right to participate in government).

(19.) See Democracy, supra note 18 (emphasizing critical nature of democracy in supporting human rights). See Human Rights Council Res. 19/36, Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law, 19th Sess., April 19, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/19/36 (Apr. 19, 2012) (defining democracy and its importance to human rights). The Human Rights Council asserts "democracy is based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives." Id. at 1.

(20.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 28 (providing basis for Human Rights Committee and defining membership). See Tomuschat, supra note 17, at 3 (defining extent of HRC and its ability to enforce ICCPR).

(21.) See Tomuschat, supra note 17, at 3 (describing HRC process for overseeing adherence to ICCPR). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 40 (requiring Member States report to HRC and HRC issue concluding observations).

(22.) See Tomuschat, supra note 17, at 3 (noting non-binding nature of HRC authority). Member States are expected to act in good faith when the HRC demands action or forbearance. Id. See Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 15, p. 20-21 (describing soft power of HRC). Though lacking legally binding authority, the HRC's assessments are expected to be adhered to by Member States, and failure to abide by the HRC's decisions will result in "name-and-shame" whereby a violating state will be publically identified to the international community. Id. By "naming-and-shaming" violating states, other states are expected to place pressure on the violating state to adhere to its ICCPR treaty obligations. Id.

(23.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 40(4) (allowing HRC to determine when and if it will release general comments).

(24.) See id. at art. 19(3) (allowing restrictions on freedom of expression). Member States may limit citizen's freedom of expression in accordance with the state's law and only as necessary to respect the rights or reputation of other citizens, or for national security, public order, public health, or morals. Id. See id. at art. 20 (prohibiting expression amounting to war propaganda or advocacy of discrimination based on race, nationality, or religion). See also id. at art. 25 (providing citizens have right to participate in public affairs free from "unreasonable restrictions").

(25.) See id., note 3, art. 4 (prohibiting limitations on minimal number of rights).

(26.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4:

1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.

2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.

3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.

Id. See also Dominic McGoldrick, The Interface Between Public Emergency Powers and International Law, 2 Int'l. J. Const. 380, 385-86 (2004) (discussing ICCPR recognition of emergency situations justifying derogation). The very concept of a state of emergency heralds back to the Roman republic, when exceptional circumstances, such as external attack or internal rebellion, justified the nomination of a 'dictator' to preserve the Republic's safety. Id. at 385.

(27.) See Joan F. Hartman, Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision, 7 Hum. Rts. Q. 89, 95-98 (1985) (recording historical debate over including derogation clause in human rights treaties). The United Kingdom's proposal was submitted to the committee alongside an alternative United States proposal that did not contain any derogation clause. Id. These two proposals became the foci in the ensuing debates over including a derogation clause. Id.

(28.) See id. at 96 (defining state representative's positions regarding derogation clause). The United States eventually proposed a general limitations clause similar to that in the UDHR. Id. at n. 34. The general limitations clause would not expressly identify any justifications for derogation, but would bind Member States to actions that were recognized under law and reasonably necessary for protecting rights and +freedoms of others, national security, or for general welfare. Id. The United Kingdom's representative emphasized the importance of states not deciding independently when and how to exercise emergency powers. Id. at n. 35. The United Kingdom's proposed derogation clause was intended to ensure that no state could unilaterally declare a state of emergency, and then use said emergency to justify the abuse of its citizens. Id. See generally UDHR, supra note 14, art. 29 (limiting UDHR restrictions to those determined by law and in recognition of other's rights and freedoms).

(29.) See Hartman, supra note 27, at 96 (fearing conventional obligations would be ignored in war unless states had method to properly derogate obligations). Proponents of including a derogation clause emphasized the possibility of states foregoing their treaty obligations entirely during times of war if no derogation clause was present. Id. Without a derogation clause, Member States would not be explicitly bound to the treaty, thus opening the possibility for arbitrary declarations of emergency and subsequent suspensions of rights. Id. By including a derogation clause, proponents believed that states would be forced to acknowledge and justify any subrogation of citizen rights, thus maintaining transparency and therefore the protection of citizens' rights. Id.

(30.) Hartman, supra note 27, at 97 (arguing ICCPR should not address non-peaceful conditions). Opponents to a derogation clause initially won out over proponents by defeating the original derogation proposal by vote in 1947. Id. Opponents of a derogation clause claimed that a derogation clause would set a negative, rather than positive, tone in the ICCPR. Id. Furthermore, opponents asserted that attaching specific limitations to specific articles would make a derogation provision extraneous; by providing specific and limited limitations to certain articles, like allowing suppression of speech for national security purposes, the ICCPR would be a more precise instrument. Id.

(31.) See id. at 97 (adopting agreement provisionally into ICCPR in 1949). See also ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (reflecting compromise from 1949).

(32.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, 1 1 (emphasizing duel nature of Article 4, both as expansion and limitation). In General Comment No. 29, the HRC acknowledges the duel nature of Article 4 by emphasizing both the freedom allotted states in protecting their "life" and the multiple levels of legality an exercise of Article 4 must undergo and satisfy. Id. 1 2-3. Along with adhering to the derogation requirements explicitly identified in the ICCPR and by the HRC, a Member State can only exercise Article 4 if, and to the extent, that its exercise adheres to the Member State's own laws and constitution, as well as all other international agreements. Id. 1 2.

(33.) See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding support of ICCPR purpose). Article 4 is intended as an emergency measure, and therefore its exercise must be temporary and exceptional. Id. If the exercise of Article 4 is not temporary and exceptional, Article 4 becomes antithetical to the ICCPR's purpose, especially its commitment to democracy. Id. See also Special Rapporteur, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege or Emergency, U.N. Doc. El CN.4/Sub. 2/1982/15, 242 (July 27, 1982) (by Nicole Questiaux) [hereinafter Questiaux] (extending democratic basis of ICCPR to Article 4). An exercise of Article 4 must be "clearly aimed in good faith at the preservation of democratic institutions and a return to their full operation at the earliest opportunity." Id. (quoting Hartman, supra note 27, at 92). See also supra Part II.A.2. (identifying ICCPR purpose as securing civil and political rights and democratic institutions).

(34.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing restrictions and extent of derogation). See also Hartman, supra note 27 (detailing extent and limitations on Article 4). General international principles also govern states' exercise of Article 4: good faith and continuation of the rule of law must be adhered to in addition to the ICCPR recognized restrictions on Article 4 derogation. Id. at 118. Similarly, the ICCPR supports a presumption that international customary law prohibits states from violating certain basic rights even during a public emergency. Id.

(35.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (denying derogations of Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18). See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, 1 7 (identifying non-derogable provisions expressly identified in Article 4(2)). Article 4(2) prohibits the derogation of the following provisions:
   [A]rticle 6 (right to life), article 7 (prohibition of torture or
   cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, or of medical or scientific
   experimentation without consent), article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2
   (prohibition of slavery, slave-trade, and servitude), article 11
   (prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfil a
   contractual obligation), article 15 (the principle of legality in
   the field of criminal law, i.e. the requirement of both criminal
   liability and punishment being limited to clear and precise
   provisions in the law that was in place and applicable at the time
   the act or omission took place, except in cases where a later law
   imposes a lighter penalty), article 16 (the recognition of everyone
   as a person before the law), and article 18 (freedom of thought,
   conscience and religion).


Id. See also Hartman, supra note 27, at 115 (summarizing history of non-derogable rights). The United Kingdom's original proposal for a derogation provision did not provide for any non-derogable rights. Id. The state parties generally agreed that certain rights should be prohibited from derogation, but which rights were included under this provision was a point of contention. Id. Ultimately, a separate vote on each right proposed as non-derogable resulted in the list present in Article 4(2) today. Id. at 118.

(36.) See U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 24: Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, 1 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.6 (Apr. 11, 1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 24] (detailing why certain rights are prohibited from derogation). Of the provisions identified in Article 4(2), the following are recognized as containing customary international law and peremptory norms: Article 6, barring arbitrary deprivation of life and execution of children and pregnant women; Article 7, barring torture and cruel/inhuman treatment of people; Article 8, prohibiting slavery; Article 9, proscribing arbitrary arrests; Article 14, requiring assumption of innocence, not presumption of guilt; Article 18, tampering with freedom of thought; Article 20, prohibiting advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Id. Other provisions of the ICCPR are considered non-derogable due to the impossibility of derogating said provisions, such as the Article 18 guarantee of freedom of conscience. Id. 1 8. Likewise, other provisions are non-derogable because of their "necessity to the rule of law," though the HRC does not identify which provisions, other than Article 4 itself, fall under this category. Id. See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 7 (justifying Article 4 non-derogable provisions). Ultimately, the HRC asserts that the identified provisions in Article 4(2) are no-derogable because they are identified as such, and no further explanation is necessary. Id.

(37.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, 1 11 (defining composition of provisions identified in Article 4(2)). The HRC acknowledges that the provisions identified in Article 4 are non-derogable as related to international peremptory norms, but are not identical with international peremptory norms. Id. Article 4 identifies Articles 6 and 7 (right to life and prohibition of torture, respectively) as non-derogable in recognition that these two provisions reflect international peremptory norms. Id. Articles 11 and 18, however, are identified as non-derogable, not because of any relation with peremptory norms, but because the HRC does not foresee any justification for their derogation. Id.

(38.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, 1 6 (dismissing argument that lack of inclusion in Article 4(2) guarantees provisions' susceptibility for derogation). Both states and the HRC have a duty to objectively assess the "exigencies of the situation" before determining whether a provision is liable for derogation. Id.

(39.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, HH 8, 13(a), 13(d), 13(e), 14 (identifying non-derogable provisions of ICCPR not listed in Article 4(2)).

(40.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26 (extending legal equality without discrimination to all people); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 8 (limiting Article 4 under Article 26). As Article 26 is immune from derogation under Article 4, derogation is invalid if it distinguishes between persons based on "race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." ICCPR, supra, art. 26. Article 2 ensures Member States enforce ICCPR without discrimination. Id. at art. 2. Article 3 provides equal rights for men and women. Id. at art. 3. Article 14 guarantees equality in courts. Id. at art. 14(1). Article 23 requires Member States to ensure equality of rights between spouses. Id. at art. 23(4). Article 24 requires states to protect children without discrimination. Id. at art. 24(1). Article 25 restricts Member States from imposing unreasonable restrictions on citizen participation in government. Id. at art. 25. Article 4 prohibits members from derogating from non-discrimination clause of derogation provision. Id. at art. 4(1).

(41.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(3) (guaranteeing Member State action upon failing to adhere to ICCPR). See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, H 14 (asserting non-derogable status of Article 2(3)). Article 2(3) secures Member States adherence to the ICCPR as a component of being a member. Id. Should a Member State derogate Article 2(3), or if Article 2(3) did not exist, Member States would not technically violate the ICCPR by failing to remedy an ineffective application of the ICCPR. Id. This results in an agreement without terms, as no Member State violates the agreement by not following it. Id. Because adherence to the ICCPR is built on the requirements contained in Article 2(3), the HRC extends non-derogable status to the provision even though it is not identified in Article 4. Id.

(42.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 13(a) (extending non-derogation status to Article 10). The ICCPR Preamble reference to the "inherent dignity of the human person" supports the inference that Article 10, much like Article 7, contains a cornerstone provision of the ICCPR. Id. See generally ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 7 (prohibiting torture and cruel/unusual punishment).

(43.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 13(d) (explaining why Article 12 is non-derogable). The HRC explicitly indicates that Article 12 is non-derogable because there is no justification for derogating the contained provisions during an emergency. Id. Any actions that constitute human rights violations are not justified by exercising Article 4. Id. 112.

(44.) See id. H 13(e) (expanding non-derogation status to Article 20(2)).

(45.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (requiring "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation"). See Commission on Human Rights E/CN.4/SR.330, at 4 (June 10, 1952) (emphasizing importance that Article 4 does not define "life of nation" too precisely). Ultimately, the definition of "life of the nation" is amorphous and seemingly without a definite expression. Id. See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (presenting HRC's official analysis of Article 4, but failing to define extent of life of nation).

(46.) See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.330, supra note 45, at 4 (detailing discussion surrounding Article 4 drafting). The Chilean representative's comment was in response to the United Kingdom's proposed amendment (E/CN.4/L.139) to Article 4, which eventually became the provision planting the term "life of the nation" in Article 4. Id. at 3.

(47.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 3 (stating that not every emergency qualifies as threat to life of nation). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 92 (including Article 4 in ICCPR rejects states' power to unilaterally and uncontrollably respond to emergencies). Article 4 limits states' definition of threats to the life of the nation by "geographic scope, severity, cause, and temporality." Id.

(48.) See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (describing principles relevant to identifying emergency threatening life of nation). The United Kingdom's original proposal for a derogation clause assumed "war or other national emergency" as the basis for derogation. Id. at 98. Similarly, a French draft explicitly identified natural disasters as a basis for derogation. Id. By 1952, however, explicit reference to war and natural disasters were removed from the derogation clause, instead replaced with "public emergency threatening the life of the nation." Id. Though never directly referenced in the drafts of the derogation article, internal political unrest was also contemplated as a source for state derogation. Id. See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 3(addressing emergency qualifications for "threatens the life of the nation"). "Not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation." Id. Armed conflict, whether national or international, does not inherently threaten the life of a nation; as such, armed conflict does not inherently justify derogation under Article 4. Id.

(49.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (requiring states to proclaim state of emergency prior to derogation); Id. at art. 4(3) (asserting states derogating rights must immediately inform Member States via Secretary-General of United Nations). A derogating state is required to both identify what provisions of the ICCPR it derogated and why that specific provision was derogated. Id. A state's termination of derogation must be publicly announced in the same manner. Id.

(50.) See General comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 17 (emphasizing importance of notice for monitoring derogating states' compliance with ICCPR). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 99 (noting exceptional nature of Article 4 notification requirement). The ICCPR is unlike other human rights treaties in that it requires a proclamation of public emergency. Id. The purpose of requiring such an announcement is "to prevent arbitrary or de facto derogations, to force derogating governments to act openly from the outset of the emergency, and to delegitimate (sic) after-the-fact justifications for violations of fundamental rights." Id. By publically acknowledging a state of emergency, citizens of a state are made aware of possible state control of otherwise uncontrolled facets of their lives, and provided an opportunity to discuss or respond to government action. Id.

(51.) See General comment No. 29, supra note 3, H 2 (enunciating importance of state adherence to own law). To ensure Member States properly adhere to their own laws in dealing with a state of emergency, the HRC implores states to provide "sufficient and precise information" on such relevant laws in their Article 40 reports. Id. Should the HRC determine that a state failed to abide by its own laws in asserting a state of emergency, any derogations implemented under the aegis of said wrongful state of emergency will be invalid. Id.

(52.) See General Comment no. 29, supra note 3,1 17 (describing process by which HRC and Member States become aware of derogations). The Secretary General informs the HRC of any Member State declaration of a state of emergency. Id. Should a Member State neglect to inform the Secretary General, the HRC may discover a Member State's declaration of a state of emergency through a third party. Id. Upon learning about a state of emergency, whether through the Secretary General or a third party, the HRC will still exercise its duty to oversee compliance with the ICCPR. Id.

(53.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 17 (detailing information derogating state must provide to HRC). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 100 (noting failures of states to properly abide by Article 4). Member States most often fail to adhere to the notification requirements by only submitting a list of articles derogated. Id. In failing to provide justification for the derogation and details of the duration, scope, and purpose of the derogation. Member States force the HRC to request this information. Id.

(54.) See Hartman, supra note 27, at 100 (acknowledging requirements for acceptable derogations). See Jorge Landinelli Silva et al. v. Uruguay, 12th Sess.,U.N. Doc. 34/1978, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) [hereinafter Communication No. 34] (addressing Uruguay's failure to provide clear explanation for derogating rights under ICCPR). Though Uruguay provided notice to the HRC for the exercise of Article 4 derogation powers, the HRC refused the notice as it merely listed what rights were to be derogated and did not provide how Uruguay's actions directly required derogation of said rights. Id. See Hartman, supra note 27, at 101 (detailing flaws in derogation enforcement). The wording of the ICCPR may be to blame for states not providing proper information, as Article 4(3) requires states to provide information on "the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated." Id. Such wording does not explicitly require reasons for each derogation and makes no requirement of noting the extent or limitations on the derogations. Id. States are required to inform the Secretary-General immediately of a state of emergency, save in circumstances that emergency is so severe that the state's government is unable to function. Id. at 101-02. The HRC, however, acknowledges that un-notified derogations are not inherently invalid due to the lack of notification; conversely, the HRC has still declined to recognize the legitimacy of certain derogations absent "submissions of fact or law to justify such derogation." Id. at 103.

(55.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (limiting derogation of rights "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation"). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 111-12 (noting history of term "strictly required by exigencies of the situation"). Drafters of the ICCPR paid little attention to the term "strictly required by exigencies of the situation," as the term was uncontroversial and the principal of proportionality was general accepted. Id.

(56.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 4 (noting insufficient attention paid to principle of proportionality). In exercising the Article 4 derogation power, Member States must ensure that the processes and methods implemented satisfactorily address the exigent circumstances that qualify as an emergency. Id. Simultaneously, however, Member States exercising Article 4 must ensure that their processes and methods are proportional to the emergency. Id. Factors like duration of the emergency, geographical coverage, and material scope must be accounted for in exercising Article 4. Id. Just because a Member State's exercise of Article 4 addresses an exigent circumstance effectively does not mean that the process and measures implemented are proportional to the emergency. Id.

(57.) See ICCPR. supra note 3, art. 4(1) (requiring measures "not inconsistent" with state's other "obligations under international law"). See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, [paragraph] 9 (detailing limitations on ICCPR outside of actual agreement). The ICCPR cannot be interpreted such that it allows a state to avoid its international obligations. Id. Though reviewing state party's conduct under other treaties is not the function of the HRC, it is authorized to take into account a state's international obligations when considering whether Article 4 allows a state to derogate from a provision of the ICCPR. Id. [section] 10. As such, state parties are expected to provide information pertaining to their international obligations so the HRC can ensure derogation does not violate any other treaties. Id. The binding of a state to its international obligations results in the conclusion that a state cannot derogate from a provision that delineates a peremptory norm, nor invoke Article 4 to justify a violation of human rights law. Id. [section] 11.

(58.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (binding derogation measures to nondiscrimination practices emphasized in ICCPR). Non-discrimination permeates the entirety of the ICCPR and is a constant factor in all Member State actions, derogation included. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (describing relationship between Article 4 and all non-discrimination provisions in ICCPR).

(59.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25:

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

Id.

(60.) See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 539, 555-56 (1992) (overviewing Article 25 development and application). The ease with which the drafters penned Article 25 has resulted in difficult questions of interpretation because the drafters spent so little time on the topic. Id. See also Democracy, supra note 18 (detailing critical nature of democracy in ICCPR). The ICCPR is noted as enshrining the civil and political rights that underpin democratic states. Id.

(61.) See Fox, supra note 60. at 555 (acknowledging that democratic institutions do not require direct democracy). The drafters of Article 25 explicitly rejected the proposal that all components of political authority be subject to democratic institutions. Id.

(62.) See Fox, supra note 60, at 556 (noting ubiquitous opinion of drafters regarding citizen participation in government). The drafters sought to secure individuals' participation in government via Article 25, but elected to allow states to decide whether to exercise proportional representation or s simple majority electoral system. Id.

(63.) See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Comment No. 25, Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote, (article 25), [paragraph] 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996) [hereinafter General Comment No. 25] (requiring states ensure citizens have "effective opportunity" to participate in government). Unlike other guarantees in the ICCPR, Article 25 specifically protects the rights of "every citizen," and each state is required to define its legal provisions granting citizenship in accordance with Article 25 and report such provisions to the HRC. Id. [paragraph] 3.

(64.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (identifying rights and restrictions). See also Fox, supra note 60, at 553-61 (delineating what Article 25 guarantees). Article 25 constitutes the heart of the ICCPR's democratic principles and is the direct protection of individuals' participation in government. Id.

(65.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (failing to explicitly include Article 25 under non-derogable provisions). See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to define relationship between Article 4 and Article 25). The HRC explicitly notes and discusses several provisions within the ICCPR and their relationship with Article 4. Id. [paragraph][paragraph] 4,7, 8, 9,13(a), 13(e). Article 25 is only addressed in the context of Article 4 regarding the Article 25 non-discrimination provision and how non-discrimination is inherently non-derogable under Article 4. Id. [paragraph] 8. The HRC also avoided impliedly identifying Article 25 as non-derogable by excluding Article 25 provisions from being peremptory norms. Id. [paragraph] 11.

(66.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (identifying express rights contained in Article 25).

(67.) See id. (providing states must allow citizen participation "without unreasonable restrictions"). See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63,1 4 (reinforcing state restrictions on Article 25 rights must be based on "objective and reasonable criteria"). The HRC imposes both an objective test and a reasonableness test for a Member State to deny citizens Article 25 rights. Id. The reasonableness test manifests from the language of Article 25 requiring Member States not impose "unreasonable restrictions" on citizen's participation in government. Id. The objective test is likely a manifestation of the ICCPR's ever present non-discrimination provision. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing Article 26 and its application to the ICCPR as a whole).

(68.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63, H 4 (defining extent of "objective and reasonable criteria"). To qualify as "objective and reasonable," restrictions on participation in government must not be based on discriminatory purposes and the restrictions must be made on a rational basis. Id.

(69.) See id. 1 5 (expanding definition of "public affairs"). According to the HRC, "public affairs" are to "all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, regional and local levels." Id. A state is required to legally secure its citizens' rights as enumerated under Article 25. Id. See also Fox, supra note 60, at 555 (detailing development of Article 25). During the formation of the ICCPR, the drafters elected to not expand citizen's right to exercise political power in "all organs of authority." Id. As such, Article 25 allows for appointed officials, so long as they are "in some way responsible to elected officials." Id.

(70.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63,1 21 (requiring states guarantee and implement will of electorate). One person, one vote, and vote equivalency are hallmarks of the rights under Article 25. Id. See also Fox, supra note 60. at 556 (detailing history of Article 25). The drafters left to states whether they would have proportional representation or a simple majority electoral system. Id.

(71.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63, 1 9 (establishing basis and means for will of individuals to manifest in government). The right to vote must be established by state laws; limitations on the right to vote must be reasonable. Id. The HRC asserts that it is unreasonable for a state to restrict voting based on physical disability or the imposition of literacy, educational, or property requirements. Id. Likewise, party membership should not be a requisite or a bar to voting. Id. See also Fox, supra note 60, at 556 (discussing parameters of "genuine elections"). The drafters of the ICCPR failed to clarify whether a "genuine election" requires party pluralism. Id. Applying the wording of Article 25, it may be concluded that Article 25 does not preclude a single party system, so long as the electorate has an opportunity to express its opinion by voting (i.e. the single party does not prohibit citizens for voting for nonparty individuals or groups). Id., at 556-58. The HRC expresses doubt whether a oneparty election adheres to Article 25, but has yet to actively address the topic. Id. at 558. See, e.g., Sarah Rainsford, Russian Elections: What We Learned, BBC News (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37410725 (addressing how "free" elections are not free if there is only one choice). Russia's most recent election in September, 2016 is noted for the impact of government-supported smear campaigns, harassment of opposition parties, and legal obstacles to opposition campaigning. Id. See, e.g., Fraud in Russia's Election, The Economist (Sept. 19, 2016), http:// www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/09/daily-chart-12 (charting statistical likelihood of Russian voter fraud). See, e.g., Russian Election: Big Victory for PutinBacked Party United Russia, BBC News (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-37403242 (alleging "carousel" voting, ballot stuffing, and "managed democracy"). Golos, the independent election monitoring group, reported that the Kremlin's system of "managed democracy" is "far from what could be called really free and fair." Id.

(72.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (requiring states remove unreasonable restrictions on citizens' ability to vote). States are required to prohibit and prosecute voting intimidation and coercion, and restrictions on voting--such as the need to register--must be reasonable. Id. States are further expected to implement "education and registration campaigns" to ensure Article 25 rights are effectively employed by an informed community. Id.

(73.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26 (prohibiting discrimination and guaranteeing equal and effective protection from discrimination). See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Comment No. 18, Non-discrimination (article 26), 1 12, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/ Rev.1 at 26 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 18] (expounding on expansive nature of Article 26 in relation to rest of ICCPR). The HRC explains that Article 26 is manifest in all of the articles in the ICCPR, regardless of whether protection from discrimination or equality under the law is explicitly enumerated. Id. As such, Article 25 is required to maintain individuals' protections from discrimination and equality before the law, and any measures implemented under Article 25 must not result or be based in discrimination. Id.

(74.) See Fox, supra note 60, at 554 (explaining why Article 25 allows states to impose reasonable restrictions on citizens' voting rights). See also ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (prohibiting discrimination based on any status). Article 25 asserts that the rights enumerated therein will be enjoyed "without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 of this Covenant and without unreasonable restrictions." Id. at art. 25. See also Fox, supra note 60, at 553-54. "'[Wjithout unreasonable restrictions' implies that" participatory restrictions can be reasonable and thus permissible so long as they are not based on distinctions prohibited elsewhere in the ICCPR, like in Article 26. Id. at 554.

(75.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63, II 10 (identifying reasonable restrictions). Drafters of the ICCPR elected to allow participatory restrictions on the rights to vote and hold public office as such--and so long as such--restrictions were not "discriminatory. Id. See also Fox, supra note 60, at 554 (detailing justification for discrimination in Article 25). The drafters accepted restricting suffrage on "minors, convicts, the mentally ill, and those failing residency requirements" as reasonable. Id. Though Article 25's non-discrimination clause expressly addresses the rights of individuals, it may be interpreted as prohibiting state discrimination against political parties, as states' discriminating against political parties is neither objective nor reasonable. Id. at 555.

(76.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (failing to provide justification for derogation of Article 25); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (addressing Article 25 only in context of non-derogable nature of non-discrimination provisions). See, e.g., Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (failing to address validity of Article 25 derogation).

(77.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (exhibiting HRC's response to derogation of Article 25 in Uruguay); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (addressing Turkey's attempt to derogate Article 25). See infra Part III.B.1-2. (overviewing Turkey and Uruguay attempts to derogate Article 25).

(78.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 40 (detailing reporting requirements for state parties). State parties are required to provide periodic reports to the HRC indicating "factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation" of the ICCPR. Id. The HRC is required to transfer its own reports on states' adherence to the ICCPR, and is authorized to release general comments defining provisions in the ICCPR. Id.

(79.) See American Convention, supra note 18, art. 23 (guaranteeing right to participate in government); id. at art. 27 (providing derogation of American Convention provisions). See European Protocol, supra note 18, art. 3 (requiring free elections); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention] (providing for derogation). See also African Charter, supra note 18, art. 13 (guaranteeing citizen participation in government). See also UDHR, supra note 14, art. 21 (protecting individuals' right to participate in government, whether directly or through representatives); id. at art. 29 (providing general derogation clause). See also Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at 1307, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (Sept. 1990) (in press; copies are available in the interim from Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, United States Congress, Washington, D.C. 20515) (identifying "free elections" and "equal voting rights" as elements ensuring peoples' will is basis of government); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, art. 7, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (enforcing importance of women's right to participate in government); League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human RIghts, art. 19, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005) (acknowledging people as source of government authority and guaranteeing citizens' political participation).

(80.) See infra Part III.A.1-2. (providing more extensive discussion of relationship between Articles 4 and 25 than provided by HRC). By looking to similar international human rights treaties and how they address, implement, and interpret their derogation clauses and government-participation clauses, one gains insight into the ICCPR. Id.

(81.) See American Convention, supra note 18, art. 23 (guaranteeing right to participate in government). Article 23 of the American Convention reads:

1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:

a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; and

c. to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country.

2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.

Id.

(82.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (providing language of Article 25); American Convention, supra note 18, art. 23 (providing language of Article 23). See Edel Hughes, Entrenched Emergencies and the "War on Terror:" Time to Reform the Derogation Procedure in International Law?, 20 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 1, at 40-41 (2007) (comparing ICCPR and American Convention). While there are differences between the two provisions, the ultimate purpose of the two provisions and the similarity in language used binds the interpretation of each provision to the other. Id.

(83.) See American Convention, supra note 18, art. 27(1) (allowing Member States to derogate obligations under certain circumstances); ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See Hughes, supra note 82, at 40-41 (detailing differences between ICCPR and American Convention). Both provisions also contain the same non-discrimination clause. Id.

(84.) See American Convention, supra note 18, art. 27 (providing for American Convention derogation of provisions); ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing for ICCPR derogation of provisions). See also Hughes, supra note 82, at 40-41 (comparing ICCPR and American Convention). Article 27's language is less restrictive on Member States' exercise of their derogation power as compared to Article 4. Id. at 39. This difference, however, is merely an expansion of Article 27 to apply to war and public danger, such as a flood or earthquake. Id. These factors, while not expressly identified in Article 4, do not affect the similarity of language shared between Article 4 and Article 27 regarding emergencies threatening states. Id.

(85.) See Hughes, supra note 82, at 40-41 (drawing parallels between language of Article 4 and Article 27). Article 27 enforces a less restrictive basis for a public emergency, recognizing any emergency that threatens the "independence or security of a State." Id. at 40. While this language does appear to make Article 27 more flexible compared to Article 4, the American Convention interpreted this language to require that an emergency threaten the "organized life of the state." Id. at 41. With this in mind, Article 27 may be read as simply identifying examples of possible emergencies that would threaten the organized life of a state. Id. Without these examples, the similarity between Article 27 and Article 4's language is even more apparent. Id.

(86.) See American Convention, supra note 18, art. 27(2) (identifying series of rights state parties cannot derogate from). See also Hughes, supra note 82, at 40 (analyzing Article 27's non-derogable provisions). Compared to the ICCPR and the European Convention, the American Convention identifies a more extensive list of non-derogable rights. Id. See also Hartman, supra note 27, at 99, n. 54 (contrasting ICCPR and American Convention). Also unlike the ICCPR, the American Convention does not require state proclamation of a state of emergency to derogate under Article 27. Id.

(87.) See Hughes, supra note 82, at 41 (emphasizing importance of threat affecting "organized life"). See also Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 27, [section] 1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (stating public danger or emergencies threatening independence or security of state allow for derogation of obligations).

(88.) See Fox, supra note 60, at 566 (identifying Inter-American Commission's stance on Article 23). See Mexico Elections Decision, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828, InterAm. C.H.R. 97, 97, OEA/ser.L/V/11.77, doc. 7, rev. 1 (1990) (arguing importance of state adherence to Article 23 as matter of international law). The Revolutionary Party, controlling the Mexican government, was alleged to have partaken in voter fraud and unethical election practices to limit candidates of the National Action party from gaining power. Id.

(89.) See Fox supra note 60, at 566 (detailing decision making of Inter-American Commission). According to the Commission, "government intrusion into the political process warp[s] and delegitimize[s]" democratic institutions. Id. at 567. To secure democratic institutions, barriers to participation in government must be removed, and if necessary, independent commissions should be brought in to oversee elections and campaigns. Id.

(90.) See European Convention, supra note 79, art. 15 (identifying means for derogating rights). Article 15 reads:

1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.

2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.

3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.

Id. See also supra note 26 (providing language used in Article 4). See also Hartman, supra note 27, at 99, n. 54 (noting European Convention, like American Convention, does not require declaration of state of emergency to derogate).

(91.) See Hughes, supra note 82, at 40-41 (drawing parallels between language of Article 4 and Article 23 of American Convention). As with the similarity of the language between Article 4 and Article 23 of the American Convention and the resulting mutual interpretation such language results in, Article 15 is similar enough to Article 4 that, once again, the interpretation of one provides insight into the other. Id. Article 15 is even more similar to Article 4 than Article 27 is to Article 4 with Article 15 using almost the exact same language with only the added acknowledgement of war as a justification for derogation. Id. See generally European Convention, supra note 79, art. 15 (providing relevant text of Article 15); ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4).

(92.) See Hughes, supra note 82, at 5 (exploring European Commission's initial definition of "life of the nation"). See generally Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 1961-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 470-474 (defining public emergency threatening life of nation). The case involved the five month detention of an Irish citizen suspected of involvement in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and whether the Irish government's detention of this citizen in violation of the European Convention was justified by a state of emergency. Id. See also Scott Dolezal, Note, The Systematic Failure to Interpret Article IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is There a Public Emergency in Nigeria?, 15 AM. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1163,1180 (2000) (providing Lawless case details).

(93.) See Hughes, supra note 82, at 13 (presenting European Commissions current stance regarding "life of the nation"). See generally The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Coy. H.R. 1, 186 (1969) (Commission Report) (reaffirming definition of state of emergency as threatening organised life of community); Herbert. Petzold, European Convention On Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, Cases And Materi als: A Reader For Students Of The International Law Of Human Rights pt. XIV-1, at I (International Institute of Human Rights, 3d ed., 1979) (detailing facts of The Greek Case); Daniel O'Donnell, Commentary on the Rapporteur on Derogation, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 23, 24 (1985) (asserting emergency only qualifies as threat to nation if threat adversely affects functioning of indispensable institutions).

(94.) See European Convention, supra note 79 (failing to address individual participation in government); European Protocol, supra note 18 (adding participatory rights to European Convention in 1952).

(95.) See European Protocol, supra note 18, art. 3 (requiring states provide free elections, secret ballot, and conditions ensuring free expression of peoples' opinion). Article 3 of the First Protocol reads: "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." Id. See also Fox, supra note 60, at 560 (distinguishing between Article 3 of European Protocol and Article 25 of ICCPR). Article 3 is far narrower than Article 25 of the ICCPR in that it does not guarantee universal suffrage, "genuine" elections, non-discrimination, or equal access to public service. Id. Article 3 provides for state responsibilities, whereas Article 25 of the ICCPR guarantees individual rights. Id. at 561-62. Though not containing a non-discrimination clause like Article 25 of the ICCPR, Article 3 is deemed bound by the European Convention's Article 14 antidiscrimination provision. Id. at 563-64.

(96.) See Fox, supra note 60, at 560-61 (discussing uniqueness of Article 3 interpretation). While Article 3's language imposes duties on states, the Commission and Court hold there to be an "implicit guarantee of individual rights" in the Protocol. Id. at 562.

(97.) See id. at 560-61 (demonstrating interconnectedness of ICCPR and European Convention). The Commission and Court have expanded the textual restrictions of Article 3 to better reflect the common expectations of European Convention Member States. Id. at 561.

(98.) See European Convention, supra note 79, art. 15(2) (prohibiting derogations on European Convention Articles 2, 3, 4 (paragraph 1), and 7). The European Convention's derogation clause is more limited than the derogation clauses in the American Convention and the ICCPR. Id. But see American Convention, supra note 18, art. 27 (prohibiting derogation of eleven provisions expressly); ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (prohibiting derogation of seven provisions expressly).

(99.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (outlining the basis for dispute). See also Hughes, supra note 82, at 33 (noting additional allegations of illegal detention, torture, and "a plethora of other human rights abuses").

(100.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (prohibiting specific citizens from partaking in any activities "of a political nature," including voting).

(101.) See id. (targeting specific individuals who ran for office entirely legally).

(102.) See Hughes, supra note 82, at 32-33 (detailing Uruguay's "notification" for derogation under Article 4). See Communication No. 34, supra note 54,1 8.2 (recording HRC request for additional details). Uruguay's notice to the HRC asserted that Uruguay was in compliance with Article 4(2) and was neither violating nor derogating any of the provisions listed therein in. Id. at [paragraph] 6. Uruguay argued that because Article 25 is not included under Article 4(2), Uruguay was free to derogate it, though Uruguay never indicated in its report that it was derogating Article 25. Id. As such, Uruguay informed the HRC that the government "has temporarily derogated from some provisions relating to political parties." Id. While Uruguay asserted that it intended to restore political life, the notice provided no indication of what circumstances justified Uruguay's derogation of Article 25. Id. at [paragraph] 8.2. Promises of future disclosure did not manifest. Id.

(103.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54, 1 8.3 (asserting that exercise of Article 4 requires accounting of circumstances justifying derogation). The HRC asserted that a derogating state is "duty-bound to give a sufficiently detailed account of the relevant facts when it invokes article 4 (1)." Id. Failure to comply with this measure leaves the HRC unable to assess the situation and its relevancy to a state derogation under Article 4. Id. Lacking such information, the HRC cannot conclude that an emergency exists sufficient to justify the exercise of Article 4. Id.

(104.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54, [paragraph] 8.4 (theorizing on validity of derogating Article 25).

(105.) See id. [paragraph] 8.4 (denying possibility of Uruguayan justification). The Uruguayan government failed to provide an explanation for its derogation. Id.

(106.) See id. (recording HRC's partial analysis of Article 4 application). The HRC identifies the broadness of Uruguay's prohibition on political participation regardless of whether the prohibited individuals conducted or encouraged violence against the state. Id. The HRC does not, however, indicate whether a more narrow prohibition against individuals who did conduct or encourage violence would justify the suppression of said individuals' Article 25 rights. Id. The HRC emphasizes the lack of specificity in the application of Article 4 as justification for nullifying its exercise, but does not reach an analysis of whether a more precise prohibition on government participation, aimed only at individuals deemed to have threatened the life of the nation, would qualify as a proper exercise of Article 4. Id.

(107.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54, [paragraph] 9 (denying validity of Uruguay's derogation). While the HRC's invalidation of Uruguay's exercise of Article 4 is valid, it solely relies on the failure of Uruguay to articulate a justification for its derogation activities. Id. H 8.4. The HRC admits that it "cannot conclude that valid reasons exist" to validate Uruguay's derogation of Article 25, but this statement is to be expected from a human rights organization. Id. [paragraph] 8.3. The HRC cannot be expected to formulate arguments for the derogation of the ICCPR; if Uruguay had articulated some reasoning to justify its derogation, then perhaps the HRC would have provided a more in depth analysis of what qualifies for the derogation of Article 25. Id.

(108.) See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (describing coup in Turkey). See Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (notifying Secretary-General of state of emergency and intent to derogate rights). On July 21, 2016, the Turkish government also informed the Council of Europe "it 'may' derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights." Id. See Martin Scheinin, Turkey's Derogation from ECHR--What to Expect?, EJIL: Talk!, (July 27, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/turkeys-derogationfrom-the-echr-what-to-expect/ (exploring Turkey's possible derogation of European Convention). See Aolain, supra note 2 (noting lack of Turkish transparency surrounding human rights). Turkey did not provide what rights it intended to derogate from. Id.

(109.) See Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (listing all derogated rights under ICCPR). ICCPR rights derogated by Turkey: Article 2, guaranteeing recognition and protection of rights enumerated in ICCPR; Article 3, equal rights for men and women in enjoyment of rights enumerated in ICCPR; Article 9, "right to liberty and security of person;" Article 10, rights of detainees; Article 12, freedom of movement and choice of residence for lawful residents; Article 13, rights of aliens; Article 14, equality "before the courts and tribunals" and right to fair trial; Article 17, freedom from "arbitrary or unlawful interference;" Article 19, "right to hold opinions without interference;" Article 21, "right of peaceful assembly;" Article 22, "right to freedom of association with others;" Article 25, right to political participation; Article 26, "equal[ity] before the law;" and Article 27, minority protection. Id.

(110.) See Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (communicating intent to derogate but failing to provide explanations, justifications, or time frame).

(111.) See U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (arguing Turkey's current status does not qualify for Article 4 derogation).

(112.) See id. (disavowing extent of provisions derogated by Turkey). The experts note that any derogation must be justified in its exercise and limited in its scope to the necessities of the situation. Id.

(113.) See Aolain, supra note 2 (accusing Turkey of being "serial" derogator of human rights). The current derogation of rights within Turkey is merely a continuation of Turkey's government suppressing human rights. Id. See U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (describing HRC's past treatment of Turkey's use of Article 4). Human Rights experts have consistently voiced concern over Turkey's use of emergency powers to target dissidents and critics of the regime. Id.

(114.) See Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 15, pp. 18-21 (summarizing process for concluding observations). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (explaining basis for concluding observations and HRC's authority under Article 40).

(115.) See Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 15, pp. 18- 21 (identifying starting date of concluding observations). See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States, 1 35-36, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Concluding Observation 2006] (condemning United States depriving felons and citizens of Washington D.C. voting rights); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, [paragraph] 28, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter U.K. Concluding Observation 2008] (paralleling reasoning in United States' 2006 Concluding Observation disavowing deprivation of felon's voting rights); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, [paragraph] 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.l 17 (Nov. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Hong Kong Concluding Observation 1999] (disagreeing with Hong Kong's decision to abolish Municipal Councils, further limiting citizens participation in government); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, [paragraph] 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/PRK (Aug. 27, 2001) [hereinafter North Korea Concluding Observation 2001] (condemning North Korea's multiple failures to implement democracy).

(116.) See U.S. Concluding Observation 2006, supra note 115,1 35 (suggesting reformation of United States' practices regarding felons voting); U.K. Concluding Observation 2008, supra note 115, [paragraph] 28 (suggesting reformation of United Kingdom's practices regarding felons voting). While the HRC's concluding observations identify Member State deficiencies, they do not offer expansive explanations for why the Member State is deficient. Id. The concluding observations are more a method for informing Member States of their ICCPR compliance than a guide on how to remedy any deficiencies. Id. See, e.g., U.S. Concluding Observation 2006, supra note 115, [paragraph] 35 (noting United States' failure to meet ICCPR standards); U.K. Concluding Observation 2008, supra note 115, [paragraph] 28 (noting United Kingdom's failure to meet ICCPR standards).

(117.) See U.S. Concluding Observation 2006, supra note 115, [paragraph] 36 (suggesting reformation of United States' practice regarding Washington D.C. federal representation). The HRC does not directly disavow the United States treatment of representation in Washington D.C., instead simply noting that it is concerned that the practice "seem[s]" to contradict Article 25. Id. As with the rest of the concluding observations regarding Article 25, the HRC provides no further guidance on why a given Member State action violates Article 25. Id. [paragraph] [paragraph] 35-36.

(118.) See Hong Kong Concluding Observation 1999, supra note 115, [paragraph] 12 (chastising Hong Kong's denial of citizen participation via municipal court system).

(119.) See North Korea Concluding Observation 2001, supra note 115, 1 25 (chastising Kim regime for non-democratic practices). In its first report to the HRC, North Korea attempted to justify its lack of democratic institutions claiming that its people manifested no desire to create new political parties. Id. The HRC considered North Korea's situation incompatible with Article 25. Id.

(120.) See Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 15, pp. 20-21 (noting limited scope of HRC to enforce measures suggested in Concluding Observations). Lacking direct enforcement measures, the HRC counts on recording and publicity to "name and shame" states not complying with the ICCPR. Id. The HRC may implement further steps to measure and oversee a state's compliance with a concluding observation's suggestions. Id. States failing to adhere to the HRC's suggestions may have their submission date for their next report altered, be required to provide additional information, or have representatives meet with the Special Rapporteur to discuss why compliance is not forthcoming. Id. at 20. Should a state continue to not remedy the issue identified by the HRC, such failure is recorded in the Committee's annual report to the U.N. General Assembly. Id.

(121.) See id. (emphasizing HRC's reliance on other Member States to pressure non-compliant Member States into compliance with ICCPR). The HRC draws attention to any state that is not in compliance with Article 25 with its "name and shame" process of ICCPR enforcement. Id. See, e.g., U.S. Concluding Observations 2006, supra note 115, [paragraph] 35 (recording United States' failure to meet standard, but not compelling action); U.K. Concluding Observation 2008, supra note 115, [paragraph] 28 (recording United Kingdom's failure to meet standard, but not compelling action); Hong Kong Concluding Observation 1999, supra note 115, [paragraph] 12 (recording Hong Kong's failure to meet standard, but not compelling action); North Korea Concluding Observation 2001, supra note 115, [paragraph] 25 (recording Kim regime's failure to meet standard, but not compelling action).

(122.) See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States, [paragraph] 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014) (identifying, again, United States failure to adhere to Article 25). In continuity with the 2006 United States Concluding Observation, the HRC acknowledges the United States recent attempts at returning voting rights to felons. Id. The 2014 Concluding Observations, however, further identifies the possible disenfranchisement of U.S. citizens' voting rights because of voter identification laws. Id. The HRC concluded by noting the citizens of Washington D.C. are still restricted in their voting rights, in violation of Article 25. Id.

(123.) See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, [paragraph] 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HKG/CO/2 (Apr. 21, 2006) (referencing 1999 Concluding Observations on Hong Kong's inadequate adherence to Article 25). The HRC, once more, condemned Hong Kong's failure to adhere to Article 25. Id. I

(124.) See infra Part IV.A.3. (concluding Article 4 cannot allow for derogation of Article 25 without undermining pro-democratic purpose of ICCPR).

(125.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63, [paragraph] 1 (requiring states to ensure citizens have "effective opportunity" to participate in government); Democracy, supra note 18 (describing United Nations support of democracy); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19, at 1 (asserting importance of citizen participation in government); ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (guaranteeing citizen participation in government). See also Fox, supra note 55, at 555-56 (detailing ICCPR's drafters ease when drafting Article 25 because of pro-democratic nature of ICCPR).

(126.) See Infra Part IV.A. (identifying and analyzing conflict between derogating Article 25 and purpose of Article 4).

(127.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (explaining connection between ICCPR provisions and ultimate ICCPR purpose). See Questiaux, supra note 33(emphasizing democratic basis of Article 4). The ICCPR as a whole is aimed towards securing citizen's civil and political rights and reinforcing democratic principles, and Article 4 reflects these purposes. Id. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.330, supra note 45, at 4 (recording ambiguity in defining "life" of nation as used in Article 4). The language used in Article 4, however, is ambiguous and requires interpretation beyond that provided by the HRC to determine how Article 4 adheres to the ICCPR's purpose. See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (presenting HRC's official analysis of Article 4, but failing to define "life" of nation). See also supra Part II.B.1., II.B.2.b. (detailing basis for and purpose of Article 4 language). See also supra Part III.A.1-2. (providing supplementary perspective on Article 4 language meaning and purpose via analysis of similar provisions). To interpret Article 4's language in the context of the ICCPR's purpose, a similar provision to Article 4 contained in similar agreements to the ICCPR, must be analyzed and compared. See also supra Part III.A.1-2.

(128.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See infra Part IV.A.I, (arguing "life" of a nation includes political structure of community).

(129.) See infra Part IV.A.2. (contending pro-democratic purpose of ICCPR manifests in Article 4).

(130.) See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.330, supra note 45, at 4 (reflecting on ambiguity of term "life of the nation"). The ambiguity over the tern "life of the nation" stretches back to the drafting of the ICCPR as evidenced by both the debates over what language should be used and, once chosen, what that language actually meant. Id. See also Hartman, supra note 27, at 96-7 (providing history of Article 4 drafting and debates over language used). See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (explaining Article 4, but not directly defining "life of the nation"). The HRC continually references "life of the nation" but never actually defines the term in the General Comment specifically issued to define and explain the scope of Article 4, including its language. Id.

(131.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (requiring "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation"); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (explaining Article 4, but not life of nation). Though the very purpose of Article 4 is to secure the "life" of a nation, little definition is provided for what this "life" includes. See supra Part II.B.2. (discussing purpose of Article 4, including intrinsic connection to purpose of ICCPR as a whole). See supra Part II.B.2.b. (detailing possible definitions of emergency threatening life of nation).

(132.) See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.330, supra note 45, at 4 (reflecting on ambiguity of term "life of the nation"). See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (explaining Article 4, but not directly defining "life of the nation").

(133.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing current language of Article 4); Hartman, supra note 27, at 95-98 (discussing drafting language of Article 4). See supra Part II.B.1. (addressing debate over drafting language of Article 4). See supra Part II.B.2. (describing HRC's treatment of Article 4). See supra Part III.A.1-2. (describing Inter-American Commission and European Commission interpretations of respective derogation articles). By compiling how "life of the nation" has been applied, analyzed, and enforced, a working definition may be formulated, similar to how the meaning behind parts of the European Convention are interpreted by comparing their language to the common expectations of European states and the language used in the ICCPR. See supra Part III.A.2. (discussing European Convention's application of derogation clause and government participation clause).

(134.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, [paragraph] 3 (asserting narrow reach of emergencies threatening "life" of nations). The HRC states "[n]ot every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation." Id. See supra Part 2.B.2.b. (discussing limitations on what emergencies threaten life of nations). See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing history of language chosen to define emergencies threatening life of nations). The drafters ultimately elected to not provide a narrow list of qualifying emergencies, thus resulting in the current analysis. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See General Comment No. 29, [paragraph] 2-3 (addressing emergency qualifications for "threatens the life of the nation"). Though the HRC does not expressly identify qualifying emergencies, it does note that emergencies threatening "the life of the nation" are measured via their "geographic scope, severity, cause, and temporality." Id. at [paragraph] 4.

(135.) See Hartman, supra note 27, at 98 (following development of derogation clause away from explicit identification of threats to life of nation). See also ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (avoiding direct identification of threats).

(136.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See UN doc. E/CN.4/SR.330, supra note 45, at 4 (providing a negative definition of what life of nations does not encompass).

(137.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, 1 3 (declaring armed conflict, alone, does not threaten life of nations). The HRC states: "[t]he [ICCPR] requires that even during an armed conflict measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation (emphasis added)." Id.

(138.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See UN doc. E/CN.4/SR.330, supra note 45, at 4 (dissociating threats to life of nation from threats to life of government or state). See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, 1 3 (identifying typical "emergencies" which one assumes threaten "life" of nation and denying their inherent threat). The HRC explicitly denies inherently granting the status of "emergency threatening the life of the nation" to armed conflict, whether international or domestic. Id. According to the HRC, armed conflict may reach the status of an emergency threatening the life of a nation, but armed conflict does not justify complete exercise of Article 4. Id. Armed conflict only authorizes derogation to the extent that the armed conflict constitutes a threat to the life of a nation, thus implying that some armed conflict may not qualify as a threat to the life of a nation. Id. See Hartman, supra note 27, at 98 (recording HRC's historical aversion to explicitly identifying specific threats to "life" of nation).

(139.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See Hughes, supra note 82, at 40-41 (noting relevancy of American Convention interpretation to ICCPR interpretation). Because of the parallels in wording and substantive limitations present in both Article 27 of the American Convention and Article 25 of the ICCPR, to interpret one is to interpret the other. Id. See Fox, supra note 60, at 560 (establishing European Commissions reliance on ICCPR in interpreting European Convention). Even in light of Article 3 of the European Protocol being much narrower than Article 25, the European Court and European Convention rely on Article 25 as the baseline in interpreting Article 3. Id.

(140.) See Hughes, supra note 80, at 41 (recording Inter-American Commission's emphasis on importance of threat affecting "organized life"). From initial drafting, the Inter-American Commission made clear that emergencies justify derogation of rights only when the situation is sufficiently grave and threatens the "organized life of the state." Id. See id., at 13 (recording European Commission's interpretation of "life of the nation" via The Greek Case). The European Commission impliedly interpreted the term "life" of a nation by identifying four characteristics necessary for an emergency to threaten the life of a nation. Id. The third characteristic stated that an emergency, in order to qualify as a threat to the life of a nation, must threaten the organized life of the community. Id.

(141.) See Hughes, supra note 80, at 41 (narrowing American Convention threats to life of nation to those endangering "organized life"). In addition to requiring that an emergency threaten the "organized life" of the state, the Inter-American Commission requires that a threat be "sufficiently grave" to qualify for derogation under Article 27. Id. See id. at 13 (narrowing European Convention threats to life of nation). In the Greek Case, the European Convention defined and narrowed its definition of threats to the life of the nation to only extend to those threats that endangered the "organized life" of the nation. Id. In the same case, the European Convention emphasized that such a threat must also endanger the "whole nation" to qualify for derogation under Article 15. Id. With these two characteristics necessary for the justified exercise of Article 15, a threat to the life of the nation must threaten the entire organized life of a nation to justify derogation. Id. Isolated threats to organized life will not qualify as threats under Article 15. Id.

(142.) Compare ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (describing justification and restrictions on derogating ICCPR provisions) with American Convention, supra note 18, art. 27 (describing justification and restrictions on derogating American Convention provisions) and European Convention, supra note 79, art. 15 (describing justification and restrictions on derogating European Convention provisions). See Hughes, supra note 82, at 40-41 (drawing parallels between language of Article 4, Article 27, and Article 15 of respective conventions). See Fox, supra note 60, at 560-61 (noting European Commission and European Court's willingness to interpret European Convention in light of ICCPR). Due to the "common democratic heritage" of European states, the European Commission and Court consistently look to the ICCPR for guidance in interpreting the European Convention because the ICCPR reflects such democratic heritage. Id. See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing democratic basis of ICCPR).

(143.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language for Article 4). See supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text (parsing out that "life" of nation includes political structure).

(144.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (requiring "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation"). See UN doc. E/CN.4/SR.330, supra note 45, at 4 (emphasizing importance that Article 4 does not define "life of nation" too precisely). Ultimately, the definition of "life of the nation" is amorphous and seemingly without a definite expression. Id. The current language in Article 4, however, was noted to not solely relate to the life of the nation or state. Id. at 3. See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (presenting HRC's official analysis of Article 4, but failing to define extent of life of nation). The HRC asserts that not every emergency qualifies as threat to life of nation. Id. See supra Part II.B.2.b. (detailing drafter's disinclination to link "life" of nation solely with government and state). Even directly following drafting of Article 4, drafters were relieved that "life" was not too narrowly defined. See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to provide any additional narrowing of "life" meaning).

(145.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, 1 3 (declaring armed conflict, alone, does not threaten life of nations); UN doc. E/CN.4/SR.330, supra note 45, at 4 (distinguishing between threats to life of nation and threats to government or state). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 98 (recording drafter's debates over derogation provision language). Had the drafters of the ICCPR or the HRC merely intended for "life" of the nation to include the physical components of the state, then merely physical threats to the "life of the nation," such as war, would have been identified as the emergencies qualifying for derogation. Id. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text (arguing "life" of nation encompasses more than physical attributes of state).

(146.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing relevant language). See supra Part III.A.1-2. (formulating definition of "life" of nation absent from HRC's discussions of Article 4). See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text (emphasizing inherent expansion of "life" of nation to political structure of state).

(147.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing current language of Article 4); Hartman, supra note 27, at 95-98 (discussing drafting language of Article 4). See supra Part II.B.1. (addressing debate over drafting language of Article 4). See supra Part II.B.2. (describing HRC's treatment of Article 4). See supra Part III.A.1-2. (describing Inter-American Commission and European Commission interpretations of respective derogation articles).

(148.) See Tomuschat, supra note 17, at 1-2 (describing connection between ICCPR and UDHR, with ICCPR acting as enforcement mechanism for human rights). As the ICCPR is intended to protect individual's civil and political rights, it follows that individual provisions of the ICCPR are aimed at securing civil and political rights. Id. See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing inter-relatedness of ICCPR's democratic purpose and its provisions). Accordingly, Article 4 must be read in the context of protecting civil and political rights, thereby impliedly extending "life" of a nation to those features of the state involving civil and political rights, such as citizen participation in government. Id.

(149.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (containing ICCPR's most direct support for democratic institutions); Democracy, supra note 18 (describing United Nations support of democracy); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (recognizing importance of democratic institutions for securing human rights); General Comment No. 25, supra note 63, [paragraph] 1 (requiring states to ensure citizens have "effective opportunity" to participate in government). See supra Part II.A.2. (identifying ICCPR purpose as securing civil and political rights and democratic institutions). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding support of ICCPR purpose). Article 4, as a provision of the ICCPR, is one of the mechanisms by which the ICCPR achieves its goals, specifically securing individual rights and democratic institutions. Id.

(150.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1 (guaranteeing individuals' rights to determine own form of government and constitution); see also id. at art. 25 (guaranteeing citizen participation in government).

(151.) See id. at art. 14 (allowing exclusion of press and public from courts only as necessary in democratic society); id. at art. 21 (restricting state suppression of freedom of assembly to only that necessary in democratic society); id. at art. 22 (prohibiting restrictions on freedom of association except as necessary in democratic society). These express limitations on ICCPR provisions further reinforces that the ICCPR assumes that Member States utilize and exercise democratic institutions. Id. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (requiring ICCPR Member States ensure citizen participating in government in accordance with democratic principles). See also supra Part II.C.I-2. (providing for democratic basis of ICCPR Member States). In order to be a Member State in good standing, democratic institutions are a must. See also supra Part II.C.1-2.

(152.) See Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 15, pp. 18-21 (summarizing process for concluding observations). See Tomuschat, supra note 17, at 3 (explaining basis for concluding observations and HRC's authority under Article 40). Due to the HRC's lack of power to enforce the ICCPR and the minimal number of instances where the HRC has had the opportunity to rule on Article 25, the best method for measuring the HRC's support of democratic principles is by looking to its treatment of states that fail to uphold their Article 25 obligations. Id. See supra Part III.C. (presenting HRC's treatment of states failing to fulfill democratic obligations). See Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 15, pp. 20-21 (detailing HRC's reliance on concluding observations to enforce ICCPR). See also supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (discussing HRC's use of concluding observations to influence ICCPR Member State compliance).

(153.) See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding support of democratic principles).

(154.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See Questiaux, supra note 33(emphasizing democratic basis of Article 4). Lacking cooperation between the ICCPR's purpose and Article 4, Article 4 is entirely a means for bypassing the limitations and purpose of the ICCPR, rending the agreement void. Id. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text (addressing inter-relatedness of ICCPR purpose and Article 4). See also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (emphasizing democratic basis of ICCPR).

(155.) See Questiaux, supra note 33 (reinforcing pro-democracy basis of Article 4). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding ICCPR's pro-democracy underpinning). "Life" of the nation likely encompasses more than just the political process of a community. Id. See supra Part IV.A.1. (providing working definition for "life" of nation). See Fox, supra note 60, at 556 (detailing history of Article 25). The drafters left to states whether they would have proportional representation or a simple majority electoral system. Id. Just focusing on the political process component of "life," one may realize that this political process is not inherently limited to being a democratic political process. Id. Accordingly, a Member State could exercise Article 4 in response to a sufficient threat to the Member State's non-democratic political processes. Id. See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (reinforcing connection between ICCPR provisions and ICCPR purpose). There is no prohibition to this exercise of Article 4, but it may be inferred that, because of the pro-democratic purpose of the ICCPR, Article 4 is intended to protect democratic political processes. Id. See also supra Part II.C.2. (noting Article 25 requires democratic institutions, but not solely democratic institutions).

(156.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (requiring Member States institute democratic institutions). See id. at art. 2(1) (requiring Member States to respect and ensure all provisions of ICCPR). In Article 2(1), the ICCPR expressly requires all Member States to adhere to all provisions of the ICCPR. Id. This provision further reinforces the integrated nature of the ICCPR and its individual provisions. Id. Member States must respect and ensure all provisions of the ICCPR, thus even if certain provisions might interfere with others (as is the case with Article 4) Member States must act in accordance with the ICCPR as a whole. Id. See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding support of ICCPR purpose). See Democracy, supra note 18 (describing United Nations support of democracy); H.R.C Res. 19/ 36, supra note 19 (recognizing importance of democratic institutions for securing human rights); General Comment No. 25, supra note 63, [paragraph] 1 (requiring states to ensure citizens have "effective opportunity" to participate in government). See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, [paragraph] 2-3 (exercising Article 4 requires adherence to Member State's own laws, international agreements, and other ICCPR provisions). See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (evidencing democratic leaning of ICCPR). See also supra note 32 and accompanying text (emphasizing connection between Article 4 and ICCPR pro-democracy purpose).

(157.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See supra Part IV.A.2. (establishing connection between ICCPR's purpose and exercise of Article 4).

(158.) See infra Part IV.A.3. (concluding Article 4 cannot allow for derogation of Article 25 without undermining pro-democratic purpose of ICCPR).

(159.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (requiring Member States adhere to provisions of ICCPR); General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (discussing application of Article 25 in Member States). The extent of these democratic institutions may vary from Member State to Member State because of the ambiguities surrounding how much of a Member State's government must contain democratic institutions. Id. See supra Part II.C. (presenting history of Article 25 and ambiguities about extent of democratic institutions required). The ICCPR does not require complete democratic institutions for all aspects of Member State government. See Fox, supra note 60, at 555 (recording drafter's refusal to require ubiquitous democratic control of government). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (requiring Member State compliance with ICCPR). Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, however, does require Member State adherence to the ICCPR, including Article 25, thus any proper ICCPR Member State will contain the required democratic institutions detailed in Article 25. Id.

(160.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (failing to prohibit derogation of Article 25); Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (showing HRC's inability to foresee justification for derogation of Article 25); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (arguing HRC will not authorize derogation of Article 25). Thus far in the history of the ICCPR, two Member States have attempted to derogate Article 25 and in each instance the HRC has not provided any indication that justification is even possible for the derogation of Article 25. Id. See supra Part III.B.1-2. (discussing attempts by Uruguay and Turkey to derogate Article 25).

(161.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (presenting Uruguay's attempt to derogate Article 25); Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (presenting Turkey's attempt to derogate Article 25).

(162.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54, [paragraph] 6 (recording HRC's response to Uruguay's derogation notice). While Uruguay filed a notice of derogation with the HRC, its notice did not explicitly state that it was derogating Article 25, though additional statements in the derogation notice emphasized Uruguay's capacity to do so. Id. Uruguay's actions, however, evidence that Uruguay was in fact derogating Article 25. Id. See supra Part III.B.1. (addressing HRC's response to Uruguay's derogation announcement).

(163.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54, [paragraph] 8.4 (theorizing on validity of derogating Article 25). While the HRC denied the derogation of Article 25 on procedural grounds, there was still the possibility that the HRC could have further explained whether the Uruguayan derogation of Article 25 could, in any manner, be justified. Id. In a single line of text, the HRC notes that it does not foresee any justification that Uruguay could offer to warrant the derogation of Article 25, but no elaboration was or is forthcoming. Id. Whether this comment was merely dicta expressing the opinion of the HRC or was a subtle attempt to acknowledge the impossibility of justifying the derogation of Article 25 is unclear. Id.

(164.) See U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (denying validity of Turkey's attempt to derogate Article 25). See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (providing facts and history of Turkish derogation from ICCPR). See also supra Part III.B.2. (presenting U.N. experts and HRC's responses to Turkey's derogations from Article 25). At time of writing, the HRC has not responded to Turkey's derogation, hence the reliance on U.N. expert's opinions. See also supra Part III.B.2.

(165.) See Alomain, supra note 2 (noting HRC repeatedly disavowing Turkey's derogations and Turkey's image as "serial derogator" of human rights). Turkey, also a member of the European Convention, has also been repeatedly chastised by the European Committee for violating European Convention provisions as well. Id.

(166.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54,1 8.4 (questioning whether emergency can justify derogating Article 25). See also U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (denying suppression of critics and dissident as aligning with democratic society). See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (evidencing democratic leaning of ICCPR). See also supra note 33 and accompanying text (emphasizing connection between Article 4 and ICCPR pro-democracy purpose).

(167.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (failing to address derogation of Article 25); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to address Article 25 in context of derogation justification). As General Comments are the primary means for the HRC to explain and expand the application of ICCPR provisions, the lack of attention paid to the derogation of Article 25 only generates ambiguity. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (noting lack of HRC attention to relationship between Articles 4 and 25). See also U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (providing no justifications for derogating Article 25). See also Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (excluding analysis of Article 25 derogation). Seemingly reflecting the lack of clarity provided by the General Comments, even direct communications regarding the relationship between Articles 4 and 25 provides no definite answer on what justifies the derogation of Article 25. Id.

(168.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (mentioning briefly lack of justification for derogation of Article 25). See U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (providing no justifications for derogating Article 25). The fact that the HRC has not provided any justifications for the derogation of Article 25, however, can also support the inference that there are no such justifications just as asserted by the HRC in their response to Uruguay's derogation announcement. Id. See supra Parts II.B.1-2., II.C.1-2. (presenting purposes and applications of Article 4 and 25). Neither the HRC nor U.N. experts provide any concrete examples of when the derogation of Article 25 may be justified. See supra Parts II.B.1-2., II.C.1-2.

(169.) ICCPR, supra iiote 3, art. 4 (providing literal language). See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing qualifications for "threat" to life of nation). See supra Part IV.A.1. (analyzing "life" of nation to determine that "life" includes community's political process).

(170.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). While the HRC allows Member States to derogate certain ICCPR provisions for just cause, the purpose of this derogation is to secure the "life" of the nation. Id. See supra Part IV.A.1-2. (providing possible definition of "life" of nation that includes democratic institutions of Member State). See also supra Part II.B.2.b. (explaining threat to the life of the nation). See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (defining basis for Article 4).

(171.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (providing text of Article 25). See supra Part II.C.3. (detailing democratic basis of Article 25 and importance to ICCPR's purpose). See supra Part IV.A.1. (arguing "life" of nation encompasses democratic institutions exercised by community). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (requiring Member States adhere to provisions of ICCPR). For a Member State to adhere to the ICCPR it must adhere to all of the provisions of the ICCPR, including Article 25. Id. Accordingly, facets of the Member States political process ("life") will include democratic institutions as defined in Article 25. Id.

(172.) See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding support of ICCPR purpose); Questiaux, supra note 33(emphasizing democratic basis of Article 4). See supra Part II.A. (discussing purpose of ICCPR, specifically support for democratic institutions). See supra Part II.B (discussing purpose of Article 4, specifically capacity as supporting mechanism for ICCPR's purposes). See supra Part U.C. (defining Article 25 as primary means of securing democratic institutions in Member States). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1), (3) (requiring Member State Compliance with ICCPR). Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires that a Member State adheres to and supports the provisions of the ICCPR, which impliedly requires that there cannot be any paradoxes generated between different provisions of the ICCPR. Id. In reading the ICCPR as a whole document, its individual provisions cannot be read as countering the overall purpose of the ICCPR as a whole. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text (addressing collective purpose of ICCPR and role individual provisions play in securing this purpose).

(173.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (containing ICCPR's most direct support for democratic institutions); Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing connection between ICCPR provisions and ICCPR purpose to secure human rights and democratic institutions); Democracy, supra note 18 (recording United Nations support for democratic institutions); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (recognizing importance of democratic institutions for securing human rights). See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (articulating importance of Article 25 to supporting democratic institutions in Member States). As Article 25 encapsulates the majority of the ICCPR's pro-democratic purpose, allowing Article 4 to derogate this provision renders the ICCPR's purpose moot. Id. See supra Part IV.A.2. (articulating why Article 4 must support purpose of ICCPR). Article 4 must be read as supporting the over-all purposes of the ICCPR, otherwise Article 4 is a means for bypassing the ICCPR's purpose entirely. See supra Part IV.A.2.

(174.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (guaranteeing citizen participation in government); id. at art. 4 (allowing derogation of ICCPR provision under certain circumstances). See Democracy, supra note 18 (describing United Nations support of democracy); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (recognizing importance of democratic institutions for securing human rights). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding support of ICCPR purpose). Article 4, as a provision of the ICCPR, is intended to aid the ICCPR in fulfilling its purpose. Id.

(175.) See ICCPR, supra note 3 (providing examples of ICCPR justifying suspension of democratic principles when necessary). See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14, 21, 22 (noting derogation of provision allowed when executed in a democratic society). The rights contained in these provisions are allowed to be suppressed in accordance with what is deemed necessary in a democratic society. Id. These provisions are distinctive from Article 25 in two ways: first, the provisions that provide for their own suppression expressly limit their suppression to that allowed in a democratic society. Id. Article 25 in no way provides for its own suppression. Id. Second, the provisions that provide for their own suppression, while critical components to democratic society, are not inherently necessary for a democratic society. Id. Article 25 contains the heart of democratic society, as recognized by the drafters of the ICCPR. Id. See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, [paragraph][paragraph] 8, 13(a), 13(d), 13(e), 14 (identifying non-derogable provisions of ICCPR not listed in Article 4(2)). See also supra Part II.B.2.a. (discussing ICCPR provisions for which HRC allows derogation, including justifications).

(176.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (containing ICCPR's most direct support for democratic institutions); Id. at art. 4 (providing for derogation of ICCPR provisions); Id. at art. 2(1) (requiring Member State adherence to ICCPR provisions). See Democracy, supra note 18 (describing United Nations support of democracy); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (recognizing importance of democratic institutions for securing human rights). See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (emphasizing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding support of ICCPR purpose). The ICCPR cannot achieve its purpose of supporting democratic institutions if the basis for the ICCPR's democratic institutions, Article 25, is capable of being derogated. Id. See Questiaux, supra note 33(arguing Article 4 is bound by democratic purpose of ICCPR). Article 4 is subject to the purpose of the ICCPR as a whole, thus to allow Article 4 to derogate Article 25 undermines Article 4's purpose of supporting democratic institutions. Id. See also supra Part II.A.2. (identifying ICCPR purpose as securing civil and political rights and democratic institutions). See also supra Part IV.A.2. (analyzing democratic basis of ICCPR).

(177.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (requiring Member States respect and ensure all rights recognized in ICCPR). See supra Part IV.A.2. (asserting pro-democratic purpose of ICCPR and in turn Article 4). To adhere to the ICCPR, Member States must exercise Article 25, otherwise the overall purpose of the ICCPR is undermined and the agreement ceases to operate as intended. See supra Part IV.A.2. Article 4 is intended to allow Member States to preserve themselves in emergencies, but not at the cost of undermining the purpose of the ICCPR as a whole. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (detailing Article 4's balance as expansion and limitation of Member State powers under ICCPR). See, e.g., supra Part III.A.1-2. (demonstrating potential for Member States to derogate from their democratic institutions). The derogations attempted by Uruguay and Turkey illustrate the danger of allowing for the derogation of Article 25. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.1-2. In both instances, the states sought to undermine the democratic institutions of the state by derogating Article 25, and in both instances the states did so to avoid the pro-democratic purpose of the ICCPR. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.1-2. By using Article 4, Uruguay and Turkey both attempted to excise themselves from the democratic requirements of membership in the ICCPR, resulting in actions completely antithetical to the pro-democratic purpose of the ICCPR and all of its provisions. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.1-2.

(178.) See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (detailing interrelated nature of ICCPR provisions regarding support of ICCPR democratic purpose); Questiaux, supra note 33(arguing Article 4 must be utilized within bounds of ICCPR democratic purpose). See Democracy, supra note 18 (describing United Nations support of democracy). See also supra note 142 and accompanying text (presenting pro-democracy purpose of Article 4 in context of comparable international human rights agreements). See also supra Part II.A.2. (identifying ICCPR purpose as securing civil and political rights and democratic institutions).

(179.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, [paragraph] [paragraph] 8, 13(a), 13(d), 13(e), 14 (identifying non-derogable provisions of ICCPR not listed in Article 4(2)). See supra Part IV.B. (articulating that justifications offered for non-derogable provisions apply to Article 25). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (defining expressly non-derogable provisions of ICCPR). See also Fox, supra note 60, at 555-56 (detailing history of Article 25 as democratic backbone of ICCPR).

(180.) See General Comment No. 24, supra note 36 (justifying why certain ICCPR provisions are non-derogable). While the HRC provides more specific justifications for why each non-derogable provision is deemed as such, each of these specific justifications fall under the wider umbrella of lacking necessity during an emergency. Id. This standard underlies each of the justifications articulated by the HRC and is expressly acknowledged in General Comment No. 24. Id. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (detailing justifications for non-derogable status).

(181.) See infra Part IV.B. (arguing that there is no justification for derogating Article 25).

(182.) See ICCPR, supra note 3 (identifying derogable provisions of ICCPR). Article 4(2) prohibits the derogation of the following provisions: article 6 (right to life), article 7 (prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, or of medical or scientific experimentation without consent), article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2 (prohibition of slavery, slave-trade, and servitude), article 11 (prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation), article 15 (the principle of legality in the field of criminal law, i.e. the requirement of both criminal liability and punishment being limited to clear and precise provisions in the law that was in place and applicable at the time the act or omission took place, except in cases where a later law imposes a lighter penalty), article 16 (the recognition of everyone as a person before the law), and article 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion). Id. See supra Part II.B.2. (defining the purpose of ICCPR and identifying non-derogable provisions of ICCPR).

(183.) See General Comment No. 24, supra note 36 (providing general HRC reasoning on what makes a provision non-derogable). The HRC expressly identifies provisions that encompass international customary norms as non-derogable, and extends non-derogable status to provisions the control of which is impossible. Id. Article 4 is identified as non-derogable because it is necessary to the rule of law, though the HRC does not define what this term means and whether it extends to any other provisions. Id.

(184.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, 1 13(e) (expanding non-derogation status to Article 20(2)). Article 20(2) is deemed non-derogable for the same over-arching reason as the expressly identified non-derogable provisions in Article 4(2): suspension of the provisions is irrelevant to the legitimate control of the state in an emergency. Id. See General Comment No. 24, supra note 36 (presenting justification for Article 4 non-derogable provisions). It is unclear why Article 20(2) is not also identified in Article 4 as non-derogable if they share the same justification for being non-derogable. Id.

(185.) See General Comment No. 29, supra note 3,1 14 (asserting non-derogable status of Article 2(3)). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2. (requiring Member State compliance with ICCPR). Article 2(1) contains the provision that Member States must adhere to the ICCPR, but non-derogation status is not extended to this provision. Id.

(186.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (noting Article 4's use of "State Party" language). Article 4 specifically allows "State Parties" to exercise the ICCPR derogation power, investing both the power to derogate and the power to identify emergencies threatening "the life of the nation" in Member States' governing bodies. Id. See supra Part II.B.1-2. (expounding on justifications and restrictions for Article 4). See also supra Part IV.A.1. (analyzing what "life" of the nation encapsulates).

(187.) See General Comment No. 24, supra note 36 (defining non-derogable provision). Article 4 invests its powers in State Parties and makes the exercise of Article 4 subject to State Parties, for the purpose of protecting the "life" of the state (note, not the life of the State Parties). Id. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (detailing Member State's derogation powers).

(188.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (identifying Article 6 as non-derogable; excluding Article 21); General Comment No. 24, supra note 36, [paragraph] 8 (asserting Article 6 is non-derogable because it contains peremptory international norms). While Article 6 is deemed non-derogable because it contains a peremptory international norm, the wider reason for its non-derogable status relies on the HRC's determination that derogating from Article 6 would not serve a legitimate purpose for controlling a state in an emergency. See General Comment No. 24, supra note 36, [paragraph] 10 (delineating between object and purpose of government acts against ICCPR provisions).

(189.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (providing Member States may act to extent strictly required by exigencies of situation during derogation). From this language it can be inferred that derogations may only be exercised according to necessity; by this logic, if there never exists a necessity for a provision to be derogated, it is for all intents and purposes non-derogable. Id. See General Comment No. 24, supra note 36 (contending that authorized derogation is based on necessity of derogation for functioning of state); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3, [paragraph] [paragraph] 8, 13(a), 13(d), 13(e), 14 (identifying non-derogable provisions of ICCPR not listed in Article 4(2)). Additional reasons for non-derogation status exist and are offered as further justification for why specific provisions are non-derogable. Id. But see, ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing derogation power to Member States). The language of Article 4, however, states that State Parties may only exercise their derogation powers in light of the requirements of the emergency at hand. Id. See also supra Part II.B.2.a. (detailing full list of HRC identified derogable provisions in ICCPR).

(190.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (guaranteeing citizen participation in government). See generally ICCPR, supra note 3 (providing individual protection from state abuses). A majority of the ICCPR provisions secure the individual from community (outside) influence: right to life; right to not be imprisoned for debt; right to freedom of thought; right to hold opinions; right to marry; right to have children; equality before the law. Id. Article 25 alone secures the individual's right to influence the community. Id. The right to peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of association, though securing an individual's right to interact with others, do not secure an individual's right to influence others; these provisions secure the individual from being stopped from peacefully assembling and associating. Id. Article 25 is the only provision in the ICCPR that guarantees an individual's ability to influence others, specifically the community as a whole through government participation. Id.

(191.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (requiring Member States allow citizen participation in government). See also Fox, supra note 60, at 553-61 (discussing Article 25 as it relates to democratic institutions and citizen participation). See also supra Parts IV.A.1-2. (defining "life" of nation to include democratic institutions of state). As Article 25 is a provision of the ICCPR, Article 2(1) requires that Member States adhere to Article 25, thus all valid Member States must, in some capacity, have democratic institutions as defined in Article 25. Id. See also supra Parts IV.A.1-2. See also ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (requiring Member State adherence to ICCPR). See also supra Part II.C.2.a. (discussing extent of citizen participation in Member States).

(192.) General Comment No. 24, supra note 36, f 10 (providing general HRC reasoning on what makes a provision non-derogable). See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2 (requiring Member States adhere to Article 25). See also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (detailing ICCPR pro-democratic purpose). See also Fox, supra note 60, at 556 (discussing extent of Article 25 provision). When writing Article 25 the drafters reflected the pro-democratic purpose of the ICCPR, because Article 25 firmly plants democratic institutions into Member States. Id. While not requiring all aspects of government to be based in democracy. Article 25 does seek to ensure that citizens routinely have access to their governments via genuine elections and limited restrictions for running for office. Id.

(193.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (securing citizen participation in Member States). In the ICCPR, Article 25 is the sole provision that guarantee's individual influence in Member State government. Id. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (discussing requirement that Member States possess some democratic institutions). Article 25, coupled with Article 2(1) requiring Member State adherence to the ICCPR, ensures that at least part of a Member State's operations occurs via democratic institutions. Id. Any suspension of an Article 25 democratic institution thus inhibits at least some of a Member State's government operation. Id. Regardless of the emergency requirement for a Member State to exercise Article 4, the derogation of Article 25 is in itself a critical blow to the government organization of any Member State because of Member State's required inclusion of democratic institutions. Id. See also Democracy, supra note 18 (describing ICCPR support of democracy). See also supra Part II.A.2. (identifying ICCPR purpose as securing civil and political rights and democratic institutions).

(194.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (failing to address derogation of Article 25 even though clearly derogable under Article 4(2)); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to address why Article 4(2) does not include Article 25); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (failing to explain whether Turkey's derogation of Article 25 is justified). See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (failing to explain why derogation of Article 25 would be wrongful in Uruguay's scenario). In its response to Uruguay's derogation notice, the HRC mentioned in passing that it could foresee no justification to derogate Article 25. Id. While this statement is a valid statement by the HRC, its lack of extrapolation fails to articulate whether any emergency could qualify to justify the derogation of Article 25. Id. Thus far the HRC has failed to articulate any justifications for the derogation of Article 25 and has failed to state whether any justifications even exist. Id. The lack of justifications, coupled with the HRC's statement questioning the possibility of derogating Article 25 in the Uruguay case, supports the inference that no such justifications exist. Id.

(195.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54,1 8.4 (questioning whether emergency can justify derogating Article 25). See supra Part IV.B. (presenting HRC's failure to address why Article 25 is or is not derogable).

(196.) See Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (communicating Turkish government's intent to derogate but failing to provide explanations, justifications, or time frame); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (arguing Turkey's current status does not qualify for Article 4 derogation). See supra Part IV.B. (detailing failure of U.N. experts and HRC to justify Article 25 derogation).

(197.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54,1 8.4 (questioning whether emergency can justify derogating Article 25); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (denying validity of derogation when viewed in light of human rights abuses performed subsequent to derogation). See also General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (failing to address derogation of Article 25); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to address Article 25 in context of derogation justification). See also supra text accompanying notes 166-68 (detailing lack of justification for Article 25 derogation). See also supra Part IV.A. (analyzing ICCPR allowing for derogation of primary security of one of its purposes).

(198.) See Part II.B.2.a. (justifying enumerated non-derogable rights because derogation would not serve legitimate purpose during public emergency). See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (recording Uruguay's derogation of Article 25 and subsequent rejection by HRC); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (denying validity of Turkey's derogation of Article 25). The HRC, the U.N. experts, Turkey, and Uruguay have all failed to provide any justification for the derogation of Article 25 that would satisfy the requirements of Article 4. See supra Part III.B.1-2. Lacking any explanations or justifications, the HRC's passing question of whether there can be a justification for the derogation of Article 25 is the primary indicator of whether the derogation of Article 25 is proper. See supra Part III.B.1-2.

(199.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (requiring democratic institutions for Member States); id. at art. 2 (requiring Member States adhere to all provisions of ICCPR). See General Comment, No. 24, supra note 36,1 8 (defining "non-derogable status" based on relevancy of provisions to legitimate state control). Citizen participation in Member States is required under Article 25; suspension of this provision undermines legitimate state control. Id. See supra Parts II.C.1-2. (detailing critical nature of citizen participation to proper operation of Member State). If a Member State does not have at least some democratic institutions, it is not a proper Member State. See supra Parts II.C.1-2. See also supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text (arguing that Article 25 is fundamental component of Member State operations).

(200.) See Democracy, supra note 18 (emphasizing critical nature of democracy in supporting human rights); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (defining democracy and its importance to human rights). See supra text accompanying notes 18-19 (detailing how democracy is critical component of ICCPR). See Fox, supra note 60, at 555-61 (presenting Article 25 as foundation of ICCPR pro-democratic purpose); General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (establishing critical nature of citizen participation in government for adherence to ICCPR).

(201.) See ICCPR, supra note 3 (identifying derogable provisions of ICCPR); General Comment No. 24, supra note 36, f 10 (providing general HRC reasoning on what makes a provision non-derogable). See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text (asserting that non-derogable status is allocated to provisions suspension of which wouldn't aid in emergency). See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (requiring Member States possess some democratic institutions). See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text (arguing derogation of Article 25 serves no legitimate purpose in democratic state). See also supra Part IV.A.1. (analyzing inclusion of political process into "life" of nation protected under Article 4). The "life" of the nation protected in Article 4 likely includes the political process of the community. See also supra Part IV.A.1. Assuming that the community composes a proper Member State, then said community must contain democratic institutions of government as prescribed in Article 25. See also supra Part IV.A.1.

(202.) See ICCPR, supra note 3 (identifying derogable provisions of ICCPR); General Comment No. 24, supra note 36, [paragraph] 10 (providing HRC reasoning: derogation disallowed when suspension of provision is irrelevant to legitimate state control). See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text (detailing why non-derogable provisions are deemed as such). See also supra Part IV.A.1. (analyzing inclusion of political process into "life" of nation protected under Article 4). The "life" protected via Article 4 includes the democratic institutions guaranteed under Article 25. See also supra Part IV.A.1. To derogate Article 25 thus impinges on the "life" of the nation that Article 4 seeks to protect; not only does the derogation of Article 25 not aid a Member State in an emergency, the derogation itself injures the "life" of the nation that the derogation is intended to protect in the first place. See also supra Part IV.A.1. Moreover, the derogation of Article 25 then contradicts the overall purpose of the ICCPR by suppressing the basis for the democratic institutions manifest in the "life" of the Member State. See also supra Part IV.A.1. See also infra Part IV.A.2. (arguing ICCPR and individual provisions support ICCPR's overall pro-democratic purpose).

(203.) See supra Part IV.B. (arguing Article 25 fulfills same requirements as those needed to be non-derogable).

(204.) See supra Part IV.C. (arguing derogation of Article 25 only benefits parties that do not want democratic institutions).

(205.) ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (providing language of Article 4). See Fox, supra note 60, at 555 (detailing drafters' decision to not require democratic institutions for all facets of government). The ICCPR requires Member States to support democracy, but the citizenry are free to pursue whatever form of constitution they desire. Id. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1 (guaranteeing individual's right to self-determination). See notes 1-4 and accompanying text (describing Turkey's recent anti-democratic actions). See supra Part III.B.1. (discussing Uruguay's executive's attempt to suppress democracy). See supra Part III.B.2. (addressing Turkey's repeated misuse of Article 4 to target dissidents and opposition). See supra Part IV.A. (evidencing "life" of nations includes democratic institutions). See also, ICCPR supra note 3, art. 2(1) (requiring Member States adhere to ICCPR provisions, including Article 25). Article 2(1) requires Member States to enforce the provisions of the ICCPR, thus any proper Member State will include democratic institutions as detailed in Article 25. Id. See also Fox, supra note 60, at 556-58 (noting ICCPR does not require Member State solely utilize democratic institutions).

(206.) See, e.g., Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (detailing Uruguay's exercise of non-democratic principles even though an allegedly democratic state); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (condemning Turkey's consistent misuse of Article 4 to suppress democratic institutions).

(207.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (containing ICCPR's most direct support for democratic institutions); id. at art. 4 (failing to expressly bar derogation of Article 25); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to extend Article 4 non-derogation to Article 25). See Democracy, supra note 18 (affirming democratic purpose of ICCPR); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (recognizing critical importance of democratic institutions to secure human rights). See supra Part II.A.2. (detailing why ICCPR purpose includes securing civil and political rights and democratic institutions). See supra Part IV.B. (contending derogation of Article 25 serves no justified purpose in democratic state). As Article 4 seeks to protect the "life" of the nation, and "life" of the nation in a Member State includes democratic institutions, using Article 4 to derogate Article 25 creates a conflict of purposes. See supra Part IV.B. Article 4 is intended to protect the "life" of the nation, but when that "life" includes the rights provided for in the to-be-derogated Article 25, Article 4 undermines its own purpose. See supra Part IV.B. Likewise, derogating Article 25 undermines the entire purpose of the ICCPR and Article 4 in the first place. See supra Part IV.B. See Hartman, supra note 27, at 91 (identifying extension of ICCPR purpose to individual ICCPR provisions, including Article 4). Article 4 provides a method to protect Member States at the cost of waiving provisions of the ICCPR. Id. As a provision of the ICCPR, however, Article 4 must be interpreted as a method for also achieving the ICCPR's purposes. Id. Using Article 4 to derogate from Article 25 creates a paradox of purposes: Member States are allowed to derogate from Article 25, but doing so directly contradicts the purpose of the ICCPR to which Article 4 is also bound. Id. Because of this paradox, the primary effect of derogating from Article 25 is to undermine the pro-democratic basis of the Member State. Id. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.1. (exploring Uruguay's attempt to justify suppression of citizens' rights via Article 4). See, e.g., supra Part III.B.2. (discussing Turkey's forgoing citizen participation in government via unjustified exercise of Article 4).

(208.) See infra notes 211-221 and accompanying text (following hypothetical state's misuse of Article 4 derogation of Article 25).

(209.) See infra notes 222-226 and accompanying text (discussing Uruguay's and Turkey's exercise of Article 4 to attack Article 25 rights).

(210.) See General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (failing to provide justification for derogation of Article 25); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (addressing Article 25 only in context of non-derogable nature of non-discrimination provisions). See, e.g., Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (failing to address validity of Article 25 derogation); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (providing no basis for proposed derogation). Neither the HRC, U.N. experts, nor the governments of Uruguay or Turkey have successfully presented a justification for the derogation of Article 25, with the HRC even indicating disbelief that such justification is possible. See supra notes 161168, 194-198 and accompanying text.

(211.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (providing basis for democratic principles in ICCPR); Id. at art. 4 (allowing for derogation of ICCPR provisions). See Fox, supra note 60, at 555-56 (recording unanimous decision by ICCPR drafters to include Article 25 provisions protecting democratic principles). The ICCPR is built on a foundation of democratic principles and Article 25 is the primary method by which drafters sought to ensure citizen participation in Member State governance. Id. See also Fox, supra note 60, at 556 (detailing how Article 25 is backbone of ICCPR pro-democratic purpose). See also supra Part IV.A.2. (arguing ICCPR and all ICCPR provisions share same pro-democratic purpose). See also supra notes 190-193 and accompanying text (arguing that derogation of Article 25 undermines democratic purpose of ICCPR). Without Article 25, the ICCPR has no means for securing democratic institutions from state abuse. See also supra notes 190-193 and accompanying text.

(212.) See, e.g., Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (derogating numerous provisions of ICCPR and consolidating power in executive). Without the democratic institutions secured by Article 25, a community's political process must alter to accommodate the power vacuum that results from the suppression of democracy. Id. Lacking the security provided by the Article 25 guarantee, there is the possibility that an anti-democratic institution will fill in the power vacuum. Id.

(213.) See, e.g., Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (seeking to derogate ICCPR provisions so executive can "remedy" emergency). The removal of democratic institutions does not reduce the amount of government power, but merely shifts control of the government power from citizens to some other entity. Id.

(214.) See U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (addressing Turkish governments consistent suppression of citizen participation in government). See also General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (failing to justify derogation of Article 25). See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to address derogation status of Article 25). As the HRC has not expressly denied the possibility of a state justifiably derogating Article 25, there may be an emergency that qualifies for the derogation of Article 25. Id.

(215.) See ICCPR supra note 3, art. 5 (denying ICCPR as justification for terminating human rights); Id. at art. 2 (requiring Member States respect rights contained in ICCPR). The ICCPR provides for over-lapping protection of individuals' rights, but does not provide for the suppression of Article 25, the sole guarantor of democratic institutions. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (containing sole rights to participate in government).

(216.) See supra Part II.B.2.a. (identifying non-derogable rights). See also General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (detailing Article 4 derogation extent and limitations). There are no limitations on the number of provisions that may be derogated from at any one time, but all derogations must be proportional and necessary to the emergency justifying the derogation. Id. This standard, however, is liable to misappropriation when Article 25 is derogated. Id. If Article 25, the cornerstone of democratic institutions in the ICCPR, is properly derogated under Article 4, many other less far-reaching provisions of the ICCPR may be subject to the same justification for derogation as Article 25, resulting in a watershed of derogations. Id. Absent the influence in government guaranteed by Article 25, there is also little guarantee that all derogated provisions will be returned in full strength. Id. See also supra Part II.B.2. (discussing extent and limitations on Article 4 derogation).

(217.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (allowing for derogation of ICCPR provisions). See, e.g., Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (recording Uruguay derogation from Article 25); Hughes, supra note 82, at 33 (detailing Uruguayan government's mistreatment of citizens following asserted derogation of Article 25); Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (declaring Turkish government's intent to derogate Article 25); McLaughlin, supra note 1 (observing multitude of deaths and arrests following Turkish derogation of Article 25). See also supra Part III.B.1-2. (discussing both Turkey and Uruguay exercising non-democratic institutions to suppress democracy).

(218.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (failing to bar derogation of democratic institutions). See Tomuschat, supra note 17, at 3 (defining limited nature of HRC and its ability to enforce ICCPR). While a Member-State will be in violation of the ICCPR, the HRC wields so little power that it will not be able to stop an anti-democratic power from completely re-organizing a Member State. Id. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.1-2. (discussing both Turkey and Uruguay exercising non-democratic institutions to suppress democracy). See also supra Part II.A.2 (noting purpose of ICCPR is to secure and protect democracy).

(219.) See H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (acknowledging possibility of different models of democracy); General Comment No. 25, supra note 63,1 9 (noting HRC's failure to assert whether democracy requires party pluralism); Fox, supra note 60, at 556-58 (asserting wording of Article 25 does not preclude single party democracy). The derogation of Article 25 creates a climate wherein any of a number of democratic institutions may be implemented, including a democratic institution less democratic than what was once available. See also supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing repercussions of Article 25 drafters not specifying whether single party democracies satisfy Article 25).

(220.) See Russian Election: Big Victory for Putin-Backed Party United Russia, supra note 71 (reporting on Russian government system). The Russian Federation utilizes a single party democracy that, technically, abides by the requirements of Article 25, but results in numerous instances of voter fraud, undue influence on voters, and "managed democracy." Id. See Fox, supra note 60, at 556-58 (recording ICCPR drafter's failure to require party pluralism). See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing Russia's "democratic" single party system).

(221.) See Democracy, supra note 18 (emphasizing critical nature of democracy in supporting human rights); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (noting reliance of human right security on democratic institutions). A suppression of democratic institutions may beget further suppression of democratic institutions and human rights. Id. See, e.g., supra Part III.B. 1-2. (detailing Uruguay and Turkey attempts to further reduce democratic institutions by derogating Article 25).

(222.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (recording Uruguay's attempt to derogate from Article 25 to suppress dissidents running for office); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (chastising Turkey's derogation of Article 25 to suppress dissidents participation in government). See also supra Part III.B.1-2. (presenting Uruguayan and Turkish governments suppression of citizen participation in government).

(223.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (prohibiting opposition leaders from participating in any activities "of a political nature," including voting); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (identifying Turkey's exercise of Article 4 as means to suppress critics and dissenters); Alomain, supra note 2 (accusing Turkey of being a "serial derogator" of human rights). See also Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 15, p. 20-21 (detailing reporting process to HRC). While the HRC may be aware of these abuses, its lack of power renders it nothing more than an alert system to other Member States of the abuses occurring in non-complying Member States. Id.

(224.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (announcing Uruguay's intent to derogate rights contained in Article 25); Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (declaring Turkeys intent to derogate Article 25). The only response in both instances was writings from human rights officials chastising the Member States for misusing Article 4. See supra Part II.B. (detailing responses to Uruguay and Turkey exercising Article 4).

(225.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (recording HRC's awareness of Uruguay's derogation); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (evidencing international awareness of Turkey's derogation and subsequent human rights abuses). See Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 15, p. 20-21 (describing soft power of HRC and reliance on "naming and shaming"). Naming and shaming, while effective to influence Member States that want to be viewed as proper Member States, does not have the same effect on states that know they are misusing the ICCPR. Id.

(226.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (recording Uruguay's attempt to justify actions via ICCPR provisions); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (addressing Turkey's attempt to derogate Article 25 to suppress dissidents and consolidate power). See supra Part III.B. 1-2. (discussing how Turkey and Uruguay used ICCPR as justification for depriving citizens' rights). By claiming that their suppression of citizen participation in government was authorized by means of the ICCPR, both Turkey and Uruguay were able to buy themselves time. See supra Part III.B. 1-2. Lacking access to the excuse provided through the derogation of Article 25, Uruguay and Turkey's actions would have been more readily identified as the improper suppression of citizen's rights that they were, allowing for quicker, more decisive acts by interested parties. See supra Part III.B. 1-2.

(227.) See, e.g., Part III.B.1-2. (detailing Uruguay's and Turkey's unjustified exercise of Article 4).

(228.) See, e.g., Part III.B.1-2. (addressing lack of justifications for derogation of Article 25). See also General Comment No. 25, supra note 63 (failing to justify derogation of Article 25); General Comment No. 29, supra note 3 (failing to address derogation status of Article 25).

(229.) See, e.g., Part III.B.2.a-b. (detailing Uruguay's and Turkey's attempts to undermine democratic institutions). Suppressions of Article 25 are likely to still occur, but violating Member States will lose the Article 4 justification behind which they hide. Id.

(230.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 25 (guaranteeing citizen participation in government). See id. at art. 2(1) (requiring Member State adherence to ICCPR provisions). A Member State adhering to the ICCPR must contain democratic institutions in its government because of the interaction between Article 25 and Article 2(1). Id. See supra notes 190-193 and accompanying text (denoting importance of democratic institutions to Member States' functions).

(231.) See, e.g., Part III.B.2.a-b. (providing Uruguay's and Turkey's use of ICCPR to weaken democratic institutions).

(232.) See Democracy, supra note 18 (highlighting interdependence and "mutually reinforcing relationship" between democracy and human rights); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (recognizing importance of democratic institutions for securing human rights). See supra Part IV.A.2 (arguing ICCPR and all individual provisions reflect pro-democratic purpose).

(233.) See, e.g., supra Part III.B.1-2. (providing examples of consequences following suspension of citizen participation in government).

(234.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (recording Uruguay's derogation of Article 25 and subsequently prohibiting citizens from partaking in "political" activities). Uruguay's exercise of Article 4 resulted in specific Uruguayan citizens being denied the right to vote, regardless of the terms of Article 25. Id. See Hughes, supra note 82, at 33 (noting allegations of Uruguay illegally detaining and torturing citizens, as well as other human rights abuses). See McLaughlin, supra note 1 (detailing death and injury results of Turkey coup and derogation of Article 25); Alomain, supra note 2 (recording extreme actions of Turkish government following coup, specifically targeting political dissenters); U.N. Experts, supra note 4 (noting Turkey's history for abusing human rights to suppress dissidents). See also supra Part III.B.1-2. (illustrating nature of states attempting to derogate Article 25).

(235.) See Tomuschat, supra note 17, at 3 (arguing ICCPR is means to make human rights enforceable); Democracy, supra note 18 (emphasizing critical nature of democracy in supporting human rights); H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (recognizing importance of democratic institutions for securing human rights); General Comment No. 25, supra note 63, [paragraph] 1 (requiring Member States ensure citizens have "effective opportunity" to participate in government). See also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (presenting ICCPR connection to democratic institutions and reliance of human rights on democracy).

(236.) See Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (recording Uruguay's attempt to derogate Article 25); Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (presenting Turkey's attempt to derogate Article 25). See supra Part III.B.1-2. (offering Uruguay and Turkey as examples of states seeking to derogate ICCPR provisions).

(237.) See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4 (failing to exclude derogation of Article 25). See, e.g., Communication No. 34, supra note 54 (detailing Uruguay's likely improper use of Article 4 to derogate Article 25); Turkey: Notification, supra note 3 (recording Turkey's likely improper use of Article 4 to derogate Article 25). See also supra Part II.A.2. (presenting purpose of ICCPR as guarantor of human rights).

(238.) See supra Part IV. (arguing Article 25 should be non-derogable under Article 4).

(239.) See H.R.C Res. 19/36, supra note 19 (recognizing importance of democratic institutions for securing human rights). See supra Part IV.B. (arguing citizen participation in government is critical to securing all human rights).
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