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Violence between and within political parties in Nigeria: statistics, structures, and patterns (2006-2014).


"To understand this kind of mafia-style activity in Nigerian politics, it is important to note that many political parties are operated by political 'godfathers,' who use money and violence to control the political process." (1)

It was in these blunt words that the United States Institute for Peace depicted political practices on the eve of the 2007 general elections in Nigeria. As it had already been the case before, these elections led to hundreds of deaths. Accordingly, the 2015 general elections came under the attention of all actors involved in politics in the region. Local populations prepared to vote with hope and fear, community leaders called for everyone to stay calm after tensions and skirmishes while think tanks and international organizations issued barometers and reports on violence in a shared hope to monitor and deter politically-associated acts of violence in Nigeria. With an accuracy that we do not seek to evaluate in this article, they have proposed different predictions regarding the most violent regions and the causes of these registered acts of violence. A complete review of these reports is yet to be done and overreaches the objective of this research.

Rather than seeking to analyze acts of violence associated to the general elections, this article will precisely question if general elections per se are indeed period of exceptional violence of Nigeria or if they merely reflect other tensions and processes occurring during non-electoral periods?

The question is central while there is little recent literature on the issue in Africa. Most of the press articles, (2) a flourishing number of reports (3) on Nigeria, but also academic research firstly focus on post electoral violences (4,5,6) with a particular focus on the 2007 Kenyan elections (7,8) and its consequences9 along with the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe. (10) There is no discussion on the relevance of this focus or discussions on political parties' violence while explanations of the phenomenon diverge.

Quantin analyzed electoral violence as a way for people to contest elections and electoral malpractices in corrupt regimes while they were kept aside from power. (11) On the other hand, more recent research show that the violence is ignited by incumbent political parties which explains that justice is not done in Kenya (12) with Hickman arguing that violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe was instrumental for parties although in the case of Zimbabwe it was also a way to contest over frauds. Hickman concludes that violence is not correlated with the intensity of political competition. (13) The only available statistical analysis of party violence in Nigeria was proposed by Timothy Sisk and focuses on the 2007 and 2011 elections. Paradoxically, it argues that elections are not the most lethal periods. (14) The other implication of the idea of popular contestation we want to discuss in the case of Nigeria is that the population would believe in political parties and expect so much that they would be ready to fight for them.

Drawing from IFRA's Nigeria Watch database that records fatalities as they are reported in the Nigerian media, this study starts with a debate on the definition of party violence before detailing the forms and actors it implies. On the opposite of Quantin and in line with Goldsmith findings, (15) I argue that in the case of Nigeria, violence is a mean of political competition among others and it is rather a tool used by parties than what would be a form of edgy participation in political life. The focus on these events occults the daily acts of violence. When it is a form of reaction to political results and creates violence it is only because it comes over and embodies some religious and ethnical questions. Events that only have political marks, and do not have ethnical or religious implications do not provoke waves of mass violence nor events with high lethality.

To do so the paper answers a fundamental set of questions on political parties violence: What are the most violent periods of political parties' related killings? What parties are most associated to fatal violence and which events are more lethal? To what extent can internal disputes and rivalries be seen as decisive factors in explaining deaths linked with political contests? What are the different scales of political violence and how do they relate to each other? What are the states that are most affected by fatal contests between parties? How do these trends evolved between 2006 and 2014?

1. A History of Party Related Violence: "Godfatherism," "Kaduna Mafia," and "Democrazy"

Political violence in Nigeria is not a particular feature of civilian regimes. The first major political assassinations after the independence came with the 1966 coup and the execution of Prime Minister Balewa along with Premiers Ahmadu Bello and Samuel Akintola and Finance minister Festius Okotie Eboh. The military era then brought to power a group of politicians, officers, and businessmen that were nicknamed the <<Kaduna Mafia>>. Since the return to a civilian regime in 1999, the term "godfatherism" also refers to the criminalization of politics and the ability of some kingmakers to select and impose their supporters. (16)

Historically, political violence had not affected Nigeria's decolonization. However, rising tensions between Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group and the NNDP led to the end of the First Republic in 1966. The 1964 General elections were marked by major irregularities. (17) They initiated a system of rigging which characterized the following elections, with the "illegal printing of voters' cards," the "harassment of candidates," "infant voting," "box-switching," and the "inflation of figures." (18) These malpractices provoked widespread violence in the 1964 general elections and the 1965 regional elections in West. At the end of the 1980's, officials thus acknowledged that "rigging of elections has become part of [Nigeria's] political culture." (19)

During the First Republic, the four major parties represented regional constituencies. Led by Ahmadu Bello and Tafawa Balewa, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) was strong in the North, together with Aminu Kano's Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), while the mostly Yoruba Action Group had its roots in the West and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens was representing the Igbo in the East. Lying behind these regional identities were also religious determinants and the idea that there was an equilibrium to be found between a Christian South and a Muslim North. This representation of a divided Federation is still very present today.

During the second Republic, the 1979 and 1983 elections were also impaired by massive fraud and violence which eventually led General Mohammadu Buhari to take power and ban existing parties. (20,21) The short lived transitional Third Republic did not perform better and parties were, again, dismantled by military rulers. With the return to a civilian regime in 1999, the first elections of the Fourth Republic were then marred with massive frauds. (22,23,24) Drawing from their research in the Niger Delta, Ben Naanen and Kialee Nyiayaana argue that they increased the tendency to use violence as the competition intensified. "In many states PDP victory in the 1999 polls was marginal. To maintain its hold on such states the party made every effort to eliminate the opposition. Events connected to the subsequent 2003 elections were to provide an indication that the party was hardly in the mood to concede power in a free electoral contest. Within the ruling party itself the struggle became even more deadly as a result of the individual ambitions of political leaders and their supporters." (25) This tendency was also bolstered by a change in the sociology of political violence "(...) unemployed and angry youths, who led the communal and ethnic-based conflicts while remaining the scourge of oil companies, now became willing recruits for ambitious politicians. The new private armies, locally referred to as political thugs or secret cult groups, were now generously funded, armed with expensive sophisticated weapons (...) Inter- and intra-party clashes laid waste whole communities. Political violence intensified with the approach of the 2003 general elections."

Human Right Watch actually reported that these elections lead to more than 100 deaths. The struggle was reinforced by the necessity for candidates to be endorsed by a registered party, which incensed the stakes of primaries and congresses. (26) The 2007 elections were "not credible" either according to the European Union observation mission. They led to more than 300 deaths, most of them before the vote. (27) Finally, the 2011 elections provoked an upheaval after the announcement of the results, which caused more than 1,000 causalities according to some press reports. (28)

2. Methodology

This study relies on the Nigeria Watch Project, which records fatalities reported in ten national newspapers since 2006. (29) We extracted from the database all the events that opposed political groups. The period under review started with the launching of the database on June 1st 2006 and ended on the 31 December 2014. The data related to 307 incidents had to be refined, excluding stories that did not mention political parties but communities, ethnic organizations or Boko Haram. The analysis is thus based on 275 relevant incidents that involved political parties. The number of death recorded in the database is an average of the numbers given by various sources when their reports differ.

To study the elections impact on political violence, we first had to determine the dates of general elections. The 2007 elections were held on the 14 and 21st of April. The 2011 elections took place on the 9th of April for the Parliament while the president was elected on the 16th. As the primaries of most parties had started in December 2006 and 2010 we decided that the electoral period under review would start 4 month before the voting date, i.e. on the 1st of December. To be more accurate, we also included some events that happened in November and that were related to primaries or to the General Elections. The end dates were chosen empirically when elections-related violence stopped. This is the most appropriate method as we will show that the patterns of violence differ strongly from one election to another.

The parties were identified with the help of press clips that are archived for each incident. When the perpetrator or the victim could not be recognized, they were tagged as being "unidentified." When it was not possible to determine whether violence was internal or targeting another party, the event was also classified as "unidentified."

3. General Elections Account for Less that 50% of the Death

Statistically, years during which general election have been held can indeed be considered as having been the most violent. The 2007 and 2011 years concentrate most of the fatal incidents during the period under review (Fig. 1). This finding confirms that General Elections are decisive moments of violence, with 24 incidents and 62 fatalities in 2006, 113 and 295 in 2007, 20 and 625 in 2008, 3 and 5 in 2009, 18 and 42 in 2010, 66 and 749 dead in 2011, 4 and 9 dead in 2012, 6 and 212 in 2013, and 20 and 30 as at 1st November 2014 (Fig. 2).

Undoubtedly, the Election factor accounts for political parties' violence. But the figures can be misleading as the number of incidents does not exactly match the number of fatalities. Although high in 2007 and 2011, the level of violence is considerable in 2008 and 2013. Despite a lower number of incidents reported, for instance, the year 2008 witnessed more victims than in 2007, with 540 people killed because of clashes between the winning PDP and the ANPP during the Plateau State Gubernatorial elections. As for the 2013 casualties, majority can be accounted for factional clashes between CPC rival groups which ignited ethnic tensions between Gwandara and Eggon communities in Nasarawa, resulting in 197 deaths during the three weeks of turmoil.

The monthly breakdown of fatalities also points to four sets of party violence: the political campaign before the General elections, between November 2006 and February 2007; a peak in December 2007 because of Local Government elections that killed 104 people in Kano; deadly State elections in Plateau in May 2008; the General Elections of April 2011 (Fig. 3).

Thus the scale and patterns of violence related to General elections are different, with 164 fatalities in 2007 and 746 in 2011. To assess more precisely the election factor, it would actually be necessary to analyze the difference between the incidents that happened during the key periods of December 2006 to April 2007, December 2010 to April 2011, and, presumably, October 2014 to April 2015.

The differences between the two elections do not only lie in the scale of violence. As understood by Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (30) election violence analysis should differentiate between pre-election and post-election times. We add to that understanding a focus on the election day itself and a difference between primaries violence and campaign violence. In 2007, most political incidents were reported before the vote and involved factional and personal clashes during party congresses and primaries, in addition to conflicts opposing at least two parties (Fig. 4). During that period, internal fighting within parties and violence perpetrated by supporters accounted respectively for 27 and 131 fatalities. States with the most deadly intra-party conflicts were Benue (5), Lagos (4) and Oyo (3) while the states where rivalries between parties were the most deadly were Nasarawa (36), Oyo (19), Lagos (18), Osun (11) and Benue (7). There were very few fatal incidents and casualties after the proclamation of the results, although President Musa Yar'adua acknowledged massive fraud and corruption.

On the contrary, most of the victims of the 2011 elections were killed after the proclamation of results that were contested in the streets (Fig. 5 and 6). Intra-party violence caused 26 deaths; clashes between parties, 76. States affected by intra-party violence were Edo (9), Delta (3) and Benue (3). The ones affected by clashes between parties were Bayelsa (21), Gombe (11), Akwa Ibom (10) and Oyo (7). After the voting day on 9 April 2011, 36 fatal incidents then caused 659 deaths, most of them in Bauchi and Kaduna State, and to a lesser extent in Akwa Ibom.

To sum up, the findings confirm that General Elections are moments of exceptional violence. Yet they only explain 45% of the total number of fatalities reported: 8% in 2007 and 37% in 2011 General Elections.

4. Intra-party Violence Accounts for 27% of the Incidents and 18% of Party-related Fatalities

Most of the "political" fatalities reported in 2006 are linked with the 2007 General elections and are internal, as in 2010 when 31 persons were killed in factional clashes within a party, as against 12 in external violence. In 2013, the highest number of fatalities resulting from intra-party clashes was found within the CPC in Nassarawa. Overall, 27% of fatal incidents involving political parties between 2006 and 2014 were internal, but they only accounted for 18% of the total number of deaths (fig. 9). This is maybe because they occur during shorter periods, mostly during primaries and party congresses. Such a violence takes two forms that are frequently linked: 1) political assassinations of aspirants who fight for the official endorsement of their party; 2) skirmishes and riots that oppose rival factions within a party.

Groups identified as gangs or cult societies are involved in more than 62% of 48 cases of intra-party violence that resulted in 274 deaths. These incidents happened in 15 States, especially in Rivers, Oyo, Ondo, Edo, Borno, and Nasarawa (which recorded 197 deaths). With 16% of 194 cases that resulted in 101 fatalities, cult societies and gangs seem to be much less involved in clashes between parties.

5. Centrality of the PDP in Clashes between Parties

What are the political parties most associated with violence? From 2006 to 2014, fatal incidents involved mainly the PDP (86%), followed by the ANPP (27%), the AC (13%) / ACN (8%), the CPC (10%), the APC (5%) and the LP (less than 5%). All major parties were affected but smaller parties do not appear in the data (see Fig. 10). (31) The PDP was also involved in 87% of the total number of fatalities, followed by the CPC (24%), the ANPP (21%), the AC / ACN (5%), and the APC and LP (1% each).

CPC has the highest rate of internal violence and 39% of its fatalities resulted from one single incident in Nasarawa. As for the PDP, 25% of its internal clashes accounted for 9% of its fatalities, mainly in Rivers (28 deaths), Akwa Ibom (23) and Benue (21). Other political parties record a much lower level of internal violence, causing 4% of the fatalities associated with the APC and 1% each for the AC, the ACN and the ANPP.

By contrast, external violence between political parties focuses on the PDP, which was involved in 97% of the fatalities resulting from such clashes (Fig. 11). This is probably because the party in power is present nationwide and controls the resources of the Federal Government.

Although the PDP is associated with over 97% of the fatalities resulting from fighting between political parties, it does not mean that it is the only perpetrator or victim. The CPC and the ANPP appear as its most violent opponents. As shown in figure 12, most of the fatalities resulting from such clashes happened between the PDP and ANPP (46%), followed by the CPC (41%). During the period under review, ANPP was the first rival of the PDP, especially in Bauchi, Oyo and Kano, which was affected by violent contests of results after local government elections. With a total of 540 fatalities during regional elections in November 2008, Plateau was the most violent state.

Struggles between the PDP and the CPC happened only during the 2011 General Elections. They occurred in the North, especially in Bauchi and Kaduna (95% of a total of 655 fatalities), and, to a lesser extent, in Gombe, Nassarawa, Kano, Kebi, Niger and Yobe. In Kaduna State alone, more than 478 people were killed in the two LGAs of Kachia and Zangon-Kataf. CPC was not involved in fatal incidents against another party. But it carried on fighting the PDP once merged into the APC. Such clashes killed 21 persons between January and October 2014, and they did not involve any other party.

Clashes between AC/ACN and PDP occurred mostly in Akwa Ibom (6 deaths), Ekiti (8), Kogi (5) and Lagos (9), with few fatal incidents (6 out of 30) involving gangs. During the period under review, AC/ACN also clashed with the LP and the ADC (3 and 1 incidents respectively).

6. How and Where Do Skirmishes Transform into Mass Violence?

Some clashes between parties are more deadly, especially when they involve the CPC, the ANPP and the PDP (fig. 13). Such cases usually happen to ignite social, religious and ethnic tensions. Also, only 14 incidents account for 70% of the fatalities reported during the period under review. With, respectively, 540 and 330 fatalities in Plateau in 2008 and Kano in 2011, for instance, clashes between the PDP and the ANPP resulted into the burning of churches and mosques. In Nasarawa in 2007, the ethnic divide opposed the Alago supporting the ANNP and the Eggon supporting the PDP. Nationwide, cases of electoral violence mixing political, ethnic and religious issues usually happen after the announcement of the results, as in 2011 between the PDP and the CPC in Plateau, Gombe and Kaduna.

In this regard, some states are more likely to experience electoral violence, with over 100 fatalities in Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa and Plateau, an average of 40 in Adamawa, Bauchi Bayelsa, Benue, Kogi, Lagos, Oyo and Rivers, and none in Abia and Taraba, maybe because such incidents were not reported (Fig. 14).

I finally want to show that the ethnical and religious factors cannot be ignored in the analysis of party violence. They are key in the episodes of mass violence whereas events that are only political are much less likely to have high lethality.

The case of the Zangon-Katuf LGA in the South of Kaduna is the epitome of this idea. Since the beginning of the '90s the region has been known for it religious violence, especially as charia was enforced in 2000. It in this context that skirmishes between CPC and PDP partisans and lead to the burning of churches and mosques, killing more than 147 people after the 2011 elections results' announcement.

Out of the total number of violent events from 2006 to 2014, it appears that only less than 5% of the events represent more that 75% of the death of the database. These 14 events, that are also the 14 most lethal, all have in common to imply ethnical or religious determinants. They were coded as such the events that referred firstly to churches and sects, or to communities. These factors do not imply that the violence is purely religious or ethnical but that it is the implication of these categories that turns political events in mass violence. Over the period studied, none of the 275 events that were strictly and uniquely political never provoked more than 20 deaths while the events that were imbricating different aspects were all doing more than 100 deaths, with a maximum of 540 deaths.


This paper has shown that despite the focus of the foreign media, general elections account for only half of the number of fatalities related to party violence in Nigeria. Moreover, clashes between parties are not always reported and should rather be studied through local disputes. Although rigging frequently lead to protest, there is no evidence that political violence is mainly linked to electoral fraud. If the contestation of the results of the 2011 general election provoked hundreds of deaths, local government elections are also important because they can exacerbate ethnic, religious and social tensions.

The PDP is the main actor of violence. It records the largest number of fatalities related to internal disputes and it is involved in 97% of all reported party clashes during the period under review, especially with the ANPP and the CPC in Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa and Plateau states.

These findings pave the way for a sociological and political analysis based on empirical studies. Several questions could be investigated. Regarding intraparty violence, for instance, are congresses and primaries more violent at the local, gubernatorial or national level? Also, which gangs or cult societies are most involved in political violence in each state? Regarding clashes between parties, do they occur when election results are tight, and to which extent rigging leads to fatal incidents? Do parties resort to violence when they are in a situation of monopoly or when they are contested in an open competition? Why are some party clashes deadlier and how do they transform into mass violence in certain LGAs? Answering all these questions would certainly help understanding the dynamics of political violence in Nigeria.


SciencesPo, Centre de Recherches Internationales, Paris

Received 8 August 2015 * Received in revised form 9 November 2015

Accepted 9 November 2015 * Available online 19 November 2015


The author is particularly grateful to David Lamoureux for his comments and proofreading. The author acknowledges Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos for his review and his editing of the map of violence in Nigeria with the help and skills of Hugo Lefebvre.


(1.) United State Institutes of Peace (2007), Nigeria's 2007 Elections, the Fitful Path to Democratic Citizenship, Special Report 182, January, p. 4.

(2.) Yc50v and

(3.) See for instance pre-electoral reports by the Transition Monitoring Group, DFID, Cleen Foundation, International Crisis Group, United State Institute of Peace, UN.

(4.) Basedeau, Matthias, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler (eds.) (2007), Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

(5.) Fadakinte, Mojibayo Mobolaji (2014), "Nigeria and Election Crises: Debating the Causes," International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 4(6): 74-86.

(6.) Igwe, Dickson (2012) "The Perception of Electoral Violence and Democratization in Ibadan, Oyo State Southwest Nigeria," Democracy and Security 8(1): 51-71.

(7.) Ruteere, Mutuma (2011), "More than Political Tools," African Security Review 20(4): 11-20,

(8.) Brown, Stephen, and Chandra Lekha Sriram (2012), "The Big Fish Won't Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-election Violence in Kenya," African Affairs 111(443): 244-260.

(9.) Kanyinga, Karuti, and James D. Long (2012), "The Political Economy of Reforms in Kenya: The Post-2007 Election Violence and a New Constitution," African Studies Review 55(1): 31-51.

(10.) Hickman, John (2011), "Explaining Post-election Violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe," Journal of Third World Studies 28(1): 29-46.

(11.) Quantin, Patrick (1998), "Pour une analyse comparative des elections africaines," Politique Africaine 69: 13-26.

(12.) Brown, Stephen, and Chandra Lekha Sriram (2012), "The Big Fish Won't Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-election Violence in Kenya," African Affairs 111(443): 244-260.

(13.) Hickman, John (2011), "Explaining Post-election Violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe," Journal of Third World Studies 28(1): 29-46.

(14.) Sisk, Timothy (2012), "Evaluating Election-Related Violence: Nigeria and Sudan in Comparative Perspective," in Dorina Bekoe (ed.), Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: USIP Press, 39.

(15.) Goldsmith, Arthur A. (2015), "Elections and Civil Violence in New Multiparty Regimes: Evidence from Africa," Journal of Peace Research 52(5): 607-621.

(16.) Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (2010), Vers un nouveau regime politique en Afrique Subsaharienne? Des transitions democratiques dans I'impasse. Paris-Bruxelles: Les etudes de l'Ifri, 20-23.

(17.) Hill, Jonathan N. (2012), Nigeria since Independence, Forever Fragile? New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 51.

(18.) Jawan, Jayun A., and Nwokeke Osinakachukwu (2011), "The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria," Journal of Politics and Law 4(2): 131.

(19.) 1986 judicial commission of inquiry into the operations of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) reported by a report of the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria in 2011 in a Premium Time article, https://www.premium

(20.) Toyin, Falola, and Julius Ihonvbere (1985), The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-1983. London: Zed Books.

(21.) Jawan, Jayun A., and Nwokeke Osinakachukwu (2011), "The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria," Journal of Politics and Law 4(2): 132.

(22.) Collier, Paul, and Pedro C. Vicente (2012), "Violence, Bribery, and Fraud: The Political Economy of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa," Public Choice 153: 117-147.

(23.) Ukana, Ikpe B. (2000), "Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria," African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique 5(1): 146-162.

(24.) The Carter Center, National Democratic Institute (1999), Observing the 1998-99 Nigeria Elections, Final Report. Washington, DC, 25-30.

(25.) Naanen, Ben, and Kialee Nyiayaana (2013), "State Failure and Niger Delta Conflict," in Mojubaolu Olufunke Okome (ed.), State Fragility, State Formation, and Human Security in Nigeria. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 124.

(26.) Oshodi, Ademola (2007), "Return to Civilian Rule in Nigeria: Problems of Electoral Culture and Transparency over the Past Three Nigerian Elections (19992007)," The Round Table 96(392): 619.

(27.) "The 2007 State and Federal elections fell far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections. They were marred by very poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, substantial evidence of fraud, widespread voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for political parties and candidates and numerous incidents of violence. As a result, the process cannot be considered to have been credible. Given the lack of transparency and evidence of fraud, particularly in the result collation process, there can be no confidence in the results of these elections. This is all the more regrettable since they were held in an improved atmosphere in which freedoms of expression and assembly were broadly respected during campaigning, the judiciary played a generally positive and independent role and the people showed remarkable commitment to democracy, eagerly engaging in the electoral process and waiting patiently to vote in often very difficult circumstances." in EU Election Observation Mission, Nigeria 2007, Final Report: Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial and State House of Assembly Elections, Executive Summary, 2.

(28.) United States Institute of Peace (2010), Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, Special Report 263, December, 2.

(29.) The newspapers are: The Daily Champion, The Guardian, PM News (moribund and replaced by Leadership since 1st June 2013), Punch, This Day, Vanguard, The Independent, New Nigerian (extinct and replaced by Nigerian Tribune since 1st June 2013), Daily Trust, and The Nation.

(30.) Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski (2014), "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?," British Journal of Political Science 44: 149-179, doi:10.1017/S0007123412000671

(31.) For a complete list of officially registered political parties, see the INEC website

Acronyms mentioned in this article

AC:   Action Congress
ACN:  Action Congress of Nigeria, formerly Action Congress, AC
ADC:  African Democratic Congress (Anambra)
AG:   Action Group
ANPP: All Nigeria Peoples Party
APC:  All Progressives Congress
APGA: All Progressive Grand Alliance
CPC:  Congress for progressive change
DPP:  Democratic People's Party
INEC: Independent National Electoral Commission
LP:   Labor Party
MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
NEPU: Northern Elements Progressive Union
NNDP: Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC:  Northern People's Congress
PDP:  People's Democratic Party


Figure 9 Political parties violence: number of incidents (left)
and fatalities (right) (2006 and 2014)

                          Internal     External

number of incidents         27%          73%
fatalities                  18%          82%

Note: Table made from pie chart.

Figure 11 % per party of fatalities
resulting from clashes between parties (2006 and 2014)

PDP    97.6
AC      6.6
ACN     3.1
ANPP   44.4
APC     1.4
CPC    39.7
LP      3.1

Note: Table made from bar graph.

Figure 13 Average number of fatalities
per political clash (2006-2014)

PDP/ AC     3,2
PDP/CPC    23,2
PDP/LP      4,2
PDP/APC     1,9
PDP/ANPP   10,7
PDP/AD      1,0
PDP/ACN     2,5

Note: Table made from bar graph.

Figure 14 Political parties related
fatalities per state (2006-2014)

Adamawa         11
Akwa Ibom       43
Anainbia         4
Bautin          38
Bayelsa         30
Benue           40
Bomo             9
Cross-River      7
Delta           30
Ebonyi           5
Edo             26
Ekiti           10
Enugu            4
Goinbe          14
Eno              7
Jigawa           9
Kaduna         593
Kano           118
Katsina          9
Kebbi            9
Kogi            47
Kwara           10
Lagos           33
Nasarawa       252
Niga            12
Ogun            15
Oil do           6
Osun            24
Oyo             36
Plateau        540
Rivas           37
Sokoto           6
Taraba           0
Yobe             2
Zamfara          8

Note: Table made from bar graph.
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Author:Cohen, Corentin
Publication:Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice
Article Type:Essay
Geographic Code:6NIGR
Date:Jul 1, 2016
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