Venture capitalists' decision to syndicate.
Venture capital (VC) firms invest in companies that have high growth potential. They have developed various strategies to deal with this high-risk environment, one of which is the syndication of investments (Wright & Robbie, 1998). An equity syndicate involves two or more VC firms taking an equity stake in an investment for a joint payoff (Wilson, 1968), either in the same investment round or, more broadly defined, at different points in time (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002).
Syndication is common in the VC industry, both in North America and in Europe. The statistics of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) (2002) show that almost 30% of the value invested by European VCs and of the number of deals were syndicated in 2001. Despite its importance in the VC sector, surprisingly little is known about the motives for syndication. VC firms will only invest if they believe the potential return adequately compensates for the investment risk. Why, then, do VC firms give up potential return by not investing the whole amount needed by the portfolio company, but rather seek another VC firm to coinvest and thereby share in the potential gains (or losses)? This question is compounded by the fact that syndicate arrangements are subject to agency conflicts and, hence, agency costs (Fried & Hisrich, 1995; Wright & Lockett, 2003). What are the perceived benefits that compensate for the costs involved in syndication?
The literature on VC syndication discusses several motives as to why VC firms syndicate their deals. These motives can be classified as dealing either with issues at the level of the management of the overall fund or with issues related to the management of a specific investment. From a portfolio management perspective and following traditional finance theory, VC firms may syndicate to obtain a well-diversified portfolio, thereby reducing the unsystematic risk of the portfolio (Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Lockett & Wright, 2001). Another rationale for syndication that addresses issues at the level of the portfolio of the fund is "window dressing" (Lerner, 1994). By syndicating, VC firms are able to limit underperformance with their peers. Alternatively, VC firms try to be associated with other successful VC firms so as to increase the chance of raising new funds successfully. Syndication may further be a means to reduce the uncertainty with regard to good economic opportunities for investing in the future. By syndicating a deal, VC firms expect other partner VC firms to reciprocate the gesture in the future (Lockett & Wright, 2001), thereby securing improved access to more and/or better quality deals (Seppa & Jaaskelainen, 2002; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Moreover, the expectation of reciprocity reduces the incentives to behave opportunistically and hence, trust between syndicating partners may be enhanced (Wright & Lockett, 2003; Zucker, 1986).
Additionally, syndication may address different activities in the VC investment cycle that deal with specific investments in the portfolio of the VC fund. First, syndication may improve the selection process through improved screening, due diligence, and decision making (Brander et al., 2002; Lerner, 1994). Second, by syndicating, investors are able to share their specific knowledge and complementary skills, and as a result, add more value to the portfolio company (Brander et al.; Bygrave, 1987). Third, syndication may be the result of a fixed-fraction equity contract at a second-round investment stage that helps resolve potential agency conflicts between the entrepreneur and inside investors on the one hand, and inside investors and new outside investors on the other hand (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Lerner, 1994). Fourth, syndication may lead to collusion and hence, investors, through cooperation, may increase their negotiating power toward the entrepreneur and, as a result, get better financing terms (Brander et al.). Finally, at exit, and more specifically at IPO, syndication may lead to enhanced certification and lower underpricing of the portfolio company (Chowdry & Nanda, 1996; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).
In this article, we compare the relative importance of syndication motives across different types of venture capitalists. Specifically, we look at two ways in which syndication may improve portfolio management, namely, by increasing deal flow and spreading risk (finance motive). We contrast these with two ways in which syndication may improve the VC investment process, namely, by improving deal selection and postinvestment value addition. The characteristics of venture capitalists that we focus on are investment stage, size, industry specialization, and experience as lead and nonlead syndicate members. We empirically test these ideas by using a questionnaire-based methodology since the motives for syndication are multidimensional.
There is growing attention to the differences between VC markets in different countries (Black & Gilson, 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000). This study furthers our knowledge of VC syndication practices in different European countries. After the U.K.-based Lockett and Wright (2001) study, this is the second study on VC syndication practices outside North America and the first to encompass multicountry data. Other international studies have shown that VC practices in North America are not necessarily replicated outside that region due to economic, legal, institutional, and cultural differences (Kaplan, Martel, & Stromberg, 2003; Manigart et al., 2002; Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996). Gaining a deeper understanding of the syndication motives in European VC markets, where legal and cultural boundaries may hamper cross-border syndication, may yield insights that are relevant for other regions of the world.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical perspectives on syndication and hypotheses are developed. Thereafter, the research setting and the methods used to test the hypotheses are outlined, and the results are presented. The final section discusses implications for researchers and practitioners.
Motives for Syndicating VC Investments
This study looks at two ways in which a VC firm can use syndication as a means to improve the management of its overall portfolio, namely, a financial motive (risk spreading) and securing access to future deal flow, and two ways in which syndication can improve the management of individual portfolio companies, namely, (1) preinvestment screening and (2) postinvestment monitoring and value adding. In the remainder of this section, we develop hypotheses as to why a particular motive for syndication may be more important for some VC firms than for others.
The Finance Motive
The traditional finance perspective shows that by constructing a well-diversified portfolio, risk can be reduced without reducing expected return. By spreading investments across a greater number of investments that do not covary, syndication has the potential to reduce risk considerably (Markowitz, 1952). This means that the variation in returns is reduced without reducing the expected return of the portfolio. A fully diversified portfolio is, however, more difficult to obtain for VC firms compared with institutional investors who invest in listed stock because of the capital constraints due to the relatively small size of a VC firm or fund (Sahlman, 1990; Wright & Robbie, 1998). If the VC firm is too small relative to the project size, syndicating the deal may well be the only way to invest in that particular deal without unbalancing the VC portfolio. Moreover, syndication gives the VC firm the opportunity to invest in a larger number of portfolio companies than it could do without syndication, thereby increasing diversification and reducing the overall risk of the fund. For example, Cumming (2006) has empirically shown that the number of portfolio companies in Canadian VC funds increases when they actively syndicate, all other things being equal, while Zacharakis (2002) has shown that there is less syndication in riskier U.S. early stage deals than in less risky but larger expansion stage deals. The latter is explained by the smaller size of early stage deals, giving early stage investors the opportunity to limit the concentration of their portfolio even without syndication.
A second finance-related motive for syndication is related to the illiquidity of VC investments (Lockett & Wright, 2001). Minimum investment periods make equity illiquid in the short to medium term. As a result, equity cannot be continuously traded, unlike shares listed on the stock market. Due to ex-ante informational asymmetry, the real risk of the investment may only be fully revealed once the investment has been made. If the risk associated with the investment turns out to be higher than anticipated, it may be difficult to adjust the portfolio by divesting because of the illiquid nature of the VC market. Syndication, therefore, provides a means of sharing risk on a deal-by-deal basis that may help to reduce overall portfolio risk. Brander et al. (2002) have shown that the volatility of the performance of Canadian syndicated investments is larger than that of stand-alone investments, implying that syndicated investments are riskier.
It is unlikely, however, that the finance motive is equally important for all VCs. It is anticipated that the importance of ex-ante information asymmetry and illiquidity of the investments are stronger for early stage VC firms than for later stage VC firms. Berger and Udell (1998) argue that startup firms are more informationally opaque. Due to informational asymmetries, VC firms ascribe a higher standard deviation to returns of early stage investments. As a result, early stage VC firms need more investments so as to reduce the unsystematic risk of the portfolio compared with later stage companies. We can expect, therefore, that the finance motive will be more important for early stage compared with later stage VC firms. Moreover, it is well known that early stage investments have a longer time to exit than later stage investments (Cumming & Macintosh, 2001). Early stage investments are thus inherently more illiquid compared with later stage investments. The above information asymmetry and illiquidity arguments lead us to derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: The finance motive is more important for early stage VC firms than for later stage VC firms.
Syndication may be driven by the desire to spread financial risk across different parties (Bygrave, 1987, 1988). The diversification argument is directly linked to the size of a VC firm. Syndication gives a VC firm the opportunity to invest in a larger number of portfolio companies than it could without syndication (Cumming, 2006), thereby increasing diversification and reducing the overall risk of the firm. All other things being equal, a smaller firm benefits more from syndication than a larger firm under the finance perspective, as this decreases the level of concentration in its portfolio (Zacharakis, 2002). Moreover, if a VC firm is not large enough relative to a particular project, syndicating the deal may well be the only way to invest in that opportunity. Hence, following traditional corporate finance arguments
Hypothesis 1b: The finance motive is more important for small VC firms than for large VC firms.
Access to Deal Flow
There is a second motive to syndicate from a portfolio management point of view, namely, to increase the quantity and quality of deal flow (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). It is important for VC firms to have access to as many high-quality opportunities as possible in order to select the very best ones. Having a strong syndication network increases the status and visibility of a VC firm (Lerner, 1994), increasing its likelihood of being invited into a syndicate network. By syndicating out deals, a VC firm may create an expectation for reciprocation in the future. If so, the VC firm may be invited to join other syndicates as a nonlead in the future, and deal flow is increased. The reciprocation of syndicated deals between VC firms means that deal flow can be maintained even when an individual VC firm may not be the originator of the deal (Bovaird, 1990).
There are again reasons to believe that the deal flow motive is not equally important for all VC firms. Larger VC firms need to invest in more deals than small VC firms, all other things being equal. It is therefore more challenging for them to maintain a good quantity (and quality) of investment opportunities. The deal flow motive is thus likely to be more important for large VC firms than for small VC firms. In particular, large firms seek to increase the quantity of their deal flow through syndication. Hence,
Hypothesis 2a: The deal flow motive is more important for large VC firms than for small VC firms.
The likelihood that a VC firm will invest in a new venture declines sharply with geographic distance and industry dissimilarity, i.e., "the level of dissimilarity between the VC firm's previous investment experiences and the industry classification of a given target company" (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001, p. 1548). Opportunities to interact and, thus, to exchange information, are more frequent among individuals and firms in the same geographic area or in related industries. This suggests that VC firms are not likely to identify interesting investment opportunities that lie outside their natural investment area. Syndication may be a powerful way to extend the geographic and industrial investment scope of VC firms. Sorenson and Stuart (2001) have shown that the probability that a VC firm invests in a distant or in a dissimilar company increases if there is a syndicate partner with whom it has previously coinvested, and if that syndicate partner is located near the target company. A dense interfirm network may be created through frequently syndicating investments. The network may be viewed as a repository of information that facilitates the dissemination of information across geographic and industry boundaries. In this way, a VC firm increases its investment opportunities in areas it would find difficult to access otherwise. The deal flow motive is therefore more important for VC firms with a broad investment scope that spans geographic and industry boundaries. The likelihood, however, that they will come across interesting opportunities that lie far outside their normal industry or geographic focus is rather small. Specialized VC firms restrict their investments to a small geographic or industry space. This reduces their need to syndicate from a deal flow perspective. Hence,
Hypothesis 2b: The deal flow motive is less important for specialized VC firms than for nonspecialized VC firms.
The Deal Selection Motive
VC firms may syndicate in order to reduce company-specific risk both ex ante and ex post. Ex-ante decision making relates to the selection of investments, whereas ex-post decision making relates to the subsequent management of the investment. Syndicating with the same partners builds trust in their investment appraisal, monitoring, and value-adding capabilities, thereby reducing the need for the VC firm to actively do so (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Wright & Lockett, 2003).
Syndication may be a way to better assess the information provided by potential portfolio companies (Lerner, 1994). The potential for adverse selection may therefore be reduced by syndicating at the deal selection stage, as syndication allows VC firms to obtain better information when evaluating risky investment decisions. From an information processing perspective, different decision makers can increase their information processing capacity to reduce uncertainty (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986).
Bygrave (1987, 1988) shows that syndication is a function of the need to share information. If VC firms syndicate in order to reduce the ex-ante risk, the selection motive will be especially important for projects where an informed second opinion is valuable. This is supported by Lerner (1994), who found evidence that established VC firms syndicate with one another in first-round investments, and they syndicate with less established organizations in later rounds. In cases where VC managers cannot decide outright to accept (high-quality projects) or reject (low-quality projects) an investment proposal, information received from syndicate partners may help to reach a better decision (Brander et al., 2002). Bygrave (1988) shows that uncertainty and willingness to syndicate are positively related. Given that uncertainty and information asymmetry are larger for early stage opportunities than for later stage opportunities, it is likely that the selection motive will be more important for early stage VC firms than for later stage VC firms. Hence,
Hypothesis 3a: The selection motive is more important for early stage VC firms than for later stage VC firms.
Furthermore, it is expected that the selection motive will be less important for firms that primarily act as lead investors compared with firms that have more deals as nonleads. The lead investor may have its own particular skills for selecting and monitoring a specific investment (Wright & Lockett, 2003). When syndicating out a deal as a lead investor, the VC firm signals to syndicate partners that it backs the deal with its reputation. This is important as the lead firm, in the vast majority of cases, has the largest (or joint largest) equity stake in the syndicate (Lockett & Wright, 2001). However, the VC firm that invests in a deal as a nonlead investor may largely rely on the reputation and the selection skills of the lead. Hence,
Hypothesis 3b: The more a VC firm acts as a nonlead investor, the more important the selection motive is.
VC firms, specialized in a specific industry sector, have a deeper understanding of that sector and therefore experience lower informational asymmetries to evaluate opportunities. Given greater in-house knowledge on their target sectors, VC firms that are specialized in a specific sector have a lower need to rely on syndicate partners for selection purposes. The same is true for VC firms, focusing on a smaller geographic region. Geographic distance between a target company and an investor is still a barrier to effect thorough due diligence and to overcome information asymmetries. Reliance on syndicate partners close to the target can help to overcome informational asymmetries (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). The logic of this argument is that VC firms, specialized in a specific industry or geographic area, have a lower need to syndicate for selection purposes than nonspecialized VC firms.
Hypothesis 3c: The selection motive is less important for specialized VC firms than for nonspecialized VC firms.
The Value-Adding Motive
Apart from selection skills, specialized resources may be required for the ex-post management (monitoring and value adding) of investments (Bruining & Wright, 2002; Sapienza et al., 1996). This need for specialist expertise in the ex-post management of portfolio companies can be met by the VC firm's own resource base, by outside industry specialists, or by syndicate partners (Brander et al., 2002). Brander et al. found that Canadian-syndicated VC deals have higher rates of return than stand-alone projects, and argue that the need to access specific resources for the ex-post management of investments, rather than for the selection of investments, is a more important driver of syndication.
There are arguments that early stage VC firms put more emphasis on the value-adding motive than later stage VC firms. VC firms add value when they are able to reduce critical uncertainties for the venture (Sapienza et al., 1996). Given the uncertainties in early stage ventures, VC firms are able to add greatest value to early stage ventures (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al.). All other things being equal, the value-adding motive is therefore be more important for VC firms investing in early stage ventures, as these firms provide more hands-on management and monitoring skills to their portfolio companies than later stage investors. Hence,
Hypothesis 4a: The value-adding motive is more important for early stage VC firms than for later stage VC firms.
Wright and Lockett (2003) argue that lead investors are more actively involved in the management of their investee companies. Given that the reputation and the standing of the lead investor is at stake when syndicating out a deal, a VC firm only takes the lead in a syndicate if it feels reasonably confident that it has the resources and ability to manage the investment. When a VC firm joins a syndicate as a nonlead, however, that firm will normally have a more passive role, relying on the lead investor for managing the relation with the portfolio company (Wright & Lockett, 2003). Consistent with hypothesis 3b, it is expected that the value-adding motive is a more important driver to syndicate for nonlead investors compared with lead investors. Hence,
Hypothesis 4b: The more a VC firm acts as nonlead investor, the more important the value-adding motive is.
Consistent with the argument that specialized VC firms rely less on syndicate partners for screening purposes, we hypothesize that specialized VC firms also rely less on syndicate partners to manage the deal after the investment. VC managers need specific skills and abilities in order to add value to their portfolio companies, and the more industry-specific knowledge they have, the better their value-adding capabilities are (Sapienza et al., 1996). Sapienza et al. have further shown that VC managers spend less time with geographically distant ventures, although their perceived added value does not decrease with distance. We hypothesize that VC firms with a broad sector or geographic scope rely more on syndicate partners to add value and monitor their investments ex post than VC firms that invest in a narrow range of opportunities.
Hypothesis 4c: The value-adding motive is less important for specialized VC firms than for nonspecialized VC firms.
Research Setting and Method
Research Setting and Sample
In order to test our hypotheses, VC syndication practices are studied in six European countries: Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. Our sample thus includes countries in different parts of Europe where the VC industry is long established and industry practices have matured. In the countries included in this study, syndication is most common in Belgium in terms of amounts invested through syndicates (53.9%) (see Table 1). However, the highest proportions of syndicated deals are found in France and Sweden (both 39.9%). In Sweden, the amount syndicated (8.2%) is remarkably lower than the number of deals syndicated (39.9%). Syndication practices in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are low both in terms of amount invested as well as the number of deals, with there having been continual decreases in syndication activity throughout the 1990s (Lockett & Wright, 2001). Syndication activity in Germany is in-between.
In order to understand why VC firms syndicate, a questionnaire was initially designed and pretested with U.K. VC managers, advisors, and academics (Lockett & Wright, 2001). Most studies to date use outcome-based methods (e.g., Brander et al., 2002; Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Lerner, 1994). A specific behavior of VC firms with respect to syndication is observed, and researchers speculate on the underlying motives that may lead to that behavior. By using a questionnaire-based method, we directly asked VC managers the motives for syndicating their deals. We expect, therefore, to get a more profound and subtle insight in some of the reasons for syndication compared with outcome-based studies. As the different theoretical perspectives on syndication were anticipated to be multidimensional, it was deemed necessary to ask respondents a number of questions relating to each of the perspectives. Data on VC firm characteristics gathered from the questionnaire--investment size, stage, and industry preferences--were further supplemented or cross-checked with data from industry directories (EVCA guide and directories of the national VC associations).
The questionnaire was administered by mail to the head offices of all 106 VC firms in the United Kingdom, identified by using the British Venture Capital Association handbook and the Center for Management Buy-Out Research records, in 1998. The questionnaires were then translated into Dutch, French, German, and Swedish. In the other countries covered in this study, questionnaires were sent out in the autumn of 2001. Questionnaires were sent to the following VC firms: 79, Belgian; 120, French; 191, German; 169, Swedish; and 54, Dutch. These firms were identified as VC firms because they were full members of the EVCA or because of their national VC associations. In order to be as complete as possible, some nonmember firms that act as VC firms were added to the sample. In all countries, follow-up was undertaken by sending reminders or by calling the VC firms after 3-6 weeks. Responses were sought from individuals at the level of investment executives upwards. An early pilot study in the United Kingdom (Lockett & Wright, 2001) showed that the issues examined here were generally driven by organization-wide policies and hence, only a single respondent would be able to provide the company-wide perspective.
Response rates were good, ranging from a low of 36% in Germany to a high of 59% in the United Kingdom. The total sample consists of 317 usable responses (44% response rate). More than 90% of the respondents had ever been involved in a syndicate. The representativeness of the sample was tested for each country separately using firm-specific characteristics (minimum and maximum investment preferences and the number of staff members) available from the national and European VC directories. In Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, no significant differences were found between respondent and nonrespondents. In Sweden and the United Kingdom, the respondents' maximum investment preference is significantly larger than that of nonrespondents. Together with the high response rates, this indicates that the sample is representative for the VC industry in the six countries included in the study.
Table 2 gives a description of the sample, after removing three outliers (one VC firm with 3,000 portfolio companies and two VC firms without investment executives). A VC firm employs, on average, 7.7 (median = 5) investment executives and has, on average, 36.4 (median = 15) investments in its current portfolio. Each investment executive thus manages, on average, 5.7 (median = 3.5) portfolio companies. The minimum investment preference is, on average, 2.91 million [euro] (median = 0.50 million [euro]), while the maximum investment preference is, on average, 18.81 million [euro] (median = 5.00 million [euro]). The average age of a VC firm in the sample is 10.4 years (median = 7 years).
In order to test the importance of the motives of interest in this study, the respondents were asked to indicate on 5-point Likert scales how important they find different items in their decision to syndicate deals (see Appendix). In order to test the selection motive, we employed a single item, namely, "the need to seek the advice of other VC firms before investing." The results for the selection motive should therefore be interpreted with caution. We included this item in the factor analysis in order to control for whether it could discriminate between the other motives. The rotated factor analysis revealed that the items load on four factors: a finance motive, a deal flow motive, a selection motive, and a value-adding motive (see Appendix). The internal reliability of the scales is high for three out of the four factors, with Cronbach's alphas of 0.74 for the finance motive (three items), 0.82 for the deal flow motive (two items), and 0.81 for the value-adding motive (five items). (1) The items for these factors were summed and the average was computed. The selection motive did not load on any of these factors and was isolated through a fourth factor in the analysis.
Methods and Independent Variables
Bivariate and multivariate analyses were used to test the above hypotheses. Given that early stage VC firms may be different from later stage VC firms, bivariate nonparametric Mann--Whitney statistics were used to test the difference in importance of the four motives for early stage and later stage investors. We obtain comparable results with parametric t-tests. We further ran multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and ordinal regressions (for the ordinal selection motive), with the motives as dependent variables and VC firm characteristics (cf. infra) as independent variables. The multivariate regressions were run not only on the total sample, but also on the subsample of early stage VC firms on the one hand and of later stage VC firms on the other hand.
The subsamples of early stage and later stage VC firms are constructed as follows. Following Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh (2005), we computed the "average investment stage" variable, reflecting the average stage in which a VC firm invests. We first collected data on the stages in which each VC firm invests: seed, start-up, expansion, and replacement/buy-out investments. Each stage was given a value from 1 for seed investments to 4 for replacement or buy-out investments. The average was calculated for each VC firm by adding these numbers and dividing the total by the number of investment stages in which the VC firm invests (Mayer et al., 2005). For example, a VC firm that invests in the startup and expansion stage will have an average of 2.5 = (2 + 3)/2. The sample was then split up between early stage and later stage investors using this average stage variable. The distribution of the "average investment stage" variable is bimodal, with maxima at 2.5 and 3.5 and a low at 2.66. Therefore, we split the sample into a subsample of early stage VC firms with an average investment stage of 2.5 or lower (n = 128) and a subsample of later stage VC firms with an average investment stage of three or higher (n = 146). We excluded two firms with an average of 2.66.
The characteristics of the subsamples of early stage versus later stage investors are presented in Table 2. To indicate differences between the means of these two groups, t-tests were used. Early stage investors have significantly fewer investments in their portfolio. While early stage investors have, on average, 25.4 (median = 12) investments in their portfolio, later stage investors have, on average, 49.0 (median = 20). The median values for the minimum investment preference (1 million [euro] versus 0.25 million [euro]) and the maximum investment preference (6.9 million [euro] versus 2.5 million [euro]) are, of course, higher for later stage investors compared with early stage investors. The difference in mean for minimum investment preference is marginally significant, whereas the difference in mean for maximum investment preference is highly significant. In order to measure the specialization of the VC firms with respect to industry and geographic region, the respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale how specialized their VC firm's investment preference is in terms of industry sector and geographic region, with 1 = highly unspecialized and 5 = highly specialized. The specialization in terms of geographic scope is, on average, 3.46 on a 5-point Likert scale, while the specialization in terms of industry sector is 3.14 on a 5-point Likert scale. Later stage investors are also significantly less specialized in specific industries and in geographic areas compared with early stage investors. Moreover, early stage investors have a significantly higher propensity to syndicate than later stage investors. Finally, early stage investors are, on average, significantly younger than later stage investors, with an average of 7 years (median = 4 years), compared with 13.6 years (median = 12 years).
Several VC firm characteristics were used in the multivariate regressions. Table 3 gives the correlation between all variables. We have four proxies of VC firm size, either self-reported or taken from industry directories: number of investment executives, number of portfolio companies, and minimum and maximum investment preferences (see Table 2). The correlation between all four size variables is high except between the number of investments in the portfolio and the minimum investment preference (see Table 3). We included, therefore, only one proxy for size in the multivariate analyses, namely, "the maximum investment preference." We also used industry and geographic preferences in the multivariate analyses. Furthermore, we included the average stage variable discussed earlier and the proportion of investments as nonlead. Finally, we included the age of the VC firm and the number of investments per investment executive as control variables, as these might influence the motives for syndication (Jaaskelainen, Maula, & Seppa, 2002).
The Importance of the Four Different Motives
Table 4 shows the importance of the different motives relating to a VC firm's decision to syndicate a deal in the sample as a whole and for the early and later stage VC firms separately. (2)
The traditional finance motive for syndication is significantly more important than the other motives tested in our questionnaire (mean = 3.99; see Table 4). This is the most important motive overall, and for both early and later stage VC firms. If the size of the deal is large compared with the size of the fund, or if additional rounds of financing are expected, then VC firms are more likely to syndicate their deals.
Our data show that the deal flow motive (mean = 2.73) is significantly less important than the finance motive (mean = 3.99) for European VC firms, but is significantly more important than the value-adding motive (mean = 2.50) and the selection motive (mean = 2.36) for the total sample (Table 4). The deal selection motive is a significantly less important motive to syndicate than the finance motive, but is not significantly different from the value-adding motive.
The Finance Motive
An examination of the results of the multivariate analyses indicates that, and in contrast to hypothesis l a, the finance motive is not more important for early stage VC firms than for later stage VC firms. The coefficient in the OLS regression for the total sample is not significant (see Table 5), and the Mann-Whitney test reports no significant difference between the sample of early and later stage investors (see Table 4). The finance motive is the most important motive for syndication (among those tested in this study) for all VC firms, both early stage and later stage: the difference between the finance and all the other motives is highly significant for the total sample and for both subsamples. Hypothesis la is therefore not supported.
The coefficient of the size variable is significantly negative. Consistent with hypothesis 1b, the finance motive is more important for small VC firms than for large VC firms in the total sample regression. The regressions for the two subsamples of early and later stage investors are not significant.
The Deal Flow Motive
Table 4 suggests that the deal flow motive is significantly more important for later stage VC firms than for early stage VC firms. While the deal flow motive is significantly more important than the selection and value-adding motives for later stage VC firms, there is no difference between the importance of these motives for early stage VC firms. The multivariate regressions for the deal flow motive in the total sample and in the sample of later stage investors are not significant (see Table 5). The regressions for the sample of early stage investors are, however, significant. The coefficient for the size proxy is significant and has the expected sign. Hypothesis 2a is therefore supported in the sample of early stage investors: the deal flow motive is more important for larger VC firms. The coefficient of industry specialization is not significant. Hypothesis 2b that states that the deal flow motive is less important for specialized VC firms is therefore not supported.
The Selection Motive
Hypothesis 3a, which states that early stage VC firms syndicate more than later stage VC firms for deal selection purposes, is supported in the bivariate analyses (see Table 4) but not in the multivariate analyses (see Table 5). The coefficient of the average stage variable has, however, the expected sign and a p-value of 0.129. The evidence is thus mixed. The bivariate analyses further suggest that the value-adding motive is marginally more important than the selection motive for later stage VC firms, but not for early stage VC firms. Deal flow, selection, and value adding are equally important motives for syndication for the latter. In the multivariate analyses, the coefficient for the percentage of deals done as nonlead investor has the expected sign and is significant. Hypothesis 3b is therefore supported for the total sample of VC firms. Hypothesis 3b is further supported for the subsamples of early and later stage investors. However, for later stage investors, the regression is only marginally significant. The finding that nonlead investors rely on the selection skills of lead investors is thus mainly driven by the behavior of early stage investors. In the subsample of early stage investors, industry specialization has the expected sign and is significant. The geographic specialization variable is not significant, however. Hypothesis 3c is therefore partially supported for early stage VC firms: the deal selection motive is significantly less important for VC firms that are specialized in a specific industry.
The Value-adding Motive
The bivariate analyses indicate that the value-adding motive is significantly more important for early stage VC firms compared with later stage VC firms (see Table 4). This is also confirmed in the multivariate analyses for the total sample: the coefficient for the average stage variable is significant and negative (see Table 5). However, the regression model for the total sample is only marginally significant. Thus, there is limited support for hypothesis 4a. The coefficient for the percentage of investments undertaken as a nonlead investor is positive and significant for the total sample. Hypothesis 4b is hence supported for the total sample; the more a VC firm invests as a nonlead investor, the more important the value-adding motive will be. This is also supported within the sample of early and later stage VC firms. The coefficient is only marginally significant, however. The value-adding motive is also more important for larger early stage investors, but is less important for larger later stage investors. Again, we should note that both the regression model for later stage and the coefficient for the size proxy are only marginally significant. Our coefficients for industry and geographic specialization are not significant. Hypothesis 4c is therefore not supported.
Motives for Syndication
The study highlights a number of key findings. First, we show that overall VC portfolio management strategy is a major driver of syndication. This driver may have been underestimated in previous studies on syndication behavior. Among the motives considered here, the motives for syndicating a deal are driven much more by finance considerations or, more broadly, by portfolio management considerations, than by the wish to exchange firm-specific resources for selecting and managing specific deals. European VC managers mainly consider syndication as a means to improve the management of their overall portfolio. The main purpose of syndication is to increase portfolio diversification, to allow VC firms to invest in deals that otherwise would be too large, and to improve access to future deal flow. Syndication as a means to improve preinvestment selection of individual deals and to enhance postinvestment monitoring and value adding in specific deals is much less important than other studies suggest.
Our results contrast with those of the majority of studies on syndication in that we find much greater support for financial motives and much less support for deal-specific motives. Although some studies, e.g., Bygrave and Timmons (1992), and Zacharakis (2002), acknowledge that financial considerations are important drivers of syndication, the majority of findings suggests the importance of better decision making (selection) or value adding as motives for driving syndication. Lerner (1994) shows that syndication is a way to better assess the information provided by potential portfolio companies. Syndication thus leads to better deal selection. More recently, Brander et al. (2002) show that syndication leads to higher performance in the portfolio company. They therefore conclude that syndication partners add value beyond those of the lead investors. In the same vein, Jaaskelainen et al. (2002) show that VC executives are able to efficiently manage a larger number of portfolio companies if they syndicate, thanks to additional resources brought in by syndication partners.
Is this an evidence of different syndication behaviors of European and American VC investors? It might well be that European VC managers underestimate the role that syndication may play in accessing information, knowledge, value-adding skills, and deal flow. Our preliminary interviews did not reveal this, though. Rather, the VC managers interviewed expressed the view that they were unlikely to invest in a deal if they did not have confidence in their own knowledge/abilities with respect to a particular deal and its sector. Another explanation for the striking differences between our results and previous studies may be that most studies on syndication have taken the individual deal as a unit of analysis, while this study focuses on the syndication policy of a VC firm. When analyzing why a particular deal is syndicated or not, it is likely that portfolio perspectives (finance and deal flow motives) are less prominent than deal perspectives (selection and value-adding motives).
VC Firm Characteristics That Influence the Motives for Syndication
The finance motive is the most important motive for syndication for both early and later stage VC firms. This is an interesting finding given the emphasis in earlier studies on early stage ventures. While the deal flow, selection, and value-adding motives are equally important for early stage VC firms, there is a clear hierarchy of motives for later stage VC firms. For later stage VC firms, the finance motive is followed by the deal flow motive, which in turn is significantly more important than the value-adding motive, but the latter motive is significantly more important than the selection motive. Value adding is not an important motive for any VC firm. Nevertheless, it is more important for early than for later stage investors. Access to specific skills from syndicate partners in order to improve the management of an individual investment is thus more important for early stage investors than for later stage investors. This is not surprising, as value adding is, in general, more important for early stage investors (Sapienza et al., 1996).
The size of a VC firm has an impact on the reasons to syndicate. We find that the finance motive is less important for larger later stage VC firms. Larger VC firms are less restricted by their fund size in their investment policy. They are able to diversify their portfolio by investing in a larger number of deals, to invest in large deals, and to provide follow-on finance when needed. This explains why larger later stage VC firms syndicate less for financial reasons. Syndication is, however, a strategy for small VC firms to overcome their liability of smallness. We think that this may also partly explain the difference we found between syndication motives in the present and earlier studies. It may be that the European VC firms in our sample are, on average, smaller than those in previous, mostly U.S.-based, studies, and that their smallness explains why financial motives are more important for them. An unexpected finding is the fact that large early stage VC firms put a higher emphasis on the value-adding motive compared with smaller early stage investors, everything else equal. We may expect that larger early stage investors have more in-house knowledge and resources. This calls for further research on the relation between syndication strategies and VC firm size.
The deal flow motive is, on the other hand, more important for larger early stage VC firms than for smaller early stage VC firms. Larger VC firms need to invest in more deals and therefore need to have access to a larger deal flow, everything else equal. (3) Finally, it is rather surprising that the selection and value-adding motives are more important for larger early stage VC firms than for smaller early stage VC firms, controlling for the number of investments per investment executive. One may expect that larger VC firms have more resources and knowledge in-house, all other things being equal, and therefore have a lower need to rely upon selection and value-adding skills of outside partners. This intriguing finding calls for more research.
Neither the industry nor the geographic specialization of a VC firm has an influence on the importance of any of the motives to syndicate except for the selection motive. Nonspecialized early stage VC firms syndicate more for deal selection purposes than specialized early stage VC firms, but not for value-adding purposes. Our lack of more significant findings should be treated with caution, however, as we rely upon a crude measure of VC firm specialization. Research that uses a more refined measure of VC specialization may yield stronger conclusions.
Finally, the more a VC firm syndicates as a nonlead investor, the more important access to specific deal management skills from syndicate partners will be. The selection and value-adding motives are significantly more important when a VC firm acts more as a nonlead investor. In that situation, VC firms rely on their syndicate partners for preinvestment selection and for postinvestment monitoring and value adding. Clearly, lead and nonlead investors syndicate for different reasons.
Implications for Practitioners
This study has implications for both researchers and practitioners. We stress the fact that our results show very similar syndication practices across different European countries. This indicates a high degree of institutionalization of an accepted way of working throughout the European VC industry. This contrasts with findings in earlier studies on the European VC industry, which found important differences in the way VC firms work in different European countries (Manigart et al., 2002; Sapienza et al., 1996). Despite the difference between the market-driven financial system in the United Kingdom on the one hand and the more bank-driven financial system (Black & Gilson, 1998) in the other Continental European countries covered in this study on the other, and notwithstanding the different degrees of maturity of the VC markets in the different countries in our study, our results are remarkably consistent across countries. VC practices have clearly spread across Europe without taking national boundaries into consideration. The VC industry appears to be evolving toward a uniform pan-European industry, with comparable methods of working. It is likely that syndication practices have helped to spread common norms and behavior (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).
We would urge VC managers to formulate explicit strategies with respect to syndication. It seems that VC managers are well aware of the financial benefits that syndication may yield, but they seem to underestimate the importance of additional benefits, such as obtaining access to additional information and skills, building strong and trustworthy networks, and increasing deal flow. We are, however, not blind to the fact that more partners in a syndicate also means more complex managerial issues after the investment has been made and more dilution of ownership (Wright & Lockett, 2003). More research is needed to assess where the optimal trade-off point lies.
Avenues for Future Research
Research on syndication in the VC industry has only recently started to receive attention, although studying syndication behavior in this setting is relevant beyond the VC community. A syndication involves a partnership between two investors, but unlike traditional alliances, there is an important third--independent--party, namely, the portfolio company. This increases the complexity of the situation, as there are potential agency problems between the portfolio company and the lead investor on the one hand, and between the lead and the nonlead investor on the other hand. We call for more research on the different positions of lead and nonlead investors. Little is known about how lead and nonlead investors behave differently (though see Wright & Lockett, 2003). The deal selection process of nonlead investors may be different from that of lead investors. The characteristics of the portfolio company and those of the lead investor may affect the decision of the nonlead to join a syndicate. After the deal is done, the monitoring and value-adding behavior is likely to be affected by the lead or nonlead position of an investor. Finally, VC firms that have a strategy to invest predominantly as lead investors may have different portfolio strategies from those that predominantly invest as nonleads. More research is needed in this area, e.g., on the impact of agency risks, of transaction costs, and of trust on the initiation and subsequent management of a syndicate arrangement.
Further research may also usefully consider the effects of different rounds of investment on the syndication decision. Our research, along with most other research on syndication, has not taken the effect of different rounds of investment into account. For example, VC firms may syndicate for different reasons in the various rounds of an early stage investment. As the venture becomes more established and larger, the deal selection issue may become less important, while value adding and risk diversification may become more important. This may have implications for the type of VC firm that it seeks at each stage. Further, the performance of the venture at the time a new investment round is planned may also have an impact on the type of syndicates that will be formed.
Finally, there is more work to be done on the relation between syndication strategies and performance, both on the level of the portfolio companies and on the level of a VC firm. As stated, the trade-off between the benefits of syndication and the costs associated with managing more complex situations is not well understood yet. We need to know more on the management of syndicates. All this will undoubtedly lead to a better understanding of the fundamental trade-off each VC firm has to make between running the VC firm as either a traditional hands-off financial intermediary on the one hand, where financial risk-return considerations are the most important management criteria, or running it as a hands-on value-added investor.
We conclude by calling for more studies that explicitly take into account the difference in institutional environments in the behavior of VC firms. There is a need to model and to test more specifically the effect of institutional environments on syndication behavior. Comparative research on syndication practices may be especially important as evidence from Venture Economics indicates that over 60% of VC investments in the United States in 2000 were syndicated. This figure compares with EVCA data of 13% in the United Kingdom and 30% across Europe as a whole. (4) Similarly, extending the analysis to compare VC syndication practices between Europe, the United States, and Asia is an interesting avenue for further research. Asian VC markets are developing rapidly (Lockett & Wright, 2002), and previous research has shown that there are important differences between U.S., European, and Asian VC industry practices (Black & Gilson, 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000). For example, the VC market in the United States is more dominated by earlier stage investments than is the case in Europe, while late stage investment is more important in Asia. Investigating similarities and potential differences in syndication motives and propensity may yield interesting insights.</p> <pre> APPENDIX Factor Loadings for Items Used to Calculate the Constructs "Motives for Syndication" How important are the following factors in your decision to syndicate a deal? (Please rate Factor loadings ([dagger]) from 1-5, 1 = very unimportant = 1
2 3 4 ... 5 very important) Finance motive The large size of the deal in proportion to the size of funds available
0.849 0.009 -0.222 -0.026 The requirement for additional
rounds of financing 0.742 -0.014 0.328 -0.061 The large size of the deal in proportion to the firm's average deal size 0.831 0.069 -0.074 0.086 Deal flow motive The possibility of the future reciprocation of deals (deal flow) 0.027 0.911 0.031 0.081 The reciprocation of past deal flow 0.31
0.914 0.086 0.090 Selection motive The need to seek the advice of other VC firms before investing -0.067 0.091 0.884 0.226 Value adding motive The need to access specific skills in order to manage the investments 0.106 0.225
0.368 0.670 Difficulty in bringing in industry experts from outside -0.015 0.060 0.249 0.779 The deal is outside the investment stage(s) in which you usually invest
-0.001 0.097 0.053 0.689 The deal is located outside the industries in which you usually invest
-0.077 -0.057 0.051 0.844 The deal is located outside of the geographic region(s) in which you usually invest
0.039 0.041 -0.058 0.700 Explained variance (%)
18.054 15.885 10.531 25.560 Cronbach's alpha
0.741 0.823 0.824 ([dagger]) Rotation method used is Varimax with Kaiser normalization. </pre> <p>REFERENCES
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Please send to correspondence to: Sophie Manigart, e-mail: email@example.com at Kuiperskaai 55E, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium.
(1.) In order to check the consistency of the data across the countries, we recomputed the scales in the different countries separately. The scales are reliable in all countries.
(2.) Similar analyses were run in each country separately. The importance of the motives to syndicate a deal is consistent across all countries, highlighting the fact that VC practices are very similar in different European countries. This finding strengthens the validity of our approach to pool respondents from the different countries into one sample for further analyses.
(3.) The correlations suggest that larger VC firms, with a higher maximum investment preference, also have more companies in their portfolio.
(4.) One should be careful, however, when comparing U.S. and European figures. As stated, U.S. figures focus on pure early stage VC, while European figures include both early and later stage VC or private equity. As we have shown, early and later stage investors have different syndication strategies.
Sophie Manigart is a full professor at Ghent University and Vlerick Leuven Ghent Management School, Ghent, Belgium.
Andy Lockett is an associate professor a reader in Strategy at Nottingham University Business School, Nottingham, England, United Kingdom.
Miguel Meuleman is a PhD student at Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium.
Mike Wright is a professor of Financial Studies and Director of Centre for Management Buy-out Research at Nottingham University Business School, Nottingham, England, United Kingdom.
Hans Landstrom is Chair in Entrepreneurship and Venture Finance at the Institute of Economic Research, Lurid University School of Economics and Management, Sweden Institute of Economic Research, Lund University.
Hans Bruining is an associate professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
Philippe Desbrieres is a professor at Universite de Bourgogne Institut d'Administration des Entreprises Universite de Bourgogne, Dijon Cedex, France.
Ulrich Hommel is Dean and Chair of Investment and Risk Management, European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel, Germany.
Table 1 Syndication Practices in Different Countries in 2001 (European Venture Capital Association, 2002) ([dagger]) Total investment Amount by VC syndicated (2)/(1) industry (1) (2) % Europe 24,331,362 6,979,829 28.7 Belgium 409,554 220,942 53.9 France 3,286,795 1,403,012 42.7 Germany 4,434,890 1,458,850 32.9 Sweden 2,042,647 168,176 8.2 The Netherlands 1,887,241 422,267 22.4 United Kingdom 6,925,946 1,334,641 19.3 Number of Number of investments investments syndicated (3)/(4) (4) (3) % Europe 3,053 10,672 28.7 Belgium 329 79 24.0 France 1,926 769 39.9 Germany 2,311 866 37.5 Sweden 619 247 39.9 The Netherlands 593 142 23.9 United Kingdom 2,054 281 13.7 All amounts are in 1,000 [euro]. VC, venture capital. Table 2 Venture Capital (VC) Firm Characteristics Total sample N Mean Size Number of investment 303 7.66 executives Number of investments 310 36.40 in current portfolio Minimum investment 281 2,914.60 preference ([dagger]) Maximum investment 275 18,807.66 preference ([dagger]) Investment strategy Average investment 276 2.78 stage ([double dagger]) Investment specialization in terms of (1 = highly unspecialized, 5 = highly specialized) Industry sectors 308 3.14 Geographical regions 306 3.46 Syndication strategy % of investments 279 2.75 syndicated (1 = 0-20% = ... 5 = 80-100%) % of syndicated deals 265 2.26 as nonlead (1 = 0-20% ... 5 = 80-100%) Number of years 312 10.42 in operation Number of investments/ 301 5.69 investment executives Total sample Median SD Size Number of investment 5 9.5 executives Number of investments 15 64.5 in current portfolio Minimum investment 500 10,408.75 preference ([dagger]) Maximum investment 5,000 43,916.57 preference ([dagger]) Investment strategy Average investment 3 0.73 stage ([double dagger]) Investment specialization in terms of (1 = highly unspecialized, 5 = highly specialized) Industry sectors 3 1.40 Geographical regions 4 1.37 Syndication strategy % of investments 3 1.40 syndicated (1 = 0-20% = ... 5 = 80-100%) % of syndicated deals 2 1.33 as nonlead (1 = 0-20% ... 5 = 80-100%) Number of years 7 11.85 in operation Number of investments/ 3.5 7.78 investment executives Early stage VC firms N Mean (c) Size Number of investment 125 5.58 *** executives Number of investments 127 25.40 *** in current portfolio Minimum investment 121 1,633.28 * preference ([dagger]) Maximum investment 122 7,300.38 **** preference ([dagger]) Investment strategy Average investment 128 2.10 *** stage ([double dagger]) Investment specialization in terms of (1 = highly unspecialized, 5 = highly specialized) Industry sectors 128 3.67 **** Geographical regions 126 3.65 ** Syndication strategy % of investments 115 3.20 **** syndicated (1 = 0-20% = ... 5 = 80-100%) % of syndicated deals 106 2.43 ** as nonlead (1 = 0-20% ... 5 = 80-100%) Number of years 128 7.01 **** in operation Number of investments/ 125 5.15 investment executives Early stage VC firms Median SD Size Number of investment 4 5.57 executives Number of investments 12 40.01 in current portfolio Minimum investment 250 11,353.32 preference ([dagger]) Maximum investment 2,500 23,646.79 preference ([dagger]) Investment strategy Average investment 2 0.43 stage ([double dagger]) Investment specialization in terms of (1 = highly unspecialized, 5 = highly specialized) Industry sectors 4 1.38 Geographical regions 4 1.20 Syndication strategy % of investments 3 1.44 syndicated (1 = 0-20% = ... 5 = 80-100%) % of syndicated deals 2 1.38 as nonlead (1 = 0-20% ... 5 = 80-100%) Number of years 4 6.20 in operation Number of investments/ 3 5.69 investment executives Later stage VC firms N Mean (c) Size Number of investment 141 10.05 **** executives Number of investments 145 49.02 *** in current portfolio Minimum investment 144 4,042.74 * preference ([dagger]) Maximum investment 137 29,825.60 **** preference ([dagger]) Investment strategy Average investment 146 3.38 *** stage ([double dagger]) Investment specialization in terms of (1 = highly unspecialized, 5 = highly specialized) Industry sectors 142 2.63 **** Geographical regions 141 3.30 ** Syndication strategy % of investments 131 2.35 **** syndicated (1 = 0-20% = ... 5 = 80-100%) % of syndicated deals 126 2.05 ** as nonlead (1 = 0-20% ... 5 = 80-100%) Number of years 145 13.61 **** in operation Number of investments/ 140 5.98 investment executives Later stage VC firms Median SD Size Number of investment 6 11.79 executives Number of investments 20 79.69 in current portfolio Minimum investment 1,000 9,986.76 preference ([dagger]) Maximum investment 6,947 55,774.08 preference ([dagger]) Investment strategy Average investment 3.50 0.29 stage ([double dagger]) Investment specialization in terms of (1 = highly unspecialized, 5 = highly specialized) Industry sectors 2.50 1.24 Geographical regions 4 1.43 Syndication strategy % of investments 2 1.28 syndicated (1 = 0-20% = ... 5 = 80-100%) % of syndicated deals 1.50 1.24 as nonlead (1 = 0-20% ... 5 = 80-100%) Number of years 12 12.66 in operation Number of investments/ 3.54 8.91 investment executives * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001 ([dagger]) Amount is in 1,000 [euro]. ([double dagger]) The average stage variable was computed following Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh (2005). ([section]) Significance levels are indicated for the differences between the means of early stage versus later stage VC firms (t-test). SD, standard deviation. Table 3 Correlation Matrix 1 2 3 1. Finance motive -- 2. Deal flow motive 0.059 -- 3. Selection motive -0.031 0.172 *** -- 4. Value-adding motive 0.014 0.203 **** 0.370 **** 5. Log (number of 0.121 ** 0.141 ** -0.179 *** investment executives) 6. Log (number of 0.011 0.113 -0.015 investments in current portfolio) 7. Log (minimum -0.185 *** 0.159 *** 0.272 ** investment preference) 8. Log (maximum -0.201 **** 0.150 ** -0.192 *** investment preference) 9. Average investment -0.057 0.142 ** -0.129 ** stage 10. Industry sector 0.040 -0.064 -0.052 specialization 11. Geographical region 0.124 ** -0.056 0.061 specialization 12. % of investments 0.061 0.026 0.275 **** syndicated as nonlead 13. Log (number of -0.047 0.059 -0.075 years in operation) 14. Number of 0.018 -0.027 0.104 * investments/ investment executives 4 5 6 1. Finance motive 2. Deal flow motive 3. Selection motive 4. Value-adding motive -- 5. Log (number of -0.042 -- investment executives) 6. Log (number of 0.036 0.601 **** -- investments in current portfolio) 7. Log (minimum -0.128 * 0.501 **** 0.067 investment preference) 8. Log (maximum 0.074 0.653 **** 0.266 **** investment preference) 9. Average investment -0.169 *** 0.259 **** 0.226 **** stage 10. Industry sector 0.034 -0.014 -0.043 specialization 11. Geographical region 0.020 -0.205 **** -0.060 specialization 12. % of investments 0.143 -0.144 ** 0.026 syndicated as nonlead 13. Log (number of -0.027 0.352 **** 0.579 **** years in operation) 14. Number of 0.038 -0.230 **** 0.454 **** investments/ investment executives 7 8 9 1. Finance motive 2. Deal flow motive 3. Selection motive 4. Value-adding motive 5. Log (number of investment executives) 6. Log (number of investments in current portfolio) 7. Log (minimum -- investment preference) 8. Log (maximum 0.839 **** -- investment preference) 9. Average investment 0.422 **** 0.379 **** -- stage 10. Industry sector -0.165 **** -0.072 -0.393 **** specialization 11. Geographical region -0.224 **** -0.177 *** -0.176 *** specialization 12. % of investments -0.160 ** -0.163 ** -0.110 * syndicated as nonlead 13. Log (number of 0.221 **** 0.153 ** 0.327 **** years in operation) 14. Number of -0.218 **** -0.248 *** 0.065 investments/ investment executives 10 11 1. Finance motive 2. Deal flow motive 3. Selection motive 4. Value-adding motive 5. Log (number of investment executives) 6. Log (number of investments in current portfolio) 7. Log (minimum investment preference) 8. Log (maximum investment preference) 9. Average investment stage 10. Industry sector -- specialization 11. Geographical region 0.078 -- specialization 12. % of investments 0.022 0.052 syndicated as nonlead 13. Log (number of -0.196 **** -0.069 years in operation) 14. Number of -0.134 0.143 ** investments/ investment executives 12 13 1. Finance motive 2. Deal flow motive 3. Selection motive 4. Value-adding motive 5. Log (number of investment executives) 6. Log (number of investments in current portfolio) 7. Log (minimum investment preference) 8. Log (maximum investment preference) 9. Average investment stage 10. Industry sector specialization 11. Geographical region specialization 12. % of investments -- syndicated as nonlead 13. Log (number of -0.060 -- years in operation) 14. Number of 0.168 *** 0.287 **** investments/ investment executives * p < . 10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001 Table 4 Motives for Syndication (1 = very unimportant = ... 5 very important) Wilcoxon signed rank test Z statistics Deal Motive Finance flow Selection Total sample Mean 3.99 2.73 2.36 SD 0.95 1.11 1.14 N 274 274 275 SD 0.92 1.23 0.96 N 57 59 57 Early stage Mean 4.07 2.57 ** 2.48 ** VC firms (a) SD 0.91 1.05 1.14 N 112 110 110 Later stage Mean 3.96 2.91 ** 2.18 ** VC firms (a) SD 0.96 1.15 1.15 N 127 130 130 Wilcoxon signed rank test Z statistics Deal Value flow- Selection- Motive adding finance finance Total sample Mean 2.5 -11.05 *** -12.00 *** SD 1.11 N 250 SD 1.16 N 50 Early stage Mean 2.73 -7.58 *** -7.54 *** VC firms (a) SD 1.10 N 100 Later stage Mean 2.39 ** -7.13 *** -8.53 *** VC firms (a) SD 1.12 N 118 Wilcoxon signed rank test Z statistics Value Deal adding- flow- Motive finance selection Total sample Mean -11.214 *** -3.96 *** SD N SD N Early stage Mean -6.48 *** -0.69 VC firms (a) SD N Later stage Mean -8.22 *** -5.30 *** VC firms (a) SD N Wilcoxon signed rank test Z statistics Deal flow- Selection- value value Motive adding adding Total sample Mean -2.55 ** -1.40 SD N SD N Early stage Mean -0.71 -1.22 VC firms (a) SD N Later stage Mean -3.35 *** -1.74 * VC firms (a) SD N * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .001 ([dagger]) Significance levels are indicated for the differences between the means of early stage versus later stage VC firms (Mann-Whitney tests). VC, venture capital; SD, standard deviation. Table 5 Regression with Motives as Dependent Variable Finance Dependent variable Total Early Later Sample sample stage stage Average investment stage 0.140 -- -- Log (maximum investment -0.206 *** -0.086 -0.292 *** preference) Industry specialization 0.117 0.224 ** -0.030 Geographical region 0.079 0.104 0.031 specialization % of investments syndicated 0.058 0.049 0.038 as nonlead Log (number of years in -0.063 -0.109 -0.044 operation) Number of -0.022 0.130 -0.078 investments/investment executives Significance 0.044 0.281 0.112 Pseudo [R.sup.2] 0.036 0.016 0.042 Deal flow Dependent variable Total Early Later Sample sample stage stage Average investment stage 0.101 -- -- Log (maximum investment 0.072 0.298 *** -0.137 preference) Industry specialization -0.043 -0.090 -0.065 Geographical region -0.041 -0.010 -0.059 specialization % of investments syndicated 0.123 0.139 0.102 as nonlead Log (number of years in 0.039 0.007 0.099 operation) Number of -0.065 -0.111 -0.054 investments/investment executives Significance 0.191 0.042 0.693 Pseudo [R.sup.2] 0.015 0.074 0.037 Selection (a) Dependent variable Total Early Later Sample sample stage stage Average investment stage -0.332 -- -- Log (maximum investment -0.023 0.247 * -0.162 preference) Industry specialization -0.171 -0.389 ** -0.055 Geographical region -0.018 0.035 0.006 specialization % of investments syndicated 0.389 *** 0.397 *** 0.368 ** as nonlead Log (number of years in -0.103 0.004 -0.031 operation) Number of -0.011 -0.003 0.007 investments/investment executives Significance 0.001 0.017 0.070 Pseudo [R.sup.2] 0.114 0.146 0.100 Value adding Dependent variable Total Early Later Sample sample stage stage Average investment stage -0.202 ** -- -- Log (maximum investment 0.047 0.373 *** -0.203 * preference) Industry specialization 0.001 -0.169 0.090 Geographical region -0.017 0.073 -0.055 specialization % of investments syndicated 0.146 ** 0.184 * 0.195 * as nonlead Log (number of years in -0.041 0.023 -0.003 operation) Number of 0.055 -0.103 0.067 investments/investment executives Significance 0.057 0.021 0.092 Pseudo [R.sup.2] 0.035 0.100 0.050 * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 ([dagger]) Since the selection variable is measured with a single item, we use ordinal regression. Pseudo [R.sup.2] is reported instead of adjusted [R.sup.2]
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|Author:||Manigart, Sophie; Lockett, Andy; Meuleman, Miguel; Wright, Mike; Landstrom, Hans; Bruining, Hans; De|
|Publication:||Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice|
|Date:||Mar 1, 2006|
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