Tunner and the Luftwaffe connection with the Berlin Airlift.
On July 28, 1948, a Douglas C-54 "Skymaster" landed at Wiesbaden Air Base and forty-two year old Maj. Gem William H. Tunner stepped out. (1) Tunner was handsome, brilliant, and arrogant; an exceptional and inspiring leader; an efficiency expert, who understood how to make organizations work; and an innovative, original thinker: A workaholic, he labored long hours and drove his staff relentlessly. And he was one thing more. Tunner was the U.S. Air Force's preeminent authority on air transport. (2) During World War II, he had helped found Air Transport Command, the U.S.
Army Air Forces's (USAAF's) global military airline, and he had commanded the "Hump," the legendary airlift from India to China over the Himalayan Mountains. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) in 1948, called him "the transportation expert to end transportation experts" and wrote that Tunner's assignment to the Berlin Airlift was "rather like appointing John Ringling to get the circus on the road." (3)
Tunner came to Germany convinced that the Berlin Crisis was "the first conflict between the free and slave world"; a belief that led him to conclude: "The forces of freedom could not afford to lose ...," (4) and this conviction drove him for the next fifteen months. Tunner quickly realized that the greatest challenge of the Airlift was to fly every minute of every hour of every day regardless of weather, while the second greatest challenge was "proper servicing and maintenance of the airlift planes." (5) The story of the air corridors has been told over and over. How the streams of aircraft flying in and out of Berlin were organized and regulated; how ground controlled approach (GCA) radar allowed around-the-clock operations in the worst of weather; and how tons of cargo were loaded, unloaded, and distributed mostly by hand has been dissected and celebrated. (6) Much less well known is the equally important story of maintenance.
Massive quantities of parts, tools, and equipment and a force of experienced maintenance personnel were required to keep the airplanes flying, and one of the chief obstacles Tunner faced was a desperate shortage of veteran mechanics. This was a worldwide problem for the U.S. Air Force, which had lost thousands of experienced men to civilian life following World War II. The units that began the Airlift were short of people, and a lot of the mechanics on hand were recent recruits. An official USAFE history reported: "Many of the airmen ... had experience in such trades as plumbing and brick laying; few had worked in aircraft maintenance." (7) And another official history added: "Many valuable flying hours were lost because personnel were not sufficiently familiar with equipment to locate sources of trouble and to take corrective action." (8) Inexperienced mechanics doubled even tripled, the time required for maintenance, or could not perform the job at all.
Once before, Tunner had faced a similar problem. As commander of Ferrying Division at the beginning of World War II, he had faced a severe shortage of experienced pilots. Then a famous prewar pilot, Nancy Harkness Love, made him aware of an ignored resource: female pilots. Intrigued and receptive, Tunner helped establish the Women Airforce Sea-vice Pilots (WASPs). The WASPs ultimately delivered thousands of military aircraft to bases across the nation while compiling an exceptional record for safety and reliability. (9) Desperate for experienced mechanics in 1948, Tunner displayed similar open-mindedness.
His autobiography, Over the Hump, tells a dramatic story: "For years the world had heard about the great Luflwaffe; surely the German air force had mechanics," the book has Tunner saying. "[The] idea of augmenting our maintenance forces with German mechanics followed naturally." (10) Tunner faced two hurdles, according to this story. The first was a non-fraternization policy that limited German nationals to mostly menial jobs. Only Gen. Lucius Clay, the U.S. Military Governor, could override this policy, according to the story, and here Tunner ran into the second hurdle. The military chain of command made it impossible to approach Clay directly. Tunner, however, was brash and aggressive and not above creating his own opportunities. According to Over the Hump, he just happened to be at Tempelhof Airport on a routine inspection when Clay just happened to be present on one of his frequent trips:
"He saw me, came over, and asked, "Any problems, Tunner?" "I told him I certainly did have a problem--there weren't enough good maintenance men to go around. "But I think I can whip it," I said, "if you will allow me to hire some skilled German mechanics." "Go ahead and do it, he said. Tell Curt [LeMay] I said it is O.K." (11)
To help Tunner, HQ USAFE located a Maj. Gen. Hans-Detlef Herhudt von Rohden who, according to the Tunner account, not only spoke English but had served in air transport during the war, and the general delivered: "Almost overnight excellent German mechanics started flowing in." According to Over the Hump, the former Luftwaffe mechanics were an instant success! (12)
Over the Hump is a well written, exciting book that rapidly became an air power classic and a standard source for writers dealing with the Berlin Airlift. But Tunner did not actually write Over the Hump. Booton Herndon, a journalist who wrote autobiographies for prominent men such as World War I fighter ace Eddie Rickenbacker, wrote the book for him. Herndon built his narratives around dramatic stories. (13) Major changes, in his accounts, resulted from spectacular, inspiring incidents, not from commonplace, everyday events, and some of these stories must be questioned.
In the case of the former Luftwaffe mechanics: First, the non-fraternization policy was not really the obstacle that Over the Hump alleges. Immediately following the war the U.S. military had made a serious effort to forbid its troops associating with German citizens, but the effort had proven futile and had been pretty much abandoned by 1946. By late 1947, the U.S. Army even had German mechanics repairing its own vehicles. (14) During the Airlift, in fact, the 559th Ordnance Automotive Maintenance Company which supported Rhein Main and Wiesbaden Air Bases had two officers, forty-four American enlisted men, and fifty German mechanics! (15) One must conclude that recruiting veteran German aircraft mechanics was not so extraordinary.
Second, the traditional story in Over the Hump describes General Herhudt yon Rohden as having served in air transport, but the general actually had a much more interesting background. Born in Lower Silesia in 1899, he was an artillery officer who had joined the Lufwaffe in 1934, received flight training secretly in the Soviet Union, and served in various training, administrative, and operational posts. He was wounded in July 1940, and, after returning to duty, became chief of staff of Luftflotte 4 on the Eastern Front, an assignment that had involved him in the unsuccessful airlift operations during the siege at Stalingrad. (16) In mid-1942, Herhudt von Rohden transferred to Luftflotte 1, and at the close of the war he was assigned to the Luflwaffe's Historical Division. (17)
Following the war, Herhudt von Rohden was among the senior officers who wrote historical accounts for the USAAF, detailing Luftwaffe operations against the Soviet Union. By the end of 1945, these men had produced some 600 pages of what American officers considered first-rate historical material. In early 1946, the USAAF brought some of the men to Wright Field, Ohio, to write the history of the Luftwaffe's fight against the Allied bomber offensive, (18) Ultimately, this project produced "forty-five volumes which laid out, in great detail, the 'military mistakes made by German Air Force generals, the clash of strong personalities that proved so detrimental to their success, and the thorough plans, drafted but never executed, tactics employed, principles of air power devised and used, adopted methods of communications, supply and training ... all lucidly and scholarly presented." (19) General Herhudt von Rohden had returned to Germany when HQ USAFE sought his aid.
Third, the account in Over the Hump concludes that employing experienced Luflwaffe mechanics was an immediate success. In fact, Airlift leaders faced many challenges in making the program effective. The language barrier presented a serious obstacle. Indeed, everything hinged upon the ability to comnmnicate. USAFE headquarters organized a translation section, which prepared bilingual training materials, technical orders, maintenance manuals, and inspection check lists, and a USAFE instruction program taught English. A German-speaking U.S. Air Force maintenance officer selected and trained competent supervisory personnel, and bilingual German personnel eventually assumed key positions. Unique U.S. maintenance techniques posed more obstacles, and HQ USAFE established a training program that featured classroom and on-the-job instruction. Two Mobile Training Units proved especially valuable. Local efforts were critical, and each base set up its own school. (20) The propeller shop at Erding Air Force Depot, for example, went further, pairing German mechanics with Air Force enlisted personnel for on-the-job training. (21) In reality, U.S. Air Force military personnel were reluctant to accept German mechanics at first. Reservations only disappeared as the men demonstrated professional competence and as the translated technical materials appeared. (22) The program was far from an instant success. Trust, confidence, and teamwork had to be nurtured and took time to grow.
Other concerns appear to have existed more in the minds of Airlift leaders than in reality. For one, some leaders worried that the presence of former Luflwaffe personnel would offend the flight crews, many of whom had flown in combat and had seen their friends and squadron mates die. Thus, initially, Airlift leaders limited German mechanics to "scheduled maintenance," which was accomplished well away from the flightline. This concern lingered on. As late as April 1949, when some Airlift officers sought to expand the use of German mechanics to "unscheduled," flight line maintenance, other officers opposed this step because it might bring the mechanics into direct contact with the aircrews. (23) It must be noted that resentment existed on the Berlin Airlift. Some U.S. airmen did find the need to help former enemies at their own inconvenience difficult to accept, but the evidence suggests that the concern described above was unwarranted.
Likewise, Airlift leaders agonized over the possibility of sabotage, and again, available evidence demonstrates that they worried unnecessarily. Airlift units reported only twenty-seven cases of suspected sabotage in fifteen months of operations, and, of these, only four reports proved valid. In other words, sabotage on the Berlin Airlift was virtually nonexistent. (24) An inspection team in early 1949, in fact, concluded that: "Apparently there is more sabotage or what looks like sabotage in Texas and California than in Germany." (25)
Most histories of the Berlin Airlift treat the problems with maintenance as solved by the late fall of 1948, but in reality the Airlift faced a major crisis in early 1949, when USAFE established a fixed tour of duty for personnel in Germany, replacing the temporary tour of duty which had caused serious morale problems. This change, however, led to another problem: hundreds of experienced men became eligible to return to the U.S. all at once. (26) Airlift leaders feared a catastrophe. Replacements, when and if they arrived, might not equal those lost "either in the case of numbers or know how." (27) On April 5, 1949, Col. T. Ross Milton, Chief of Staff of the Airlift, flatly stated: "We are now more concerned with maintenance than with operations." (28)
Airlift leaders responded by asking those eligible for rotation to volunteer to stay in Germany, but this effort failed. Out of 6,100 enlisted men scheduled to return to the U.S. in early 1949, only 19 agreed to remain. (29) The Airlift then offered special inducements. For example, General Tunner himself promised that those willing to volunteer to remain could return to their original permanent duty station rather than be reassigned arbitrarily to some base anywhere. This offer, too, found few takers. (30) The solution to the problem was at hand, though. Airlift leaders assigned German mechanics to every part of the Airlift. (31) Thus, while the mechanics first appeared in September 1948, the number employed increased dramatically early in 1949, and these men essentially solved the Airlift's manpower crisis. (32)
At the same time the German mechanics also helped address another concern. In early 1949, flight surgeons began reporting cases of extreme stress among the aircrews. The shortage of parts and uncertainty about qualified maintenance personnel threatened the safety and reliability of the aircraft they flew and this situation worried the airmen. Expanding the presence of experienced German mechanics proved an effective antidote. Col. Luther Harris, Director of Aircraft Maintenance, reported that German civilian technicians gave the flight crews confidence and alleviated worries about their aircraft. (33)
The number of former Luftwaffe mechanics employed on the Berlin Airlift remains uncertain. The best figure I have is from an undated chart in the William Tunner Papers at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. According to this chart, 1,114 German mechanics were assigned to the 1st Airlift Task Force. (34) This figure presents two problems, however. First, the source is unknown. Second, it might also include other German citizens doing maintenance type work. Still, it is the best figure that I have for now.
Other statistics are indicative, but imprecise. One USAFE history, for example, states that each base had a quota of fifty German mechanics, and that number later increased to sixty-five per base. The Airlift used seven bases, thus yielding a possible total of 455 mechanics. This figure seems extremely low, however, especially when compared with the statement in Over the Hump that eighty-five German mechanics were assigned to each squadron. (35) The Airlift had twenty-eight aircraft maintenance squadrons of various types, thus yielding a possible total of 2,380 mechanics. Other figures are equally imprecise and subject to interpretation: In October 1948, the 7210th Maintenance Group at Erding reported that its workforce of 1,506 included 850 German employees. A significant number of these were mechanics, according to the report, but it fails to provide a number. (36)
As for our Allies, the chart cited above credits the Royal Air Force (RAF) with no German mechanics at all, (37) and a draft "lessons learned" report asserts that the RAF did "not believe in the advisability of using [German] nationals." (38) However, a photograph caption in a history of the Airlift which reads: "German mechanic" calls this evidence into question. The mechanic in the photo is servicing an in-line aircraft engine and only RAF aircraft had inline engines. Air Marshal T. M. Williams, Air Officer Commanding, British Air Force of Occupation, offered an explanation when he wrote: "Nith our own tender regard for the Potsdam Agreement and preference for self-dilusion [sic] we refer to them as aircraft cleaners," but, he acknowledged: "They are all ex-Luftwaffe technical personnel ..." (39) The RAF did employ former Luftwaffe mechanics, but apparently would not or could not acknowledge their presence.
The same chart credits the French Air Force with fifty-eight German mechanics. (40) The French Air Force flew the Berlin Airlift for a time, and among the French aircraft were at least three German-designed, French-built Junkers JU-52 transports. Given these aircraft, the presence of former Luftwaffe mechanics is unsurprising. (41)
In summary, it is important to emphasize that aircraft maintenance was absolutely critical to the Berlin Airlift. A famous pilot offers his testimony: "I often state that it wasn't the pilots that were so important," Gaff Halvorsen wrote to me recently. "Most of my talks emphasize that there would have been no aircraft over Berlin if it hadn't been for the aircraft mechanics." (42) Based on my own work, I believe that former Luftwaffe mechanics comprised a higher percentage of the maintenance force on the Berlin Airlift than has been recognized until now, and they, thus, made a major contribution to the success of the Airlift. We do not have precise figures, but I hope someday, somewhere, in some repository to find a folder labeled "Luftwaffe Mechanics" that will answer all my questions. Until then, I conclude that the Berlin Airlift was very much an Allied victory: American, British, French, and German.
As for General Tunner, his willingness to accept former enemies on an equal basis with his own mechanics reflects credit on his open-mindedness and demonstrates his determination to fulfill his mission. Tunner ultimately became a legend in the history of global air transport. Following the Airlift, he went to Asia to command Combat Cargo Command, which provided unparalleled air logistical support for United Nations troops fighting in Korea. Tunner then returned to Germany to lead USAFE. In 1956, West Germany formed the new Bundesluftwaffe actively assisted by the U.S. Air Force. On May 30, 1956, when the first class of German pilots graduated from Primary Training at Landsberg Air Base, Bavaria, Lieutenant General Tunner personally spoke at the ceremony. (43) Subsequently, Tunner took command of the U.S. Air Force's Military Air Transport Service a position he held until his retirement on June 1, 1960. During that time his colorful advocacy of global military air logistics and for development of the giant, jet-powered air transport aircraft whose descendants would serve the U.S. Air Force and the Free World into the Twenty-first Century earned him the nickname "Mr. Airlift," invented by Congressman L. Mendel Rivers. (44)
(1.) This paper was presented during a conference sponsored by Das Alliierten Museum, held in the former restaurant, at Tempelhof Airport in Berlin, Germany, on May 4, 2009. It is published with the permission of Dr. Hehnut Trotnow, Museum Director. The author wishes to thank Yvonne Kinkaid, Terry Kiss, Capt. Douglas Lantry, and Jean Mansavage, Air Force Historical Studies Office, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.; Daniel F. Harrington, Air Combat Command History Office, Langley AFB, Virginia; John D. Weber, Air Force Material Command History Office, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Kathy S. Gunn, Air Mobility Command History Office, Scott AFB, Illinois; Phillip F. Whigham, USAFE History Office, Ramstein AB, Germany; Prof. Robert Slayton, Chapman University, Orange, California; Joerg Muth, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Col. Wolfgang W. E. Samuel, USAF Ret., Independent Scholar, Fairfax Station Virginia; and Captain Berger, Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsam (MGFA), Potsdam, Germany, for their invaluable assistance.
(2.) Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1948 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), p. 87.
(3.) Curtis E. LeMay (with McKinley Kantor), Mission With LeMay: My Story (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 416.
(4.) William H. Tunner, Over the Hump: The Story of General William H. Tunner, the Man Who Moved Anything, Anytime, Anywhere, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1964), p. 160.
(5.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1948: Supply and Operational Aspects" (HQ USAFE, Apr 1, 1949), p. 90.
(6.) See, for example, the extensive discussions in Miller, To Save a City; Daniel F. Harrington, "The Air Force Can Deliver Anything!": A History of the Berlin Airlift (Ramstein AB, Germany: USAFE Office of History, May, 1998); Frank Donovan, Bridge in the Sky (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1968); Richard Collier, Bridge Across the Sky: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978); Thomas Parrish, Berlin in the Balance: The Blockade, the Airlift, The First Major Battle of the Cold War (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1998); Michael Haydock, City Under Siege: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949 (London: Brassey's, 1999); Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (New York: Atheneum, 1988).
(7.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1949: Supply and Operational Aspects" (HQ USAFE, Feb 8, 1950), p. 59.
(8.) Rpt, "Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary, 26 June 1948-30 September 1949" (Ramstein AB: HQ USAFE, 1949), p. 95.
(9.) Tunner, Over the Hump, pp. 34-39.
(10.) Ibid., p. 182.
(11.) Ibid., p. 183.
(13.) W. David Lewis, Eddie Rickenbacker: An American Hero in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 543-44.
(14.) A political guide that accompanied Combined Chief of Staff (CCS) 551 directed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to establish a policy of non-fraternization between his troops and German nationals. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) issued orders implementing this policy and attempted to enforce them with great effort and limited success. The policy of non-fraternization broke down quickly. See Earle F. Ziemke, The US. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), pp. 97-98, 321-27.
(15.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1949," p. 34.
(16.) Joel S. A. Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the West, 1942-1943 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), p. 142; E-Mail, Captain Berger, MiIitaergeschictliches Forschungsaint, Potsdam, to Dr. Roger G. Miller, AF/HOH, subj: "Your Inquiry, February 12th, 2009, ref.-no.: 09-240, dtd: February 17, 2009, 9:28 am (In author's files.); Wolfgang J. Hushke, The Candy Bombers: The Berlin Airlift 1948/49 The Technical Conditions and Their Successful Transformation, 2d ed. (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2008), p. 212.
(17.) Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad, p. 263; Memo, Col. Donald L. Putt, General Intelligence (T-2), to Cored. Gen., USAAF, subj: German Air Force Officers in Operation OVERCAST, 22 Jan 1946, in appendix to Harriet Bayer and Edna Jensen, History of AAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945-March 1947 (Exploitation of German Scientists (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Air Material Command, August 1948). See also Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists and Project Paperclip, 1945-1990 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 31. Hunt is incorrect in her comments about Colonel (later General) Putt, however. He supervised the program at Wright Field, but the decision to bring former German officers to Ohio was made at a much higher level. See the letter cited in the following footnote.
(18.) Ltr, Gen. Carl Spaatz, Cmd., USAAF, to UndSecArmy Kenneth C. Royall, 18 Dec 1945, in appendix to Bayer and Jensen, "History of AAF Participation in Project Paperclip".
(19.) History of Operation Lusty (HQ USAFE, 8 January 1946), Pt. 1, pp. 15-16, quoted in Wolfgang W.E. Samuel, American Raiders: The Race to Capture the Luftwaffe's Secrets (Jackson: The University Press of Mississippi, 2004), pp. 121-22.
(20.) Rpt, Combined Airlift Task Force, "Preliminary Analysis of Lessons Learned," June 1949, p. 23; Rpt, "Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary," p. 95.
(21.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1948," p. 117.
(22.) Rpt, "Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary," p. 243.
(23.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1949," pp. 95-96.
(24.) Rpt, "Preliminary Analysis of Lessons Learned," p. 22. The belief is that disgruntled U.S. airmen involuntarily assigned to Germany were the perpetrators of any sabotage that took place.
(25.) Rpt, " Bobwhite [sic] Study of Aircraft Maintenance & Maintenance Management, Combined Airlift Task Forces," 13 Feb-6 Mar 1949, Frame 895, Microfilm Roll 34921, Gen. William H. Tunner Papers, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala.
(26.) Harrington, "The Air Force Can Deliver Anything!'" p. 81.
(27.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1949," p. 92.
(28.) Ibid., p. 95.
(29.) Harrington, The Air Force Can Deliver Anything!, pp. 81-82. Germany had been devastated during the war and almost every necessity including housing and food was in short supply. In contrast to conditions in the 1950s and 1960s, there were few comforts to attract or keep American personnel who just wanted to get home.
(30.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1949," pp. 242-43.
(31.) Ibid., p. 92.
(32.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1948," p. 243.
(33.) Memo, Col. Luther Harris to Chief of Staff, subj: Comments on Aeromedical Survey Performed by USAF Surgeons, n.d., Frame 906, Microfilm Roll 34921, Gen. William H. Tunner Papers, AFHRA.
(34.) Table: "Personnel," Frame 494, ibid.
(35.) Rpt, "Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary," p. 134; Tunner, Over the Hump, p. 183.
(36.) Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1948," p. 113fn. Erding performed depot-level maintenance on engine accessories, propellers, instruments, electronic components, and similar items. Memo, "Supply and Maintenance Procedures for Airlift Task Force (Prov.), 13 August 1938, attach to Hist, "USAFE and the Berlin Airlift, 1948," Appendix V.
(37.) Table: "Personnel," Frame 494, Microfilm Roll 34921, Gen. William H. Tunner Papers, AFHRA.
(38.) Memo, subj: "Points of Disagreement on Preliminary Analysis of Lessons Learned," 26 July 1949, Frame 265, ibid.
(39.) Rpt, "Use of German Nationals," Frame 259, ibid. This page may be part of the document by Air Marshall T. M. Williams at frames 257-258.
(40.) Table, "Personnel," Frame 494, ibid.
(41.) Ibid.; Miller, To Save a City, pp. 75-76.
(42.) E-Mail, Col. Gail Halvorsen, USAF Ret., to Dr. Roger. G. Miller, HQ USAF/HOH, subj: "On to Tempelhof!!", 11:34 a.m., March 17, 2009 (In author's files).
(43.) Hist, 7351st Flying Training Wing (MDAP), January l-June 30, 1956, pp. 11-12, Frames 1492-1526, Microfilm Roll P0268, AFHRA; See also James S. Corum, "Starting from Scratch: Establishing the Bundesluftwaffe as a Modern Air Force, 1955-1960," Air Power History (Summer 2003), pp. 16-29; Col. Clarke Newlon, "Luftwaffe Flies Again," Pegasus (December 1957), pp. 1-9.
(44.) Obituary, "William H. Tunner, Berlin Airlift Chief," The Washington Times, April 8, 1983; Miller, To Save a City, p. 93.
Roger G. Miller is Deputy Director of the Air Force Historical Studies Office, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. Dr. Miller earned degrees at North Texas State University, and his doctorate at Indiana University, in Bloomington. Dr. Miller entered the Air Force history program in 1980. He has served as a historian at Lowry Technical Training Center, Denver, Colorado; HQ Air Training Command, Texas; HQ, 17th Air Force, Federal Republic of Germany; and HQ, U.S. Air Force in Washington, D.C. Dr. Miller writes, publishes, and lectures widely on many aspects of history. His primary areas of interest include air logistics, air transportation, and early military aviation history. Dr. Miller's book, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949, was published by Texas A&M University Press in November 2000, and his articles and reviews have appeared in numerous professional journals. His contributions to the Air Force History monograph series include A Preliminary to War: The 1st Aero Squadron and the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916 and Billy Mitchell: Stormy Petrel of the Air, both published in 2004. His most recent contribution to the monograph series is "Like a Thunderbolt": The Lafayette Escadrille and the Advent of American Pursuit in World War I published in 2007.
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|Title Annotation:||William H. Tunner|
|Author:||Miller, Roger G.|
|Publication:||Air Power History|
|Date:||Dec 22, 2009|
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