Trust among militants in wireless sensor network.
WSN are adhoc networks, consisting of spatially distributed devices also called as motes using sensor nodes (SN) to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions at different locations. Devices of WSN are resource constrained such as low processing speed, storage capacity etc. Since the SNs are battery powered, available energy limits the overall operation in certain applications. The main factors in designing WSN applications are sustaining network functionality without interruption, possibility to enlarge and reduce the network, selecting suitable deploying location of SNs and network lifetime to be maximized [6, 9].
The military areas are more detached and increasingly difficult to monitor. Addition to this, military operations are held more in urban deployment locations. To adhere to such locations, the military environment requires a sensor system which securely sense and send the information to Mobile Sink (MS). Also communication among militants must be secure and authenticated.
The mote used in sensor network is a small, low cost, low power computer. Efficient radio link is necessary to connect mote to outside world. The most common radio link allows a mote to transmit at a distance of something like 10 to 200 feet i.e., 3 to 61 meters. Power consumption, size and cost are the barriers to longer distance. All of the motes in an area create a giant, amorphous network that can collect data. Motes can run on batteries or they can make their existence in power grid. The processing inside motes are in four stages namely collecting the data, processing the data, packaging of data and communicating the data [7, 8]. After collecting the data, motes will process the data using electronic brain and then pack them as usable format. This process is called enveloping. The performance of motes is analyzed in terms of metric size, cost, power usage, data rate, radio outdoor range, memory management, receive sensitivity, networking protocols and supporting operating system. Thus in military applications, motes deployed in various locations can detect unwanted occurrences and forward to neighborhood mote which in turn to commander.
In military network, the communication among militants must be all time secure and authenticated. Thus this paper further focuses on designing a prototype 'Trust among Militants' which would enhance the secrecy and efficient communication among militants. TAM prototype is developed based on DKO and PTAP mechanism. Table 1.
Discuses the different components of motes which enable to understand memory and throughput utilization. Table 2. Shows the operating systems of all motes with its transmission capabilities. () inferred that Tiny Node is better among all the motes due to less energy consumption and similar communication abilities.
This paper is organized as follows, section 2 discusses related works, section 3 presents TAM prototype, section 4 discusses about how DKO and PTAP is applied to TAM. Section 5 deals the predictable performance of TAM. Section 6 describes future enhancement and section 7 summarizes the conclusion.
2. Related Work:
2.1 Military Network using CP-ABE:
Junbeon Hur et al, discussed about ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) which is a data retrieval scheme. Several security and privacy challenges such as attribute revocation, key escrow and coordination of attributes issued by different authorities are taken as objective function . CP-ABE which has multiple authorities to manage their attributes is applied to disruption tolerant military network. Communication cost is analyzed when comparing with several multi authority CP-ABE schemes.
2.2 Security Architecture for WSN:
David Boyle et al, (2008) discuses about various security architectures which are necessary for potential network designers. Encryption and authenticity was the primary concern . Security architectures are reviewed, contrasted and compared based on their individual characteristics. Authors started with SPINS, a suit of security protocol which incorporates secure network encryption protocol (SNEP) and pTesla runs on TinyOS operating system. TINYSEC, link layer security architecture is based on semantic security. Localized encryption and authentication protocol (LEAP) is a key management protocol dealing with security requirement for different messages propogated inside the network. Authors concluded that symmetric key cryptography is preferably suitable for security in WSN for indeed applications.
2.3 Tired Architecture for Military Surveillance:
Louise Lamont et al, (2011) present a tiered WSN architecture for military surveillance applications. SASNet architecture comprises of SNs, fusion nodes and management nodes in a three tier hierarchy . Monitoring and sensing activities are done by SNs in tier 1. Fusion nodes in tier 2 are responsible for database synchronization, cluster formation, application logic formation and commanding. Tier 3 comprises of management node providing global view for operational control and system management. Authors concluded that tiered architecture results in agile surveillance system with upgraded flexibility and usability.
2.4 Public Key Cryptography in Military Environment:
Rajat Gupta et al., discusses about public key cryptography applicable to military environment. There are three phases namely key establishment phase, neighbor discovery phase and secure communication phase . Elliptical curve cryptography is used in key establishment since the key length has efficient security level. Neighbor discovery is initiated by handshake protocol by flooding the HELLO packets so that the reply is received from directly connected neighbors. Symmetric link is established in third phase. Security is analyzed in terms of resilience against node capture, node replications, attacks, scalability etc.
3. Problem Defnition:
Various related works have been studies and the basic objective function was analyzed. Militants in different battalion forces are unknown to each other and thus secure communication is needed between them to ensure confidentiality in battlefield related information. The following target issues are considered to develop a prototype 'TAM' for military environment.
1. Key deployment to militants embedded with SNs from Mobile Sink (MS).
2. Secure pairwise key establishment.
3. Authentication among militants.
4. Secure data transmission using encryption and decryption.
4. Trust Among Militants (Tam):
The prototype TAM shows 3-tier security among militants. Base Station (BS) in tier 1 receives information from MS in tier2. MS is responsible for generating random keys and store it in Key Pool (KP). Subsets of random keys are assigned to each battalion force (group of militants with SNs). Key generation and pairwise key establishment between militants is done by DKO methodology. Every militant are authorized and secure data communication between militants is ensured by PTAP methodology.
4.1 DKO and PTAP in TAM:
DKO is the process of performing pairwise key establishment using pair key generation process and group configuration methodology. Groups are formed by factorial arrangement. The main constraint is every group will be provided with one common key and one random key. Analytical results proved that DKO generates less number of keys than existing key pre-distribution schemes. Assuming nodes [n.sub.1] and [n.sub.2] for establishing a pairwise key, let [K.sub.p] denote the initial key pool value that has been allocated for various groups under the mobile sink and let x, y, z be the chosen parameter denoted by [C.sub.p] given by MS. The values of [K.sub.p], [C.sub.p] and the common key of each group are given as inputs to the hash function g. It is proven that
[K.sub.x6,x5] = [K.sub. x5,x6] = [g.sub.x5] ([x.sub.6]) = [g.sub.x6] (x5) (1)
will have similar values. Thus, SNs n1 and n2 have established a pairwise key.
PTAP is the process for node evaluation, key generation and authentication. To achieve this, trust based routing is established based on trust threshold value of sensor nodes in random topology. This threshold value includes trust node recommendation, Reliability factor, packet forwarding and sending rate calculation. Including this, symmetric encryption and decryption method is also done for identifying and isolating the malicious nodes, packet integrity and node authentication in network. Simulation results shows that the PTAP provides better packet delivery ratio, low end to end delay, high link reliability rate, more network stability rate and less control overhead than existing schemes.
Further when the above said DKO is applied to TAM, Each battalion force is considered as one group. The MS in military vehicle is responsible for generating random keys and deployed to each battalion force. Among the deployed random keys, each battalion force will be provided with one common key ie., each militant will have a pair of key comprising of one common key and one random key. Any two militants within same battalion establish communication using pairwise key where both militant will be having same common key. This is called as direct path establishment. If the militant needs communication with a militant in another battalion then path key establishment is initiated. The path is constructed by one or more hops from source to destination in which pair keys of each link having one common key.
By Applying PTAP to TAM, Initially trust threshold value is maintained among SN of each militant. If any militant's SN falls below the trust threshold value, then the particular militant is not authenticated person. Trust threshold value includes packet arrival rate, packet sending rate, packet forwarding rate, reliability factor, node recommendation and node proposal. Once the malicious militant is identified and legitimate militants are authenticated, key generation process initiated where it gets input from DKO. Finally encryption is performed for transmission of messages between militants.
A [right arrow] B : M, A, B, [E.sub.KAT] ([N.sub.A], M, A, B) (2)
B [right arrow] T: M, A, B, [E.sub.KAT]([N.sub.A], M, A, B), [E.sub.KBT]([N.sub.B], M, A, B) (3)
T [right arrow] B : [E.sub.KAT] ([N.sub.A], k),[E.sub.KBT]([N.sub.B], k) (4)
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Trusted node B (militant 1) interacts with trusted server (MS in military vehicle) and node A (militant 2). KAT and KBT are the pairwise key between A & T and B & T respectively. NA and NB are the nonces chosen by A and B. M is the second nonce chosen by A which serves as a transaction identifier.
Based on simulation performance of PTAP, the proposed prototype TAM can withstand the chosen cipher text attacks, Sybil attack, sink hole attack and other passive attacks etc. In previous military security models, there was no reliability on trust management system. PTAP is simulated with Network Simulator tool (NS 2.34). In our simulation, 100 sensor nodes move in a 1300 meter x 1300 meter square region for 100 seconds simulation time. We assume each node moves independently with the same average speed. All nodes have the same transmission range of 200 meters. The simulated traffic is Constant Bit Rate (CBR). Simulation results of PTAP ensure that TAM is an efficient prototype for implementing in real test beds of military environment. Our simulation settings and parameters are summarized in table 1. Performance is evaluated according to following metrics.
Average end-to-end delay:
The end-to-end-delay is averaged over all surviving data packets from the sources to the destinations.
Average Packet Delivery Ratio:
It is the ratio of the number of packets received successfully and the total number of packets transmitted.
It is defined as the number of epochs delivered to destination based on node battery.
Network Stability Rate:
Number of nodes are stable during high mobility environment.
Link Reliability Rate:
Packet integrity is maintained through the links to destination.
Ratio of control packets to the data packets received.
Specification For Tam:
Analysis of popular motes results in choosing Tiny Node for military surveillance system due to average distance coverage. The essential specification of Tiny Node is given below in table.4. Some precise activities in military environment need different types of sensors such as IR sensors, Flame sensors, Magnetic and Vibration sensors.
These sensors will be beneficial in certain deployment places in battlefield. IR sensors are circuits which provide binary output and good for detecting the proximity of an obstacle and not the range. This cheapest IR sensor can be plotted in battlefield in order to predict the nearest obstacle. It might be useful in predicting harmful obstacles in prior distance and can be intimated to nearest militant's sensor. Flame sensor is used for short range fire detection. This is opted for military battlefield due to less power consumption which is less than 10 microamps. Magnetic sensor is used for vehicle detection where the change of earth's magnetic field, caused by the movement of passing vehicle is measured. Vibration sensor is used for condition monitoring of a motor. The imbalance or misaligned motors (motor gun or other instruments used by militant) are intimated to nearest militant's SN as high energy vibration signal at the frequency in the range of 50 Hz. Accelerometer is one among the vibration sensor.
Security plays a vital role in military surveillance system. The deployed SNs have great influence of physical attack and other security attacks. The prototype 'TAM', when applied to military environment will result in efficient and secure communication among militants. This could be achieved by DKO and PTAP. TAM makes resourceful key pre-distribution with generation of less number of keys using DKO. The SNs of militants are authenticated and the secrecy of data is maintained using PTAP. TAM will results in resilience against node capture since the data is encrypted using pairwise key.
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(1) M. Raghini, (2) N. Uma Maheswari and (3) R. Venkatesh
(1) Department of Computer Science & Engineering, K L. N. College of Engineering,Sivagangai District, Tamilnadu, India.
(2) Department of Computer Science & Engineering, PSNA College of Engineering & Technology Dindigul, Tamilnadu, India.
(3) Department of Information Technology, PSNA College of Engineering & Technology Dindigul, Tamilnadu, India.
Received 27 May 2016; Accepted 28 June 2016; Available 12 July 2016
Address For Correspondence:
M. Raghini, Department of Computer Science & Engineering, K. L. N. College of Engineering, Sivagangai District, Tamilnadu, India. Tel: 91-9655341426; E-mail: email@example.com
Table 1: CPU, Memory, Frequency Range and Data Rate S.NO MOTES Microcontroller Program+Data Memory 1 MicaZ ATMEGA128 TI 4K RAM 2 TelosB MSP430 10K RAM 3 IRIS ATMEGA128 TI 8K RAM 4 SHIMMER MSP430F1611 TI 10K RAM 5 TinyNode MSP430 8K RAM 6 Sun SPOT ARM920T 512K RAM 7 Cricket ATMEL128L 128K+4K+4K 8 LOTUS NXPLPC1758 64K SRAM S.NO External Frequency Datarate(kbps) memory 1 128K 2.4 GHZ 250 2 48K 2.4-2.4835 GHZ 250 3 128K 2.4 GHZ 250 4 48K 2.4-2.4835 GHZ 250 5 512K 868-870 MHZ 152.3 6 4MB 2.4-2.4835 GHZ 250 7 512K 433 MHZ 250 8 512K 2405-2480MHZ 250 Table 2: Operating system and Transmission capabilities S.NO MOTES Transeiver Operating System 1 MicaZ TI Chipcon TI TINY OS,MOTE RUNNER 2 TelosB TI CC2420 TINY OS,SOS,MANTISOS 3 IRIS AT86RF230 TINY OS,MOTE RUNNER 4 SHIMMER SHIMMER SR7 (TICC2420) TINY OS 5 TinyNode CC2420 TI TINY OS 6 Sun SPOT Chipcon CC 2420 TI SQUAWK JAVA ME 7 Cricket Chipcon 868/916 MHZ TINY OS 8 LOTUS CC2420 RTOS,TINY OS S.NO Transmitter Power Outdoor Range 1 -(24) dBm -0dBm 75-100 m 2 -(24) dBm -0dBm 75-100 m 3 3 dBm (typ.1) >300 m 4 -(24) dBm -0dBm ~100 m 5 upto +12dBm firstname.lastname@example.org kbps 6 -(24) dBm -0dBm ~100 m 7 3 dBm (typ.) 30 m indoor 8 3 dBm (typ.) 100 m Table 3: Simulation Settings and Parameters No. of Nodes 100 Area Size 1300 X 1300 Mac 802.11 Radio Range 200m Simulation Time 100 sec Traffic Source CBR & Poisson Packet Size 512 bytes Mobility Model Random Way Point Protocol LEACH Table 4: Specification of TinyNode mote Processor MSP 430 Radio chip XE 1205 Flash 4MB Sensors Light Temperature Frequency of Operation 868-870 MHz Transmit Power 0 to +12 dBm Maximum Data rate 152.3 Kbps Max Range 200m @ 76.8 Kbps Power Consumption 25mA @0dBm 62mA @ +12 dBm Interface Serial Operating system TinyOS Cost $180
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|Author:||Raghini, M.; Maheswari, N. Uma; Venkatesh, R.|
|Publication:||Advances in Natural and Applied Sciences|
|Date:||Jun 30, 2016|
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