The Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP), headed by the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) can help security professionals understand both documents. Defense Industrial Security Program (DISP) contractors will find various DOD publications, like the Industrial Security Letter and the Security Awareness Bulletin useful vehicles to learn more about the treaties.
The Chemical Weapons Convention. The CWC contains the most aggressive provisions of any arms control agreement to date. The multi-national convention forbids member nations to develop, produce, stockpile, or use chemical weapons. The 130 signature nations are required to destroy all their chemical weapons within ten years from the time the CWC begins. All chemical weapons production facilities must also be destroyed.
Under the CWC, verifications would be conducted by a team of inspectors permanently established for this purpose. The inspection regime provides for perimeter monitoring, geological sampling, on-site inspection, and files inspection. Routine inspections will occur at certain predetermined, or declared, facilities and short notice challenge inspections at undeclared sites to investigate suspicions of noncompliance. Declared sites are ones currently capable of producing or storing chemical weapons. Complete information on declared facilities will be provided to the multi-national CWC oversight group. Undeclared sites might include any facility that meets parameters for use, storage, or production of certain chemicals outlined in the CWC.
A provision negotiated into the CWC allows the United States to manage access for on-site inspections based on the sensitivity of the facility's activities. Managed access provides the opportunity to define the area at a facility that the inspectors will be allowed to check, rather than granting unlimited access.
Because of complications in CWC negotiation stemming from the large number of signatories, the United States and Russia have entered into two bilateral chemical weapons agreements. The treaties call for some verifications and data exchanges as well as the nonproduction and destruction of chemical agents. Some of these goals have been accomplished. Other objectives, including destruction of the chemicals, have been hindered by Russia's lack of facilities.
The CWC agreement has been delivered to Paris for signature and could take effect as early as January 1995. After it is enacted, the CWC could impact some DISP contractors. Working through industrial security representatives and the DTIRP, DISP will keep all parties informed of general developments concerning the CWC and specific issues that may require special measures to protect classified and sensitive information.
The Open Skies Treaty. Designed to be a confidence and security-building agreement, the OST subjects the entire territory of the United States to short notice, observation overflights by the other participants. Twenty-seven nations are signatories to the OST, including eleven East European and former Soviet states as well as NATO allies.
The data captured during these flights may be shared among the signatories. An OST flight may begin as early as seventy-two hours after the initial notification is given to the United States by the observing party. During a ninety-six-hour period the OST flight may cover as many as 4,900 kilometers of U.S. territory.
At least sixteen hours prior to takeoff of the OST flight, the United States will be informed of the precise route to be flown. Through the DTIRP, all affected government and private government contractor sites located in proximity to the flight path that wish to be notified will be informed of the route. The OST stipulates that there will be no right of refusal of these overflights. Since no national territory can be excluded from an OST overflight, all restricted airspace will be required to permit passage of the OST aircraft.
The OST permits the overflight aircraft to be equipped with a single optical panoramic camera, a pair of optical framing cameras, a video camera with real-time display, and a side viewing synthetic aperture radar. After December 31, 1996, or earlier if all parties consent, the aircraft may also use an infra-red line scanning device.
The quota of overflights will increase as the treaty becomes older. Through December 1994, only four overflights are expected from Russia. By the end of 1996, the quota of OST flights will increase to thirty-one per year. Beginning in 1997, the annual number increases to forty-two.
The OST aircraft will not be allowed to loiter over or circle any specific area. The altitude of the aircraft may vary according to the type of sensor being used as long as the maximum collection resolutions for that sensor are not exceeded. The video and IRLS sensors are allowed at an altitude as low as 1,000 meters. The framing cameras will normally be used between 1,000 and 2,600 meters, and the panoramic camera is to be used at or above 8,000 meters.
Although the OST flights will fly over many facilities, the OST will not prove a great threat to classified or proprietary information. Contractors that conduct sensitive outdoor testing or that need to move large, sensitive hardware may find the OST to be a new, but not insurmountable, security challenge.
John F. Donnelly is director of the Defense Investigative Service.
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Title Annotation:||Pentagon Corner; arms and control agreements|
|Author:||Donnelly, John F.|
|Date:||Mar 1, 1994|
|Previous Article:||The path to professional progress.|
|Next Article:||Hands-On Countermeasures.|
|Mutual assured obstruction.|
|RUSSIA - Jan. 10 - Kremlin Hits Washington.|
|Toward a new foreign policy.|
|Disarm! Dismantle the war economy.|