Tracing fraternity in the social sciences and Catholic social teaching.
To philosopher Roberto Mancini, one reason for fraternity's obscurity has to do with its pretension of universality, which appears to contradict the reality of social exclusion. Ultimately, fraternity appears utopian and unattainable and thus not apt for policy. (4) Therefore, in the social sciences--even within the humanities--the notion of fraternity is not widely used. Fraternity would contradict the conflictual nature of power, creating an ontological pessimism in politics. (5) However, the empirical phenomenon to which it refers, that is, an attitude of reciprocal care among citizens, has been recognized and studied largely through the concepts of social cohesion, trust, social capital, pro-sociality, reciprocity, altruism, democratic coexistence, civic friendship, community, and solidarity. We approach fraternity by taking these concepts as a semantic field or semantic domain as they are not synonymous but refer to approximately the same phenomenon.
In this article we also show that, as a semantic field, fraternity is an idea widely used in Catholic Social Teaching (hereafter CST), and that the principle of fraternity has only recently gained a more specific and precise meaning. Indeed, the latest encyclicals argue that the principle of fraternity presupposes the existence of a common Creator or Father, and by extension, that men should live in reciprocal love and respect. From that point of view, CST makes an insistent call for fraternity as a moral virtue at the core of society.
The objective of this article is to advance our understanding of the affinities and differences between academic conceptualizations of fraternity and those of CST. As a first step in this task, this article examines and surveys three social science concepts that seem to have a "family resemblance" to the notion of fraternity: social cohesion, trust, and social capital. We then continue our survey with the concepts of community and solidarity, which have received mixed attention from law and philosophy. Finally, we enter into the realm of civic friendship and fraternity, which, while mostly absent from the social sciences, are often discussed in political theory. (6) We do not pretend to engage in a linguistic or post-structuralist approach of the idea of fraternity, but rather in a pragmatic attempt to build a bridge between some of social sciences' concepts and a philosophical idea widely relevant to CST. Finally, we present some challenges that the study of the idea of fraternity poses and how CST may assist in overcoming them.
Fraternity's Semantic Domain in the Social Sciences
The concept of social cohesion has been associated with a great variety of issues such as: values and shared meanings, socioeconomic equality, multiculturality, cooperation, social protection, social bonds, inclusion, and citizenship. (7) Since 2001, the European Union has measured social cohesion by social gaps through the so-called Laeken indicators that encompass four areas: income, employment, education, and health. In 2007 the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) adjusted the Laeken indicators to better measure the more pervasive gaps in Latin America and added indicators regarding the role of democratic institutions and the sense of community belonging. (8) The development community's literature on social cohesion assumes that through active social policy socioeconomic gaps may be narrowed, and this in turn generates a sense of belonging; both produce social cohesion.
Nobel laureate in economics Gary Becker defines social capital as a natural part of the human capital of a person found not in relationships, but in individuals. (9) In contrast, most of the literature uses the concept of social capital to refer to the value of relationships and social networks. (10) According to sociologist James Coleman, social capital refers to the social organizations that facilitate the attainment of objectives that would not be reached in their absence, or only at greater cost. (11) One of those objectives is social cohesion; therefore, one can consider social capital an ingredient or component of social cohesion.
Sociologist Michael Woolcock classifies social capital by the type of relationships it involves: first, relationships with close interpersonal bonds (bonding social capital); and second, capital that builds bridges between groups (bridging). These two types refer to a horizontal dimension (between equals). A third type tackles the vertical dimension and discusses the relationship between individuals and structures of power, particularly the capacity of these to obtain resources, information, and benefits from formal institutions, such as the government (linking). (12) This last type of capital refers to relationships both up and down the social scale. (13) Thus the effects of social capital depend on the combinations of the three types of social capital, some being negative combinations for society. For example, highly cohesive groups--like gangs--with little capacity to relate to each other in a country with very weak formal institutions can result in situations of conflict or exclusion. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama claims, alternatively, that not just any type of norm or relationship generates social capital: these must be inspired by virtues, such as honesty, reciprocity, cooperation, and trust. (14)
If social capital has been conceived of as a component of social cohesion, trust in turn has been traditionally conceived of as a basic component of social capital. Regarding the concept of trust, political scientist Peter Nannestad distinguishes between particularized and generalized trust and between rational and normative trust. Particularized trust appears when an individual trusts another with respect to a specific matter or domain of affairs. (15) Rational trust, as defined by Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, is when an individual's act of trust exposes him to vulnerability: another individual, a group, or an organization is now able to harm or betray him. (16) To political scientist Russell Hardin, the individual's previous experiences determine his predisposition to trust or distrust, while trustworthinesss would be ensured through institutional mechanisms, such as contracts that define incentives and punishments. Hardin points out the economic relevance of trust by quoting two Nobel Prize laureates Kenneth Arrow and Douglass North. Arrow sees trust as the social system's lubricant which improves efficiency, and North perceives that trust reduces transaction costs and thus favors international competitiveness. (17) In contrast, normative--or moralist--trust is, according to political scientist Eric Uslaner, a personal predisposition that transcends individual experience, which is neither strategic nor based on expected utility or risk but a commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy, or some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other. (18)
Within a more specific political context, policy experts William Leach and Paul Sabatier discuss trust by considering psychological dynamics in political settings that are characterized by interpersonal relationships, such as long-term policy dialogue tables. They found evidence that participants of these tables tend to honor their promises, to honestly negotiate, to show respect toward other points of view, and to express concern for the well-being of others. (19) This is the interpersonal relational dimension of trust also underlined in the work of economist Vittorio Pelligra. (20)
While Leach and Sabatier, as well as Pelligra, have concentrated their studies on interpersonal face-to-face trust, generalized trust in contrast refers to the idea that an individual can trust people that he or she does not know; it is more properly a favorable general attitude toward all human beings. (21) Generalized trust does not limit itself to people that belong to the same local or national group, as the notion of community does. Neither does it refer to a specific domain of well-specified issues in which someone trusts another. (22) Science writer Marek Kohn calls the latter type of trust thin. While thick trust arises through frequent interpersonal experience over time, thin trust is that which is based on reputation, norms, or signs like appearance or behavior. This second type is particularly important, as it allows the expansion of the radius of interpersonal relationships beyond firsthand experience, and does not require a long time lapse. (23)
In their reading of nineteenth-century social theorist Ferdinand Tonnies and twentieth-century sociologist Robert Nisbet, theologians Severino Dianich and Carmelo Torcivia contend that the notion of community seemed focused on a shared feeling of belonging, in which territory, interpersonal relationships, and participation are key dimensions, beyond mere functionalism. As community psychology underlines, not every human group (which is narrowly defined by a vague sense of belonging) is a community; a precise and shared vision of common good or purpose is required for the latter. (24)
According to economist Luigino Bruni, social theory contends that community is the most important social unit of the ancient and pre-modern worlds--and a lost paradise of warm human relationships that anonymous contractual societies tend to destroy. In fact, the ancient world did not experience community in its etymological sense of cum munus, that is, reciprocal gift, which expresses the equilibrium of interpersonal relationships. Indeed, in the ancient world society was less concerned with individuals but instead with hierarchical collective bodies. Within ancient communities--continues Bruni's argument--there were hierarchical relationships: wives, children, and slaves were expropriated of their rights as individuals, as in the ancient Roman model of the pater familiae. Therefore, it was only in modernity--with the reaffirmation of individuality and equality--that community as the place to engage in reciprocal and free interpersonal relationships could take place. (25)
Mutual concern between citizens has been identified as solidarity in law, sociology, and psychology. Solidarity is mostly conceived of as relational or interpersonal, or, in Emile Durkheim's tradition, mechanical solidarity. Some relate solidarity to social cohesion, whereas others think that it is the result of a shared project, which generates unity. In any case, solidarity entails concrete obligations toward fellow citizens by virtue of common membership to a community. (26) The pioneering work of sociologist and jurist Georges Gurvitch on social law made an important contribution to overcoming juridical individualism of contracts and allowing the emergence of the idea of social rights, (27) which is arguably the foundation of modern solidarity, or organic solidarity, following Durkheim's distiction.
Philosopher Kurt Bayertz distinguishes four forms of solidarity: first, human solidarity as the force that bridges all humankind; second, social solidarity, a relative of social cohesion in the communitarian tradition of Emile Durkheim; third, civic solidarity, which alludes to the functions of the welfare state through social policies addressed to the needs of citizens; and fourth, political solidarity, which defines the relationships among members of a community. (28) This last concept means that the well-being of others enters one's practical reasoning in a non-instrumental way and cooperation is the expression of one's duties toward others. (29) To jurist Erhard Denninger, solidarity refers to more than duties, to a permanent predisposition to show decency toward other people and respect for the common spirit, going beyond sentiments and emotions, which to him would constitute the fallacy of the concept of fraternity. Denninger extends solidarity to a planetary scale, as it not only refers to a comrade or member of one's own community, but even to a stranger. (30)
"Concern" is also the key sentiment or emotion in the idea of civic friendship. Philospher of education David Blacker defines civic friendship as a certain "reciprocal concern" that is manifested in the public relationship between citizens. For Blacker, civic friendship is an imperative that permits the achievement of two goals. First, it assures certain levels of spiritual, moral, and aesthetic depth to citizens' political obligations. Second, it allows citizens to cultivate the capacity to hear and tolerate the views put forth by other citizens. (31) To political theorist Sybil Schwarzenbach, civic friendship does not require that citizens be alike and possess everything in common. (32) Instead, it requires unanimity on the basics of the constitution as well as a mutual "concern" for the well-being of fellow citizens expressed through concrete actions. (33)
Reciprocal concern as a choice to act for the well-being of others is also a key trait of fraternity. (34) In fact, using the terms "civic friendship" and "fraternity" synonymously is common in political philosophy; still, some prefer to make a distinction. Political theorist Oscar Godoy, for example, argues that the concept of fraternity in its ambition of universality and abstraction is less comprehensible than that of friendship, which is related to people's everyday experience. Further, Godoy prefers to use the term friendship in its original Greek sense philia, as it is the oldest sense on record. (35) Schwarzenbach for her part indicates that she prefers to use the concept of civic friendship, instead of fraternity, because the latter has a masculine connotation (fraternity), which excludes women (sorority). (36) Also Nelson rejects as "poingnantly ironic" that fraternity would try to promote among men attitudes and emotions usually associated with women. (37) While this distinction is present in the English language, it has little significance in Spanish, Italian, French, and Portuguese, where there is no single word to translate the term "sorority." French uses the expression "confrerie feminine," while Spanish uses "hermandad de mujeres." The subtleties of the languages are better expressed in German, in which fraternity refers to three distinct things. First, the community of the brothers (Bruderschaft); second, the bond that unites (Bruderlichkeit); and third, the virtue of fraternal love (Bruderliebe). (38)
Other authors, though, openly use the term fraternity in English. According to philosopher James Griffin, fraternity at times refers to observing mutual respect, a type of concerned relationship that is at the same time free, easy, and natural, and makes life better. (39) Education expert Gerald Johnston also conceives of fraternity as a sentiment of mutual responsibility or a moral obligation that falls upon citizens, in line with the construction of community. (40) For Griffin's part, fraternity corresponds to a prudent value: that is, "a valuable type of personal relationship." (41) From John Rawls's conception in his Theory of Justice, in relation to the principles of liberty and equality, comes the idea that fraternity does not define democratic rights but instead alludes to certain mental attitudes and to behaviors such as social esteem and the absence of servility and the feelings of friendship and social solidarity. These mental states do not imply an obligation and instead incorporate emotions and attitudes that can be applied only within the context of face-to-face interactions and not on a macro societal scale, as philosopher of education Kenneth Benne implies. (42) Even then, Rawls points out, the principle of difference offers an interpretation of the principle of fraternity, in the sense that it postulates the idea of not wanting more personal gain except for in the case that others in worse conditions benefit. (43)
Rawls's interpretation thus makes equivalence between the concepts of civic friendship and fraternity impossible. While civic friendship defines obligations, fraternity does not. Also, it suggests that though civic friendship could be applied as a political category, fraternity would fall short. Fraternity has tended to be interpreted as solidarity, as proposed by Maria Nieves Tapia within the context of Latin American educational experience on service learning. (44) But for philosopher Antonio Baggio, solidarity, referring more to social rights, has been practiced as such that it maintains the social vertical relationship of weak to strong. (45) In fraternity, though, the relationship is totally horizontal, among brothers. (46) Therefore, fraternity should not be considered a synonym for solidarity.
The previous discussion, in our opinion, indicates that while these concepts are approached from diverse perspectives and disciplines, they nevertheless have important elements in common and offer a rich basis for deepening the study of fraternity from the social sciences point of view. While social cohesion, trust, and social capital are social science concepts, they are simplifications of empirical phenomena that have been built with the final purpose of measurement and comparison; the notions of community, solidarity, civic friendship, and fraternity, more common in the humanities, are richer and more comprehensive, while more abstract in their reach. All of these notions--from the social sciences and the humanities--make reference to some sort of virtuous social bond, and this social bond is what defines their belonging to our proposed semantic domain.
Fraternity's Semantic Domain in Catholic Social Teaching
CST did not refer to social cohesion explicitly until recently, though the phenomenon to which this idea refers is discussed--that is, that which keeps community united. Caritas in Veritate (hereafter CV) incorporates the phenomena, as well as the nomenclature of trust, social capital, and social cohesion, into CST as requirements for the proper functioning of democracy and civil coexistence. (47) In any case, CV does not touch upon the subtleties and grey-zones proper to these concepts that are found in social science literature: for example, the distinction between instrumental or strategic trust and normative trust, or the idea that there exist forms of bonding social capital that are noxious, in the degree to which they do not generate relationships between groups in the same manner as does bridging social capital.
Mutual trust is discussed a few times in Pacem in Terris, but linked to the relationship between states and as a mechanism to assure peace. (48) Gaudium et Spes advances this idea, arguing that peace must emerge from mutual trust between nations and not be imposed by fear or weapon deterrence. (49) CV (35) claims that without trust the market cannot fulfill the very economic function it is supposed to serve. It is necessary to point out, though, that the type of trust lost that CV laments is actually normative or moral trust. In contrast, rational or instrumental trust--which can also be expressed as reciprocal trust--remains implicit in the document and is that which, along with contracts, assures the market's functioning, though not as an economic institution that allows encounters among people and thus social cohesion.
CST's invitation goes further. A society with good contracts and institutions and even a culture of encounter would fall short of CST aspirations unless these are founded on the recognition of God as the source: "The God who is himself reliable gives us a city which is reliable." Removing faith in God from cities (understood as political communities) would weaken mutual trust and the bond that joins humanity, as we would remain united only by interest or fear. (50)
The concept of community is not well defined in CST but is used widely. CST acknowledges the sociological distinction between society and community arguing that in the community affective bonds prevail, while in society bonds are pragmatic. Community holds the highest importance in CST, both as an organizational model of coexistence and as an everyday way of living. In CST's dictionary, human existence requires the emergence of communities and associations not only to address material needs but also to exercise fraternity. (51) Consequently, CST does not put society in opposition to community; in effect, it calls on every society to become a community.
The pontifical documents usually refer to different spheres in which community occurs. Gaudium et Spes, for example, refers to the universal community (GS 4), the human community (GS 9 and 40), the "civic community" (GS 53), or the "political community" (GS 65). More narrowly, GS refers to the Church founded by Christ as "a new brotherly community" (GS 32), "spiritual community" (GS 40), "the community of the faithful" (GS 58), or the "Christian community" (GS 62). Ut Unum Sint speaks of the "Catholic community," and also of "other Christian communities." (52) In turn, countries form a community on their own (PT 46), or a political community that exercises authority and government (PT 73). Chapter 4 of Gaudium et Spes is dedicated to "the life of the political community," which exists "for the sake of the common good" (GS 74)--an objective that is also proclaimed in Caritas in Veritate (CV 6).
Given the universal nature of the Christian message, building an international community represents an important objective, which technological development and greater exchange are making increasingly possible (Diz. 136-37). In Pacem in Terris, society forms a "community of men" (PT 36). Gaudium et Spes mentions the idea of forming the "community of mankind" (GS 23-32). Populorum Progressio defines universal charity as "the effort to build a more humane world community." (53) This "worldwide community of nations" (PT 7 and 33) is also called the "international community" (PP 6), or "the community of peoples and nations" (CV 7).
To deepen the notion of worldwide community, Pacem in Terris refers in chapter 4 to the relation between political communities and the world community. As the political community at the national level must be concerned with the national common good, so must the worldwide community exercise government and authority on the grounds that the common good of humankind makes it imperative (PT 7). If unity is the very essence of the Christian community (UUS 9), mutatis mutandis the international community should direct itself toward this end; however, this could never be achieved without God (CV 34).
Solidarity has a place of preeminence in the magisterium. It is named one of the four cardinal principles in CST, the other three being the centrality of the human person, subsidiarity, and the common good. (54) Solidarity is key in CST because it addresses the intrinsic social nature of man and as a result it reflects the authentic nature of human relations (Diz. 725). In Populorum Progressio, Blessed Paul VI argues that each man belongs to humanity, and therefore has obligations to everyone, even to those who are to come in the future (PP 17). In CentesimusAnnus, Pope Saint John Paul II indicates that the principle of solidarity was referred to by Leo XIII as "friendship," by Pius XII as "social charity," and by Paul VI as "civilization of love." (55) Solicitudo Rei Socialis recognizes solidarity as a Christian virtue with many points of contact to the notion of charity, which underlines total gratuity, forgiveness, and reconciliation. (56)
For CST solidarity is the participation of men with their peers as much in the production as in the enjoyment of common goods. In solidum means to participate together or co-participate. Solidarity is the tie that unites men and drives them to reciprocate concrete acts of assistance. Moreover, in Pacem in Terris the result of solidarity --lived at different levels, from the local community to the state to the international order--is universal fraternity (Diz. 722-23). That is, solidarity--as in the case of community--is a prerequisite for fraternity to exist. In CST, solidarity is composed of two complementary aspects: a social principle, that must order institutions, laws, and market rules; and a moral virtue, in the sense that it is not a pure emotion or sentiment, but instead a firm and persevering disposition--or concern--to act for the good of others (Comp. 193).
To Paul VI universal solidarity is also a duty (PP 17). Caritas in Veritate argues that solidarity is composed of a concrete concern and sense of responsibility for others and that solidarity cannot be merely delegated to the state, as without gratuitousness there can be no justice (CV 38). Paul suggests that, more than material causes, the problem of underdevelopment occurs because of a lack of understanding of the responsibilities required for solidarity. Paul also mentions nationalism and racism as obstacles to universal solidarity (PP 62). He points out that the development of the individual cannot be separated from the development of humanity, and that for this purpose, man and nations should meet and work together in the mutual understanding of friendship (PP 43). There is also a duty particularly relevant for wealthier nations that arises from the human and supernatural brotherhood of man that presents a three-fold obligation: mutual solidarity, social justice, and universal charity (PP 44).
Uzochukwu Jude Njoku presents solidarity as a central concept in John Paul's thought; however there appears to be no agreement on the meaning of the concept in the latter's writings. Quoting several of John Paul's encyclicals Njoku identifies its meaning as alternatively interdependence, communion, charity, forgiveness, and reconciliation, commitment to the good of the other, a preferential option for the poor, participation, a spirit of cooperation, the absence of oppression, defense of the poor and those in need, pursuit of the common good, and advancement of true life-fulfillment to persons and communities. (57) Also, in Laborem Exercens solidarity suggests the idea of workers' social movement (LE 8). (58) While solidarity for John Paul may be an ambivalent concept, there are nevertheless two traits that are common to his thought: first, he undertakes theological arguments centered on the idea of the interdependence of people, the common fatherhood of God, and the brotherhood of all in Christ; and second, in line with personalism, he develops the idea that solidarity emphasizes individual responsibility and agency instead of arguing for the determinism of social or collective structures. (59)
The doctrines regarding civic friendship and the unity of the human family and dignity of all individuals as children of God can be found in several encyclicals. For example, in Rerum Novarum, "if Christian precepts prevail, the respective classes will not only be united in the bonds of friendship, but also in those of brotherly love" (RN 25). (60) Ut Unum Sint (42) underlines the need to recognize that brotherhood is not the consequence of a large-hearted philanthropy or a vague family spirit, but is rooted in the oneness of baptism, and that the unity of all divided humanity is the will of God (UUS 6). In the Second Vatican Council the Church offers its collaboration to humankind in fostering fraternity as this corresponds to man's destiny (GS 3): to constitute a single family and to treat each other in a spirit of brotherhood (GS 24). More specifically with respect to human unity, Lumen Fidei has recently placed love as key in keeping men and women united (LF 51).
Although Pacem in Terris did not explicitly include the notion of fraternity, it does often refer to it as "charity" (PT 34), the "fellowship" (PT 121) of humankind and "brotherly love" (PT 171), which is an individual attitude of care toward others and primarily a matter of personal decision (PT 34) or "an appeal to conscience" (PT 48). Some 50 years later, Caritas in Veritate points out that "economic, social and political development, if it is to be authentically human, needs to make room for the principle of gratuitousness as an expression of fraternity" (CV 34).
To theologians Dianich and Torcivia, fraternity expresses an ontological notion of bond that the concept of community is unable to reach. (61) Baggio, inspired by Chiara Lubich's charismatic experience, underlines this concept, referring to universal fraternity. Lubich conceives of universal fraternity not as a mere feeling exhausted in an affective dimension, but instead as the ontological bond of humanity. (62) As such, the Trinity becomes a model for society. (63) This trinitarian view calls for a transformation of social relations in the widest sense. (64) In order to understand the deepest meaning of fraternity, says Baggio, one needs to refer to the bond that unites the divine persons as expressed in Jesus's prayer: "May they all be one, just as, Father, you are in me and I am in you, so that they also may be in us, so that the world may believe it was you who sent me." (65)
According to Dianich and Torcivia it is in the first book of Maccabees that the term fraternity first appears in the Bible to remind readers of the fraternal bond that unites Jews and Spartans, which is neither founded over the Alliance nor refers to the meaning of community. (66) Later, in the New Testament the term appears a few times in the first letter of Peter referring to Christians being together; (67) to reciprocal fraternal love, and to the virtue of fraternity, (68) which altogether applies to the community of Christians, but also implies hospitality toward foreigners, and a moral duty of concern toward non-believers. (69) The fathers of the Church (Tertullian, Cyprian, and Augustine of Hippo) refer to fraternity as synonymous with Church; the community of Christians at two levels: the local Church and the universal Church. For Augustine, a relationship of fraternity emerges among Christians through baptism. (70)
To Joseph Ratzinger, fraternity goes beyond the Christian community. He recalls the doctrine of the two brothers, by which the Church helps in the realization of the Kingdom of God in an eschatological sense of unity and universal fraternity. But the Church is just one of two brothers, and is called on by God not to condemn the other brother (the nonbeliever), but to save him. (71)
Following Baggio, it is in light of the principle of fraternity that the fundamental concepts and moral categories of CST can be properly interpreted and lived; thus, these concepts and categories perform the role of mediating the principle of fraternity. (72) Baggio argues that Vatican II represents a turning point in defining a new humanism as a founding category; that is, it renders fraternity a fully meaningful social and political principle. Particularly through Gaudium et Spes, we witness the birth of a new humanism, one in which man is defined first of all by this responsibility to his brothers and to human history (GS 55). (73)
In Erangelii Gaudium, Francis argues that social peace cannot be understood as pacification or the mere absence of violence (EG 218), as peace cannot be reduced to the absence of war (EG 219). Becoming a people--that is, a community--is an ongoing process that requires a culture of encounter (EG 220). Such a community is also conceived of as universal (EG 181 and 188). It is essential to actively reach out toward others in order to build such fraternity (EG 179). This seems to be the key for distinguishing civic friendship from fraternity. Civic friendship as mere democratic and peaceful coexistence is different from the more active and demanding fraternity, which presuposes the former, but requires a thick culture of encounter among citizens as a result of an active and universal reciprocal concern.
Challenges to the Study and the Idea of Fraternity
According to Barreneche, fraternity is not a forgotten principle, but a challenged principle. (74) Indeed, as evident from tracing fraternity in social sciences and CST, there are numerous objections that hinder fraternity from becoming a feasible social and political category. We will comment on three deemed of particular importance: the tension between homo economicus and homo reciprocans; fraternity as duty or virtue; and local versus universal fraternity.
The first challenge is the widespread idea of the homo economicus as the only valid behavioral assumption of decisional agents in mainstream economics. Regarding the nature of human relationships, the social sciences have been influenced by the rational choice paradigm with its assumption of an individual that maximizes his or her own utility. From an epistemological point of view, the effect of this problem has been to consider altruistic behavior as instrumentally rational. Also, one of the dilemmas of the social sciences is that the type of face-to-face relations that a person establishes with his fellows cannot be considered equivalent to the relations that an individual has with people that he or she is not capable of encountering. Traditionally, the response by mainstream economists to the prevailing criticism has been to incorporate altruism into the individual's utilitarian function, which does not alter the fundamental anthropological view of an economic agent.
The generalization of this assumption not only had an important effect on the social sciences, but more importantly it has fed a cynical stance among many scholars when approaching the study of human relationships. However, arguments against this assumption are not new and have increased over time, even within economics. This reductionism through an instrumentalist individualist rationality has been questioned from a macroeconomic (75) as well as from a micro economic perspective. (76) The interest in a more integral conception of the person is observed in diverse instances, including recent initiatives at the United Nations. (77)
CST suggests that the cause of today's difficulty in understanding the concept of fraternity and accepting its implications is the lack of a profound understanding of human nature, a nature that shares a common Father and one made to love (Diz. 359-60)--a lack of reciprocal charity. According to Lumen Fidei, one of the key contributions of faith is to illuminate the true nature of social relationships (54). CST underlines that the human being is made for gift and reciprocity; as Lumen Fidei says, stressing the relational character of human existence: "Persons always live in relationship. We come from others, we belong to others, and our lives are enlarged by our encounter with others" (LF 38).
This same nature is extrapolated to social and political spheres as well as community, local, national, and global spheres. Charity, conceived of as the basis of said community, illuminates in Christians the most profound meaning of political life (Comp. 392). In Caritas in Veritate, Benedict XVI indicates that charity is not just a principle for micro-relations (friendship, family), but also for macro-relations (social, economic, and political) (CV 2, EG 203 and 206), as man is made only for gift (CV 34, EG 20 5). This encyclical is explicit in terms of the need for an integral view of man and his development, inviting the social sciences in this direction. (78)
PT equates what it proposes as harmonious relations between men to those at the state level. In effect, given that men are equals in their natural dignity, there is no difference from the point of view of natural dignity between political communities (PT 89). States should be governed by virtue of the truth and that presupposes the elimination of racial discrimination and the recognition of the inviolable principle that all states are by nature equal in dignity (PT 86).Thus, the relationship between states must be harmonized with truth, justice, liberty, and the disposition to cooperate (PT 80).
Just as the rational choice paradigm holds up the maximization of one's utility as the motive of the individual and explains social phenomena as an aggregation of self-interested individuals (homo economicus), CST proposes that man by nature is made for gift and reciprocity (homo reciprocans). (79) Thus the nature of society will be the extrapolation from this reality that is not individual but relational. Distinct from behavioral determinism--the paradox that does not allow a choice that is not rational--the focus of CST, especially in more recent documents, puts before men the choice of donating themselves or denying themselves the true sense of their existence.
The second challenge regards the possibility of sublimating duties associated with fraternity into an active concern (CST would say love), that is, a moral virtue. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948 proposes that "all human beings ... should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." (80) This entails recognition of liberty and equality and a consciousness of a moral duty toward fraternity. This duty, though, has contested status in political theory. (81)
From the perspective of republicanism, economist Jacques Attali conceives of fraternity as duty. (82) However, in the liberal tradition individuals are disengaged and morally free of duties toward their compatriots, even though liberalism has refused to consider them "moral strangers." (83) In this context, what could fraternity mean more than a futile moralizing effort--as presented by political scientist Wilson Carey McWilliams (84)--opposed to the real practice of power and politics? Political theorist Christopher Wellmann considers it acceptable to assume that we have special duties toward our friends--a moral responsibility that is absent toward strangers. To Wellmann, compatriots do not care about each other and do not feel identified or connected with each other to the same degree as toward their friends. (85)
According to political theorist and expert on global education, Jason Scorza, within liberalism, citizenship is regarded as instrumental. Therefore, citizens can demand respect and tolerance from one another along with the provision of welfare according to human dignity; however, they cannot demand to be loved or to be treated as friends. However, Scorza identifies within certain lines of liberal thought the possibility of civic friendship based on the concept of democratic connectedness--which is a non-instrumental value that emerges from the experience of belonging to the same community of equals, based on openness and empathy, more than in purely contractual obligations. (86) This line of argument is also proposed by Bruni for the functioning of the market. (87) Whereas anonymity and impersonality characterizes most marketplaces, fraternity in the form of reciprocity in interpersonal relationships characterizes the functioning of the civil economy. (88)
Considering CST in relation to political theory's dilemma regarding whether fraternity alludes to duty or virtue, for Aquinas the profound meaning of political life does not emerge from a list of rights and duties, but should be based on civil friendship and fraternity (Comp. 390). Pacem in Terris defines rights and duties as universal, inviolable, and proper to human nature and by extension inalienable (PT 9). It also rescues the idea of reciprocity between rights and responsibilities (PT 30). Moreover, in their relationship with other people, the individual must act based on his own initiative, conviction, and the sense of responsibility and not under pressure or external coercion (PT 34). Human society demands men act guided by justice, respect for others' rights, and the fulfillment of their responsibilities; but it also demands that they act guided by a love such that they feel the needs of others as their own, and they be driven to share their material and spiritual goods (PT 35).
The criteria that orient moral action are moral justice and the common good, but charity goes beyond justice in CST and completes it (CV 6). The earthly city is not only about rights and duties, but much more importantly relationships of "gratuitousness, mercy and communion" (CV 6); for social, economic, and political development to be authentically human it must include gratuitousness as an expression of fraternity (CV 34). Christians should go beyond living fraternity as a duty or even as a moral virtue as they are called to live a mystical or contemplative fraternity, which ultimately is finding God in every human being (EG 92).
A third challenge pertains to the scope of fraternity. From a normative perspective, extrapolating the idea of fraternity from a local or national community to an international community is a valid goal, as humanity is called to live in universal fraternity. However, there exist various obstacles that curtail the scope of fraternity, in particular those that restrict it to regional, ethnic, or class spheres.
CST is explicit in appealing to the universality of fraternity. Pacem in Terris underlines the importance of collaboration between all, an assertion that for the first time in the Church's encyclicals is directed toward all men of good faith. Gaudium et Spes prescribes that citizens are endowed with a loyal spirit of patriotism that should be open to the whole human family (GS 75). In Populorum Progressio, "Paul VI clearly understood that the social question had become worldwide and he grasped the interconnection between the impetus towards the unification of humanity and the Christian ideal of a single family of peoples in solidarity and fraternity" (CV 13). Indeed, Paul indicates that the "illness" of the world is the weakening of brotherly ties among individuals and peoples (PP 66). Benedict XVI adds that 40 years after PP, the principal novelty has been the sudden appearance of planetary interdependence, called globalization (CV 33). Beyond human and natural bonds--reads Sollicitudo Rei Socialis--faith underlines a new model of unity of the human race that must be inspired by the life of God as one God in three Persons; a model that may be better expressed through the word "communion"; the brotherhood of all in Christ (SRS 40).
CST proposes that it is everyone's duty--and especially that of Christians--to promote universal fraternity (Diz. 360). In part this duty arises from the confirmation that all men are brothers in the unity of the human family (PT 132), but also due to the global reach of some contemporary problems that require joint actions (PP 13). The modern era has also multiplied contacts among people and nations, and therefore "the human family is gradually recognizing that it comprises a single world community and is making itself so" (GS 33). As such, fraternity is universal because it involves us all, but also because it covers all areas of social relations: interpersonal, local, national, and global.
Universal fraternity requires at least the existence of a global political entity that promotes global common goods. Some have argued that the ongoing globalization process will not yield a world government, if in fact one is even possible. Indeed, political theorist Miguel Vatter points out that although Rawls in his Theory of Justice equates his second principle of justice with fraternity, later Rawls went on to throw out this possibility, realizing the obstacles that such an international order would entail. (89) The question regarding the feasibility of such a world government can be addressed from an empirical perspective. In fact, the international community has generated a set of global rules and institutions that could be the initial stages of it. An alternative perspective claims a pragmatic and incremental approach toward universal fraternity. (90)
CST also refers to global authority and relations among nations. To promote the common good, some form of worldwide public authority is needed (PT 137). To be legitimate, this universal public authority should be accepted by all, and endowed as such with power to safeguard security, justice, and respect for human rights (GS 81). A sufficiently powerful authority at the international level would prevent the threat of war (GS 79). Populorum Progressio advances the idea of establishing a world fund by diverting military expenditures to relieve the needs of the poor (PP 51). In PT the relationships between states should be regulated by justice, which assumes the recognition of mutual rights and responsibilities (PT 91). This also assumes that the purpose of a civil authority is to protect the common good of the state, which cannot be divorced from the common good of the entire human family (PT 98). These relationships should also be regulated by the principle of liberty, and no country has the right to oppress or interfere in the affairs of another without justification. An important and final idea is that Christians should cooperate decisively to establish an international order built upon universal brotherhood and the respect of freedoms (GS 88).Through Catholic social thought, Christians should feel compelled to act for the sake of their fellow human beings a concern identified by several scholars as key to the development of global citizenship. (91)
In this preliminary study we have dipped into the analysis of how the concept of fraternity has been revealed in social sciences and in CST through kindred notions that appear in fact to describe the same phenomenon. Contemporary political philosophy and other social sciences have somehow forgotten or challenged the concept of fraternity and prefer to frame the function that this notion performs in democracy as civic friendship, social cohesion, and solidarity. Likewise, the concept of fraternity is absent in economics, but similar ideas have been considered in the extensive literature of trust and social capital. For its part, CST has long used the notion of fraternity to mean many things. At some point early in its history, fraternity was used synonymously with the Church itself. In more recent documents, it has been given more specific meaning. In particular since Pacem in Terris, Gaudium et Spes, and especially Caritas in Veritate, it has been proposed as a fundamental principle that can properly justify both liberty and equality and provide a moral root to democracy.
For it to expand its capacity to transform society, CST requires deep dialogue with the social sciences, as it can contribute in its effort to forge a new culture. The building of a common language is an essential part of such a dialogue. We aim to contribute to this effort by bringing into focus possible points of common construction, where social sciences can be enlightened by CST, and CST can find spaces for entering the cultural and analytical discussions that result in policymaking and institutional arrangements.
If in fact reason is capable of giving significance to equality and the need for peaceful coexistence among nations, it nonetheless cannot establish fraternity (CV 19). Modernity tried to build a universal brotherhood based on equality (LF 54). The historical trajectory of the triptych of the French Revolution generated an "unequal liberalism" and an "unfree equality" as a result of the lack of fraternity (Diz. 359). Fraternity according to CST is a "link necessary for harmonizing, in social life, liberty and equality" (Diz. 361). But in the end, for brotherhood to endure, it needs as its ultimate foundation a reference to a common Father (LF 54). Of course, the latter raises the question of how to transform fraternity from a demanding theological and even teleological category to an actionable social and political category that needs to be embedded in political institutions and culture--a challenge that remains.
(1.) An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Catholic Social Tradition conference "Peace Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Celebrating 50 Years Since Pacem In Terris" (University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN: March 21-23, 2013). We wish to express our appreciation for comments from participants at this conference. We are also grateful for comments from Antonio Baggio, Osvaldo Barreneche, Luigino Bruni, Sebastian Cea, and Pasquale Ferrara.
(2.) Antonio M. Baggio, El Principio Olvidado: La Fraternidad. En la Politica y el Derecho (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva, 2006).
(3.) David Blacker, "Civic friendship and democratic education," in Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities, ed. Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 92.
(4.) Roberto Mancini, Esistenza e gratuita: Antropologia della condivisione (Assisi: Cittadella, 2009), 162-92, quoted by Severino Dianich and Carmelo Torcivia, Forme delpopolo di Dio:Tra comunita efraternita (Milan: San Paolo, 2012), 163-64.
(5.) Alberto Lo Presti, "El poder politico en busca de nuevos paradigmas" in El Principio Olvidado: La Fraternidad. En la Politica y el Derecho, ed. Antonio M. Baggio (comp.) (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva, 2006), 210.
(6.) Rodrigo Mardones, "Hacia una precision conceptual de la fraternidad politica," in Estudios Recientes sobre Fraternidad, ed. Osvaldo Barreneche (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva), 33-62.
(7.) Carlos Pena, "El concepto de cohesion social. Debates teoricos y usos politicos," in Redes, Estado y Mercados: Soportes de la Cohesion Social Latinoamericana, ed. Eugenio Tironi (Santiago: Uqbar Editores, 2008), 42-43.
(8.) CEPAL, Cohesion Social: Inclusion y Sentido de Pertenencia en America Latina (Santiago: Naciones Unidas, 2007), 25-29.
(9.) Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 3.
(10.) Sebastian Cea and Alejandra Marinovic, "Capital social, confianza y educacion," in Fraternidad y Educacion: Un Principio para la Formacion Ciudadana y la Convivencia Democratica, ed. Rodrigo Mardones (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva, 2012), 205-42.
(11.) James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990), 304.
(12.) Michael Woolcock, "The place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes," Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2, no. 1 (2001).
(13.) Brian Keely, Human Capital: How What you Know Shapes your Life, OECD Insights (Paris: OECD, 2007).
(14.) Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
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(16.) Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, "Political trust and trustworthiness," Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 476.
(17.) Russell Hardin, "Trustworthiness," Ethics 107, no. 1 (1996): 32.
(18.) Eric M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18.
(19.) William D. Leach and Paul A. Sabatier, "To trust an adversary: Integrating rational and psychological models of collaborative policymaking," American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (2005): 492-95.
(20.) Vittorio Pelligra, IParadossi della Fiducia: Scelte Racionali e Dinamiche Interpersonale (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007).
(21.) Karen Jones, "Trust as an affective attitude," Ethics 107, no. 1 (1996); Lawrence C. Becker, "Trust as noncognitive security about motives," Ethics 107, no. 1 (1996).
(22.) Nannestad, "What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything?," 414.
(23.) Marek Kohn, Trust: Self-Interest and the Common Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 89-90.
(24.) Dianich and Torcivia, Forme del popolo di Dio, 113.
(25.) Luigino Bruni, "Communitas," in Dizionario di economia civile, ed. Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni (Roma: Citta Nuova, 2009).
(26.) Sally J. Scholz, "Political solidarity, and violent resistance,"Journal of Social Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2007): 38; Sally J. Scholz, Political Solidarity (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).
(27.) Rocio Caro Gandara and Antonio Marquez Prieto, "Il diritto di comunione di Georges Gurvitch e l'economia di comunione. Primi esplorazioni," in Per una Economia di Comunione: Un Approccio Multidisciplinare, ed. Luigino Bruni and Luca Crivelli (Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 2004).
(28.) Kurt Bayertz, "Four uses of solidarity," in Solidarity, ed. Kurt Bayertz (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1999).
(29.) Scholz, "Political solidarity, and violent resistance," 42.
(30.) Erhard Denninger, "'Security, diversity, solidarity' instead of 'freedom, equality, fraternity,'" Constellations 7, no. 4 (2000): 514.
(31.) Blacker, "Civic friendship and democratic education," 249.
(32.) Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, "On civic friendship," Ethics 107, no. 1 (1996): 107.
(33.) Oscar Godoy, "La amistad como principio politico," Estudios Publicos 49 (1993): 18.
(34.) Pablo Ramirez Rivas, "De la utopia a la eutopia. Apuntes criticos para pensar y actuar la fraternidad hoy," in Estudios Recientes sobre Fraternidad, ed. Osvaldo Barreneche (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva), 63-90.
(35.) Godoy, "La amistad como principio politico," 6.
(36.) Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
(37.) Julie Nelson, "A response to Bruni and Sudgen," Economics & Philosophy 25, no. 2 (2009): 187-93.
(38.) Dianich and Torcivia, Forme del popolo di Dio, 140-41.
(39.) James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
(40.) Gerald L. Johnston, "Liberty, equality, fraternity: democratic ideals and educational effects," British Journal of Sociology of Education 12, no. 4 (1991): 492-93.
(41.) Griffin, Well-Being, 388.
(42.) Kenneth D. Benne, "The uses of fraternity," Daedalus 90, no. 2 (1961).
(43.) John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 105-06.
(44.) Maria Nieves Tapia, "Educacion y fraternidad: la pedagogia del aprendizaje-servicio solidario," in Fraternidady Educacion: Un Principio para la Formacion Ciudadanay la Convivencia Democratica, ed. Rodrigo Mardones (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva, 2012), 27-61.
(45.) Antonio M. Baggio, "Introduction al principio olvidado. El redescubrimiento de la fraternidad en la epoca del Tercer '89," in El Principio Olvidado: La Fraternidad. En la Politicay el Derecho, ed. Antonio M. Baggio (comp.) (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva, 2006), 39.
(46.) See also: Enrique Dussel, "From fraternity to solidarity: Toward a politics of liberation," Journal of Social Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2007).
(47.) Caritas in Veritate, [section]32. Hereafter cited in text as CV, with references to section numbers.
(48.) Pacem in Terris, [section]2. Hereafter cited in text as PT, with references to section numbers.
(49.) Gaudium et Spes, [section]81. Hereafter cited in text as GS, with references to section numbers.
(50.) Lumen Fidei, [section]50, 51 and 55. Hereafter cited in text as LF, with references to section numbers.
(51.) Pontificio Consiglio della Giustiza e della Pace, Dizionario di Dottrina Sociale della Chiesa (Rome: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 2005), 134-35. Hereafter cited in text as Diz., with references to section numbers.
(52.) Ut Unum Sint, [section]4 and 11. Hereafter cited in text as UUS, with references to section numbers.
(53.) Populorum Progressio, [section]44. Hereafter cited in text as PP, with references to section numbers.
(54.) Stefano Zamagni, "Fraternity, gift, and reciprocity in Caritas in Veritate," Revista Cultura Economica 27, no. 75/76 (2009): 22.
(55.) Pontificio Consejo "Justicia y Paz," Compendio de la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005), no. 103. Hereafter cited in text as Comp., with references to section numbers.
(56.) Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, [section]40. Hereafter cited in text as SRS, with references to section numbers.
(57.) Uzochukwu Jude Njoku, "Discourse on the foundations of solidarity in the social encyclicals of John Paul II," Ethical Perspectives 14, no. 1 (2007): 81.
(58.) Laborem Exercens, [section] 8.
(59.) Njoku, "Discourse on the foundations of solidarity in the social encyclicals of John Paul II," 92.
(60.) Rerum Novarum, [section]25.
(61.) Dianich and Torcivia, Forme del popolo di Dio, 140.
(62.) Antonio Maria Baggio, Laboro e dottrina sociale cristiana: Dalle origini al Novecento (Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 2005), 49.
(63.) Enrique Cambon, Trinidad, 1modelo social? (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva, 2013).
(64.) Alejandra Marinovic, "Chiara Lubich and the Transformation of Relationships: A Response to 'Chiara Lubich and Gender Sociology,'" Claritas: Journal of Dialogue and Culture 4, no. 1 (2015): 36-38.
(65.) Jn 17:21.
(66.) 1 Mac 12:10, 17.
(67.) 1 Pet 2:17; 5:9.
(68.) 1 Pet 3:8; and 1 Pet 1:22.
(69.) Dianich and Torcivia, Forme del popolo di Dio, 141-43.
(70.) Ibid., 147-49.
(71.) Joseph Ratzinger, Christian Brotherhood (London: Sheed & Ward, 1966). Originally published as Die christliche Bruderlichkeit (Munchen: Kosel, 1960), quoted by ibid., 177.
(72.) Baggio, Laboro e dottrina sociale cristiana, 53.
(73.) Ibid., 46-47.
(74.) Osvaldo Barreneche, "De principio olvidado a principio objetado. Discusiones sobre la fraternidad como categoria politica y como perspectiva de estudios academicos," Revista do Curso de Direito Amicus Curiae 9, no. 9 (2012).
(75.) See Stefano Zamagni, L'Economia del bene comune (Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 2007); Leonardo Becchetti, Oltre L'homo Oeconomicus: Felicita, Responsibility, Economia delle Relazioni (Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 2009); Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Pier Luigi Sacco, Paolo Vanin, and Stefano Zamagni, "Chapter 9: The economics of human relationships," in Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, ed. Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier, 2006).
(76.) There are multiple studies about the behavior of economic agents that explore beyond the maximization of individual utility. See: Samuel Bowles, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "Social preferences, homo economicus and zoon politikon," in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). Literature reviews about we-rationality and team agency can be found in Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni, Dizionario di economia civile (Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 2009).
(77.) See "Going beyond GDP, UNDP proposes human development measure of sustainability," accessed April 8, 2012, http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/press/. Previous references can be found in UNDP (2011). Also see the first report on global human happiness: John Helliwell, Richard Layard, and Jeffrey Sachs, World Happiness Report, vol. 1 (New York: The Earth Institute, Columbia University, 2012).
(78.) Cardinal Peter K. A. Turkson, "Caritas in Veritate, Good News for Society," Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 15, no. 3 (2012).
(79.) Becchetti, Oltre L'homo Oeconomicus.
(80.) Spanish, French, and Italian translations use the term "fraternity" instead of "brotherhood." Available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/searchbylang.aspx, accessed on May 17, 2010.
(81.) Michael T. Gibbons, "The idea of fraternity revisited," Pespectives on Political Science 35, no. 4 (2006).
(82.) Jacques Attali, Fraternidades: Una Nueva Utopia (Barcelona: Paidos, 2000), 140.
(83.) Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1986).
(84.) Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
(85.) Christopher Heath Wellman, "Friends, compatriots, and special political obligations," Political Theory 29, no. 2 (2001): 220-25.
(86.) Jason A. Scorza, "Liberal citizenship and civic friendship," Political Theory 32, no. 1 (2004): 85-87.
(87.) Luigino Bruni, "Fraternita," in Dizionario di Economia Civile, ed. Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni (Rome: Citta Nuova, 2009), 442. See also: Luigino Bruni and Robert Sudgen, "Fraternity: Why the market need not be a morally free zone," Economics and Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2008); Zamagni, "Fraternity, gift, and reciprocity in Caritas in Veritate."
(88.) Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni, Civil Economy: Efficiency, Equity, Public Happiness (Oxford, UK: Peter Lang, 2007).
(89.) Antonio M. Baggio et al., "Seminario 'Libertad, igualdad, fraternidad,'" Revista de Ciencia Politica 27, no. 1 (2007): 148.
(90.) Pasquale Ferrara, Global Religion and International Relations: A Diplomatic Perspective (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
(91.) See for example: Martha Nussbaum, "Tagore, Dewey, and the imminent demise of liberal education," in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education, ed. Harvey Siegel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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|Author:||Mardones, Rodrigo; Marinovic, Alejandra|
|Publication:||Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture|
|Date:||Mar 22, 2016|
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