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Toppling the barriers to trade in insurance services.

Services are the largest growing sector of the U.S. economy. Passenger fares, royalties on American movies, banking, education, fees for managing complex construction projects, telecommunications, insurance and other services provide substantial income to U.S. businesses from foreign consumers. In 1991, services represented 52 percent of the gross national product (as opposed to 48 percent for goods). Furthermore, 78 percent of U.S. citizens are employed in providing services, whereas only 22 percent are employed in the manufacture of goods, according to the Coalition of Service Industries Inc. in Washington, D.C.

Not surprisingly, the United States has a healthy surplus in the international trade balance with respect to services. While the total U.S. trade deficit in 1992 was $32.7 billion, the country exhibited a trade surplus of $69 billion in services, reports the U.S. Department of Commerce. Imagine, without the contribution of trade in services, the United States would have been faced last year with a trade deficit of nearly $102 billion!

Insurance is one of the major service sectors. For international trade purposes, insurance is usually labeled as a "financial service" and grouped with banking and securities. A growing number of U.S. insurers are expanding into foreign markets. Likewise, foreign insurers are increasing their U.S. operations.

There have been gains toward liberalization of the insurance markets throughout the world, but restrictions (or barriers) to international trade in insurance services continue in many countries. Some are "prudential measures" taken by national authorities to ensure that insurers are financially sound and capable of meeting their contractual commitments to domestic policyholders and to third parties who may depend on compensation to be obtained from a policyholder's insurance contract. Many other forms of restrictions are protectionist measures and trade barriers.

Bringing Down the Barriers

There exists a long history of agreements liberalizing world trade in goods, but it is two major pending trade agreements that would liberalize trade in services, including insurance: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) - now being negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The fundamental GATT principles are: trade without discrimination; protection through tariffs; stable and identifiable tariff bindings; encouraging fair competition; prohibition of quotas: allowing waiver procedures and safeguards to alleviate temporary injury to domestic industry; permitting regional trading arrangements; and encouraging settlement of trade disputes by rule rather than by economic or military power. The non-discrimination principles are contained in Articles I and III. Article I is the most-favored-nation clause, where each party to GATT is obligated to treat other GATT members at least as well as it treats any other country with regard to import or export of goods. Article III is the national treatment obligation, where each party to GATT agrees that imports will be treated no less favorably than domestically produced goods. Today, III countries are contracting parties to GATT. Some notable countries now attempting to join GATT are Russia, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.

Since GATT entered to force on January 1, 1948, there have been eight multilateral trade negotiating sessions (called rounds) sponsored by GATT. The first six rounds dealt with further tariff reductions. By the 1970s however, countries realized that trade barriers often took forms other than tariffs. So the seventh round (the Tokyo Round) became the first to address non-tariff barriers to world trade in goods. The Uruguay Round, which is presently under way, focuses on the elimination of non-tariff barriers and, for the first time, the extension of a trading agreement to services. This round is also addressing new areas of non-tariff barriers such as the lack of intellectual property (e.g., copyrights, trademarks, patents, etc.) protection in many countries.

The Tokyo Round produced a number of separate multilateral trade agreements on non-tariff barriers to world trade in goods. However, even today, only about one-fourth (or less, depending on the specific agreement) of the parties to GATT have signed on to these separate agreements on non-tariff barriers. The low worldwide acceptance level of rules designed to eliminate non-tariff barriers is one of the reasons for the slow going in the Uruguay Round. Moreover, it portends difficulties in reaching worldwide agreement on, and acceptance of, rules to liberalize trade in insurance and other services.

Barriers to Insurance Trade

Overall, services are a relatively new matter for international trade negotiations Services were addressed in the United States' first free trade agreement, the 1985 Israel/U.S. Free Trade Agreement, but only in the form of a non-binding declaration of the need to develop reciprocal market access and national treatment for services trade. The 1988 Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement covered services, including insurance, and obligated each country (and its provinces or states) to afford national treatment to the other's services providers. Thus, U.S. citizens were no longer subject to the restrictions on foreign ownership of Canadian insurers in the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act. However, most existing U.S. and Canadian restrictions on foreign service providers were allowed to remain in force.

As attention focuses on trade in services, the manner in which insurance services are provided by a foreign insurer has been separated into two concepts. The first is the "right of establishment," which relates to the right of a foreign entity to establish or acquire insurance or other service operations in another country. The second is "cross-border trade," which deals with the ability of a service provider to offer services from its home base of operation to residents in a foreign country using advertising, media, postal services, etc., to transact business without actually being established in the foreign country.

Gordon Cloney, president of the Washington, D.C.-based International Insurance Council, suggests that a country's policy on insurance services can be labeled as "statist" (no private insurers), "nationalistic" (no foreign insurers), "protectionist" (foreign insurers permitted to various degrees), "transitional" (towards less protection), or "liberal" (generally open access). Most countries in Asia are either statist, nationalistic or protectionist. Most countries in South and North America are in a transitional state towards opening their insurance markets. Western European countries are now transitional or liberal, although the centralized insurance directives of the European Community (EC) raise new issues. Most African countries are statist or nationalistic.

How would the individually regulated 50-state U.S. insurance market be described in terms of access? About 12 states already limit non-U.S. insurers to writing on a non-admitted basis. Using Maryland as an example, Maryland law classifies insurers as "domestic" (those domiciled in Maryland), "foreign" (those domiciled in some other U.S. state) and "alien" (those insurers based and domiciled in a foreign country outside of the United States). A.U.S. subsidiary of an alien (non-U.S.) insurer would be considered the same as any other insurer domiciled in Maryland or in another U.S. state.

In Maryland, "admitted insurers" are those that have received a certificate of authority from the Maryland insurance commissioner. "Approved surplus line insurers" may write risk within Maryland through specialized surplus line brokers. "Unauthorized insurers" may be used by insureds who have a full-time insurance manager or use a full-time insurance consultant to obtain insurance, or by insureds that employ more than 25 full-time employees or pay more than $100,000 in premium. In other words, larger and more sophisticated insureds may use "unauthorized insurers."

Multiply Maryland's regulatory regime by 50 and one can begin to understand why the United States' trading partners (the EC members, for example) have complained about the lack of national and uniform regulation of insurers. State insurance regulators have asked Congress to empower the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to serve as the gatekeeper for non-U.S. insurers and reinsurers seeking to do business in the United States. Under one proposal, the NAIC would be authorized by the federal government to expand its screening of non-U.S. property/casualty and health and life insurance companies. The NAIC would also set minimum requirements for next worth, collateralization and reporting requirements. Overall, with so many different regulatory regimes, it would be difficult - if not inaccurate - to put one label on the U.S. market.

A Single European Market?

The insurance market in Europe is now in transition due to the dramatic changes that have occurred as a result of the formation of the EC. A complete single internal market did not arrive on schedule in 1992, but it is not far behind. This creates uncertainty at present for U.S. insurers (not already established in the EC) that want to provide insurance services in the EC.

Freedom of insurance services does not now exist in Europe. As of 1989, six countries did not permit the direct insurance of risks in their territory by insurers not authorized and established there (France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain); three countries (Denmark, Luxembourg and the then-West Germany) permitted customers to deal with a foreign insurer but prevented intermediaries (brokers and agents) from engaging in the placing of business across frontiers; and three countries (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium) generally had no restrictions in this respect.

The most important insurance directives handed down by the European Commission will be implemented in 1994. These so-called "framework" directives will apply to both life and non-life insurance. Furthermore, they provide for the use of a single license that will permit an insurer, once established in the home country of any EC-member state, to establish branches and provide services freely throughout the EC without having to comply with separate regulations from other EC-member states. The "home country" is obligated to require the insurer to meet the financial and other standards set by the EC. the "host country" recognizes and accepts the insurer licensed by the home country. In general, the EC insurance directives are based on several fundamental principles: a single license based on recognition by all member states and on home country control; host country recognition of a branch authorized by the home country; and responsibility of the home country to make certain that its insurers maintain financial safety, solvency, accounting and other standards.

As of now, it appears that the EC single internal market will not be a barrier to U.S. firms providing insurance services within Europe. But this is based on assurances from EC representatives to the United States rather than any public commitments or the actual experiences of U.S. insurers. The legal basis for U.S. insurers to gain access to EC insurance markets stems from the portion of the insurance directives on relations with non-EC countries - the "reciprocity" clause. For the insurance sector, the applicable reciprocity clause is found in the EC's directive (November 8, 1990) on motor vehicle liability insurance. Member countries inform the European Commission of any general difficulties encountered by their insurance companies in establishing themselves or carrying on their activities in a third country. The commission will periodically issue a report examining the treatment accorded to EC insurance companies. A report was issued in June 1992 that commented on adverse aspects of U.S. insurance regulation (rules against banks affiliating with insurers, rules against government-owned/controlled insurers, and the port of entry requirements), but the report did not recommended limiting access of U.S. insurers to the EC market, not did not call for negotiations with the United States on insurance market access.

Whenever it appears to the commission that a third country is not granting EC insurers effective market access comparable to that granted by the EC, the commission may submit proposals for negotiation with a view to obtaining comparable competitive opportunities for EC insurance companies. Furthermore, whenever it appears to the commission that EC insurance companies are not receiving national treatment offering the same competitive opportunities as those available to domestic insurance companies and that the conditions of effective market access are not being fulfilled, the commission may initiate negotiations in order to remedy the situation. Under this directive, the EC may have its member countries limit or suspend licenses to, or acquisitions by, foreign insurers. The directive tempers this power to deny access to foreign insurers by also requiring the EC to comply with its own obligations under international trade agreements.

The unsettling feature of the EC's insurance reciprocity policy is that it nowhere commits the EC to a non-discrimination policy regarding foreign insurers. Moreover, the reciprocity clause does not affirmatively extend most-favored-nation or national treatment commitments to third countries. An affirmative commitment of most-favored-nation and national treatment obligations from the EC apparently must await new bilateral agreements or an agreement on services in the Uruguay Round, where trade-offs among agricultural, intellectual property and other disputes are likely to occur. Such an affirmative commitment by the EC would be the strongest legal basis for U.S. insurers to gain access to EC insurance markets.

Agreements at All Levels

Over the years, the United States has sought to eliminate trade barriers through negotiations and agreements on a number of levels - unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, gives the U.S. president the authority to take unilateral action to enforce U.S. rights under international trade aggreements and to take unilateral action to respond to unfair practices by foreign countries detrimentally affecting U.S. trade.

Pursuant to this authority, the United States has conducted many bilateral consultations and negotiations with foreign countries designed to avoid the imposition of unilateral sanctions by reducing a whole range of foreign trade barriers against U.S. trade in goods and services. In fact, the United States has been seeking liberalization with respect to trade in services, including insurance, for many years on a bilateral basis, sometimes without success and sometimes without.

In 1988, Congress granted, for a limited period, additional authority to the president to deal with so-called "priority practices" and "priority countries" that were denying the United States the benefits of international trade. This was called "Super 301," but it has now expired. The successful negotiations with South Korea and Taiwan are some recent examples of the use of Section 301 (and Super 301) to open foreign insurance markets to U.S. insurers. But, by contrast, India refused to discuss insurance liberalization after it was designated as a priority country under Super 301.

The Invisibles Code

The earliest multilateral efforts to liberalize trade in insurance services began in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD is head-quartered in Paris and is the successor to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation set up after World War II under the Marshall Plan to help rebuild the war-torn European economies. Much of the EC's single internal market planning was based on work done by the OECD.

In 1955, under its predecessor, the OECD adopted the Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations (the "Invisibles Code"). It deals with trade in securities, investments, insurance, banking, etc. - sectors now called services. The provisions in the Invisibles Code are the first statement of the basic trade-in-services principles - the right of establishment of insurance services, the right to provide services cross-border and an individual's right to buy insurance from any company.

The commitments made by the OECD countries in the code are to eliminate restrictions on current invisible transactions and to grant applications for the provision of services in as liberal a manner as possible. Each member country agrees not to discriminate against other members in authorizing insurance operations. There are, of course, exceptions in the Invisibles Code to the commitments to liberalization, such as exceptions for public order and security and the ability to withdraw any commitments that result in serious economic disturbance.

The United States obtained an exemption from the code for any "action by a State of the United States which comes within the jurisdiction of that State" - in effect, a total exemption. The problem with the Invisibles Code is that it lacks enforcement power.

General Agreement on Trade in Services

After seven years, the Uruguay Round of negotiations has yet to produce an agreement on rules for trade in services. There is, however, an overall draft agreement that was published in December 1991 by the GATT Secretariat to show skeptics that some concrete progress had been made in the negotiations. It contains a draft of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (1991 GATS Draft). The Clinton administration, EC officials and the leaders of the developed trading nations have recently affirmed their commitment to successful completion of the Uruguay Round.

The 1991 GATS Draft contains a most-favored-nation provision; a "transparency" requirement for laws and regulations (i.e., that they be published promptly and made available to the public); and general non-discrimination commitments. Article XVI requires the parties to accord market access to the services and service providers of other parties (right of establishment); Article XVII is a national treatment commitment. The 1991 GATS Draft takes a limited approach to opening trade in services. Only those insurance services specifically listed in the Annex on Financial Services are covered.

GATS preserves the right of any party to the agreement to take measures for "prudential reasons," including the protection of policyholders. It also envisions dispute settlement panels to resolve disputes about prudential measures taken by a party that restrict services or service providers. Insurance and insurance-related services are defined as: direct life and non-life insurance (including co-insurance); reinsurance and retrocession; insurance intermediation, such as brokerage and agency; and services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, actuarial, risk assessment and claim settlement services.

The heart of a services agreement will be the specific commitments to open service sector markets that each party sets out in the Article XX Schedules of Commitments, stating in particular those insurance markets that will be opened to foreign ownership and competition. At this time, the 1991 GATS Draft contains only a general framework for a services agreement (negotiations on a multilateral basis are complex). The most-favored-nation obligation among (potentially) 111 countries makes the service commitments very broad. Because the Uruguay Round negotiations are still under way, it is difficult to assess now what opportunities GATS would present for U.S. insurers.

Another separate document related to the 1991 GATS Draft is the "Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services." A section entitled "Cross-border Trade" requires that non-resident providers be permitted to provide insurance services relating to maritime shipping and commercial aviation, to goods in international transit, and to reinsurance and retrocession. Life insurance and many forms of non-life insurance are not extended cross-border privileges.

Opening North American Trade

NAFTA is the most comprehensive trade agreement to date, the result of years of experience with bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. As a consequence, it is better and more comprehensive than GATT and the 1991 GATS Draft combined. It also demonstrates the relative speed and efficiency of three-country trade negotiations compared to 104-country trade negotiations.

NAFTA is expected to create an open market of more than 360 million people and more than $600 trillion in annual output. Under NAFTA, all services are covered unless they are specifically withdrawn from the agreement in the so-called scheduling reservations. In addition, NAFTA applies to both existing and future laws governing trade and services. This will result in elimination of existing barriers to services trade. NAFTA defines financial service to mean "any service of a financial nature, including insurance, and any service incidental or auxiliary to a service of a financial nature."

The U.S. insurance sector did better than either the securities or banking industries because there is no "snap-back" provision for the Mexican insurance market. In other service sectors, if the market share of U.S. providers exceeds certain limits, then former restrictions "snap back" into effect. This means that by the year 2000, regardless of the extent of U.S. insurers' market share, Mexico will be a totally open market for insurance in terms of the right of establishment.

The $3.5 billion Mexican life and non-life insurance market is very small compared with its $453 billion U.S. counterpart. However, there is potential growth in Mexico for U.S. insurers and brokers in employee health and pension benefits (which until now essentially had been provided by the Mexican government itself) and in overall insurance products, particularly as the middle class expands.

Three legal principles are reflected in NAFTA: nondiscrimination, transparency and due process. These principles provide one set of rules for all those involved in international trade, rules that are widely known, uniformly applied, and that provide for the orderly and equitable resolution of disputes. These legal principles also mean good trade policy.

The clearest and most straightforward liberalization in NAFTA is the agreement by the three countries that an insurance service provider of one of the countries is permitted to establish an insurance institution in the territory of one of the other countries. It also includes the right to provide a full range of services, to expand geographically within the country and to hold ownership without restrictions as to the percent of ownership.

There is no similar clear and broad commitment among the three countries with respect to cross-border trade. Under NAFTA, Mexico reserved its existing prohibitions and restrictions on cross-border trade in insurance services, but did not reserve its present restrictions with respect to the ability of residents of Mexico to purchase tourist insurance and cargo insurance from non-resident insurance companies. Consultation in the years ahead under NAFTA is provided for with respect to further cross-border liberalization.

Canada maintained several reservations as to foreign insurance providers, particularly requiring Canadian insurers (other than life or a reinsurer) to limit the amount of a risk reinsured with a non-resident insurer to 25 percent. Mexican citizens, however, would be free of restrictions on ownership of Canadian insurers (as U.S. citizens now are). The only U.S. reservation was for the exclusion of branches of foreign insurance companies from providing surety bonds for U.S. Contracts.

NAFTA allows for free flow of reinsurance across borders. Mexican residents will now be allowed to purchase life, health and tourist insurance in the United States. NAFTA also prohibits any nationality requirements for senior management and other essential personnel.

Moreover, NAFTA contains a national treatment commitment. In the United States, national treatment of Mexican and Canadian insurers means home state (or state of entry) treatment. In other words, a Mexicanor Canadian-owned insurer will receive the same treatment within any state of the United States that any other U.S. insurer would receive within that state. The three countries also commit to most-favored-nation treatment, to transparency in their negotiations and procedures, and, to the extent practical, to providing the opportunity for foreign businesses to comment on regulations a country intends to adopt.

In Mexico, NAFTA has much to offer U.S. insurers. For example, U.S. insurers who, as of July 1, 1992, had an ownership interest of 10 percent or more in a Mexican insurer may increase their equity ownership to 100 percent by January 1, 1996. (So, U.S. insurers already there on July 1, 1992, can increase their ownership up to 100 percent in four years.) Foreign equity participation in new joint ventures will be permitted, beginning with 30 percent by January 1, 1994, up to 50 percent by January 1, 1998, and up to 100 percent by January 1, 2000. In addition, U.S. insurers may establish new subsidiaries subject to individual company market share caps that would be gradually eliminated by the year 2000. On January 1, 1994, insurers may establish 100 percent-owned subsidiaries subject to aggregate limits of 6 percent of market share and an individual market share capital of 1.5 percent. U.S. companies providing intermediate and auxiliary insurance services (brokers and consultants) will be permitted to establish subsidiaries in Mexico free of ownership and market share limitations.

If concepts of national sovereignty and economic protectionism can be put aside, these international trade agreements reducing barriers to free trade in services will be adopted and implemented. Liberalizing trade in insurance services should benefit the U.S. insurance industry and expand the base for greater international trade in goods and services alike. As international trade in services flourishes, the international law to govern it will follow.

Insurance Market Access Around the Globe

The following is a sample of some of the barriers U.S. insurers face overseas that will help in understanding what the trade agreements on services seek to achieve. Whether these restrictions are being enforced for genuinely prudential reasons or as a protective trade measure will be a key consideration in determining the success or failure of the current trade negotiations.

Argentina: Entry into the insurance sector was very limited prior to 1992. Foreign insurers may be established as local companies and compete on an equal footing, but branches of foreign insurers still face restrictions. The superintendent of insurance will not issue new licenses until 1994, except for pension funds.

Egypt: U.S. insurers are denied entry into the overall Egyptian insurance market and are generally restricted to operating in free trade zones. Some private insurers have some minority ownership.

India: All insurance companies are government-owned. Foreign insurers have no direct access to the domestic insurance market except for surplus lines, and some reinsurance and marine cargo insurance. The United States sought to apply pressure through threatened trade sanctions, but India balked. India reportedly has offered some insurance services concessions in the Uruguay Round negotiations.

Indonesia: All foreign investment in insurance companies must be made through joint ventures. The minimum Indonesian ownership is 20 percent, and the company must have a plan for "Indonesianization" over time. In 1988, the government introduced some deregulatory measures, particularly the abolition of property/casualty and automobile tariffs and the permitting of access for Indonesian insurers to the international reinsurance markets, although insurers still use the tariffs as a guide. Insurers now may place reinsurance for 100 percent of particular risk when the local market cannot absorb the exposure or meet the coverage terms. Non-admitted insurance of any type is still prohibited.

Japan: Regulations restrict the use of "manuscripted" or tailor-made insurance policies. Insurers in Japan cannot set rates based on market conditions. Rates must be tied to internal tariffs established by the Japanese government in an official schedule of permitted insurance coverages and premiums. The barriers also include nontransparent governmental practices related to licensing approval criteria and limits on the introduction of new products. Obtaining a license to write insurance business in Japan is not easy. Establishment of an operation in Japan can take three years or more and involve lengthy negotiation with the Japanese Ministry of Finance. U.S. and other foreign brokers do provide coverage for U.S. and European multinationals who have Japanese operations. U.S. brokers place about 80 percent of the coverage for Japanese multinational corporations outside of Japan, but practically none of the coverage for these Japanese insurers tend to use Japan. Japanese insurers tend to use reinsurance brokers in the London market.

Malaysia: There is strong regulatory control of all facets of the insurance industry. In May of 1988, the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara) assumed responsibility for the supervision of the insurance industry. Tariffs control underwriting property insurance, which must be placed with Malaysia registered insurers. Agents' and brokers' commissions are limited to 15 percent. Foreign direct insurers cannot establish branches or subsidiaries. No new insurers are being licensed, and foreign insurers with more than a 30 percent equity ownership in an existing insurance company are being encouraged to reduce or divest over time.

Mexico: Many barriers in the insurance sector were removed in early 1990 when Mexico adopted new insurance regulations. New investments by foreign corporations in insurance companies had been prohibited since 1935, and established companies had been required to reduce their ownership to 15 percent. In 1990, the government reversed this ban and increased the limit of permitted foreign ownership to 49 percent and eliminated the requirement that insurers place at least 50 percent of their reinsurance in the Mexican market. There is still a prohibition on the import and export of primary insurance, meaning primary insurance on risks must be placed with Mexican insurers. Most of the major U.S. brokers are already in Mexico through relationships with Mexican brokers.

Pakistan: The government will not license new foreign insurers, but there are several insurance companies in Pakistan with partial foreign ownership. Thirty percent of the face value of all insurance transactions (except life and marine hull insurance) must be reinsured by the state-run insurance facility, the Pakistan Insurance Corp.

People's Republic of China: The government has a monopoly on the insurance market in China. But over the last year, a handful of foreign insurers, including American International Group Inc., has been approved to enter the Chinese market. Sun Alliance Group PLC, a British insurer, is setting up a representative office in Beijing as part of its bid to become licensed.

Philippines: A 25-year ban on new insurers imposed by President Marcos in 1966 was recently lifted. An insurer in the Philippines is now allowed to have non-Philippine ownership provided it does not exceed 40 percent.

Singapore: The government determined that the local insurance market is saturated and issued a ban on the issuance of new licenses for foreign insurers.

South Korea: The barriers to entry are unwiedly standards and regulations, difficult-to-understand administrative procedures, and restrictive local market practices. Until recently, the South Korean government required that all reinsurance be placed with the Korean Reinsurance Corp. (KRC). New products are highly regulated and must be approved. Pricing of insurance premiums in Korea is still subject to the government tariff or KRC rating. There is no brokerage system. In 1986, the United States threatened trade sanctions if South Korea did not agree to open its insurance market to U.S. insurers. As a result, Cigna and American International Group have Korean operations, and it is anticipated that other U.S. insurers will be granted licenses. Although some progress has been made, U.S. insurers still encounter significant delays in South Korea's license application process, and U.S. insurers must comply with burdensome insurance pool requirements.

Taiwan: U.S. insurers are subject to a variety of restrictions. For example, they are prohibited from establishing insurance subsidiaries, investment in domestic insurance companies is limited to 40 percent (or less), and U.S. insurers may not hold real estate in their investment portfolio. Moreover, Taiwan's product approval process discourages the introduction of new insurance products. To date, U.S. government pressure has resulted in some U.S. insurers being allowed to operate in Taiwan - two U.S. life insurers and two U.S. non-life insurers will be allowed to enter the market each year.

Thailand: Foreign direct insurers are not allowed to establish branches or subsidiaries in Thailand or hold more than 49 percent equity interest in an insurance company without special permission. Government insurance is required to be placed with local Thai companies.
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Title Annotation:includes related article on access to global insurance markets
Author:Gorman, Francis J.
Publication:Risk Management
Date:Oct 1, 1993
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