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Thirteenth Air Force radio countermeasures operations, 1944-45.

It was a beautiful evening with light haze as May 7, 1945 drew to a close in the southwestern Pacific. Lieutenant Everett re-checked the settings on the three APT-1 radar jammers, then powered them up when Consolidated B-24L 44-41464 was 60 miles out from the target. Tuned to 190, 194 and 197 MHz, the jamming pattern covered the Imperial Japanese Navy Type 12 air search radars and Mark IV searchlight radars that were protecting the Japanese naval base at Soerabaja, Java. Eight minutes later the Liberator was within 40 miles of the target--time for the waist gunners to start dispensing 'rope,' very long strips of aluminum foil one half inch wide and 400 feet long. Suspended from a paper parachute, 'rope' was used against radars below 350 MHz in frequency. With their controlling radars blinded, the Japanese searchlight crews vainly scanned the skies with their beams looking for the inbound bombers they knew were out there. Lt Olsen, piloting Liberator #464, switched his landing lights on to draw the searchlights. As soon as they came close, he switched them off. Olsen continued the game of chicken as six aircraft piloted by his squadron mates barreled in at low altitude, bearing down on the merchant ships at anchor throughout the harbor. These bombers received only inaccurate anti-aircraft fire when attacking one of the best protected Japanese naval bases in the region--a direct result of the past two years of work undertaken by the Allies to understand and counter the Japanese use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

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The South West Pacific Area

The South West Pacific Area (SWPA) was the Allied supreme military command that oversaw operations in the Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies, Australia, New Guinea, and the western part of the Solomon Islands. Commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, the SWPA came into being on April 18, 1942, replacing the failed American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDA) and, after the fall of the Philippines in May 1942, became the sole US force in the region. Airpower under MacArthur was organized under a combined command--Allied Air Forces--with Australian and US air components. Australian forces were organized under the RAAF Command which by October 1944 had fielded the Australian First Tactical Air Force. US forces would eventually comprise three numbered air forces.

Fifth Air Force was created from the remnants of Philippine air power and the Far East Air Force in February 1942, while the Thirteenth Air Force was assigned to SWPA under a re-formed Far East Air Forces in June 1944 followed by Seventh Air Force in July 1945.

The fight for New Guinea was the defining action of the first part of the war for the South West Pacific Theater. First occupied by the Japanese in January 1942, the battle for the island would be waged for the remainder of the war. The Allied campaign to retake the island started with the defense of Port Moresby and the landing at Milne Bay on the eastern end of the island. The campaign turned into a series of amphibious end runs by MacArthur's forces as the Allies fought westward, with goals of reducing the Japanese base at Rabaul and securing territory to support the liberation of the Philippines.

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Japanese Radar Development through 1944

Like many nations in the 1930s, Japanese technical research was split between Army and Navy factions. The Imperial Japanese Navy's (UN) Naval Technical Research Department started their initial work into what became radar in 1935. Neither the Naval General Staff nor the Bureau of Naval Construction displayed much interest in the effort, so development was slow. (1) A visit in March 1941 to Germany that included inspection of German and captured British radars revealed the state of radar development to Japan, spurring interest and development. Tests in September 1941 led to the production of the first IJN land-based radar, the Mark I Model 1 (Type 11), in early 1942. (2) A more mobile radar, the Mark I Model 2 (Type 12), appeared at the end of 1942 with the smaller Mark I Model 3 (Type 13) following in 1943. (3)

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) was also sponsoring radar development in the 1930s. The Type A continuous wave radar system was initially deployed on the Japanese Home Islands in 1941, providing longer range but poorer resolution compared to a pulsed radar system. An IJA technical commission spent many months in Germany in 1940, and their summary reports coupled with Japanese research resulted in the production of the Tachi-6 search radar in 1942; the more mobile Tachi-7 followed in 1943. Searchlight and fire control radars based on captured US and British radars appeared with the Tachi-1, -2 and -3 sets in 1943. (4)

Records are scare, but it appears Japan started to deploy radars to its overseas conquests in mid-1942. The first Tachi 6 overseas deployment was to an airfield in Sumatra in late 1942, followed up with an additional 20 sets to Palambang, Sumatra between December 1942 and spring 1944. At least four sets were deployed to Java as well. The Tachi 7 started to deploy in 1943, with 20 sets being shipped to the Philippines in October 1944 - the first IJA radars deployed to this former US territory. (5) Though close to 50 IJA radars were shipped to the Southwest Pacific Area, on average less than 20 were deployed at any given time, the majority likely in depot for future use or to act as reserves for those in the field. The majority of the Japanese radars deployed overseas were the IJN Type 11, 12 and 13. The IJN initiated deployment of radars shortly after the Type 11 went into production, with one set being on Guadalcanal prior to the US invasion in August 1942. (6)

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The Japanese air surveillance network in the SWPA consisted of thinly scattered belts of radars to provide early warning of approaching raids. (7) As the tactical situation changed, the IJA or IJN would shift their radar sites around to increase coverage of critical avenues of approach. As the US moved into the southern Philippines, the Japanese rapidly re-oriented their air surveillance coverage to better screen their southern flank. (8) Many Japanese radar posts had more than one radar set assigned to them. A review of the February 1945 electronic order of battle for the Netherlands East Indies shows this to be the case with approximately 15 percent of the sites, with a slightly smaller percentage of sites in the Philippines following this rule. (9) Some Japanese radar sets could also receive US Identification, Friend, or Foe (IFF) signals, a factor likely taken into account when equipment was deployed. The IJN Type 13, along with some variants of the Type 12, the Type 11-3-K, and land based adaptations of the Air Mark VI Mod 4 radars operated in the same frequency band as the US Type III IFF transponders that came into universal service in the Pacific in last 1943. These radars could and did trigger an IFF response that enabled the Japanese to monitor Allied aircraft not only medium altitude but also allowed them to track aircraft at altitudes lower than the radars could normally pick up targets at ranges out to 300 kilometers. (10)

While the concepts and countermeasures taken by the adversaries were no different than that of the European Theater, the critical difference was knowledge of the adversary's radar technology. In the Pacific, the Allied knowledge of Japanese radar in 1942 was nonexistent, and the Allies spent the first few years of the war understanding the adversary's technology and tactical employment of radar. Key to this analysis in the SWPA was Section 22. (11)

Section 22

Founded in Brisbane, Australia in July 1943, Section 22 reported to the Chief Signal Officer of General MacArthur's General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA). Originally named "Radio and Radar Countermeasures Division" until November 1943, Section 22 combined all Allied efforts--not only US Army Air Forces and US Navy but also British Commonwealth and Dutch personnel--in a coalition effort to understand the Japanese use of radar and develop countermeasures to ensure success of Allied operations. (12) Section 22 had its origins with the primary communications intelligence organization in SWPA, the Central Bureau, which among other tasks had been plotting the locations of Japanese visual observer posts. When these posts started to get radar sets, it was natural that a new organization attached to GHQ SWPA should take over the work. Geographically separated subordinate elements called "Field Units" provided information to the headquarters through a myriad of reports. Some of the intelligence was actual 'hands-on' exploitation of captured Japanese equipment while other was electronic intelligence--intercepts of Japanese radar signals from air, land or sea-based platforms. Section 22 collated all information and circulated weekly and monthly reports on Japanese radar technology and current radar deployment locations. (13) Section 22 also requisitioned and assigned radio counter-measures (RCM) personnel and equipment. As the theater expert in radar countermeasures, 4Section 22 was also involved in the development and installation of radar interception and jamming equipment and worked closely with US based organizations such as the Radio Research Laboratory at Harvard University. But all of this was in the future; the first task assigned to the unit was to determine the type, accuracy and location of Japanese radar stations. With the theater being a broad expanse of water populated with many small islands, the easiest and fastest method to accomplish such a task was with an airborne platform. (14)

Initial SWPA RCM Activities

History is never clean and simple with clear cut start and stop dates. The emergence of airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations in the Pacific in the early days of the Second World War was no different. Though records of such activity from this hectic time period are scarce, prior to the formation of Section 22 GHQ SWPA loosely orchestrated a group of British, Australian and New Zealand RCM observers who rotated through available assets, including 90th Bomb Group (H) B-24Ds, 403rd and 435th Bomb Squadron Boeing B-17s, and RAAF Consolidated Catalinas and Lockheed Hudsons. The first aircraft outfitted with this equipment was likely a 435th Bomb Squadron B-17 in early September 1942, with other aircraft being added one at a time in the following months.

The RCM observers would lug aboard their heavy Hallicrafter S-27 or Australian SN-2 radar intercept receivers and ride along for the mission. Soon this activity with USAAF units would be formalized with the 'ad-hoc' ferrets found in many SWPA Bomb Groups.

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'Ad-hoc' ferrets (a contemporary term used by aviation historians) are standard bomber aircraft field-modified with racks, cabling, and antennas that enable them to carry radar receivers and other SIGINT equipment on an a periodic basis, usually as a secondary mission to a primary function of bombing. Shortly after arriving in theater at Fenton Field, Australia in May 1943, the 380th Bomb Group (H) started flying its first 'ad-hoc' ferret missions. Initially, a handful of Group B-24D aircraft were fitted out with racks, cabling and antennas to support radar receivers operated by Royal Air Force, Royal New Zealand Navy, or Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) RCM observers on loan to the unit. (15) Section 22 soon organized Field Unit 6 to work with the 380th Bomb Group (H), the unit operating a dozen or so 'ad-hoc' ferrets before the war was through. The 380th Bomb Group (H) was just the tip of the iceberg.

The plan required detailed knowledge of Japanese defenses in the region

In December 1942 Cast Mike #1, a small group of sailors trained at the Naval Research Lab, started experimental flights with an XARD receiver in VP-72 PBY-5A Catalinas in the South Pacific. After a couple months of flights in the Solomon Islands without finding any radar signals, the team upgraded the receiver to the AN/ARC-1 and started to meet with success. (16) The PBY Catalina ferret flight operations continued through 1943 with the team and equipment bouncing between PBY squadrons resident in the South Pacific, but in late 1943 Cast Mike #1 was disbanded as the Navy searched for a more permanent solution. (17) The Army Air Forces had come to the same conclusion as well, reacting favorably to a Section 22 request.

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The Introduction of Ferrets

MacArthur's planned offensive against Rabaul, a key Japanese base on New Britain, was given approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in spring 1943. Executed as Operation CARTWHEEL, the plan required detailed knowledge of Japanese defenses in the region. This action likely galvanized the creation of Section 22 and provided the impetus and priority to move from an ad-hoc approach of radar reconnaissance to a more formal structure with proper equipment. Backed by a Joint Chiefs directive, the staff at GHQ SWPA soon went calling to Washington. In July 1943 Brigadier General Spencer Akin, Chief Signal Officer for SWPA, flew to Washington to meet with Major General Harold McClelland, the newly appointed Air Communications Officer at Headquarters Army Air Forces. At a meeting on July 22, the Army Air Forces agreed to build two ferret aircraft to aid GHQ SWPA in gathering SIGINT for current and proposed operations. (18) This was a rush job, with SWPA desiring the receipt of the aircraft little more than a month after Material Command was notified. With no time to build a prototype, Air Staff recommended Material Command use Ferret I as a starting point for installation of the necessary radar equipment. Ferret I, a B-24D modified for the radar reconnaissance role in February 1943, was the first USAAF purpose-built radar intelligence aircraft and had flown missions in the Aleutians starting in March 1943. (19)

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Plans for Project 96288R--the production of two ferrets for SWPA-were quickly drawn up and sent to the First Proving Ground Electronics Unit of the Air Service Command at Eglin Field, Florida. Two new production B-24D aircraft allocated to SWPA left the Tucson Modification Center after having post-production work performed on them and arrived at Eglin in late September for their transformation into ferrets. A plywood compartment was built in the aft section of the bomb bay to house two RCM observers, with seats on the right side and equipment racks on the left. Personnel from Wright Field and the Radio Research Laboratory assisted in the modifications. (20)

While Material Command was building two new ferret aircraft for SWPA, Section 22 looked what it could do in-theater. In late July it asked Headquarters Army Air Forces staff for any information they could provide on design and performance data on radar search receiver antennas for B-24 aircraft. (21) With nothing being available from Thirteenth Air Force, Field Unit 13 of Section 22 started to acquire the necessary equipment--receivers, pulse analyzers, antennas, etc--from other units in theater, mainly US Navy squadrons. The equipment was gathered at Thirteenth Air Force and sorted out while waiting for a host aircraft. When the 868th Bomb Squadron arrived in theater in January 1944 one of the squadron aircraft was configured as an 'ad-hoc' ferret with an AN/ARC-1 radar receiver, but since the plane was still assigned bombing duties the ferret equipment was removed every time she flew a 'standard' bombing mission to preclude unnecessary loss. In late February and early March 1944 the aircraft flew only three electronic reconnaissance missions. (22) In the interim, the new ferrets arrived in theater and started to map out Japanese radar sites.

In January 1944 the two modified B-24Ds, now identified as Ferrets VII and VIII, arrived in theater. Flight personnel for ferret aircraft were not available in theater, so four countermeasure operators and four enlisted mechanics joined the ferrets in the US and were assigned to V Bomber Command. (23) In addition, a Radio Research Laboratory Technical Observer, Clark Cahill, accompanied the ferrets to theater at the request of SWPA to observe and report on the performance of the aircraft. (24) Although administratively assigned to the 63rd Bomb Squadron, 43rd Bomb Group (H) for maintenance, the mission tasking of the ferrets was controlled by Section 22.

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The first 28 operational ferret missions were flown around New Britain, New Ireland, and the north coast of New Guinea. These missions, combined with earlier efforts, greatly contributed to understanding of the eleven Type 11 and Type 12 radars protecting Rabaul and aided Fifth Air Force and US Navy air strikes on the base. Once the ferrets were able to precisely locate the sites they were targeted for attack. Destruction of Japanese radar sets started in April or May of 1944, with half the radar sites out of action by August. (25) In early April the ferrets moved from Nadzab, New Guinea to Fenton Field, Australia and were temporarily assigned to the 530th Bomb Squadron of the 380th Bomb Group (H). While Ferret VII was undergoing modification, Ferret VIII flew eight missions and plotted five radar sites on Timor, Ambon Island and western New Guinea. (26) The upgrade to the ferrets--Ferret VIII would follow Ferret VII once she had returned to flight operations --was something that had been planned for a while. Section 22 had noted that the direction finding antennas on the aircraft required improvement and the SCR-587 radar receiver was of little utility. (27) The search radar was also considered inadequate for navigation and storm avoidance. (28)

The ferrets were modified in Brisbane, Australia by a group in Section 22 responsible for development work and adaption of existing equipment. Equipment location within the RCM observer compartment was changed around to ease operation while flying. The SCR-587 was retained, likely due to the lack of suitable replacement at hand, while the C-2100 Direction Finding Assembly was kept in place pending improvements shipped from the US. (29) The navigation radar was also upgraded from the SCR-521 to the SCR-717B. Section 22 would continue to modify SWPA ferrets through the end of the war, tweaking antennas and equipment to optimize performance and passing results back to the US for incorporation into future ferret development.

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By the end of August the Fenton Field-based ferrets had mapped the Banda Sea and Borneo region and were ready to join the fight for the Philippines. The Allied liberation of Owi Island enabled the ferrets to move northward and rejoin the 63rd Bomb Squadron in early September, arriving in time to survey Morotai and the Palaus before the allied landings. (30) With their assignment to the 43rd Bomb Group (H), the ferrets would be linked to Fifth Air Force operations for the rest of the war, leaving the Netherlands East Indies without a dedicated USAAF ferret platform. Thankfully the Navy patrol community was able to cover some of this gap.

In late 1943 the replacement for the USN Cast Mike #1 team, teams of officer aircrews dedicated to the radar search missions, started to arrive in the South Pacific. A VP-104 Consolidated PB4Y-1 was modified for the ferret mission and flew about twenty missions in February 1944 against radars at Truk, Caroline Islands, and New Britain. The missions proved successful and VPB 116, a PB4Y-1 squadron flying out of Eniwetok, was tasked with performing electronic reconnaissance of the region with three aircraft fitted out with receivers. (31) The Navy saw success in this endeavor and expanded the deployment of RCM equipment. By August 1944 13 of the 18 land based patrol squadrons had aircraft fitted out with AN/APR-1, AN/APA-6, direction finding (DF) antennas, and AN/APT-1 jammers. (32)

In April 1944 two PBY Catalinas were fitted out as dedicated ferret aircraft with AN/ARC-1 radar receivers at Palm Island near Townsville in Australia and assigned to the operational control of Section 22. Operations began in May 1944 with missions based out of Port Moresby searching for Japanese radars in New Guinea, Halmaheras, and the Philippines. (33) Like B-24 Ferrets VII and VIII, they were administratively attached to various units for support, including VP-33, VP-34 and VP-71.

Section 22 Evolves

As the organization grew, Section 22 asked War Department for additional RCM-trained personnel to perform non-ferret work, likely planning and tactics development. (34) Section 22 endeavored to stay abreast with developments in electronics that were occurring on an increasingly faster pace, requesting shipment of prototype RCM equipment to Australia so the theater would be ready to fully utilize the new receivers when they came into production. (35)

Section 22 was also building its inventory of operational equipment as well. Likely driven by the memory of having to borrow equipment from the US Navy for outfitting its first 'ad-hoc' ferret, Section 22 requested a long laundry list of equipment from War Department ranging from AN/APR-4 and Hallicrafter S-36 receivers to test equipment. (36) By mid-1944 Section 22 had the personnel and equipment in hand to start addressing the needs of the theater. Ferrets VII and VIII, coupled with the other elements of Section 22, were gathering details on Japanese radar deployment and employment to enable staff planners to start developing ways to counter Japanese air surveillance. Radar jammers and window were on hand from shipments earlier in the year, giving SWPA aircraft the ability to mask their actions from Japanese radars. (37) On September 10, 1944 air commander Lieutenant General George Kenney sent an urgent message to General MacArthur requesting assistance in circumventing Japanese radar coverage of Goerango Point on Morotai Island in preparation for upcoming bombing operations. Section 22's exhaustive response noted that any bombers would need to be masked from both the Goerango Point and the Cape Petak radars; while jamming or window could be used, it was recommended that the offending radars be precisely located and bombed. (38)

South West Pacific Strategic Picture--Fall 1944

In September 1944 the staff in SWPA was tense. The years of slow fighting along New Guinea were about to change as MacArthur was poised to return to the Philippines through an amphibious landing on Leyte Island--an operation accelerated two months in mid-September to an October 20th assault date. The seizure of western New Guinea also opened up air bases for operations against the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. In September 1944, the island of Noemfoor was captured and two 7,000 foot runways were completed. This action set in motion air boss Lieutenant General Kenney's next move--a series of five raids by his Far East Air Forces against the major oil refinery complexes at Balikpapan and Lutong, Borneo. The first raid was on September 30--hence his interest in Japanese radars in the region. That month, Ferrets VII and VIII started flight operations from Owi Island, positioning them to range deep into the Philippines and over Borneo. As the fighting dragged on in the southern Philippines SWPA planners charted out follow on actions for the theater. In February 1945, GHQ SWPA outlined operations for the next six months, with plans centering on clearing the remainder of the Philippines and the Australian invasion of Borneo. (39) Japanese forces in the Netherlands East Indies, though bypassed by MacArthur, were still prevalent and considered dangerous. GHQ SWPA looked to the Thirteenth Air Force to soften up the enemy to support the operations planned for the next six months.

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By this time, Thirteenth Air Force had three bomb groups assigned to XIII Bomber Command--the 5th Bomb Group (H), the 42nd Bomb Group (M), and the 307th Bomb Group (H)--along with the 868th Bomb Squadron. In September, the 307th Bomb Group (H) commenced operations in the Netherlands East Indies, hitting targets in the Halmaheras, Ceram and at Balikpapan, Borneo. The 307th would continue flying missions in this region through mid-1945, targeting Japanese shipping, oil refineries, and airfields. The 5th Bomb Group (H) followed a similar course of action, alternating between oil refineries of Borneo, Japanese shipping from Morotai through the Sulu Sea, and airfields throughout the Philippine Islands, Celebes, Halmaheras, and Borneo. In between these missions, the 'Bomber Barons' of the 5th Bomb Group (H) supported clearing operations in the Philippine Islands (Luzon and Mindanao) and the Australian invasion of Borneo. The 42nd Bomb Group (M) and the Australian First Tactical Air Force played similar roles, keeping pressure on Japanese forces and supporting clearing operations throughout the region. Though bypassed by the main war effort, the Japanese forces in the Netherlands East Indies were far from pacific and, supplied with fuel from Borneo, were able to aggressively resist Allied incursions. It was up to Section 22 to help the allied airmen thread through the Japanese air defenses to successfully strike their targets.

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The Rise of the Ad-Hoc Ferrets

The split of SWPA into two lines of effort--north through the Philippines and west into the Netherlands East Indies--split the airborne RCM effort. Ferrets VII and VIII and the ferret PBYs could only cover so much territory and by the end of September 1944 were mainly devoted to missions against the Philippines. This left the Netherlands East Indies--which had received some radar reconnaissance from the ferrets during their stay at Fenton Field--lacking dedicated airborne collection. A requirement for two "radar investigational search" aircraft for service with the Fifth Air Force in the Southwest Pacific Area was passed on to Material Command in late March 1944. (40) These two aircraft, designated Ferrets X and XI, arrived in Ohio in mid-July 1944 from a pool of B-24J but it would not be until early 1945 that these aircraft would be ready to depart the US. With the hard use of Ferrets VII and VIII, the new aircraft were likely just going to replace old airframes vice add new capacity. Something clearly needed to be done--and the solution lay with the Field Units of Section 22.

It was realized that only by searching during a strike could it be determined how the Japanese used their radars against enemy aircraft, be it searchlight, gun-laying, or ground controlled intercept by fighter aircraft. For this reason, before 'ad-hoc' ferrets proliferated, Ferrets VII and VIII accompanied several strike missions. (41) The 380th Bomb Group (H) 'ad-hoc' ferrets were still operating and had actually received six 'updated' aircraft by mid-1944. (42) By this time Section 22 had accumulated a large number of AN/APR- 1s receivers and AN/APA-6 pulse analyzers and work started to create 'ad-hoc' ferrets for all the bomb groups in Fifth Air Force. (43) Seventh Air Force had taken a similar approach to the vexing problem of too many SIGINT requirements and not enough ferrets. In November 1944 Headquarters Seventh Air Force set forth a Radio and Radar Reconnaissance Plan that required that provisions be made for rack, power and antenna installations in four aircraft per heavy bomb squadron to carry radar receivers. (44) The Thirteenth Air Force, left to cover the 'backwater' Netherlands East Indies, needed its own 'ad-hoc' ferret force--and Field Unit (FU) 13 of Section 22 provided a solution.

FU 13 had been assigned to Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force since mid-1943. Attached to FU 13 in September 1944 were two physicists and New Zealand Army officers, Major Edward 'Ted' Collins and Lt. Robert 'Bob' Unwin. After looking at the resources available to them, they determined the 868th Bomb Squadron's operations--single aircraft going in at night that could stir up Japanese radar activity--as the perfect fit. The Field Unit joined the 868th in the Admiralties in August 1944 but did not 'send out any missions' until September 18, 1944 after the squadron was settled and flying operations from Noemfoor, Dutch New Guinea. In the interim, the Field Unit had fitted out one of the squadron's B-24J aircraft as an 'ad-hoc' ferret. Equipment racks and cabling were installed as well as antennas; the aircraft was then fitted with the appropriate receivers and analyzers before a mission. The concept was pretty simple; the bomber would fly its standard night anti-shipping or strike mission but on board would be a Section 22 RCM observer who would monitor the gear and record signals of Japanese radars. Eventually six 868th BS B-24 aircraft would be equipped to perform in the 'ad-hoc' ferret role, with Field Unit technicians performing the work on-site. (45) FU 13 also constructed homing antennas and cockpit displays to enable the pilots of these aircraft to make bombing runs against Japanese radar sites. (46) Ad-hoc' ferret aircraft differed from traditional ferret aircraft not only in their equipment fit but also by their tasking; operations were controlled not by Section 22 but by subordinate commands such as XIII Bomber or Fighter Command.

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The US Navy was also helping with the reconnaissance mission over the Celebes Sea. By October 1944, each land based squadron was authorized three aircraft fitted out with a variety of receivers and ordered to maintain a "continual RCM survey" of the enemy, with tasking from fleet commanders. (47) In the SWPA, Section 22 Field Units 3 and 11 supported Navy patrol units. Field Unit 3 worked with multiple squadrons, but with the exception of two ferret PBY missions flown against Celebes in October the thrust of the units work was in the Philippines. Field Unit 11, based out of Morotai, started to support missions in October 1944. Initially working with three VPB-146 Lockheed PV-1 aircraft that flew dedicated SIGINT missions, the unit switched to supporting VPB-101 and VPB-104 PB4Y-1s. The nine Ventura flights fanned out in the northwest quadrant from Morotai, with the majority of the missions covering the Celebes Sea. The ten PB4Y-1 flights in November 1944 covered similar territory, reaching out to Palawan and Makassar Strait. Reporting from both Field Units dies off by the end of 1944, but the Navy VPB squadrons continued to send reports on Japanese radar activity to Section 22. By this time most of the Navy patrol community was no longer flying in the Celebes Sea region; after supporting the invasions of Mindoro and Luzon they were ranging between Formosa and Indo-China along the western edge of the China Sea, leaving the 868th BS to cover the Celebes Sea.

The 868th BS 'ad-hoc' ferrets were fitted out with one AN/APR-1 receiver and one pulse analyzer--either an AN/APA-6 or AN/SPA-1--with both instruments operated by a dedicated RCM observer. The squadron flew 36 missions with 'ad-hoc' ferrets before the end of the 1944, with approximately 2/3 of them associated with armed shipping search missions ranging across the Celebes Sea, Sulu Sea and around Borneo to include Makassar Strait. The remainder of the missions was bombing missions against the Balikpapan refinery complex or Japanese airfields on Celebes, Cebu or Palawan Islands. The missions averaged 2-3 radar intercepts, usually composed of IJN Type 12 and Type 13 radar sets. Both Major Collins and Lt Unwin would fly missions with the 'ad-hoc' ferrets--an activity that enabled them to see firsthand how their equipment was working as well as stay connected with the operational side of Section 22. RCM Mission #16, flown the night of 23-24 October, was a typical sortie for an 868th BS 'ad-hoc' ferret. Taking off at 2230, pilot Lt Wadsworth flew B-24J s/n 44-40899 northwest from Noemfoor, Dutch New Guinea across the Celebes Sea. The crew was on a solo armed shipping search mission of the northeast coast of Palawan Island, using not only their SCR-717 radar but also RCM observer Technician Fourth Grade Kunhart's radar receivers to scan for Japanese maritime activity. Kunhart was one of the enlisted soldiers that FU 13 had been training at Noemfoor to fly as RCM observers. Like everything else in the SWPA, the theater was low in priority for trained RCM officers from the US--so just as they built their own ferret aircraft, Section 22 did their own training. Kunhart did not have much to do this mission--only three signals were reported for the nineteen hour sortie. With no shipping found, Lt Wadsworth attacked the dock area at Jolo Town, Jolo Island enroute home. The bombs missed, but they let the Japanese staff know they were being watched--and kept #899 from lugging the bombs back across the Celebes Sea. (48) Kunhart's work, though unglamorous that night helped build a better understanding of Japanese radar activity.

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The mission flown the night of 2-3 November 1944 was a little different. Taking off at 1500 from Noemfoor, B-24J 'ad-hoc' ferret s/n 44-40902 recovered at Morotai by 1845. The aircraft was refueled and the crew rested for a couple hours before climbing into the air at 2300. Turning northwest, #902 crossed the Celebes Sea alone enroute to the Mindanao Sea for an armed shipping search. The sky was overcast, interspersed with showers and lightning, making the trip across the open sea a little challenging both for pilot Captain Wallace and navigator Lt. Carp. Back in the waist section, Ted Collins chatted with Major Ken Newbury, RCM officer for the Thirteenth Air Force. As the Liberator approached Illana Bay on Mindanao's west coast at 0130 they received a weak signal at 149 MHz. Within 10 minutes the three direction finding cuts intersected west of the aircraft in the open sea, but with the SCR-717 showing no maritime activity in the region Collins chalked it up to a radar site further west of the aircraft. As soon as the RCM observers dropped this signal, another at 161 MHz appeared. Five bearing cuts placed it to the east of #902 on Mindanao near Leback. Three additional signals were heard through the night as the B-24 patrolled the Mindanao Sea and Sulu Sea on her return flight, but no shipping was found. As #902 turned southeast towards Morotai, Ted Collins once again picked up the 149 MHz signal he had received at the beginning of the mission. Passing the eastern tip of Basilan Island, the signal was strong--but his receiver was giving a bearing of 190 degrees into the Celebes Sea. Directing Captain Wallace to turn the aircraft, Collins soon located the radar on a reciprocal heading on Sibago Island. Wallace overflew the island at low altitude from north to south and the there it was--a Type 13 radar, perched on the spine of a 700 foot ridge, 100 yards from an old lighthouse. Captured in images from the K-20 camera shot out the B-24's waist window the radar quickly powered up and starting tracking the receding aircraft. Wallace racked the Liberator into a hard turn as the bombardier hunched over his Norden bombsight. Wallace made three runs on the radar, dropping single 500 lb general purpose bombs on the first two attacks and two on the third. The bombs appeared to miss the radar by a few hundred feet each time. (49) By the time the crew landed at Noemfoor at 1145 the adrenalin from the attack had long since dissipated from their tired bodies--but for the RCM observers, there was work to do.

After each mission, the Field Unit would review the hand-written logs of the RCM observer and type up a message to be sent to Section 22 for analysis. The headquarters element reviewed all intercepts for new signals and tactics and combined intercepts to produce an updated electronic order of battle that was circulated in weekly or monthly 'statements' throughout SWPA. Thirteenth Air Force, desiring a more rapid refresh of its radar data, had Field Unit 13 set up a local analysis shop to support the headquarters staff. (50) As Section 22 gained experience and confidence in working against the Japanese radar sites, it started to provide feedback on reconnaissance operations. In November 1944 a message sent to the 868th BS admonished the squadron from altering their flight path to enable precise direction finding against a radar; such activity would either allow the Japanese to develop a track on the aircraft and enable them to bring anti-aircraft (AA) fire to bear or cause the radar operators to turn off their set. Field Unit 13 worked to educate Thirteenth Air Force on such tactics and how to work against the Japanese radar system, but it soon became apparent that the best tactic against the radars was to kill the radar site vice jamming or spoofing them. (51)

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Radar Destruction

In the past, Japanese radar sites in the SWPA had been viewed as targets of opportunity or had been struck when viewed as a particular problem. Thirteenth Air Force P-70s and P-38s had targeted the Japanese radar installation protecting Rabaul at Cape Saint George, New Ireland on at least three occasions between January and March 1944, using data from Ferrets VII and VIII. The 868th Bomb Squadron's nascent 'ad-hoc' ferret work in the same time period was also tied to radar destruction efforts. Commander, Aircraft, Solomons, subordinate to Allied Pacific Ocean Areas Command, directed the squadron to confirm the location of the radar site at Merai, north of Adler Bay, New Britain, with imagery to aid in its destruction--the pilot of the 'ad-hoc' ferret even making a bomb run on the target once he thought he had visually acquired it! (52) Starting with the November 3 attack on the Sibago radar site, the 868th Bomb Squadron 'ad-hoc' ferrets performed strikes against Japanese radar sites, but this was not the primary function or mission of these aircraft.

One of the challenges in precisely locating Japanese radar sites was the use of camouflage. As compared to sites in Europe where German radars were placed in the open with minimal obscuration, the Japanese worked hard to hide their radar emplacements. Radar towers were camouflaged with palm fronds and sometimes antenna elements were attached to live trees. Location via electronic means was not good enough--photographs were needed to definitively place the radar to enable follow-on bombers to find and strike the target. Ideally, a dedicated aircraft would perform this function. On October 1, 1944 Section 22 requested information on an antenna fit for a B-25 aircraft to enable it to home in on an enemy radar set. Though the Radio Research Laboratory was working on such a set for the US Navy for installation in a Grumman F6F Hellcat, the time delays likely were not to the liking of the theater. (53) Field Unit 13 personnel started working on modifying a 42nd Bomb Group (M) B-25 in November 1944 using equipment on-hand that was being used with the 868th BS 'ad-hoc' ferrets--the AN/APR-1 receiver and AN/SPA-1 pulse analyzer. The resultant aircraft - 100th Bomb Squadron B-25J s/n 43-27983 - flew her first mission on November 28, 1944 with two RCM observers.

XIII Fighter Command tasked the B-25 "ferret" to assist in the systematic destruction of enemy radar installations. (54) The aircraft's first ten missions, flown in November and December 1944 from Sansapor, Dutch New Guinea, concentrated on locating strategically important radars on Halmahera Island. By December 11th the 100th Bomb Squadron was ready to go on the offensive against the Japanese radar net. XIII Fighter Command was undertaking a major strike against Japanese facilities at Goeroea, Halmahera, with eleven A-20s, twenty four B-25s, and twelve P-38s. To support this operation, the ferret B-25 was teamed up with another 100th BS B-25 for the mission of suppressing the Japanese radar at Cape Petak, 30 miles away from the target area. With the ferret B-25 providing direction, the two bombers arrived one hour prior to the strike and dropped bombs singly or in pairs for a period of 50 minutes, then dropped down to low altitude and made six strafing runs against the radar site. The initial surprise at Goeroea was so complete that the A-20 strikers received no AA fire until they were departing the target area. Additional strikes were flown against the Cape Noesanive radar on December 14th with six B-25s and a follow-up attack against Cape Petak on December 17th, both strikes flown at the behest of XIII Fighter Command. (55) With the Halmaheras apparently cleared out, the B-25 ferret was directed to operate further south against Ceram Island on Banda Sea. Key to these missions was the two dedicated RCM observers who flew #983--1Lt Dylowski and Sgt. Plant. Dylowski (promoted to Captain in December) would continue to fly with #983 until mid-January, when he trained up two lieutenants as replacements--2d Lt James Alderman and 2d Lt Fenn.

The success of the Thirteenth Air Force ferret B-25 was readily apparent

B-25 ferret #983 would spend the next two months operating in the Ceram Island area, investigating radars and radio towers for future strike operations. (56) During this time period, the B-25 ferret flew 28 sorties including a dozen that resulted in attacks against radar sites. On December 28th, #983 and another B-25 were tasked with suppressing the Japanese radar site on the southeast side of Laoet Island to prevent detection of a XIII Fighter Command strike headed for Ambon and Haroekoe Islands. The bombers dropped fragmentation bombs at 15 minute intervals to keep the radar offline. (57)

On February 6th, the ferret was accompanied by another B-25 to attack the Japanese radar site at Boela, Ceram. This installation had led a charmed life, being attacked six times previously by the ferret. The ferret separated from the bomber to work bearings on the site, though after a few minutes the site was off the air. Both bombers dropped their bombs from medium altitude and departed the area. The results were unknown, but the Boela site would reappear on the air later in the month. (58) While the strike missions were exciting, the majority of the missions flown by #983 were orders from XIII Fighter Command and XIII Bomber Command to "obtain intercept and photographic information on radar activity" at specific tasked locations. The job of finding Japanese radars was getting a little harder. Soon enemy radar operators learned to recognize the homing runs flown by #983 and would switch off the radar when the aircraft was miles from the coast, making this manner of taking bearings of little use. Still, the B-25 ferret helped contribute to a better understanding of radars in the region, being credited with finding installations on Eastern Ceram at Boela, Banda Islands south of Ceram, and at Ambelau Island. (59) This information, fused with data gained from local scouts in the region controlled by the Dutch, gave Section 22 specific radar locations that not only aided in coverage diagrams but also helped in the radar destruction campaign. (60)

The last mission flown by the ferret B-25 from Sansapor was of note. On February 16, the ferret accompanied a strike mission of twenty four 42nd Bomb Group (M) B-25s against the Kendari supply area and adjacent Mega village on southeast Celebes Island. The ferret flew along to gather information as to the effectiveness of the low level ingress planned to evade Japanese radar detection. RCM observer 2Lt Alderman heard no Japanese signals after the formation dropped down to 500 feet, validating the mission plan and the mapping of the Japanese radars in the region by Section 22. (61) Up to this time, the B-25 ferret averaged three radars intercepted per sortie, the majority being IJN Type 13 radars.

With this mission complete, the crew packed up and deployed to Puerto Princessa, Palawan, situated between the Sulu Sea and the South China Sea. Packing his belongings for Palawan, 2Lt Jim Alderman must have paused to contemplate the strange world he was now in. A native of Wartrace, Tennessee, he would spend the next few months flying with #983 as her dedicated RCM observer, racking up 40 operational missions by the end of the war. The flying was exciting as was the challenge of locating Japanese radars. B-25 ferret #983 was one of a kind, and she had made a dent in the Japanese air picture in the Southwest Pacific.

The success of the Thirteenth Air Force ferret B-25 was readily apparent, and soon another ferret B-25 was being built by Section 22--but for use with Fifth Air Force. Section 22 staff officer Captain Victor Tatelman, a veteran B-25 pilot on his second tour to the SWPA, worked with RRL technical representatives to modify a B-25D into a ferret configuration. Tasked by V Bomber Command, he flew anti-radar missions out of the Philippines with maintenance support from the 499th Bomb Squadron, 345th Bomb Group (M). Starting in February 1945, Tatelman flew his B-25D 'Dirty Dora IF for a few months until radar targets started to dry up.

As the Field Unit 13 Detachment associated with the ferret B-25 packed their belongings for the trip to Palawan, just recently liberated on February 28, the remainder of the unit continued to work with the 868th BS. Joining them in February was 2Lt Fenn, who after flying nine missions with #983 switched over to the B-24 side of FU 13 to fly in 'ad-hoc' ferrets. Sgt. Plant, veteran of B-25 ferret missions from the beginning, also switched to B-24s at the same time. The 'ad-hoc' ferrets of the 868th BS flew six missions in January but for unknown reasons did not fly in February. The missions were all armed shipping searches along northwest Borneo near Miri or north in Brunei Bay with secondary targets of infrastructure at Jesselton or Lutong. Only 2-3 signals were received on each missions, usually IJN Type 12 and Type 13 radars. Upgrades were made to the 'ad-hoc' ferret fleet as new equipment was made available, with new direction-finding antennas being installed in the aircraft in January 1945. Since there were only 2-3 boxes of each type of electronic equipment on hand at the base, receivers were loaded onto the 'ad-hoc' ferrets before each mission and pulled post-flight. (62)

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Thirteenth Air Force Ferret

By the winter of 1944-45 the Ferrets VII and VIII were showing their age. They still completed the mapping of the Philippines and had started on Formosa, though did take one spin through their former haunting grounds with a single mission by Ferret VII to Halmahera on January 15, 1945. (63) Ferret VII's mission confirmed the location of radars plotted by the 'ad-hoc' ferrets and cemented the need for a dedicated ferret for Thirteenth Air Force. As strikes by XIII Bomber Command against Borneo and the southern Philippines increased, the command became more aware of the need to make a concerted effort against Japanese radar sites like what was occurring with the XIII Fighter Command in the Halmahera and Ceram Island region. Though US Navy patrol aircraft were starting to use Section 22 radar data to attack radar installations around the Celebes Sea, XIII Bomber Command personnel recognized the need to have a long range ferret aircraft that could positively locate radars through imagery to enable successful strikes. (64) While the 'ad-hoc' ferrets of the 868th BS contributed to a much greater understanding of Japanese radar employment and tactics, the RCM search mission was still a secondary tasking. If a radar site was to be located with any degree of accuracy, a dedicated aerial platform was required. A test orchestrated by Field Unit 13 commander Major Collins during a November 1944 'ad-hoc' ferret mission confirmed that when the aircraft was dedicated to ferret work a radar site could be located within a half mile radius and attacked. Vindicated in his convictions, Collins started to lobby for a B-24 fitted out as a ferret but capable of dropping bombs for attacking radars. The Commanding General of Thirteenth Air Force concurred and released a new B-24 that had been in theater a couple months to Field Unit 13 for conversion to a ferret. (65)

Collins immediately started fitting out the aircraft as both a radar reconnaissance and radar attack platform. Radar jammers were fitted out in the aft fuselage and waist gunners were enlisted to drop window. As opposed to the purpose-built ferret aircraft coming from the States, Field Unit 13 did not locate any electronic gear in the bomb bay, leaving it available for weapons. (66) Two RCM observer positions were installed in the aircraft, one in the nose and one in the waist position. Each location had an AN/APR-4 receiver and an AN/APA-11 pulse analyzer to allow reconnaissance against multiple signals simultaneously. K-17 and K-20 cameras were also carried to enable radar installations to be photographed. Finally, homing gear and displays for the pilot similar to those in B-25 ferret #983 were installed in the cockpit. Once the aircraft was fitted out, operators were needed--so Field Unit 13 started to train enlisted personnel already on base to operate the equipment. The first operational mission was flown on March 1, 1945 though only one RCM position had a complete equipment installation for the flight. (67)

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

The Thirteenth Air Force ferret--B-24L-5-CO s/n 44-41464--flew dedicated RCM reconnaissance missions with the 868th BS. Between March 15 and April 13 she flew six sorties across the SWPA, including two missions to Makassar Strait, two to Mindanao, and two to Halmahera and Ceram Islands. Major Collins flew on the first three missions of #464, joined by Lt Unwin on her second flight; this helped validate their design work as well as get them out from behind the desk and into the action. The endurance of the B-24 coupled with two dedicated RCM observers and the mission flexibility to loiter enabled #464 to be used in a verification role, confirming suspected radar positions and coverage or investigating odd activity such as Japanese night fighters. Low level visual and photographic runs were made to precisely locate radars installations. On April 9 #464 took a run at the hapless radar site at Boela, Ceram, but cloud cover kept her from going in on the final bomb run to drop her belly load of five 100 lb M47 A-2 napalm bombs and ten 260 lb fragmentation bombs. Two days later #464 tried her luck again against another radar site. Five bombing runs were made against the radar site at Donggala, Celebes but all bombs burst 100 to 250 feet short and to the right of the station. Undoubtedly frustrated, the pilot lined the aircraft up and made two strafing runs against the radar post. The secondary target, the radar site at Kabaladoea Island, was strafed seven times. (68) After taking the month of February off, the 868th BS 'ad-hoc' ferrets flew three missions in March and five through mid-April 1945. The March missions continued to be anti-shipping, now concentrating on the east coast of Borneo to include the Makassar Strait. Two of the April missions continued this trend, while two other missions expanded beyond the Makassar Strait into the south Celebes Sea. Additional signals were observed on these sorties, the average being four to five Type 12, Type 13, and Type 11 Modification 2 radars--the latter a new signal for the unit. On April 17, 'ad-hoc' ferret B-24 #899 was accompanying another B-24 in an anti-shipping search of southern Makassar Strait. Unfortunately, the RCM observer turned out to be in for the ride as the antenna feeder short circuited, making his gear inoperative. After chasing down two schooners and one small cargo ship Lt. Everett, the RCM observer, recommended #899 attack the Type 13 radar at Balabalangan Island. Lt. Olsen, #899's pilot, dropped the B-24 down to low altitude and made two bombing runs. On the first run, five 250 lb. general purpose bombs were dropped on three buildings near the radar tower while four bombs were dropped on the tower on the second run--both accompanied by machine gun fire. Two additional strafing runs were made with fire concentrating on the radar tower. For her efforts, #899 received holes in 14 places from AA fire and had her hydraulics were knocked out--but Lt. Everett blandly noted in the mission report, "this radar may be considered as at least temporarily out of service." (69)

Low level visual and photographic runs were made to precisely locate radars installations

The mission for April 6 was a different role for the 'adhoc' ferrets and was a portent of things to come with the 868th BS. Ad-hoc' ferret B-24J #025 was tasked with B-24J #462 to bomb Sepinggan Airfield at Balikpapan, Borneo and remain in the area as a diversion for a low flying Lockheed F-5 reconnaissance plane taking photos on the area. The weather was cloudy and the bombing run at 10,000 feet was made with radar assistance. After flying in the area for 40 minutes, the bombers were released--but not after seven different radars were observed and plotted. The ferret then dropped beneath the cloud cover and took low altitude oblique photos of the Donggala radar post with a K-17 camera before returning to Morotai. (70) Soon the 868th BS would start to utilize their ferret and 'ad-hoc' ferrets in this type of strike support role--an expansion of the pioneering work done by B-25 ferret #983.

On April 17, 1945 Ferret #464 took off from Morotai with the mission of accurately locating radars on Tarakan Island off northeast Borneo and obtaining photo coverage of the Lemo and Donggola areas. When complete, she landed at Puerta Princessa, Palawan where the Field Unit 13 Detachment was working with 42nd Bomb Group (M) B-25 ferret #983. Major Collins accompanied the ferret as one of the RCM observers--he had not flown on her for three weeks and this trip enabled him to stay current in the job as well as check up on operations of the FU 13 Detachment. #464 remained for three days, flying a mission along the coast of French Indo China before taking off on April 21 for a mission to inspect Balikpapan and Tarakan Island en route to home at Morotai. #464's mission to the Indo China coast was likely to augment #983's work from the past month. (71)

B-25 ferret #983 flew her first mission from Puerta Princessa, Palawan, on March 26. The first five missions were mainly along the northeast and northwest coast of Borneo and surprisingly revealed no radar signals between 40 MHz and 1000 MHz. On the night of 27/28 March, the commanding officer of the 42nd Bomb Group (M) ordered #983 aloft to help look for two Japanese battleships that were thought to be roaming in the area; it was hoped that they would have their surface search radars on and be visible to the ferret, but the tired RCM observers on #983 saw nothing. The Japanese battleships turned out to be two Royal Navy destroyers mis-identified by a fighter pilot. On March 31, #983 ventured into the South China Sea to look for a reported radar installation on Itu Aba Island, but again the receivers picked up no signals. Searches of the Turtle Islands and the China Coast in early April also provided similar results though range limitations kept #983 150 miles off of China. The RCM observer for the ninth Palawan flight, Lt. Alderman, must have been ecstatic as the mission on April 14 actually had signals to record! With a bomb bay full of fuel tanks and escorted by six P-38s, the intrepid #983 took off at 0735 and with the sun at her back flew due west to Saigon, French Indo China. Alderman noted seven radars active during the mission, including Type 11 Modification 2, Type 12, Type 13, and IJA Tachi 6 radars. While the April 21 flight to Brunei revealed no radar activity, the flight activity over the next two weeks provided a change of pace for the crew of #983. Between April 22 and May 6, five missions were flown to Indo China, with #983 acting as a pathfinder for fighter sweeps into the area and taking advantage of the extra air activity acting as a stimulus to note radar activity. A similar mission was flown on April 26 with the target being Kuching on the west coast of Borneo. The day prior, #983 tried to stir up Japanese activity in northwest Borneo by flying near the Japanese airfields at Kudate, Jesselton and Labuan, but no radars were heard operating. (72)

End Game for Field Unit 13 - Late April missions

When B-24 ferret #464 returned from Palawan big plans lay in store for her. First up was a strike on Soerabaja Harbor, Java on the night of April 24, 1945. The harbor was a major naval base for the Japanese and also a shipping terminal for oil from local refineries. The planned attack featured #464, fitted with three radar jammers and carrying CHH-2 'rope' window, entering the target area at 14,000 feet, jamming searchlight and fire control radars and dropping rope at 5 second intervals. 90 seconds later, B-24 #397, flown by Major Harris, flew 500 feet under #464 and dropped napalm bombs on the Naval Base Warehouse area. The idea was for the fire to light up the target area for the following low altitude attack, but a bomb rack malfunction kept the weapons in the bomb bay. Lt Putnam in B-24 #129 pressed on his attack at 300 feet, using radar to augment what he could see from the cockpit windows to attack shipping tied up to the wharf. The bombs went long, landing in the warehouse complex. #464's support was perfect, the Japanese AA response inaccurate and searchlights randomly scanning the sky until they by chance swept across the medium altitude aircraft. Seven radar signals were intercepted, the majority Type 12 radars. After being in the air for 16.5 hours, the snoopers recovered at Morotai at 6 AM on April 25. (73) The mission against Soerabaja was good practice for what was in store for the intrepid #464.

When B-24 ferret #464 returned from Palawan big plans lay in store for her

On April 27 the 868th BS returned to Soerabaja. A more aggressive mission was planned with #464, crewed by veteran FU 13 operators Lt Everett, Sgt Plant, and Sgt Powers, once again playing a lead role in supporting the strike. Though it was planned for B-24 #397 to light up the target area with flares, her H2X radar was inoperative and #464 quickly made two passes, dropping ten flares over the target area. Five 'snooper' Liberators then came in for the attack at one minute intervals, originally planning on hitting ships in harbor but instead attacking port facilities due to visibility in the harbor area. The searchlights and AA appeared to be visually controlled, with the bombers only encountering inaccurate ground fire. Though Japanese radars started tracking the bombers at 225 miles out from the target area, jamming did not commence until 75 miles from the target area. Starting at 20 miles out, window was dropped, with one of the three RCM observers on #464 noting jamming as "very effective." Ad-hoc' ferret #899 with NZ Lt Unwin as the RCM observer joined the mission as one of the strikers, leading the bombers over the target area and dropping window when 7 minutes out from the target area and monitoring the jamming coverage of #464. Fourteen signals were noted on the mission by ferret #464 including Type 11, Type 12, and Type 13 radar sets. The snoopers then set course for Truscott, Australia, landing just before 6 AM. That evening the snoopers returned to Morotai, conducting an armed shipping search of south Makassar Strait en route to home. (74)

On May 7 the 868th BS returned to Soerabaja with a vengeance. Ten snooper B-24s set out to attack shipping in the harbor. B-24 ferret #464 led three other aircraft coming over the target at 13,000 feet. #464 jamming both early warning and AA fire control radars and dropping rope window. 15 minutes later six low altitude strikers fanned out separated by 2 degrees of azimuth and 30 seconds in time. The final three medium altitude aircraft then departed the holding point at 1 minute intervals, dropping window as they progressed towards the inner harbor. The medium altitude aircraft hit harbor facilities while the low altitude aircraft scored hits on five ships. Three aircraft received moderate damage from AA, which was viewed as inaccurate but with a high volume of fire. (75)

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Signals intelligence within the 868th BS--and the SWPA in general--had come a long way in one year, but more was on the horizon. The monitoring and copying of enemy radio communications in the SWPA had been occurring since before hostilities had started with radio interception sites on Corregidor. This capability had slowly matured and by 1945 SWPA had a number of units performing radio communications intelligence. Among the units assigned to Thirteenth Air Force was the 7th Radio Squadron (Mobile), based at Morotai until April 1945, when it transferred to Leyte. The squadron maintained a detachment at Palawan and even after the move to Leyte maintained a group of airmen at Morotai. The squadron was tasked with running a net of ground-based radio intercept stations that targeted Japanese air-ground communications, to include the detachment at Puerta Princessa, Palawan.

The Palawan detachment was receiving little in the way of Japanese radio traffic. Believing the difficulty was weak signals due to distance, the detachment coordinated with XIII Fighter Command to fly with ferret B-25 #983. 7th RS (M) linguist Sgt Yukio Tamura climbed aboard #983 and flew missions on April 24 and 25 to monitor Japanese radio frequencies along the coast of northwest Borneo. (76) After the two Palawan missions, there appeared to be some strife as the squadron issued an order to cease and desist as flying was "not an authorized function." (77)

Either the squadron overcame its difficulties or the men at Morotai received updated guidance, as ferret B-24 #464 flew a mission with a radio intercept operator on April 27 for the attack on Soerabaja harbor. Using a BC-348 receiver for this purpose, the radio intercept operator was able to copy several new frequencies and four new call signs. On May 2, flying with an RBK-9 receiver as well as the BC-348, ferret #464 was tasked to reconnoiter Soerabaja and search between 2 and 10 MHz. Intercepting a new station at 10.1 MHz handling traffic between Singapore and Makassar, the operator forwarded the data to GHQ SWPA for further analysis. On the May 10 mission to northeastern Celebes, the radio intercept operator noted light activity, only capturing one piece of traffic on the BC-348.

The ferret B-25 continued to fly from Palawan through mid-1945, but even before B-24 ferret #464 had departed Navy radar receiver-equipped aircraft were flooding the island. First to arrive were detachments from two PBM-3D Mariner squadrons, VPB-17 and VPB-20, operating from the seaplane tender USS Pocomoke. The aircraft arrived on March 11, with flights mainly ranging to the west into the China Sea. VPB-17 departed on April 22, but within one week VPB-20 and the USS Pocomoke moved to Tawi-Tawi, Sulu Archipelago. The squadron provided convoy coverage and reconnaissance flights in support of the invasion of Borneo. In the month of June VPB-17 sent a detachment to join in and operations were concentrated on mine spotting for convoys and task groups involved in operations around Borneo at Brunei Bay and Balikpapan.

Between mid-April and early May the US Navy re-located three land-based patrol squadrons to Puerto Princessa, placing them under the operational control of Fleet Air Wing 10. VPB-106, flying PB4Y-2s, flew in from Iwo Jima and started flying anti-shipping patrols along the Malay coast in May 6. VPB-109 deployed to the island from Hawaii, starting to attack land and maritime targets in Borneo and Celebes in late April. VPB-111 arrived on April 11 from Tacloban with PB4Y-1s, but started conversion to the Privateer on May 1 and joined VPB-109 in hitting Borneo and Malayan targets. VPB-117, flying from McGuire Field, Mindoro, starting in February 1945 under the operational control of FAW-17, also contributed sorties over the northwest coast of Borneo, the coastline of Indochina and the waters in between. The RCM A-kit wired into the Privateers during production enabled great flexibility in the missions they were assigned, with many reconnaissance missions flown in support of the upcoming invasion of Borneo. The addition of these long range aircraft, many with radar receivers, literally flooded the region with aircraft able to map the remaining Japanese radars. In addition to the large increase in US Navy receiver-equipped aircraft, the USAAF heavy bomber groups were also seeing an influx of aircraft wired for radar receivers and jammers. (78)

By mid-1945 V Bomber Command was able to field dozens of RCM aircraft equipped with a single receiver and up to two jammers but the two XIII Bomber Command heavy bomber groups were not that robust. A victim of low placement behind Europe and the main push towards Japan, the XIII Bomber Command also had to contend with theater logistic priorities. There is no indication that 5th Bomb Group (H) had any RCM equipped aircraft, while the 307th Bomb Group (H) only fielded two such aircraft. These aircraft carried older AN/APR-1 receivers and two AN/APT-1 jammers but did not start flight operations until late May. (79) By then, the main fight was in Luzon preparing for the final push into Japan and Section 22 was changing its mission.

Conclusion

On May 1, 1945, operational control of the RCM mission passed to Far East Air Forces and 7th Fleet. With this transfer, the Field Units were dissolved and their personnel and equipment turned over to their respective commands. Day to day operations continued as before, with flying squadrons continuing to report back to Section 22 all the data that was collected. Section22 transitioned to more of a theater planning/intelligence unit, acting as the central RCM intelligence organization of the theater and maintaining control of Army Ground Force RCM units. (80) This transition as hardly felt in the field as most of the Field Units had fully embraced the units they reported to--RCM had become an accepted way of life for the airmen. On 7 May 1945 HQ RAAF took over operational control of Field Unit 15 from Section 22. Later that day, it directed the Field Unit to fit out two B-24s of 12 Squadron, RAAF with equipment similar to the 'ad-hoc' ferrets of Thirteenth Air Force. Field Unit 15, bereft of any RCM-equipped aircraft, had already been working on modifying a 24 Squadron B-24. This aircraft flew three missions in May before the 12 Squadron aircraft took over. These two B-24s flew operational missions from Darwin over the Celebes Sea region, usually shipping searches or strike missions against land targets in the region. Plans were made to equip two aircraft from 99 Squadron with a similar equipment load. (81) The Australians--who had started it all with RCM observers assigned to the 380th BG--were fully transitioned to independent operations.

NOTES

(1.) Yasuzo Nakagawa, Japanese Radar and Related Weapons of World War II (Aegean Park Press: Laguna Hills, Calif, 1997), p. 10-16.

(2.) Ibid., p. 24-29.

(3.) 2D & 3D Operations Analysis Section, Far East Air Force. A Short Survey of Japanese Radar, Volume I, November 20, 1945; Air Force Historical Research Agency, 720.310A V.1, Maxwell AFB, Ala., p. 11.

(4.) Ibid., p. 1-8.

(5.) Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific). Interrogation No. 491, Subject: Army Radar: Operations and Tactics, Dec. 4, 1945; Air Force Historical Research Agency, 137.73-15, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(6.) 2D & 3D Operations Analysis Section, Far East Air Force. A Short Survey of Japanese Radar, Volume I, November 20, 1945; Air Force Historical Research Agency, 720.310A V.1, Maxwell AFB, Ala., p. 14; the GHQ SWPA February 1945 order of battle (see AFHRA IRIS 00254218 listed below) references a "Mk 'CHI'" radar; this is undoubtedly the IJA Tachi-6 radar due to a reference to its bi-static nature and similar frequency range. Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Section 22, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Monthly Statement--Japanese Radar & Radio Activities in the Southwest Pacific Area. 9 February 1945, p. 30. Air Force Historical Research Agency, 710.654A/IRIS 00254218, Maxwell AFB, Ala. Similarly, the "Mk 'B'" radar parametrically fits the Tachi-7; see Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Section 22, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Current Statement--No. 0248. 15 December 1944, p.1. Air Force Historical Research Agency, 710.654B/IRIS 00254219, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(7.) Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, World War 2 Narratives. No. 3 Radar (Wellington, NZ: July 1948), p. 547. Archives New Zealand, AAOQ W3424 16.

(8.) Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Section 22, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area. Current Statement 259. 14 January 1945. Found in: RAAF Command Headquarters--RCM [Radio Counter Measure] Current Statements--Section 22, Series number A11093, Control symbol 676/4A11 PART 7, Barcode 1120657, National Archives of Australia.

(9.) Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Section 22, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Monthly Statement--Japanese Radar & Radio Activities in the Southwest Pacific Area. 9 February 1945, p. 34. Air Force Historical Research Agency, 710.654A/IRIS 00254218, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 18:3013; Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1956) pp. 304-305. The February 1945 is found in tabular format in the February 9, 1945 Monthly Statement on Japanese Radar & Radio Activities in the Southwest Pacific Area.

(10.) Royal Australian Navy. Monthly Naval Review, A.C.B. 0254/44. November 1944, pp. 9-11. http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications, accessed 7 Jan 2017.; Ed Simmonds and Norm Smith, ECHOES OVER THE PACIFIC: An overview of Allied Air Warning Radar in the Pacific from Pearl Harbor to the Philippines Campaign (E.W. & E. Simmonds, 1995), p. 235; Dr. S. Nakajima, "The history of Japanese radar development to 1945," found in Radar Development to 1945 (IEE Radar, Sonar, Navigation and Avionics Series 2, Russell Burns (Editor); Inspec/IEE, revised edition February 1989).

(11.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 311.

(12.) Alfred Price, The History of US Electronic Warfare, Volume I, (Washington: Association of Old Crows, 1984), pp. 138-141; Kevin Davis, "Field Unit 12 Takes New Technology to War in Southwest Pacific," Studies in Intelligence Vol 58, No. 3 (September 2014).

(13.) Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, World War 2 Narratives. No. 3 Radar (Wellington, NZ: July 1948), p. 547. Archives New Zealand, AAOQ W3424 16.

(14.) Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific Area. Report No. 18, Reconnaissance Aviation in the Southwest Pacific Area. April 22, 1946, p. 24. IRIS 114060, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 347.

(15.) Dick Dakeyne, Radar Gunner (Coolalinga, Northern Territory: David M. Welch, 2014), pp. 35-37; Commander, HMAS "Rushcutter." Enclosure to "Rushcutter" 963/2/20 to The Secretary, Naval Board, Melbourne. February 23, 1943. Australian War Memorial Records (Department of Navy AWM 79 File 609.13).

(16.) Price, US Electronic Warfare, pp. 55-56.

(17.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 320; Price, US Electronic Warfare, pp. 133-137.

(18.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. No subject. Signal Corps No. Q4546, Staff No. C-5107. August 26, 1943. Box 2064, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives.

(19.) Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution. Memorandum to CG, Material Command, Wright Field. September 25, 1943. Subject: Installation of RCM Equipment in Ferrets VII and VIII. 452.1--CONSOLIDATED B-24 FERRET 1943-44-45 Folder, Box 2713, Entry--Sarah Clark (Central Decimal File), RG 342, National Archives.

(20.) Price, US Electronic Warfare, p. 139; Individual Aircraft Data Card for 42-63991 and 42-64045, AFHRA; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. No subject. Signal Corps No. Q45, Staff No. C-5327. 2 September 1943. Box 2064, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives.

(21.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Commanding General, Army Air Force. No subject. Signal Corps No. Q4542, Staff No. C-5079. August 25, 1943. Box 2064, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. No subject. Signal Corps No. Q4966, Staff No. C-5259. August 31, 1943. Box 2064, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives.

(22.) Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific Area. Report No. 18, Reconnaissance Aviation in the Southwest Pacific Area. April 22, 1946, pp. 24-6. IRIS 114060, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(23.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. Subject: Personnel for Ferret Aircraft. Signal Corps No. Q1916, Staff No. C-6161. September 29, 1943. Box 2064, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. Subject: Ferret Aircraft. Signal Corps No. Q4472, Staff No. C-74450. November 4, 1943. Box 2065, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives.

(24.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. No subject. Signal Corps No. Q2711, Staff No. C-6492. October 4, 1943. Box 2065, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives.

(25.) United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific). The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul. (Washington: 1946), pp. 15-17, 28.

(26.) Section 22, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area. Report No. OWW-6, Ferret Operations. April 24, 1944. Air Force Historical Research Agency, 178.46-188/IRIS 00132153, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(27.) Office of the Chief Signal Officer, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Memorandum to Chief Signal Officer, War Department, Washington. February 28, 1944. Subject: Radar Counter Measures in the Southwest Pacific Area. SWPA RCM #1 1 of 2 Folder, Box 1489, Entry--Classified Central Decimal Files, RG 111, National Archives.

(28.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. Subject: Ferret Installation. Signal Corps No. Q4478, Staff No. C-7470. November 4, 1943. Box 2065, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. Subject: SCR Fittings in Ferrets. Signal Corps No. Q54, Staff No. C-7713. November 11, 1943. Box 2065, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, CG AAF (To Arnold for Jackson). Subject: Radar Shipment. Signal Corps No. Q518, Staff No. C-1120. January 30, 1944. Box 2066, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives.

(29.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Memorandum to Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Attention: Air Communications Section. Subject: Ferret Installations. June 2, 1944. Air Force Historical Research Agency, 710.84-1, Jun 44, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces. Memorandum to Commanding General, SWPA-Attn: Chief Signal Officer. 8 April 1944. Subject: Radar Counter Measures in the Southwest Pacific Area. SWPA RCM #1 2 of 2 Folder, Box 1489, Entry--Classified Central Decimal Files, RG 111, National Archives.

(30.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 348.

(31.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 320; Price, US Electronic Warfare, pp. 133-137.

(32.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 320.

(33.) Ibid., p. 348; Price, US Electronic Warfare, pp. 147-147.

(34.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. Subject: RCM Officers. Signal Corps No. Q1162, Staff No. C-8314. November 28, 1943. Box 2065, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives.

(35.) Office of the Chief Signal Officer, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Memorandum to Chief Signal Officer, War Department, Washington. February 28, 1944. Subject: Radar Counter Measures in the Southwest Pacific Area. SWPA RCM #1 1 of 2 Folder, Box 1489, Entry--Classified Central Decimal Files, RG 111, National Archives.

(36.) Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Stock Control Branch, War Department. Material Requirements for Section 22, OCSigO, GHQ, SWPA. February 22, 1944. SWPA RCM #1 2 of 2 Folder, Box 1489, Entry--Classified Central Decimal Files, RG 111, National Archives.

(37.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to War Department, Adjutant General. No subject. Signal Corps No. Q1700, Staff No. C-6084. September 27, 1943. Box 2064, Entry UD-UP 271--Outgoing Messages from GHQ to War Department, RG 496, National Archives.

(38.) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to Commanding General, Far East Air Forces. September 13, 1944. Subject: Radars in Halmahera and Morotai. Box 850, Entry 184/Top Secret General Correspondence, RG 496, National Archives.

(39.) Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area. Message to Chief of Staff, War Department. February 26, 1945. No subject. Box 852, Entry 184/Top Secret General Corr., RG 496, National Archives.

(40.) Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution. Memorandum to CG, Material Command, Wright Field. 23 March 1944. Subject: Ferrets X and XI, Project Number 96508R. 452.1--CONSOLIDATED B-24 FERRET 1943-44-45 Folder, Box 2713, Entry--Sarah Clark (Central Decimal File), RG 342, National Archives.

(41.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 349.

(42.) Joint Electronic Information Agency. Report No. 6229, Radio Countermeasures in Southwest Pacific Area. September 6, 1944. Air Force Historical Research Agency, 706.906, Jan-Mar 45/Frame 1650, Reel A7182, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(43.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 349.

(44.) Office of the Air Force Commander, Headquarters Seventh Air Force, APO 244. Memorandum to Distribution. 19 November 1944. Subject: General Program for Radar and Radio Reconnaissance in the Seventh Air Force. IRIS 259960, 740.907 Aug 1944 --Apr 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(45.) Field Unit 13, Section 22, GHQ, Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force, A-3 Section. Memorandum to Assistant Director, Section 22, GHQ SWPA, APO 500. December 26, 1944. Subject: Change of Address of Field Unit 13. Reel A7671, Frame 465, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, World War 2 Narratives. No. 3 Radar (Wellington, NZ: July 1948), pp. 535, 546. Archives New Zealand, AAOQ W3424 16; Field Unit 13, Section 22, GHQ, 868th Bombardment Squadron (H). Booklet of radar plots. November 27, 1944. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL, SQ-BOMB-868-Su Reel. Located on Reel A0670, Frame 599.

(46.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 349.

(47.) Ibid., p. 321.

(48.) 868th Bombardment Squadron. Special Reports on Missions, October-December 1944; Special Report on Missions #868-362, October 24, 1944; Section 22 Field Unit 13 Det. Report on RCM Mission #16. 27 October 1944; all associated with IRIS 50367, SQ-BOMB-868-Su; Microfilm Reel A0670, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(49.) 868th Bombardment Squadron. Special Report on Mission No. 868-381, 2-3 November 1944; 3 November 1944; Section 22 Field Unit 13 Det. Report on RCM Mission #22. November 7, 1944; IRIS 50367, SQ-BOMB-868-Su, Microfilm Reel A0670, Frames 746-758, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(50.) Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, World War 2 Narratives. No. 3 Radar (Wellington, NZ: July 1948), p. 547. Archives New Zealand, AAOQ W3424 16.

(51.) Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, World War 2 Narratives. No. 3 Radar (Wellington, NZ: July 1948), pp. 547-8. Archives New Zealand, AAOQ W3424 16; Chief Signal Officer, GHQ SWPA. Cable to Signal Officer, 868 Bomb Squadron. Cite: CM118, RCM Mission #22. November 7,1944. SQ-BOMB-868-Su-Op 868 BS, Air Force Historical Research Agency, located on Reel A0670, Frame 750.

(52.) 868th Bombardment Squadron. Memorandum to XIII Bomber Command. Subject: Special Report on Missions #868-105 and #868-111. 6 March 1944. IRIS 50373, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(53.) Chief Signal office, GHQ SWPA. Classified Message to the Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces. October 1, 1944. SWPA RCM #1 1 of 2 Folder, Box 1488, Entry--Classified Central Decimal Files, RG 111, National Archives; Signal Corps Liaison Office, Radio Research Laboratory. Memorandum to Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces. October 16, 1944. Subject: C-1900, Tail. SWPA RCM #1 1 of 2 Folder, Box 1488, Entry - Classified Central Decimal Files, RG 111, National Archives

(54.) Field Unit 13, Section 22, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area. Memorandum on Special RCM missions in cooperation with Thirteenth Fighter Command, Dec 1, 1944. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 526.

(55.) 100th Bomb Squadron. Historical Records and Histories of Organization. January 1, 1945, p. 4; narrative mission reports for 14 and 17 December 1944. IRIS 45024, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(56.) Office of the Intelligence Officer, Headquarters XIII Fighter Command. Memorandum on Armed Ferret Mission for December 19, 1944, Dec 18, 1944. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 485.

(57.) Headquarters XIII Fighter Command. Armed Ferret Mission for 28 December 1944. December 27, 1944. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 532.

(58.) 100th Bomb Squadron. Historical Records and Histories of Organization. March 1, 1945, Final Mission Report No. 266. IRIS 45026, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(59.) Office of the Intelligence Officer, Headquarters XIII Fighter Command. Memorandum on Armed Ferret Mission

(60.) 100th Bomb Squadron. Historical Records and Histories of Organization. February 1, 1945, p. 3. IRIS 45025, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL; Field Unit 13, Section 22, GHQ. RCM Mission Report #53 (100th Bomb Squadron--B-25 Aircraft). February 6, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame720.

(61.) Letter, Field Unit 13 Detachment, Sansapor to Field Unit 13, Morotai. December 20, 1944, December 23, 1944. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frames 484, 496.

(62.) Section 22 Field Unit 13 Det. Report on Ferret Flight #38 on 15 February 1945, and Flight #39 on February 16, 1945. February 17, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 823; Headquarters, 42nd Bomb Group. Standard Mission Report for Mission No. 42-1119. February 16, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 828

(63.) Field Unit 13, Section 22, GHQ, Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force, A-3 Section. Memorandum to Assistant Director, Section 22, GHQ SWPA, APO 500. December 26, 1944. Subject: Change of Address of Field Unit 13. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 465; Field Unit 13, Section 22, GHQ, Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force, A-3 Section. RCM Mission Report #48. January 22, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 608. The mission totals are derived from review of the RCM Mission Reports for the month of January 1945 from the same AFHRA entry.

(64.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 348.

(65.) Headquarters XIII Bomber Command, APO #719-2. Informal Action Sheet. No date (estimate December 22, 1944). Subject: Jolo Island Radar. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 478.

(66.) Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, World War 2 Narratives. No. 3 Radar (Wellington, NZ: July 1948), p. 549. Archives New Zealand, AAOQ W3424 16.

(67.) Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, World War 2 Narratives. No. 3 Radar (Wellington, NZ: July 1948), p. 549. Archives New Zealand, AAOQ W3424 16.

(68.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #57. March 8, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 839; Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #68. April 12, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 985; Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Log Sheet. April 10, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 985; Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 348.

(69.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #59. March 19, 1945; RCM Mission Report #62. April 2, 1945; RCM Mission Report #68. April 12, 1945; Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frames 861, 890, 985; 868th Bombardment Squadron. Standard Mission Report, mission no. 868-591. April 11, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1019.

(70.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #72a. April 20, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL, 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1067; 868th Bombardment Squadron. Standard Mission Report, mission no. 868-607. April 18, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1068.

(71.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #67. April 8, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 962; 868th Bombardment Squadron. Standard Mission Report, mission no. 868-580. April 6, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 965.

(72.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #74 Flight #1. 26 April 1945; RCM Mission Report #74 Flight #2. 26 April 1945; RCM Mission Report #74 Flight #3. April 26, 1945; Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL, 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frames 1106, 1118, 1129.

(73.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #78, May 1, 1945; Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1216.

(74.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #75. April 28, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL, 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1191; 868th Bombardment Squadron. Standard Mission Report, mission no. 868-623. April 26, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1194.

(75.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #79. May 3, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1245; 868th Bombardment Squadron. Standard Mission Report, mission no. 868-626. April 29, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1251.

(76.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #85. May 12, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7672, Frame 106; 868th Bombardment Squadron. Standard Mission Report, mission no. 868-650. May 8, 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7672, Frame 109.

(77.) Field Unit 13, Section 22 GHQ. RCM Mission Report #78, May 1, 1945; Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 750.907; located on Reel A7671, Frame 1216.

(78.) Headquarters, 7th AAF Radio Squadron Mobile. Memorandum to Commanding General, Thirteenth Air Force. Subject: Historical Record, 1 April to 30 April, 1945. 20 May 1945, pp. 5-6. Located in Unit History, 7th Radio Squadron Mobile (J), October 1942--October 1945. Copy--D769.363 7th .U52 1940, National Defense University Library.

(79.) Alan Carey, Consolidated PB4Y-2 Privateer (Schiffer Military History: Atglen, PA, 2005), pp. 91-94.

(80.) Headquarters, 307th Bomb Group (HV). Memorandum to Commanding General, XIII Bomber Command. Subject: Weekly Activity Report for Week Ending 2 June 1945; Weekly Activity Report for Week Ending 14 April 1945. Both from Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., GP-307-SU-RE-W; located on Reel B0227, Frames 476, 510.

(81.) Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Summary Technical Report of Division 15, NDRC, Volume 1. Radio Countermeasures (Washington, DC: 1946), p. 347.

(82.) Field Unit 15, Section 22. Memorandum to O.I.C. Section 22, Rear Echelon. June 4, 1945. Subject: Monthly Report--May; Field Unit 15, Section 22. Memorandum to GHQ, SWPA, O.C. Sig. O., Section 22. July 3, 1945. Subject: Monthly Report--June. Both located in RAAF Command Headquarters--RCM [Radio Counter Measure]--Search equipped strike aeroplanes--Reports. Series number A11093, Control symbol 676/4A8, Barcode 3081754, National Archives of Australia.

William Cahill is a retired Air Force intelligence officer who contracts for DoD in the Washington D.C. area. An Intelligence Weapons Officer with squadron and wing-level experience, he has also served on the Air Staff and in an inter-agency capacity outside of DoD. Mr. Cahill is a graduate of San Jose State University and has MS degrees from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and the National Defense Intelligence College. Mr. Cahill has been published in Air Power History, FlyPast, the USAF Weapons Review and C4ISR Journal.
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