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The year in review 2012.


I     PART 1

      Jones v Tsige
      Bedford v Canada (AG)
      R v Baldree
      Temoin v Martin
      R v Pham
      Mihalyko (Re)
      Darcis v Manitoba
      Small v NB Liquor
      Lewis v Central Credit
      Mor-Town v MacDonald
      Statutory Interpretation
      Clarification of the Law
      Internet Luring
      Constitutional Challenges
      Universities and the Charter
      Aboriginal Law
      Class Actions
      Legal Process

II    PART 2

      Bedford v Canada (AG)
      Evidence Law
      Privacy law



In 2008, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review began its Year in Review Project. The original goal of the project was to produce a yearly article reviewing the significant judgments out of appellate courts from across Canada. In 2009, Year in Review editors added an online component. The goal became twofold: not only to continue to provide a year-end review article like this one, but also to post timely summaries of significant cases to the website. The scope of the project has always been all Canadian appellate court cases (save for those of the Quebec Court of Appeal). Summaries posted to the website are spare, focusing on only the significant aspects of the cases, and are free of editorial comment. The Year in Review strives to offer students, practitioners, judges, and academics a succinct survey of changes in the law from across the country. The database is accessed free of charge, via a link from the University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review website.

Decisions are determined to be significant for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, they might be found to have effected a change in the law. Unexpected applications of unchanged law are likewise significant. Occasionally, unusual fact situations merit review. Some decisions have interesting theoretical implications. New and extended applications of statutory rules are noteworthy. And certain cases will have a political or practical importance outside the law proper. Working in groups, associate and articles editors read the thousands of cases reported across Canada every year in search of that small proportion that--on the basis of these editors' hard work and close attention--makes up the substance of our print and electronic review. While the website provides something in the way of a real-time reporter, our year-end article aims to highlight a small selection of the most meaningful cases reviewed, and to structure this more in-depth review around a few important themes.

It is our hope that the Year in Review website is found to make a useful contribution to contemporary case reporting. The vast number of appellate cases heard across this country in any given year makes close attention on the part of any one individual reader practically impossible. To be sure, it offers challenge enough for a team of busy (if keen and talented) students. The student-editors benefit from the challenge in several ways, however. First and foremost, they gain a great deal of experience reading and understanding cases quickly, and then writing concise summaries. Further, they find themselves engaged with current case law in ways that inform their developing interests, their term assignments, and perhaps ultimately their careers. Oftentimes the full import of a case reviewed is revealed only with the passage of time. Student-editors gauge the evolution of their understanding of law in looking back on summaries written months ago.


In Part 1, we consider in brief a variety of cases that were found significant. These are representative of the kind of summaries (or "blurbs" as we refer to them) that we upload to our Year in Review blog. Part 2 presents the handful of the more significant cases discussed in fuller detail.


In 2012, a number of cases made significant changes to the law. Among the most interesting of these must be the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Jones v Tsige. (1) In Jones, Justice Robert Sharpe, writing for Winkler CJO and Cunningham ACJ Ont SCJ (ad hoc), held that Ontario recognizes a cause of action for invasion of privacy at common law. Looking back more than a century to the seminal Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis essay, The Right to Privacy, then tracing the privacy interest through the contributions of Professor William Prosser, both Ontario and foreign courts, Canadian Charter jurisprudence, as well as relevant federal and provincial legislation, Sharpe JA decided that
   it is appropriate for this court to confirm the existence of a
   right of action for intrusion upon seclusion. Recognition of such a
   cause of action would amount to an incremental step that is
   consistent with the role of this court to develop the common law in
   a manner consistent with the changing needs of society. (2)


In Bedford v Canada (AG), (3) a panel of five judges of the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the constitutionality of three Criminal Code (4) provisions that compose the core of Parliament's response to the question of prostitution. As to sections 210 and 212(1)(j)--which prohibit the operation of a common bawdy-house and living on the avails of prostitution--the Court was unanimous in declaring the provisions unconstitutional. By contrast, a bare majority held that section 213(1)(c)--which prohibits communicating for the purposes of prostitution in public--did not offend the principles of fundamental justice and is also a reasonable limit on expression.

Bedford, however, is significant more for its discussion of the notion of binding precedent and the principle of stare decisis. At issue was whether the application judge in Bedford was bound by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in the Prostitution Reference. (5) The Attorney General of Canada argued that Justice Himel, in the lower court, had erred by departing from binding precedent in considering the constitutionality of both the bawdy-house and communicating provisions. Justices Doherty, Rosenberg, and Feldman held that
   the application judge did not err in considering whether or not the
   bawdy-house and communicating provisions violate s. 7 of the
   Charter. The reason is that both the legal issues raised, and the
   legal framework to be applied, are different now than they were at
   the time of the Prostitution Reference. By contrast, we conclude
   that the application judge erred in reconsidering whether or not
   the communicating provision is an unjustified infringement of s.
   2(b) of the Charter. The Supreme Court definitively decided this
   issue in the Prostitution Reference, and only that court may
   revisit it. (6)


The Ontario Court of Appeal produced yet another significant case in R v Baldree, (7) in which the Court considered whether drug-purchase telephone calls intercepted by police investigators and offered in evidence should be admitted as circumstantial evidence of drug-dealing activity or excluded as implied hearsay. Baldree is significant not as much for the usual reasons, but rather as a window into the world of judicial dialogue and decision making. Justices Watt and Feldman went to great lengths over a problem that can be seen to have aspects of the proper approach to precedent, and the question of deference to the courts of first instance. Moreover, by way of Baldree, we get an intensive course in the trials and tribulations of Canadian evidence law. In the result, drug-purchase phone calls are, indeed, hearsay, and a new trial for Mr. Baldree has been ordered. (8)


Other provincial appellate courts produced significant case law in 2012. In Temoin v Martin, (9) the British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court decision that courts have a power under their "parens patriae jurisdiction" to order the psychiatric examination of a person who appears to be incapable of managing his or her own affairs, when the person in question will not voluntarily undergo examination. In confirming the court's authority over vulnerable persons incapable of protecting themselves, the BCCA stressed that the presumption of mental fitness under the Patients Property Act (10) remains intact and the court must only order medical assessments in exceptional circumstances.


In R v Pham, (11) the Alberta Court of Appeal considered whether minor variations in duration of sentence should be granted for convicted persons with a prior criminal record, in situations where an accused might be subject to proceedings under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. (12) A divided Court held that, where an appellant has a criminal record, no variation should be granted. The majority stated, "[I]t would be a strange and unfortunate legal system wherein a non-citizen could expect to receive a lesser sentence than a citizen for the same crime. No such distinction should be countenanced." (13) Recognizing the Crown's willingness (based on prevailing practice) to accept a sentence of two years less a day, Justice Martin, in dissent, would have allowed the appeal.


In Mihalyko (Re), (14) the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considered whether it "clearly would not be in the interests of justice" (15) that a 1998 Chevrolet Blazer --which had been found to be an instrument of the unlawful sale of two tabs of Oxycontin for $60 ("not the best facts" (16) per Vancise JA)--be forfeit to the Crown pursuant to section 7(1) of The Seizure of Criminal Property Act, 2009. (17) To that end, the Court undertook the first judicial interpretation of that section in Saskatchewan. Justice Vancise, for the Court, approved the "implicit" (18) finding of the chambers judge that, once the property in issue has been found to be an instrument of unlawful activity, the party relying on the section 7(1) exception bears the burden of proving the exception applies. Vancise JA held further that
   the "interests of justice" determination is not just a balancing of
   the pros and cons of making the order of forfeiture. It is more
   than that. The word "clearly" must, as Doherty J.A. stated, be
   given some meaning and I am inclined to his opinion that the
   applicant or party seeking the leave must demonstrate that in the
   circumstances of [the] case before the court[,] the forfeiture
   would be a "manifestly harsh and inequitable result." (19)


The Manitoba Court of Appeal in 2012 answered a stated question of law put to it by an arbitrator under the Northern Flood Agreement (NFA) (20) in Darcis v Manitoba. (21) The Court considered whether
   claimants who no longer reside ordinarily at or near [their home]
   community...can make a claim to the NFA arbitrator for social,
   cultural, or economic loss and damage experienced by them in their
   new environment following their departure from [their home
   community] as those are not losses or damages that arose within the
   [contemplation of the agreement]. (22)

Justice Hamilton found that the Agreement defines a "claimant" to include anyone ordinarily resident at or near the home community, at either of the date of the Agreement or the date of the damage or loss, and that one type of claim follows "regardless of where the damage or loss arose". (23) Consequently, Hamilton JA determined that the fact that the claimants had moved away to mitigate the adverse effects of the Hydro project that led to the Agreement in the first place should not limit their recourse to a claim for damages under the Agreement. (24) The appeal was allowed.


In yet another significant administrative law instalment out of the province of New Brunswick, the Court of Appeal, in Small v New Brunswick Liquor Corp (25) held that it is unreasonable, and a fortiori incorrect, for an adjudicator to interpret statutory or contractual provisions except according to the methodology imposed by the law. (26) Where a provision is ambiguous, an adjudicator's choice between two reasonable interpretations will generally prevail under a deferential standard of review. (27) However, in order to justify such deference, it must first be found that the adjudicator correctly determined whether the provision was ambiguous. (28)


In Lewis v Central Credit Union Ltd, (29) the PEI Court of Appeal shed light on the distinction between actual and presumed undue influence. The majority adopted and refined the statement of these equitable doctrines made by Feldman JA in CIBC Mortgage v Rowatt. (30) The dissent, following Justice Sopinka's concurring opinion in Geffen v Goodman Estate, (31) took the view that the application judge's finding of no actual undue influence should preclude the operation of the presumption. (32) For the majority, Jenkins CJPEI concluded,
   Remembering that equity operates through principles rather than
   hard rules, and allows for a remedial reply for a violation of
   rights where justice advises, all the time being careful to respect
   the sanctity of contract and ensure predictability and certainty in
   contractual relations, it can be seen that the desired balance is
   achieved in this case. The doctrine of presumed undue influence,
   which incorporates the doctrine of constructive notice, arose. This
   provides a suitable tool for raising an equity. The Credit Union
   could have responded to this equity at the time of the transaction
   by requiring independent legal advice for Ella Lewis, but it did
   not. (33)


The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, in Mor-Town Developments v MacDonald, (34) considered whether, under the Legal Profession Act, (35) a Small Claims Court adjudicator has jurisdiction to tax a solicitor's account that has already been paid. (36) The Court further had to determine which of the parties bore the burden of proving the reasonableness of the legal account(s). (37) Justice Saunders, for the Court, held that the primary purpose of the Legal Profession Act was to protect the public; interpreting its words "to be paid" (38) to mean only those accounts as yet unpaid would lead to unjust results. (39) Moreover, Saunders JA concluded that the onus of proving the reasonableness of an account must be on the solicitor, who is in the better position to know which tasks had been completed and the fees to be charged. It would be impractical for a client to have to prove the unreasonableness of accounts produced by its lawyer. He wrote,
   The Legal Profession Act should be interpreted in a manner that is
   consistent with the ethical obligations of the profession. ... [It]
   ought to enjoy the same generous interpretation as its predecessor
   legislation, so as to achieve the profession's principal objective
   in regulating its affairs, which is to "uphold and protect the
   public interest in the practice of law". (40)

He continued,
   The onus of proving the reasonableness of an account should always
   rest with the lawyer. The lawyer knows what was done, by whom and
   when. The lawyer knows how long it took to complete the task(s) and
   what fee was charged to do it. The lawyer will also know why the
   task or particular action was necessary. Rarely would a client be
   possessed of such information. (41)


Cases of statutory interpretation are often significant: witness Mihalyko, Darcis, Small, and Mor-Town, above. 1420041 Ontario Inc v 1 King West Inc (42) is a classic interpretation case, and a matter of first impression in Ontario, in which the Court considered whether, and in what circumstances, an individual condominium unit owner has the legal capacity to sue for relief relating to the common elements, or in other words, whether section 23(1) of the Condominium Act, 1998 (43) permits only condominium corporations to commence such an action. Justice Blair, for the Court, framed the question this way:
   The central issue ... revolves around the use of the word "may" in
   subsection (1). Is "may" mandatory, in the sense that it grants a
   condominium corporation the exclusive authority to pursue an action
   in relation to the common elements of that condominium? Or is it
   simply permissive, in the sense that it grants the corporation
   standing to bring such an action--a right that it would not
   otherwise have on behalf of individual unit owners at common
   law--without taking away the right of a unit owner to bring such a
   proceeding in appropriate circumstances? (44)

Having looked to the history and purpose of the section, Blair JA found that "[a]n important underlying tenet of subsection 23(1) is its objective of protecting the interests of the condominium community as a whole, not the interests of individual unit owners in their capacity as individual unit owners". (45) Justice Blair held that subsection 23(1) thus grants a condominium corporation standing (but not exclusive standing) to commence, maintain, or settle the types of action referred to therein. (46) However, properly interpreted, it does not preclude an individual condominium unit owner from pursuing a claim relating to common elements where what is at issue is a contractually unique problem or other unit-specific wrong raising a discrete issue relating to common elements immediately pertaining to the owner's unit. (47)


Often the significance of a case is not by way of any change effected in the law, but rather in clarification of the meaning of the law. Bedford is, of course, significant in this way, as is Lewis, above. In Centre for Addiction and Mental Health v Ontario, (48) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the interpretation of "consent" in the context of section 672.62 of the Criminal Code, which provides that where an accused has been found unfit to stand trial and has been ordered to undergo treatment according to section 672.58, the consent of the person in charge of the hospital in question is required. Justice Blair overturned the hearing judge on the question of whether the consent requirement had been met in the circumstances it had not (49)--and further considered the constitutionality of section 672.62, an issue before the Court for the first time on appeal. (50) Noting that section 672.58 "orders are ... not intended to be...for the medical benefit of the unfit accused in the broad sense", (51) Blair JA held that the section 672.62 consent requirement complies with society's notions of procedural fairness, (52) and that it is not unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary. (53)

The decision clarifies the law on what Blair JA called "a recurring theme" (54) in Ontario courts: the tension between judges' desire to avoid interim jail time for mentally-unfit accused persons awaiting treatment, and the hospitals' refusal to consent to treatment due to bed shortages. The decision makes the point that policy decisions concerning the allocation of psychiatric hospital resources are beyond the competence of courts. (55)


In R v Dragos, (56) the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld convictions for Internet luring, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and indecent exposure against a 24-year-old man who had sexually explicit online exchanges with a 13-year-old girl who claimed to be 14. The Court had to consider the requisite legal standards for the determination of the sufficiency of steps taken by the appellant to ascertain the complainant's age. The defence argued the appellant had made an honest mistake in belief in that regard. (57) Moreover, for the offences in issue, the standard varied. (58) However, Justice Cronk held for the Court that
   the [trial] did not require a detailed analysis of the distinction,
   if any, between [the standards of "all reasonable steps" under
   subsection 150.1(4) and "reasonable steps" under subsection
   172.1(4) of the Code]. Nor is such an analysis required for the
   disposition of this appeal. On the trial judge's unchallenged
   factual findings, the appellant's conduct fell short of meeting
   either standard. (59)

Justice Cronk noted that what constitutes "reasonable steps" in a given case is a fact-specific inquiry that turns on the particular circumstances, (60) and that the Supreme Court of Canada has described the subsection 150.1(4) "all reasonable steps requirement" as a "due diligence defence". (61) She noted that, under subsection 273.2(b) of the Code, an accused is required to "take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting". (62) Thus, by analogy, to make out the defence of honest but mistaken belief under subsection 172.1(4), a due diligence formulation of the reasonable steps requirement is appropriate. The appeal was dismissed.


Constitutional challenges are often significant: recall Bedford and CAMH, above. Association of Justice Counsel v Canada (AG) (63) was another such case. Justice Counsel involved a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Expenditure Restraint Act, (64) which limited compensation increases for approximately 400,000 federal employees, including the members of the respondent Association of Justice Counsel, for a five-year period from 2006 to 2011. This was the first subsection 2(d) Charter challenge to the ERA to reach a court of appeal.

Tracing the evolution of the right to freedom of association in the context of labour relations through the most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue in Ontario (AG) v Fraser (65)--which held that subsection 2(d) "does not require the parties to conclude an agreement or accept any particular terms" (66) and only protects "the right to collective bargaining in the minimal sense of good faith exchanges" (67) but "does not impose a particular process" (68) and "does not guarantee a legislated dispute resolution mechanism in the case of an impasse" (69)--Justice Sharpe held that the Association of Justice Counsel had failed to demonstrate that the ERA infringed the rights of its members to engage in a meaningful process of collective bargaining and that the claim under subsection 2(d) must fail. (70)


In Pridgen v University of Calgary, (71) the Alberta Court of Appeal considered whether universities are Charter-free zones, and whether the University exercised reasonable discretion in its decision to discipline students who had publicly criticized their instructors and educational institution on social networking sites. The Court unanimously upheld the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, which quashed the disciplinary measures taken against the students. However, each of the panel's three judges wrote a separate opinion.

Finding that the university-student relationship is not a matter of purely contractual relations, Paperny JA held that the imposition of discipline by universities--an exercise of statutory authority and thus "governmental" in nature--should attract Charter scrutiny. (72) She emphasized that the application of the Charter in circumstances such as these does not undermine or interfere with academic freedom. (73) Consequently, the University's decision, which infringed the freedom of expression of the students disciplined, could not be saved under section 1. (74)

Concurring in the result, McDonald JA based his decision entirely on administrative law grounds, and found it was unnecessary to perform a Charter analysis. (75) In a third opinion, O'Ferrall JA stated the issue not as whether the University is a "Charter-free zone", but rather whether, in disciplining the students, the General Faculties Council ought to have considered whether its decision violated the students' rights to freedom of expression and association, both of which have enjoyed legal protection in Canada since long before the Charter was promulgated. (76)


In 2012 there were significant developments in Canadian Aboriginal law. In Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish First Nation v Canada (AG), (77) the British Columbia Court of Appeal determined whether the chambers judge, in certifying a class action, properly defined the relevant class as "all aboriginal collectives who have or assert constitutionally protected aboriginal and/or treaty rights to fish wild salmon for food, social, and ceremonial purposes within the Broughton Archipelago and the rivers that drain into the Broughton Archipelago on behalf of [the representative plaintiff] and other Aboriginal collectives who have rights to fish in the Broughton Archipelago". (78) In the result, Justice Garson concluded that
   the chambers judge erred and was clearly wrong in certifying the
   class. ... The class is comprised of parties that do not have
   capacity to sue and the class definition does not meet the
   objectivity requirements of [section 4 of the Class Proceedings
   Act]. (79)

Recalling R v Sparrow, R v Van der Peet, R v Powley, and R v Marshall; R v Bernard, Garson JA held that "in an Aboriginal rights claim, the identity of the proper rights holder is integral to the analysis". (80) This was relevant in the instant case, because that identity was also integral to part of the class definition, which requires class members to "have" or "assert" an Aboriginal right to fish. (81) The Court found that the certification of the representative action on behalf of "Aboriginal collectives" failed to specify objective criteria by which a collective could (without an ethnographic analysis and court determination) identify its membership in the class. (82) Moreover, the term "Aboriginal collective" does not, without more, identify a group that has legal capacity. (83) Finally, there was no acceptable definition of the class that the Court could substitute for the one used by the chambers judge. (84)


Another significant case arising out of a class action certification order was Stanway v Wyeth Canada Inc. (85) The main significance of this case turned on a matter of statutory interpretation, the central question for the Court being whether an omission can constitute a deceptive act or practice under the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act. (86) Justice Kirkpatrick held that a failure to disclose can be a deceptive act or practice, even in the absence of any particular communicated misrepresentation. (87) Wyeth's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Wyeth, manufactured hormone therapy products that were, according to one study, associated with an increased risk of breast cancer. The respondent class consisted of women who had been diagnosed with breast cancer after having taken one of the hormone therapy drugs prescribed in Canada during the 27-year class period. The respondent alleged that Wyeth had conducted "deceptive acts or practices" under subsections 4(1) and 4(3)(b)(vi) of the BPCPA by failing to "accurately disclose the risks of the hormone therapy" (88) on its product monographs and labels. In doing so, Wyeth had engaged, it was alleged, in a "systemic course of deceptive conduct". (89) Wyeth, for its part, urged an interpretation of Chalmers v AMO Canada (90) as implicating only those failures to disclose which are tied to specific representations. (91) Wyeth contended that "any claim under the BPCPA must rest on a representation" and that an omission in itself failed to meet this requirement. (92) For the Court, Kirkpatrick JA found that "[t]he wording of [subsection] 4(3)(b)(vi)--'representation by a supplier...that fails to state a material fact'--anticipates that an omission can [without more] constitute a deceptive practice", (93) an interpretation which, in her opinion, is consonant with the purposes of the BPCPA (which is "all about consumer protection"). (94)


This year several cases were significant for their pronouncements on matters of process. Of particular importance was Steinberg v Ellis Entertainment Corp, (95) a case where the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a complicated pleadings issue. Steinberg brought a suit for wrongful dismissal against both Ellis Entertainment Corporation and its CEO, Mr. Ellis. The corporation and Mr. Ellis together defended the claim in a joint pleading. The joint pleading included a joint statement of defence, and a counterclaim brought by the corporation only. The corporation became insolvent and its first-ranking creditor acquired its assets. That creditor assigned the counterclaim to Mr. Ellis. When the corporation failed to attend for discovery, Steinberg successfully moved to have its defence struck out. Mr. Ellis had, by this time, obtained an order to continue the counterclaim. The question for the Court was whether Ellis could be permitted to amend his pleadings to make them consistent with the counterclaim. The Court said no, holding that to allow the amendments would be to allow an abuse of process. (96) Justice Gillese wrote for the Court,
   The effect of the assignment was to give Ellis the right to pursue
   the Counterclaim on behalf of the Corporation. He stood in the
   Corporation's shoes for the purpose of pursuing the Counterclaim.
   He could not have a better claim than the Corporation.

   .... As a consequence of the Corporation's defence being struck
   out...the Corporation was deemed to admit...that it had wrongfully
   terminated Steinberg's employment.

   ....Because the Corporation could not factually or legally
   establish the claims in the Counterclaim, it would be an abuse of
   process to allow Ellis to amend his pleadings so that he could
   assert the claims in the Counterclaim. (97)


In Fairhurst v De Beers Canada, Inc, (98) the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered whether harm caused by conspiracy fits under the mandatory presumption categories under section 10 of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (99) that determine a real and substantial connection to the jurisdiction of British Columbia. As Newbury J put it, "[T]he Court must apply the 'real and substantial connection' test for court jurisdiction, as codified by [the CJPTA], to allegations of a criminal anti-competition conspiracy of global (and indeed historic) proportions." (100) Justice Newbury held that a conspiracy causing harm in British Columbia is sufficient to establish the real and substantial connection necessary to prove jurisdiction under the Act. (101) She wrote,
   [I]n cases of alleged conspiracy causing economic loss...Canadian
   courts recognize the "important interest a state has in injuries
   suffered by persons within its territory. "... It may seem
   inconceivable to the large European and South African corporate
   defendants in this proceeding that, in the phrase of Ms. Kay, they
   are being "called to the court" of a jurisdiction on the far side
   of North America that seldom, if ever, figures in their
   decision-making. However, consumers in this province, no less than
   in other jurisdictions, may be affected by conduct of the kind
   alleged by the plaintiff. The territorial competence of British
   Columbia courts over the defendants is the result of the operation
   of 'objective' rules of territorial competence that have been
   formulated to reflect the realities of modern commerce. (102)

Decisions in 2012 were meaningful for many reasons. The cases reviewed above constitute a roughly representative sample of the sorts of decisions determined to be significant in any given year. In 2012, cases not described above made significant contributions to the law of insurance, (103) workers' compensation, (104) youth criminal justice, (105) sentencing, (106) costs rulings, (107) time for appeal, (108) good faith in the context of leave to commence a derivative action, (109) and the unlawful means tort, (110) among other things. What follows now is an in-depth review of several of the most interesting cases of 2012.
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Title Annotation:Introduction through I. Part 1, p. 113-127
Author:Drake, Tony; Ho, Fidelia
Publication:University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review
Date:Mar 22, 2013
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