The twin swords of the sovereign: cross-cultural killings in seventeenth-century English America.
In the fall of 1707, Jeremiah Pate of New Kent County, Virginia was killed by a party of Tuscarora Indians. Virginia's government, decrying the killing as "barbarous murder," quickly ordered the apprehension and trial of the accused killers. (1) In retrospect, this response may seem self-evident, yet it poses a significant historical question: what does it mean to call a cross-cultural killing a crime? Recent historiography on the legal aspects of English colonialism has largely focused on property law as the key component of English claims to sovereignty and dominion. (2) However, dominium was not the only path to imperium. The law was a complex field of contestation over people as well as land. In what follows, I suggest that the study of criminal law and jurisdiction, and, in particular, treatment of cross-cultural killings, deserves greater integration into our understanding of the relationship between the law and colonialism. Previous scholarship on Indian interactions with criminal law has been concerned primarily with assessing the relative "fairness" of English courts to Indians. (3) This is a reasonable and interesting question, but it is not the question I pursue here. Instead, I argue that efforts to include or exclude Indians from jurisdictional space can serve as a barometer of different colonial approaches to power over people, one incorporative and aggressive in its assertion of sovereignty through jurisdiction, the other using military force to police subordinate, but autonomous, Indian polities.
Criminal law in Virginia was built on the edifice of English law, which placed killings within an economy of intentionality and circumstance through which they were classified as more or less serious acts, or, as in the case of self-defense, as outside the scope of criminality entirely. (4) Ferdinando Pulton's influential compendium of English law, De Pace Regis et Regni, included dozens of different categories of homicide, carefully delineating the interplay between motives, circumstance, and liability. (5) Murder, which Edward Coke considered the "most heinous" of felonies, was the pinnacle of this complex hierarchy. (6) But murder was about more than intent. As Thomas Hobbes and other English legal and political thinkers argued, to pronounce a killing a crime was to inscribe it within the realm of law, and thus, within the dominion of the sovereign. (7) The law, Bacon wrote, "is the great organ by which the sovereign power doth move," and the threshold of its jurisdiction marked the boundary of sovereignty. (8) In this sense, murder necessarily occurs within the power of the sovereign, in whose name the judicial system punishes individuals who have committed offenses against the King's peace. Significantly, Hobbes differentiated this interior power to punish subjects from the power to punish aliens, describing them as two distinct swords of the sovereign. The sword of justice signified the power to punish an individual guilty of an infraction within the sphere of the sovereign, while the sword of war represented the power to punish those who fell outside the sphere of the law. (9)
Hobbes treated the distinction between subjects and foreigners as self-evident, though within English law these categories had been the subject of recent controversy. In the colonies, a clear demarcation between subject and alien was even more problematic. Colonial charters were silent on the issue of whether Indians were to be treated as subjects, and Calvin's Case (1608), which had profound implications for the legal status of settlers, offered little clarity on the matter of Indians. (10) Over the course of the seventeenth century many Indians would sign treaties acknowledging their subjection to the King, yet this de jure status was often only loosely connected to any de facto reality, and Indians successfully countered many colonial attempts to treat them as subjects. Colonial frontiers could not be ordered by fiat, and, as a practical matter, the status of Indians remained contentious, ambivalent, and subject to cross-cultural negotiation. Given these legal ambiguities, we should interpret efforts by the English to treat a killing as "murder" as an active attempt to create or enforce sovereignty through a claim of jurisdiction. (11) Sir John Davies, solicitor-general for Ireland under James I, helps us to understand the specifically colonial dimensions of Hobbes' distinction. Davies argued that the power to punish under "ordinary law," rather than through military action was a necessary condition for any claim to sovereignty over a land and its people. (12) The boundary between Hobbes' twin swords, then, marks a border between two separable forms of colonial power, with distinctive stances towards subjection and sovereignty.
Ironically, the decision to treat a killing as proper to the sword of justice, and thus the sphere of law, frequently involved recourse to the sword of war. This reminds us, in the first instance, that colonial claims to jurisdiction cannot be considered as arising in a vacuum. Native Americans brought their own cultural norms to the question of cross-cultural killings, views with which colonial officials had to grapple. (13) While the intricacies of individual tribes' ideas about homicide are largely lost to history, scholars do agree on the broad cultural framework which structured Indian ideas about homicide in eastern North America. At its center was the idea that murder was an offense of one clan against another; in most instances the individual identity of the victim or the killer was of secondary importance. Murder created an imbalance that compelled the victimized clan to respond, by killing a member of the offending clan, by obtaining satisfaction for the deceased in the form of material and spiritually charged goods, or, in some cases, by replacing the dead with a captive or slave who might then be adopted into the clan. Unlike the English, Indians did not consider questions of intentionality as crucial to the status of a homicide, and they recognized, in theory at least, no distinctions between types of culpability. In theory, every human-caused death was morally equal: "liability, not culpability, was the operative legal concept." (14)
These very different cultural and legal ideas about homicide incited contestations in which the stakes were quite high. Recent historiography on Indian-settler relations has stressed the development of middle-ground relationships in which both sides built fragile, but surprisingly durable, cross-cultural understandings relating to homicide and its redress. Violence and murder, as Richard White has noted, were among the central concerns of the middle-ground between the French and Algonquians in the pays d'en haut, where negotiated solutions and compromise were commonly used to cover the dead and avert escalations of violence. (15) This hybrid approach to cross-cultural killings could and did take place in the English colonies, though in other times, places, and situations, relatively 'pure' Native or European approaches prevailed.
My suggestion here is that the shifting terrain of law and jurisdiction over cross-cultural killings offers a new way of tracking the relative power and political strategies of competing cultural groups in colonial North America. As a preliminary way of broaching these issues, I will focus on the two oldest of the mainland English colonies in New England and Virginia, both of which developed distinctive answers to the question of colonial jurisdiction and different strategies of colonial power. In New England, colonists readily claimed jurisdiction over such cases, and, in so doing, tried to inscribe Indians as interior to a common sphere of law. In contrast, seventeenth-century Virginians treated cross-cultural killings as matters of war, in part because Virginians sought to enforce and sustain their power by holding Indians apart and managing their exteriority.
John Stone, The Pequot War, and the Sword of Justice
Despite lacking clear legal authority to do so, early English settlers in the New England Colonies demanded that their cultural norms would govern cases of cross-cultural homicide. (16) In Plymouth, English assertions of criminal jurisdiction were among the earliest claims the English made in cross-cultural diplomacy. The brief 1621 treaty between Plymouth Colony and Massasoit, a Wampanoag Sachem, included a non-reciprocal requirement that the Wampanoag turn over any Indian who "did any hurt" to an Englishman that "they might punish him." (17) Plymouth was not alone in making these demands. Just a few years later, both Plymouth and Massachusetts would go to war over the principle of English jurisdiction and murder. The circumstances surrounding the Pequot War provide an excellent opportunity, then, to understand the stakes involved in questions of violence and the law.
Curiously, the events which lead to war between the English and the Pequot began as a dispute between the Pequot and Dutch traders in which the Dutch kidnapped and executed a Pequot sachem named Tatobem, despite having received a ransom for him. (18) Shortly thereafter, a Virginian by the name of John Stone was killed by the Pequot along the coastal Connecticut River. Stone had a reputation as a trouble-maker, and had recently been banished from Massachusetts after being charged with piracy, drunkenness, and adultery. Political leaders there were initially inclined to consider his death a case of rough justice and look the other way, but decided instead to assert their rights over his killer. (19) Puritan demands that the Pequot "deliver up to us those men who were guilty of Stone's death" became the core issue of early diplomatic relations. (20) The Pequot readily accepted responsibility for Stone's death, but argued that they had mistaken him for a Dutchman. This was a plausible argument. The Pequot had no known relations with the English prior to Stone's death, and presumably little ability to differentiate English from Dutch. Pequot ambassadors ducked continual English demands to turn over the killers, probably believing that the wampum accepted by the English during negotiations was sufficient to settle the death. (21) The English had already developed an idea of wampum as a medium of exchange, but it is unclear if they had an awareness of its specific use to compensate for the dead, making it possible that they did not realize that in accepting the wampum, they were, from the Pequot's perspective, settling the matter of Stone's death. (22)
Over the following two years, the English would make repeated demands that the Pequot turn over the killers, demands which the Pequot either could not or would not meet. In 1636, Puritan threats gave way to force, after another Englishman, John Oldham, was killed by a group of Narragansett and their allies. The English, perhaps fearing that their failure to compel Pequot submission was sending a dangerous signal, dispatched a squadron of soldiers, commanded by John Endecott, to assault a community of Indians living on Block Island, where Oldham's murderers were believed to live. Endecott's orders were to attack Block Island and then advance on the Pequot, giving them one final chance to hand over Stone's killers, pay damages, and turn over hostages to guarantee future behavior. (23) Confronted by Endecott's forces, the Pequot made a final effort to inscribe the murder within their own cultural logic of kinship and just retribution, arguing that Stone had been slain by Tatobem's son, who had avenged his father's death by slaying someone he believed to be Dutch. (24) The English replied that "you have slaine the King of Englands subjects," and that they had come "to demand an account of their blood." (25) The Pequot War broke out soon after.
Historians such as Francis Jennings and Neal Salisbury have written influential accounts of the Pequot War which insist that its primary context is the struggle for control of Indian land in the Connecticut River valley. (26) Yet, the English consistently placed Stone's death, and the questions it raised about jurisdiction, at the center of their motivations for war. (27) Recent historiography has been increasingly inclined to take these assertions at face value. Alfred Cave has convincingly demonstrated that the inability of the Pequot to recognize the inflexibility of the English demands and the Puritan's insistence on "total English control" over the resolution of "intercultural conflict" fueled the cultural tensions that erupted into war. (28) Daniel Richter has also noted the centrality of jurisdictional issues to the war, suggesting that Boston's insistence on "imposing the power of life and death over criminals" needs to be understood as the "most important indicator" of English "domination." (29)
If attitudes towards cross-cultural killings are indicative of larger stances regarding colonial power, then the events leading to the Pequot War indicate an early tendency in New England towards incorporatism and interiority as modes for exercising power. Questions about jurisdiction and criminal law were important components of this project. Indeed, one of the major outcomes of the war was that the jurisdictional integration of Indians into English law began in earnest, if unevenly and contingently. In the decades between the Pequot and King Philip's war, Indians living near the English were frequently charged in English courts for crimes ranging from theft to murder. (30) Katherine Hermes has recently characterized seventeenth-century New England as a legal middle ground in which still-sovereign Indians and the English mutually created a surprisingly functional cross-cultural jurispractice based on the ideas of reciprocity and substantive justice. Indians, she contends, voluntarily chose English courts as the location for most of these disputes. In Hermes' account, this middle ground dissolved slowly in the years leading up to King Philip's War, eroded from without by "the pressures of Anglo-European culture" which were then "reflected" in the demise of this now lost early American legality. (31)
The killings that led to the Pequot war suggest another history of law and colonial power in New England. Between the English and the Pequot, no middle ground was to be found. This was partially due to a lack of cultural brokers who might have mediated the dispute. But, it was also a product of the particular stress that homicide placed on both native and English ideas about what substantive justice might entail. Murder was the breaking point of the middle-ground in New England, a point at which Hermes' model of voluntary Indian involvement in English courts gave way to forced participation. (32) Once the English decided to treat the killings as murders, the space for negotiation and compromise collapsed within the logic of the law that defined murder as an infraction of an individual subject against the will of the sovereign. Andrea Robertson Cremer has recently suggested that the war was fought to make 'dependent subject[s]" out of unruly Pequot bodies. (33) The first stage in this battle was to claim their interiority to the jurisdiction of the law through the cultural renaming of homicide as murder.
Virginia, Tributary Indians, and the Sword of War
We should avoid thinking of this tendency to pursue power through the sword of justice, and with it the assumption of Indian interiority, as inevitable. Indeed, we need look no further afield than Virginia to find a very different strategy towards asserting and maintaining colonial power based on managing the alien-ness of Indians. These differences are not easily framed within the historiography focused on property and law, which has tended to describe sovereignty as springing from dominion, but come into focus when viewed through the lens of homicide and the sword of war.
Virginia's seventeenth-century history is noteworthy for its relative lack of interest in asserting jurisdiction over cross-cultural violence. In Virginia, acts which Massachusetts would have considered murder tended instead to be treated as acts of war. (34) Virginia's early history can help to explain why it developed along a divergent path from that taken by the New England colonies. Between 1610 and 1619, Virginia was organized politically and legally along explicitly military lines, which encouraged recourse to the 'sword of war' by establishing force as the primary mode of power within the colony, and by attempting to strictly segregate Indians from colonists. (35) These decisions were reinforced by the open warfare of the years between 1609 and 1614, as the English struggled to establish a colony in the middle of what was perhaps the most centralized and powerful Indian polity in the eastern half of the continent. (36) Much of the fighting, as well as the cross-cultural violence in the aftermaths of the famous 1622 and 1644 Powhatan 'uprisings,' consisted of "protracted series of brief attacks ... with goals of revenge." (37) This type of warfare is noteworthy both for its clear resemblance to Hobbes' sword of war, and its conformity to Powhatan cultural responses to homicide. In the Virginia tidewater, as in the American woodlands more generally, cross-cultural killings were a major cause of endemic, if relatively low-level, warfare. Indian jurispractice included normative proscriptions which tended to limit retributive violence within communities. A clan would avenge the death of one of its members, restoring balance, and closing the matter. Inter-tribal violence was much more dangerous, as it lacked these normative limits. War, an ongoing cycle of killing and counter-killing that could be very difficult to constrain, was the frequent result. (38) In a tragic, but real sense, a common recourse to war as a tool for resolving cross-cultural violence operated as a kind of 'found' middle-ground between the English and Indians in Virginia. It also serves as a reminder of the profound influence that Indians had on shaping the power struggles of the early colonial era. The Powhatan, along with the English, were building a Virginia in which cross-cultural conflict tended to be mediated via warfare.
Cross-cultural conflict would remain primarily a military issue in Virginia until the end of the century. As was the case in New England, Virginia's approach to cross-cultural conflict can tell us something about the larger agendas of power pursued by different colonial cultures. In Virginia, efforts to assert power over Indians would concentrate overwhelmingly on the subordination of Indian polities rather than on the subjugation of individual Indians. Virginia's Indian treaties sought to maintain separate, largely self-governing English and Indian communities, policed collectively by military force, rather than individually through judicial power. None of Virginia's Indian treaties between 1614 and 1676 included provisions requiring Indians to turn over murderers to English courts. (39) Instead, Virginia sought to shape and maintain a level of Indian autonomy, as a corollary to dividing the landscape into Indian and English spheres. The authority of the Indian 'king' or 'queen' to "Govern their own People," was a necessary part of this arrangement, and treaty provisions from this period were overwhelmingly concerned with the separation of Indian from English space, and with limitations on English behavior. (40) Individual Indians were the subjects of their own kings: only the kings themselves were personally subjects of the English monarch. Cross-cultural crime in such circumstances could not, strictly speaking, exist. In short, Indians' killing of settlers was a political, rather than criminal act. The subordinate, but still autonomous, polities that Virginia's tributary arrangements attempted to shape depended in part on jurisdictional distinction and the separation of Indians from the interiority of the law.
These patterns shifted towards the end of the seventeenth century, as Virginia began to channel cross-cultural killings through its courts. As the century closed, Virginia would increasingly insist on its rights over individual Indians, who suddenly became capable of committing murder. The Tuscarora and other tribes powerful enough to resist this incorporative logic did so with great resolve. (41) Virginia's efforts to force the Tuscarora to turn over the suspects in the murder of Jeremiah Pate dragged on for nearly two years, during which Virginia repeatedly threatened war and attempted an economic embargo of the Tuscarora and their Nottoway and Meherrin neighbors, yet eventually backed down. Only in the aftermath of the Tuscarora and Yamasee Wars, which substantially realigned Indian politics in the Southeast, would Virginia impose the name of crime on cross-cultural transgressions. (42)
Dylan Ruediger (Georgia State University)
(1) H.R. McIlwaine, ed., Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1928), 3:159.
(2) See, for example, David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500-c. 1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).
(3) See for instance, David Bushnell, "The Treatment of the Indians in Plymouth Colony," New England Quarterly 26, no.2 (June 1953): 203-7, and James Ronda, "Red and White at the Bench: Indians and the Law in Plymouth Colony, 1620-1691," Essex Institute Historical Collections 110, no.3 (July 1974): 200-215, both of whom argue that Indians did receive essentially fair treatment in courts, at least before King Philip's War. For a dissent, see Lyle Koehler, "Red-White Power Relations and Justice in the Courts of Seventeenth Century New England," American Indian Culture and Research Journal 3, no. 4 (1979): 1-31.
(4) Warren Billings, "The Transfer of English Law to Virginia, 1606-50," in The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America, 1480-1650, ed. K.R. Andrews, N.P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978), 215; William Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1:26; Arthur P. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), 194. In contrast, Michael Meranze has noted that colonists in fact only "selectively appropriated" English criminal law. Among the novelties of colonial law was its interaction with Indian ideas about justice. See Michael Meranze, "Penalty and the Colonial Project: Crime, Punishment, and the Regulation of Morals in Early America," in The Cambridge History of Law in America, ed. Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1:178-210, quote on p. 178. For a social history of crime in colonial Virginia, see James Horn, Adapting to a New World: English Society in the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 349-68.
(5) Ferdinando Pulton, De Pace Regis et Regni (London, 1609), 120r-128v.
(6) Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, 1644), 47.
(7) Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 191.
(8) Thomas Bayly Howell, ed., Cobbett's Complete Collection of State Trials (London, 1809), 2:580.
(9) Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 93-94, 181.
(10) On the colonial implications of Calvin's Case, see James Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978); Christopher Tomlins, Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civil Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 82-89; P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 86-87.
(11) Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 1-29.
(12) John Davies, A Discovery of the True Causes Why Ireland Was Never Entirely Subdued, ed. James P. Myers (Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1988), 71-72, 76.
(13) On Indian ideas about murder, see: James Adair, The History of the American Indians, ed. Kathryn Holland Braund (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 184-5; John Philip Reid, A Law of Blood: The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 73-112; Yasuhide Kawashima, Puritan Justice and the Indian: White Man's Law in Massachusetts, 1630-1763 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1986), 3-20; Daniel Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 32-33.
(14) Reid, Law of Blood, 76.
(15) Richard White, The Middle-Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 76. See also James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: Norton, 1999), 42-53, and Reid, Law of Blood, 80-83.
(16) The Massachusetts charter, like the earlier Virginia charters, included extensive descriptions of the political and legal authority of the colony, none of which grant jurisdiction over Indians. Plymouth lacked any formal authority from the Crown, having been founded without a charter. As MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession, has recently suggested, colonial charters need to be considered as precise and deliberate legal blueprints. Thus, the absence of a grant of jurisdiction over Indians needs to be considered as a limit on colonial power, rather than an oversight.
(17) William Hubbard, The Present State of New-England (Bainbridge, NY: York Mail-Print, 1972), 7.
(18) Mark Meuwese, "The Dutch Connection: New Netherland, the Pequots, and the Puritans in Southern New England, 1620-1638," Early American Studies 92, no.2 (Spring 2011): 313-14.
(19) On Stone's reputation, see John Winthrop, Winthrop's Journal: History of New England, 1630-1639, ed. James Hosmer (New York: Scribners, 1908), 1:102, 108; Alfred Cave, The Pequot War (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 72-5, and Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (New York: North, 1976), 189-90.
(20) William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647, ed. Samuel Morrison (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 291.
(21) Cave, Pequot War, 76; Winthrop, Journal, 1:139.
(22) Winthrop, Journal, 1:131, remarks that most of the fur acquired by the Colonies was in exchange for Wampum. For wampum as money, see Mary Herman, "Wampum as Money in Northeastern North America," Ethnohistory 3, no.1 (Winter 1956): 21-33. Daniel Gookin's famous observation on the use of wampum as compensation for murder was not written until 1674. Daniel Gookin, Historical Collections of the Indians In New England (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1792).
(23) Winthrop, Journal, 1:186. On Oldham's death, see Andrew Lipman, "Murder on the Saltwater Frontier: The Death of John Oldham," Early American Studies 9, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 268-94.
(24) Cave, Pequot War, 115.
(25) John Underhill, Newes from America; or, A New and Experimentall Discoverie of New England (London, 1638), 1112, quotes on p. 12.
(26) Jennings, Invasion of America, chap. 11-13; Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
(27) In addition to the accounts mentioned above, see John Mason, A Brief History of the Pequot War (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966), viii-x.
(28) Cave, Pequot War, 121, 76.
(29) Daniel Richter, Before the Revolution: America's Ancient Past (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 162.
(30) Alden Vaughan, New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 186-203.
(31) Katherine Hermes, "Justice Will Be Done Us: Algonquian Demands for Reciprocity in the Courts of European Settlers," in The Many Legalities of Early America, ed. Christopher Tomlins and Bruce Mann (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 123-50, and Katherine Hermes, "The Law of Native Americans, to 1815," in Cambridge History of Law in America, ed. Grossberg and Tomlins, 44-49. For the purposes of this paper, the most pertinent account of King Philip's war is Yasuhide Kawashima, Igniting King Philip's War: The John Sassamon Murder Trial (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2001).
(32) Hermes recognizes this breaking point, noting that most examples of the colonies forcing Indians into court involved "serious felonies, such as murder." Hermes, "Justice Will Be Done Us," 139.
(33) Andrea Robertson Cremer, "Possession: Indian Bodies, Cultural Control, and Colonialism in the Pequot War," Early American Studies 6, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 303.
(34) Hermes, "Law of Native Americans," 47.
(35) Edmund Morgan, American Slavery/American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: Norton, 1975), 79-80; William Strachey, For the Colony in Virginea Britannia: Lawes Divine, Morall, and Martiall (London: Walter Burre, 1612).
(36) Frederick Fausz, "An Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides: England's First Indian War, 1609-1614," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 98, no.1 (January 1990): 3-56; Helen Rountree, Pocahontas's People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia Through Four Centuries (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 43, 50-55; and Alfred Cave, Lethal Encounters: Englishmen and Indians in Colonial Virginia (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 45-101.
(37) Frederic Gleach, Powhatan s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 161.
(38) Reid, Law of Blood, 153-61; Gleach, Powhatan's World, 51-52. For a trenchant analysis of the vicious cycle of the mourning war, see Daniel Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," William & Mary Quarterly 40, no. 4 (October, 1983): 528-59.
(39) See the 1614 Treaty with Chickahominy in Ralph Hamor, A True Discourse of the Present State of Virginia (London, 1615), 13-14. The 1646 Treaty is printed in William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia (New York, 1809-1823) 1:323-26, and the 1677 Treaty of the Middle Plantation is printed in W. Stitt Robinson, ed., Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983), 4:82-87, as well as the important, and hitherto largely overlooked, reorganization of colonial laws related to Indians in the aftermath of the Restoration, printed in Hening, The Statutes at Large, 2:138-43.
(40) Quote is from the 1677 treaty in Robinson, Early Indian Documents, 4:85.
(41) See, for example, H.R. McIlwaine, ed., Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1925-1966), 1:205-7, 216-7, 2:383-6, 388-91, 3:157-161.
(42) See, for example, the early eighteenth century treaties with the Tuscarora, Nottoway, and other tributary groups in Robinson, Early American Indian Documents, 4:213, 217, 221.
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|Title Annotation:||Special Section: Sovereignty and World History|
|Publication:||World History Bulletin|
|Date:||Mar 22, 2013|
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