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The second world's Third World.

For historians of Soviet foreign policy, the Third World in the Cold War has long been something of an afterthought--or, in the words of one leading practitioner, "a sideshow to the main drama of the Cold War." (1) Indeed, the very term "Cold War" reflects a focus on Europe. First used in reference to the Nazi "phony war" (Sitzkrieg) in 1938, the term described opposing troops facing each other but not exchanging tire. (2) That applied well enough to post-World War II Europe, where the war remained "cold" in that no direct military engagements took place. But the term hardly fit the Third World, where many if not most countries found themselves embroiled in genuine military conflict with global implications at some point during the "Cold" War.

When the Third World did come to scholars' attention, it was usually during moments of crisis involving superpower showdown. In these conflicts, Third World leaders seeking help from the USSR were typically considered Soviet puppets, and Third World countries themselves functioned only as a backdrop to Soviet-American confrontation. This view of Soviet-Third World relations in the Cold War could be crudely summed up in an anecdote from June 1950. When reporters asked the State Department spokesman which individual bore responsibility for the North Korean offensive, he blamed Iosif Stalin. He posed the rhetorical question, "Can you imagine Donald Duck going on a rampage without Walt Disney knowing about it?" (3) Third World leaders like Kim II-Sung, in this construction, were Stalin's puppets of his creations.

This view that Moscow directed all of its allies' actions in the Cold War is no longer sustainable. The declassification of archival materials in the 1990s in Moscow and across the former Soviet bloc rebalanced the "objective correlation of sources" between the superpowers. It revealed opposition to Soviet policies both within and beyond the Soviet leadership. Yet it did little to change the geographical of topical focus of the field. (4) Even the best scholars at the leading institutions of the new Cold War history used these newly excavated sources to answer old questions with broader perspective and more sophistication. The history of superpower crises has been greatly enriched by the nuggets harvested from what Mark von Hagen termed the "archival gold rush." These materials showed how Third World clients shaped Soviet foreign-policy decisions through persistence, manipulation, and pleading. Yet scholarship on the Cold War has remained focused on wars and crises in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam, and primarily on military aid of relationships between communist parties. Now that the gold rush is over, it is time to mine further afield, searching for new documents and new approaches to the study of the USSR in the world. (5) In doing so, scholars can build on recent overviews of Soviet foreign policy that devote more attention to Soviet engagements in the Third World. (6)

Work on East-South relations can become part of a broader effort to study the USSR in transnational context--a trend familiar to readers of this and other journals on Soviet history. (7) This essay will make the case for studying Soviet-Third World contacts in particular. (8) By taking better account of the connections with the Third World--whether political, cultural, economic, of diplomatic--historians of the Soviet Union could contribute to multiple scholarly agendas, many of which already relate to their own concerns. More serious attention to East-South relations will help recast the Cold War as a fundamentally multipolar conflict, with the superpowers constantly responding not just to each other but to their allies and adversaries in the Third World. Scholars not centrally concerned with international relations could also benefit from a consideration of the full range of East-South connections; whether interested in the Academy of Sciences of in higher education, studying the physical and intellectual traces of the Third World in the USSR offers excellent insights into ostensibly "domestic" Soviet history. Such a focus on the periphery could, paradoxically, bring the study of Soviet foreign relations closer to the central concerns of the field asa whole.

In pursuing the history of the Second World's Third World, scholars could learn from the major reconceptualization and expansion of the study of U.S. diplomatic history since 1980, when Charles Maier accused it of "marking time." (9) Studies of U.S.-Third World contacts--including but not limited to formal diplomatic relations--have blossomed in recent decades, as many new topics have come to the fore: a web of economic, cultural, and intellectual connections between the United States and the outside world, only some of which involved the State Department. Many scholars refer to a "cultural turn" or a "new diplomatic history," but those falsely suggest a single direction or emphasis rather than a field moving in different and even contradictory directions simultaneously. (10) Scholars of U.S. foreign relations ate examining the flows of people and ideas internationally, treating the experiences of tourists, migrants, soldiers, and diplomats as aspects of international social history. (11) Scholars have tracked the process of "Americanization" as well as the growth of anti-Americanism--another way in which scholarship has come a long way since it studied only (in one critic's words) "the world according to Washington." (12)

Scholarship on U.S.-Third World relations has explored a variety of themes relevant for understanding Soviet relations with the Third World. Writings on race have been especially numerous and original, with a general but not exclusive focus on African-Americans' ties to Africa. They have explored in admirable depth not just the formation of American foreign policy in Africa but the ways in which American political and cultural history has been shaped by the engagement with Africa and the Third World. (13) An increasing number of works investigate the ways in which concepts of race shaped U.S. foreign relations. (14) Similarly, new work on international students and cultural exchanges explore not just America's impact on the world but the world's impact on the United States. (15)

Scholarship on American modernization and development programs has both expanded and transformed in the last decade. Pioneering accounts on the topic were written by anthropologists who were deeply critical of U.S. aid. (16) A first wave of historical work analyzed the projects using documents from official U.S. archives to show how ideas about modernization shaped American policy discussions. (17) New work has expanded the chronological and intellectual reach of modernization ideas and practices, showing how many different meanings modernization held within donor as well as recipient nations. (18) Other scholars have crossed borders between intellectual and diplomatic history, or between domestic and international history, showing the pervasiveness and persuasiveness of ideas about modernization and development in the 1950s and 1960s. (19) Scholars with deep area studies training have also expanded the geographic context by looking at the complex interactions between donors and recipients. The simple vision of Americans dictating the direction of Third World countries, even among its allies, is harder to sustain after reading, for instance, the account of Indonesian efforts to reframe modernization asa military project in Brad Simpson's aptly titled Economists with Guns. (20) Nor is U.S. development the only show in town. Historians of Western Europe have begun serious research into overseas activities in the postcolonial world. (21) Finally, historians have been exploring the ways in which an alphabet soup of international organizations--ranging from the World Bank to agencies under the UN umbrella--shaped evolving theories and practices of development. (22) Work on Western modernization and development projects has quickly incorporated intellectual and cultural history while exploring the on-the-ground workings of these projects, full of tensions and conflicts with the countries receiving aid.

For all of its growth and sophistication, though, this scholarship still has a major gap. Americanists constantly invoke the Cold War context, showing how education, development, and university research were weapons in the "battle for the hearts and minds" of the Third World. Yet few pay much attention to the opponent in this battle, the USSR, and none examines in any depth Soviet activities in the Third World. Specialists in Soviet history have done little here to help. Readers of the scholarly journals and monographs would find only dim inklings of the variety, intensity, and meanings of Soviet engagements with the Third World. This essay highlights some of these works and suggests avenues for further research.

Writing the history of the Second World's Third World, fortunately, can take advantage of contemporaneous Western scholarship on Soviet-Third World activities during the Cold War. The handful of political scientists who devoted themselves to charting these activities produced remarkably thorough accounts based on scarce and problematic sources. Roger Kanet, perhaps the most prolific Anglophone scholar on East-South relations, identified two major trends in Soviet attitudes toward the Third World: first, a gradual turn away from ideology and toward "realism," especially after the heady optimism of the Khrushchev years. Second, Kanet focused attention on the intensification of Soviet Third World contacts: first came military aid, then came troops from Soviet proxies, and finally direct Soviet intervention. (23) He and others provided both impressive detail anda broad heuristic for understanding Soviet policy, always looking from Moscow outward. (24) These contemporaneous works bore marks of time and context. First and foremost, these works explicitly and unabashedly treated the Soviet Union as an antagonist. Superpower competition shaped the point of view, the tone, and the assumptions of scholarship appearing before 1991. Even works by such original scholars as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Alexander Dallin brim with language about the Soviet "penetration" of the Third World and about the ways in which the USSR foisted aid on unwise or unwitting Third World leaders. (25) Scholars in the 1950s and 1960s wrote of a Soviet "economic offensive" in the Third World, with the sense of alarm that that nomenclature implied. (26)

Worries about economic aid were soon enough displaced by concerns about military aid. By the late 1960s, Western scholars focused almost exclusively on military dimensions when they discussed Soviet aid. They typically saw such aid as part of Soviet grand strategy--or, more dramatically, the Soviet scheme for world domination. Francis Fukuyama, before he became a neoconservative oracle (and then apostate), epitomized this perspective. Writing with Andrzej Korbonski, Fukuyama asserted, "Moscow has reasonably consistent objectives and the means used to achieve them ... often bear the marks of systematic planning." Strikingly, they presented this conclusion asa revision of prior scholarship emphasizing Soviet grand strategy without qualifiers. They, like other scholars, dealt only with military aid to the exclusion of economic relations. Fukuyama and Korbonski, for instance, dated the "opening volley" of Soviet outreach to the Third World to 1955, when Egypt received its first shipment of Soviet and Czech armaments. (27) Numerous economic agreements that the Soviet Union signed between 1953 and 1955--including some with Egypt--were neglected. (28)

Cold War-era scholarship on Soviet Third World relations, furthermore, usually contained elements of a policy brief; almost every work concluded with a discussion of U.S. policy options. Making do with a very limited range of published sources, scholars typically incorporated not just policy statements but academic debates into their analyses of Soviet policy. Their works asserted (or, worse, assumed) that any Soviet publication, including academic journals, represented the official party line. (29) These assertions in turn bolstered notions of a Soviet grand strategy in the Third World. Scholars typically traced the actions of any communist country back to Moscow; other communist countries (including, through the 1950s, China) were simply proxies carrying out Soviet orders--much like Kim Il-Sung's Donald Duck and Stalin's Walt Disney.

A focus on the Third World's Cold War--and on the Soviet Union's actions in the region--changes not just the geography but the chronology and even the topography of the conflict. Broader examination of the Third World in the Cold War demonstrates, for instance, the ideological nature of the conflict; a shifting competition helps explain why the superpowers were competing for influence in areas marginal to their national interests. No Third World country was powerful enough to present a serious military or economic threat to the superpowers, and only a few had significant economic resources. Superpower competition in the Third World was driven in part by the need to demonstrate the superiority of each ideology by gathering allies and imitators. (30) Yet ideology could divide as well as unite within the three worlds of the Cold War.

The most important divide in the so-ca]led Second World was, of course, between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. As Lorenz Luthi's award-winning new book on Sino-Soviet relations--the first to use such a range of archival materials--demonstrates, the core of the Sino-Soviet conflict was ideological difference, not antagonistic interests or competition for prestige. Luthi's facility with Russian and Chinese gave him access to excellent archival materials to a]low the retelling of this story, but it was his native German that provided some of the best material; the East German SED Party Archive was a tremendous resource for Luthi. With these sources, plus a smattering from Romanian and Bulgarian archives, Luthi shows convincingly that the divergence of China and the Soviet Union began in the mid-1950s, as each side contemplated its respective domestic policies; Khrushchev accelerated changes in the Soviet Union while Mao Zedong reversed a failed effort at liberalization. As Luthi shows, the "seminal issue" behind the Sino-Soviet conflict was ideological: "the basic idea behind the first Chinese Five-Year Plan." That plan echoed the first Soviet plan, with its basis in mobilization and coercion, at a time when Khrushchev was increasing his distance from Stalinist policies. Luthi convincingly argues that Mao "controlled the relationship's deterioration and eventual collapse." Starting in 1957, he used the Soviet Union asa foil to reach new domestic goals and enforce his ideological supremacy by marginalizing his domestic opponents. (31) Chinese initiative in Sino-Soviet relations transformed East-West competition in the Third World. By the early 1960s, such competition had become tripolar, with Soviet efforts to influence Third World leaders under attack from both China and the United States. One sign of this new three-way competition was Khrushchev's speech in early 1961--addressing the Higher Party School but aimed at his Chinese comrades--declaring Soviet commitment to come to the aid of national liberation struggles around the world. (32) Coming only weeks before John E Kennedy's inauguration, the speech reinforced the young president's determination to challenge aggressively what he considered Soviet encroachments around the Third World. (33)

Chinese enthusiasm for confrontation with the capitalist world shaped a variety of conflicts in Asia, including Korea and Vietnam. The Chinese attitudes complicated Soviet actions in the region, pushing Khrushchev toward brinksmanship in cases where he had originally sought compromise. By the early 1960s, Soviet leadership was as busy trying to rein in its Chinese ally as it was trying to control the Pathet Lao, the Viet Cong, of local communist parties across Asia. (34) The Sino-Soviet split weighed especially heavily on the increasingly troublesome situation in Indochina, which has been a topic of much recent scholarship. (35)

The Chinese threat to Soviet influence was greatest in Asia, where China's stakes were highest and Mao's reputation strongest. Debates within the Communist Party of Indonesia in the early 1960s, for instance, soon favored Chinese comrades over Soviet ones. The issue here was primarily ideological, as Indonesian party leaders felt that the Soviets were unable to formulate an effective concept for communist parties outside Europe. The Indonesian tilt toward the Chinese was especially damaging for the Soviets, who had made Indonesia the exemplar of Soviet aid and support in Asia. (36) The Chinese threat also extended into Africa. Zanzibari radical political leaders, for example, expressed great enthusiasm for rapid industrialization through central planning and enthusiastically studied both the Soviet and Chinese experiences. Like his counterparts around the Third World, Zanzibar's Ali Sultan Issi sought to learn from both communist powers and felt "free to put all ideologies to the test, to see which was most viable and most suitable for our conditions." They even excused the devastating famines in both countries as unfortunate but worthwhile side-effects of rapid industrialization. By the mid-1960s, Zanzibari leaders, now part of the Tanzanian government, leaned distinctly toward China, citing Chinese similarities to predominantly agricultural Tanzanian society and the success of Chinese aid programs. (37)

The Soviet Union, though leader of the world communist movement, faced plenty of competition from other allies, not just China. Take, for instance, Cuba. In the aftermath of the Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders put an increased emphasis on promoting revolution in Latin America, an aim shared with their Cuban comrades. (38) But Cuban leaders did not limit their sights to the region; they were also active in Africa, an effort that culminated in more than 4,000 Cuban troops fighting alongside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the 1970s. These soldiers were typically seen as proxies fulfilling a Soviet mission, a view roundly challenged in an impressive and original book by Piero Gleijeses that retells the story from a Cuban perspective--what he calls Cold War history "from below." Cuban aid to Angola started in 1967, well before the conflict attracted international attention in the mid-1970s. This aid, in turn, emerged from a Cuban relationship with African revolutionaries that went back to the first years of Castro's rule. Cuban and Algerian radicals experienced what one Cuban intellectual called "spontaneous brotherhood."

By 1965, when Che Guevara toured African hotspots, the Cuban government was more focused on fomenting revolution in Africa than in Latin America. Foreshadowing support for MPLA, a Cuban column fought in Zaire in 1965--with the Soviets and Chinese informed only after the fact. This contingent in Zaire, Gleijeses notes, meant that more Cubans fought in Africa than in Latin America between 1959 and 1980. Castro and Guevera undertook this support in spite of the diplomatic and economic fallout, both potential and actual: Cuban support for the Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella, for instancc, jeopardized relations with President Charles de Gaulle of France as well as an agreement to export sugar to Morocco (which was, it should be noted, a client for Soviet military aid). Ditto for Angola a decade later; in an international oral history project, Castro insisted: "That was a decision of ours. The only thing that came from the Soviet Union was worries." (39)

Why did Cuban revolutionaries &vote their limited resources to a continent so remote? Taking power immediately before "The Year of Africa" (1960)--in which 17 new countries came into being on the continent--Castro's fellow radicals situated themselves as the vanguard of global revolution. Cubans felt a sense of nostalgia for their own revolution as they watched similar upheavals take place in Africa. (Soviet nostalgia, tellingly, focused less on revolution than on industrialization.) (40) Cuban leaders did not need or want Soviet direction in pursuing revolution in Africa; in&ed, they faced constant pressure from the Soviets to curtail their activities there. By the time of the Angolan intervention in 1975, though, the Soviets were following the lead of their erstwhile clients, providing transportation support for Cuban troops. (41) From the first days of the Cold War, Soviet leaders followed their Asian and African clients, very often dragging their feet in doing so; one scholar writing of Soviet-Vietnamese relations uses the apt term "unequal interdependence." (42) Donald Duck could draw Walt Disney into war.

Post-1991 scholarship, with unprecedented if uneven access to archival materials, has emphasized the ways in which superpower competition created leverage for the Third World nations they were wooing. In case after case, Soviet leadership was responding to demands, however divergent from Soviet ideas and interests, from Third World leaders. In 1968, one Vietnamese journalist told a Soviet counterpart that the Soviets were paying 75-80 percent of the total assistance to North Vietnam in exchange for 4-5 percent of the influence; the Soviet quibbled with the numbers in his report to the Central Committee but basically agreed. (43) Soviet aid did not even protect local Communists. In the early 1960s, Anastas Mikoian traveled to Baghdad to protest to Ba'athist leaders who jailed and eventually executed Iraqi Communists. 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, the Iraqi premier, told him to mind his own business. (44) At his summit with President John E Kennedy in the spring of 1961, Khrushchev complained that some of the USSR's most important clients in the Third World ignored Soviet wishes and repressed their domestic communist parties even while receiving substantial Soviet aid. (45) Superpower competition offered plenty of opportunities for Third World leaders to dictate the terms of relations with the USSR.

Indonesia was one of many sites of Soviet defeat in the battle for "hearts and minds," as the USSR lost out first to China and then to the United States. Ragna Boden demonstrates in her valuable book, Die Grenzen der Weltmacht (The Boundaries of World Power), that Soviet investments there yielded little fruit and even less influence. Soviet-Indonesian relations got off to a good start, as leaders of the newly independent nation established contacts with the USSR within weeks of attaining independence in 1949. (46) Both sides soon sought mutually advantageous trade relations, in spite of the fact that President Sukarno was attacking the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). (47) By winning Sukarno's favor, Soviet diplomats hoped to influence the broader movements that Sukarno helped lead, by hosting first the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955, and then the Non-Aligned Movement. Hence their responsiveness to Sukarno's requests, even as his preferences diverged substantially from Soviet strategic or economic interests. In spite of sending Indonesia over one-fifth of its total aid budget for "nonsocialist developing countries," Soviet authorities found themselves with little if any leverage in their dealings with the Sukarno regime. While the Soviets aimed to make Indonesia a model economy for Southeast Asia, Sukarno had other agendas. Sukarno wanted a 100,000-seat sports complex in Jakarta; Khrushchev considered the stadium a waste of money but approved the project anyway. Even more than grandstanding, though, Sukarno sought territory--what Boden nicely terms "the territorial development of Indonesia." He launched military campaigns in West Irian/West New Guinea and then the "Crush Malaysia" campaign immediately afterwards. No wonder, then, that almost 90 percent of Soviet aid to Indonesia was military, even though it took place under an agreement for "economic and technical cooperation." The question of initiative--Third World vs. superpower--also forces a reconsideration of Soviet policy. Contrary to contemporaneous Western fulminations about a Soviet grand strategy to take over the Third World, Soviet leaders were responding to Indonesian pressures. The Soviet leadership, Boden aptly concludes, had "no well-thought out plan for their economic aid to Indonesia," let alone a global strategy. (48) In other situations, Soviet military aid to help allies serve their regional interests went beyond equipment and training. Soviet pilots began a long-term "airbridge" between Egypt and Yemen--in the midst of the Caribbean Crisis of 1962, no less--not for any direct geopolitical gain but to strengthen their Egyptian ally. Recent historical scholarship based on an extraordinary range of archival materials in multiple languages suggests that Soviet military aid was a multifaceted process with complex motivations and diverse impacts. (49)

Similar signs of Third World initiative are evident in Africa. What Indonesia was for Soviet dreams in Asia, Guinea was for Soviet dreams in West Africa, as S. V. Mazov argues compellingly in his recent book. Guinea's leader, Ahmed Sekou Toure, had close ties to French Communists and was familiar with the basic works of Marx and Lenin. Alone in Francophone Africa, Guinea did not adopt Charles de Gaulle's French constitution. As punishment, French officials abruptly cut off all aid to Guinea, to the point of ripping up telephone and electrical lines. Politburo member Frol Kozlov promised Soviet aid to Guinea as a demonstration of solidarity with newly independent African nations. Yet a classic litany of errors--sending canned crab and Bulgarian cognac but no tractor repairmen--soon tarnished the Soviet image in Conakry. By 1962, Sekou Toure had expelled the Soviet ambassador, accusing him of antigovernmental activities, and started courting American aid. U.S. officials soon won over Guinean loyalties, a high-profile fiasco for Soviet efforts in Africa and a portent of things to come. (50) As in Indonesia, it was the geopolitical competition that provided an opportunity for Third World leaders to go aid-shopping, playing the superpowers (plus China) off against each other. One British scholar had it only half-right when he commented that "the Soviet Union proposes, Africa disposes." What is striking about much Soviet aid in the Third World is that the Soviet Union neither proposed nor disposed but was often at the mercy of others. (51)

China and the Third World aid recipients did not provide the only limits on Soviet power. East European efforts in the Third World further demonstrate the problems of understanding the Cold War strictly in terms of Moscow, Beijing, and Washington. (52) In India, for instance, Soviet tractor exporters faced competition from Czech manufacturers, who (according to the historian Andreas Hilger) "completely command[ed]" the Indian tractor market. (53) But intrasocialist commercial competition was only one, and perhaps not even the most significant, form of multipolarity. Many of the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe had extensive relations with Third World countries, ranging from economic and military aid to educational programs. Most important was the German Democratic Republic. The Hallstein Doctrine (1955-69), under which West German governments refused to recognize any nation (aside from the USSR) that recognized their eastern counterpart, gave East Germany an incentive to build diplomatic as well as unofficial relations around the world. Shut out of Europe, East German officials quickly expanded their ties in Asia and Africa, seeking to stay one step ahead of the West. East and West Germany carried out aid programs in many of the same countries--for instance, Syria, Iraq, and Nigeria. The Hallstein Doctrine provided another arrow in the quiver for Third World countries, well aware of the pressures on East Germany. (54) East German efforts in the Third World were hardly independent of its efforts to build legitimacy through external recognition--which in turn demonstrate the linkages between European politics and those in the Third World.

Studies of East Germany have benefited handily if indirectly from German reunification, which put a wealth of GDR archival materials under Bundesarchiv control. Using these materials, scholars have examined an impressive range of topics from the heyday of development optimism in the 1950s to the reverberations of late 1960s social movements. (55) Even as North-South connections expanded and broadened, though, Third World leaders successfully maintained control over the aid coming into their countries. Until the end of the Cold War, Third World leaders were usually able (as one historian put it) "[to] set the terms and scope of interaction with a superpower" thanks to the geopolitical competition. (56) A similar point, made by a Russian scholar seemingly nostalgic for the Cold War, credited this competition for containing superpower misbehavior. With the demise of the USSR, he wrote, there was no competitor to "uplift" American policies in the Third World, to save the Third World from American aggression. (57)

For as much as a focus on the Cold War in the Third World documents the impact of the superpowers' competition, it also reveals some of the common ground between them. Such commonalities, recent scholarship indicates, are visible in spheres of both ideology and practice. Westad's Global Cold War, for instance, devotes two extended chapters at the start to outlining American and Soviet ideologies, beginning well before the origins of the Cold War itself. Framing the global conflict as ideological in nature, Westad hardly equates the two superpowers or their policies. But he does suggest how much the two ideologies shared. They were both set against an older system of international relations in which state sovereignty and national interest reigned supreme. They saw the spread of their respective political and economic systems around the world as a sign of success. And they were both deterministic, maintaining confidence in inevitable victory. As terrestrial incarnations of universalistic and deterministic ideologies, each superpower envisioned that "the whole world was going our way," as the title of one recent work had it. Yet both sides worked fervently to nudge history along, each seeking to expand its own influence and contain the spread of its opponent. (58)

But the common ground between the blocs went well beyond ideological motivation. Working on cases widely dispersed over time and space, various scholars have noted similarities in the structure and purposes of aid. Both sides worked primarily if not exclusively through government agencies, and envisioned (as Oscar Sanchez Sibony put it) "an active state sector" for development. (59) In spite of American celebrations of flee markets, aid officials always worked through government agencies, including central planning organizations, and had few compunctions about supporting a significant government role in setting prices, serving as a purchasing or sales agent, or operating as the primary player in a key sector. (60) From Indonesia to Iraq, fraternal socialist aid bore much in common with aid from capitalist countries: an emphasis on industrialization and large showcase projects, a determination to integrate the Third World into global trade networks, and the application of technical expertise. There was, of course, a qualitative difference in Western and Soviet versions of planning and state intervention--the difference between a command and a market economy--though many observers played down these differences to argue a broader convergence toward some kind of planning. (61) The specifics here address some of the same concerns animating those writing in the so-called "modernity school" in Russian history, which emphasizes, with a Foucauldian tilt, the ways in which the practices of Soviet rule were part of a broader modern political and economic organization that shared much with other states. (62)

In How Russia Shaped the Modern World, the historian Steven Marks argues that it was dictatorship, and not central planning or communism, that defined the Soviet legacy in the Third World. He considers Middle-Eastern dictators like Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Asad as "Oriental despots" who were "the closest heirs of Stalinism." Marks has a stronger point when he identifies "techniques of governance" as a key form of Soviet influence-more important, he argues, than revolutionary idealism or hopes for economic equality. (63) Soviet and Eastern bloc aid programs in the Third World quickly became exercises in state building, for reasons both overdetermined and obscure. Perhaps the most nuanced account of how fraternal socialist aid worked in the Third World comes from the Italian scholar Massimiliano Trentin, who has brought together German and Arab sources to analyze the two Germanies' aid programs in the Middle East. Trentin observes that the major concern of the Ba'ath Party (whose program emphasized secular modernization across the Middle East) was political in two dimensions: it sought to strengthen central governmental control over the economy and society and to build Ba'ath party hegemony within this growing state apparatus. These dual aims, Trentin concludes, gave socialist nations a competitive advantage. Aiding industry over agriculture and challenging local merchants--as the East German model did--promoted pro-Ba'athist elements and marginalized traditional bases of anti-Ba'ath sentiment. Local politics could shape geopolitics as much as vice versa. (64) With an ideological investment in expanding the state sector, socialist countries helped build state capacities in any number of ways. They trained economists in India, for instance, where planner-in-chief Prasanta Mahalanobis actively sought the advice of economists from Gosplan and the Academy of Sciences as well as the distinguished Polish economist/ planner Oskar Lange. (65) East Germany provided a range of technical support for North Vietnam--including not just weapons but surveillance equipment to bolster North Vietnam's internal control apparatus. (66)

Soviet influence could shape Third World political systems by inspiration as well as by intervention. Marks is too quick to dismiss two other elements of Third World attraction to the USSR: ideological and programmatic. Aside from Third World elites enthusiastic about a socialist future, there were many who hoped to replicate Soviet economic achievements by applying Soviet economic instruments. Viewing Soviet industrialization as a successful (if costly) venture, Third World elites sought to replicate the means of Soviet success: emphasis on heavy industry, reliance on central planning, extraction of resources from the agricultural sector, all at a rapid pace. Leaders all over the Third World, from Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana to Ahmed Sekou Toure in Guinea to Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt to Jawaharlal Nehru in India, all celebrated the Soviet model and sought to implement some version of it. Whereas scholarship dealing with the postcolonial histories of these countries recognized the importance of the Soviet model, few specialists on Soviet history and economics have addressed the issue. (67)

Newly independent nations proclaimed their appreciation of Soviet planning, which they saw as distinct from a budding alliance with the USSR. Self-proclaimed socialist leaders in Algeria and Kenya eagerly sought out Soviet aid and advice, but this was hardly tantamount to accepting an invitation to join the Soviet bloc. (68) India's Jawaharlal Nehru sought out Soviet economic aid-including building an Indian version of Magnitogorsk in Bhilai--while attacking the Communist Party of India at home and leading the Non-Aligned Movement abroad. (69) One interesting, if indirect, perspective on African views of the USSR comes by way of an unusual primary source: a 1962 survey of African students in Parisian universities. Centrally planned economies were much preferred: about 25 percent saw the USSR as their "favorite country," slightly ahead of China (20 percent) and well in front of France (8 percent) and the United States (3 percent). Students' enthusiasm for the USSR was primarily practical: its rapid economic progress (35 percent) and its scientific developments (19 percent); ideology (22 percent) mattered but was not primary. Enthusiasm for China similarly emphasized methods of rapid development (44 percent) over ideological factors. Democracy, at least when thinking of the United States, was a relatively low priority; those favoring the United States emphasized industrial prowess (37 percent), standard of living (26 percent), and even jazz (15 percent) over democracy (9 percent). When asked what economic model they desired, well over 35 percent wanted "integral socialism" along Soviet lines, whereas only 7 percent wanted a "liberal economy." (70) Soviet diplomats and aid officials, however, were remarkably ill equipped to take advantage of this interest. West African economists wanting to read English-language material about the Soviet economy found nothing produced in the USSR aside from the occasional statistical compendium. They relied on Western sources to learn about Soviet economic planning, which no doubt contributed to the diminishing enthusiasm for the USSR in the 1960s. (71) The disconnect between ideologically driven Soviet policy in the Third World and Third World nations' focus on practical economic and political benefits helps explain Soviet difficulties in the region.

For all of the initial excitement about Soviet-style planning, then, the USSR soon found its principal allies more interested in security concerns than economic ones. In The Global Cold War, Westad documents with stirring if exhausting effectiveness the extent of Soviet military aid across subSaharan Africa in the 1970s. Superpower intervention--most often meaning military aid in the form of weapons, advisors, and eventually troops--had devastating consequences in these regions and well beyond. The aid turned divisive local battles into highly destructive fronts in a global war, sweeping governments, economies, and societies across the Third World into its vortex. Of course, the escalation of such conflicts can hardly be blamed on the USSR alone, but its involvement, along with that of the United States, left scars from which parts of the Third World have yet to recover. Dreams of independence and economic prosperity (whether socialist or market-oriented) created nightmares of poverty, famine, and civil war in Ethiopia, Somalia, southern Africa, and Afghanistan.

Studies of East-South relations would make a contribution to histories of Soviet foreign relations, to be sure, but could also reshape scholarly understanding of key domestic Soviet institutions and trends. Elizabeth Bishop's impressive dissertation on Soviet engineers and workers involved in the construction of Egypt's Aswan High Dam offers important insights into what she calls Soviet "production culture" as well as gender relations. Her insights indicate the numerous difficulties in taking Soviet work plans at face value, without the possibility of engaging in the back-channel trading and occasional "storming" that were so ubiquitous in Soviet industrial enterprises. (72) Similarly, recent explorations of engagement with the Third World in Eastern bloc politics and culture suggest the possibilities of exploring the Third World in the broader Soviet imagination. (73)

More readily accessible would be sources on postwar Soviet intellectual life, which was shaped by the newfound official interest in the Third World. In the late 1950s, the Soviet Academy of Sciences went on a crash course for knowledge about the world; it established a welter of area institutes that paralleled in some ways the American effort to build "area studies" a few years earlier. (74) As in the United States, the expansion of area knowledge in the USSR was a response to world events undertaken at the instigation of political leaders. Anastas Mikoian complained in 1956 that the academy was out of touch with its own time. "While the entire East has awakened in our time," he berated the Oriental Institute, "this institute has been napping to this day. Isn't it time that the institute raised itself to the level of the demands of our time?" (75) Soon thereafter the Oriental Institute added an African department, which by 1959 had become a separate African Institute at the academy. A Latin American Institute soon followed. Mikoian's original target, the Oriental Institute, soon hived into two programs, one in Leningrad continuing the long tradition of classical Orientalism while a new Moscow branch focused on the contemporary "East." (76) With each of these institutes came new journals--for instance, Narody Azii i Afriki, Latinskaia Amerika, and Problemy mira i sotsializma.

The history of the African Institute is perhaps most readily visible in recent scholarship. In his memoirs A. B. Davidson, one of the field's doyens, recounts the "Africa Boom" of the late 1950s and early 1960s, in which he and many others joined a new and exciting intellectual enterprise. (77) With a strong interest in the history of his field, Davidson has incorporated key 73 See, for instance, Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Nick Pas, "European Radicals and the 'Third World': Imagined Solidarities and Radical Networks, 1958-1973," Cultural and Social History (forthcoming, 2011); and Sudha Rajagopalan, Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going after Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). material on the topic into document collections on Soviet African relations. (78) While these collections demonstrate the excitement of the late 1950s, they also trace the roots of Soviet African studies before the Cold War, as a number of Soviet scholars learned about the continent through involvement in the Comintern. (79) The comparisons to knowledge about and policies toward "backward" peoples within the USSR are striking and relevant to the burgeoning literature on Soviet nationalities. (80) Yet the intensification of Soviet efforts to understand modern Africa, Asia, and Latin America awaited the surge of interest in the 1950s. Retelling the history of these institutes would contribute to scholarly understanding of both policy formation as well as the relationship between area knowledge and the disciplines--a debate that roiled American political science in the 1960s and 1970s. (81)

Cold-War era scholarship read the debates in the academy institutes, including not just the regional ones but also the Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), as proxies for policy debates. As Mikoian's 1956 intervention suggests, there clearly was a dense network of political and intellectual ties between the institutes and the foreign-policy apparatus. At the same time, though, the debates within the regional institutes did not simply replicate policy disputes. One product of the African Institute, the sociologist Georgii Derluguian, argues that his institute and its Third World counterparts were "relatively undogmatized intellectual zones" in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, existing "on the fringes of official ideology." (82) As scholars like Jerry Hough and Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier observed in the 1970s and 1980s, the pressing debates in these institutes got to the core of Soviet ideology and eschatology: the evolution of societies. The succession of concepts discussed in those years suggests both intellectual evolution and the waning of optimism over the future of the Third World. (83) Recognizing that not all newly independent nations were ready for the leap to communism, scholars discussed countries that had an "orientation to socialism," meaning that the political allegiances were pro-Soviet even if the material circumstances were far from socialist. An alternative concept, "noncapitalist development," encouraged the adoption of Soviet techniques (central planning, government ownership, etc.) without proclaiming an explicitly socialist agenda. But the reigning concept of the mid-1960s, mnogoukladnost' (multi-structurality), took hold in part because it came into vogue in precisely that time for understanding 19th-century Russian history. Derived from Lenin's brief description of capitalist remnants in Russia in 1918, mnogoukladnost" allowed the broadest possible discussion of social, political, economic, and cultural circumstances that fit poorly within Marx's unilinear and materialist framework of history. Not surprisingly, it eventually attracted critics attacking the lack of partiinost" in social-scientific scholarship. (84) These topics are ripe for revisiting; Hough's innovative analysis of published Soviet writings on the Third World provides an excellent basis for archival work on the topic.

Some recent scholarship has explored the contradictory role of ideology in another important aspect of Soviet-Third World relations: international students in the USSR. Ideological subjects were especially prominent at the Moscow-based universities attracting Third World students: Lumumba University for the Friendship of Peoples; Moscow State University; the Institute of the Social Sciences (an organ of the Party's Central Committee), which served foreign Communists; and the Komsomol Institute, which included Third World cadres in its ranks. The trade union organization also tried to establish a school for union leaders from the Third World but soon provoked the hostility of government leaders who resented alternative access to power and to Soviet authority. Students came to the USSR from all over the Third World, with the largest contingents from Soviet allies, but smaller groups even from staunch Western allies like Kuwait. These elite institutions in Moscow accounted for only a small share of Third World students in Soviet universities. Lumumba University had great symbolic importance but never accounted for more than one-eighth of Arab students in the USSR. The remainder were at provincial universities or (even more) at technical institutes. (85) A very limited survey of African students who had come to American universities after leaving Soviet ones included more students from the Chemical and Oil Institute in Baku than anywhere else. Other data suggested the wide dispersal of Third World students across the USSR. (86)

As the historians Maxim Matusevich and Vladimir Bartenev demonstrate in their recent works, Third World students typically wanted practical, not political, enlightenment. One Nigerian student insisted that he wanted to study in the USSR in order to learn advanced techniques and technologies, not to "be ideologized," as he told one reporter. (87) A compatriot studying at Lumumba University attracted international attention when he complained in the British press about the ideologization of Soviet education. Arab students responded similarly, seeking a diverse range of educational opportunities but only rarely coming to the USSR on political pilgrimages. Indeed, in Nigeria, Matusevich reports, Soviet medical and engineering degrees were not considered acceptable credentials because the degrees involved too much Marx and not enough medicine or mechanics. (88) Similar circumstances appeared in other corners of the Soviet bloc, as Third World students and trainees were disillusioned by their educational and living experiences there. (89)

Some Third World students faced not just disillusionment but danger. There were dozens of conflicts between African and Soviet students in Soviet universities in the 1950s and 1960s. The most common spark for violence was a relationship (real or imagined) between a male student from the Third World and a Soviet woman. The dangers plaguing African students in Moscow, furthermore, were hardly absent elsewhere. Ultimately, bringing Third World students to experience the best of socialist education did not always result in the "Friendship of Nations"--indeed, sometimes quite the opposite. The racial incidents in Moscow and elsewhere prompted the formation of an African student organization rallying for better treatment. (90) Conditions outside Moscow, furthermore, made Lumumba University seem tolerant and even luxurious. The 55 Guinean students at the Defense Ministry's aviation training facility in Kyrgyzstan, for instance, reported that as many as seven shared a single poorly equipped and ill-furnished room, heated only by a stove and lacking hot water or sewage disposal. In Zanzibar/Tanzania, enthusiasm for Soviet education dulled considerably after the USSR started charging for the coffins used to repatriate a couple of students who died while in the USSR--and then billed the families for shipping. Soviet officials ended their sponsorship of education programs with Algeria because participants came back with hostile attitudes towards the USSR. (91) Only months after the "Year of Africa" ended, troubles in Soviet universities began to multiply.

Indeed, much of the Soviet encounter with the Third World involved similar disillusionment. Many Soviet efforts to aid Third World countries foundered on the inefficiencies of the planned economy, on unrealistic aspirations for aid projects, and the spread of deleterious information about the USSR into the Third World--most often by people who had been there. A delegation of Indian engineers and business people, for instance, concluded its 1954 visit to the USSR by noting the shortages of consumer goods, poorly constructed buildings, and decrepit and outdated factories. (92) Familiarity bred dissatisfaction, if not contempt.

Nor were Soviet losses only in prestige, as Ragna Boden's case study on Indonesia as well as a recent dissertation by Oscar Sanchez Sibony indicate. In material terms, Soviet activities in the Third World were a major drain on resources. While Soviet leadership emphasized strategic, ideological, and economic aims in expanding East-South relations, economics often was shunted aside. As two historians recently concluded regarding aid to Afghanistan, Soviet officials were "often economically naive" about the actual costs and effects of the aid they administered. (93) Karen Brutents, a Third World specialist in the CPSU's International Department, recalled critically:
   On the whole, the foreign economic policy of the Soviet Union in
   its relations with developing countries sinned with many serious
   miscalculations. I might take the liberty of saying that our course
   in the Third World was in no way planned out, not even simply on a
   sketchy economic basis. There was no real concern about the real
   links between political and economic interests, or about whether
   our presence in this or that country would be accompanied by ...
   economic opportunities. (94)


Brutents echoed a confidential 1964 report that accused Khrushchev of expanding relationships with Third World countries based on insufficient knowledge or cost-benefit analysis. (95) Even with the encroaching pragmatism in Soviet dealings with the Third World--one of Khrushchev's last acts, but one that did not forestall his removal--the USSR still devoted substantial sums to Third World states. Competing for Third World favor against far larger capitalist economies put the Soviet Union and its East European satellites at a grave disadvantage, often overcoming any advantages rooted in ideology or program. In India, for instance, Western countries, primarily the United States but also West Germany, were delivering a total aid package roughly ten times that of the socialist countries. Similar ratios held across the Third World, the result of Western economic superiority. And yet even as its contributions fell further behind those from the West, the USSR devoted enough resources to expanding its Third World influence to contribute to domestic economic stagnation. (96) A series of RAND Corporation reports calculated the increasing "costs of Soviet empire" in the 1980s, predicting that the cost of competing with the West would soon grow prohibitive. (97)

As Ragna Boden generalizes from her work on Soviet-Indonesian relations, "More often than not, the periphery gained while the centers lost." Yet even as Soviet costs mounted, gains in the Third World countries were hard to identify. The fragmentary scholarship on Soviet-Third World relations suggests that the problems of Soviet aid had many causes. One major factor will be familiar to all students of Soviet society: the manifest failures of central planning--the inability to account for local conditions, unrealistic time horizons, supply problems, and the like. Tales of such problems abound in the scattered scholarship on East-South relations. Boden counts only 3 of 27 Soviet aid projects in Indonesia completed on time. Soviet projects in Afghanistan fared better but were hardly a matter of pride: just over half of the 270 aid projects begun over a 30-year period were completed. (98) Perhaps the most poignant image of failed Soviet dreams in the Third World is one recounted by Matusevich in his history of Soviet-Nigerian economic relations. The USSR and Nigeria began planning the Ajaokuta Steel Plant in 1976, reaching an agreement three years later with a scheduled opening of 1986. Around that time, a sign outside the plant side advertised Ajaokuta Steel as "The Path to True Industrialization"; behind it, a herd of goats stood calmly out to pasture. (99) A fitting image for grandiose Soviet plans gone awry, but one that does not account for the cost of such dreams--in economic or ideological terms--to the USSR itself. Those costs themselves suggest the benefits of historians seeking to discover the Second World's Third World.

The works considered here can provide both starting points and role models for a fuller history of the Second World's Third World. So far many of the best works have been bilateral or regional case studies, varying in scope and source base. More bilateral accounts that use Soviet archives along with published and archival documents from selected Third World countries would be essential building blocks for a broader history of U.S.-Third World relations. Recent accounts by Boden (on Indonesia) and Mazov (on West Africa) provide excellent models of bilateral studies that include and seek to integrate formal diplomatic relations, economic and military aid, cultural relations, and Soviet research institutions. The published portions of Andreas Hilger's study of Soviet-South Asian relations suggest a similarly broad analysis in the works. (The Parallel History Project has brought Hilger together with Indian scholars to gather primary sources and post them online.) (100) An excellent starting point is a collection of essays, Die Sowjetunion und die Dritte Welt (The Soviet Union and the Third World [2009]), edited by Andreas Hilger. Covering episodes that extend from Tel Aviv in 1948 through Kabul in 1979, its essays trace an extraordinary range of historical actors, from Soviet friendship societies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) to the CPSU to the KGB. This geographic and organizational range, however, only suggests the pressing need for more detailed studies tracing the complex nature of Soviet interactions with Third World nations in the Cold War.

Researching histories of key Soviet institutions would provide different building blocks toward a comprehensive understanding of Soviet-Third World relations. The number of Soviet organizations involved in foreign relations (broadly defined) means that the bilateral studies require work in archival collections related to the Academy of Sciences, Council of Ministers, Gosplan, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Higher Education, and Foreign Trade--not to mention party organs like the Commission on Ideology, Culture, and International Party Movements. Detailed studies of these organizations (or components of them, like individual universities and technical institutes or individual institutes of the Academy of Sciences) would shed light on the competing institutional interests and international visions that shaped Soviet policies and practices in the Third World.

These bilateral and institutional histories would pave the way for broader synthesis of Soviet-Third World relations, building upon Westad's admirable effort in The Global Cold War. Though Westad offered a broad argument about the ideological factors shaping the Cold War, his empirical material focused on Soviet (and Chinese and American) activities in Third World military hotspots in the USSR's final decades. The cost of paying such close attention to the international history of the Third World crises of the 1970s and 1980s, however, was that he slighted the domestic impact of Soviet-Third World relations as well as the range of contacts and connections beyond military aid.

It is at this nexus of domestic and international history that more intensive study of Soviet-Third World relations has the greatest promise. Expanding the geographic and thematic focus of the field has brought U.S. diplomatic historians in much closer touch with a "mainstream" that had, until the mid-1990s little interest in overseas connections or events. With the push to "internationalize" American history--by 2011 over a dozen years old--historians are abandoning long-held assumptions that the United States shaped the world more than it was shaped by it; histories of slavery (its origins and demise), westward expansion, and civil rights now require a transnational perspective. Scholars of U.S. foreign relations have joined forces with those in African-American, intellectual, cultural, and political history to retell that history from a broader perspective.

Although some of the elements of this historiographic shift are unique to the United States, other elements suggest future directions for historians of the USSR. More attention to Soviet-Third World relations would be a natural next step for those exploring the history of national, racial, religious, and economic differentiation in Soviet politics and life. The "imperial turn" has generated new questions about the expansion of a multinational polity--questions that resonate with Soviet Third World relations. (101) Social histories of Third World students and visitors to the USSR and Soviet officials overseas, furthermore, could contribute to discussions of Soviet subjectivity as distance and new experiences challenged Soviet ideas and identities. And those scholars exploring what has been called the "modernity" paradigm would find both confirming and disconfirming evidence in seeing how competing modernities--Soviet, American, and European--were advertised, enacted, and received overseas.

Studies of the Second World's Third World would fill obvious and important empirical gaps and could contribute meaningfully to current approaches to Soviet history. Much as Soviet actions in the Third World shaped the course of Soviet history, scholarship on the geographic periphery can help rewrite the mainstream history of the USSR.

Dept. of History / Mailstop 036

Brandeis University

Waltham, MA 02454 USA

engerman@brandeis.edu

(1) The terms first/second/third worlds themselves have a meaningful history that will not be dwelt upon here. It is also worth noting that Soviet writings typically avoided these terms, preferring "developing countries" (razvivaiushchiesia strany), "the East" (vostok), or "economically underdeveloped countries" (ekonomicheski slaborazvitye strany). For a critical review of Western categories, see Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Quotation from Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Union's Partnership with India," Journal of Cold War Studies 12, 3 (2010): 88.

(2) "Hitler's Cold War" (editorial), The Nation 146 (26 March 1938): 345-46.

(3) Edward W. Barrett, Truth Is Our Weapon (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1953), 156. Indeed, Stalin not only knew about Kim II-Sung's plans but approved them--only after Kim made multiple entreaties. See Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950," Cold War International History Project Working Paper, no. 8 (1993).

(4) The quotation is from the masthead of Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 160.

(5) Mark von Hagen, "The Archival Gold Rush and Historical Agendas in the Post-Soviet Era," Slavic Review 52, 1 (1993): 96-100.

(6) See, for instance, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006); and Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

(7) See two recent special issues on transnational Soviet history: Larissa Zakharova and Eleonory Gilburd, eds., "Repenser le Degel: Versions du socialisme, influences internationales et societe sovietique," Cahiers du monde russe 47, 1 (2006); and "Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," Kritika 9, 4 (2008). On East-South relations in particular, see Narue-Pierre Rey, ed., "L'URSS et les Suds," Outre-Mers, no. 354-55 (2007).

(8) For a similar call, with useful citations, see Tobias Rupprecht, "Die Sowjetunion und die Welt im Kalten Krieg: Neue Forschungsperspektiven auf eine vermeintlich hermetisch abgeschottete Gesellschaft," Jahrbucherfiir Geschichte Osteuropas 58, 3 (2010): 381-99.

(9) Charles Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations," in The Past before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980); see also Michael H. Hunt, "The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure," Diplomatic History 16, 1 (1992): 115-40.

(10) For helpful guides to the literature in the 1980s and 1990s, see the relevant articles republished in Michael J. Hogan, ed., America and the World: The Historiography of U.S. Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For more recent scholarship, see Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss, eds., Empire and Revolution: The Untied States and the Third World since 1945 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001); and Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, eds., The Eisenhower Administration, The Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). Four diplomatic historians debate the state of the field in Journal of American History 95, 4 (2009): 1053-91.

(11) For instance, Petra Goedde, GI's and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Christopher Endy, Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); and Jonathan Zimmerman, Innocents Abroad: American Teachers in the American Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

(12) See, for instance, Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); on anti-Americanism, see especially Max Paul Friedman, "Anti-Americanism and U.S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 32, 4 (September 2008): 497-514; and Sally Marks, "The World According to Washington," Diplomatic History 11, 3 (July 1987): 265-282.

(13) On the domestic politics of Africa policy, see Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). On cultural and intellectual interactions, see Penny M. ron Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Mary L. Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Anc[for an influential view of how American civil rights history was shaped by international politics, see Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). On the intellectual impact of travels to Africa, see James Campbell, Middle Passages: African-American Journeys to Africa, 1787-2005 (New York: Penguin, 2006).

(14) See, for instance, Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Paul A. Kramer, Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and Jason C. Parker, Brother's Keeper: The Un#ed States, Race, and Empire in the Caribbean, 1937-1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

(15) Paul Kramer, "Is the World Our Campus? International Students and U.S. Global Power in the Long Twentieth-Century America," Diplomatic History 33, 5 (2009): 775-806; Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), esp. chaps. 6-7; Liping Bu, Making the World Like Us: Education, Cultural Expansion, and the American Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

(16) For ethnographies, see James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); and more recently Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics (Durham. NC: Duke University Press, 2007). For discursive analysis, sec Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Wolfgang Sachs, ed., The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (London: Zed Books, 1992).

(17) Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The Un#ed States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Nick Cullather, "Development? It's History," Diplomatic History 24, 4 (2000): 541-654. For a snapshot of the field as of 2003, see David C. Engerman, Nils Hilman, Mark Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, eds., Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

(18) Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Orden 1914 to Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

(19) Nick Cullather, "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie," American Historical Review 112, 2 (2007): 337-64. For citations to similar work, see David C. Engerman, "American Knowledge and Global Power," Diplomatic History 31, 4 (2007): 599-622; and Alyosha Goldstein, "On the Internal Border: Colonial Difference, the Cold War, and Locations of 'Underdevelopment,'" Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, 1 (2008): 26-56.

(20) BradIey R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Gregg Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

(21) See, for instance, two special journal issues: Contemporary European History 12, 4 (2003); and "Modernizing Missions: Approaches to 'Developing' the Non-Western World after 1945," Journal of Modern European History 8, 1 (2010).

(22) Amy L. M. Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and WorM Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006); Daniel Maui, Menschenrechte, Sozialpolitik und Dekolonisation: Die Internationale Arbeitsorganization (IAO), 1940-1970 (Essen: Klartext, 2007); Richard Jolly et al., U.N. Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Michele Alacevich, The Political Economy of the WorM Bank: The Early Years (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

(23) See, for instance, Roger Kanet, ed., The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

(24) See Kanet's useful retrospectives: "The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for 'Wars of National Liberation,'" Cold War History 6, 3 (2006): 331-52; "Sowjetische Militarhilfe fur nationale Befreiungsbriege," in Heisse Kriege im Kalten Krieg, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Muller, and Dierck Walter (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006); and "Vier Jahrzehnte sowjetische Wirtschaftshilfe," in Okonomie im Kalten Krieg, ed. Greiner, Muller, and Claudia Weber (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2010).

(25) Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The African Challenge," and Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union in Africa: The Political Dimension," both in Africa and the Communist World, ed. Brzezinski (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963), v, 4, 47.

(26) Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Politics of Underdevelopment," World Politics 9, 1 (1956): 55-75; Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1958), 33; Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Pracger, 1967).

(27) Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, "Preface," to The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades, ed. Korbonski and Fukuyama (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), xii, vil. See also, for example, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

(28) On early Soviet-Egyptian agreements, see Charles B. McLane, Soviet-Middle East Relations (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1973), 35.

(29) A few works sought to study these connections, even without access to adequate sources. See, for instance, Robert Remnek, Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Soviet Policy towards India (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1975); and Oded Eran, Mezhdunarodniki: An Assessment of Professional Expertise in the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy (Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove Publishing, 1979).

(30) Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Own Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chaps. 1-2; Engerman, "Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1962," in Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

(31) Lorenz Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 11-12, 41, 112, 109.

(32) N. S. Khrushchev, "Za nowe pobedy mirovogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniia," Kommunist, no. 1 (1961): 25-29. More generally, see Jeremy Friedman, "Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s," Cold War History 10, 2 (2010): 247-72.

(33) See, for instance, Thomas J. Noer, "New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

(34) Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 394,424; E. O. Obichkina, "Sovetskoe ruko vodstvo i voina v Alzhire 1954-1962 gg. po materialam arkhiva MID RF," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 1 (2000): 19-30.

(35) Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Mari Olsen, Soviet-Vietnamese Relations and the Role of China, 1949-64 (London: Routledge, 2006).

(36) Ragna Boden Die Grenzen der Weltmacht: Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik von Stalin bis Breznev (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), esp. chapter 2.7. Boden refers to Soviet "Konzeptlosigkeit" ("conceptlessness") in dealing with non-European communist parties (321).

(37) iii Sultan Issi, in Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights in Zanzibar, ed. G. Thomas Burgess (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 61; Thomas Burgess, "A Socialist Diaspora: Ali Sultan Issa, the Soviet Union, and the Zanzibari Revolution," in Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters, ed. Maxim Matusevich (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007), 270-71, 281-82.

(38) Daniela Spenser, "The Caribbean Crisis: Catalyst for Soviet Projection in Latin America," in In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).

(39) Piero G[eijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 9, 184, 31, 29, 92-93, 377, 306-7. Gleijeses quotes Castro (11 January 1992) from The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, ed. Laurence Change and Peter Kornbluh (New York: New Press, 1998), 334.

(40) Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 40-41 1; K. Krishna Moorty, The Road Begins at Bhilai (Madras: Technology Books, 1987), 195-202.

(41) Westad, Global Cold War, chap. 6; Piero Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975-1988," Journal of Cold War Studies 8, 2 (2006): 3-51. For a Soviet perspective, see Vladimir Shubin, The Hot "Cold" War: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto, 2008).

(42) Celine Marange, "Alliance ou interdependance inegale? Les relations politiques de l'Union sovietique avec le Viernam de 1975 a 1991," Outre-Mers, no. 354-55 (2007): 147-71.

(43) Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 72.

(44) Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 511-12.

(45) Transcript of Khrushchev-Kennedy conversation, 3 June 1961, in Prezidium TsKKPSS, ed. A. A. Fursenko, 3 vols. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 3:189.

(46) Larisa M. Efimova, "Stalin and the Revival of the Communist Party of Indonesia," Cold War History 5, 1 (2005): 107-20.

(47) Oscar Sanchez Sibony, "Red Globalization: The Political Economy of Soviet Foreign Relations in the '50s and '60s" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2009), chap. 5.

(48) Boden, Grenzen der Weltmacht, 271-72, 195, 189. Her conclusions are summarized in Ragna Boden, "Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia," Journal of Cold War Studies 10, 3 (2008): 110-28.

(49) On the Yemen airbridge, see Jesse Ferris, "Soviet Support for Egypt's Intervention in Yemen, 1962-1963," Journal of Cold War Studies 10, 4 (2008): 5-36.

(50) S. V. Mazov, Politika SSSR v zapadnoi Afrike, 1956-1964: Neizvestnye stranitsy istorii kholodnoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 2008), 60, 79, 152, 162-63--published in English as Sergey Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War." The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

(51) Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976), 191.

(52) Martin Rudner, "East European Aid to Asian Developing Countries: The Legacy of the Communist Era," Modern Asian Studies 30, 1 (1996): 1-28; Jude Howell, "The End of an Era: The Rise and Fall of G.D.R. Aid," Journal of Modern African Studies 32, 2 (1994): 305-28.

(53) Andreas Hilger, "Revolutionsideologie, Systemkonkurrenz, oder Entwicklungspolitik: Sowjetische-indische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in Chruschtschows Kaltem Krieg," Archivfiir Sozialgeschichte 48 (2008): 406.

(54) William Glenn Gray, Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Sara Lorenzini, Due Germanie in Africa: La cooperzione allo sviluppo e la competizione per i mercati di materie prime e technologia (Florence: Edizioni Polistampi, 2003), chap. 4; Massimiliano Trentin, "'Tough Negotiations': The Two Germanies in Syria and Iraq (1963-1974)," Cold War History 8, 3 (2008): 353-80.

(55) Christian Jetzlsperger, "Die Emanzipation der Entwicklungspolitik vonder HallsteinDoktrin: Die Krise der deutschen Nahostpolitik yon 1965, die Entwicklungspolitik, und der Ost West-Konflikt," Historisches Jahrbuch 121 (2001): 320-66; Sara Lorenzini, "Globalizing Ostpolitik," Cold War History 9, 2 (2009): 223-42; Andreas Hilger, "Moskau und die Entwicklungslander," in Prager Fruhling: Das internationale Krisenjahre 1968, ed. Manfred Wilke (Cologne: Bohlau, 2008).

(56) Maxim Matusevich, No Easy Row for the Russian Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigerian Soviet Relations 1960-1991 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003), 262.

(57) Vladimir Shubin, "Beyond the Fairy Tales: The Reality of Soviet Involvement in the Liberation of Southern Africa," in Africa in Russia, 349.

(58) Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic, 2005); Westad, Global Cold War, chaps. 1-2.

(59) Sanchez Sibony, "Red Globalization," chap. 5.

(60) See, for instance, Nick Cullather, "'Fuel for the Good Dragon': The United States and Industrial Policy in Taiwan, 1950-1965," Diplomatic History 20, 1 (1996): 1-26; Bevan Sackley, "A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America," Diplomatic History 32, 5 (2008): 841-68.

(61) Boden, "Cold War Economics," 123; Trentin, "Tough Negotiations," 362; Max F. Millikan, "Introduction," to National Econamic Planning, ed. Millikan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 3 vols. (New York: Pantheon, 1968), part IV, "A Third World of Planning." (62) Michael David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet History," Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 55, 4 (2006): 535-55; David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices (New York: St. Martin's, 2000).

(63) Steven G. Marks, How Russia Shaped the Modern World (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 2003), 325,320.

(64) Trentin, "Tough Negotiations"; Trentin, "Modernization as State-Building: The Two Germanies in Syria, 1962-1972," Diplomatic History 33, 3 (2009): 487-505.

(65) Hilger, "Revolutionsideologie," 399-400. Mahalanobis also sought advice from Western economists, including experts on Soviet planning like Abram Bergson.

(66) Bernd Schiller, "Socialist Modernization of Vietnam: The East German Approach, 1976- 1989" (unpublished paper from German Historical Institute workshop on "Modernization as a Global Project," March 2008).

(67) See, for instance, Francine R. Frankel, India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1978). See also two essays in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): Sugata Bose, "Instruments and Idioms of Colonial and National Development: India's Historical Experience in Comparative Perspective" (45-63); and Frederick Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept" (64-92).

(68) See, for instance, Jeffrey James Byrne, "Our Own Special Kind of Socialism: Algeria and the Contest of Modernizations in the 1960s," Diplomatic History 33, 3 (2009): 427-48; and Daniel Speich, "The Kenyan Style of 'African Socialism': Developmental Knowledge Claims and the Explanatory Liraits of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 33, 3 (2009): 449-66.

(69) See the citations in David C. Engerman, "The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 28, 1 (2004): 32-35.

(70) J. P. N'Diaye, Enquete sur les etudiants noirs en France (Paris: Realites africaines, 1962), 243-52, 228-30.

(71) Mazov, Politika SSSR, 278.

(72) Elizabeth Bishop, "Talking Shop: Egyptian Engineers and Soviet Specialists at the Aswan High Dam" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1997); Bishop, "Assuan, 1959: Sowjetische Entwicklungspolitik--die Perspektive der 'Gender-History,'" in Die Sowjetunion und die Dritte Welt: UdSSR, Staatssozialismus und Antikolonialismus im Kalten Krieg 1945-1991, ed. Andreas Hilger (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2009).

(74) For citations on the American effort, see Engerman, "American Knowledge," 607-10.

(75) "XX s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza i zadachi izucheniia sovremennogo vostoka," Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, no. 1 (1956): 6.

(76) A. B. Davidson and Sergei Mazov, "Vvedenie," in Rossiia i Afrika: Dokumenty i materialy XVIII v.-1960 g., 2 vols., ed. Davidson and Mazov (Moscow: Institute of World History, 1999), 2:5-6; Tobias Rupprecht, "Progress--Desarrollo--Modernization: Konzepte von Fortschritt und Modernitat in der geteilten sowjetisch-lateinamerikanischen Geschichte 1956-1966" (Magister thesis, Universitat Tubingen, 2007), 53-59. N. A. Kuznetsova and L. M. Kulagina, Iz istorii sovetskogo vostokovedeniia, 1917-1967 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 152-59. By 1960, the name changed again, to Institut narodov Azii. A useful overview is Eran, Mezhdunarodniki.

(77) A. B. Davidson, Moskovskaia Afrika (Moscow: Izdatel 'stvo teatral "nogo instituta im. Borisa Shchukina, 2003), 26-30.

(78) Davidson and Mazov, eds., Rossiia i Afrika.

(79) Apollon Davidson et al., SSSR i Afrika, 1918-1960: Dokumentirovannaia istoriia vzaimootnoshenii (Moscow: Institute of World History, 2003), 56-64.

(80) See esp. Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

(81) David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities," 552.

(82) G. Derluguian, "Dogmas and Heresies: Soviet Debate on the Social Nature of the Third World and the Legacy of Vladimir Krylov," Annie africaine, 1992-93, 448. Davidson, one of Derluguian's teachers, in contrast emphasized the "ideologization of African studies" in the 1960s--Davidson and Mazov, "Vvedenie," 6.

(83) This is not strictly an Eastern bloc phenomenon; American scholars, too, wrote with increasing pessimism about the Third World over the course of the 1960s. See Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, chap. 6; and Ekbladh, Great American Mission, chap. 7.

(84) Jerry E Hough has an excellent if brief synopsis of the rise of the mnogoukladnost "argument in his The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986), 54-60. See also Valkenier, Soviet Union and the Third World, chap. 3.

(85) Constantin Katsakioris, "Soviet Lessons for Arab Modernization: Soviet Educational Aid towards Arab Countries after 1956," Journal of Modern European History 8, 1 (2010): 85-106.

(86) Kenneth L. Baer, "African Students in the East and West, 1959-1966: An Analysis of Experiences and Attitudes," Syracuse University Program of Eastern African Studies, Occasional Paper 54 (July 1970), 7; Nicholas De Witt, Education and Professional Employment in the USSR (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1961).

(87) Matusevich, No Easy Row, 145. More broadly, see Vladimir Bartenev, "L'URSS et l'Afrique noir sous Khrouchtchev: La mise a jour des mythes de la cooperation," Outre-Mers, no. 354-55 (2007): 71-76; Konstantin Katsakioris, "Afrikanskie studenty v SSSR: Ucheba politika vo vremia dekolonizatsii--shestidesiatye gody," Sotsial "naia istoriia: Ezhegodnik (2008).

(88) Mazov, Politika SSSR, 272; Katsakioris, "Soviet Lessons," 98-99; Matusevich, No Easy Row, 157.

(89) See, for instance, Young-Sun Hong, "'The Benefits of Health Must Spread among All': International Solidarity, Health, and Race in the East German Encounter with the Third World," in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics, ed. Katherine Pence and Paul Betts (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

(90) Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," Cahiers du monde russe 47, 1-2 (2006): 33-64. For a retrospective on the university, including its difficult post-Soviet life, see Tobias Rupprecht, "Gestrandetes Flaggschiff: Die Moskauer Universitat der Volkerfreundschaft," Osteuropa 60, 1 (2010): 95-114.

(91) Constantine Katsakioris, "Transferts Est-Sud: Echange educatifs et formation de cadres africains en Union sovietique pendant les annees soixante," Outre-Mers, no. 354-55 (2007): 95-106; Mazov, Politika SSSR, 269-272, 268; Burgess, "Socialist Diaspora," 281; Katsakioris, "Soviet Lessons," 102.

(92) Sanchez Sibony, "Red Globalization," chap. 5.

(93) Boden, "Cold War Economics," 121; Paul Robinson and Jay Dixon, "Soviet Development Theory and Economic and Technical Assistance to Afghanistan, 1954-1991," The Historian 72, 3 (2010): 599-623.

(94) K. N. Brutents, Tridtsat' let na Staroi Ploshchadi (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye omosheniia, 1998), 301.

(95) "Doklad Prezidiuma TsK KPSS na oktiabr'skom plenume TsK KPSS [14 October 1964] (variant)," Istochnik, no. 2 (1998): 114-17.

(96) Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 543, 77; Sanchez Sibony, "Red Globalization," chap. 5.

(97) Not all these costs, as RAND calculated them, were related to the Third World; the bulk of expenditures were in Eastern Europe. See Charles Wolf et al., "The Costs and Benefits of the Soviet Empire, 1981-1983" (RAND Report R-3419, 1986); and David F. Epstein, "The Economic Cost of Soviet Security and Empire," in The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden, ed. Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr. (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1990).

(98) Boden, "Cold War Economics," 128, 119; Robinson and Dixon, "Soviet Development Theory," 600.

(99) Matusevich, No Easy Row, 189-244.

(100) For details, see www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=56154 (accessed December 2008).

(101) See the discussions and citations in "The Imperial Turn," Kritika 7, 4 (2006): 705-12.
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