The public nature of private industry in confederate Georgia.
The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it.... A State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes--will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished.--John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
During the Civil War the Confederacy undertook a remarkable, state-mandated industrialization which made possible a protracted war against one of the world's preeminent industrial powers. The new nation encouraged manufacturing in two ways. First, the Confederacy embraced direct state ownership of indispensable industries, especially ordnance and munitions factories. Second, Richmond promoted private enterprise with numerous official goads and incentives. This article concentrates on the latter process within one relatively industrialized Deep South state. At first Georgia entrepreneurs took full advantage of government inducements to build a robust private industrial economy. But the government exercised an extraordinary degree of control over this "private" sector. Confederate jurisdiction over labor sources and transportation meant that businesses were thoroughly dependent on the government. As companies showed themselves unable or unwilling to meet state demands, the government denied them access to workers and railcars and invoked its prerogative to impress supplies and whole businesses. Through these means the Confederacy came to dominate private industries almost as fully as government shops.
The historical assessment of Confederate industrialization has generally fallen into one of two rough categories. The first emphasizes rigid state control of the industrial economy. "To industrialize an agrarian country," Raimondo Luraghi writes, "means nothing less than introducing and achieving therein an industrial revolution that elsewhere had been accomplished in a matter of years, decades, if not centuries--and to do it walking across history with 'seven-league boots.'" The rapid industrialization of a predominantly agrarian society, be it the Confederacy, Soviet Russia, or Meiji Japan, requires strict government direction of the economy. Furthermore, the vigorous growth of private enterprise may challenge the power of landed elites. According to Luraghi the South had to limit the function and power of private businessmen. (1)
In recent years other scholars have refined their understanding of the role of the Confederate state. Some have argued that the South's wartime about-face should not surprise. "It would appear that the South's opposition to the North's industrial and commercial policies provided the impetus for both the region's opposition to a strong central state in the Union and support for a centralized Confederate regime after secession," social scientist Richard Franklin Bensel has written. "Southern support for a strong Confederate and a weak American state (before and after the Civil War until the end of Reconstruction) can ... be viewed as a consistent strategy intended to minimize the anticipated deleterious impact of the northern industrial program on the plantation South." In other words, slaveholders acted rationally according to their class interests when they repudiated their former attachment to individual rights. In the case of Virginia, moreover, William Blair has argued convincingly that the citizenry desired an activist state. As in so many instances before and during the war, planter class interests dovetailed with the popular will. Finally, Douglas Ambrose has demonstrated that statism was a surprisingly vital element of antebellum Southern thought. All in all, it is not surprising that the Confederate South would pursue a statist course. But what of the many wartime industries funded by private capital? Could this large, ostensibly independent economy have been a mere adjunct of the Confederate government? (2)
Some historians say no. Exemplified best in Mary A. DeCredico's work on wartime Georgia, the second way of thinking about Confederate industrialization stresses the contributions of urban entrepreneurs. Citing the work of Joseph Schumpeter, DeCredico maintains that the entrepreneur "creates new situations that precipitate socioeconomic change. A prerequisite to such actions is social approval." To be sure, both the government and the commercial community played important roles in the South's industrial mobilization. But the salient question is not whether Georgia's entrepreneurs were important; rather, it is whether the mobilization of Georgia entrepreneurs presaged social change in the form of an independent bourgeoisie that could threaten planters for control of Georgia society. Put differently, were Georgia entrepreneurs a self-conscious class advancing their interests against those of the slaveholders? Or did their dependence on the government, and thus on the planters, preclude the ability of Georgia businessmen to challenge the planter power structure? Also, did slaveholders encourage the entrepreneurial impulse for its own sake or as a means of defeating Northern capitalists? If the latter is correct, do their actions constitute "approval" of entrepreneurs? (3)
By concentrating on the crucial relationship between government and private enterprise in Georgia, this essay seeks to answer these critical questions. It will show that the complete dependence of Georgia entrepreneurs on the planterdominated state precluded virtually any autonomy on their part; it certainly did not permit the development of an independent middle class with the potential to challenge planter power. The current historiography does not suggest that the planters beat back a bourgeois threat during the war. Rather, it argues that entrepreneurs' political power was irretrievably compromised from the outset by virtue of their thoroughgoing reliance on the slaveholders' government. Some have suggested that slaveholders had to compromise their authority in order to go to war, and that the upshot of industrialization must have been the diminution of planter power. In contrast, I will argue that the crucial development was not industrialization per se but industrialization that could be controlled by planters. Industrialization consolidated rather than weakened the power of slaveholders because it did away with what had been the slaveholding regime's Achilles' heel: dependence on the North and foreign countries for finished goods. The true irony of Confederate modernization was not that it undermined the society it was undertaken to preserve. Rather, it resides in the fact that slaveholders reached the height of their power at the very moment they were devoured from without.
Immediately following secession the rewards of doing business with the Confederacy were substantial. In the war's first years the Confederate government provided capital and means of production to practically anyone who thought they might be able to produce essential goods. In August 1861 Congress gave the secretary of war authority, pending presidential assent, to make advances of up to 331/3 percent on contracts for arms and munitions. The legislature upped that number the following April and pledged advances of 50 percent to prospective ordnance producers for the "erection and preparation of the works and machinery necessary" for factories. Two days later Congress added coal and iron mines and manufacturers to the list of businesses eligible for such advances. Another early act authorized the government's purchase of raw materials and machinery necessary for use in private clothing and shoe shops. Finally, the army was to be the primary customer for all such businesses, ensuring that there would be no lack of demand for the products. To give prospective entrepreneurs an added nudge, Georgia newspapers even published instructions for the manufacture of such items as niter and salt along with Great Leap Forward-like exhortations to "Make Your Own Iron." (4)
The upshot of the Confederacy's lavish incentive program was an entrepreneurial bonanza. In Georgia private industry took off in spectacular if sometimes clumsy fashion. First among the state's Civil War cities, Atlanta grew to be the preeminent supply center of the Lower South. The city's ascent owed much to the gigantic government works located there, but a host of private businesses augmented industrial output. In 1861 the city already boasted fifteen manufacturing firms while forty-four trains pulled into its stations each day. With secession new firms appeared, including iron works, sword manufacturers, haversack makers, and pistol cap factories. DeCredico estimated that, among other items, Gate City contractors produced 3,500 canteens, 7,000 haversacks, 5,000 knapsacks, 3,000 swords and 8,500 "sets of accouterments." Local manufacturers also contributed to ordnance production. The Atlanta Machine Works produced forges for rifling muskets, and machine shops for the Georgia Railroad turned out cannon weighing between 600 and 800 pounds each. (5)
Augusta, too, became a center of manufacturing activity. In October 1861 the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel expressed the hope that the Confederacy "shall forever hereafter be more independent of all the world than it has heretofore been" and that manufactures would presently blossom in the city and the nation. But Augustans in general, and the Chronicle's editors in particular, were cagier about industry than other Georgians because of their stillborn pre-war efforts to turn the city into a Southern Lowell. All the same, the city's ailing textile industry received a much-needed shot in the arm. Owing to Confederate loans and patronage, a revived Augusta Factory expanded its productive capacity tremendously. By 1863 it employed 750 workers and manufactured 20,000 yards of cloth daily. The war also gave rise to local producers of blankets, buckets, flags, haversacks, and saddles. One firm, S. S. Jones and Company, turned out l0,000 buckles per week in addition to quantities of canteens, bayonet casings, and artillery pails. (6)
Less susceptible than Augusta manufacturers to antebellum slumps, Columbus producers were more eager to capitalize on new opportunities. "Before the Confederate Quartermaster could effect some semblance of order and discipline in the production of army equipment," Columbus historian Diffee William Standard wrote, "government contracts were plentiful in Columbus and were apparently issued to any willing experimenters on the vaguest promises of future delivery." Meaningful numbers are again in short supply, but clearly Confederate largesse triggered a rapid expansion of Columbus's clothing and shoe industries. S. M. Sappington's previously negligible shop made 8,000 pairs of army shoes in just a few months. Wartime incentives brought new producers of army caps, India rubber cloth for capes, knapsacks, lampblack, military buttons, oilcloth, saddlebags, swords, and tents. During the war the Charleston Courier declared that Columbus "figures most prominently among the cities and towns that are exhibiting in local enterprises and factories encouraging evidence of our ability and resources wherever we find men of faith and spirit, willing to try to help themselves and their country, without exclusive reliance on Nassau and New York." (7)
Despite a demonstrated enthusiasm for manufacturing, Macon enjoyed a smaller boom than other major Georgia cities. In early 1862 the Macon Telegraph asked, "Who can estimate the blessings or benefits" that would accrue to the South once "the young and vigorous Confederation" made itself "independent commercially and politically from Lincolndom?" For its part Macon wished "her sister cities God-speed in their manufacturing enterprises, and without ostentation, would cite a few examples for imitation in what she has been doing for the development of her resources, for the good of the Commonwealth." Although its more optimally located sister cities would outstrip Macon, the city's armory and arsenal annexed and expanded many existing factories and shops following the arrival of Burton and Cuyler. (8)
Other cities also attempted to capitalize on the new opportunities presented by war. More often than not they failed. Athens and Rome cultivated small weapons industries. Meanwhile, federal raids along the South Carolina coasts and the early fall of Fort Pulaski dampened the commercial spirit of Savannah. Elsewhere interest in manufacturing flickered in locales as improbable as Albany, Dalton, and Gainesville, yet none of those towns grew to be major manufacturing centers. (9)
Nonetheless, the early years of the Civil War were productive ones for private manufacturers. But why did the Confederacy turn to entrepreneurs to help with supply? If the Old South was so committed to stifling any threat to planter power, and if indeed the individual states had called the Confederacy into existence to escape domination by the bourgeois North, why encourage the entrepreneur's [or plural?] creative destruction at home? One answer lies in their perception of the threat. Many Southerners anticipated a short war in which a large industrial mobilization would be unnecessary. It followed that the resultant growth of the Southern bourgeoisie would be minimal. Moreover, the Confederacy needed to supply its armies immediately but did not yet possess the apparatus to develop state industries. Most significantly, the government never relinquished any real power to the producers. Even if aspiring businessmen could give full vent to their entrepreneurial yen, many of them were still getting their advances from the Confederate government. Private companies also relied on the state for access to workers and transportation. Finally, freshly minted Southern businesses needed the government to buy their goods; it was the creation of a large quasi-modern army, after all, which occasioned this extraordinary opportunity. In short, most Southern businessmen were thoroughly dependent on the planter-dominated Confederate government for their success. (10)
The Confederacy's command of the South's labor supply gave the government particular control over Southern industrial development. In April 1862 the Confederate Congress enacted America's first conscription act, requiring that all able-bodied white men between ages eighteen and thirty-five enlist in the Confederate army. Congress passed an exemption act five days later that rendered certain types of industrial workers ineligible for the draft. From that point forward the state could allow the labor exemptions of uncooperative or inefficient plants to lapse and drum their white male workers into the army. The April conscription and exemption acts were only the beginning. The following September Congress amended the conscription act to include men up to forty-five years old. By February 1864 all white males between seventeen and fifty were subject to the draft. In most industries employers could tap other sources of labor such as women, slaves, and free blacks. But the conscription of white men, who made up the bulk of skilled workers in Georgia, could still thwart a business's chances for success. (11)
The Etowah Iron Works in northern Georgia learned early the power over manufacturers the conscription act gave the government. Etowah's owner, Mark A. Cooper, had entered into the iron business in the 1840s and enjoyed only marginal success before the war. After secession he saw an opportunity to improve his fortunes. He promptly obtained a contract to provide arms to the Confederacy. With the Union blockade cutting off iron imports, Cooper saw an opportunity to branch out into non-government manufacture. When the Quartermaster Department approached Cooper in January 1862 about supplying it with sheet iron from his rolling mill, he felt that "opportunities in the manufacture of bar iron and nails were too profitable to justify a change in the present machinery." (12)
Following his rebuff of the government, Cooper learned a sobering lesson about doing business in the Confederacy: if he was not producing for the government, he was not going to be producing, period. By April 1862 labor shortages caused by conscription were crippling Etowah. Cooper found he could get no details and that even former employees who specifically requested assignment to Etowah were transferred elsewhere. Utterly unable to fill orders, Cooper was forced in July to sell Etowah to a Memphis firm that "only furnish[ed] through the order or by the order of the Secty of War or Navy." Although there was never an abundance of labor at Etowah (or anywhere in the Confederacy for that matter), the new owners experienced fewer hassles in having workers detailed to the factory. (13)
The Confederacy likewise denied laborers to those companies who cheated it or attempted to exact more than the government was willing to pay. When a Stone Mountain quarrying firm sent one of its partners to Camp Randolph to procure stone cutters, he found that the commanding officer there "refused the details stating that he had vague recollections" of "a charge against us for swindling" the Central Laboratory. Apparently, the business had--or Laboratory Superintendent John Mallet felt it had--charged more for its services than it had originally contracted for. In either event, like Cooper, the offending firm paid for its transgression with the dwindling of its productive capacity and profits. (14)
Labor exemption was not always the result of a deliberate government effort to stymie recalcitrant businesses. It often happened that, with the Confederate armies' dire manpower shortages, only so many men could be exempted. Those few men usually went to government plants. With the army often reluctant to detail enough men to run even its own works, private producers faced an even more desperate situation. An 1863 communication from John Mallet to Josiah Gorgas illustrates the plight many entrepreneurs faced when attempting to staff their operations. Mallet had contracted with Joseph F. Dever to supply him a quantity of slate to be used in the construction of the Macon Central Laboratory. According to Mallet, Dever "exhibited very considerable energy in endeavoring to fulfill his contract, and has made very creditable progress in the midst of great difficulties." But Dever was unable to produce the slate. "His principal difficulty has been the want of competent quarrymen--Welchmen, it appears, are the only skilled laborers to be found in this special branch of industry," Mallet reported. "The detail of four or five men of the country in question, often asked for by Mr. Dever through Col. Burton and myself, has been uniformly refused." The redoubtable Mr. Dever had "managed to bring over others from Pennsylvania" but these had been "frightened by threats of arrest by the Provost Marshall at Charlottesville so that they ran off again." Clearly Dever was not getting a lot of help from the government. But while the slate quarrier was in an exceptionally difficult situation, he had also been exceptionally resourceful in his efforts to secure workers. If the man who hired Welshmen across enemy lines could not obtain workers, it is safe to assume that other entrepreneurs confronted serious difficulties in manning their companies. (15)
Coercion through the granting or withholding of details and exemptions was not the exclusive province of Richmond, however. Georgia's state government used the power to exempt workers from militia duty to obtain favorable contracts with factories. Citing the "difficulties which stood in the way of this department's securing a sufficiency of osnaburgs, cotton yarns, &c.," Georgia quartermaster general Ira R. Foster allowed factories "to furnish these goods to the state at very low prices on condition that their hands be exempted from military service." The policy was effective. A typical agreement had Columbus's Ocmulgee Mills supplying the government 1,500 yards of osnaburgs monthly for $1.50 a yard. Other contracts required factories to sell as much as 6,000 yards of osnaburgs a month to the state. (16)
The Confederate Quartermaster Department likewise urged the state militia to exempt workers from duty. Writing to the commandant of the Georgia reserves in October 1864, Alexander Lawton asked that men detailed to Georgia factories "be allowed to remain at least for the present.... If this important interest is once deranged," Lawton explained, "it is almost impossible to restore it to an efficient condition." With Sherman marching his enormous force inexorably to the sea, though, local military commanders were less inclined than ever to let detailed soldiers remain in factories. Unsurprisingly, Joseph Brown took issue with Confederate attempts to exempt men eligible for military service. Hearing "that the Inferior Courts [that is, Georgia's county legislative bodies] ... have abused the privilege of exemption to millers," Brown announced in July 1864 that "orders of Confederate officers interfering with the execution of the militia laws of the State, and attempting to protect from active service their favorites in civil pursuits, ... can neither be respected nor obeyed by state officers." Friction between state and national authorities only made retention of workers more problematic. (17)
The government's effective monopoly of transportation was as complete as its command of labor. With Union gunboats blocking Southern ports and waterways, railroads became the only means of quickly transporting large quantities of supplies. Although the South had the second highest density of railroad track per capita in the world, and Georgia itself boasted an advanced rail system, Southerners in general would have been hard-pressed to call their jumble of uncoordinated lines a rail "network." Southern rails came in at least six different gauges, each requiring its own cars and locomotives. In addition, there were gaps in the rail service. There was an unforgivable breach between Meridian, Mississippi, and Selma, Alabama. To send equipment from one important supply depot to the other involved taking an impossibly circuitous route. Furthermore, Florida and Texas had virtually no rail connection to the rest of the South. The disarray of Southern railroads invited government intervention. In the first year of the war, the Confederacy appointed William S. Ashe director of railroads with orders to coordinate shipping schedules and link individual lines. Ashe failed to create a comprehensive rail network, but government authorities began to privilege shipments necessary for the prosecution of the war. The inefficient rail system and the primacy of government shipments combined to leave independent capitalists without the access to transportation that the successful operation of a business required. (18)
In the summer of 1862 a consortium of sugar merchants expressed dismay to the governors of several Deep South states because their sugar lay idle at depots in an "exposed and deteriorated condition "Atlanta's Daily Intelligencer reported that "large shipments of sugar and molasses ... from New Orleans last winter and spring" were delayed "in consequence of the employment of railroads by the Government, and their inability to do any other than Government transportation." The sugar was not critical to the prosecution of the war and therefore got left indefinitely on the side of the tracks. The Intelligencer took the opportunity to castigate the merchants for their grumbling and to provide a basic lesson in Confederate sovereignty: "The mischievous portion of the above memorial is its appeal to the Governors of the states for redress--mischievous if it seeks to raise any controversy at this time between them and the Confederate authorities. The tribunal of appeal for the memorialists, if the heads of Government refuse them justice[,] is the Congress of the Confederacy. If that body denies them just relief, the Confederate Courts, we presume, will still have jurisdiction of the matter, and will determine it equitably, without any conflict of authorities." In other words, where rail transport was concerned, there was no appeal to any power outside of the national government. (19)
Government coercion of railroads was especially heavy handed. Under the provisions of the official army regulations, Quartermaster General Myers and company were charged with "providing transportation for troops and all army stores, equipage, and supplies." Since Southern rails were scarcely equipped to carry even essential supplies, endowing the quartermaster with this authority often meant giving him plenipotentiary power over most railroad activities. The need for government domination of the rails was amply demonstrated within a year of the conflict's first shots. Writing in March 1862 Abraham Myers stated that "the working time of the iron-works at Etowa [sic] and Atlanta, is curtailed to one-third in consequence of a want of sufficient supplies of coal, occasioned by some interference with the transit of the coal trains on the Nashville and Chattanooga Rail Rd." The Confederacy desperately needed these plants to work at full capacity, and "if the R. R. authorities will not afford the necessary facilities for forwarding supplies of coal," then "the authority of the Govt must be employed on the roads not owned by the State of Georgia." In this case, as in others, private control of railroads was at odds with the needs of the Confederate army. As this tension grew more acute, nominally private railroads found more of their decisions being made for them. (20)
As Georgia's food shortage intensified, government interference in rail transport caused consternation on the home front. "On many of the roads--all the principal thoroughfare--Government agents have taken the control of freight cars," the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel complained. "Many of these gentlemen are novices in this kind of business, and the consequence is that vast amounts of produce cannot be distributed. Many hundreds of thousands of bushels of corn are now furnishing food to the weevil, which, under more judicious management of the carrying department might have been consumed by our soldiers and citizens." The Chronicle certainly exaggerated the amount of food that would have been available to Southerners given a more reliable rail system. But as every study on the subject has shown, the editor correctly perceived that Confederate railroad management was inept. Whether more prudent supervision could have materially alleviated shortages is unknown; but there can be no question that the government, and the Quartermaster Department in particular, mishandled the situation. (21)
When the railroads were briefly moved outside of the quartermaster's purview in late 1862, Myers objected vigorously. It was imperative, he wrote the secretary of war, that the superintendent of railroads "should report to this Department and act under its authority." In January he renewed his appeal for quartermaster authority over railroads. In the two months since the government had appointed Georgian William M. Wadley railroad bureau chief, Myers claimed to have been kept completely in the dark regarding railroad plans and shipments. Meanwhile, there had been reports of thirty cars of "much needed supplies of subsistence stores and cloth" sitting inert at the Charlotte depot as well as "serious detention in the transportation of grins, ordnance stores, ammunition, &c." (22)
In fact, Wadley was an unusually thoughtful and competent manager, and perhaps the only Confederate railroad superintendent to evince anything like a unified vision of how the South might establish an efficient rail system. Unfortunately, the need to get materials to the front immediately always trumped the need to set in motion a long-term plan. This turned out to be one of the most fateful developments of the Civil War, as the South's compromised rail system severely hampered Confederate operations in the conflict's final two years. Whether implementing some overarching strategy would have changed events and whether it was practicable to do so is an open question. What is certain is that the Confederate brass deemed Wadley's designs untenable and, on April z6, relieved him of his position. (23)
Meanwhile, the state consolidated its control of railroad shipping. On May 1, 1863, the government granted the Quartermaster Department control over all railroad equipment save a single train per line. In practice lines were sometimes lucky to get even that. Alexander Lawton wrote in 1864 that the quartermaster had taken control of "Every car and engine owned" by the Memphis and Charleston, Nashville and Chattanooga, and East Tennessee and Georgia Railroads. Railroad companies who chose not to comply with the government's preemptory directives faced the prospect of outright impressment. Confiscation was the Confederacy's final resort with companies that could not or would not dispatch efficiently with government business.
The Confederacy faced little public outcry over seizures from and of private companies because much of the population viewed businessmen with an extremely jaundiced eye. Papers routinely condemned merchants and manufacturers as unpatriotic and unprincipled "extortionists" who parlayed wartime desperation into abundant profits. One newspaper item characterized businessmen as "heartless cormorants who infest that city [Atlanta] as well as every other commercial mart of the Confederacy, and who are doing more to dishearten and paralyze the energies of our people than the Yankee armies who infest our coasts." Everyone knew "the sliding scale by which every article rises from day to day, until the necessaries have reached prices which place them out of the reach" of everyone not likewise involved in speculation and price-gauging. Upon hearing of the fall of Atlanta to the Union army, Confederate nurse Kate Cumming reported that "few regret the loss of the city itself, not even Georgians, as they say it was the most wicked place in the world." One infers from the denunciations of "extortioners and speculators" that pepper Cumming's diary that she considered those groups responsible for the city's sorry state. (24)
Old newspaper hand Jacob Cardozo, who surfaced as a columnist for the Atlanta Southern Confederacy during the war, felt that by buying up supplies the government drove prices higher and precipitated merchant greed. "The Government agents come into the market with a large purchasing power ... and enter into competition with private purchasers," Cardozo wrote. "This advances prices from increasing demand. The withdrawing of large quantities of any particular commodity from the market, of course, lessens the supply, which further advances prices, not from the reduced quantity only, but from producers withholding stocks from market, in hopes of obtaining still higher prices." (25)
But while the government came under some fire, critics more often targeted manufacturers, especially for their use of auction sales to augment profits. "Defended by some as the only method of fixing a price for any article," E. Merton Coulter wrote, "the auction, in fact, scared people into paying a third to half more than a thing should have sold for or into not buying it at all" The Macon Telegraph was more blunt: "Since the adoption of the auction system for the sale of their fabrics by the Augusta and other factories, the progress in the prices of such goods has been steadily upward, until they have now attained figures astounding to contemplate," the paper exclaimed. "A crowd of greedy merchants attend the sales, all of whom have to replenish their stocks at almost any price, well knowing that they cannot purchase elsewhere, and that the necessities of the people generally will compel them to buy the goods at whatever price." Simply put, desperate merchants outbid needy civilians at auction sales and passed the inflated prices along to consumers. (26)
The business community thus took most of the blame for the high prices of commodities in Confederate Georgia. It was not entirely fair. Factors and merchants certainly played some role in driving prices higher, but the exorbitant cost of everyday items was an inevitable result of general scarcity and the government's inflationary currency policy. Still, people looked to the government to step in. "Winter is coming on, the times are getting tight, all sorts of supplies are rapidly being exhausted, and things generally are looking decidedly blue" the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel observed as early as October 1861. Under the circumstances the Chronicle urged "the Government [to] come to the aid of the people" and end the pernicious cycle of speculation. (27)
While the Confederate government answered this call by dramatically expanding its purview in commercial and industrial matters, the Georgia state legislature also took steps to curtail the abuses of private companies. On December 14, 1861, the assembly passed a "Monopoly and Extortion Bill" that penalized "any person or persons who shall monopolize" or "exact, demand or receive exorbitant, unjust, or unreasonable prices" for "clothing, shoes, leather, cloth of any kind, provisions, wheat, flour, corn, meal, meat, bacon, hogs, cattle, salt, bagging, rope, and twine" Monopolists were subject to a fine of $500 to $5000, while "extortionists" faced a penalty of up to $1,000 and six months in prison. (28)
As the Confederate government stepped up regulation of the private economy, it acquired a bureaucracy's reputation for being wasteful and ineffectual. In May 1863 the owner of the Milburnie Paper Mills in Raleigh, North Carolina, wrote John Mallet that if he undertook to supply the Central Laboratory with paper, he hoped "that some short way may be practicable" of receiving payment. "Being in the government employ," he clarified, "you may not have heard, what every body else has, that the circumlocutory operation of their accounts" was "a great bore" to everyday tradesmen. Businessmen did not "doubt the ability of the Govt to pay--nor the soundness of the currency," claimed the paper mill owner. But they could not "want to be bothered" with government evasions and incompetence. (29)
The Confederacy at first represented an unprecedented opportunity for Georgia entrepreneurs, but even in the halcyon days of the Southern nation the state exercised firm control over private manufacturing. By 1863 the atmosphere had turned positively toxic for businessmen. As shopkeepers and industrialists became scapegoats in an impossible economic scenario, the government tightened the screws on manufacturers. After 1862 ordnance and quartermaster officers threatened more manufacturers, confiscated more supplies, and took over more companies. Means of coercion varied not just over time but also across industries. State participation in ordnance production precluded the success of private producers in that sector. As a result the government generally purchased iron companies and other ordnance-related manufacturers in order to squeeze maximum output from them. In nonordnance production the Confederacy tended to rely more on price-fixing and the impressment of vital goods.
Some established manufacturers--compelled partly by patriotic fervor but also sensing trouble as private producers under the Confederacy--sought the security of government ownership straight away. Four days after Virginia's secession Richmond's famous Tredegar Iron Works dispatched a representative to Montgomery to offer to sell the firm to the Confederacy. Similar propositions came from companies throughout the Confederacy. In February 1861 Alabama's Selma Manufacturing Company offered to sell its works to the government for $40,000. The owners had paid $75,000 for it. (30)
Not yet certain that an extended war would ensue, the Confederate government rejected these early offers. It did not want to assume the unnecessary risk that came with state ownership. Companies took a huge chance by augmenting their operations to fill Confederate orders. If the war ended quickly, these firms would be left holding a very large bag. Having incurred debt to increase their productivity, they would have had no customers to buy their additional output and no way to repay their loans. Put another way, who was going to buy all those cannon, kepis, haversacks, and [bolts of] India rubber cloth if peace came next month? In October 1864 quartermaster officer W. B. B. Crofs wrote that the impressment of a Coosa County, Alabama, factory "has been under consideration for some time past." Crofs felt it not "advisable to authorize the impressment" because confiscation "would be attended with no little vexation" and that it was finally "safer and simpler to impress the goods of the factory." (31)
The government's aversion to unnecessary risk was understandable. So, too, was a preference for leaving operations in the hands of those who knew what they were doing. The Confederacy could always buy or impress factories if matters went awry. In the meantime the state still controlled access to everything necessary to a company's operation. Private ownership, however, proved a particular handicap to smaller iron plants. In a sector increasingly dominated by large government arsenals and armories, they were the last to get government-mined ore, the last to have their shipments put on boxcars, and the last to receive army details. The state could make special arrangements to supply Tredegar with these things because of the scale of its operations. But as it became clear that the war was not going to be short and that most producers did not have sufficient access to labor, raw materials, and transportation, the Confederacy overcame its reluctance to absorb smaller companies. Sooner or later the government reached agreements to buy or lease most of Georgia's sizeable iron plants, including the Columbus Iron Works (which formed the foundation of the city's extensive naval complex) and Macon's Findlay Iron Works (the latter-day Macon Arsenal). This action both consolidated production and ensured that the industrial capacity of private manufacturers was not wasted. In one blow the government augmented state production and released owners of works from the difficulties of competing with it. (32)
There was also ample reason not to rely on fledgling entrepreneurs when it came to ordnance manufacture, because some products of Southern ingenuity proved less than successful. For example, one Athens firm manufactured the Confederacy's famous double-barreled cannon, which was designed to fire simultaneously two cannonballs connected by a chain--the idea being to cut a swath through the enemy ranks. Unhappily, one barrel inevitably discharged before the other causing the cannonballs either to describe an irregular and unpredictable trajectory or, worse, to whip around in a potentially fatal fashion. (33)
Private producers of clothing, shoes, paper, and other nonordnance items were not necessarily willing to be subsumed by the state. This was because the latter category of manufacturers stood to make a tidy profit even without government contracts by selling to local civilian populations. Since the Confederacy actually preferred to dominate rather than own factories, the desire to remain independent was not a problem. What was a problem was that manufacturers' goods frequently sold for higher prices in commodities-starved local markets than they did from to government agents, and so it was often not in their self-interest to sell to the Confederacy. This circumstance presented the army with a potentially disastrous supply crisis. To avert it the government coerced nonordnance industries to do business with it.
The Confederacy forced companies to sell to it through an indirect price-fixing scheme packaged as the exemption acts. The first exemption act allowed paper mill workers, shoemakers, textile workers, tanners, wagon makers, and others to remain at their work, provided the profits of factories that used exempted workers not exceed 75 percent. The government subsequently limited the manufacturers' profits to one-third the cost of production. Ironically, despite repeated popular appeals to enact a price-fixing plan to make commodities more affordable for civilians, this policy did nothing to improve conditions on the home front. If anything, it contributed to increased civilian deprivation. So long as goods remained above the price the government was willing to pay, they were available for civilian consumption. Supplies were more often than not priced out of the range of common Southerners, but they were at least on the market. When standard prices went into effect, the army snapped up many of the supplies that had previously been available in the private economy, leaving private citizens completely bereft. (34)
Where price-fixing could not resolve the Confederate supply problem, the government resorted to confiscation. Since the state eventually absorbed most ordnance works, and since nonordnance manufacturers constituted the majority of private producers, the latter suffered more forced seizures. An early instance of impressment in Columbus illustrates the pattern government seizures generally followed. In the summer of 1862 Columbus's government shoe mill desperately needed leather to make shoes. But the price of leather had shot up steeply, and Columbus tanners refused to sell at government rates. Within weeks Columbus quartermaster F. W. Dillard secured permission from Richmond to impress the requisite hides. Such was the usual course of events. The government made offers. Manufacturers demurred. Then Confederate agents simply took what they needed, leaving the producer with a token sum or a promissory note. (35)
Worse still, from the perspective of private producers, Georgia's state government was characteristically poised to pick up the scraps left behind after the depredations of national authorities. In December 1862 the state assembly passed resolutions authorizing the governor "to seize all the factories and tanneries and manufactured articles in this State, or so many of them as he may find necessary and appropriate their whole products ... till a good pair of shoes and a good suit of clothes are furnished to every Georgia soldier" unable to purchase the same for himself. Passed on November 25, these measures extended the governor's right to seizure through the 20th of the following month. (36)
Feeling this action was not quite sufficient, Governor Brown chose on December 11 not to approve the confiscation resolutions because he could not do so "without sanctioning the one which limits the term of seizure to the next nine days." "It is impossible," he wrote the state quartermaster general, "for you to take possession within the next nine days of all the factories and tanneries of the State, and it would be unjust to seize part of them ... and leave others to grow rich by extortion." The logical solution was the wholesale confiscation of all non-Confederate factories by the state government. Brown was prudent enough not to follow through on this urge--not because his action would have alienated the much-despised manufacturing community, but because it would have heightened tensions between manufacturers and the Confederate government. Instead Brown adopted a new set of resolutions in tandem with the assembly. While setting prices higher, the new laws extended the term of confiscation. Joe Brown was always less reluctant to expand government prerogatives when the government in question was his own. (37)
Before the spring of 1863 there was no law regulating impressment. Instead authorities conducted confiscations "according to custom and principle." The lack of rules predictably resulted in widespread abuse. "There is now almost universal outcry against the unjustifiable seizures of private property, which have recently become too common," one Atlanta paper declared in March. "If our governments, State and Confederate, wish to maintain the respect and good opinions of the people, they had better cause their officials to cease all such operations--so near akin to pillaging--at once." The article was careful to point out that the outcry stemmed from "what the people feel to be unnecessary seizures, done by men who could have obtained supplies elsewhere by purchase." The people, or at least the editors of the Southern Confederacy, understood that some impressment was inevitable; they just wanted to be protected against unwarranted seizures. (38)
On March 26, 1863, Congress responded and passed a law stating that "whenever the exigencies of an army in the field are such as to make impressments absolutely necessary, then such impressments may be made by the officer or officers whose duty it is to furnish such forage articles of subsistence or other property for such army." Like the act giving the Quartermaster Department authority over railroads, the impressment act really formalized an existing arrangement. Confiscations had not formerly been regulated. Now countless officers from the Commissary, Quartermaster, and Ordnance Departments, as well as from the regular army, were empowered to seize supplies they deemed "absolutely necessary." (39)
For all of that the impressment act was more than the simple codification of an existing practice. It was a watershed event that irrevocably changed the Confederate government's relationship with private producers. At least one Georgia political luminary saw clearly the implications of making impressment official government policy. Erstwhile Confederate presidential hopeful, wartime political general, and perennial gadfly Robert Toombs stated that the impressment act "rests upon the fundamental error that the Government has the right and that it is sound policy to impress commodities for the supply of the army whenever it may determine that the market price is too high." Error or not, Toombs rightly perceived that the law "imposes a large and grossly unequal share of the public burthens upon the producers of army supplies," which in turn removed the motivation for private citizens and businesses to manufacture. With the impressment law the Confederate government announced it was no longer in the business of encouraging entrepreneurialism, no matter how circumscribed. Manufacturers, whom the Confederacy had seduced with generous incentives, were thereafter compelled to produce at a loss or face the seizure of their works. (40) To be fair, there was a convoluted appeals process for aggrieved producers. But if the occasional plaintiff gained redress through appeal, his victory was but one drop in a sea of defeats. Although it is impossible to ascertain exactly how many supplies the Confederate government seized, indications suggest that confiscations reached epic proportions after the passage of the impressment act. Whereas thirty-nine articles were subject to official confiscation in May 1863, by December of the following year that number had climbed to ninety-three. Price-fixing and impressment paralyzed Georgia's state economy. In a November 1863 letter to the secretary of war, Governor Brown protested that the "effect of the present system of low prices and inadequate compensation ... is to withhold the supplies from the market and cause them to be secreted and concealed from the Government agents.... This result has inaugurated the system of supplying the Army by impressment instead of by purchase" As usual Brown was at odds with, but powerless to do anything about, the Confederate government's increasing control over Georgia's economy. (41)
Under the impressment system there was another reason--if more were needed--for manufacturers to hold back their supplies. An 1864 Quartermaster Department circular stated that "in changing every two months the schedule of prices of the articles of prime necessity," the impressment law punished farms and factories that disclosed their assets and submitted to impressment. Because the government adjusted prices so frequently, those citizens and companies who willingly accepted the state's pittance for their goods suffered for being so forthcoming. In two months' time "those who act[ed] on less patriotic impulses," who either failed to volunteer or actively hid supplies, secured better prices for the same wares. It therefore behooved businesses and individuals to hold onto their produce, causing state demands for private goods to grow even more forceful and heavy handed. (42)
In addition to seizures, the tax act of April 24, 1863, placed a 10 percent mandatory impost on profits from the manufacture of blankets, cotton and wool clothing, iron, and shoes. The same act instituted a 10 percent tax in kind on agriculture. Like the spate of confiscations following the first impressment law in the spring of 1863, the April tax law marked the beginning of drastically increased government levies. For manufacturers Congress added 5 percent to the existing 10 percent tax in February 1864. By the end of the war taxes on industrial profits reached 40 percent. (43)
In most cases, the men of the Quartermaster Department were the public faces of an increasingly intrusive and overweening state. Where the Southern public had once urged the Confederate government to take a more active role in the economy, by 1864 an anonymous quartermaster officer complained of the people's mistreatment of department men. "It has become the custom, throughout the Confederacy, to abuse, indiscriminately, the officers serving in the Quartermaster Department," he griped in the pages of the Columbus Daily Sun. Such were the rewards for doing the dirty work in what often amounted to a command economy. (44)
If all of this were not enough, the codification of impressment by the March 1863 law appears to have done little to mitigate unauthorized confiscations. The Atlanta Southern Confederacy reported in August "that the officers and privates"--the latter being legally prohibited to seize anything--"who were detailed to do the work of collecting horses, went to peoples [sic] stables and tore down doors and gates and broke open locks in a most destructive manner, and all this, without giving any notice whatever to the owners of the horses." A grand jury presentment in Hancock County cited "flagrant violations ... of orders of superior officers, on the subject of impressments, by subordinate officers & agents." Abuses were sufficiently prevalent for the Daily Sun to suggest that the Confederacy issue the names of officers with the power to seize goods. In early November the Macon Telegraph seconded the Columbus paper's "Good Suggestion" and recommended that "it would be proper for the authorities to cause the names of all authorized impressment officers to be published in order to save the country from fraudulent impositions." Even if the government had been receptive to this suggestion, the fact that the impressment law empowered so many officers to confiscate goods rendered a comprehensive listing impractical Given the fluidity and frequent turnover within every governmental department, moreover, any such roll would have undoubtedly been outdated almost as soon as it was published. (45)
In Georgia both the state and especially the national government vigorously subordinated private enterprise. The latter prevented companies that did not serve a clear-cut state purpose from succeeding. By definition the national government dictated the operations of those industries that did serve it. Private enterprise under the Confederacy was thus often barely distinguishable from state industry. Slaveholders needed to cultivate an entrepreneur class, but they also needed to restrict its power. And, of course, they needed to industrialize with utmost speed. To accomplish all of these things, the state the slaveholders made put aside any pretense of laissez faire and seized total control of the South's industrial economy.
(1.) Raimondo Luraghi, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation South (New York: New Viewpoints, 1978), 112-13; Luraghi's point about the necessity of suppressing a capitalist class at home echoes Eugene Genovese's early work on the subject in The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), 180-220.
(2.) Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 96; William Blair, Virginia's Private War: Feeding Body and Soul in the Confederacy, 186x-1865 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 5; Douglas Ambrose, "Statism in the Old South: A Reconsideration," in Robert Louis Paquette and Louis A. Ferleger, eds., Slavery, Secession, and Southern History (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 2000), 101-25.
(3.) Mary A. DeCredico, Patriotism for Profit: Georgia's Urban Entrepreneurs and the Confederate War Effort (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1990), 16. Frank. J. Byrne essentially seconds DeCredico's view in "Rebellion and Retail: A Tale of Two Merchants in Confederate Atlanta," Georgia Historical Quarterly 79 (Spring 95): 30-56.
(4.) The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1880-190l), ser. 4, vol. 1:532, l070, 1074, vol. 2:109 (hereafter OR). Instructions for manufacturing niter and salt often ran side by side on the front page of the Atlanta Southern Confederacy during May and June 1862. Southern Confederacy, May 11, 1863.
(5). Lee Kennett, Marching Through Georgia: A Story of Soldiers and Civilians during Sherman's Campaign (New York: Harper Collins,1995), 113-14; DeCredico, Patriotism for Profit, 38; James M. Russell, Atlanta, 1847-7890: City Building in the Old South and the New (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1988), 102.
(6.) Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, Oct. 9, 1861; DeCredico, Patriotism for Profit, 43, 63; Florence Fleming Corley, Confederate City: Augusta, Georgia, 1860-1865 (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1960), 46-47.
(7.) Diffee William Standard, Columbus, Georgia, in the Confederacy: The Social and Industrial Life of the Chattahoochee River Port (New York: William-Frederick Press, 1954), 30-33; Charleston Courier quoted in Columbus Daily Sun, Mar. 29, 1864.
(8.) Macon Telegraph, Feb. 7, 1862.
(9.) Decredico, Patriotism for Profit, 38-39.
(10.) Richard C. Todd, Confederate Finance (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1954), 166.
(11.) James M. Matthews, ed., Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the First Session of the First Congress; 1862 (Richmond: R. M. Smith, Printer to Congress, 1862), 29-30; Matthews, ed., Statutes at Large ... Second Session of the First Congress (Richmond: R. M. Smith, Printer to Congress, 1862), 61; Matthews ed., Statutes at Large ... Fourth Session of the First Congress, 1863-1864 (Richmond: R. M. Smith, Printer to Congress, 1864), 2l. On the government's use of labor exemptions to gain leverage over private enterprise, see Charles Ramsdell, "The Control of Manufacturing by the Confederate Government," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 8 (Dec. 192l): 245, and Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1969), 69.
(12.) Mark Cooper Pope III and J. Donald McKee, Mark Anthony Cooper: The Iron Man of Georgia, Biography (Atlanta: Graphic Publishing, 2000), 180.
(13.) Ibid., 180-86, 186. Later in the year the Ordnance Department systematized the practice of refusing laborers to firms that did not produce for the government. For several days in December 1862 the Atlanta Southern Confederacy ran an order issued by M. H. Wright introducing the new policy. "Under directions from the Chief of Ordnance," Wright decreed, "all contractors with the Ordnance Department, in this district ... will forward to this office certified lists of the names of all their employees, subject to Conscription under existing laws." The firm then "must make affidavit" that the detailed workers "will not be engaged on other than Government work." Atlanta Southern Confederacy, Dec. 5, 1862.
(14.) Wood Meador and Co. to John W. Mallet, May 2l, 1863, Ordnance Records, Ch. IV, vol. 37, RG 109, War Department Collection of Confederate Records, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NARA).
(15.) John Mallet to Josiah Gorgas, Aug. 3, 1863, in Ordnance Records, Ch. IV, vol. 24, NARA.
(16.) Annual Report of Ira R. Foster, Quartermaster General of Georgia, for Fiscal Year Ending October 15, 1864 (Minedgeville, Ga.: Boughton, Nisbet, Barnes, & Moore, State Printers, 1864), 8.
(17.) Alexander R. Lawton to Howell Cobb, Oct. 12, 1864, Quartermaster Records, Ch. V, vol. 20, NARA. Brown's pronouncement was reprinted in the Columbus Daily Sun, July 31, 1864.
(18.) On gauges and railroads generally, see Robert C. Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy (1952; reprint, Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1998). The most vivid account of the inefficiency of antebellum southern rail travel before the war is found in William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990), 936. On government control of Southern railroads, see E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of America: 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1950), 271-73, 280-81.
(19.) Atlanta Daily Intelligencer, June 20, 1862. The extent to which this episode disrupted private shipping is evident in a "Notice to Shippers" from the Montgomery and West Point Rail Road, printed in the Atlanta Southern Confederacy, Apr. 16, 1862.
(20.) A. C. Myers to James Seddon, Dec. 9, 1862, Quartermaster Records, Ch. V, vol. 157, NARA; A. C. Myers to L. H. Oliver, Mar. 22, 1862, Quartermaster Records, Ch. V, vol. 15, NARA.
(21.) Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, Aug. 19, 1863. On the ineffectiveness of Confederate rail policy, see Black, Railroads of the Confederacy, 63; John E. Clark, Railroads in the Civil War: The Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 200l), 213-34; and DeCredico, Patriotism for Profit, 72-109.
(22.) A. C. Myers to James Seddon, Dec. 9, 1862, and A. C. Myers to James Seddon, Jan. 26, 1863, Quartermaster Records, Ch. V, vol. 157, NARA.
(23.) In Railroads of the Confederacy Robert C. Black III incontrovertibly established the key role the South's inefficient rail system played in Confederate defeat. DeCredico chronicled the entropy of Georgia railroads specifically in Patriotism for Profit, 72-104.
(24.) Coulter, The Confederate States of America, 280-81; Alexander Lawton to Jefferson Davis, Sept. 20, 1864, Quartermaster Records, Ch. V, vol. 20, NARA; Savannah Morning News article reprinted in the Atlanta Daily Intelligencer, Apr. 3, 1862; Kate Cumming, The Journal of Kate Cumming, A Confederate Nurse, 1862-1865 (Savannah, Ga.: Beehive Press, 1975), 128, 215.
(25.) Atlanta Southern Confederacy, Feb. 27, 1863.
(26.) Coulter, The Confederate States of America, 233; Macon Telegraph, Aug. 6, 1862.
(27.) Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, Oct. 3, 1861.
(28.) "Monopoly and Extortion Bill," Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, Passed in Milledgeville, at an Annual Session in November and December, 1861 (Milledgeville, Ga.: Boughton, Nisbet, Barnes, & Moore, State Printers, 1862), 66-67. To drive the point home the Atlanta Southern Confederacy reprinted the "Monopoly and Extortion Bill" frequently in its pages at least until March 1862.
(29.) H. Hasted to John Mallet, May 18, 1863, Ordnance Records, Ch. IV, vol. 37, NARA.
(30.) Charles B. Dew, Ironmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R. Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), 84-85, 147; Lester J. Cappon, "Government and Private Industry in the Southern Confederacy," Humanistic Studies in Honor of John Calvin Metcalf (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1941), 174-75.
(31.) W. B. B. Crofs to G. W. Cunningham, Oct. 20, 1864, Quartermaster Records, Ch. V, vol. 20, NARA. Although impressment and confiscation were technically different--impressment was for loyal citizens, confiscation for disloyal--they are used interchangeably here as they were by most contemporaries.
(32.) Standard, Columbus, Georgia, in the Confederacy, 40-41; Robert S. Davis, Cotton, Fire and Dreams: The Robert Findlay Iron Works and Heavy Industry in Macon, Georgia, 1839-1912 (Macon, Ga.: Mercer Univ. Press, 1998), 128-29.
(33.) Athens Double-Barreled Cannon State Historical Marker, Athens City Hall Square, Athens, Georgia.
(34.) Quoted in Ramsdell, "The Control of Manufacturing by the Confederate Government," 235.
(35.) Standard, Columbus, Georgia, in the Confederacy, 38.
(36.) Resolutions reprinted in Atlanta Southern Confederacy, Jan. 1, 1863.
(37.) Joseph Brown to Ira R. Foster, Dec. 11, 1862, reprinted in Atlanta Southern Confederacy, Jan. 1, 1863.
(38.) Todd, Confederate Finance, 166; Atlanta Southern Confederacy, Mar. 6, 1863.
(39.) Matthews, ed., The Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the Third Session of the First Congress, 1863 (Richmond: R. M. Smith, Printer to Congress, 1863), 115-26; Todd, Confederate Finance, 166-71.
(40.) Robert Toombs, letter reprinted in Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, Aug. 26, 1863.
(41.) Todd, Confederate Finance, 166-71.
(42.) Alexander R. Lawton, Quartermaster Circular, Oct. 31, 1864, Quartermaster Records, Ch. V, vol. 20, NARA.
(43.) Original tax act in Matthews, ed., Statutes at Large ... Third Session of the First Congress, 1863 (Richmond: R. M. Smith, Printer to Congress, 1863), 115-26; Feb. 17, 1864, tax act in Matthews, ed., Statutes at Large ... Fourth Session of the First Congress, 208-11. On subsequent tax increases, see Coulter, The Confederate States of America, 181.
(44.) Columbus Daily Sun, Jan. 20, 1864
(45.) Atlanta Southern Confederacy, Aug. 18, 1863. The wording from the grand jury's allegations was taken not from the presentment itself but from Alexander R. Lawton's letter to Superior Court Judge William M. Ruse, Oct. 26, 1864, Quartermaster Records, Ch. V, vol. 20, NARA. The Macon Telegraph quotations were reprinted in the Columbus Daily Sun, Nov. 11, 1863.
CHAD MORGAN received his Ph.D. in spring 2003 from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, where he is now a teaching fellow. He is working on a study of industrialization and state power in Confederate Georgia.
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|Publication:||Civil War History|
|Date:||Mar 1, 2004|
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