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The press and power in the Russian Federation.

The relationship of the Russian government to the central Moscow media has changed enormously during the last eight years. Once fully in control of the media, the government is now forced to resort to various tactics of persuasion and pressure to influence them. In a country where the struggle for power and resources is intense, and the media are often the only means of communicating one's designs to the Russian masses, access to television air time and press coverage has become more coveted than ever by politicians. During the ongoing struggle for glasnost and freedom of speech, many journalists and editors have gained an attitude of independence that has rendered them skeptical of government efforts to reassert control and endowed them with a belief that they possess a right to report and comment on events as they see fit. While in some media this is manifested as journalists strive for fact-based reporting and unbiased coverage, other organs of the media actively participate in the political struggle.

This article traces the steps that eased Soviet and Russian government control over the centrally controlled media and elaborates on recent developments in media-government relations. It also lays out some concrete examples of how media content has changed over the last eight years, illustrating both media independence and instances in which objective media coverage fell victim to the political game that seems perpetually to rule Russia. Finally, it analyzes the role of the media in the ongoing power struggle in Moscow and concludes that, given the precedent of government manipulation of the media and the difficult financial position of most newspapers and television, the media are unlikely to be freed from political influence in the near future. However, because of the independent attitudes cultivated by glasnost, the net result is somewhat of a balance: While the political power struggle continues to influence the media, the media likewise continue to exert a certain independent influence on the power struggle, as well as on their own future.

THE PRE-GORBACHEV ERA

The characteristics of the media in the pre-Gorbachev era are well-documented.(1) journalists were rigorously educated in a fashion which, like most Soviet curricula of higher education, was based on the Marxist-Leninist theories and the current policies of the Communist Party. For most editors and journalists in the 1980s, a book issued in 1979, CPSU [The Communist Party of the Soviet Union]: On the Mass Media and Propaganda functioned as the essential guide to the limits of permissible reporting.(2) Editors at the central news agencies were at the fingertips of the Kremlin via the verkhushka, or direct-line Kremlin telephone on their desks, and their local counterparts were similarly connected to the City Soviet and Regional Party Committees. Judicious following of the party line and working for a central newspaper or major local agency were usually sufficient to become a card-carrying member of the Union of journalists, which united the more loyal journalists and aided in the oversight of their work.(3)

Central control of the media produced predictable results. Altered pictures of the Politburo and glorifying photographs of socialist workers were splashed across front pages of newspapers. Accompanying text reported the outstanding political and economic achievements of the Party and detailed propagandistic speeches at length. It has been frequently recounted that Soviet citizens learned to read the newspapers back to front, searching the back columns for four-line accounts of major accidents or hints of social or political nonconformity. The controlled press was countered by the presence of samizdat, or self-publishing. A widespread phenomenon in the early 1970s and 1980s, samizdat usually consisted of typewritten carbon copies of censored literature, poetry and political thought.

Like the press, television was strictly controlled. The State Committee for Television and Radio (GOSTELERADIO) controlled Russian-language programming for the 15 republics and the bulk of East Central Europe. The nightly news program "Vremya" (Time) had one of the largest viewing audiences in the world -- 15 million -- even though it reported primarily on official activities, presenting its viewers with wholly falsified accounts of meetings and bogus statistics. For television entertainment, viewers usually had the choice of documentaries on the history of the Communist Party and the Second World War, and other political propaganda programs such as "Ya sluzhu Sovietskomu Soyuzu" (I Serve the Soviet Union), a program on the achievements of the Soviet Army. Non-political educational and cultural programs existed, but they typically lacked entertainment value. Thus, although by the mid-1980s these programs reached about 90 million television sets in the Soviet Union, they hardly played as dynamic and significant a role in the political arena as they would play in the next several years.

THE ACCESSION OF GORBACHEV

Mikhail Gorbachev's promotion to the post of general-secretary of the Communist Party in 1985 signalled a new era for the media, but not their immediate independence. During the early months of the Gorbachev era, prior to the initiation of the perestroika and glasnost campaigns, the print and electronic media were utilized for the anti-alcohol and anti-corruption campaigns initiated by Gorbachev and Central Committee member Yegor Ligachev. Even as late as November 1986, "Vremya" continued with old-style programming, beginning newscasts with reports of the over-fulfillment of the plan for the current quarter or reports of increased productivity.

The first indication of the new openness that was to follow came during the January 1986 Twenty-seventh Party Congress. In his speech, Gorbachev made references to the idea of glasnost, "openness," or -- more literally -- "voiceness".(4) Both Gorbachev and the Communist Party, however, had a narrow conception of this meaning: Glasnost was to be limited to making the new Communist Party leadership appear more active in its defense of the average Soviet worker; to legitimizing the tempered changes that the Party wanted to carry out from above; and to attempting to create a modicum of personal popularity for Gorbachev, which would differentiate him from his predecessors.

Official glasnost was inaugurated in the Soviet media immediately after the January 1986 Party Congress. In early April 1986, for instance, "Vremya" broadcast a segment -- soon to become typical -- which covered Gorbachev's visit to Kuibyshev. Greeted by the local population, Gorbachev was shown striking up a conversation with a group of girls from a local collective farm. He immediately pressed them to talk about their problems and -- predictably -- got no response. Finally, one of the farm girls mentioned that the city could use another theater. The discussion continued, touching on local product shortages, child care and other concerns. "Vremya" rolled on for an hour and 50 minutes.(5)

This kind of coverage, publicly discussing problems that emphasized the need for the initial stage of reforms and generally preaching perestroika, was frequent in 1986. Tailored to the goals of the early glasnost-perestroika campaign, it became the norm in 1987, as long news segments covered Gorbachev and his Politburo allies. Not unlike the carefully planned media moments of U.S. presidential campaigns, clips were shown of Gorbachev with workers, women, union leaders, children and members of minority groups, in an attempt to prove his concern for the plight of the average citizen. Moreover, the gathering of prominent figures like Andrei Gromyko behind Gorbachev on the television screen provided visible proof that the Communist Party supported his new ideas.(6)

While producing reports supporting the Party line usually did not create any difficulties for journalists, covering the problems of Soviet socialism -- alcoholism, corruption and the deficit of food and consumer goods -- created numerous dilemmas: How much criticism was too much? What were the censor's limits? Since Gorbachev was roaming the streets pointing out deficits and social problems, shouldn't the media do likewise?

Journalists started cautiously down the road of glasnost, wary of the penalties of stepping out of acceptable boundaries. When commentary seemed necessary, one of the more common defense mechanisms was to substitute a journalistic account with an interview, handing the microphone -- and the risk -- to someone else. In the beginning, when free speech was more restricted, these interviews were typically done with well-established, party-sanctioned commentators and academics. Eventually, as the media progressed from relaying official policy and commentary to seeking out more dissident views, journalists included the input of the proverbial man-on-the-street, the precedent for which Gorbachev had already firmly set. When coverage concerned accidents, such as Chernobyl, and other official admissions of mistakes or failure, such as the Soviet withdrawal from the Afghan war in autumn 1988, man-on-the-street interviews often reached the heart of the matter in a more exacting way than official sources.

This trend from official to unofficial commentary, allowing the individual, in effect, to broadcast his own opinion, was one of the forces that contributed to the blossoming of glasnost. It also illustrated the catapulting of glasnost from a Party-controlled policy to a socially based phenomenon that exerted its own pressure on the policies of the reformist Gorbachev government.

THE ROLE OF De-STALINIZATION UNDER GORBACHEV

The official Gorbachev policy that unintentionally contributed the most to the disintegration of government control of the media was the drive for de-stalinization. For the Gorbachev Politburo, de-stalinization was both a tool to legitimize the current government -- without alienating Brezhnev -- era politicians who still retained considerable power -- and a necessity for implementing reform, which required restructuring the Stalinist-shaped bureaucracy. It is unlikely that the Gorbachev version of de-Stalinization was intended to extend much beyond the limits of liberalism that had been set by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1960s.(7) Yet, by officially questioning Stalinist policies -- for example, on collectivization or the lack of preparation of the Soviet Union on the eve of the Second World War -- the Gorbachev government opened the door to a popular response. Russians and other ethnic groups demanded recognition of and vindication for the random terror against the people from the 1930s to the 1950s.(8) De-Stalinization became the basis on which the media began to offer independent illumination of political subject matter, eventually becoming sarcastic and irreverent not just about the figures directly connected to Stalin, but, finally, about the contemporary ruling class of the Communist Party as well.

The progress of de-stalinization in the print media under Gorbachev has been widely reported in the Western media and is fairly well known.(9) Journals like Ogonyok (Flame) and newspapers such as Literaturnaya gazeta (Literary Gazette) and Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and Facts) quickly outpaced Gorbachev, who offered only a limited scope of historical revision in his November 1987 speech on history. By 1988 and 1989, the press contained animated discussions about such former "enemies of the people" as Nikolai Bukharin and Leon Trotsky, and revealed well-kept secrets as sensitive as Stalin's annihilation of the Soviet Army's officer corps. Articles described Stalin's own death in vivid detail, and even broached the subject of the guilt of the Communist Party for Stalin's crimes.(10)

Television, easier to regulate than print media, changed more slowly, but was clearly out of state control by mid-1989. "Vzglyad" (Glance or View), a live, weekly, late-night program with a viewing audience of close to 10 million, became a tremendous catalyst to this process when it began broadcasting in 1987. It was the first to compare Stalinism with Nazism, to discuss Lenin's testament and the controversy over Stalin's assumption of power and to imply openly that socialism was a failure. "Vzglyad" was unpredictable, surprising viewers and sometimes even censors with its assertiveness in the de-stalinization campaign. Long-hidden archival footage appeared, for example, like that of a collective farm girl, raving as she praised Stalin at the Farmers' Congress; Stalin's private life was shown in photographs and film; and a walking tour was taken through the long-closed museum of gifts to Stalin.

The "Vzglyad" knack for touching the untouchable soon expanded from Stalinism: A sarcastic segment on a farcical social club, the Brezhnev Friends' Club, included footage of an aged, drunken Leonid Brezhnev receiving yet another medal and kissing his fellow Politburo members on the lips; one rock video by the group "DDT" depicted Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev being blown into the wind and ran a portrait of Gorbachev back-to-back with a side of beef on a meat hook -- one of the first instances in which Gorbachev was portrayed in a derogatory context along with previous Soviet leaders.(11)

The most inadmissible of "Vzglyad" programs, during which Lenkom Theater director Mark Zakharov suggested that Lenin's remains be removed from the mausoleum, forced the resignation of Aleksandr Aksionov, head of GOSTELERADIO in late 1989. Yet the investigative stories on "Vzglyad" continued, pointing the finger of corruption at leading Party figures. Other segments covered a broad range of taboo subjects from AIDS to a dissident Moscow lawyer elaborating on how to form one's own political party. The program was frequently the subject of the central power's wrath, and it was often delayed or not broadcast at all. Yet Aleksandr Lyubimov, the main host of "Vzglyad," enjoyed mocking the censor right on the set, well aware that he had the support of tens of millions of viewers and even of some in the political bureaucracy.

The "Vzglyad" disease spread quickly and a call-in program called "Kto est kto" (Who's Who), ostensibly created to familiarize the population with current government figures, instead posed sarcastic questions to individuals as sacred as Vladimir Kryuchkov, then head of the KGB.(12) In an expose that brought out a flood of criticism from government officials, "Vremya" ran an investigative news segment on the secret export of tank treads to Germany.(13) The story implicated military figures and, as it later developed, Nikolai Ryzhkov, then Soviet prime minister. The government struggled to control the independent-minded journalists of the central media, and slowly became aware that its own poorly defined limits on glasnost were playing a role in a wave of Party-hostile media developments. But journalists, supported by the public in overstepping the boundaries of glasnost, had already presented the government with a fait accompli: The precedent of investigative reporting and independent commentary was firmly set.

THE 1991 CRACKDOWN

Given the degree to which the media worked in 1989 and 1990 to debunk the myth of Communist Party omnipotence, it is hardly surprising that a media crackdown followed in early 1991. Torn between reformist and hard-line political forces in January 1991, Gorbachev appointed Leonid Kravchenko, a known hardliner, as the head of GOSTELERADIO. Simultaneously, the Supreme Soviet supported the nomination of Nikolai Yefimov, the conservative head of the State Committee on the Press, as the editor-in-chief of Izvestia (News).(14) A general censorship campaign was soon underway. The government posted censors in television and newspaper editing rooms and closed down independent news agencies like INTERFAX. In early January 1991, Soviet army troops seized the television and radio broadcast facilities in Riga, Latvia and Vilnius, Lithuania.(15) On central Soviet television, the program "Vzglyad" was canceled. As a kind of official sanction to these activities, Gorbachev proposed the suspension of the Law on the Press.(16) Although Parliament refused to accept Gorbachev's motion, it did approve general measures designed to "enhance the objectivity" of the media.

Journalists fought back with a crusade for honest reporting on the Baltic situation.(17) Many of Moscow's leading editors signed a one-page protest against the use of force in the region that appeared in Moskovskie novosti (Moscow News). Television newscasters, such as Sergei Lomakin of "Vremya," refused to read censored, biased reports that focused on nationalistic issues like the plight of Russians in Riga. Bolstered by a feeling of popular support, many television journalists chose to resist their new boss Leonid Kravchenko and criticized him publicly: On 30 January 1991, Kravchenko and Pyotr Reshetov, deputy head of GOSTELERADIO, were invited to appear on a call-in show on Channel I. The program, hosted by the recently rebuked commentator Lomakin, featured remarkably frank discussion. Lomakin did his best to put both of his guests on the defensive. When he pressed Reshetov to justify meager, biased coverage of the Baltics and the recent increase in light artistic programming on GOSTELERADIO, Reshetov replied, "People are tired of politics, they want stability. This is the image -- stability -- that we are trying to convey on TV."(18) Lomakin used appropriate responses from viewers in reply to Kravchenko's and Reshetov's skirting of the real issues. For example, he read from one caller's remarks: "I just don't get it. There is blood flowing in the country, and there is sap on TV."(19)

Other uncensored coverage came from liberal newspapers like Moskovskie novosti and Nezavisiniaya gazeta (Independent Newspaper). State television's Channel II news program "Televisionnaya sluzhba novosti" (Television News Service) (TSN) also won viewers, as, despite the censors, newswoman Tatiana Mitkova often showed condemning footage of the Baltic crackdown.

YELTSIN'S BID FOR TELEVISION

At the very end of 1990, rumors began circulating that Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was planning to start his own television station.(20) The rumors were plausible because Yeltsin had already been instrumental in defending the liberal media -- he had helped the banned news agency INTERFAX find new office space when Kravchenko expelled it from Ostankino; he had also offered strong support to "Vzglyad" when it was taken off the air in early 1991.(21) Furthermore, the growing rivalry of the Russian Federation state apparatus with that of the Soviet Union made such a development possible.

For Yeltsin, the best scenario would have been to secure air time on Ostankino's Channel I which has a broadcast range covering the entire former Soviet Union.(22) With Ostankino's chairman and higher bureaucrats controlled by the Kremlin, however, this was highly unlikely. Also, even as the president of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin could not contemplate building a television tower that could replicate Ostankino's all-union broadcast capability -- the trillions of rubles needed were far out of reach. Instead, Yeltsin launched a bid for control of GOSTELERADIO's Channel II, which covered a smaller broadcast range of 200 million people, but which Yeltsin proposed turning into a television station for the Russian Republic. At the beginning of 1991, with Kravchenko at the helm of GOSTELERADIO and a media crackdown underway, Yeltsin's proposed station -- which would offer a balance to the official media -- seemed extremely necessary. Yet, given the strong conservative trend in Moscow politics at the time, the realization of such a station also seemed problematic, if not improbable.

By the beginning of February, however, GOSTELERADIO had preliminarily agreed to grant six of Channel II's 18 hours per day of broadcast time to Yeltsin. On 13 May 1991, the Vserossisskaya Teleradio Kompaniya (All-Russian Television and Radio Company or VRTRK) hit the airwaves. As part of the programming, Russian Television developed a news program called "Vesti" (News or Events), which touted an alternative perspective on domestic affairs and more freely utilized footage and commentary from outside news sources like Cable News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service. Other programs like "Sovershenno sekretno" (Top Secret), launched by the journal of the same name, picked up on political investigative reporting where "Vzglyad" left off.

Yeltsin also used the air time to maximum political advantage, publicizing his own political activities to increase his importance relative to that of the central powers. For instance, it was not uncommon to be able to switch from Channel I, on which Gorbachev or speaker Anatoly Lukyanov headed a session of the Supreme Soviet, to Channel II, on which Yeltsin chaired a session of the Parliament of the Russian Federation. There is also retrospective importance to the start of the VRTRK, as the first step of many that Yeltsin took to gain a modicum of control over the media.

THE AUGUST 1991 COUP ATTEMPT

The August 1991 coup attempt served as a vivid reminder to Soviet society as a whole, and to journalists especially, of the tyranny of Soviet power. Late in the evening on 18 August, Gennadi Yanaev, the self-proclaimed chairman of the Committee for the Emergency Situation in the Country (GKChP), forced the TASS news agency to announce its assumption of power and successfully demanded that GOSTELERADIO broadcast an announcement that Gorbachev, on vacation at Foros, had resigned for reasons of health. Soviet troops quickly occupied radio and television broadcasting facilities in Riga, forcing them off the air. In Moscow, a decree was issued banning all but nine newspapers -- those loyal to the Communists -- from publishing.(23) Yanaev was clearly counting on the support of the latter, although the sanctions for disobeying the ban or for failing to support the new government were not clear.

Undeterred by the coup leaders' decree, some of the media tried to go on with business as usual. The news agency POSTFACTUM continued to put out its bulletins over the fax wires; Radio Ekho (Echo Radio), a Moscow-based radio station, shifted from one airwave to the next to avoid electronic jamming; and Kuranty, among other local newspapers, issued one-page flyers that spread throughout Moscow. The editors-in-chief of many of the central newspapers gathered together to issue the first number of the Obshchaya gazeta (Common Newspaper). Printed on the presses of Literaturnaya gazeta, Obshchaya gazeta was pasted-up in the metro cars and the street underpasses in Moscow, and included a message from Gorbachev at Foros and information on the resistance to the coup in regions outside Moscow. Finally, in a sign of protest, Izvestia -- not banned by the GKChP decree -- refused to publish, and concentrated its efforts on solidifying support for the ouster of unloved Editor-in-Chief Yefimov.

On central television, the coup brought out the best of the early glasnost tricks. One young GOSTELERADIO reporter, Sergei Medvedev, provided an astounding news report on the broadcast of "Vremya" on 19 August, despite the tight control of Channel I. Standing in front of the Russian White House, Medvedev began his report: "While in the Kremlin there's a new government, here at the White House there are other events occurring. . . ." Turning to a few fellows gathering cement, bricks and other debris, Medvedev asked them, "And why are you here today?" Obligingly, the interviewees explained that they were building barricades, and that many Muscovites were expected to gather at the White House in opposition to the putschists. Without offering any commentary himself, Medvedev made the fact of opposition to the new regime perfectly clear.(24)

Other enterprising Russian journalists assisted the Western networks. Artyom Borovik, host of the VRTRK program "Sovershenno sekretno" and a special correspondent for the U.S. program"-Sixty Minutes," called in reports to CBS. Veronika Khilchevskaya, formerly a journalist for the journal Novoye vremya and host of a Russian business program, updated NBC. Russian amateur and professional cameramen offered footage to Western news bureaus, and these images were transmitted to the local population as hundreds of Russians tuned in to CNN, seeking a break from the concerts and garden programs of GOSTELERADIO.(25)

The GKChP actions during the coup in many ways represented the worst-case scenario for the media: There was a full attempt at government censorship. The refusal of journalists to comply with its imposition was based in part on their awareness of broader popular opposition to the "Gang of Eight' coup plotters, but also on the earlier experience of the media in out-foxing the central powers' efforts to control the flow of information. In resisting the reimposition of such control, journalists were greatly aided by the power of modern technology. The simple presence of fax machines, electronic mail and limited independent radio and television equipment greatly facilitated the collection and distribution of information within the Soviet Union and abroad.

While it is difficult to conclude that the GKChP attempt to seize power failed because they were unable to secure the compliance of the media, it is undeniable that the active opposition of some of the media played a great role in assisting the defeat of the coup. The work of the media during August 1991 sent a strong message about their own independence and set a precedent of freedom from central influence that continues to be important in developing press-government relations in the former Soviet Union.

THE POST-COUP MEDIA

The post-coup euphoria among journalists was high. The failure of the putschists led to a purge of media figures who had participated in -- or simply not opposed -- the blatant censorship of the media.(26) The program "Vzglyad," snapped from the airwaves by Kravchenko only months prior, reappeared with the first broadcast of a video of Gorbachev in Foros made by his son-in-law. As with Russian economic reform, however, the struggle for media independence was not won after August; it only intensified.

The New Censorship

In the wake of the coup, Yeltsin took the proverbial two steps forward, one step back, when, along with cleaning the hard-liners out of the main media organizations, he decreed a shutdown of six Communist Party newspapers and ordered that their publishing facilities be put under the control of the Russian government.(27) Widely criticized for his own brand of censorship, Yeltsin later reversed his decrees.(28) Many of the papers re-emerged -- most without their Party affiliations and Lenin mastheads. In a separate incident, the conservative and controversial television program "600 Seconds," hosted by the notoriously nationalist and anti-Yeltsin Aleksandr Nevzorov, was taken off the air when Viktor Yugin, the head of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on the Mass Media and a strong Yeltsin supporter, assumed control of St. Petersburg Television.(29) With a rally of support, which included picketing the St. Petersburg City Soviet and publicity from the reborn newspaper Pravda, the program was put back on the air two days later.

The potential independence of the mass media remained an issue for the post-coup Parliament. During the April 1992 Congress of People's Deputies, a number of parliamentarians wanted to put the media's handling of government affairs on the agenda for discussion. Many of the deputies had clearly expected the unequivocal support of the press, and their complaints largely concerned the media's critical approach to the work of the Congress. Some newspapers, including Izvestia, were singled out in speeches for their so-called non-objective coverage of the Congress. When the Russian Guild of Parliamentary Journalists protested the government debate over what they considered regular journalistic commentary and analysis, the item was pulled from the agenda, but not without considerable debate.(30)

Subsidization and Livelihood: Funding of the Media

Post-coup government influence over the media created additional problems for the stability of many news organizations. While the coup freed newspapers from the state fold, it also freed the government from the obligation to fund them.(31) This created serious problems for many newspapers, which became victims of an inflationary environment in which paper costs, rent, distribution, salaries and other expenses spiraled upward much faster than revenues. At the time of this writing, newspaper subscriptions were only available for three-month periods, enabling quarterly price hikes; and newspapers sold on the street did not have prices printed on them, facilitating weekly and even daily price hikes, as the value of the ruble continued to fall.

The government plays a capricious game of favorites with the subsidies it does grant. Determining eligibility for subsidization is now done almost openly on the basis of a newspaper's loyalty to the government: Rossiskiie vesti (Russian News), controlled by Yeltsin, is fully funded by the Russian government; and Komsomolskaya pravda (Komsomol Truth) receives a government subsidy, as does Rossiskaya gazeta, which remains the formal publication of the Congress of People's Deputies and sympathetic to the Parliament.(32) Pravda receives no subsidy, and is instead financed by a large bank loan. Even well-known newspapers like Moskovskie novosti still depend on subsidies for more than 10 percent of their budgets. As Aleksei Pushkov, the deputy editor-in-chief noted, "It is an issue for us....[D]o we criticize [Ruslan] Khasbulatov [Speaker of the Parliament], who will then refuse us money tomorrow?"(33)

Aside from the subsidy game, the state continues to control other privileges given to the media, including reduced costs and access to state television-editing studios -- privileges which they feel free to grant or take away on a whim. Yury Shchekochikin, "political observer" for Literaturnaya gazeta, claims that his newspaper had its rent raised after the publication of an article critical of Kremlin personalities.(34) Borovik, editor and host of the Channel II television program "Sovershenno sekretno," found himself barred from an editing studio after he had aired a segment mocking Parliament Speaker Khasbulatov and Georgi Matyukin, former head of the Central Bank.((35) Borovik believes the two events are directly related, because when he called the studio administration to complain, the manager told him, "Matyukin sends his regards," and hung up.(36)

The most bitter post-coup controversy developed between the Supreme Soviet and Izvestia. On 23 August 1991, immediately after the coup, a group of Izvestia correspondents led by Editor-in-Chief Igor Golembiovsky requested registration of the newspaper as an independent joint-stock company, freeing it from its long-time tie to the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet granted the registration, surrendering its control over the newspaper. Yet Khasbulatov, the new speaker of the Parliament, never recognized this decision. Over the course of the next year and a half he forced parliamentary decrees, nullifying independent registration of the newspaper and reinstating it as an arm of the Supreme Soviet.(37)

The struggle for Izvestia followed an unpleasant progression--from name-calling to a lawsuit between the newspaper and Khasbulatov.(38) The newspaper was registered as both an entity of the Supreme Soviet, the assets of which belonged to the Russian Federation, and as a private company, the assets of which belonged to its founding members. Needless to say, this struggle increased the difficulty for Izvestia's journalists in maintaining an objective line in relation to certain members of Parliament.(39)

THE POLITICIZED PRESS

In part because of the above-mentioned precedents in media-government relations, the Russian media remain more notable for their politicization than for their independence. Most of the individuals involved in the media feel compelled to participate in the political and resource struggle and thus align themselves with some force or movement in society. It is, in fact, not difficult to line up many major organs of the media along the spectrum of the current political struggle. (See the chart on pages 124-5.) Even infrequent readers and viewers can quickly label Moskovskie novosti and Izvestia as pro-President and anti-Parliament; Pravda and Sovietskaya Rossiya as pro-Parliament and anti-President; and Den (Day) as reactionary hard-line.(40) Likewise, Channel I of Ostankino television is labeled conservative to moderate, and Channel II, which is essentially controlled by the Russian government, is commonly labeled "Yeltsin's station."(41)

Some news sources that help to balance coverage are provided by the foreign media, including CBS News and the BBC World Service, both aired daily on Channel III, a Moscow local station. Foreign productions on Channels I and II include everything from the U.S. situation comedy, "The Love Boat," to the business program, "Adam Smith's Money World." The popular Russian-language compilations of the New York Times and Financial Times also contribute to the balance.(42)

THE DECEMBER 1992 CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES

Examples of politically motivated differences in coverage can be found in the reporting on the December 1992 Congress of People's Deputies. In examining this coverage, one should differentiate between reporting prior to the Congress and during the Congress itself. Yeltsin's pre-congress actions caused criticism from many organs of the media that previously supported him. This critical coverage was largely the result of Yeltsin's sacrifice of some of the key reformers in his government, in a move to appease the conservative factions and to maintain Yegor Gaidar as prime minister. The array of forced resignations that preceded the Congress so agitated journalists that even the most neutral of the media jumped into the fray, manifesting that media support for the president was limited when he was not perceived as acting in the interests of reform.(43)

Among the television programs particularly critical of Yeltsin's action was the 27 November broadcast of Channel I's "Novosti." The program is not known for being pro-Yeltsin, but is not typically as outspoken in its criticism as it was during that evening's newscast: As part of a regular news segment, commentator Mikhail Osokin announced Gennadi Burbulis' retainer in Yeltsin's cabinet as the head of the President's Council of Advisers. The announcement became the lead-in to a video segment on Yeltsin's recent actions. The video lined up pictures of the four resignations to date, lamenting their sacrifice to the opposing forces. The voice-over noted:

But what president doesn't have to compromise? Of course, we can

make an analogy to Gorbachev. (Gorbachev's face appeared on the

screen.) He also gave away many of his team players -- remember

Shevardnadze? (Cut to a picture of Shevardnadze.) And Aleksandr

Yakovlev? (Yakovlev's face appeared.) And soon, there were others

in their places. (Cut to a picture of Yanaev and his followers

lined up at their first press conference.) The segment wryly dubbed the recent resignations as "appetizers," thrown to the anti-reform bloc, but stated, "Yeltsin has made it clear that the two most important leftovers in his government -- say [Anatoly] Chubais and Gaidar -- are not going be served up as the main dish."(44)

In both the print and television media, Yeltsin's sacrifice of Yakovlev as the head of Ostankino was a widely publicized story -- probably as a sign of journalistic solidarity. Moskovskie novosti ran a cover photograph of its former editor-in-chief with the years 1968, 1991 and 1992 printed in bold -- 1968, for the year when Yakovlev was booted out as the head of Zhurnalist (journalist); 1991, when Moskovskie novosti was closed down by the coup plotters;(45) and 1992, when Yakovlev was ousted as the head (predsedatel) of Ostankino Television. Vitaly Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya gazeta, wrote a page-one article in which he called the dismissal of Yakovlev, "a tactical error of the President fraught with bad consequences," and heralded the move as the "beginning of the end of free speech."(46)

As the Congress progressed and the stand-off between the executive and legislative branches became more pronounced, the news media fell more precisely along their typical lines of political loyalty. The height of the stand-off was 10 December, when it became clear that the Parliament was unlikely to support Gaidar as prime minister, and it was not clear whom they might recommend in his place. As a result, the continuation of reform itself seemed at stake. Tensions between Khasbulatov and Yeltsin were high, as they openly parried each other. Media coverage from this date therefore easily revealed the political fault lines in the press and television.

In the print media, on the far right, Den published derogatory poetry and slogans about Yeltsin and Gaidar and gave front-page coverage to the claims of the People's Congress that Yeltsin's "Appeal to the People" in his 10 December speech at the Congress was unconstitutional.(47) In the moderate and pro-reform press, Moskovskii komsomolets, Kuranty and Izvestia focused on Yeltsin's activities, offering support to Gaidar as prime minister and pointing out Khasbulatov's violations of protocol.(48)

The politicization of the media was also evident in television coverage from 10 December. The difference in coverage between the two main Ostankino channels was particularly extreme. Channel I, under the temporary direction of Igor Maleshenko, Yakovlev's former deputy, catered to every point of view, visibly unsure of who its next political patron might be. The net result, although perhaps unintentional, was a fairly objective news program despite the political turmoil. For example, coverage of the Congress by "Novosti" on Channel I, hosted by commentator Osokin, included segments of a speech by Yeltsin, and comments from Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, Deputy Nikolai Travkin (leader of the Civic Union) and Valery Zorkin (head of the Constitutional Court). Coverage of a news conference given by Gaidar on Yeltsin's Appeal focused on the issue of the constitutionality of the Appeal, although without passing judgment. "Novosti" also covered two demonstrations on Red Square and the Manezhnaya Square -- one pro-Yeltsin and one pro-communist. Osokin's comments were typically mild. He concluded his segment on the domestic political situation worrying about the possibility of a clash between the opposing demonstrations.

Channel II's news program "Vesti," on the other hand, was fiercely pro-Yeltsin. Hosted by the outspoken Svetlana Sorokina, it began with a full broadcast of Yeltsin's Appeal and covered no one else from the Congress. The Gaidar press conference was quickly covered, but it did not include any constitutional evaluation of Yeltsin's bid and focused on Gaidar, saying that, although he did not know Yeltsin was going to make such an appeal, "he did the right thing."(49) The remaining segments of "Vesti" covered a Union of Miners meeting in Vorkuta that offered support for Yeltsin, footage of solely pro-Yeltsin man-on-the-street interviews in Nizhny Novgorod and Kaliningrad, the pro-Yeltsin rally on Manezh Square in Moscow (without mention of other demonstrations) and a set of interviews with Georgians outside the House of Government in Tbilisi, emphasizing Georgia's support for the Russian president. Sorokina concluded the program with the following one-sided comments:

Airplanes don't have emergency brakes. You can not simply stop

them in mid-air. But it's hard not to get the physical sensation that

someone is stubbornly trying to pull the emergency brake on

reform ....(50)

BACK TO THE FUTURE

The Aftermath of the December 1992 Congress

In the wake of the December Congress, both Yeltsin and Khasbulatov moved to tighten their control over the media. On 25 December, Yeltsin issued a decree forming a "Federal Information Center" for the Russian Federation.(51) Supposedly a kind of public relations center meant to provide information to the press about the reforms, Yeltsin named Mikhail Poltoranin, former minister of information and close political ally, as its head. The Center has not been well-received; even liberal journalists are leery of it, fearing that it will put pressure on their newspapers to report a certain Yeltsin party line. The politics of the Center are clearly not completely neutral: As one of its goals, the Center plans to start a spin-off consortium to raise money to help fund certain organs of the mass media--like the VRTRK, Izvestia, Komsomolskaya pravda and Argumenty i fakty.

Yeltsin moved further in January 1993 by issuing a decree that would switch the broadcasting frequencies of Channels I and II, giving his Russian Television Company access to a broad viewing audience across the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and restricting Channel I -- which is not loyal to his cause -- to central Russia and Ukraine. Again, this move was poorly received by many in the television industry, and not just by state-oriented Channel-I bureaucrats. Private studios and advertisers that have purchased air time on one of the stations are also against such a change for fear of losing money. Moreover, this proposal would damage relations within the CIS, as the republics have agreed to begin some joint handling of the programming from Ostankino's Channel 1, which they continue to view.(52)

During the early months of 1993, Khasbulatov matched Yeltsin's every step toward media control. An "anonymous draft resolution" of the Supreme Soviet, the origin of which many attributed to Khasbulatov, proposed wresting control of subsidies and other privileges to newspapers from the Ministry of the Press -- a Presidential body -- and giving the privilege to the Supreme Soviet.(53) Moreover, Khasbulatov also vowed that he would close down Yeltsin's Federal Information Center by having Parliament issue a decree declaring it unconstitutional.

In the midst of growing controversy over the media, journalists once again resisted: Igor Maleshenko, general manager of Ostankino Radio and Television, resigned on 23 February in protest over the political pressure being exerted on television broadcast policy. Malashenko specifically cited an incident in which Pyotr Fillipov, a well-known democratic People's Deputy, came to the Ostankino broadcast facility to encourage programming supportive of Yeltsin during the run up to the April 1993 referendum. Malashenko loudly voiced his reasons for leaving his position, accusing Ostankino Chairman Vyacheslav Bragin, of "party methods of management" and supporting "a massive propaganda campaign."(54)

The March 1993 Emergency Congress of People's Deputies

The post-congress encroachments on the media by the president and the Parliament, however, were mild in comparison to the events of late March 1993. When Yeltsin appeared on television on 24 March announcing -special executive rule" in Russia, he also announced two new decrees on the mass media. The first, "On Defense of the Freedom of the Mass Media," declared that the mass media was "defended by the laws and the President of the Russian Federation."(55) This was a clear indication that Yeltsin would fight to call the shots concerning the role of the media. In his decree, Yeltsin further warned state organs and other organizations against interference in the free work of the media and called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to "take the necessary measures to protect the state television company, information agencies and publishing houses."(56)

In the first decree, Yeltsin essentially gave himself the right to take any actions he believed necessary to exert his own control over the media, relying on the assistance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs if he deemed it necessary. While perhaps his intentions were purely defensive -- against probable steps by the Parliament -- the decree hardly respected the independence of the media.

In his second decree, "On the Guarantee of Informational Stability and Requirements for Television and Radio Broadcasting," Yeltsin went a step further, laying out "minimal standards" of "informational objectivity" and "professional responsibility" necessary for acceptable television and radio broadcasts.(57) While this was most likely a counter-step to Supreme Soviet proposals for more programming featuring the Parliament, television journalists remained skeptical of both organs of power.

Regardless of the fact that neither decree was immediately implemented, Yeltsin's steps proved what most journalists already realized: As a vital tool for manipulating public opinion, they were in the line of fire in the showdown between the president and Parliament. Not even Yeltsin, democrat though he is reputed to be, could afford to fight this critical battle without the media as a weapon in hand.

When the Supreme Soviet decided to call an emergency session of the Congress of People's Deputies, it was expected that the Parliament would also make a bid for media control. This was possible in one of two ways: either a vote in favor of the impeachment of the president, which would have established parliamentary control over the media, or a separate resolution on the mass media. When the vote for the impeachment of the president failed, the Parliament quickly seized the second variation. By a vote of 537 to 263, they passed the resolution "On Measures to Ensure Freedom of Speech on State Television and Radio." Among articles ordering the removal of Oleg Poptsov, the head of VRTRK, and abolishing the Federal Information Center -- founded by Yeltsin -- the resolution called for the creation of oversight committees to implement the resolution and to appoint and dismiss the heads of central media entities.(58)

In the wake of these new decrees, journalists were put on the defensive, but many protested the efforts by the president and Parliament to control the media. Aleksandr Nevzorov, the conservative host of "600 Seconds" who was banned from the St. Petersburg airwaves in the name of Yeltsin's decree on television and radio broadcasting, for example, publicly protested a deal he was forced to strike in order to resume programming; the deal required him to submit all footage to inspection prior to broadcasting every evening. Some Moscow television journalists grouped together to protest the Parliament's decrees, with the support of Yeltsin. Most journalists, however, were against both sides. As Mikhail Ponomarev, a commentator on the usually pro-Yeltsin news program "Vesti" remarked, "If the changes envisioned in either of the special resolutions on the media are realized, it is likely to lead us into conflict that will serve no one's purposes."(59) Perhaps the only consoling factor in the situation is that, like most of the laws in Russia, the media resolutions are unlikely to be implemented in any thorough fashion, although they present both the president and the Parliament with the opportunity seriously to violate press freedoms if they choose to act on their own decrees.

These steps are being taken for a combination of short- and long-term reasons. In the short term, politicians find it a sound idea to try to force media loyalty during a showdown between President Yeltsin and Speaker Khasbulatov. Yeltsin must seriously consider the media's role in this volatile political context. Although the media have traditionally treated him well, his hold on power has consistently weakened over the last year and a half, and he feels a challenge from rival Khasbulatov's attempts to gain control. At the time of this writing, Yeltsin claims more unsolicited media support than the speaker. However, the liberal press is showing a tendency to support reformist ideas instead of supporting Yeltsin personally. Thus, outright attempts to control the media would only bring Yeltsin exactly what he is trying to avoid: bad press.

The most disturbing aspect of recent media-government relations and media coverage is the continuity. Despite an official campaign for glasnost and the de facto disintegration of the Communist Party dictatorship, the government has not yet stepped back from open attempts to control the media. The government believes it has a right to control the media, based on historical precedent, and given the quasi-independence of the press in terms of financing and resources, it believes it can successfully achieve this control. Likewise, with its own precedent of pushing the limits of glasnost and remarkable success during the August coup attempt, the media have not stopped trying to force their way out from under the rubric of government influence -- if only to participate more fully in the quest for power and resources now underway in Russian society.

A prognosis for the Russian media is difficult. The situation is like the current condition of privatizing Russian military factories: New managers want to buy them out and run the show, but the state -- which understands the importance of the factories' resources and output -- will not relinquish more than 49 percent of the stock. More balanced, depoliticized media are urgently needed during this time of power struggle to facilitate a democratic resolution. Paradoxically, less politicized media are likely to be a component of Russian society only if and when the power struggle is more or less resolved, and the general scramble for resources is over. (1.) See, for example, Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, Split Signals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). (2.) See KPSS: O sredstvvakh massovoi informatsii i propagandy (Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury: Moskva, 1978) [CPSU: On the Mass Media and Propaganda (Publishing House for Political Literature: Moscow, 1978)]. (3.) The Union of Journalists was founded in 1959 during Nikita Khrushchev's tenure as General Secretary. Although Khrushchev is sometimes remembered in the West for his more liberal social policies, the formation of the Union of journalists is sometimes noted as an effort to establish peer-group supervision over journalists' work -- a common controlling device in other Soviet labor and artistic unions. The Union of journalists was formally disbanded after the downfall of the Soviet Union and replaced by the Confederation of joumalists, which unites the more democratic journalists and states and has as a goal the formation of an "independent fourth estate" in the Russian Federation. (4.) "Expanding the sphere of glasnost is for us a principal political task," Gorbachev asserted. "Without glasnost you cannot have ... political creativity of the masses or their participation in the process Of government." Adam Ulam, The Communists (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1992) pp. 407-8. (5.) From the archive of the Working Group on Soviet Television of the Harriman Institute of Columbia University (hereafter WGSTVHI), "Vremya" broadcast, 26 May 1986 (Tape 860526). (6.) Gromyko was then known for his role in supporting Communist hard-line foreign policy but later emerged as an important supporter of Gorbachev and the reforms. For more on Andrei Gromyko's role in the Gorbachev succession, see Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Publishers, 1990). (7.) A main difference between Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's efforts to de-Stalinize was that Khrushchev's "thaw" took place within the Party -- starting with his secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress -- and was in the public realm only to a limited extent; Gorbachev's de-stalinization, launched in his November 1987 speech on history, was from the outset more public. (8.) Such measures included the extreme coercive measures used to implement collectivization (1929-1934), the pre-war destruction of the Red Army officer corps (1937-1939) and the repression of the republics. (9.) For an English-language compilation of glasnost-era articles, see Jonathan Eisen, The Glasnost Reader (New York: New American Library, Penguin Books, 1990). (10.) See, for instance, the interviews published with historian Roy Medvedev in Argumenty i fakty, 4-10 February 1989 and 18-24 March 1989; the interview with author Anatoly Rybakov in Moskovskie novosti (Moscow News) of 29 November 1989; and the memoirs of Stalin's medical attendant, L. Myasnikov, published in Literaturnaya gazeta on 1 March 1989. (11.) See WGSTVHI Tapes No. 890120A, 890505A, 890428A, 900302A. (12.) One example of this aggressive approach was a 10 August 1990 program, hosted by Igor Fesunenko with guests Stanislav Shatalin, economist, and Vladimir Kryuchkov, during which Fesunenko interrogated Kryuchkov on the privileges of his position. See WGSTVHI Tape No. 900810B, 7 May 1990. (13.) "Vremya," hosted by Igor Fesunenko, 1 March 1990, WGSTVHI Tape No. 900301A. See the protest broadcast during "Vstrecha veterani vtoroi mirovoi voini" (Meeting of Veterans of the Second World War) WGSTVHI Tape No. 900507B, 7 May 1990. (14.) Izvestia was formerly entitled News of the Central Committee of the CPSU and was the official publication of the Supreme Soviet. Throughout communist rule, Izvestia was typically cited along with Pravda as a guide to official policy. (15.) This was immediately prior to a Lithuanian vote on 9 February 1991, and Latvian and Estonian votes on 3 March 1991, for independence from the Soviet Union. (16.) The Law of the USSR on the Press and Mass Media (1989) did not greatly loosen the restrictions on journalists but did provide for the registration of "independent" organs of the mass media. It was superseded by the Law on the Mass Media, signed by Boris Yeltsin in December 1991, which was active at the time of this writing. Discussion of a new Law on the Press took place in the Supreme Soviet in February 1993. (17.) For Communists during the Baltic crackdown, turning in one's party card became the sign of a "decent" Communist. For journalists, protesting the Baltic crackdown in the media became one of the hallmarks of a "good" journalist. (18.) GOSTELERADIO, call-in show on Channel 1, 30 January 1991. (19.) Ibid. (20.) The author was aware of this development through discussions conducted with Russians involved in television, including Arkady Bederov, a senior producer for the "Thesaurus Production Company" and Artyom Borovik of Channel II's "Sovershenno sekretno," (Top Secret) who both said they wanted to "join Yeltsin" on Channel II. (21.) Ostankino is the central all-union television tower built by the Soviets. (22.) Channel I claims a viewership of up to 240 million people within the former Soviet Union. See the chart on page 125. (23.) They allowed only the best of the still-communist, loyal newspapers to publish, namely Izvestia, Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star), Moskovskdya pravda (Moscow Truth), Pravda, Rabochayatribuna (Workers' Tribune), Selskayazhizn (Country Life), Sovietskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia) and Trud (Labor). (24.) "Vremya," 19 August 1993. (25.) CNN has been available in Moscow since 1990. It is best received via satellite, which few Russians own; it can also be received using a good UHF tuner and, in some regions, a decoder. According to Alessio Vinci of CNN Moscow, there are an estimated 800 to 1,000 viewers of CNN in the Russian capital. Exact figures are unavailable. (26.) Leonid Kravchenko was replaced at GOSTELERADIO by the well known pro-reformist Yegor Yakoviev, who had brought the weekly Moskovskie novosti from propaganda rag to intelligent news source; Nikolai Yefimov was ousted from Izvestia and replaced by his liberal deputy Igor Golembiovsky; and the TASS and Novosti news agencies were re-organized, although still under the oversight of the government. (27.) Pravda, Sovietskaya Rossiya, Glasnost, Rabochaya tribuna, Moskovskaya pravda and Leninskoye znamya were shut down. (28.) Vladimir Nadein, "In Shutting Down Newspapers Yeltsin Made a Mistake: He Himself Should Rectify it," Izvestia, 24 August 1991; and Sergei Livshin, "Changes in the Fourth Estate," Izvestia, 27 August 1991, both summarized in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 21 October 1991, pp. 23-4. (29.) For more about Nevzorov, see p. 121. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet was distinct from the central Supreme Soviet until the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in January 1992. (30.) The Russian Guild of Parliamentary Journalists was created during the tenure of Anatoly Lukyanov as speaker of the Parliament by journalists who reported regularly on political affairs. The goal of the Guild is solidarity against government pressure on media coverage of political affairs. (31.) For example, Izvestia, Pravda, Rabochaya tribuna, Sovietskaya Rossiya, Moskovskaya pravda, Kommunist, Leningradskaya pravda and Kazakhskaya pravda were freed from their very formal relationships with the state after the coup. (32.) Interviews with journalists from Komsomolskaya pravda and Pravda, who requested anonymnity. (33.) Pushkov discussed subsidies and other pressures on newspapers at a Kettering Foundation conference on the press in Moscow, held at the Institute for the Study of USA and Canada, Moscow, 21 May 1992. (34.) ibid. (35.) Unbroadcast interview for the WNET program "Adam Smith's Money World," 16 June 1992. (36.) Ibid. (37.) Izvestia was registered on 23 August 1991 and received its "Certificate of Registration as a News Media Outlet," No. 1057 from the Russian Federation Ministry of Press and Public Information. The registered owners are the "journalists and staff of Izvestia." See also Supreme Soviet Resolution 3686-1, "On the Publishing House Izvestia," 20 October 1992. (38.) The lawsuit arose from comments that Khasbulatov made on 10 April 1992, when he declared that Izvestia was "in debt for over a billion rubles," that "people no longer read the newspaper," and that the leadership of the newspaper was "not too competent." The case was to be tried at Moscow's Krasnaya Presnia District Court, although Khasbulatov's representative never appeared, despite numerous summonses. See Izvestia, 13 April 1992, 22 May 1992 and 24 July 1992. (39.) On the eve of publication of this article, 19 May 1993, the Russian Constitutional Court passed its verdict on the Supreme Soviet's relationship to the newspaper. It declared the Supreme Soviet's resolution claiming ownership of Izvestia unconstitutional. The hard-fought case was heralded in the press as "affirming the constitutional norm of freedom of speech and the press," but journalists could only hope that it would "cool down the fires of the members of the corps of peoples' deputies who have the pretension of clutching the mass media in their hands." See Supreme Soviet Resolution, "On the Newspaper Izvestia," No. 3333-1 of 17 July 1992; and Yuri Feofanov, "Konstitutsionnii Sud Rossii Zashchitil Svobodu Pechati i Pravovoi Poryadok," Izvestia, 20 May 1993. (40.) Note that one of the founders of Den is Sergei Baburin, a notable conservative deputy. (41.) Few branches of the media really approach independence. Even the business daily Kommersant (Businessman) -- relatively independent and founded with foreign capital -- is not always objective in its coverage of political issues, since its very nature as a supporter of the market economy creates a particular political slant. (42.) Translations are published through joint ventures between the New York Times and Moskovskiye novosti, and between the Financial Times and Izvestia. (43.) Resignations at this time included those of Galina Starovoitova, presidential advisor; Mikhail Poltoranin, minister of information; Gennadi Burbulis, the president's state secretary; and Yegor Yakovlev, head of Ostankino television. (44.) "Novosti" is the successor to "Vremya," the name of which was changed after the August 1991 coup attempt. It has the largest viewership of all news programs in the Russian Federation. "Novosti," 27 November 1992. (45.) At the time, Yakovlev was editor-in-chief of Moskovskie novosti. (46.) See Vitaly Tretiakov's editorial, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 November 1992, p. 1; Valery Torovsky and Albert Plutnik's commentary, Izvestia, 25 November 1992, p. 1; and Yakovlev's letter to Moscow News, in Moscow News No. 2, 2 December 1992. (47.) Den, 13-19 December 1992, along with the text of a separate appeal to the people on behalf of the conservative deputies of the Congress, published the following verses: "Yeltsin, how much longer will you torment Russia? Yeltsin, return the stolen Soviet Union! Yeltsin, your people lie! Yeltsin, you have poisoned the Soviet Army! Yeltsin, where are the fruits of our labors? Yeltsin, you have let spies in the government! Yeltsin, you have strangled culture! Yeltsin, you have suffocated science! Yeltsin, the children of Russia detest you! Yeltsin, veterans spit in your footsteps! Yeltsin, you are covered in blood! Yeltsin, get out!" Den, 6-13 December 1992, published the following on Yegor Gaidar: "Americans think Jeffrey Sachs is an idiot; Gaidar is a Sachs maniac!" (48.) See the front page articles of Kuranty, 11 December 1992, including "Prav ii Yeltsin?" ("Is Yeltsin Right?") and "S etim syezdom ne po puti" ("With This Congress, We're on the Wrong Track"). See also, Moskovskiye komsomolets, 11 December 1993, with its "Decembrists Wake up Yeltsin" banner, and Izvestia, 11-12 December 1992. (49.) "Vesti," 10 December 1992. (50.) ibid. (51.) See the decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1647, "On the Federation Information Center of Russia," 24 December 1992. (52.) See "Kakoi kanal gosudarstvennee?" ("Which Channel is More Statist?") Izvestia, 23 January 1993. (53.) See "Prezidium v poli glavnovo tsensora?" ("The Presidium as Chief Censor?") Moskovskii komsomolets, 21 January 1993. (54.) See articles in Kommersant and Komsomolskaya pravda, 23 February 1993. (55.) "Address of the President of the Russian Federation," Channel I, 24 March 1993. (56.) See the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 376, 20 March 1993, "On the Defense of the Freedom of Mass Information." (57.) See the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 377, 20 March 1993," On the Guarantee of Informational Stability and the Requirements for Television and Radio Broadcasts." (58.) See the resolution as it is reported in Rossiskiie vesti, 30 March 1993. (59.) "Vesti," 29 March 1993.
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Title Annotation:Power of the Media in the Global System
Author:Jensen, Linda
Publication:Journal of International Affairs
Date:Jun 22, 1993
Words:9709
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