The position of G20 within the present structures of global governance.
However, the precise outline of the concept of global governance has remained difficult to be determined. For James Rosenau, it refers to activities "backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance". (4) In essence, it has a fragmented character, being split "among governmental and nongovernmental actors at the national and international level" with the states still occupying central stage, but with the international organizations, NGOs and multinational corporations increasingly involved in the "formulation, implementation and monitoring of international policies, rules and regulations". (5) It is about "shifting the location of authority". (6) For Professor James Rosenau, it involves "systems of rule at all levels of human activity--from family to the international organization--in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions" (7). According to Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst it is easier to define global governance by what it is not: "it is not global government, it is not a single world order, and it is not a top-down, hierarchical structure of authority". (8) Nevertheless, global governance as a concept is not entirely new. Its roots can be traced back to the European conquests of the fifteenth century, but its current form and structures came to become increasingly difficult to be explained. (9)
Moreover, it generated a "governance dilemma" as defined by the distinguished professor Robert Keohane (10) that has persistently came under the scrutiny of the political scientists who tried to settle it in different ways. It basically referred to the fact that although we stand to benefit from this network of institutions that increase the potential for cooperation we tend to resist their creation as they are perceived as having the potential to limit our liberties with the rules that they create. Anne-Marie Slaughter reshaped the governance dilemma and turned it into a "globalization paradox", as she reframed the terms under scrutiny. In her opinion, the paradox stems from the fact that on the one hand "[p]eoples and their governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems" whereas on the other hand an excessive centralization of power at the international level that might gradually lead to the creation of a world government can become a "dangerous threat to individual liberty". (11) Under these circumstances, she advances the solution of "government networks" in the form of loose, cooperative, coordinated arrangements across borders among regulatory agents and agencies. (12) A different kind of answer has been put forward by Jan Aart Scholte, who considers that the most evident expression of the paradox lies in the democratic deficit of the institutions of global governance. Under these circumstances, his response to the issue in question was to make the structures of global governance accountable to the civil society understood as a "political arena where associations of citizens seek from outside political parties to shape societal rules". (13) Although proceeding from a similar hypothesis, but advancing a somehow different solution, Thorsten Benner, Wolfgang Reinicke and Jan Martin Witte proposed a pluralistic system of accountability for the institutions of global governance in the form of multisectoral public policy networks that bring together "the public sector (government and international organizations), civil society and business". (14) Dani Rodrik, in his turn, acknowledges the existence of the globalization paradox and warns that we have to limit our ambitions with regard to economic globalization as otherwise we risk running one of the two risks of either deepening the legitimacy deficit if we advance too far in imposing global rules or of intensifying instability when we let global markets move on too far. The only way out according to his opinion is a return to the preceding version of globalization in which the nation-states preserved a central position.
Over the final part of the last century, the global governance received an increased attention due to the fact that the substantial thicker network of globalized relations altered the conduct of world affairs. Although it did not question the preeminence of states and international institutions, global governance involved also an increased number of other actors than the customarily public ones. At the same time, it underscored the recourse to very innovative practices and instruments, more informal in character than the long established ones existing in the relations between states and/or states and international institutions. Finally yet importantly, it heightened the multi-layered character of governance activities while overcoming at the same time the division between international, supranational and national. (15) The crisis that started in 2008 in the US made the reassessment of the role and functioning of the present structures of global governance a top priority. Under the current circumstances, an evaluation of the role that groupings like G20, which came to play a key role in any discussion on the reform of the global forums an institutions becomes mandatory.
Nevertheless, any judgment on the present structures of global governance cannot be based only on considerations with regard to the degree of achievement of the goals laid down for them. On the contrary, without playing down their accomplishments one has to bear in mind the fact that they have been constantly lambasted for their lack of effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability. More often than ever, any detraction of their merits was accompanied by an appeal for their restructuring. As such, the endeavors aimed at their reform are not new in themselves. They reemerged with increased strength in the context of the Asian crisis of 1997, but did not lead to any breakthrough. Only almost ten years later when a new crisis broke out with increased strength the need of finding ways out for overcoming the misgivings of the existing structures of global governance became stringent. The reforms have to proceed however from assessing the current situation and the criticism addressed to them, to value their relevance for overcoming the crisis and to appraise their value once the crisis is over.
Generally speaking, the effectiveness of an international institution depends on its transparency or its ease of monitoring and verifying compliance, on the robustness of its social-choice mechanisms or the capacity to withstand perturbations or disruptive occurrences in connection with the activities it governs, on its transformation rules or the procedures governing change, on the capacity of its governments to implement its provisions, on the fairness of its distribution of power, on the level of interdependence of its participants and on the power of its intellectual substructures to resist transforming pressures (16). Assessing the effectiveness of an international institution is difficult and depends on the goals set for it, especially if we take into consideration that sometimes is hard to make a distinction between output-, outcome- an impact oriented objectives. (17) However, it is widely accepted that an institution can be regarded as effective "when it fulfills the demands placed on it" (18) which is basically equivalent with advancing common objectives in a way in which the individual member states could not accomplish them alone.
The legitimacy as a concept was originally developed for assessing the democratic legitimacy of the states not of international institutions, but it was enlarged gradually to embrace also international institutions (19). In relation to international institutions, legitimacy was defined as "a property of a rule or rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process" (20). The legitimacy of global governance institutions matters especially if we take into consideration the fact that although they do not control major means of coercion and only rarely exert direct authority over individuals, it becomes increasingly difficult to elude the norms and practices that stem from them (which in fact were once settled almost exclusively by the states) and at the same time pretend to be integrated in the international affairs. (21)
The accountability of international governance institutions takes into consideration not only the ways in which these are held accountable for their conduct, but in a more general manner how responsible they are in "developing policies and procedures for shaping mission and values, and for assessing performance in relation to goals". (22) If traditionally accountability was viewed as a retrospective process of evaluation of what has already been done, undertaken by those who have authority over the international organization (usually, its member states), nowadays there is increasing pressure for transforming the process into one which is more ongoing and participative in the sense of expanding the circle of those to which the organization is answerable to those broadly affected by its decisions especially where there are substantial risks of negative externalities such as financial crisis.
In brief, any reform of the institutions of global governance is bound to proceed from addressing the issues that affect the credibility of their entire activity. It is true that international institutions "should not be compared to ideal democratic systems". They only have to approximate the 'real world' democracy since they also "face constraints of limited public information and interest, regulatory capture, the credibility of commitments, and bounded consensus". What is of importance is to "calibrate" them in order to make them "the best that are feasible under 'real-world' circumstances". (23)
When the latest economic crisis was at its peak, the willpower for speeding up the pace of reform of some of the key institutions of global governance gained considerable ground. The process of reform though did not begin with the latest crisis. On the contrary, it was already in progress at the outbreak of the downturn as the deficiencies exposed by the structures of global governance have long been acknowledged. The reform was only further accelerated and deepened by the adverse economic conditions. In other words, despite its seriousness, the latest crisis contributed to the strengthening of multilateralism by bolstering the efforts of making the international financial institutions more effective, legitimate and accountable.
Against the background of the global economic decline the limits of G8, which has been long diagnosed of suffering on all three accounts discussed above, (24) became more than apparent. The questions concerning G8's effectiveness stem more or less from the remoteness of its decision-making and its lack of resources for carrying out these decisions. The legitimacy problem is connected with the fact that its members were not elected, but invited to participate based on their capacity of being representative for the worldwide political and economic agenda. As far as the accountability is concerned, G8 has not developed any sort of mechanisms in this respect. However, it was not only the need to address these flaws the only reason for the transformation of G8. The change can be better understood in the context of the ongoing evolution of the international setup towards global networks at the expense of international hierarchies. (25) The crisis only added up to the need for a return to multilateralism in international relations requiring a new "style of leadership and diplomacy that is flatter, less hierarchical, and more inclusive". (26)
After decade-long attempts to reconsider the format of G8 by extending invitations to different Third World countries, (27) G-20, (28) a wider group of nations, including beyond the G8 members the fast-growing China, Brazil and India, evolved into a leading forum for deliberating on the future economic and financial cooperation. G20 was not new in its entirely since its finance ministers and central bankers started already ten years before, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, to work together on technical matters of international cooperation in their area of competence. The November 2008 G20 summit in Washington was a first positive signal that the grouping is capable of taking rapid action. However, the first meetings held firstly in Washington and then in London (April 2009) had a rather narrow agenda, limited to the coordination of the fiscal stimuli and financial bailouts necessary to put an end. A sea change in the G20 area of interest occurred on the Pittsburgh summit of September 2009. It is considered that from that point onward G20 started to evolve "from crisis response to global economic governance". (29) Beyond creating a Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth that enclosed a firm commitment "to promote a resilient international financial system, and to reap the benefits of an open global economy", the Leader's Statement of the Pittsburgh Summit made unambiguous pronouncements on the measures to be taken for the policy and institutional reform of IMF and World Bank, the completion of the Doha Round or the establishment of a climate change regime with the help of the World Bank and other regional development banks. (30)
The first three summits with their focus on immediate crisis management contributed directly to establishing for G20 a reputation of effective crisis manager. They placed high on the agenda of G20 some overarching goals that have ever since retained preeminence regardless of any of the subsequent attempts to recast these priorities and to add new ones. They are connected with the reviving of the global economy, strengthening of the financial system and improving the international financial architecture, (31) in order to be concise. They launched an overly ambitious Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) according to which, on the request of the G20, the IMF has to provide the grouping with the necessary technical analysis for evaluating how members' policies fit together and contribute to achieving G20's goals.
Although the Toronto summit of June 2010 did not manage to rise up to the high expectations attached to it due primarily to the disagreement between the European countries interested in laying sound foundations for international finance and the United States which emphasize the need for stimulating economic growth in the first place while deciding on the financial problems at a later point and a general lack of agreement on a future bank levy, the Seoul Summit of November 2010 managed to surmount some of the misunderstandings and created the premises for reinforcing the G20 position in the structures of global governance. It offered at least G20 the perspective of moving from crisis management to sustainable economic strategies. On this very occasion, G20 tackled complex problems as for instance the adoption of Basel III, the reform of the IMF or the redressing of global imbalances. It is obvious that in 2010 G20 benefited from a very proactive Korean leadership, keen to make from the Seoul summit, the first to be chaired by a non-G7 country, a success. If on the front of MAP the controversies were overwhelming, the Korean presidency was able to set in motion a far-reaching review of the IMF governance. The 14-th General Review of Quotas agreed upon by the Board of Governors of the IMF at its summit from December 2010 will, upon its entering into force, double the amount of quotas, shift more than 6 percent of quota shares to dynamic emergent markets and significantly realign quota shares (32). As a result, China will become the third largest economy within the IMF whereas Brazil, China, India and Russia will enter the club of the ten largest shareholders. This will have as a result a change in the veto power of these countries. As a result, in the IMF Executive Board there will be two seats less for European countries and two seats more for emergent economies.
The last and one of the most dynamic stages in the up to now history of G20 began in 2011 and marked a new comeback of G20 in matters of crisis management. This was in fact a direct outcome of the rekindle of the euro-area sovereign debt crisis, which absorbed to a certain extent all the energies of the G20s presidencies and summits from then onwards. After the G20 members tripled the resources available to IMF to $750 billion, including $250 billion in Special Drawing Rights, at their summit in Los Cabos in June 2012 the G20 leaders undertook to provide the Fund with another $456 billion in bilateral credit to increase its resources. Apart from this, G20 failed to deliver as the "premier forum for international economic cooperation" that has aimed to become. Of course, a number of reasons have already been put forward as for instance the fact that the European problems are difficult to be tackled because of the difficulties posed by the internal coordination mechanisms or the reality that any help offered to the Europeans will pave the way for a further alteration of their power inside international organizations. (33) Although the results of the last two G20 summits did not rise to the high expectations attached to them, it will be nevertheless difficult to ignore the fact that if a forum like G20 did not exist, it would have been necessary to invent it.
Sweeping G20 into a central position among the international forums of global governance can be construed as a strong signal that emerging markets are ever more significant and in the long term will keep growing in importance. The ascendancy of G20 can be nevertheless assigned to a certain number of factors. Firstly, it was recognized as a leading forum for managing and steering political processes during the latest financial crisis. It proved to be more supple than the existing "'hard' legalized organizations of the United Nations" as it could decide with increased flexibility on issues like the frequency of the meetings, agenda or future directions of action. (34) Secondly, it responds better to at least some of the problems that were raised in connection with G8 namely those regarding its capacity of being representative and legitimate. G20 accounts for almost 85 per cent of the world's gross domestic product, some 80 per cent of the global trade and 65 per cent of the entire population. Thirdly, it involves in global decision-making countries, which play a progressively more significant weight in world economic affairs. Finally, it allows a country like China a smoother integration in a leading club while avoiding a humiliating probation period as it was the case with Russia (35) and, at the same time, to maintain a relative low profile until reaching the position of global leadership it is striving for so long. (36)
Nevertheless, the fact that the crisis has given G20 a hefty thrust and moved it to the forefront do by any means not connote that G8 is going to become obsolescent. On the contrary, when taking a closer look to the documents adopted on the occasion of their last summits held in June 2010 in Canada, G8 appears to have stepped aside from the economic realm and accepted the precedence of G20 in dealing with this sort of issues, while maintaining at the top of its agenda non-economic issues such as development, environmental sustainability, maternal and child health and, extremely important, international peace and security. (37) This is actually another recognition of the fact that G20 is now to be regarded as the most important economic consultative body. Although G20 assumed increased responsibilities there is no sign that in the near future this forum will replace the more mature G8. On the contrary, it is to be expected that the division of responsibilities will be furthered.
Despite its already established usefulness in times of crisis, in its up-to-now existence of G20 could not escape the critics. They span from the observation that the leaders of the member states although competent for making difficult political decisions lack the necessary expertise for dealing with the technicalities of financial challenges and reach to the observation that the grouping is nothing more than a steering committee for G8. (38)
It is true that G20 assuaged to a certain extent the legitimacy concerns that accompanied the existence of G8 from its very beginning. (39) It cannot however eliminate these apprehensions as long as its membership does little to alleviate older wounds such as the overrepresentation of the European countries (with four full members plus the European Union represented by the president of the European Council) whereas entire regions are not present at its meetings or are obviously underrepresented (for instance, for the whole African continent there is only one seat occupied by South Africa). As a consequence we can consider this forum as more representative than the previous G8, but still far from being representative of the entire international community as its membership remains selective, self-selective, to be more precise.
The process of reforming the institutions of global governance, so intensely discussed in the years that followed the Asian economic crisis, was finally set into motion although its ultimate outcome is now still difficult to be predicted. There is however high expectations that the "growing pressure for more inclusive, secure and sustainable globalization" is likely to give additional momentum to the emergence of new patterns, institutions and processes in global governance that can address "the need for proactive global systemic risk management". (40) However "in a world where economic globalization has outpaced political globalization", (41) the necessity to adjust the existing institutions of global governance to the structural changes both inside and outside their own organizations in order to better cope with future economic systemic risks is and will continue to remain at least for the foreseeable future a very demanding task. From the onset of the crisis, the difficult issue of reforming the institutions of global governance was addressed most thoroughly on the last G-20 summits. When the crisis was at its peak, G20 proved to be flexible in easily adapting its agenda, imaginative in coming out with solutions to difficult issues and efficient in the sense suggested above by Oran Young, that is to say in coming up with transformation rules and procedures for governing change. (42) Still, one important issue for the G20 will be to prove its usefulness also in times when there is no crisis to demand a decisive response.
1. Beisheim, Marianne and Harald Fuhr (2008), "Vorwort" in: Marianne Beisheim and Harald Fuhr (ed.), Governance durch Interaktion nicht-staatlicher und staatlicher Akteure. Entstehungsbedingungen, Effektivitat und Legitimitat sowie Nachhaltigkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 16, August 2008.
2. von Bogdany, Armin, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann (2008), "Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities" in: German Law Journal, Special Issue: Public Authority and International Institutions, Vol. 9, No. 11, 1375-1401.
3. Benner, Thorsten, Wolfgang Reinicke and Jan Martin Witte (2004), "Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: Towards a Pluralistic System of Accountability" in: Government and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 2, 191-210.
4. Buchanan, Allen and Robert Keohane (2006), "The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions" in: Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 20, Issue 4, 2006, p. 405-37.
5. Burral, Simon and Caroline Neligan (2005), The Accountability of International Organizations, Global Public Policy Institute Research Paper Series, No.2, [http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/IO_Acct_Burall_05012005.pdf]
6. Commission on Global Governance (1995), Our Global Neighborhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Jean Pisani-Ferry (2012), "Macroeconomic Coordination: What Has the G20 Achieved?" in: Think Tank 20: New Challenges for the Global Economy, New Uncertainties for the G-20, Washington D.C.: Brookings, 28-33.
8. Franck, Thomas (1990), The power of legitimacy among nations, New York: Oxford University Press.
9. Garrett, Geoffrey (2010), "G2 in G20: China, The United States and the World after the Global Financial Crisis" in: Global Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, 29-39.
10. Gnath, Katharina and Niklas Reimers (2009), Die G8-Gipfelarchitektur im Wandel: Neue Herausforderungen an globales Regieren am Beispiel von Indiens wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg, DGAP Analyse, no. 6.
11. Gnath, Katharina, Stormy-Annika Mildner and Claudia Schmucker (2012), G20, IMF, and WTO in Turbulent Times: Legitimacy and Effectiveness Put to the Test, SWP Research Paper RP 10, August 2012.
12. Higgott, Richard, Multilalteralism and the Limits of Global Governance, CSGR University of Warwick, Working Paper No. 134/04, May 2004.
13. International Monetary Fund, Factsheet--IMF Quotas, 24 August 2012, [http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm].
14. Karns, Margaret and Karen Mingst (2004), International organizations: the politics and processes of global governance, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
15. Keohane, Robert, "Governance in a Partially Globalized World" in: American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, 2001, p. 1-13.
16. Kirton, John (2011), "The Group of Twenty" in: Thomas Hale and David Held (ed.), Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions & Innovations, Malden: Polity Press, pp. 55-61.
17. Krahmann, Elke (2003), "National, Regional and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?" in: Global Governance, Vol. 9, No. 3, 323-346.
18. Moravcsik, Andrew (2004), "Is there a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis" in: Government and Opposition, vol. 39, no. 2, 336-363.
19. Murphy, Craig N. (2004), "Global governance: poorly done and poorly understood" in: International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4, 789-803.
20. Ozkan, Gokhan (2011), "The global governance reform and the role of the G20 in recovery from the global crisis" in: Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences, vol. 24, 159-166.
21. Payne, Anthony (2008), "The G8 in a changing global economic order" in: International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 3, p. 519-533.
22. Scholte, Jan Aart (2011), Building Global Democracy? Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
23. Rosenau, James (1995), "Governance in the Twenty-First Century" in: Global Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1, 13-43.
24. Schneckener, Ulrich (2009), The opportunities and Limits of Global Governance by Clubs, SWP Comments, no. 22, September 2009.
25. Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2004), A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
26. Stiglitz, Joseph (2008), "Making Globalization Work" in: The Economic and Social Review, vol. 39, no. 3, 171-190.
27. Weiss, Thomas G. (2000), "Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges" in: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5, 795-814.
28. Young, Oran R. (1992), "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables" in: James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), Governance without government: order and change in world politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1) Jan Aart Scholte, Building Global Democracy? Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 2-3.
(2) Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst, International organizations: the politics and processes of global governance, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 4-15.
(3) Ibidem, p. 5.
(4) James Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century" in: Global Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, p. 4.
(5) Elke Krahmann, "National, Regional and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?" in: Global Governance, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2003, p. 329.
(6) Thomas G. Weiss, "Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges" in: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2000, p. 806.
(7) James Rosenau, "Governance ...", p. 13.
(8) M. Karns and K. Mingst, International organizations ..., p. 4.
(9) Craig N. Murphy, "Global governance: poorly done and poorly understood" in: International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4, 2000, p. 789.
(10) Robert Keohane, "Governance in a Partially Globalized World" in: American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, 2001, p. 1.
(11) Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 8.
(12) Ibidem, p. 14.
(13) J. A. Scholte, Building Global Democracy, p. 36.
(14) Thorsten Benner, Wolfgang Reinicke and Jan Martin Witte, "Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: Towards a Pluralistic System of Accountability" in: Government and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2004, pp. 191-92.
(15) Armin von Bogdany, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann, "Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities" in: German Law Journal, Special Issue: Public Authority and International Institutions, Vol. 9, No. 11, 2008, p. 1378.
(16) Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables" in: James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance without government: order and change in world politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 175-192.
(17) Marianne Beisheim and Harald Fuhr, "Vorwort" in: Marianne Beisheim and Harald Fuhr (ed.), Governance durch Interaktion nicht-staatlicher und staatlicher Akteure. Entstehungsbedingungen, Effektivitat und Legitimitat sowie Nachhaltigkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 16, August 2008, p. 6.
(18) Katharina Gnath, Stormy-Annika Mildner and Claudia Schmucker, G20, IMF, and WTO in Turbulent Times: Legitimacy and Effectiveness Put to the Test, SWP Research Paper RP 10, August 2012, p. 7.
(19) Ibidem, p. 6.
(20) Thomas Franck, The power of legitimacy among nations, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 24.
(21) Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, "The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions" in: Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 20, Issue 4, 2006, pp. 405-6.
(22) Simon Burral and Caroline Neligan, Burral, Simon and Caroline Neligan, The Accountability of International Organizations, Global Public Policy Institute Research Paper Series, No.2, 2005 [http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/IO_Acct_Burall_05012005.pdf], 03 October 2012, p. 7.
(23) Andrew Moravcsik, "Is there a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis" in: Government and Opposition, vol. 39, no. 2, 2004, p. 337.
(24) Katharina Gnath and Niklas Reimers, "Die G8-Gipfelarchitektur im Wandel: Neue Herausforderungen an globales Regieren am Beispiel von Indiens wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg" in: DGAPAnalyse, no. 6, 2009. For a wider discussions on the problems raised by the implication of the new multilateral forums in the global governance see Ulrich Schneckener, The Opportunities and Limits of Global Governance by Clubs, SWP Comments, no. 22, September 2009, pp. 4-6.
(25) Richard Higgott, Multilalteralism and the Limits of Global Governance, CSGR University of Warwick, Working Paper No. 134/04, May 2004, p. 30.
(26) Ibidem, pp. 34-5.
(27) In 2001, the then Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin proposed a thorough reform of G8 through its transformation into L20 (Leaders 20) comprising almost the same countries that belong to G20. Two years later the president of France made a new attempt to make the grouping more representative by inviting a number of countries regarded as having a systemic importance: Algeria, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and South Africa to the 2003 Evian summit. Another two years on, it was the turn of Tony Blair to propose a new formula for a more representative G8 summit. By inviting Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa to the 2005 Gleneagles meeting, Blair attempted to transform the group into a G8+5 club, but unfortunately neither this formula did survive the presidency of its designer. When Germany took over the G8 presidency in 2007, it tried to revive the old British proposal and added to it the idea of embedding the five countries into a thorough results-oriented discussion on cross-border investment, innovation and intellectual property rights, energy and climate change and development. The German initiative became better known as Heiligendamm Process. The results of the dialogue were to be evaluated by a G8+5 summit in 2009.
(28) G-20 consists of 19 countries--Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States--and the European Union. Since 2008, the leaders of these countries met four times. In 2010, one additional summit was held in South Korea. From 2011, the G-20 summits will be held annually. The meetings of the leaders are supported by the activities of a number of working and expert groups and the expertise of the leading international organizations such as World Bank, the IMF, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Labor Organization.
(29) Geoffrey Garrett, "G2 in G20: China, The United States and the World after the Global Financial Crisis" in: Global Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, 2010, p. 37.
(30) Pittsburgh Summit--Leader's Statement, Pittsburgh, 25 November 2009 on [http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf], 30 September 2012.
(31) K. Gnath, S.-A. Mildner and C. Schmucker, G20, IMF, and WTO ..., pp. 10-11.
(32) International Monetary Fund, Factsheet--IMF Quotas, 24 August 2012, [http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm], 30 September 2012.
(33) Jean Pisani-Ferry, "Macroeconomic Coordination: What Has the G20 Achieved?" in: Think Tank 20: New Challenges for the Global Economy, New Uncertainties for the G-20, Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2012, p. 33.
(34) John Kirton, "The Group of Twenty" in: Thomas Hale and David Held (ed.), Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions & Innovations, Malden: Polity Press, 2011, p. 54.
(35) Anthony Payne, "The G8 in a changing global economic order" in: International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 3, 2008, p. 532.
(36) G. Garrett, "G2 in G20 ...", p. 37.
(37) Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, Muskoka, Canada, 26 June 2010 [http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2010muskoka/communique.html] 30 September 2012.
(38) Ibidem, pp. 57-8.
(39) Gokhan Ozkan, "The global governance reform and the role of the G20 in recovery from the global crisis" in: Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences, vol. 24, 2011, p. 162.
(40) Ulrich Schneckener, The Opportunities and Limits of Global Governance by Clubs, p. 7.
(41) Joseph Stiglitz, "Making Globalization Work" in: The Economic and Social Review, vol. 39, no. 3, 2008, p. 177.
(42) Oran Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions ...", pp. 175-92.
Georgiana Ciceo *
* Georgiana Ciceo is a PhD Lecturer at the Faculty of European Studies, Babef-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania). E-mail: email@example.com.
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