The politicization of intelligence: the Bonapartist Intelligence Model.
Intelligence has become a quasi-intrinsic component of contemporary state structure, based on essential information supplied by important policy makers whose decisions can guarantee the protection of national interest and security. The main reason why informative authorities are all important is that no "state actor" is untouchable and completely immune to the risk of being subjected to terrorist attacks or the uncountable number of current cross-border threats. Four of the international security environment evolutions (1) are increasing the need for intelligence in order to ensure internal stability and to prevent all possible risks, threats and state vulnerabilities. First of all, it's about the multiplication of "state/non-state entities", of crisis sources and of capabilities that brought threatening on a multidimensional level; then, it's about the transfer of the foreign violence situations to both internal and urbane regions security causing thus, the augmentation of society's ethno-religious cleavages; moreover, it's about the international economic, technological and information interdependence as a potential threat for the national security; last but not least, it's about the proliferation of the Internet regarded as an instrument of multilingual open information dissemination, doubled by the "information explosion" materialized not only by the exponential augmentation of published materials but also by the diversification of the cross--border nontraditional threatening.
Only an adequate intelligence can guarantee the success of decision and policy making. Governmental policy makers shall be able to make relevant internal political or diplomatic intercessions, only if they assimilate the information regarding the global security and political context and try to adapt it to the strategic situation, risks, threatening or existent opportunities--all the above elements are essential in a) defining the state's national interests; b)developing an adequate and efficient national security system ; c) in creating efficient management strategies in case of internal crises; d) involving or not security and intelligence agencies in military missions. (2)
[section] Information Senders and Receivers
Despite of the scepticism showed by some politologists who perceive information services as instruments strictly serving the Executive Authorities and deprived of autonomous decision making, intelligence' political relevance can be demonstrated not only by appointing former information (3) officers in strategic decision making positions, but also by its capacity to monitor both the open information flow (mass media) and the restricted one (institutions, private societies, banks and political parties data bases) facilitating thus, the possibility to use information as a means of manipulating political authorities. According to Aldo Giannuli, information services do not only fulfil the role of "receivers" but also the role of "information senders". (4) Consequently, a third of the broadcast political, economic or military news contain an essential informative value.
The main function and feature of intelligence agencies, that of "information senders", has been greatly the result of "white intelligence" paradigm emergence under the impact of technological evolution. This very situations proves the hypothesis regarding the collapse of intelligence traditional doctrine and the emergence of both public, substate intelligence and open sources intelligence (OSINT), the latter based on the "Clearances Matter Less than Knowledge" doctrine.
[section] OSINT Exploitation Open Source Intelligence in Political Marketing
Open Source Intelligence has been used even in election marketing strategies developed by political intelligence (5) suppliers whose specific activity focuses on an operative--informative approach of the election process, taking shape in the form of information collection (from open sources, in case of election campaigns) and information dissemination conceived in such a way as to address the target electorate (by including a message into an election communication strategy) in order to obtain the expected number of votes.
In order to be appointed as Political Intelligence Consultant one must firstly be granted a communication election mandate. The mandate into question is awarded on condition that a political party or political leader is involved into an election race aiming at a political strategic position (local management, Parliament, presidential management, etc). Moreover, the election communication mandate must contain information about the election platform, the possible political enemies and ally, local branches, respectively, the political party's image capital or about its candidate.
The organizational and implementation frame of the political intelligence providers' election mandate, shall include the party's or the candidate's organizational diagnosis, the SWOT assessment, doubled by the PESTLE analysis on the party's external environment--using as essential analysis tool, the information collected from open sources--in order to both draw up the political party profile (the consumer) and the party's political marketing previsions, on the grounds of which the communication election mandate sequencer shall make the best political decision.
[section] The Impact of Political Intelligence Activity upon the Internal Party Dynamics
By granting the election mandate to political intelligence counselors, the political gain at stake can have negative consequences on the party membership, even if, generally speaking, the aimed effect is that of increasing the political parties' responsibility towards its electorate.
One of the possible negative consequences refers to the decrease of the democracy within parties by oligarchizing the organizational dimension of the political party in the disadvantage of the pluralist--hierarchical model proposed by S. Eldersveld, (6) the creator of hierarchical organizational structure, each level or stratum (that can influence the party's program) generating a number of leaders vertically connected whose main purpose is to gain the trust of the electorate. (7) On the contrary, the oligarchical type of the parties' political organization, reflected in "The Oligarchy's Iron Law" by Robert Michels, it's about assigning the decision making power to a restricted political leaders group and their election counselors, by decreasing the party members' implication who are thus, scarified in the name of election success.
As an extreme measure, the decision to neglect the party membership as a consequence of political marketing, may turn the mass parties (which rely on their own membership in charge with: asserting the party into a political system; supervising the election campaign; and offering the necessary financial support) into cadre parties (which tend to gather prestigious personalities and political consultants, in order to organize, direct and maintain a permanent relationship with the candidates). (8)
Nevertheless, the secret use of political intelligence activities by political parties, especially during the election period,--referring to the collection of nonpublic information to support the election process--may eventually transform the parties into the main manipulators of the social and political space. Consequently, the parties may resort to a differentiated and capillary type of control over the resources and decision making processes, or to put it differently, may resort to what is generally known as "Partitocracy". The Italian case help frame a definition of partitocrazia as the degeneration of a specific form of regulation of social conflict, counterpoised to neocorporatist (organization of strong interests), pluralist (strong civil society), and policy network (strong technocracy) formulations: that is to say, party government. The Italian system has been defined as a government by the parties, with the parties in a position to control pressure groups (whose influence in the political system depends upon their clientelistic relationship, with ideological proximity to a political party) the technocrats (lottizzati, appointed in proportion to party strength), and civil society (social movements too being aligned around party actors). According to Donatella della Porta, (9) partitocracy, as a concept describing the degeneration of party government and resembling to Katz & Mair's cartel parties, has three defining elements: (1) strong mass political parties, (2) that make up government, determine government policies and are able to implement those policies, and (3) that use public resources to appoint befriended personnel in public and semi-public agencies in a system of patronage and clientelism.
An election process corrupted by the discretionary use of the political intelligence activity shall certainly have negative consequences not only on the party's internal organization, by favoring oligarchical tendencies, but also on the party system, by resorting to fragmentation and division, which would eventually threaten the political system stability.
2. The Political Authority (10)--Intelligence Authorities Nexus
The interaction between policy makers and intelligence structures has become a contemporary governmental sine qua non. On the one hand, policy makers commissioned to formulate public policies base their political approaches firstly, on information disseminated by intelligence structures, related to internal and international political evolutions, and secondly, on state enemies military strategies, or on possible security risks.
On the other hand, the information community perceives policy as a raison d'etre, by supplying the synthesis--analysis reports necessary to formulate efficient public policies. However, the interconditioning may take the form of side slips such as intelligence politization that refers to the fact that policy makers use secret information supplied by secret services or put pressure on intelligence structures in order to impose the dissemination of some biased information products meant to increase the credibility of the promoted public politics.
The meaning of the word "politization" is not ipso facto pejorative, but on the contrary, according to DEX, the meaning of the word "politization" refers to the act of "directing something in the political sense of the word, of giving to a situation a political character, of presenting something in relation with the political sphere." As far as the intelligence process is concerned, the pejorative connotation of this notion consists in making up or distorting the information that serves the interests of policy makers with a long-term negative consequence--that of decreasing the credibility of intelligence activity. Thus, the political "contamination" of the intelligence activity may take place from top to bottom, on the one hand (the top-down model according to which policy makers indicate the intelligence conclusions, as an overlapping between the information product and their interests) and from bottom to top, on the other hand (the bottom up model according to which, the information product is unconsciously biased by the analysts) or to put it differently, the "contamination" of the information product by the intelligence structure managers.
Two normative theories are subject to debate and controversy as regards good practices models that may constitute an integrant part of the relation between policy and intelligence. (11) The first approach formulated by Sherman Kent in his work Strategic Intelligence for American (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946) World Policy and which led to the formation of the post-war American community, focuses especially on the concept of "independent intelligence", while the second one, connected to the reforms set up by CIA manager, Robert M. Gates, in the mid 8th decade, focuses on the concept of "actionable intelligence".
Sherman Kent based his political approach on the fact that an efficient intelligence is an independent intelligence. Intelligence analysts should stay away from the public policies and policy makers so that they could prevent the information reports bias and "overlap" them with the governmental officials' own interests. According to the herein approach both intelligence managers and analysts are free to agree upon the information product format and to decide which of the information products can be delivered to their beneficiaries. Kent's theory creates a barrier against intelligence politicization by blocking the intrusion of the politics in the activity carried on by intelligence collectors and providers, which may lead to a dangerously restricted delimitation between those two spheres.
The so called actionable intelligence was created when, Robert Gates, as deputy manager of CIA, confronted with the providers' radical refusal to deliver information material the insistent demand of governmental officials. The main purpose of Gates' approach was that of increasing the efficiency of the information products' dissemination by making analysts aware of the policy makers' needs, respectively, of making intelligence managers become conscious of the fact that they are bound to assign analysts information tasks serving the target political "clients". De facto, intelligence beneficiaries can subtly corrupt the information product: policy intelligence delivery, according to policy makers' demand, shall be rewarded in the form of wage increase or professional advancement, while negative intelligence, in opposition with the policy makers' demands, can result into the analyst's "bureaucratic demise", becoming thus undesirable for governmental structures.
[section] Dilemmas Regarding the Cooperation Between Policy Makers and Intelligence Agencies
The relations between politics and intelligence spheres have been synthesized, taking the form of four major dilemmas formulated by Michael Handel. (12) Handel's approach originality consists in launching the debate not only in structural, but also in psychological terms. His ingenuity, his ability to take advice, his perseverance as regards long term political decisions represent essential features in determining his political relation with the intelligence:
1. A dogmatic leader will not respond to a disseminated information product that is incompatible with both his political targets and his previously formulated decisions. A too liberal leader shall change his political perspectives, becoming thus, unable to handle this leadership.
2. The relation between the policy maker and the intelligence consultants must always be placed at the border between approach and detachment. Getting too close may dangerously lead to a kind of identification with the leader's previous policies and decisions, the objectivity being dismissed. On the other hand, a too distant relation can result into a too independent relation between the leader and the counselor and consequently, may loose the contact with the intelligence community.
3. The intelligence product received by that leader whose only information source is a dominant consultant, may be highly biased. On the other hand, in case of a "multiple advocacy" situation, that of a great number of consultants, there is a plausible possibility to select that intelligence product in concordance with their preceding decisions.
4. Sometimes, leaders need direct access to gross information ("raw intelligence"), but if this tendency becomes frequent, the leader tends to become his own intelligence consultant.
The intelligence activities influence the decisions making process on two levels. Firstly, they provide information and an analysis-synthesis report in order for the leader to make a decision easier, at the same time analyzing the reaction of the political enemy. Secondly, the intelligence services can undermine the leader's authority subject to the critics as a follow up of the assessment of his actions. The leaders interested by the political survival on a short term and not on a long-term, shall neglect and condemn the critics of intelligence, focusing upon those consultants who are willing to draft unreliable information products, but favorable to the policy makers.
Also, the majority of political or military leaders tend to favor the primary intelligence dissemination to the prejudice of the action recommendations drafted by the intelligence services that could limit their decision possibilities.
[section] Politicization of Intelligence and the Paradigm of the State Reason
The contribution of Michael Handel is also decisive for studying the politicization of intelligence processes. Thus, the degree of intelligence interference with political imperatives is an element allowing for the information to be considered or rejected. The weaker the interference is, the more the classified information remains alien to any partisan contingency, maintaining the appearance of an information or knowledge close to the reality to which it reports.
The politicization's debate distinguishes the partisans of a professional approach--meaning those that understand the necessity to maintain the politics and politicization faraway from intelligence--from the adherents to a realistic approach. (13) According to Handel, even if the political pressures on the analysts or on the policy makers' entourage, whose objective is reorientation or deviation of information, definitely blurs its quality, is thus necessary for the policy maker's entourage to transmit the information to him. At this stage, the analysts must convince politicians, members of his entourage, to place the intelligence product information on the political agenda, at the decider's disposal. Finally, after the decision making, the information continues to be used politically--at the level of the internal and external politics--as a last clue of the politics--intelligence interdependence. Defined as "the volatile distortion of the intelligence analysis for the purpose of fulfilling the requests of the policy makers or of the information structures' board directors", the politicization of the intelligence can either take the form of direct pressures performed by the governmental officials directed toward the amending of the information reports contents or the suppression or ignoring the information products non-compliant with desired variant of the policy makers. It also can take the form of a preferential selection from a array of intelligence products of the desired variant, or the manifestation of the reserve vis-a-vis of an intelligence product related to both sides--both the governmental officials and the information (14) ones.
Last, but not least, the maximal dimension of the intelligence politicization refers to invoking the "state reason" and the "national security" argument. The "state reason" concept, similar to the "national sovereignty" doctrine is involved in a divergence relation with the democracy and the political contemporary sphere.
3. The politics (15)-intelligence Dichotomy: formal and informal relations
Formally, the relation between the information services, as intelligence providers and political authority, as beneficiary or consumer of the intelligence product, is a subordination of the former ones in relation to the second. The intelligence providers are the officers and agents involved in the collection, analysis and dissemination of information, the result of their activity being materialized into the intelligence products (16).
On the other hand, the intelligence consumers include policy makers, their consultants from the departments or agencies dedicated to the implementation of the security policy, fundamenting its principles on the information products disseminated by the intelligence structures. This category of intelligence providers includes "the collectors" and "the analysts". The collectors are compound structures of the intelligence community whose activity is directed by the analysts by developing complex sets of "norms related to information collection" (collection requirements). (17) The mission of the analysts is to formulate--on the grounds of a cognitive and empiric activity--the information product toward the beneficiaries' dissemination.
The debate of the relation between the political authorities (the beneficiaries of the information product) and the intelligence authorities (providers of the information product) is often described as related to the non-compliance of the two spheres, motivating the discrepancy between the political culture and the information culture on which its functioning is based. Thus, the perspective of the politics over the situations can be dominated by political interest matters on short, not benefiting from the existing information products.
The interest of policy makers for intelligence is reflected in all of the three stages of an event development: in the beginning, if they have anticipated the configuration of an event, they could be interested in understanding its implications and signification of the manifestation form; the interest is debated along with making a decision, wanting to find the existing alternatives; finally, the policy makers become interested in the information product after they have agreed upon acting, valorizing especially the information confirming their strategies and being open including to distort the analyses in order to sustain their decisions.
The informal relations between the political authority (beneficiary) and the intelligence authorities (provider) have generated the theory of "deviated intelligence services" with praetorian and politicized characteristics. From this point of view, the information structures tend to behave as autonomous political subjects, not just by doubling but even acting, sometimes, against the political authority.
The tendency toward political autonomization of intelligence structures has as a catalyst "the non-democratic ontological characteristic of intelligence", as Alessandro Pizzorno describes the manifestations of "Cesar's power nucleus": "and in a pluralist regime there is a decisional sphere where the imperial systems equilibriums are being decided". These decisions have a secret and an absolutist character generating a dualist power structure represented by the conflict between a Cesar's level and a polyarchic pluralist one". (18)
Under the pressure of frustration generated by devaluation of disseminated intelligence products toward the policy makers conditioned by electoral goals and by the overcharged internal political agenda, the leaders of intelligence community can manifest the tendency of self perception as the genuine representatives of national interests in counterpart with the litigious decisions of political leaders.
4. The Dual State
The tendency of identifying as direct and authentic representation of the nation, doubled by the indignation toward the political authority, prevalence of orientation toward the long-term temporal horizon and toward the international politics field rather than to the internal politics, respectively by the praetorian tendencies, certifies the approach of intelligence structures formulated from the perspective of the Bonapartist Model (19).
In Italy, the expansion of the intelligence authorities' intervention into the political sphere generated the phenomenon that political literature has defined as "Dual State" ("il Doppio Stato") or "Parallel State" (20) ("lo Stato parallelo") meaning "a pathology of the de-facto Constitution, (21) by which within the State itself a network of subjects performing criminal actions is built" (22). According to the Final Report of the Commissione Stragi, those criminal elements have found fertile ground within the Italian State due to the deviant behavior of certain sectors within the secret services. After 13 years of activity, in March 2001, the Parliamentary Commission on Italian Terrorism concluded its inquiries by making public records and archives consisting in over 1.5 million documents confirming the duality of the Italian Republic. As chairman of the Commission, Senator Giovanni Pellegrino stated that this duality described specific operating modes of entire sectors of the state administration, mainly the security sectors (such as Police, Carabinieri, Armed Forces, intelligence agencies) that operated at two parallel levels, a constitutional one and a covert one lacking any judicial or parliamentary accountability. (23)
Accordingly, in order to have a Parallel State, two pre-requisites should be satisfied: a) the clandestine network has to be both deeply and widely spread within the state institutions; and b) the covert agent must belong to the current system of power, not to an alternative one in opposition to it. Thereby, as defined by Paolo Cucchiarelli and Aldo Giannulli, "a dual state exists when a part of the constitutional elite, in order to preserve the current system [of power], forms a hidden power, with a principle of legitimation of its own--outside and in contra-position to that of the formal constitution--in order to permanently condition the political system through illegal methods, without going so far as to subvert the formal one, which partly maintains its efficacy". (24)
Proof of the existence of a Dual State in Italy has been collected by various Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry into specific events, and documented in the findings of magistrates' investigations into specific events, and articles written by journalists uncovering classified material.
Post-war Italy has undergone bombings, attempted coups d'etat and other illegal attempts at taking over state institutions: the Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan in 1969, in which 12 people were killed, the Borghese coup d'etat in 1971; the Italicus train massacre, the Piazza della Loggia massacre in Brescia, the Rosa dei Venti coup in 1973, the Sogno "white" coup in 1974, the deadliest terror attack in Italian history--the Bologna station massacre in August 1980, the execution of banker Roberto Calvi, head of the largest Italian private bank--Banco Ambrosiano--on June 17, 1982, but also the more recent assassinations of Massimo D'Antona (in 1999) and Marco Biagi (2002) both academics and government economic consultants.
During this "Strategy of tension", the Parallel State made extensive use of manipulation of right-wing terrorism and of left-wing terrorism (especially the Red Brigades), (25) acting with support from General Giovanni De Lorenzo, (26) head of Servizio informazioni forze armate (SIFAR) and under the National Security Council Directive 1/3 dated 8 March 1948 (entitled "Position of the USA towards Italy in light of participation of the Communists in government by legal means") and National Security Council Directive 10/2 dated 18 June 194827 that authorized the CIA to handle covert operations as a measure designed to prevent the Communist Parties PCI and the PSI from winning participation in the government which would jeopardize US interests in the Mediterranean area. The power structure of the Parallel State had to be cleared by the CIA; according the Minority Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Events of June-July 1964 (Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sugli eventi del giugno-luglio 1964), an official security clearance, called "Security clearance of loyalty to NATO" was indispensable in order not only to become a Minister, but even a senior public servant or a scientist working in State scientific research centres. These security clearances were the duty of a special office under the authority of the Defence Chief of Staff, called Ufficio Sicurezza del Patto Atlantico (USPA), Atlantic Pact Security Office. (28)
5. Arcana imperii. Arcana dominationis. Arcana seditionis
In his article, "La democrazia e il potere invisibile", (29) the Italian political thinker Norberto Bobbio refers to the "crypto-government" (criptogoverno) as to an ensemble of actions conducted by subversive and unaccountable political forces along with the intelligence agencies. In The Future of Democracy, he also distinguishes between visible and invisible government, the latter considered one of the biggest threats to the correct functioning of democratic institutions: the larger the space occupied by invisible government, the smaller the space available to open and democratic institutions and vice versa. (30)
According to Bobbio, the degeneration of the Italian democratic system began with the 1969 massacre of Piazza Fontana when an Arcanum unexpectedly and violently entered in the collective life of the Italians, and was followed by other no less violent and obscure incidents. The Arcanum mentioned by Bobbio refers to the 1605 Arnold Clapmar's work De Arcanis rerum publicarum that distinguishes the arcana Imperii (methods aimed at preserving the existing form of State) from the arcana dominationis (methods aimed at maintaining in power those who were ruling at the time).
In Italy, the invisible powers (potere occulto)--the arcana Imperii and arcana seditionis--were aiming at undermining the democratic setting (il governo del potere pubblico in pubblico), making way to autocracy and making from secrecy the rule that in democracy is an exception. Moreover, Norberto Bobbio argues that one can write the history of the arcana seditionis along with the history of the arcana dominationis since "invisible power and invisible counter-rule/resistance are two sides of the same coin". (31)
The notion of "arcana imperii" as principle of the secrecy of authorities'operations, replaced in modern democratic societies by the system of classified data protection--articulated above by Norberto Bobbio --was previously debated by Hannah Arendt in her essay, "Lying in Politics. Reflection on the Pentagon Papers"--the first essay of the Crises of the Republic--to describe how secrecy and deception, the deliberate falsehood and the outright lie used as legitimate means to achieve political ends, have been with us since the beginning of recorded history. Arendt is particularly concerned on how lying became a professional obligation as a result of a political system where popular sovereignity no longer has the right of disclosure. Attention is also drawn to the existence of a professional government apparatus (the intelligence community) frequently employed for truth distortion, for concealment, falsehood and deception. Accordingly, the lies of politicians and the state could lead to a loss of legitimacy, which usually leads to civil disobedience by the informed and engaged citizens which leads to either capitulation by the state and its agents or to a violent response and possibly revolution.
1. Bobbio, Norberto (1987), The Future of Democracy, Oxford: Polity Press
2. Born, Hans; Caparini, Marina (2007), Democratic control of intelligence services: containing rogue elephants, UK: Ashgate
3. Cipriani, Gianni (2002), Lo Stato invisibile. Storia dello spionaggio in Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi, Milano: Sperling&Kupfer Editori
4. Cucchiarelli, P., Giannulli, A. (1997), Lo Stato parallelo. L'Italia "oscura" nei documenti e nelle relazioni della Commissione Stragi, Roma: Gamberetti
5. Della Porta, Donatella, Vannucci, Alberto (1999), Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
6. Forcade, Olivier; Laurent, Sebastien (2008), Serviciile secrete. Puterea si informatia secreta in lumea moderna, Bucuresti: Cartier
7. George, Roger Z.; Bruce, James B. (2008), Analyzing intelligence: origins, obstacles, and innovations, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.
8. Giannuli, Aldo (2009), Come funzionano i servizi segreti, Milano: Ponte ale Grazie.
9. Handel, Michael I. (1989), Leaders and Intelligence, London: Frank Kass.
10. Hastings, Michel (2000), Abordarea stiintei politice, Iasi: Institutul European.
11. Johnson, Loch K.(2007), Strategic intelligence, US: Praeger Security.
12. Leary, William (1984), The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press.
13. Pasquino, Gianfranco (2002), Curs de Stiinta politica, Iasi: Institutul European.
Studies in periodicals
14. Bobbio, Norberto (1980), "La democrazia e il potere invisibile", in Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, Vol.10, no.2, pp. 181-204
15. Dossi, Rosella (2001), "Italy's Invisible Government", in CERC Working Papers Series, no.1, pp. 1-50
16. Katz, Richard, Mair, Peter (1995), "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party", in Party Politics, vol.1, no.1, pp. 5 -28
17. Morrone, Andreea (2009), Il nomos del segreto di Stato, tra politica e Costituzione [http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/docume nti_forum/paper/0164_morrone.pdf], 04.06.2010
(1) ***, Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight. A Practitioner's View, Geneva: Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCAF, 2003, pp. 6-7.
(2) Fred Schreier, "The Need for Efficient and Legitimate Intelligence", in Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Democratic control of intelligence services: containing rogue elephants, UK: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 27-28
(3) Is the case of the former CIA manager, George Bush, who became the president of the US, of the former KGB agent, Vladimir Putin who became president of Russian Federation or the case of Boyko Borisov, former security officer and bodyguard of the dictator Zhivko, appointed as prime minister of Bulgaria.
(4) Aldo Giannuli, Commefunzionano I servizi segreti, Milano: Ponte ale Grazie, 2009, pp. 18-20
(5) According to the restricted meaning given by two American legislative projects, "Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act" and "Political Intelligence Disclosure Act", the political intelligence activity refers to the confidential governmental or legislative information collection delivered by important decision makers with the view to obtain personal benefits by providing the financial market with such type of information. In its large sense, political intelligence refers to the political marketing instrument based on the collection of information from open sources in order to reach the aimed election target or in order to enrich their image capital.
(6) Eldersveld has termed "stratarchy" as "hierarchical pattern of stratified devolution of responsibility for the settlement of conflict". The general characteristics of stratarchy are the proliferation of the ruling group and the diffusion of power prerogatives and power exercise. Rather than centralized "unity of command" or a general dilution of power throughout the structure, "strata commands" exist which operate with a varying but considerable degree of independence." (Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).
(7) The stratarchy concept is also used by Katz and Mair in their study of party organization: In their cartel model of party organization, they claim that party organizations are becoming increasingly stratarchical, as opposed to hierarchical. Local elites are granted more autonomy vis a vis the central party, as both levels consider the situation mutually advantageous. Local office-holders and elites intervene little in national politics, while the central party gives them a large degree of autonomy in local politics. Political parties are also likely to adopt a stratarchical form of organization because parties are increasingly close to and dependent on the state for their resources. The cartel parties also are likely to adopt a stratarchical form of organization mainly because they increase their ability to react strategically to electoral demands. For further reading on this topic, refer to Richard Katz, Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party", in Party Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 1995, pp. 5 -28.
(8) Maurice Duverger apud Gianfranco Pasquino, Curs de stiinta politca, Iafi: Instituted European, 2002, p. 156.
(9) Donatella della Porta, Alberto Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1999, pp. 117--120.
(10) The discrimination of the notion "political power" in favor of "political authority" is explained by Weber in his definition regarding the relation between power and authority, in terms of political authority regarded as lawful authority. According to Max Weber, the power can be identified as a lawful authority if it can be associated with one of the three ideal types: traditional, charismatic and rational-legal. Consequently, the political party refers to the ability of making and enforcing compulsory decisions while, the authority is entitled to lead after having obtained the electoral approval.
(11) James Witz, "The Intelligence Policy Nexus" in Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence, US: Praeger Security, 2007, pp. 140-146.
(12) Michael I. Handel, Leaders and Intelligence, London: Frank Kass, 1989, pp. 5-7.
(13) Olivier Forcade, Sebastien Laurent, Serviciile secrete. Puterea si informatia secreta in lumea moderna, Bucurecti: Cartier, 2008, p. 59.
(14) Originally, the politicization's forms had the following names: direct pressure, house line, cherry picking, shared mindset. Gregory Treverton, "Intelligence Analysis: Between Politicization and Irrelevance", in Roger Z.George, James B. Bruce, Analyzing intelligence: origins, obstacles, and innovations, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008, pp. 93-94.
(15) The term "politics" is one of the essentially contested concepts, being equivoque, ambiguous and polysemic. The polysemy refers to the tridimensionality of politics: polity (institutionalized dimension meaning political system), politics (procedural dimension meaning political process), policy (normative dimension meaning "public politics"). Michel Hastings, Abordarea stiintei politice, Iasi: Institutul European, 2000, pp. 4-5.
(16) Mats Bjore, manager of Infosphere AB, at the opening of the Reinventing Open Source Intelligence. A catalyst for change and sharing presented at Bernadotte Academy Stockholm, in 2007, named three levels of analysis: a passive one, corresponding the DATA, a present one corresponding the INFORMATION. As the analysis directs from the data collection toward the intelligence level, the information volume decreases by filtering and synthesizing the collected information. Important to mention that, the existing hidden data become information as requested or contextualized, standardized, synthesized, compared, calculated.
(17) Roger Z. George, James B. Bruce, Analyzing intelligence: origins, obstacles, and innovations, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008, p. 309.
(18) Alessandro Pizzorno, apud Aldo Gianulli, Come funzionano i servizi segreti, Milano: Ponte ale Grazie, 2009, p. 326.
(19) The "Bonapartist Intelligence Model" refers to the expansion of the intelligence authorities' intervention into the political sphere performed in general by means of information manipulation and the practice of pressures and intimidations on the politics.
(20) Coined by the American historian Robert Paxton, the term "Parallel State" was first used in the Italian Parliament in 1991 by MP Colajanni during the hearings of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on Terrorism in Italy and on the non-Detection of those Responsible for the Massacres ("La Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi" better known as "Commissione Stragi")
(21) The Parallel State justifies its existence within the sphere of the de-facto constitution (costituzione materiale), since a formal constitution (costituzione formale) could not justify two different legal systems with contrasting ends.
(22) P. Cucchiarelli, A. Giannulli, Lo Stato parallelo. L'Italia "oscura" nei documenti e nelle relazioni della Commissione Stragi, Roma: Gamberetti, 1997, p. 223.
(23) Gianni Cipriani, Lo Stato invisibile. Storia dello spionaggio in Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi, Milano: Sperling&Kupfer Editori, 2002, p. XXXI.
(24) P. Cucchiarelli, A. Giannulli, Op.cit, p. 18.
(25) Italian Prime Minister at the time, the Christian Democrat Aldo Moro was convinced that political stability could be achieved only by seconding into government the second largest party in the country, the PCI. This conviction cost him his life. He was kidnapped by the Red Brigades on March 16, 1978 and killed 54 days later. It has come to light relatively recently that the Red Brigades were infiltrated and manipulated by the secret services, the Moro killing operation being conducted by intelligence officer Lt. Col. Renzo Rocca, head of the economic division of SIFAR, the Italian Military Intelligence Service.
(26) General Giovanni De Lorenzo engineered a coup d'etat to be carried out in conjunction with the army and the special police branch of the Carabinieri. The coup was prepared for the summer of 1964, but never implemented. It came to the public domain in 1967, when two investigative journalists, Lino Jannuzzi and Eugenio Scalfari, published a series of articles in the newspaper Espresso.
(27) William L. Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1984, pp. 131-133
(28) For further reading on the subject, refer to Rosella Dossi, "Italy's Invisible Government", in CERC Working Papers Series, no.1/2001, pp. 21-33.
(29) Norberto Bobbio, "La democrazia e il potere invisibile", in Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, Vol.10, no.2, 1980, pp. 181--204.
(30) Norberto Bobbio, The Future of Democracy, Oxford: Polity Press, 1987, pp. 79-97.
(31) Norberto Bobbio apud Andreea Morrone, Il nomos del segreto di Stato, tra politica e Costituzione, 2009, [http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/ stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0164_morrone.pdf], 04.06.2010.
Claudia Cristescu, Teaching assistant, Department of Political Science, West University of Timifoara; PhD Candidate, National Defence University "Carol I" Bucharest; E-mail: email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org
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