The phenomenon of shifting frontiers: the Kenya-Somalia case in the Horn of Africa, 1880s-1970s.
While this essay is concerned principally with the Kenya-Somali area, it is not a region in isolation from the rest of the Horn, and incursions from Ethiopia and elsewhere have affected its destiny. Obviously, the Kenya-Somalia border problem is not intelligible without an understanding of the historical background which laid the foundations of the contemporary conflict.(2) Trans-frontier movements of nomadic peoples, and more recently of Somali, and the formulation of administrative policies during the colonial period (1895-1960) in relation to such movements as well as attitudes to northern frontiers in general, and to the Kenyan Northern Frontier Province in particular, had implications for the later Somali perception of themselves in relations to other peoples in the same region. While these movements were accompanied by the phenomenon of shifting frontiers, they predate the formulation of official policy(3) towards such movements of nomadic peoples. Both aspects are important for a clear understanding of their implications for international frontiers in the colonial period and thereafter, and in terms of the evolution of the Kenya-Somalia border (actually, territorial) problem.
Frontiers in Gestation
The policies resulting from European ascendancy in the region of Northeastern Africa towards the end of the 19th century were unfolded in the opening years of the 20th century. The territories in the Horn of Africa constitute one geographically contiguous region, despite the rise and fall of various hegemonies and states in the pre-European period spanning several centuries, with Ethiopia emerging as the dominant African, if expansionist, power, from the mid-19th century. Flanked by the Mahdist State of the Sudan in the west and Egypt in the north, there were no other hegemonies of any significance in the region in that period, apart from the domains further south, of the Sultan of Zanzibar (also expansionist) which consisted mainly of city states on the coast of Eastern Africa but with the focal point of authority on Zanzibar Island. The orientation of this paper is, however, directed towards the Northern Frontier Province (later Northern Frontier District) of the British East Africa Protectorate redesignated Kenya(4) in 1920. But its overlapping of other territories such as the northeastern frontier of Uganda and the southeastern part of the Sudan and the southern part of Ethiopia makes for continuity in the movements of peoples and cannot be ignored in the reconstruction of this historical period of shifting frontiers.
During the centuries in which there persisted numerous struggles for hegemony in the Horn, Kenya did not escape unscathed. Its modern frontiers with Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland (modern Somalia) had begun to take shape from the Anglo-Italian Protocol of 1891.(5) There were two other Protocols(6) in 1894 which reinforced that of 1891 and they have been largely responsible for definition of the Kenya-Somalia border with a series of adjustments(7) until the emergence of both countries as sovereign states in the early 1960s. The first attempt of 1891 to give concrete form to the Kenya-Somalia border was simply an attempt to separate the British from the Italian spheres of influence. In a period in which Europeans were rushing to acquire spheres of influence and to legitimize them before other European contenders and, notably, to the signatories of the Berlin act of 1885, this endeavor at acquisition, delimitation, if not demarcation, while "effective occupation" was still far from being realized, became quite persistent. A whole series of treaty arrangements between European powers themselves and between these powers and African Kings and potentates(8) all helped to reshape the region and crisscross them with new frontiers. It is these successive frontier deliminations which crystallized the existing boundaries of the nascent African states such as Kenya and Somalia. For the original line of separation between the British and Italian spheres, the Protocol of 1891 had stipulated that:
The line of demarcation of Eastern Africa between the spheres of influence
respectively reserved to Great Britain and Italy shall follow from the sea
the mid-channel (thalweg) of the River Juba up to latitude 6[degrees] north
Kismayu with its territory on the right bank of the river thus remaining to
While many of these treaties which shaped the zone, in particular, and other parts of Africa, in general are matters for controversy and critical comment, they were in fact, part of the instruments employed by the European imperial powers to validate their claims to territory in the continent and in this particular region. They had also been inherited by the nascent states and contributed to their respective perceptions of border problems as this will become apparent presently.
The Juba River, as the original line of demarcation between their respective spheres, was also one of the ethnic divisions since, at the time of delimination, Somali lived on both sides of the river and trans-Juba movements continued undisturbed. But the Somali population west of the Juba, in Jubaland, was negligible by comparison with those living on the eastern side of the river. Persistent movements, however, swelled their numbers which increasingly encroached on already settled clans and communities.(10) These incursions, in turn, generated acute conflicts between the new arrivals and their predecessors and were soon to compel interventionist measures by the British administration to contain or eliminate inter-communal conflicts. This was a period pregnant with inter-communal strife among the Somali themselves and between Somali groups and their previous pro-Somali patrons. It saw the intensification of the Somali-Boran (Galla) struggles for control of land and resources; struggles which had predated the European arrival in the Horn by several centuries. The creation by the British administration in Kenya of an artificial Somali-Boran line to separate both warring factions emphasized the antagonisms of both groups in the early years of colonial administration in the region of the Northern Frontier Province. But Somali, said to be confined east of this line, persisted in their encroachment west of the line in the area exclusively earmarked for the Boran. These encroachments brought in their train numerous conflicts, which have persisted to this day although with less intensity.
Not until 1914 was another attempt made to give concrete effect to the border when, by proclamation, the administrative limits of Jubaland were fixed. This was followed by the post-war Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1924, which resulted in the transfer of Jubaland from Kenyan to Italian juristiction in 1925.(11) But from the time the British government assumed responsibility of the East African Protectorate from the Imperial British East Africa Company (hereafter IBEAC) in 1895, it was faced with the task of setting up viable administration and formulating policy for the entire area in general and the northern frontier in particular. Since this task predated actual efforts at demarcating the respective spheres of British and Italian influence, it is to the former that we must now turn to make sense of this checkered and complicated history.
British Policy and Two Northern Frontiers in Retrospect
British government takeover of both Kenya and Uganda occurred almost simultaneously(12) in both cases for which areas of minimal administration were their northern frontiers. The first attempt to establish a rudimentary administration in the Northern Frontier Province of the British East Africa Protectorate (later the NFD of Kenya) was made in 1909. Between 1895 and 1909, as has been mentioned above, the concentration of Somali was on the eastern part of the Juba River although the flow into the western part became increasingly insistent. The de facto borders then were those separating the British sphere in Eastern Africa from the Italian, and the British and Italian spheres from the Ethiopian. In the light of difficulties, which the British experienced in parts of Somaliland during the years 1898-1920, due to the not infrequent distractions of Muhammad Abdille Hassan (the "Mad Mullah" of British Historical records), British policy in the entire region, and, principally, in British Somaliland, wavered from complete or partial withdrawal to coastal concentration or total occupation of the interior with all that it entailed in terms of loss of lives and financial resources, between less administration and more administration.(13) These divergent viewpoints had their respective advocates in the Colonial and Foreign Offices. The affairs of British and Italian Somaliland had their bearing on those of the British East Africa Protectorate and were reflected in the policies fostered in the northern frontier area, where the Somali population continued to grow by leaps and bounds. Although the total evacuation of the entire protectorate had been considered by the British government, withdrawal to the coast, in 1910, was the compromise. But further engagements with the Mullah's Dervish forces and the disastrous confrontations at Dul Madoba (1913) led to the British decision to reoccupy the interior of Somaliland. Between 1914 and 1918 when the reoccupation occurred, the issue preoccupied official thinking and defied solution.
That period coincided with the First World War and Menelik's death (1913) further complicated the situation with the installation in Ethiopia of the Emperor Lej Iyasu. The latter's Muslim proclivities led him to send emissaries to the Mullah and to attempt contacts with the Germans and the Turks, and consequently, aroused British anxieties. The deposition of Lej Iyasu and the civil war which followed still left the situation uncertain but the installation of Menelik's daughter, Zauditu, as Empress, with Ras Tafari Makonen as Regent, (the later Emperor, Haile Selassie I) received British approval and support(14) and undermined any moves the Mullah might have made to secure Ethiopian support from his exploits against the "infidels" -- the British (and possibly the Italians).
Thus, once the British government had decided on the reoccupation of the interior, their local administrators found themselves increasingly involved in the feuding and many conflicts of the nomadic peoples of the interior and, not the least of which were the Somali. Sometimes, their functions were to keep the peace by mediating among warring peoples ("tribes" or micro-nations) and at other times they had to punish the guilty. Sometimes, the offenders fled into neighboring territories, thus generating possibilities of increased international conflicts between the four powers in the region: Britain, Italy, France and Ethiopia. Nomadic peoples fleeing from Ethiopian tax collectors,(15) or punitive forces sometimes mounted armed incursions into the northern provinces of the Uganda Protectorate and the British East Africa Protectorate (Kenya). They were frequently pursued by official and unofficial Ethiopians -- in the forms of military forces, hunters or plains raiders -- who themselves were making incursions into the already volatile British and Italian spheres of influence in the Horn. Evidence suggests that the incursions were more persistent from the Ethiopian north into the British south in both Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate, a phenomenon which persisted from the 1920s into the post-colonial period.(16)
As a result, from the late 19th century, there began to emerge that peculiar phenomenon, which came to be known as "British protected tribes." But the remoteness of these northern territories made them, for administrative purposes, what Professor James Barber had described as "one man stations,"(17) supported by a handful of policemen. These very often had to contend with hostile communities and, often, had to avoid their antagonism and opposition. This fact hardly made administration easy. There was also the extra burden of the infiltration of arms. Attempts to suppress the arms traffic, which filtered down through Ethiopia, into the British Protectorate and the Sudan, remained a nagging preoccupation of the authorities in these territories, even after 1918. Another problem was that of disarming border peoples. These points in the period between 1911 and 1921 have been so carefully discussed and analyzed in James Barber's useful book (The Imperial Frontier) that they need not detain us here. But Barber also highlighted the nature, complexity and frequency of border conflicts resulting from European attempts at delimiting and even actual demarcation of their respective spheres of influence which the communities refused or failed to countenance.(18) Owing to this attitude of mind and often due to sheer necessity there was, with reference to the Suk, "a shifting, indefinite boundary, crossed by raiding parties from either side, but the general movement was always in favor of the numerically stronger Suk."(19) This interesting observation could be generalized for the entire region of the Horn of Africa and beyond and for territories which are geographically contiguous, as power was the final arbiter in maintaining temporary peace.
While conflicts ensued among the communities, the administrators were to discover, as Barber rightly pointed out, that "it was impossible to distinguish the tribal dispute from the boundary dispute, but that there was considerable confusion about administrative responsibilities."(20) The essential point that the "Suk could not be contained merely by declaring a boundary,"(21) applied equally to the nomadic people (and tendencies) in the two northern frontiers and elsewhere in the region and beyond and was productive of much confusion among those deputed to administer frontiers in the entire region.
Not only were there immense difficulties to northern expansion but the maintenance of what had been acquired remained problematic. The official viewpoint was that these difficulties inhibited the infusion of capital for the purpose of development due to the high risks involved in an uncertain atmosphere and environment. The policies evolved depended on the kind of appraisal made of the northern regions in the British East Africa Protectorate. Thus, Sir Charles Elliot, Commissioner for the Protectorate (1901-1905), was ambivalent about extending the frontier. He saw no purpose in expansion for its own sake and especially one that was financially extravagant and fraught with dangers. But he was in favor of it, if it showed signs of substantial revenue or returns, and if he felt there were no dangers in doing so. In a communication with Lord Landsdowne he had said:
I am penetrated with the conviction that it is useless to spend lives and
money in subduing the barbarous inhabitants of barren deserts and that
punitive expeditions are a mistake.(22)
But he believed punitive expeditions were "absolutely necessary to protect the borders of quasi-civilized areas, otherwise those areas will contract and the general movement of the Protectorate be retrogressive."(23) For an observation of this seemingly negative attitude to the region, the observations of an American writer, Negley Farson, in 1949, seem pertinent. Observing the NFD within the Kenyan colony as the "most uninhabitable part of the colony,"(24) he went on to say that neither the British, when they first began to establish their domain in Kenya nor the Ethiopian Emperor, Menelik, in his collaboration with the powers in the scramble for Africa, desired "this desert waste with its turbulent peoples;" but it was an American naturalist, Donaldson-Smith, who "with astounding prescience," saw the strategic importance of this territory and warned the British that they should seize it.(25)
The northern border continued to be ignored until the arrival of Sir Percy Girouard as Governor of the British East Africa Protectorate. As an expansionist he approved, in 1909, the establishment of a post at Moyale (Fort Harrington) and at Marsabit.(26) More posts were then erected in the east and west of these stations. From that moment, effort was directed towards the defense of the NFP of British East Africa. West of this, in Uganda, no effort at protecting the Northeastern Frontier was made. This territory, from the late 19th century into the 20th, remained an area of persistent incursions by Ethiopians and Sudanese, who would embrace a wide variety of people (including nomadic Somali) some of whom were traders, while others were raiders. Even in 1915, the northern regions of the two protectorates had not been determined. The Turkana in the far north nearer the Ethiopian and Sudanese borders, who had proved intractable and warlike, compelling the unleashing of periodic punitive expeditions against them, found themselves handed to the administration of the East Africa Protectorate, while the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan extended its boundary southward to embrace the Didinga and other mountain peoples then in northern Uganda.(27) But the Turkana region remained unpacified by the British and incursions by Ethiopians could not be arrested. British military operations in Turkana country in 1918 gave them the territory without the administrative details of the area settled. In 1919 the Turkana were described in a minute as "a perfect nuisance to the East Africa Protectorate"(28) and there was a willingness of the British East Africa Protectorate to hand over the entire Turkana and Suk areas to Uganda, provided the Uganda administration would undertake effective administration. But the British administration in Uganda manifested little interest in that kind of administration. The British East Africa Protectorate officials felt that they had quite enough on their hands in their own Northern Frontier and in Jubaland and attempts to administer the Turkana and Suk areas had merely increased their financial burdens.(29)
Both Governors Edward Northey (of the East Africa Protectorate) and Robert Corynden (of Uganda) recognized the unsatisfactory nature of the existing boundary between their respective territories and saw the necessity for a new one with administrative responsibilities defined.(30) The responsibility for the administration of the Turkana and Suk devolved on the East Africa Protectorate while Uganda, initially, agreed to pay for the upkeep of half a company of troops in Turkana, an undertaking from which it soon reneged.(31) Their provisional boundary line was at the foot of the escarpment between Turkana and Karamoja Districts. In an attempt to settle the boundary between the Suk and Karamojong,(32) the provisional line (which was never implemented) placed a large part of what is now southern Karamoja District in the British East Africa Protectorate, with the boundary line cutting across Mount Kadam and Mount Moroto.(33) But these agreements were only confirmed by Order in Council in 1926, although from 1919, the Turkana and Suk had, for all intents and purposes, become wards of the British East Africa Protectorate, while Karamoja District "tribes" were left to Uganda. Further adjustments put the inter-protectorate boundary point at Turkwell as the Karasuk, the Suk territory west of Turkwell, fell to the Ugandan administration. The implication was that Uganda accepted responsibility for what was in essence British East African territory. Yet the Turkana area was regarded as worthless, although for the British East Africa Protectorate it constituted an area for restraining border incidents. Thus, Uganda shed its responsibilities to the British East Africa Protectorate. But the policy of using the Northern Frontier Province of the British East Africa Protectorate as a buffer against Ethiopian-Somali incursionists into the British East Africa Protectorate and its White Highlands seemed consistent with the policy expressed by Sir Geoffrey Archer, Governor of Uganda at the time, having himself served in the Northern Frontier Provinces of both the East Africa Protectorate and Uganda and even as governor of Somaliland. He observed that:
There is only one way to treat these Northern Territories, the home of
nomadic camel, cattle and sheep owning people, and that is to give them
what protection we can undertake, the British flag and, otherwise, to leave
them to their own customs, as far as possible, and under their own chiefs.
Anything else is certainly uneconomic and if we attempt to go too fast, there
will be trouble in store for us and no advantage whatever that I can see to
the local inhabitants. I think it necessary to record not only this view but
what is my considered opinion and therefore an instruction -- because of
recent beating to death of a Karamojong Chief attempting to carry out our
The consequences of such a policy statement, which permeated official attitudes on the spot, were that the northern provinces in the Horn, whether in Somaliland, Uganda or the East Africa Protectorate (Kenya), during the succeeding decades, remained areas of neglect in which the status quo prevailed. These were treated like "absentee" territories. The absentee nature of the area of the NFD of Kenya in administrative thought and policy, although periodic upheavals did not allow for endles complacency, had prompted the statement of Negley Farson that:
There is ONE-HALF of Kenya about which the other half knows nothing, and
seems to care even less. This is the N.F.D., Kenya's Northern Frontier
District. It is about 100,000 square miles, mostly volcanic desert, supposed
to contain about 100,000 people, for they cannot be counted even for poll
tax, pagan cattle-owning Boran, and nomadic Somalis always on trek with their
camels, lying between Lake Rudolph and the frontier of Italian Somaliland
and north to south, from the green foothills of Abyssinia to the banks of
the elephant invested Tana River.(35)
Despite the administration's official policy of allowing the pastoral people to "develop at their own pace," as observed by Professor James Barber with respect to Uganda, and despite its necessity to maintain "peace and order" through minimal expenditure and allowing the problem to resolve itself with the passage of time and the arrival of more favorable times, yet Barber's observation that while this proclaimed principle might seem logical, it was nonetheless, a logic "founded upon false premises, the premises that the pastoral tribes could be kept apart indefinitely from the remainder of the Protectorate;"(36) with all that could result there from, was apt. It was an observation that could be aptly applied and generalized for the minimal British administration; the NFP, like its counterpart in Uganda, and elsewhere, remained an "Imperial Frontier," with its potential for generating conflict.
Shifting Human Frontiers
The more recent history of the entire region is one of persistent incursions and the conflicts generated by those incursions. Often, the incursions were made by raiders from Ethiopia using the Kenya/Ethiopia border of the northern frontier district of Kenya rather than the Kenya/Somali border of the former NFD. This evoked protests from the settler-government of Kenya.(37) These often unofficial raids across the borders frequently generated feverish diplomatic activity and counter-defensive measures. For example, in early December 1923, a considerable force of Ethiopian levies was reported to be moving southwards towards Moyale (NFD). It compelled the Kenyan authorities to strengthen their defenses on the northern frontier. Prior to that there had been much unrest in the northern frontier for upwards of three years and this was due to differences regarding the frontier line.(38) This Kenya-Ethiopian frontier, affecting administration in the Northern Frontier District, has always been in dispute from the ascendancy of European imperialism in the region. As far back as 1921 a correspondent of the Times(39) could write that:
Both in its geographical situation and in its history this frontier [the
Northern Frontier] is unfortunate. Between the fertile highlands of Kenya
and those of Southern Abyssinia [Ethiopia] is a comparatively low-lying
strip of barren land. Part of this strip is occupied by a waterless waste
strewn with lava debris impassable to wheeled transport and difficult of
transit even for pack camels... When the need first arose for defining a
frontier between the Colony [Kenya] and Abyssinia [Ethiopia], the line
demarcated was designated to avoid committing the [then] East Africa
Protectorate Government to any administrative responsibilities near the
That correspondent further observed that should the Ethiopian incursionists penetrate southward beyond Moyale, the Kenyan frontier post would become untenable,(40) as it seemed to have been in the previous decades.
When the British Government issued a White Paper in 1928 it revealed a total of 133 raids from Ethiopia into the Sudan, British Somaliland and Kenya.(41) The raids of the 1930s were regarded as more "terribly devastating than any of their predecessors."(42) Yet, by 1932, the raids were said to have abated for two or three years.(43) But these incidents still persisted even in the post-colonial report.(44)
The NFD in Official Perception
The opinion of a former Governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, that the NFD "has always been a zone of problems" consisting of "lonely stations in the desert with ... the British, Asian and African public servants who live their exiled lives there in the vast brown stretches of thorn scrub and sand carrying on from day to dreary day with cheerful heart the work appointed for them,"(45) is characteristic of the official attitude towards the northern regions of Eastern Africa whether in Uganda, Kenya or British Somaliland. This thought expressed in the declining years of colonial administration reinforced the general attitude earlier observed by an American writer, Negley Farson, that, for administrators, the NFD was an area of exile.(46) This fact sheds light not only on the remoteness of the region from the capital, Nairobi, in the early colonial period, but in the later colonial period was used as an area of punishment.(47) The first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, and some others convicted in the days of the Mau Mau Emergency of the 1950s, were detained in this arid region until their eventual release.(48) But the attitude of visualizing the region as separate, if not peculiar, belongs to a period before the imposition of British Administration there.(49) The first British Commissioner for the East Africa Protectorate,(50) Sir Charles Elliot, had in 1904 written the sentiments which later vested the Somali with a distinctiveness, as if they were the only people dwelling in the region thus:
If it were possible to detach the district inhabited by the Somali it would
be an excellent thing to form them into a separate government as they are
different in population, economic and physical conditions from the other
provinces; but unfortunately, they are too small to form a separate
administration, and the adjoining Somali territories are not British.(51)
This expression of opinion by a British administrative officer might be said to contain the early seeds of the "Greater Somalia" dream and to foreshadow the so-called "Bevin plan"(52) in a period, when Somali consciousness of Somaliness had not even stirred, in spite of the resistance activities of the Ogaden Somali Mullah, Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan. This thought of Somali exclusiveness and distinctiveness was not only incorporated into the conduct of some administrators but seemed to have reinforced in time, Somali perceptions of themselves as distinct from other Africans in the neighborhood, an attitude which led them in 1920 to demand an honorary Asian status by opting to pay the "Non-native poll tax."(53) The essential point to note was that the official attitude to Somali in the area, which became British Somaliland, appeared to have extended to the Somali living on the west bank of the Juba River (Jubaland) in the British East Africa Protectorate, even after the latter was redesignated Kenya. It was also reinforced by numerous experiences with the Somali, some truculent, others seemingly congenial and these created a wide spectrum of opinions in the perception of Somali by administrators ranging from the most favorable to the most adverse. Thus, Somali reputation in administrative circles ranged from the best to the worst and the Somali were described as "disobedient" and "law-abiding", "crime free" and "criminals"(54) at the same time, in the same period, by various settlers and administrators based on their past and current experiences. These divergent perceptions went into the fashioning of policy for the Somali. Moreover, there was a tendency for administrators to serve in one territory and later be transferred to another that is contiguous in the region. An example was Gerald Reece,(55) who, for over twenty years, was resident in the NFD in several administrative capacities and graduated to Provincial Commissioner there before becoming governor of British Somaliland. Another was Geoffrey Archer (after whom Archer's post in Kenya is named),(56) who later served in Somaliland, Uganda and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Such men shaped the administrative perception of the Somali and helped to crystallize a view which the Somali later internalized about themselves, especially the most favorable images. There was, of course, local settler opinion to be reckoned with. This too covered a wide spectrum with most of the views oscillating between most favorable and most adverse impressions of the Somali. These opinions, periodically, featured in Legislative Council Debates.(57) The manner of administration of the region as well as the laws fashioned for it all helped to establish the separateness of the region from the rest of the country. Thus, initially, the administration of the region was by military means and only in 1925 did it revert to civilian administration, with periodic intrusions by the military for the purpose of establishing law and order after upheavals, which were perennial to the region. As the earlier period of administration coincided with the period of military activities of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, forces of the King's African Rifles, based on the East Africa Protectorate, were involved in the expeditions sent out against him during the period from 1900 until his death in 1921. Furthermore, the King's African Rifles were also employed to deal with periodic acts of rebellion and defiance in the Somali-inhabited parts of the region and in other inter-communal conflicts. One of these expeditions was mounted after the Somali had murdered the Assistant District Commissioner for Jubaland, Mr. Janner, in 1901. Much of the history of these activities has been dealt with exhaustively elsewhere.(58)
When, therefore, the British established a rudimentary administration from 1909 there were already some Somali dwelling on the western side of the Juba River in what was later Kenyan Jubaland, eventually handed over to Italy by the Anglo-Italian Treaty of 1924 and incorporated into Italian Somaliland (later Somalia) a year after the official handing over. While many writers have noted the existence of Somali in this region from the second half of the 19th century, they are not explicit about the significance of their numbers. However, the records show that many of the Somali in the NFD are twentieth century arrivals,(59) arriving simultaneously with the British administration, first, in a trickle, and then increasing in numbers until the time of the Jubaland transfer from British to Italian jurisdiction.(60) The transfer did not put an end to Somali incursions from across both the Somalia and Ethiopian borders, and these posed problems for the administrators on all sides of the common frontiers in this period, especially because of the capacity of Somali for expansion, even into areas in Kenya from which they were barred and generating trouble in so doing.
Prior to that date the British administration in Kenya had experienced numerous problems from Somali encroaching on other Somali communities such as the encroachment of the Mohammed Zubeir on the Herti, which led to a major conflagration just before the Jubaland transfer(61) but which was quickly contained by prompt military action by the administration. They also encroached on the half-Somali, like the Ajuran, and non-Somali people like the Boran (Galla),(62) already settled there. These upheavals were, sometimes, of such magnitude as to call for interventionist measures from the administration. The experiences hardly enhanced the Somali image and in some official circles, they earned the reputation of being troublesome and truculent; one such Somali group was the Adbulla Ogaden -- who had migrated into Kenya from the Ethiopian Ogaden. But the implications were clear; the British government had to devise a policy for these trans-frontier migrations if it had to govern the area effectively, and give the necessary protection to some of the so-called "British protected tribes." As a prerequisite it had first to decide whether it intended to administer the area at all. In this respect, events and policies in British Somaliland had some bearing on policy within Kenya itself. For while the local administration in Somaliland chafed under the harassment and threats of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan and contributed to the lack of clarity for a long time of British policy, the implications of his activities in the area also had serious implications for the administration of the Kenyan NFD as it remained an area of possible retreat with the consequences that were possible. This is not a farfetched point of view since in the twenty years of his encounter with the British he had shown the capacity to retreat into British territory, then into Italian and into Ethiopia. While he did not actually enter the NFD the fear remained that he might, in fact, extend his activities there, and it was not for want of trying. As one contemporary administrator, Sir Geoffrey Archer, remarked, his activities for twenty years "defied every effort to establish the Pax Britannica."(63) While air power had been used against him at the end of the First World War, it was death that finally broke up his movement.
Implications of British Policy in the NFD and the Somali Problem
The problem of shifting frontiers and the establishment of authority in this region of northeastern Africa continued to reflect and determine the local government's policies in relation to the people of the region -- nomadic, semi-nomadic and sedentary. Having decided on minimum administration and its corollary of minimum expenditure, it continued to hope that by leaving the inhabitants to their own devices, and, occasionally, intervening only in situations of "lawlessness" and strife, it would be possible to avoid the problems which went with punitive expeditions of which there were many in the earlier period. However, the peace and tranquillity sought were not characteristic of areas in which nomadic peoples struggled and competed for limited water resources and pastures for their animals in order to sustain life both for the animals and themselves. The earlier and later military experiences in Jubaland have been discussed by many writers(64) and need not be repeated in any detail here. Yet,Jubaland, which had given successive British administrative officials in the British East Africa Protectorate and British Somaliland so much trouble, remained a problem which, periodically, or shall we say, perennially, was to insinuate itself into the discussion of conflicts in the Horn in general. Jubaland, therefore, represents a good starting point from which to view the further development of this early period.
Jubaland: Unclear Formulation of Policy
Jubaland, which occupied the west bank of the Juba River and acted as a buffer between the British East Africa Protectorate and Italian Somaliland in the early years of British arrival, continued to experience the intransigence of bellicose Somali populations. Somali incursions from both the east bank and from the Ethiopian north were persistent.
The murder of the British Assistant Commissioner, A. C. Janner, in November 1900, and the subsequent punitive expedition which it invited is discussed elsewhere.(65) While this paper is not concerned with the internal politics of Jubaland, yet, as Jubaland was the buffer between the British and Italian spheres in Eastern Africa, an understanding of British policy concerning their common border is vital for understanding British government attempts to cope with persistent Somali incursions. This is also justifiable as it was originally part of the British East Africa Protectorate. The difficulty of restraining Somali nomadic movements from the eastern bank of the Juba, after the establishment of British administration, who were encroaching on non-Somali peoples on the eastern bank needs some brief sketching. The confrontations to which these Somali movements had given rise and, which modern research attests(66) had persisted for centuries, became more pronounced from the 1840s. The story of these early confrontations do not concern this paper only in so far as they compelled European powers in the region, and especially, the British, to adopt a policy which minimized or terminated the conflict generated by incursions of outsiders into the domain of others and, their own sphere of influence, when these incursions were armed and aggressive.
Major Preoccupation of the British Administration
At the inception of the British administration in the area it was not the Somali-Boran conflicts which were their major preoccupation, as some writers have tended to insinuate,(67) but rather the "growing discord among the Somali themselves."(68) Fresh incursions of groups such as the Degodia to Wajir in 1912 provided the occasions for heightening conflicts which were further enhanced in succeeding years by other arrivals, such as those of the Aulihan to Wajir in 1914 consisting of no less than 1,400 persons.(69) While the British local administration had "unobtrusively removed" the Aulihan from Wajir in order to terminate their "bickering"(70) with the Muhammad Zubeir (another of these Somali offshoots), by 1915 they were reported to be returning and this in itself spelled trouble.(71) As these were no less troublesome customers, British efforts to forestall, stave off, and prevent determined incursions by these Somali groups into Wajir from 1911 proved unsuccessful. The administration was concerned that they did not drive out the Boran and Ajuran already settled in the areas and the policy was to encourage those two groups to settle in Wajir. But the persistent Somali incursions led Charles Elliot to express the concern thus: "Our real task at present is... to see that they [the Somali] do not encroach to the south and prevent them from raiding the Tana."(72) Similar views were expressed years later by Colonel Graham who said: "We cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that the Somali movement should be checked."(73) But the danger of the Somali raiding the Galla (Boran) and the Pokomo seemed to have been manifest since 1909 just as administration was being established, and had compelled the administration to rush in a Company of the King's African Rifles to the region.(74) The Somali seemed poised to remain in Tanaland. The Abd Wak, for example, remained in the Tana but gradually moved north towards the Lorian Swamp.(75)
Not only was the administration overwhelmed by the size of the Somali incursionists but it faced the dilemma of what to do with them and seemed unable to turn them back, as their numbers appeared to dwarf the District Commissioner and his hand-full of police support; and officials like Graham, who, though anxious to discourage Somali settlements in the East Africa Protectorate from the Italian sphere, in 1914 allowed a group of Aulihan to cross the Juba as their numbers approximated 1,000 Aulihans with an estimated 6000 camels, 4000 cattle and 10,000 sheep.(76) It was also estimated that in the first six months of 1911 about 4,000 Somali had crossed the river Juba westward into the British Protectorate and many of them were in possession of rifles.(77) This then was hardly the situation for punitive expeditions whose effectiveness could have been negligible or productive of more antagonism and strife. The British proposed a Convention involving Ethiopia, Italy and Britain in an effort to find a way out of the difficulties, even though the implementation of such an agreement seemed doomed from the start. Among the solutions proposed by Salkeld, was the possibility of constituting a "Somali Reserve"(78) as a damper on any further Somali westward movement. This notion, although discussed at length, came to nothing after the British Government's transfer of Jubaland to Italian jurisdiction in 1925.
The transfer falls within the scope of this work, as it relates to the evolution of boundaries in this area of the Horn and its contribution to the problems of the region in general, created by the phenomenon of shifting frontiers. But, in spite of this transfer, the Somali problem continued as Somali were to be found in the Kenya Colony and Protectorate after that event. Thus, the sheer force of numbers among the Somali incursionists and the absence of any ready military force to secure compliance with regulations or to effect their ejection from the Protectorate led to local administrative acquiescence in their presence. But, despite this, a myth seemed to have grown in certain quarters that the British "saved" the Boran (Galla), Rendille and other so-called "Bantu" and "pre-Somali tribes" of Kenya from almost certain Somali conquest and extinction.(79) This seems inconsistent with the historical realities of the times and was more fiction than fact. It gave rise to the myth of Somali "invincibility" not very dissimilar to the myth that had been evolved in respect of the Fulani Jihad of the 19th century in Northern Nigeria and its implications for the south in which it was asserted; but for the British the Fulani were marching south and would have overwhelmed the peoples of the south. Yet even from the accounts of other administrative officers in the Kenyan northern frontier, the perception of the problem was different. For instance, the Acting District Commissioner at Moyale (NFD), Mr. Plowman, had observed the crisis posed by the persistent Somali incursion westward from Jubaland and farther west when, in 1918, he wrote:
I would urge most strongly the immediate removal of these undesirable aliens.
They are a stumbling-block to the progress of the District and a standing
menace to its internal peace. This reform had often been advocated in the
past but it still awaits execution, and the longer we delay the more
difficult it will become as these Somalis will, before long, be able to point
to years of residence there. Further there is a greater danger of their
importunity causing people to forget that Wajir is Galla country, though
the rightful owners have temporarily been dispossessed owing to Government
While the British administration was not in possession of the massive force which could expel the Somali bag and baggage from the NFD and the Protectorate, even the belief, in some official quarters, that the Somali sojourn would be of short duration, with the passage of time, appeared hollow. The above citation is also significant for the light it casts on the further evolution of the border conflict in the post-independence era, when the Somali have insisted that it was their territory; whereas Kenyans have often maintained, with some justification, in the light of the history of the "tribes"(81) in that zone, that the Somali were, in fact, outsiders, who had intruded into the region in the early twentieth century and had no historical claim to it whatsoever.(82) Yet, at the commencement of the First World War, the feeling had surfaced among some of the administrators that very little had, in fact, been achieved since 1897, indicating an expression of helplessness, that the truculent Somali were still far from being brought under control either in British East Africa or in British Somaliland. This viewpoint was quite at variance with sentiments of complacency, which had characterized the earlier period, when the British government in London had been bombared with dispatches from East Africa which often gave misleading impressions. The implication of the new awareness was simply that the Protectorate had hardly begun to be administered and there were limitations in the Protectorate's control of the Somali.(83) These revelations compelled a reappraisal of performance in the Protectorate as well as of the problems posed for the northern border and induced a recoil from the hitherto romanticized picture of a "grateful" and "friendly" Somali from the time of British arrival in the NFD and the numerous assertions that it was possible to "civilize" them. This erstwhile romanticized picture of the Somali is ubiquitous and could itself form the subject of another paper.(84)
These glamorized and romanticized views of the Somali (investing them with sterling qualities and stressing their essential difference from neighboring African populations with whom they were in contact) were viewpoints difficult to live down and were, in time, to find their way into Somali consciousness. There were, of course, opposing minority viewpoints but they remained so at the time and, especially, during the 1890s to the end of the first five decades of the twentieth century. Thus, views like those of Kittermaster, that "obviously our aim must be to civilize our natives [in this case Somali] as much as possible,"(85) were not untypical. But such views were reinforced with others which left no other impression than that the Somali were different and superior to the so-called "Bantu". Craufurd, for instance, in 1896, had written thus of the Somali: "the race in my opinion, has no equal in this part of Africa either in intelligence or in courage,"(86) a viewpoint shared by many of the administrators, if not all. Yet, coexistent with this generally shared administrative viewpoint was a not-so-favorable impression expressed by another official, who had observed: "I do not think the Somali will ever be civilized along the lines of the Bantu tribes in this country."(87) These divergent viewpoints are indications of preference, very common in administrative dispatches of colonial administrators. Despite favorable impressions of the Somali, the East Africa Protectorate's policy towards the Somali, negative as it was in endeavoring to prevent their westward flow, produced some sympathizers and some genuine doubts in the same official circles. One administrator wrote of the situation: "We try to stop him [the Somali]. Are we right? He is obviously better material than many of our tribes."(88)
In retrospect these attitudes had their implications for the enhanced status of the Somali and their perception of such an exalted status; for, in the immediate post-World War I period, the Somali attempted to express their difference from other Africans by their insistence on obtaining parity of status with Asians and Arabs and by insisting on "non-native" status, a demand, which the administration found difficult to resist. The administration's views fluctuated with the wind. But, on 11 March 1920, the Kenya Executive Council meeting attempted a definition of the status of the Somali. It considered and approved that local legislation should be amended so as not to include Somali in the definition of "natives" but that where it was considered desirable to extend similar legislation than that applied to natives of any class or section of Somali or Asiatics, special provision should be made in each Ordinance. The Executive Council recommended that instructions be issued to all District Commissioners and Resident Magistrates to issue "non-native" poll tax receipts, provisionally, to Somali tendering the full amount of Rs (Rupees) 15 and claiming to be Asiatic. The Council also approved that the position should be explained to the Somali by the Chief Native Commissioner and that the registration of Somali under the Native Registration Ordinance not be pressed.(89)
Ten years later there was to be a redefinition of the word "native" to be inclusive of Somali. Thus, at the Executive Council Meeting, on 14 March 1930, in promoting the Native Tribunal's Bill the definition of native was to be "a native of Africa and include Somali, Swahili and Comoro Islanders."(90) It was a volte face from a previous situation. But the Somali continued to agitate the issue and even their kith and kin in what was then Tanganyika (now modern Tanzania), rejected the appellation of Africans and insisted that Africans are slaves and Somali are not.(91) The Somali agitation in Kenya for the poll tax to maintain a non-African status but to adopt an Asian one continued throughout the thirties and the forties, and this attitude could hardly have endeared them to other Kenyans. Modern research has revealed that while this agitation was going on in the late 1930s the Kenyan Somali community urged on their kinsmen in British Somaliland the need to resist Britain's attempt to incorporate the use of the Somali language into the educational program insisting on a preference for Arabic as the language of the Koran, and expressing the fear that the teaching of the Somali language would weaken Islam.(92) It was not difficult to understand the problem in that the preceding period the Somali have claimed their ancestry from Arabia, as the Darod and Isaak groups still do to this day. But the fact that Somali outside British Somaliland counseled this course of action among their kith and kin expresses this element of external influence in the development of certain attitudes and tendencies such as the growth of Somali consciousness and the exclusive Pan-Somali mentality. There are two phases of this, the first occurring in the post-World War I period and, the second, in the post-World War II period.
The first phase was for Asiatic status and a rejection of the African one. The second raised the secessionist threat for Kenya, albeit to merge with a heightened Somali consciousness not for personal status but for national status as embodied in the "Greater Somalia" ideal with occasional professions of its Africanicity or Africanness. These developments, as the records show, were extraneous to the NFD and were not generated from within. Thus, the Somali incursion into the realm of political protest and pressure group activity through which they demanded a higher status than the Africans came from the north from those sometimes described as "alien Somali," whose origin was either the British Somaliland Protectorate, Aden or even Italian Somaliland, but who resided in Nairobi. It was these who initiated the protest for status. But the activity set the pace and the pattern for the emergence of a Somali consciousness recognizing the Somali as a national, rather than what had always been the official attitude -- a "tribal", group, or the reality of Somali conduct in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, that of clan identity. But the infusion of this nascent consciousness amongst the Somali of the NFD in the second phase came from the north in Somaliland in the post-World War II period coupled with a Pan-Somali aspiration, as exemplified in the formation of the Somali Youth League in the area in 1946, though proscribed in 1948.
Nevertheless, a painful conclusion emerged from the foregoing and the administrative policies pursued in the NFD over a period of no less than five decades. An essential ingredient of that policy was the assumption that neither interaction nor coexistence between the Somali and the people of the region and the rest of the country was possible and was, therefore, discouraged, through administrative policies, as well as such projections as the "Closed Districts" enactments,(93), which prevented the free movement of people into the region from other parts of the country or vice versa. While the majority of Somali remained in the north, a few managed to infiltrate into other parts of the country thus forming small communities of Somali in urban centers like Nairobi, Mombasa, Gilgil, Naivasha, Eldoret and a few more places to the chagrin of some European settlers. This policy in the long term did not have the effect of preventing the growth of a secessionist mentality in the later incubation period, prior to Kenya's attainment of sovereign status. In short, official policy had helped to sow the seeds of a later tendency to fission rather than cooperation, coexistence and unity among peoples of differing cultural backgrounds or origins, in spite of the processes of intermarriage and some intercultural exchanges which had proceeded among some of them, through a prolonged period of contact, even if restricted by administrative policy or the lack of it.
Persistent Somali infiltration resulted in bitter conflicts and contributed to further displacements of settled populations. They were haphazard, if not persistent, and constituted clan movements and, where peaceful, were done on the basis of a principle of clientage known as Shegat,(94) for their safety and protection, which they soon cast off whenever they felt numerically and materially stronger than their patrons. Sometimes, such a manifestation of their independence was accompanied by the seizure of their patron's land and sometimes forced a western retreat on the latter. Although these shegat arrangements were often of a temporary kind they were known to have been thrown off many times in the Somali penetration of the northern region of the East Africa Protectorate (alias Kenya).(95)
Somali infiltrators and other groups did not always come from east of the Juba but also from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in which the infiltrators crossed the East Africa Protectorate (Kenya/Ethiopian) border. While the Protocol of 1,391 made the Juba River the eastern limit of the British East Africa Protectorate, nonetheless, the beginning of an administration there had to await the twentieth century. The initial occupation of Jubaland was a military affair and a civilian administration trailed far behind for many years. The extent to which the British policy fostered a separate Somali concept has already been discussed above. But it might be said that these pronouncements and policies sowed the seeds of pan-Somali aspirations which plagued Kenya in the post-colonial period.
Between 1906 and 1914 there were streams of arrivals into the northern region. While the Ogaden Somali reached Wajir in 1908 to be joined by the Degodia also from Ethiopia, the Darod-Somali had advanced to the Tana River by 1908. By 1912 British civil authority extended to Wajir with a resident administrative office saddled with the task of ensuring that the Boran and Ajuran were not displaced from their settled position, through the infiltration of hostile Somali clans. The administration's hope of maintaining the peace was based on the assumption that the querulous and antagonistic people prone to internecine strife, could be mollified by an equitable division of the wells in Wajir apportioning those to the east of the El-Wak-Wajir-Habaswein Road to the Somali while those to the west were left to the Boran. But there were already some sub-clans of the Somali dwelling among the Boran in the west among whom there were the Rer Mohammed Liban and the Gelibleh as shegats to the Ajuran.(96)
Early Preliminaries at Defining The Kenya-Somaliland Border
When the border was fixed by proclamation in 1914,97 the northernmost limit of Jubaland coincided with the direction of the El-Wak-Wajir-Habaswein Road -- the line between the Boran-Somali areas (see Map 3). But soon after, the problems raised by the outbreak of World War I resulted in a temporary withdrawal of the British administration from Wajir (1916-1917).(98) This gave the warring "tribes" in the area a field day; for the Degodia-Somali took advantage of the opportunity and attacked the Boran who, in withdrawing to Moyale, gave the Rer Mohammed and the Gelibleh their opportunity to throw off their clientage relationship with the Ajuran and assert their independence. The administration now had to cope with two frontiers, the international frontier separating Kenya from the Italian sphere, apart from the Kenya/Ethiopian frontier, across which Somali continued to drift in and out of Kenya; but also, the internal frontier established by the local administration to separate hostile Somali groups from the non-Somali on whom they encroached or those living in close proximity to them. Thus, the affected both frontiers, and the local administration were equally concerned with troth, as they were generative of conflict, which the administration would prefer to be without.
Shifting Frontiers in Kenya's Northern Region
The internal line continued to shift. In 1919 the southern part of this ephemeral boundary was made to incorporate Muddo-Gashi, and by 1922 a further concession was made to the Aulihan. In 1925 Hilole Mohamed, a former Aulihan "frontier agent", was granted a special concession inside Boran territory at Garba Tula. These concessions were to contribute to a deterioration of Boran-'Somali relations for upwards of a decade, but in the late 1920s, the Boran had already begun to complain to the administration about these Somali concessions. The Boran in 1927 urged the administration to move them out of the District if it was unable or unwilling to protect them against Somali depredations. By 1929 their relations with the Rer Mohammed were so bad that they broke off contact with them, but the administration seemed incapable of easing the situation for the Boran. Matters became so bad that by 1931 they had drifted into violence. But the Boran state of readiness, together with the Kenya African Rifles and police intervention, prevented Somali groups from attacking and so the situation was contained, but not for long. By 1932, the British administration, faced with the stark realities, moved the Boran from the Wajir District. It was an admission of failure of the administration's halfhearted policy. But the Somali refused to be confined on the eastern part of the shifting Boran-(Galla)/Somali frontier (between Habaswein through Arbagahan through Buna to Takabba). The administration's decision to administer the Ajuran as Somali by moving them east of the line provided the Boran with some land and a temporary respite, but the determined Somali hordes continued their infiltrations unchecked right through the 1940s and 1950s, compelling the administration to make periodic adjustments to the line.(99) Even as late as 1954 suggestions were still being made for land concessions to the Somali described as "alien Somali" in places like Mackinnon Road and Isolo Leasehold areas even though the government's policy continued to resist any attempts to establish a "Somali Reserve."(100)
Efforts to contain any groups within their own district or administratively defined areas were futile.(101) Efforts to move them to appropriate areas reserved for them proved daunting to the administration.(102) Estimates of Somali populations varied between 1911 and 1949 as the table below shows.
[TABULAR DATA 1 OMITTED] These figures remain unreliable, as even the administrators admitted. Thus the attempts to control the movements and formulate a policy were in fact, far from enthusiastic and this point was re-echoed again by the Motion of an African representative in the Kenya Legislative Council, Mr. Mathu,(105) in 1954, in which he proposed that land be made available for the settlement of Somali already in Kenya. With remarkable foresight he observed that the problem was already thirty years old and unless the government acted, the problem would still be crying out for a solution thirty years later.(106)
The International Boundaries: Considerations in the Transfer of Jubaland
Under the exigencies of war, Italy, which had remained neutral in the war by the Allied Powers against the Central Powers led by Germany, was persuaded to enter into a secret treaty in London in 1915(107) with the Allied Powers (Britain, France and Russia) which promised it territory in Africa in return for cooperation in the war.(108) While it would appear that no mention was made of Jubaland (and this remains a contentious point),(109) it was hoped that the adjustments might be made as a result of depriving Germany of its African possessions. The agreement embodied in the Treaty of London (1915) read:
In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial
territories in Africa at the expense of Germany those two powers agree in
principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as
regards the settlements in her favour of the question relative to the
frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the
neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.(110)
As Britain profited from Germany's loss of its African possessions, Italy, by the provisions of the Treaty of London, expected something comparable. While article 13 of the Treaty seemed not to have been explicit on the question of boundary adjustments in Eastern Africa, in the post-war period it was decided that Italy should be rewarded with the Jubaland Province of the East Africa Protectorate (Kenya).(111) The terms of the Anglo-Italian Treaty of 15 July 1924 allowed for the territory lying between the Juba River and a new boundary defined by the treaty to be ceded to Italy.(112)
There were additional problems in the transfer, as a part of the mainland (the coastal strip) of East Africa belonged to the Sultan of Zanzibar recognized by previous agreements in the past and Britain took it upon itself to act on his behalf. Thus, Article 4 of the Treaty stipulated the undertaken by Italy to pay the Sultan an annual sum of 1,000[pounds] as the proportional share of the annuity payable by Britain under the agreement with Zanzibar in 1895 when it took over the administration of the EAP from the IBEAC.(113) The new boundary as stipulated in Article I of the Treaty read:
From the confluence of the rivers Ganale and Daua along the course of the
Daua upstream to the southern point of the small southerly bend of the
latter river in the vicinity of Malka Re, thence in a south-westerly
direction in a straight line to the center of the pool of Dumasa;
thence in a south-westerly direction in a straight line towards Eilla Kalla
(which remains in British territory) to such meridian east of Greenwich as
shall leave in Italian territory the well of El Beru; thence along the same
meridian southward until it reaches the boundary between the provinces of
Jubaland and Tanaland; thence along that provincial boundary to a point
due north of the point on the coast due west of the southernmost of the
four islets in the immediate vicinity of Ras Kiambone (Dick's Head);
thence due southwards to such point on the coast. Ras Kiambone (Dick's Head)
and the four islets above mentioned shall fall within the territory to be
transferred to Italy.
In the event, however, of it being found by the Commission referred to in
Article 12 that the well of El Beru does not contain water either sufficient
or suitable for the maintenance at that point of an Italian frontier post,
then the line, as between El Beru and Eilla Kalla, shall be so
drawn by the Commission as to include in Italian territory the neighbouring
well of El Shama.(114)
The preliminaries to the Jubaland transfer were complex and created a period of strained Anglo-Italian relations before the eventual transfer.(115) But other considerations stalled the settlement for a number of years and even when the agreement was in sight figures of what would fall to Italy differed from 34,000 to 43,000 square miles. In the end it was a figure of 36,740(116) that was conceded.
The issue was not only a question of land transfer but the actual position of the western frontier of Italian Somaliland in relation to Kenya. Uppermost in British government s consideration was the concern of the Kenyan administration to restrain the flow of Somali from the Jubaland and Italian sectors once the territory was ceded. Jubaland, prior to the cession, had not been a very easy area to administer because of the not infrequent incursions of Somali hordes from the eastern and northern areas of the Horn and the many conflicts and feuds they provoked. In many respects, the area was seen as a liability. But there was also the danger of incursions into British territory (EAP) in times of stress, due to water and pasture shortage, which had the potential of bringing in an inflow of undesirable Somali from the Italian sphere. Another problem which later became a factor in the Anglo-Italian relations in that region was the seepage which would be engendered through the smuggling of elephants tusks (ivory) from Kenyan territory into Italian Somaliland. Jubaland could provide this center of seepage. In the 1930s an exchange of notes occurred in order to regulate the traffic of game trophies between their common border,(117) a fact mentioned in Article II of the 1924 Treaty.(118) The augmenting of the Anglo-Italian border, therefore, proved intractable and in February 1924, prior to the signing of the agreement of 15 July 1924, a redefinition of the western boundary limit of the Jubaland Province was made to coincide with the new international boundary proposed."(119)
By the new proclamation, Jubaland incorporated parts of the former province which lay east of the meridian of 41[degrees] East longitude leaving out a triangular portion west of this which was to be part of the Kenyan NFD.(120) The cession of Kenyan territory hardly relieved it of the problem of feuding among antagonistic Somali clans on the one hand, and between them and other groups, such as the Boran, on the other. A fore taste of Somali truculence was experienced prior to the cession of Jubaland. A serious incident was provoked by the intransigent Mohammed Zubeir, who, for a very long time, were said to be on bad terms with the Herti. In the incident which ensued, the former had occupied the wells belonging to the Herti, which the latter felt was an act of deep aggression. In the confrontation the Mohammed Zubeir descended on the Herti and killed about 58 to 60 of them and when urged by the administrative authorities to defuse the situation by paying the traditional blood money they refused to meet the government. It resulted in the government acting promptly to secure law and order and to bring the Mohammed Zubeir to heel. It was the authorities view that such action was necessary in order to prevent a general disturbance of a territory that was about to be ceded to the Italians. Thus, the administration mounted another punitive expedition to Jubaland between March and April, which cost nothing less than 8,000[pounds] and evoked the reaction of some elected members of the Kenya Legislative Council, who regarded the expedition as a waste of money. However, the Kenyan Colonial Secretary defended the action claiming that, in fact, it prevented the situation from becoming worse than it was and that their action had been achieved without bloodshed, although it had exacted the compensation from the Mohammed Zubeir by seizing their cattle and handing a sizable part of them to the Herti, while only retaining 2,000 in order to compensate the administration for the enforced military action by the King's African Rifles.(121)
While it was British policy to eliminate the Somali-Boran problem, the cession of territory did not promise to reduce or minimize this. The original western international border of Jubaland had been considered a kind of line separating the Somali from the Boran areas. The new international boundary line seemed like entrenching an artificial division between the Somali in both the Italian and British (Kenyan) territories. Article 6 annex of the new treaty sought to redress this and British and Italian subjects respectively were catered to in its provisions. British subjects and those who had acceded to the status at the time of the annexation of Kenya as a colony, and those resident there at the time the agreement became operative in Jubaland were transferred. Under Article I, these individuals automatically became British subjects without further delay on the request to do so unless they opted for Italian nationality within six months of the implementation of the agreement. If they opted for Italian nationality and later sought to withdraw, this was possible only within twelve months. British-protected persons and subjects, who had at the time of the annexation of the Kenyan colony, but were ordinarily resident in the transferred territory would automatically acquire Italian nationality and cease to be British-protected persons and British subjects respectively provided that such persons, not being Somali, or belonging to the "native races of the area Transferred" should possess the right to retain their existing nationality on condition that they withdraw from the transferred territory within twelve months of the implementation of the Convention. It was further stipulated that:
The same right is conferred on such a number of Somalis who are separated
from their families by the new frontier as the wells and pasturage in the
territory defined in the Annex to this article can support, having regard to
the present and reasonable future requirements of the tribes or sections of
tribes already there, provided that such persons must be individually
registered before they are allowed to cross into British territory. The
Commission referred to in article wells and pasturage and as to the number
of the persons who may avail themselves of the right...
The territory lying within a straight line from the Lorian Swamp to Saddi:
a straight line from Saddi to El Beru to its junction with the
Tanaland-Jubaland frontier: and a straight line from the said junction to
the Lorian Swamp.(122)
The territory mentioned in the annex of Article 6 was the triangular part of Jubaland (embracing El-Wak-Lorian Swamp-junction of 41[degrees] parallel with the Tittoni line) which was not transferred to Italy.(123)
The major problem for the administration was still one of policing nomadic peoples and preventing the eastern bank Somali moving westward to the Lorian Swamp, where the western peoples and clans also water their animals. Such contact, it was feared, would compound the problems and actually expressed the hopelessness of the situation. Italians were expected to dig wells on their own side of the line for their own clans. But it was still the British government's intention, by the provisions of Article 6, to allow any would be Somali entry into Kenya provided they did not penetrate beyond the former western frontier of Jubaland established in 1914. Both governments, in Article 9, undertook to prevent any migration of Somali or "other natives" across the frontier defined by Article I. They also agreed that if in the neighborhood of the sector of the new frontier, running from E1 Beru to the Jubaland boundary, there existed a shortage of pasture for the "tribes" situated on the Italian side of the frontier, and if inquiries of the Commission, referred to in Article 12, revealed during the rainy season, that there was on the British side of the sector and the region, bounded on the east by the new frontier and on the west by the line Goochi-Ribba-El Tulli-Lakola-Toor Guda-Ramagada, an abundance of pasture that was required for the "tribes" in the British sector, the Commission would exercise its discretion that for a certain period, not less than five years, allow Somali or other natives of the transferred territory to cross the boundary to the British side for the purpose of grazing. But their grazing limited them only to the east of the line indicated above. The position was open to review at the end of the period in the light of the experience gained and of the requirements at the time of the "tribes" in the British territory.(124)
Article 5 was also of interest in that the Italian Government mandated that should it desire to abandon all or any part of the transferred territory first preference would be given to the British government upon terms as may be deemed to be just. But should differences arise between both governments as to the terms of the transfer, the matter would be submitted to arbitration with such procedure as the League of Nations Council would prescribe.(125) This proviso is interesting in that it could raise issues of international law were the Kenya government to insist on the return of Jubaland to Kenyan jurisdiction, as some Kenyan parliamentarians (and some British ones before them in the post-World War II era) had insisted in the 1960s during the Shifta crisis by insisting that with colonialism over the agreements had lapsed. It is all the more significant as the Somali have insisted that they were not bound by treaties concluded during the colonial period,(126) and particularly those which affected their common borders with their neighbors, such as the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 in relation to the Ogaden. Yet, on the Jubaland issue, Somali spokesmen in the Republic have tended to argue that the cession of Jubaland by the British to Italy constituted the first step taken to achieve the goal of a "Greater Somalia."(127) The fact is that it aimed at no such thing. Hitherto, Jubaland was part of the East Africa Protectorate, later Kenya, and it was the Somali, who were infiltrators in the zone, as the above discussion and evidence in the records suggest. Be that as it may, on the Jubaland situation in 1925, the Articles of Ratification were exchanged in London, on 1 May 1925, by representatives of both countries the British Minister, Ramsay MacDonald for Britain and the Italian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Signor Torreton. This was followed, on 25 July 1925, at Kismayu by the ceremony of handing over Jubaland to Italy. Jubaland was renamed by then Oltre Giaba and was administered as a separate entity for a year before its incorporation into Italian Somaliland.(128)
Demarcation of The Kenya/Somalia Border
The next task was to demarcate the border. Two Commissions were appointed for Jubaland, the first was a Permanent Mixed Commission for regulating customs, transit, conservation, navigation and irrigation on the river, already provided for in the Anglo-Italian River Juba Agreement of 24 December 1915(129) and authorized in Article 12 of the 1924 agreement. The second was a demarcation Commission, named the Jubaland Boundary Commission, with Lieutenant L. N. King serving as Senior Commissioner on the British side and Signor Tullio Colluci as the Senior Italian Commissioner from 1925. Due to the work of the Jubaland Boundary Commission an adjustment was made in which the previous boundary line from the El Beru meridian southward to the intersection of Jubaland-Tanaland provincial boundary was extended south to latitude 0[degrees] 50'S and so eliminated Tanaland from the boundary, a point later known as Zero Cinquanta. This adjustment of the boundary was approved through an exchange of notes in dune 1925.(130) Thus, the boundary line which emerged was one which separated Jubaland from the Northern Frontier Province (later NFD). On the completion of the work of the Mixed Jubaland Boundary Commission another agreement, which detailed and confirmed the previous agreement, was signed on 17 December 1927,(131) details of which could be gleaned there.(132) The boundary was demarcated by twenty-nine beacons together with some secondary cairns.(133)
On trans-frontier movement of population the Commission recommended that, where genuine cases existed concerning the separation of families, the right of crossing should be restricted to not more than 500 people, excluding children under the age of ten years, a right which was to be exercised within one year from the confirmation of the 1927 agreement. But the confirmation of the agreement had to await 22 November 1933.(134) Shortly after the Boundary Demarcation Commission had completed its task, loopholes were found in the demarcation. Further adjustments were made and the recommendations of the locally-based Commissioners(135) were approved in 1933, through an exchange of notes.(136) It was this exchange which confirmed the work of the Mixed Commission of 1927. In that Commission s report, a description of the boundary was rendered in two parts; the first part incorporating the general description and the second part the detailed description. The former reads:
Starting in the north from the Abyssinian frontier at a point in the
"thalweg" of Uebi Daua about 450 metres upstream from Malca Rie,
the boundary passes, in a south-westerly direction, in a straight
line through the point where the south bank of the Uebi Daua is
intersected by the meridian of longitude 41[degrees]59'44". 34 East of
Greenwich; thence due south along this meridian, leaving the well of El
Sciama in Italian territory, to its intersection with the parallel of South
latitude 0[degrees]50'00".00; thence in a straight line, in a south-easterly
direction, towards the highest point of Ras Chiamboni until this line is
intersected by the meridian of longitude which passes through a point at Dar
Es Salaam 15 metres inland from High Water Mark and due west to the
southern extremity of the southernmost of the group of 5 islets known as
Diua Damasciaca; thence due south along this meridian as far as the point
at Dar Es Salaam defined above: thence, in a south-easterly direction, to
the limit of territorial waters in a straight line at right angles to the
general trend of the coastline at Dar Es Salaam leaving the islets of Diua
Damasciaca in Italian Territory.(137)
Thus by 1934 the eastern border of Kenya constituting the present Kenya/ Somalia (previously Somaliland) border had the force of law. The boundary was demarcated again with new pillars in 1957-58.(138) While the population of Kenya was estimated to have been diminished by 12,000,(139) the cession was not without some local upheavals, but the settler government of Kenya considered it to have "passed off satisfactorily... which is largely due to the impression produced amongst all the tribes by the despatch of a large military force and the confiscation of a very considerable number of cattle."(140)
It is difficult not to sense that from the point of view of the Kenya settler administration, the cession of Jubaland was a great relief, bearing in mind the intractable nature of the territory and its truculent inhabitants together with the financial(141) and military burdens it imposed on the administration,(142) and, this, in spite of the demand for compensation echoed in the Legislative Council.(143) Yet the problem of Somali influx and penetration westward continued beyond the Juba and beyond Kenya's western frontier which was closed to them. The years 1923 and 1924 had seen a fresh incursion of Degodia Somali from Ethiopia, but the proposal to send them back was shelved owing to the necessity to deploy troops elsewhere.(144) After the transfer of Jubaland the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya, containing nomadic and settled peoples among whom were the Somali, became known as the Northern Frontier Province later to be renamed the Northern Frontier District of the Northern Province. If earlier and subsequent(145) legislation helped to keep it isolated from other parts of Kenya, individual Somali still penetrated into other trading centers in Kenya,(146) even if the bulk remained in the northern and coastal parts of the country. The long term implications of this policy for the growth of the secessionist mentality became obvious in the early 1960s. Another legislation made in 1934 relating to Outlying Districts and "Special Districts"(147), for convenience of administration, had the effect of insulating much of the north, even of Kenya, and thus confirming the "isolation"(148) which the Somali have so far complained of as one of their excuses for not desiring to be part of a sovereign Kenya in the early days of its independence. While official policy contributed to this state of affairs, the early difficulties in administering the territory must be taken into account as well. Nonetheless, both within and outside official circles, a mentality which, in some sense, might be described as a "semi Laager" mentality had been reinforced and was, therefore, to plague the post-colonial politics of a sovereign Kenya and the international relations of two African states, Kenya and Somalia with wider implications for the continent.
But the Jubaland issue was not allowed to rest as had been pointed above.(149) A question by the Unionist MP for Leominster, Mr. A. E. Baldwin, in the British House of Commons, on 24 November 1948, while the fate of ex-Italian Somaliland (including Jubaland) and Eritrea still hung in the balance, for the restoration of Jubaland to Kenyan jurisdiction received a negative reply from the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Christopher Mayhew. The Minister had insisted that Jubaland had been ceded to Italy on 15 July 1924, under the treaty signed in London and then became part of former Italian Somaliland. He emphasized that the disposal of former Somaliland was still being considered by the United Nations General Assembly in that current session, under the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty. But pressed further by Mr. Baldwin that before any decision was arrived at, the British government should consult the elected members of the Kenya Legislature, who felt that Jubaland should be returned to Kenya, Mr. Mayhew replied that the restoration of Jubaland was another question.(150) Yet this was not the last that was to be heard of Jubaland, for when the Kenya/Somali conflict was at its apogee in the 1960s, opinions were expressed by Kenyan parliamentarians on Jubaland, who castigated Somalia for its claims on Kenyan territory when Kenya could legitimately institute counter-claims for the return of Jubaland. The implication was that Kenya had exercised restraint on this issue and expected a reciprocal gesture from Somali propagandists.(151)
But the NFD still remained an unsettled, if not shifting, frontier region. The Italo-Ethiopian conflict of the thirties, ultimately resulting in the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, unsettled the frontier region in the Horn and the frontiers generally. Italian incorporation of Ethiopia into its East African Empire and the redrawing of the borders and the division of peoples based on assumptions of ethnic origins(152) and affinity further contributed to this uncertainty. The commencement of the Second World War against Germany threw British policy in Eastern Africa into disarray. For, while Britain was still counseling its administrators in the territories of East Africa and especially in Kenya to avoid provocative acts(153) which might antagonize Italy into joining the war on the German side and embarking on the encroachment on British territories in the region, it remained conscious of the fact that war with Italy could still break out by design or accident or choice with consequences for Eastern Africa. It did receive intelligence that Italy had such a plan of attack in existence(154) and subsequent events were to confirm the correctness of the intelligence.
The frontiers separating the British sphere from Italian East Africa, as covered by the Kenya/Ethiopia (which became the Kenya/Italian East Africa) and the Kenya/Italian Somaliland [Somalia] frontiers seemed to have become merged into one broad area as a frontier separating Italian East Africa from British possessions in Kenya and the rest of Eastern Africa. These were problem frontiers judging from past experiences, owing, as it has been shown above, to incursions of nomadic peoples seeking pasture and water and fleeing across one frontier into the other sphere, either to escape the extremities of drought and famine situations or the rigors of colonial administration and Ethiopian control, or engaging in feuds and settling of old scores. These proclivities among the peoples of the area raised possibilities for border incidents, which could inch Britain and Italy, the two administering powers in the area, into open confrontations with prospects of widening the conflicts or edging them down the precipice of a violent war. In fact, some such border incidents occurred and were the subject of prospects and dispatches between the local administrators and representations through the chancelleries in London and Rome. The prospect of their escalating into something more serious did not hearten the British government. The mood was reflected in numerous secret telegrams and dispatches in this tense period.
But equally, the British government and the local administrators began to consider contigency plans and the necessity for preparedness for any eventualities with Italy.(155) Among these preliminaries were considerations for bringing in West African troops with contingency plans devised concerning the borders, although difficulties were envisaged concerning the former without alerting the Italians about these British preparations. The fears were real and had even led to the evacuation of the administrative posts of Mandera and Moyale in the NFD, which became the subject of some corespondence between the Governor of Kenya and the British government in London.(156) Italy had also occupied Moyale temporarily giving its reasons as the necessity to maintain good order.(157) But these evacuated posts were soon reoccupied. This British evacuation seemed to have created a vacuum and the danger of its being filled by Italy and posing a challenge to Kenya was uppermost in the minds of the British government and the local administrators in Kenya hence it reoccupation.(158) The intervening period between withdrawal and reoccupation saw a whole series of revealing correspondence.(159)
Italy's entry into the war then provided the opportunity for the confrontation which was feared all along. Italy quickly captured British Somaliland in 1940(160) and retained it for eight months. In further reorganizing the region (having first reorganized Ethiopia)(161) it also proceeded to recruit British protected Somali, Ethiopians and Sudanese into its forces.(162) There were reports that it recruited many British protected persons (Somali) from the Somaliland Protectorate.(163) With the situation thus, except for Kenya on which Italy had not encroached, though it seemed that it was not far from Italian plans as well as from British calculations,(164) Italy was in control of most of the Somali-inhabited territories. The borders were thus back in the melting pot of controversy. The danger of Italian attack on Kenya's Northern Region (Frontier District) if not the entire country, was ever present in the calculations of the British Foreign War and Colonial Offices as well as those of the administrators on the spot in the region embracing the Sudan, Kenya and Somaliland and the British Legation in Ethiopia. It was partly that fear which had led initially to the temporary evacuation of Moyale and Mandera.
Once Italy had joined the war against the allied powers and had proceeded to capture British Somaliland, British restraint was removed and produced the counteroffensive with Commonwealth and colonial forces which together with Ethiopian cooperation resulted in the complete liberation of the entire region from Italian rule. It was this which ushered in the period of British Military Administration in the entire region, which is not discussed in greater detail even though it had serious implications for the border conflict in the succeeding period. But in addition, British reoccupation of all territories seized by Italy, including the relief of Ethiopia and Eritrea and the establishment of military administrations in Ethiopia, Ex-Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland and Eritrea, the achievement once again brought all the Somali-inhabited areas under one imperial ruler. Thus, in this period of coming under one ruler or another, it was not impossible for the Somalis to have become alerted to the implications of their long-standing divisions and centrifugal tendencies. The ground was thus laid for sowing the seeds of the "Greater Somalia" ambition, first indications of which were manifested while the war was still raging in 1943 in the formation of the Somali Youth League (SYL) with unification of Somalis as one of its objectives. This period overlaps the next period of incubation of the conflict and some preliminary observations here seem appropriate.
The SYL's activities in this period were also helped by favorable sentiments expressed from the British quarter and by no less a personage than the British Labor Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, who raised the issue of Somali unity at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, though without the support of the other three powers consisting of France, the USA and the USSR. The idea, according to the Somalis, had gladdened their hearts(165) and so they proceeded to advocate it with greater vehemence. It was to culminate in the Mogadishu riots in January 1948(166) at the time of the visit of the Four Power Commission to investigate the whole question of disposal of ex-Italian territories to which Ethiopia was now laying claims both on historical grounds and for reasons of security of border as well as sentiment. Others soon saw the necessity to raise the issue of Jubaland previously ceded to Italy in 1925 and that it be returned to the Kenyan fold.(167) Clearly the borders seemed at the time up for realignment. Their shifting nature, which characterized the nineteenth and the first four to five decades of the twentieth centuries, had again become manifest. It was on this new development that the series of conflicts in the Horn, especially the Kenya/Somalia conflict, was inaugurated. The incubation period carries the preliminaries to the conflict a stage further into the contemporary situation. While Somali perceptions of unity and of being one people was a minority viewpoint at this time, it was the incubation period which further enhanced it. In the period which succeeded it, when Somalia attained sovereign status, the activities of men like Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, in spite of their divisive nature, began to have a more favorable interpretation among the Somali. With the growth of that consciousness other claimed heroes of the zone such as Ahmed Gran (Ibrahim al Ghazi or Gurey) began to be appropriated as Somali heroes. This was the point at which Somali consciousness of themselves as a people distinct from other Africans in the region found self-expression among Somali spokesmen and reinforced by sympathetic foreign writers. This earlier period to 1940 forms the historical background to the Kenya/Somalia border conflict.
(1) See for instance, M. Abir, Ethiopia, The era of the Princes, London, Longmans, 1968. (The text is subtitled: The Challenge of Islam and the Re-unification of the Christian Empire 1769-1855). Of course it can be validly asserted that borders shifted more in the pre-European period than when the latter gained hegemony in Africa. But even they had to augment and adjust so that in the Horn borders continued to shift until just their departure in the early 1960s. (2) Currently in abeyance because the State of Somalia is bedeviled by centrifugal tendencies approximating civil war since the overthrow of President Barre in January 1991. (3) By official policy here is meant the series of policy decisions evolved by colonial administrators on the spot to meet the contingency of movements which tended to disrupt their ordering of their respective territories and which periodically drew them into retaliatory action in the form of punitive expeditions. (4) See G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912: The Establishment of Administration in the East African Protectorate, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966. (5) See Herstlet, Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. 3 (3rd ed.), 1909, p. 948. Earlier editions pp. 665 & 667 for Protocol between Great Britain and Italy for the Demarcation of Their Respective Spheres of Influence in Eastern Africa, form the River Juba to the Blue Nile, signed at Rome, 24 March 1891; also Clive Parry (ed.), The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 175, 1891, p. 67. (6) Protocol between Great Britain and Italy defining their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa, Rome, 5 May 1894: Treaty Series, No. 15, 1894; Cmd. 7358. Parliamentary Papers. XCVI (96) of 1894 181; Map of Africa by treaty, (Hertslet) Vol. I, 410; Vol. 3, 951. (7) For a list of such agreements see V. B. Thompson, "Conflict in the Horn of Africa-The Kenya-Somalia Border Problem," London University Ph.D. thesis, 1985, pp. 511-15. (8) The treaties are numerous and a new examples will suffice here. British treaties with the Gadabursi (1884) and with the Habar Awal (1884 & 1886),French treaty with the `Iise'(1885) and the British Treaty with Ethiopia (1897). The last treaty recognized Ethiopian sovereignty over most of the Haud at a time events in the Sudan compelled Britain to seek Ethiopia's friendship. Somalia at independence refused to recognize the Treaty of 1897 and that of 1954 by which the territory reverted to Ethiopian control and thus became a source of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. There was also the concession to the French by Ethiopia in 1894 to build the Addis Ababa & Djibouti railway line. This resulted in the eclipse of the Zeila as a port and the latter declined while Djibouti prospered. The Ogaden was returned to Ethiopia in 1948. Until 1954, there were only two British civil Affairs Officers there. There were also treaties between the big powers which also affected the region such as the Franco British Treaty of 1888 to secure their frontiers. (9) See n. 4 above, loc. cit. (10) Kenya Land Commission Report: Evidence and Memoranda, 1933 (Printed in Kenya), London, HMSO, 1934 (Colonial No. 91, 3 Vols. esp. Vols. I & II). (11) Anglo-Italian Convention Cession of Jubaland in Treaty Series (G.B.) No. 29 (1925), Cmd. 2427; also Cmd. 2194. It was this settlement and the demarcation which formalized the existing Kenya-Somalia border. (12) Mungeam, op. cit. Chs. 1 & 2; also K. Ingram, "The Eastern Boundary of Uganda in 1902." Uganda Journal, XXI (1957); pp. 41-46; also his History of Fast Africa, London, Longmans, 1966, Chs. 5 & 6 and especially, p. 166-70, 181 and 205 et. seq. (13) Recent research reveals the ambivalent and vacillatory nature of British official policy. See E. R. Turton, "The Pastoral Tribes of Northern Kenya 1800- 1916," Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1970, pp. 232-38; also P. A. Kakwenzire, "Colonial Rule in the British Somaliland Protectorate 1905-1939; London University, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1976, 2 Vols.; also H. F. Prevost-Battersby, Richard Corfield of Somaliland, London, Edward Arnold, 1914, Chs. 18-19. (14) Andrew S. Caplan, "British Policy Towards Ethiopia, 1909-1919", London University, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1971; see especially pp. 126-137, 186-253, 191 et. seq. Also Kakwenzire, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 260. (15) Arnold Hodson, whose position as British Consul in Southern Ethiopia gave him the opportunity to record many such incidents. See Seven Years in Southern Abyssinia, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927. (16) See a British publication containing a schedule of raids. Cmd. 3217. H.M.S.O. Abyssinia No. 1, (1928-Correspondence concerning this). (17) James Barber, Imperial Frontier, Nairobi, EAPH, 1971. (18) Barber, Ibid., See his Chapter 13 on the expansion of the Suk, pp. 157-69. (19) Ibid., p. 163. (20) Ibid., p. 166. (21) Ibid., p. 168. (22) Quoted in Mungeam, op. cit., p. 79. (23) Ibid. (24) Negley Farson, Last Chance in Africa, London, Victor Gollancz, 1949, p. 267, 2nd ea., 1950. 25 Ibid. (26) H. Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles, Aldershott, 1956, p. 212. (27) J. Barber, op. cit., p. 180. (28) Quoted in Ibid., p. 197. (29) Ibid., p. 197. (30) Ibid., p. 196. (31) Ibid., p. 197. (32) Karamoja refers to the territory and Karimojong to the people. For a more detailed study of these people see N. Dyson-Hudson, Karimajong Politics, Oxford, 1966. (33) Barber, op. cit., pp. 197-98. (34) Quoted in Barber, op. cit., p. 209. (35) N. Farson, op. cit., p. 267. (36) Barber, op. cit., p. 220. (37) See Daily Telegraph, 23June 1944. In one encounter with "bandits" in April 1944 near Moyale the British Commissioner for the District of Moyale, Mr. William Keir, was killed in an ambush. For reports of earlier and similar raids in the area bordering Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Somali see the limes, (London), 4 December 1925. This was an attack on Ethiopian raiders by the King's African Rifles in Turkana. These increasing raids became matters of serious concern for the authorities in the entire region and for Anglo-Ethiopian diplomatic exchanges. See Morning Post, (London), also the Times, 7 September 1921, 4 December 1923; Daily Telegraph, 19 February 1924; and Hansard House of Commons 18 February 1924 for other incidents emphasizing their repetitive nature. (38) The Times, (London) 4 December 1923; also 15 February 1923. (39) The Times, 7 September 1921. It was also an indication that the border even then was fluid and that both the area and people constituted a neglected part of colonial administration as also confirmed in Negley Farson. (40) Ibid. For other incidents prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, principally on the Kenya-Ethiopian frontier see Journal Des Nations, 6 February 1936, as well as for British- Italian Somaliland border. (41) The Times, 6 June 1932; also White Paper 1928; Cmd, 3217, Abyssinia No. 1 (1928). (42) See letter of John H. Harris to Times, 15 November 1932; also New York Times, 16 November 1932; and Times, 1 December 1932. (43) The Manchester Guardian, 7 September 1935; see also the Times, 23 June 1942. (44) See for instance: Hansard, H. C., Vol. 457, Col. 78 (3 November 1948); Vol. 614, Cols. 1521-22 (4 December 1959); also Vol. 615, Cols. 95-96 (14 December 1959); Cols. 183-84 (16 December 1959); Cols. 204 (17 December 1959); Vol. 616, Cols. 113 (2 February 1960); also Kenya House of Representatives Parliamentary Debates, several volumes between 1962-1966. (45) P. Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, p. 271. (46) N. Farson, Last Chance... It was even described by some as "hell," Ibid., p. 271. For a description of the harsh environment see Ibid., p. 271, et. seq. (47) The former Northern Frontier Province which also contained Jubaland in 1922 received a prominent Kenyan political prisoner, Harry Thuku. See K. J. King (ed.), Harry Thuku: Autobiography, Nairobi, 1971, Ch. 3, p. 19-20, 22-23. (48) They were confined to the Turkana area of the Northern Frontier District. See B. Kaggia, Roots of Freedom, 1921-1963: The Autobiography of Bildad Kaggia, Nairobi, 1975, Chs. 12-17 inclusive. They spent the first three weeks in the Samburu area of Marsabit, six months at Kapenguria and later Lokitaung and then Lodwar, see p. 119. (49) H. G. C. Swayne, Seventeen Trips Through Somaliland, London, 1895. (50) The East Africa Protectorate was redesignated the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in 1920. Its precise boundaries even then were still not finally determined. (51) Charles Elliot, The East Africa Protectorate, London, 1905, pp. 180-81. Elliot was Commissioner between the years of 1901-1905. (52) Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Minister first put across the plan for Somali unity at the Paris Peace Conference in the immediate post-war period and it re-echoed both inside and outside the British Parliament. See E. Sylvia Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland, London, 1951, pp. 217-19. See p. 218 for plans of other papers and 299. Hansard H. C., Vol. 423 (14 June 1946), Cols. 1840-41; also W. R. Foran, Crown Colonist, July 1946); S. K. Aaronovitch, Crises in Kenya, London, 1947, pp. 12-13. (53) Kenya Executive Council Minutes, 11 March 1920; See reversal of policy ten years later in CO 544/14 East Africa Protectorate Executive Council Minutes 1916-1922 (Ex. Co. Mins. II March 1930, also CO 544/30: Kenya: East African Protectorate Ex Co. Mins. 14 March 1930-Clause 2. 1929- 1930. See also E. R. Turton. "The Ishaak Somali Diaspora and the poll tax agitation in Kenya 1936-1941," African. Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 No. 292 July 1974), pare. 69; Also Ibid. 1938, p. 32, pare. 69. (54) See Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, Vol. 12, 1940 (16 April-26June), Cols. 16- 17, 328; also Vol. 18 (pt. 2), 1944 (20 April), Cols. 217-218. (55) See a book written by his wife on the area: Alys Recce, To My Wife 50 Camels, London, Harvill Press, 1963. (56) One of the lasting legacies of Archer in the NFD was the survival of his name in the post which bore his name on the Uaso Nyiro River near Isiolo which later became part of the Eastern Province of Kenya. (57) Captain F. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, Vol. 1, London, 1893, p. 411. He described them as "excessively hostile and fanatical." A. H. Hardinge, A Diplomatist in the East, London, 1928, p. 220 called them "champions of resistance" also Memoirs of an East African Administrator, Edinburgh, 1963, pp. 134-35, described them as a "mercurial people" with "fanatical obsessions" and "highly excitable." Also R. F. Drake-Brockman, British Somaliland, London, 1912, pp. viii-ix and Ch. 2 refers to the Somali as a "child" needing sharp shrift treatment. Arnold Hodson, in his text cited in this work mentioned "unpleasant Somali who give both Abyssinians and ourselves a good deal of trouble," p. 259. Other samples occur in the early debates of the Kenyan Legislative Council especially for the year 1925 when the campaign against the Mohamed Zubeir was undertaken. But there were many such references in other Council reports. (58) Many accounts exist. D. Jardine, The Mad Mullah of British Somaliland; P. A. Kakwensire, thesis cited. More recently Said Samatar has done a comprehensive work on this Somali leader. See also E. R. Turton, Thesis cit. (59) Report of Kenya Commission cited above. Also Turton, thesis cited. (60) Cmd. 2427. (61) Leg. Co. Debates, 1925, Vol. II, Part II (18 August 1925), pp. 615-24. (62) F. G. Jennings, Evidence to Kenya Land Commission, Vol. 2, 1934, pp. 1649-51. (63) Sir Geoffrey Archer, Personal and Historical Memories of an East African Administrator, Edinburgh and London, 1963. British ambivalence might be seen in the attitude that after the third expedition against the Mullah it was regarded as advantageous to have driven him back into British territory where he could be more effectively handled. Yet after the fourth campaign, it was claimed as a victory to have driven him out of British territory. See Moyse-Bartlett, op. cit., p. 190, et. seq. (64) See Moyse-Bartlett, op cit., Part IV. Ch. 14, pp. 111-20; 215-27; 434-39 for punitive expeditions between 1917). (65) See also Sir A. H. Hardinge, A Diplomatist in the East, London, 1928, pp. 216-23 for his views on Juba land and the murder of Janner, he being a believer in a strong military presence there and how his intentions to invade Afmadu were countermanded by Lord Salisbury. See also Kenya National Archive (KNA hereafter), Nairobi, C. P. 1 Intelligence Reports of the Ogaden Punitive Expedition 1900, C. P. 3-C.P. 5: Jubaland outward and inward correspondence and three unreferenced files of Jubaland miscellaneous corespondence, 1901-1902. (66) Turton, op. cit., thesis, pp. 360-69 and Ch. VI of Ibid. (67) See I. M. Lewis, "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa," Journal of African History, 1, (1960), pp. 213-23. (68) For details see Turton, thesis cit. pp. 496-97 et. seq. (69) Bid., pp. 498-99. (70) Turton, op. cit., pp. 498-99. (71) Ibid., pp. 499-500. (72) Elliot, op. cit., p. 121. (73) CO 533/121, Graham, Memorandum, 25 August 1913. (74) Herbert Spencer to Secretary of State, 12 March 1909 in CO 5343/58. (75) CO 533/58, Gilkison to Herbert Spencer, 13 March 1909. (76) CO 533/139, Graham to chief Secretary. (77) The image of the Somali as a "gun carrying" group also has persisted in the thoughts of some administrators. See for instance G. Archer, op. cit., p. 135. But gun procuring and carrying was characteristic of other communities in the region as well for instance the Gabbre and Merille and even Rendille in Ethiopia. Many references to this occurred in Kenya House of Representative debate of the 1960s, during the Shifta period. (78) CO 533/139. Salkeld to Chief Secretary, 7 July 1914; also CO 533/137, 6 April 1914 (this revolved around the containing of the Somali and preventing their incursions westward or their nomadic depredations). For a later Kenyan-European settler adverse reaction to the idea of "Somali Reserve," see Leg. Co. Deuates, (14 December 1932), p.319. Also Ibid. Vol.59 (3rd Session 19 February 1954), Cols. 123-129. (79) See Gerald Reece, "The Horn of Africa," International Affairs, XXX, No. r, 1954, p. 441; also I.N. Dracapoli, "Across Southern Jubaland to the Lorian Swamp," Geographical Journal, XLII, No. 2 (1913), p. 132; also I. M. Lewis, "Modern Political Movements in Somaliland, II," Africa, pp. 356-57. (80) Plowman to OCT NFD, 4 January 1918, PC/NFD/4/1/4 Kenya National Archives. (81) E. R. Turton has done a most painstaking and detailed historical account of this evolution of "tribes" of the northern frontier region of Kenya in thesis cit. and contains a good deal of information of various phases of Somali penetration into the British East Africa Protectorate and some of their violent encounters with other groups which did not always resulted in victory for Somalis. (82) The European settlers had expressed this viewpoint. See for instance Kenya Leg. Co. Debates. Vol. 63 (4th Session 28 October 1954), Cols. 515-528, 529-549. Report of A Kenya Land Commission. 1933, op. cit.; Cmd. 5446, pp. 224-245. (83) See CO 533/123, Belfield to Harcourt, 31 October 1913; CO 533/136, Hoskins "Memorandum on the Military Situation" in British East Africa Protectorate, 6 April 1914 and W. Isaak to chief Secretary 17 March 1914; also CO 533/134, Harper Minute, 27 May 1914. (84) See for instance, D. Jardine, the Mad Mullah of British Somaliland. (85) Quoted in Turton, op. cit., p. 508. (86) FO 107/55, Craufurd to Salisbury, 13 July 1896. (87) Turton, p. 508. (88) DC/GRA/3/4 H. B. Sharpe "The Somali General History," January 1932, KNA. (89) CO 544/14. East African Protectorate Executive Council Minutes 1916-1922, Ex. Co. Meeting 11 March 1920. (90) CO 544/30. Minutes, 14 March 1930, Minutes No. 140, Clause 2. (91) See E. R. Turton, "The Ishaak Somali Diaspora and poll tax agitation in Kenya 1936- 1941 " in African Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 292 July 1974), pp. 325-46. For a people so long schooled in the art of slave raiding of other Africans in the same region the attitude, though unfortunate, is hardly surprising. Compare this with post-colonial Somali insistence on their being Africans and an indigenous people to the continent which has appeared in so many places. (92) P. A. Kakwenzire, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 21, n. 8. The controversy generated by the invention of the Osmaniya (Somali) script in 1920 by Isman Yusuf Kenadid with a view to replacing the Arabic script for long in use in some Somali circles split Somali opinion between those who preferred the Arabic to the Somali script. The prolonged debate which it had generated was only resolved by the adoption of the Roman script. But the effect of the earlier controversy between the Somali and Arabic scripts mirrored that Somali ambivalence vis-a-vis Arabs, which has persisted into the present. Somalia's joining of the Arab League in 1974 was the manifestation of this flirtation with being Arab. It is difficult to discern any consistency in what has been a history of love-hate Somali/Arab relations. (93) See Regulations No. 31 of 1900, the forerunner to The Outlying District Ordinance 1902, No. 25, Cap. 104 The Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance, (91 34), Cap. 1 05. In Laws of A Kenya 1962; also, The Official Gazette of the East Africa Protectorate, Vol. XVII, No. 403, Nairobi, 1915; Proclamation No. 1 East Africa Outlying District Ordinance 1902, p. 3, Nairobi 6 January 1915 excluding Naivasha and surrounding areas from "closed districts:, Vol. VI, No. 102, February 1, 1904: East Africa Protectorate: Removal of Natives in Special Districts Ordinance, 1904. (94) See Mungeam, op. cit. Also E. R. Turton, op. cit., pp. 19 and 364-66, et. seq. (95) C. W. Hobley, Kenya from Chartered Company to Crown Colony: Thirty years of Exploration and British Administration in British East Africa, London 1st ed., 1929, 2nd Cass, 1970, pp. 176-77. See also State Papers: Accounts and Papers, No. 11, Sir R. Coryndon to Mr. J. H. Thomas, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 April 1924, pare. 5, pp. 14-16. See memo of A. M. Champion (P. L. Turkana), 4 November 1932 to Kenya Land Commission, 1933, op. cit., pp. 1729-1730. (96) See F. C. Jennings, Kenya Land Commission, Evidence, Nairobi, 1933, Vol. 2 (Nairobi 1934), pp. 1650-51. (97) Proclamation No. 2. 1914. The Official Gazettes of the East Africa Protectorate, 8 April 1914, p. 308. Moyse-Bartlett, op. cit., p. 447; also p. 448 for other later evacuations from Moyale and problems with incursions from Ethiopia. The administration was gradually restored in 1917. (99) Adjustments were made in 1938, 1939, 1942. See Wajir Annual Report, 1919-1942, KNA. (100) For subsequent developments see Michael Blundell, African Land Development in Kenya 1946-1962, Nairobi, 1962, pp. 222-23. Also Kenya Leg. Co. Debates, (18 February 1954), Cols. 123-128; Ibid., (27 October 1954), Cols. 515-528; also (28 October 1954), Cols. 529-549. (101) See Wajir Anual Report 1944-1948; Also Blundell, op. cit. While the Mau Mau emergency was used as the excuse for failure to clarify government policy on the Somalis they were quite emphatic against the creation of "Somali Reserves." One of the speakers in the debate, Mr. Cooke, intimated that "The Somali now are naturally feeling a little bit anxious as to their future, seeing it as an urgent matter to reward their loyalty. He further observed that the failure to anticipate Somali grievances in the past had given rise to the existing situation. Kenya Leg. Co. Debates, (19 February 1954) Col. 125. For earlier consideration see the Kenya Leg. Co., (25 March 1925), Cols. 112-120 (102) Ibid. (103) Adapted from Wajir Annual Report, 1921, 1926, 1936, 1939, 1949, KNA. About 4,000 Somali were said to have been admitted into the protectorate during the first six months of 1914 (see CO 533/139, Graham to Chief Secretary). Elsewhere it was said that the Jubaland transfer of 1925 lost Kenya a population of 12,000. See Hansard, H. C., Fifth Series, Vol. 170, Col. 954. (104) See FO 371/23378, Folio J.88, 9 January 1939 for a list of "British protected Somalis" said to be recruited by Italy into their forces; also Folio M. 2543, 28June 1939 for Italian recruitment of Sudanese British subjects as was the case with Somali British subjects. (105) Eliud Mathu was the first African Member of the Kenya Leg. Co. nominated in 1944 and remained the only one (and while on leave was replaced by Mr. Walter Odede). Later they were the only two. African interests were represented by Rev. Beecher in a period when it was felt that Africans were not "ripe" to speak for themselves. The franchise was not broadened until after 1956. (106) See Mathu's reply to the Minister of African Affairs in his summing up of his Motion in the Kenya Leg. Co. Debates, Vol. 63, Col. 546 (28 October 1954). It was not the first time that Mathu spoke out for a clear and considerate government policy on the Somali. See, for instance, Kenya Leg. Co. Debates, Vol. 61, Col. 126 (19 February 1954). (107) H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, London, 1920, Vol. V, p. 390. Most British newspapers in the 1920s just before the cession of Jubaland to Italy asserted this. See for instance, the Times Manchester Guardian. Also Rennell Rodd, British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa during the Tears 1941-1947, London, HMSO, 1948. (108) Italy joined the Allies in the war in May 1915. (109) The following British newspapers in the 1920s insisted on the point that Jubaland was mentioned in the agreement, see for instance the Times, 22 February 1922; Morning Post, 10 January 1922; Manchester Guardian, 24 February 1924; Observer, 24 May 1924. (110) Temperley (ed.) op. cit., Vol. V, p. 390. Winston Churchill insists that as early as August 1914 there was a deliberate Cabinet plan to seize all German colonies in every part of the world. For details see Winston Churchill, The World Crisis (in 6 Vols.), Vol. 1, New York, Scribner, 1923, pp. 305-306. See Art. 13 Treaty of April 26, 1915, Cmd. 671 (1920); also R. L. Buell, International Relations, p. 313. (111) An examination of the Anglo-Italian River Juba Agreement of 24 December 1915, which made the proviso for a Permanent mixed Commission for the regulation of customs transit, conservation, navigation and irrigation, hardly contemplated the transfer of Jubaland. See Hansard, H. C. Fifth. Ser., Vol. 170 (3 March 1924), Cols. 954-55; also The Official Gazette of the Fast Africa Protectorate 7 June 1916, p. 416. (112) Cmd. 2194. (Anglo-Italian Treaty, 15 July 1924; also Cmd. 2427. Art. 1. Treaty Series No. 29 (1925): Treaty Between the United Kingdom and Italy Regulating Certain Questions Concerning Boundaries of Their Respective Territories in East Africa. signed at London, 15 July 1924. Ratification exchanged at London 1 May 1925. See Kenya Leg. Co. Debates, 1923, Second Session (20 August 1924), p. 9 for preliminary announcement of the agreement; also Treaty Between Italy and the United Kingdom regulating certain questions concerning the boundaries of their Respective territories defining a section of the said boundaries, exchanged at Rome, 16 and 26 June 1925. 36, League of Nations Treaty Series, 379. For British ratification of the Treaty see the Anglo-Italian Treaty (East African Territories) Act, 1925. (113) Herstlet, Map of Africa By Treaty, Vol. 1, p. 3822 (3rd ed.). See also an interesting point made by Lord Delemare in the debates at the Committee stage on the Appropriations when he observed that the sum in question had always been budgeted for and paid by Kenya whereas the British government appeared to carry the glory of paying a sum which it had never paid at any time. Kenya Leg. Co. Debates for 1924, Session II, (11 September 1924), p. 99. It was said in that debate that Kenya would gain the figure of 1,000[pounds] through the cession of Jubaland. (114) Ibid. (115) This period in Anglo-Italian relations on territorial concessions in that region of Africa (Horn) contains enough material for another paper for it set the scene for Italian imperial ambitions in Eastern Africa in the 1930s and brought closer the crises provoked by the Fascist government of Benito Mussolini in the 1930s. The grant of territory to Italy was said to be contingent on Britain and France increasing their African possessions and all at the expense of Germany at the conclusion of the First World War. (116) The remaining 14,000 square miles which were formerly part of the province remained in Kenya to become part of the Northern Frontier Province (NFD). See Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: Leg. Co. Debates, Second Session, 1925, Vol. II (11 August 1925), p. 388. See Hansard H. C., Vol. 170 (3 March 1924), Col. 954 for a figure of 33,000 and a population of 12,000 suggested by the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Thomas. (117) Cmd. 4232. Treaty Series No. 1 (1933) Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government Regarding the Control of Traffic in Game Trophies across the Frontier between Kenya and Italian Somaliland. Rome, Nov. 26, 1932. (118) Cmd. 2427, Article II (119) See Proclamation No. 54 of 1924: Kenya Official Gazette, 29 February 1924, p. 185. (120) Kenya Leg. Co. Debates 1925, Vol. 11 (11 August 1925), loc. cit. (121) Kenya Leg. Co. Debates for 1925, Vol. II, Part II (18 August 1925), pp. 615-624. Also Moyse-Bartlett, op. cit., pp. 438-39. Moyse-Bartlett puts the figure of stock obtained at 20,000 which would be more accurate, while the Leg. Co. report put it at 2,000 retained which would be on the lower side (see Leg. Co. Deb. cit. above p. 617). But the latter might have been a misprint. The sum deployed in the expedition being estimated at between 10,000[pounds] to 20,000[pounds] and regarded in some quarters as a waste of money, a charge denied by the administration. (122) Cmd. 2427. (treaty of 15 July 1924). Art. 6 and Annex. (123) The right bank of the Juba River to Port Durnford is very valuable for cultivation. (124) Cmd. 2427, Art. 9. (125) Ibid. Art. 5. (126) This sentiment is ubiquitous. (127) This sentiment is ubiquitous. (128) See L. N. King, "The Work of the Jubaland Boundary Commission," G.J., Vol. 72, (1928), p.420. (129) See above, p. 4 and 30, n. 28. (130) League Of Nations Treaty Series, (hereafter L.N.T.S.) 379. (131) See Cmd. 4491. Treaty Series No. 1 (1934). Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government Regarding the Boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland with the Agreement of the Boundary Commission. Appendices and Map, London, 22 nov. 1933). Also L.N.T.S. 337. (132) L.N.T.S. 737. (133) For details see L. N. King Report on the Work of the Jubaland Boundary Commission, 1925-28, (Typescript) Cat. No. DT. 136, Commonwealth Relations Office Library, formerly at Gt. Smith Street. London. (134) Cmd. 4491. (135) See Cmd. 4231 for work of local Commissioners. (136) Cmd. 4491, op. cit. above. (137) Cmd. 4491. Appendix 1. For full details of Appendix 11, pp. 13-35. (138) Report on Cartographic Activity in Kenya: United Nations Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa, E.CN.14/CART/4, E/CONF.43/4, p. 4. (139) Hansard H. C. Fifth Ser., Vol. 170, Col. 954 (3 March 1924). (140) Kenya Leg. Co. Debates, 1925, Vol. II, p. 389. See details of preliminaries in pp. 388-89. (141) For the relief which Kenya envisaged from the transfer see Kenya Leg. Co. Debates 1924 (11 September 1924), pp. 99-100, and (15 September 1924), pp. 179-180. The Officer commanding the troops felt that "undoubtedly") there will be savings directly after the Italians take over Jubaland. He also envisaged a reduction of troops and so military expenditure, but it was also pinned on the hope of Ethiopia's joining of the League of Nations. But he still felt it advisable to keep the troops in being prior to the disbandment while admitting that at the time it was difficult to anticipate the actual savings to the Colony but that government envisaged further economies even though this had nothing to do with the 1925 estimates presented on that occasion. (142) Moyse-Bartlett, op. cit., p. 456. (143) Kenya settlers led by Lord Delemare demanded the Kilimanjaro region as compensation for the loss of Jubaland. See Leg. Co. Debates. (144) Kenya Land Commission, 1933, p. 1651. (145) Among these laws were the following: Laws of Kenya 1962. The Outlying Districts Act, Cap. 104. The Special District (Administration) Act. Cap. 105, as amended by L. N. 459/1963. For provisions relating to the exercise of emergency powers in the area see Statutory Instrument 1963/68, Sect. 19, and Kenya Constitutional Amendment Act. No. 16 of 1966 as examples of subsequent legislation affecting the area. (146) For problems created by Somalis at trading centers such as Laikipia, Gilgil and Navaisha in the Rift Valley see Leg. Co. Debates, Vol. 1, 1926, (25 March 1926), pp. 111-120; earlier p. 25. (147) See n. 142 above. (148) The entire tenor of a publication by the political parties of the NFD in 1962 emphasizes this: see A People in Isolation, Nairobi, 1962. (149) Hansard, H. C. Vol. 458, (24 November 1948), Cols. 1224-25. (150) Ibid. (151) Examples could be found in KHR Debates, Vol. 2, (31 December 1963), Col. 23, also Vol. 4, (26 March 1965), Cols. 881-81. In a debate initiated by the KPU Opposition Party in the Kenya House of Representatives of November 4, 1966 Dr. Mungai, Kenya's Defense Minister, was even more emphatic. He said that since Jubaland as part of Kenya was given to Italy (and inherited by Somalia) if Kenya wished to make trouble with Somalia, the Kenya army would simply move into Jubaland and occupy it. See KHR Debates, Vol. 10, Pt. 2 (4 November 1966), Col. 1741. For a reference to Jubaland from Somalia see letters of Sheikh Mahmud Farah, General Secretary of the SYL, on the NFD and Jubaland to the Editor in the Somali News, 3 November 1961; also in the same issue for Mboya's insistence in Ethiopia that the NFD and Jubaland (including Kismayu) are parts of Kenya and that Jubaland be returned on the grounds that "an imperial power ceded it" to [Somalia] Italy. Farah's letter was a rebuttal of Mboya's statement. See also EAS., 30 October 1961. (152) This was done by Royal Decree of June 1, 1939. See Ommuggio Dello R. Legarione D'Italia, The Social and Economic System of Italian East Africa. Societta Editrice Di Novissima, Roma A.XVI., p. 1. Through this division the Danakils were included in Eritrea, while the people of the Ogaden (Ethiopia) were grouped with Somalia. See also FO/371/23387/1939, Frederick Adam's letter to Kelly, British Foreign Office 25 October 1939 from British Legation in Panama and enclosures (which includes the pamphlet mentioned above). (153) Ibid. (154) FO/371/23378 folio J. 4847, p. 53, et seq., 16 August 1939. (155) ibid. Colonial Secretary to S of S for Foreign Affairs communication 38447/39 of 14 September 1939; Cypher Telegram from Governor of Kenya to S of S for Colonies, 10 September 1939; also FO/371/23393 (1939) folio J.4451 /G. (156) Ibid. (157) FO/371/23378 (1939), Cypher Telegram from Officer Commanding Northern Brigade King's African Rifles to Staff Officer, African Colonial Forces, 27 August 1939, No. 130 (Secret). (158) Ibid. Colonial Secretary to S of S. Foreign Affairs communication 3844/39; Cypher Telegram from Governor of Kenya to S of S for the Colonies, 10 September 1938; Telegram Governor of Kenya to S of S for colonies No. 235, Secret in folio J.3621, 8 September 1939. (159) Ibid. (160) Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Their Finest Hour, Vol. 2, pp. 330-331. Churchill's reactions to this were far from happy for he regarded it as an "ignominious defeat for Britain." The British evacuation of British Somaliland took place on 15 August 1940. (161) FO/371/23378 (1939), 145-46. (162) Ibid. folio J.88, 9 January 1939 etc. Also folio J.2543, 29 June 1939 (for recruitment of Sudanese). (163) Ibid. (164) Ibid. Cypher Telegram from Governor of Kenya to the S of S for the Colonies, 10 September 1939, No. 239, Secret. Also FO/371/23393 (1939), folio J.3003/G Coordination of defence scheme in African dependencies: memo by Overseas Defence Subcommittee on artillery reinforcements for Kenya. Also folio J.3471/G, 28 August 1919. See Secret Copy No. 3, et. .seq. Also folio J.424/2175/66 to Mr. Kelly, No. M.0.5/65, 19 October 1939 and folio J.4451/G, (165) See n. 50 above in reference to E. S. Pankhurst and also Four Power Commission Report. UN 1948. (166) A People in Isolation, Publication of the Political Parties of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, Nairobi, 1962, p. 33. (167) Hansard, H. C. Vol. 458 (24 November 1948), Cols. 1224-25. Also Kenya House of Representatives Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 2 (31 December 1963), Col. 25; also Ibid. Vol. 2 (25 February 1964), 166-67; also Vol. 2 (17 March 1964), Cols. 1012-13; Vol. 4 (26 March 1965), Cols. 879-80 and several more.
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|Author:||Thompson, Vincent B.|
|Publication:||Journal of Asian and African Studies|
|Date:||Jun 1, 1995|
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