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The market versus the state: the Chinese press since Tiananmen.

Great changes in a society are often heralded by an unprecedented diffusion of information and debate over public affairs among individuals involved in increasingly diverse political and economic activities. This is the way civil society grows.(2) China can by no means remain an exception, no matter how much the nation's uniqueness is emphasized.(3)

There is, however, something unique about the press in China's transition to the market, namely the duality of its formal and informal roles. On the formal side, all media are required to toe the official propaganda line.(4) Press controls in China are not based upon codified censorship but are issue-specific. In order to ensure that the media interpret the news in a way favorable to the regime, the state decides what the press can and cannot report, who deals with particular issues and how these news items are to be presented. On the informal side, journalists have been attempting to break free from state control as their media seek liberties in the marketplace. Though all Chinese media have bureaucratic affiliations, their operations have been increasingly commercialized, and they can express opinions which are quite different from those prescribed by their bureaucratic affiliations.(5)

The period since the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing in June 1989 illustrates both the obstacles to press freedoms and hopes that they will grow along with the country's market-oriented reform. For the Chinese press, the past four years can be divided roughly into three periods: the setback from June 1989 to the turn of 1990; opposition to the post-Tiananmen regime's recentralization program from early 1990 to 1991; and most recently, amid more open economic debates, renewed political demands.

Before Tiananmen, an informal coalition existed between journalists and other forces pursuing market-oriented reform and greater civil liberties. Though the millions of people who have interests in a market economy might not understand the meaning of freedom of the press, their economic interests were inherently in conflict with intervention from the state. The increasing flow of information, as a necessary condition of the market, in turn fed on the demand for a redefinition of the meanings of society, individual and authority. Journalists welcomed these changes and wanted to earn the expected financial rewards and acclaim from the marketplace. During the inspiring, though very brief, moment of the mass protests in 1989, Chinese journalists proved as capable as their overseas colleagues in running a free press. Since the crackdown, however, they have been forced to resume serving their old masters at the central propaganda authorities.

The suppression of press freedoms essentially destroys both the meaning and the means of journalists' lives while the market can provide the conditions for the flourishing of both.(6) Since Tiananmen, Chinese journalists have tried tenaciously to retain a free flow of information and exchange of ideas in the face of state repression -- and they have met with certain successes. Their efforts focused on safeguarding the market; by continuing to sponsor debates, they and their coalition forces thwarted the regime's recentralization program. The program, which was slated to last until at least the end of 1992, began to collapse in 1990 and was officially abandoned in early 1992. At the same time, the press further expanded its own market.

This article will detail the developments in Chinese press freedoms since the initiation of market reforms in the late 1970s. It will demonstrate that the dynamics of market-oriented reform and greater freedom of the press have reinforced one another, although press freedoms have not yet been institutionalized, as have some market reforms. The ongoing struggle between the state and the media over the presentation and freedom of information will show that China stands at a crossroads of political and economic development: The path taken by a new generation of leaders will prove critical to the future of press freedoms. Despite the movement toward greater freedom of the press in recent years, the Chinese media still face a long march in asserting themselves amidst the historic changes occurring in China.

CHANGES IN THE PRESS SINCE THE LATE 1970s

Press debate over policy issues had been virtually unthinkable until economic reform was set in motion during the late 1970s. By the 1980s, however, such exchanges had become a significant part of Chinese politics. The debates exposed many problems that the regime had pretended to ignore. Individuals began to question nonsensical explanations given by those who had claimed to monopolize the truth. Question after question knocked the bottom out of the official ideology. At first, press debates helped individuals relate improvements in their living standards with the market's underlying concepts. For instance, people began to ask why the quality of the goods and services provided by state-owned enterprises was so poor compared to that of free market products. Economists explained that the state-owned enterprises were not yet truly free market operations, but rather bureaucratic extensions of the state. While the direct consequences of market reform were modest in the beginning, the debates eventually succeeded in drawing people away not only from old economic concepts but also from the entire ideology of the Stalinist-Maoist state.

The regime, however, was too faint-hearted to suffer more questioning. It soon tried to intervene by requiring the press to reserve 80 percent of its coverage for so-called positive reporting, or reporting favorable to the regime's image.(7) The press continued to host critical opinions of Chinese intellectuals who were calling for price reform, a new ownership structure and political liberalization. The notion of neo-authoritarianism, an idea first raised in late 1986, sparked a debate over political theories that lasted for more than two years. Both the advocates and opponents of this concept were removed from Marxist orthodoxy, which illustrated how free these debates were from state control.(8)

Freedom of the press was also addressed more candidly than ever before. Journalists, including those long affiliated with the Communist Party, began to urge reform of state press policies. They argued that the press be divided into a party press and a non-party press; that it facilitate the spread of political opinions -- including objections -- before decisions were made; and that non-party political journals be established "to provide a forum for free discussion."(9) They demanded that each news organization be granted "adequate decision-making power," that the Communist Party "keep interference to a minimum" and that the multiple functions of the media and the "opinions of editors and readers" be institutionalized.(10) Throughout this period, journalists strove to show that they chose to support the general direction of the changes in Chinese society, and that they were not acting out of loyalty to certain pro-reform power factions.

Amid the early efforts at market-building, the press also began to experience major structural changes. First, the number of press outlets increased, and their sponsorship became more decentralized. The number of publicly circulated newspapers grew to more than 1,600 in 1988 from only 200 ten years earlier.(11)

There are several reasons for the proliferation of press outlets during this era. Since the early 1980s, one bureaucratic institution after another had become interested in running its own newspaper. The state, besieged by a severe economic crisis, had shifted its priorities from pure ideology to development. This change forced the regime to take on more diverse operations as the division of functions between ideological and economic bureaucracies became more distinct. Of the economic bureaucracies, some were virtual national monopolies complete with work forces of more than a million each. The ideological bureaucracies were too dogmatic and slow to formulate useful operational policies. And the media under their direct control were too few and too unfamiliar with economic affairs. This encouraged the various economic bureaucracies to seek self-reliance in information services. In turn, this development broke down the monopoly that the central ideological authorities held over the media.

The second structural change of the press in the 1980s involved the emergence of a media market. With the increase in the number of the media, a circumscribed -- though one with much potential -- information market appeared. The media with loose state associations, the local media, the press under the central ideological authorities' direct control and the print and television media began to compete for audiences. During this time, television sets became one of the most popular durable goods in Chinese households.(12) Consequently, the burgeoning advertising business also provided the potential for the media's financial autonomy.

The third change was in the personnel structure of the press. The media expanded due to the need to employ the millions of rehabilitated intellectuals who had been victims of persecution and labor re-education, a Chinese version of the Soviet Gulag. Chinese universities also produced more than 5,000 graduates of journalism between 1984 and 1989. The press corps numbered about 70,000 in 1985 and was composed mostly of university graduates from the humanities and social sciences.(13) In 1988, total employment in the press and publishing industry had risen to about 600,000.(14) Many young journalists were either related to the persecuted intellectuals or had themselves experienced labor reeducation, and they tended to share the sensitivity of intellectuals from other fields. They sought the respect of their educated compatriots, while the bureaucrats habitually viewed journalists only as lifeless components of the state propaganda machine. The irony is that most Chinese journalists may be the least qualified propaganda cadres: A regime that is insensitive to their demands and concerns can easily transform journalists into angry protestors and subversive entrepreneurs, as was the case in 1989.

TIANANMEN AND ITS IMPACT

Between April and June 1989, student-led protests against official corruption and the lack of political democralization broke out in Beijing and in nearly every major Chinese city.(15) The regime closed down the World Economic Herald, a regular forum of its critics.(16) This action only provoked journalists -- as well as people from all walks of life -- to join the protests. More than 1,000 Beijing-based journalists signed a petition calling for a dialogue with the Communist Party leaders and for more press freedoms. Freedom of the press, became a catch phrase of the new democracy movement.(17)

The regime then imposed martial law in Beijing, a move which was met with nonviolent resistance. Accompanied by tanks, the troops enforcing martial law blasted their way into Tiananmen Square in downtown Beijing, killing up to 1,000 civilians. In the following months, thousands of people were arrested in connection with the protest movements.(18)

The press -- not the student demonstrators -- were the first victims of the crackdown, presenting a classic case of tactics used by a repressive regime to crush the opposition.(19) The press were described by the post-Tiananmen regime as one of the "hardest-hit disaster zones" of the proliferation of liberal ideas and protest activities; journalists were blamed for having "turned their backs" on the Communist Party.(20)

The real disaster, however, came after the crackdown when the regime silenced many of China's independent voices. Familiar bylines and voices disappeared, and leaders of earlier press debates were barred from publishing. The regime restricted the personal freedom of senior editors who had held influential positions and had been regarded as role models by younger journalists.(21) Dozens of economists were arrested, forced into exile or barred from teaching and conducting research. The remaining leaders of market-related economic research had to keep a low profile.

Thousands of journalists were victims of persecution, ranging from forced submission of self-criticism and re-indoctrination to imprisonment or exile. Those editors and reporters of the World Economic Herald and the New Observer(22) who were not arrested or exiled, were denied the right to work for more than a year. Disobedient journalists from the People's Daily, the China Youth News, the Workers' Daily,(23) China Central Television and the Central People's Broadcasting Station(24) were dismissed from their jobs. At the People's Daily, at least 597 of 700 editorial staff members were blacklisted for alleged political problems, and four were imprisoned. Between 1989 and 1992, China had more journalists in jail than any other nation during the same period; at least 26 journalists were arrested for political reasons.(245) Communist Party ideological authorities forced changes in leading personnel within many media organizations. "At that time," recalled an editor of the People's Daily, "I thought any day police might show up at my house to arrest me. The whole feeling was one of terror."(26)

Public debate over reform of ownership structure, public finance, economic legislation and the central-regional division of power were suspended. Support for open debate or for the market was viewed by the regime as bourgeois liberalism, a label given by the regime to an alleged conspiracy aimed at corrupting China's socialism with capitalism. The tentative experiment with greater autonomy for the press from 1986 to 1988, was smeared by the state as an "editor-in-chief doing-whatever-he-wants-to-do system" and declared unacceptable.(27)

During the persecution of intellectuals and journalists, the economic recentralization program was in full swing under the pretext of inflation control. The regime slowed economic growth; reduced the autonomy of local economies; reinstated the monopoly over production materials; protected state-run enterprises from market competition; reduced the size of industrial ventures run by rural communities and private investors; and placed severe limits on private enterprises in urban areas.(28) This was exactly what the intellectuals had feared: After the crackdown in Tiananmen, there would be a reversal of both political and economic reforms.

THE REACTION FROM THE PRESS: DEBATES OVER ECONOMIC POLICIES

By 1992, the autonomy of the media had compounded the pressures on the regime to reinstitute market reforms. Though all media were required to represent the hardliners' policies, many began to raise a different line of argument in early 1990. At a time when political debates were impermissible, the press was still able to build a bulwark on the economic front. Finally, in 1992, the Chinese regime made an about-face in economic reform when it realized the need for economic liberalization.

According to a November 1989 decision by the Communist Party Central Committee, the campaign to restore central planning was to extend for "three years or even longer."(29) The government dubbed the program economic rectification. Economists put forward mildly worded suggestions in late 1989 and early 1990 that rectification would be subordinated to the goals of the early reforms and would eventually improve the industrial structure.(30) In reality, however, the regime sought to recentralize control over the economy and to reverse many earlier reforms.

By the end of 1990, it was clear from accounts in the Chinese press that rectification had created more problems than it had solved. Every day, the media were filled with accounts of negative growth rates in state-owned industry, falling sales, defaults in debt payments, rising stockpiles of unmarketable inventories and declines in employment and rural income levels. China's GNP grew by only 3.9 percent in 1989, and rural income failed to rise in real terms.(31) In 1990 -- when overall inflation declined -- the GNP rose 5 percent, as rural income grew by 1.8 percent.(32) Although the Chinese economy continued to grow, these figures must be examined in the context of rapid growth elsewhere in East Asia. Between 1980 and 1988, China's GNP had grown by almost 10 percent annually, nearly matching South Korea's growth during its economic boom.(33) Between 1989 and 1991, industrial performance in China obviously deteriorated, as the regime itself later admitted.(34)

The post-Tiananmen regime had clearly been overambitious in its rectification program. First, it miscalculated the international situation: Any chance for economic and political alliance with the "socialist brothers" in Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union made it impossible for China, with already about 30 per cent of GNP tied to the world market, to seek a major change in its trading pattern.(35) From Moscow and Eastern Europe, as from anywhere in the world, Beijing could receive no sympathy for its military crackdown on the non-violent domestic protestors. Nor could it initiate the kind of special economic relations that the East bloc states had once shared.(36)

Second, the regime also failed to understand that market forces are irreplaceable and do not respond to military force. The information market had become somewhat autonomous, particularly given the structural features of the press. The number of the media had continued to grow even after Tiananmen: Despite the campaign to close down or merge media outlets, the number of newspapers grew to 1,755 by the end of 1992 while magazines topped the 3,000 mark.(37) In addition, the previous reforms had invested various bureaucratic institutions with greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the central authorities. These institutions -- along with their media outlets -- would not surrender their new leverage without considerable incentive.

Another important reason for the failure of recentralization was the increase in the media's financial autonomy. The expansion of the information market made it more difficult for the regime to exercise control over the press by financial means. The media sponsored by institutions other than the central bureaucracies had learned to supplement their operational budgets through increasing ideologically neutral entertainment content and advertising. In 1992, newspaper-advertising income totalled 960 million yuan ($170 million), or 13 times that earned in 1983. One third of China's newspapers had reportedly achieved financial autonomy as of 1992.(38)

The press was also able to maintain some autonomy because of the regime's inability to effect major changes in the personnel structure of the media. The size of the Chinese press corps now exceeds 80,000, having been supplemented by additional university graduates, many of whom had actually been frustrated protestors in 1989. At the same time, a number of scholars and writers remained as editors of their journal,(39) including prominent economists such as Jiang Yiwei and Wu Jinglian.(40) Jiang and Wu were editors of Reform and Comparative Economic and Social Systems, respectively. Because of their editors' stature, opinions in those journals are likely to be reprinted or reflected in the popular press.

At the beginning of the recentralization program, many newspapers adhered to the party line. For instance, the Economic Daily, under the control of the Chinese cabinet and apparently reflecting the prime minister's view, used the word sluggish only in quotation marks in 1989. This was an attempt to deny the validity of claims that economic growth was slowing and to convince its readers that nothing was really happening.(41) In 1990, the newspaper removed the quotation marks when the regime declared that the problem was sectoral and that stockpiled inventories could be sold in the rural market.(42) The problem was admitted as if it were not serious, and would soon be solved. In early 1991, the Economic Daily had no choice but to admit, implicitly, that there was discontent, as market-oriented reform had actually ground to a halt.(43)

In defiance of the central leaders' line, the Farmer's Daily, reflecting the concerns of China's agricultural officials and reform specialist's, published front-page editorials reporting that rural income levels had been on the decline due to the downsizing of rural industries and an increase in bureaucratic levies.(44) The rural population could not afford the unmarketable goods that the regime had expected them to absorb. In 1991, news continued to come from the country's grain-producing regions that the prices of farm materials were still rising, while the prices paid by the state for purchases of farm products dropped to a new low.(45)

After a time, even some of the Economic Daily's own columns began to attribute the mounting economic problems to the regime's policy of deliberately restraining overall income levels in order to generate compulsory savings. The additional savings were then used to bail out money-losing, state-run enterprises. In essence, they pointed out, the recession was not just sectoral but was more widespread and deep.(46) By late 1990, the Economic Daily went on to report that so-called chain debt -- mutual defaults on debt payments -- among enterprises was so rampant in the state sector that it had topped 100 billion yuan ($18 billion).(47)

By the end of 1990, economists were declaring that all the efforts to rescue the state-owned enterprises were useless. Virtually nothing had been done -- or could be done -- to fix the industrial structure after the waste of so much capital.(48) After the press discredited the regime's justifications for its unworkable rectification program, the need to reaffirm market-oriented reform became critical. The China Business Times reported in mid-1991:

First, it is by no means normal that economic growth, when efficiency

remains low, can rely on such huge increases in the supply

of working capital. The current growth model would be just unthinkable

in a western market economy, for [enterprise'] failure

to keep the flow of working capital would lead to bankruptcy

This ... will more easily cause low efficiency as well as inflation ....

The growth policy [of 1991] should therefore be readjusted.

Second, in 1990, the increase in the wage income of urban workers

exceeded the increase in the GNP and investment in the fixed assets.

The latter registered only a minus increase in 1989. Continuing low

investment, as proved by the experience of other countries, will

hardly be able to support the economy to grow "in a sustained and

steady way."(49)

This time, quotation marks were used to remind readers of the type of growth that the regime had promised after Tiananmen. This contrasted with the Economic Daily's above-mentioned use of quotes to deny the sluggishness of the economy. Quotation marks are used in the Chinese language as an expression of serious doubt or cynicism. After the failure of rectification, however, the regime could no longer scorn its critics but instead became a target of contempt. The press, however, remained cautious in its exposure of the regime's failures. The editor of the quoted piece felt compelled to take the precaution of depositing it in a discrete corner on an inside page, thus compromising the potential effect of the communication. The modus operandi for evading Beijing's ideological radar system also included burying an article's message in the middle of the piece; the controversial point would often follow a "however" and would include a few totally contradictory modifications that would essentially suggest a general crisis. For example:

However, despite all that has been done so far to fix the problems,

the economic readjustment program still cannot be said to have

won a decisive victory. The program apparently needs a little

tune-up now because some of its achievements are being detracted

by certain side effects, such as the sluggish market and dwindling

growth rate of industry as a whole.(50)

In October 1990, the first tide of pro-market arguments began to roll in at an economics conference convened by the Reform. The meeting was the first of its kind since Tiananmen and was depicted as a "parade" of economists by the press, a word reminiscent of the 1989 petition march by intellectuals. This was, to be sure, a practical petition march for the market. Liberal economists "defended the market-oriented reform as realistic and effective in promoting the nation's economy."(51) But the political atmosphere was still too harsh for the press to report on economist Wu Jinglian's fierce challenge to the president of Beijing University -- installed after Tiananmen -- for his poorly-grounded attacks on the market-oriented reform.

A few months later, pro-market arguments emerged in the Shanghai press in a more systematic, though still moderate, manner. The Liberation Daily, an organ of the Communist Party Shanghai Municipal Committee, published four editorials calling for more "emancipation of minds," a slogan first proposed in the Chinese press in the late 1970s and unheard of since Tiananmen. They went so far as to suggest that Shanghai should become "a socialist Hong Kong."(52)

Clips and copies of these editorials were distributed among journalists in Beijing, many of whom wanted to print similar views. But the central ideological authorities piled up denunciations of the market in the Beijing media.(53) The Liberation Daily editorials were reprinted only in the daring Reform. The call for "adding to the weight of the reform," however, was echoed in other press outlets.(54)

There were myriad issues in the market that sustained press debates. Among the most notable were the heavy waste of public funds by the state-run enterprises, bureaucratic levies and the state's payment of IOUs to farmers for grain procurement, which

were assets that could not be redeemed until months later and that carried no interest payments. Yet these issues could still only be discussed as purely academic debates, couched in a curious blend of economic terms and vague, newly-coined technicalities. This kind of discussion could speak only to intellectuals. But such exchanges were free from interference by the central ideological authorities, who were ignorant of macroeconomic principles.

The media were also able to touch the emotions of their audiences by associating these discussions with certain incidents in people's everyday lives. This was a tactic used exclusively by journalists. The regime could only promise that economic conditions would improve. But as long as the economy stagnated, the press debates would continue. And as long as the press debates continued, the regime could exercise little effective control over the press.

In the beginning of 1992, faced by mounting dissatisfaction at home and the collapse of the Soviet Union abroad, Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping was forced to abort the recentralization program that had been slated to last until 1992. Economic liberalization appeared to be the only viable policy alternative.(55) This opening for market reform caused debates to multiply, since the number of issues had also burgeoned. Since mid-1992, when economic growth began to pick up, opinions expressed in the press have involved an array of concerns: the relation between growth and inflation; labor reform and workers' welfare; land transactions and their environmental impact; and the crisis of rural development and population. Debate over economic policies has nearly recovered to the intensity of the pre-Tiananmen level. Though there is not yet a frank discussion of economic and political reform, there is now open space for a straightforward presentation of important messages, and editors no longer have to tuck them away at the bottom of inside pages.(56) The messages are, as a result, more often picked up by foreign news services, and communication on these issues has improved.(57)

CONTINUING DEBATES: THE CRY FOR DEMOCRACY

The Chinese Communist Party permitted the development of a so-called socialist market economy in October 1992.(58) A shift to a free market, however, does not simply entail a change of slogan, but requires a different state philosophy. This pressure for a new way of thinking is the most important side-effect of marketization that central ideological authorities are unable to prevent. Without the support of political institutions, including an institutionalized free press, what economic opportunities can be secure? It was not surprising that the heated debates over economic policies of the 1980s spilled over to other issues including the question of widespread institutional reform. The shape of this reform has been expressed as democracy.

The role of the press stands out in every major democratic transformation in modern time.(59) The political and economic significance of freedom of the press can be appreciated from a number of perspectives. First, freedom of expression can be viewed as a universal human right. An independent press and the right to free expression have been treated as two of the most important civil liberties since the eighteenth-century revolutions in Western Europe and North America. In the twentieth century, these liberties have been codified by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.(60)

Second, press freedom must be viewed within the context of intellectual movements. Diffusion of knowledge and information is a necessary condition for individuals to make rational choices and take political action and is a powerful challenge to the domination of any single ideological tenet. Since the Enlightenment, the struggle for freedom of the press has been a critical component to resistance against internally and externally imposed tyrannies, as well as domestic tyrants.(61) In the same vein, a free press serves as a component of the public infrastructure, one which allows liberal democracy to function over an extensive territory and in diverse social conditions.

Third, a free press serves as a resource for economic development. Numerous Third World developmental disasters, such a famines, can be in part ascribed to the lack of a free, press.(62) An information service independent enough to expose the negative consequences of state policies is a basic condition for society's general welfare. China's 1957 persecution of 300,000 intellectuals, including journalists, paralyzed the objective functioning of the media when the great famine of 1958 to 1961 took place, which claimed between 15 and 30 million lives.(63) If the Chinese press had remained as stifled after Tiananmen as it had been. in the early 1960s, the recentralization program could have triggered a great economic disaster.

Since the end of 1992, direct challenges to the official ideology have resurfaced from a press emboldened by the renewed vitality of economic freedom. For example, in February 1992 an article calling for "a democracy compatible with market competition" was published in Wuhan, shortly after Deng's preaching about "using capitalism.(64) Two months later, a researcher from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Journalism published a defense of a free press, which argued that allowing only one voice to represent more than a billion people could only create another Soviet Union -- a sudden collapse and no chance for stability and development.(65) In August, four editors of the People's Literature demonstrated the courage to defy the control of the Ministry of Culture: They submitted a joint resignation and wrote an open letter in protest of the attempt by the editor-in-chief, a post-Tiananmen appointee, to "reduce literature to ideology's housemaid or henchman."(66)

In September, an appeal for the right to free access to information appeared in the Liberation Daily:

If we really want to have an open China, we must first have an

open press. That means opening up the press: Journalists have the

right to interview, the media have the right to report and the public

have the right to know.(67) Officials of the state-controlled All-China journalists' Association declared that clear rules were needed to stop the frequent infringement of reporters' rights.(68)

These were just two of the opinions aired after Ji Anguo, the editor-in-chief of the Shanghai Legal News, brought legal proceedings against the court of Nanyang City for barring one of the paper's reporters from covering a court case in July 1992. The provincial court refused to accept the case.(69) Ji, himself a lawyer, appealed to the national Supreme People's Court which, at the time of writing, had not responded. Chinese observers, who said that the case was the only known instance of a news organization suing a court, regarded it as a barometer of China's commitment to the rule of law.

At the same time, the broadcast media seem to be gaining ground in sponsoring debates. The increasing availability of tele phones has enabled listeners to raise anonymous questions on talk-show radio programs.(70) Television services with looser state associations are also said to be in the works. These developments are occurring most often in regions where more liberal economic policies are in place and investment activities are more active.

It would be naive to expect the culprits of Tiananmen to learn to respect the freedom of the press any time soon. Indeed, the struggle between state power and the press became more dramatic in late 1992. The Beijing magazine Future and Development was banned for publishing articles by two scholars on political democratization.(71) Two books containing critiques of the official ideology were also banned.(72) The December 1992 edition of the Shanghai-based Life Weekly was confiscated for discussing personnel changes in the military.(73) As a sort of counteroffensive, Hu Jiwei, the disgraced former director of the People's Daily, argued in a local newspaper for "free and equal debates" of issues related to democracy.(74)

At the same time, the non-political press has greatly expanded its everyday content to meet the changing interests and lifestyles of the Chinese people. A growing number of newspapers publish weekend editions that eschew the more restricted political news reporting. In the major cities, broadcast media offer more programs and radio call-in shows. Rush-hour traffic reports for commuters have emerged. The state-run broadcast program in Shanghai has even taken to airing late-night sex tips for adults.

These changes are not enough for some observers in China. For instance, Gan Xifen, journalism professor at the People's University of China in Beijing, has argued that the regime is still at the beginning of reform, confining itself to tinkering with the old system. He contends that new touches of color in media's content alone cannot bring about serious press reform in China; the ultimate problem is the lack of overall reform.

Many newspapers carry little substance. Most of their coverage is

about leading cadres, official institutions, and certain things they

want the masses to be informed of. Rarely do they reflect the

demands of the latter. Although they claim to keep in touch with

the realities, they are actually far removed from the realities.... The

press should have many voices.(75)

THE FUTURE: A LONG MARCH IN A SHORT TIME

There is ample evidence that, since Tiananmen, the Chinese regime has continued to lose the ideological power that political scientists regard as a mainstay of totalitarianism.(76) It was this authority that allowed Mao Zedong to conceal his policy blunders, such as the economic fiasco that caused China's great famine from 1959 to 1961. The ability of many dissidents to flee China -- even after three years in hiding -- proves that the credibility of the official ideology, as a system of state power, is deeply flawed. Nowadays, Chinese citizens tend either to ignore or respond with contempt to the regime's efforts at social integration. Official campaigns, such as the one emulating the late Lei Feng, Chairman Mao's model soldier, have yielded only a marginal effect.(77) To gain the acquiescence of the people., however, the regime must pay a price: Allow its citizens to benefit from an open marketplace. Though economic reform is presented as an official campaign, it is really an exchange between the state and the people, one that erodes the regime's ideological power.

Now that the state has only a few worn-out tricks to deal with the press, how much can the media pressure the regime? Chinese journalists still face great obstacles to planting the roots of freedom of the press in Chinese society.

At the moment, this author's view is that many journalists are still unsure about the prospects for immediate change, though increasing numbers are openly ridiculing the regime. Chinese citizens who have travelled to the former Soviet Union have returned with reports of disorder and low standards of living. They fear that west am money alone would be insufficient to salvage an economic collapse on such a colossal scale. Many in the West view post-communist Russia as a nation struggling with an anarchic economic system and a rampant black market; many Chinese realize that the same problems are fermenting in their own society as well.(78) A hard reality of history is that China has had only 10 years experience with press debate and little democratic tradition. At the present time, there does not exist a ready alternative for change.(79) The overseas democracy groups, which always have problems among themselves and are poorly organized, have yet to represent an alternative.

But these obstacles only indicate that press freedoms in China are all the more critical. Chinese journalists have found that if they can relate new theoretical concepts to concrete stories, they can enrich the new experiences of their audiences.

For example, no one -- except a few economists -- seems to have understood the effects of market-oriented reform in China. Even journalists had plenty of misgivings. Establishing a market, after three decades o state involvement in the economy, requires mass re-education. Yet the people do seem to have learned -- partly from the press -- to budget their money, to manage their businesses and -- more importantly -- to pass critical judgement on state policies from the point of view of their own interests. Millions of Chinese have become small business owners; in rural areas alone, there are 19 million non-farm businesses outside state control.(80) Furthermore, when the demand for official political publications flagged in 1992, the appetite for business readings surged.(81)

Human rights is another area in which the press can make a positive contribution. No journalists, except those at the official New China News Agency, have signed substantive reports to back up the regime's whitewash of its human rights record.(82) Journalists themselves are occasionally harassed by the police, driven out of courtrooms, have had their film exposed and cameras smashed and have even been charged as counterrevolutionaries. They are not, however, supposed to protest these abuses, and it is impossible for them to investigate political scandals. Consequently, they seek to report on successful lawsuits by citizens against state bureaucracies -- although such legal action often concerns less politically sensitive, economic or civil matters. The image of citizens taking legal action against the state has been echoed by television playwrights, novelists and film makers. It is this type of attention that generates ideas of individual rights.

The Chinese media still have much to achieve in at least several areas. First, they must struggle for autonomy. The Shanghai Legal News case reflects a theme in the debate over the role of media in China. This attempt by a news organization to establish legal status could open the door for legal equality with the Communist Party and would mark a break from the long-standing relationship between the state and the press. And the debate over China's major political and economic reform -- including the drafting of laws concerning the freedom of the press -- will allow journalists to expand informal networks and coalitions with other social forces.

The development of a market economy is an important step toward the financial autonomy of the media. State revenues are falling; in 1991, the government collected nearly 20 percent of GNP, in contrast to 35 percent in 1978.(83) As state financing shrinks, and the size of the media increases, more outlets have sought greater advertising revenues.

Technologies have also allowed the media to elude the regime's remaining media controls. Chinese media are now equipped with more international direct-dial telephones, fax machines, word processors and typesetting technologies. Rapid changes in the market now outstrip the time-consuming and ambiguous centralized policy formulation.

Second, the Chinese media must continue to sponsor press debates, an important way to foster the growth of democracy. Although Walter Lippmann has warned of the danger in expecting the press to replace democratic institutions entirely, China may be an opposite case.(84) There are still no institutions other than the market and the press that enable large numbers of individuals to exchange goods and ideas. Citizens cannot organize their own political organizations and activities; no social movements exist; police closely monitor political and non-political gatherings. The press is not yet identified by the regime as a public institution. Instead, the debates substitute as a type of public forum, enabling citizens to identify their interests, form groups and raise demands.

As the market provides an endless supply of topics, debates over economic affairs continue, mostly under the leadership of China's economists. While sociologists' opinions are also reflected in the press, the debate over law reform, political theories and institutions, the institutionalization of the discussion requires more attention.

Third, the press must also make the political process more open to guarantee the citizens' right to know. An area that demands the media's attention involves the activities of the national and local legislatures, which are still largely rubber stamps of the regime. It would be interesting to know how much power the National People's Congress will assume as the old generation of leaders leaves the scene.

Finally, the press must support initiatives in political and economic reforms, on the central, local and individual levels. Since the early 1980s, the press have discovered and introduced to China a series of developmental models for rural reform and rural enterprises. Those models are still valid. In 1988 and 1989, the New Observer, the World Economic Herald and Economics Weekly worked together to promote political reform in Zhuozi County, Inner Mongolia.(85) On the individual level, in present-day China, entrepreneurs who succeed in the market and farmers who protest against bureaucratic levies are viewed as role models, much more so than Chairman Mao's stoic model soldier.

These challenges amount to a new long march for the Chinese press. The real question is not how long it will take for the press to meet these demands. Rather, it is a matter of how far journalists are able to press the regime in their efforts at any given time. Those powerful old men in Beijing will not live much longer, and they will leave behind plenty of problems, only some of which have been addressed in this article. No matter who emerges as China's ruler, if he does not brave these difficulties, he will not be likely to secure power. But if he does, the next leader of China will have to rule through bargains and negotiations and seek solutions through debates and democratic channels. Tanks can resolve none of China's problems. (1.) The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Sophia Woodman of Human Rights in China and Allison Liu Jernow of the Committee to Protect Journalists. (2.) For more on the emergence of the Western bourgeois society, see Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). For more on the role of the press in the eighteenth-century bourgeois revolutions, see Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, "On Revolution and the Printed Word," in Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich, eds., Revolution in History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) pp. 186-205; and Jeffrey A. Smith, Printers and Press Freedom: The Ideology of Early American Journalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). (3.) China's so-called uniqueness can be approached in two ways. One is for a Chinese political group to use it to justify its strategy, by pointing to certain apparent differences between the country's historical experience and cultural forms and those of the West. It is often used by the regime -- dynastic, pre-revolutionary or the present -- to serve its conservative-policy priority. See Andrew J. Nathan, China Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). The second approach is reflected in the studies of the historical conditions of the Chinese state. Development in China, compared with the Western experience, may have had certain special constraints and may require a more complicated process. See Elizabeth J. Perry and Ellen V. Fuller, "China's Long March to Democracy," World Policy Journal 8, no. 4, Fall 1991, pp. 663-85; Martin K. Whyte, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?" in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed., State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992) pp. 77-101. (4.) Although the Chinese constitution endorses freedom of the press, it is a constitution of one-party rule, subjecting the entire society to Communist Party leadership. There are no legal specifications to safeguard the press from official intervention. (5.) Although much of this article will examine the print media, it does not suggest that the role of China's broadcast media is less important. This focus is mainly because of the technical difficulties of documenting content of broadcasts and because of the heavy state surveillance of the television media. (6.) This is said against the backdrop of market-oriented reform that has enabled citizens to break away from the rigid social institutions that China inherited. For analysis of such urban and rural institutions, see Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989); and Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986). (7.) See Hu Yaobang, "On the Party's journalism Work," 8 February 1985, in New China News Agency, The People's Republic of China Yearbook, 1986 (Beijing: New China News Agency, 1986) p. 558. (8.) See Barry Sautman, "Debate Over Neo-Authoritarianism During the Reform Years,' China Quarterly, no. 129 (March 1992) pp. 73-102. (9.) Press Reform Urged," China Daily, 4 August 1986, p. 4. (10.) Xiangpu, "Media Reform Stirs Lively Public Debate," China Daily, 29 September 1986, p. 4. (11.) Judy Polaumbaum, "Chinese Journalism Since the Tragedy of Tiananmen," in W.A. Joseph, ed., China Briefing, 1991 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992) pp. 57-76. In addition, some 4,000 newspapers and periodicals, called "internal publications," were circulated to a restricted audience. See Marlowe Hood, "All the News Not Fit to Print: China's Internal Media," China Forum Newsletter (April 1992) pp. 14, (May 1992) pp. 1-2. (12.) The number of television sets per 100 persons increased from 0.3 in 1978 to 13.2 in 1988. However, the percentage was much higher in the cities than in the rural areas. State Statistical Bureau Social Statistical Department, China Social Statistical Data 1990 (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1990) p. 83. (13.) New China News Agency, The People's Republic of China Yearbook 1986, pp. 560-3; J. Polumbaum, "The Tribulations of Chinese Journalists After a Decade of Reform," in Chin-Chuan Lee, ed., Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism (New York: Guilford, 1990) pp. 33-68; and J. Polumbaum, "Chinese Journalism Since the Tragedy of Tiananmen." (14.) See China Social Statistics Data, 1988. (15.) For a general introduction to the events of Tiananmen, see Michael Fathers and Andrew Higgins, Tiananmen: The Rape of Peking (London: Doubleday, 1990); for social background and impact, see Tony Saich, ed., The Chinese People's Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); George Hicks, ed., The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen (Essex, UK: Longman, 1990); for documentation, see Suzanne Ogden, Kathleen Hartford, Lawrence R. Sullivan and David Zweig, eds., China's Search for Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement of 1989 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992). (16.) The World Economic Herald was based in Shanghai but was active in Beijing. It was sponsored by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the Association of World Economics and was banned in 1989. (17.) For more on protest activities by the Journalists, see Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco, CA: China Books, 1989) pp. 10943; Linda Jakobson, "Lies in Ink, Truth in Blood," (Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center discussion paper D-6, Harvard University, 1990); and Allison Liu Jernow, Don't Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era (New York: Committee to Protect journalists, 1993). (18.) No official account of civilian casualties has ever been provided. However, the figure used here has been consistent in the reports made by all major nongovernmental human rights organizations since 1989. See Asia Watch, Punishment Season: Human Rights in China After Martial Law (New York: Asia Watch, 1990); and Amnesty International Report 1992 (New York: Amnesty International, 1992) pp. 88-89. For military actions, see China in Crisis: The Role of the Military (Surrey, UK: Jane's Defense Data, 1989); and Timothy Brook, Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). (19.) See Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship," in Comparative Politics 24, no. 3 (April 191)2) pp. 285-6. (20.) Jiang Zemin, the post-Tiananmen general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, said this at one of the official conferences to launch the purge of Journalists. The other disaster zones- were said to be the research of social theories -- including economics, higher education, and literature and art. (21.) These figures included: Hu Jiwei, the former director of the People's Daily, which is an organ of the Communist Party Central Committee; Wang Ruoshui, the former acting editor of the People's Daily; Qin Benli, the former editor of the World Economic Herald, who died in 1990; Sun Changjiang, the former acting editor of Science and Technology Daily, which is associated with the State Science and Technology Commission. (22.) The New Observer was sponsored by the then fairly independent All-China Writers' Association. it was based in Beijing-and banned in 1989. (23.) The Workers' Daily and the China Youth News are organs of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the Communist Youth League Central Committee respectively. (24.) China Central Television and the Central People's Broadcasting Station are both controlled by the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television. (25.) See Attacks on the Press, 1990 (New York: Committee to Protect journalists, 1991) pp. 7, 45-8; Attacks on the Press, 1991 (New York: Committee to Protect journalists, 1992) pp. 19-21, 6-9, 70-3; and A.L. Jernow, pp. 137-40. The Committee to Protect journalists has reported 24 Tiananmen-related arrests of journalists. According to other sources, however, there were at least two more arrests. (26.) Jernow, p. 62. (27.) Yu Quanyu, "On the Editor-in-Chief Responsibility System," Economic Information, 18 September 1989, p. 4. (28.) The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Decision on Furthering Rectification and Deepening Reform" (Excerpts), People's Daily, 17 January 1990, pp. 1-3. (29.) ibid.. The main points of the hardliners' attacks on the market economy are quoted in Wu Jinglian, Planned Economy or Market Economy (Beijing: China Economics Press, 1993), pp. 60-1, 112-4 and 170. (30.) See Xue Muqiao, "Remember Historical Experience; Resolutely Implement the Policy of Improving the Economic Environment and Straighten Out the Economic Order," People's Daily, 18 December 1989, p. 6; Liu Guoguang, "On the Relationship Between Improving the Economic Environment and Straightening Out the Economic Order, on the One Hand, and Deepening the Reform, on the Other," People's Daily, 2 February 1990, p. 6; and Wu Jinglian, "Economic Development Faces a New Stage in which Reforms will Promote Readjustment," Reform, no. 1 (1990) pp. 6-11. (31.) The index of rural income is important because it also reflects the conditions of rural industry, a mainstay of the economy outside the central control. State Statistical Bureau, "Statistical Communique of the People's Republic of China on National Economic and Social Development in 1989," Economic Daily, 21 February 1990, p. 2. For rural income levels, see State Statistical Bureau Rural Social and Economic Statistical Department, China Rural Statistical Yearbook: 1990 (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1990) p. 14. (32.) State Statistical Bureau, "Statistical Communique of the People's Republic of China on National Economic and Social Development in 1990," Beijing Review 34, no. 10, (11-17 March 1991) sup. pp. i, viii. (33.) China: Between Plan and Market (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990) p. 2. On average, however, China was still able to achieve almost 9 per cent annual growth in real GNP from 1978 to 1992. (34.) State Statistical Bureau: "Communique of the People's Republic of China on National Economic and Social Development in 1992," People's Daily, 19 February 1993, p. 2. (35.) See Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Communism," SAIS Review 12, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1992) pp. 125-37. (36.) For figures on foreign trade, see Jim Rohwer, "China Survey," The Economist, 28 November 1992, pp. 4-5. (37.) China News Agency, 11 and 16 November 1992. (38.) China News Agency, 11 November 1992. The media have also become increasingly dependent on their continued appeal to the rising moneyed classes. (39.) Several schools of literary writers are running a total of about 200 literary magazines in China. China News Agency, 2 October 1992. (40.) In 1989, Jiang retired as director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Industrial Economics and then oversaw one of China's first conversions of a state-owned enterprise into a joint-stock company. He was also the editor of the bimonthly Reform until his death in January 1993. Reform is sponsored by the Comprehensive Development Institute in Beijing and the Chongqing Municipal Academy of Social Sciences, Sichuan Province. Wu's senior researcher at the State Council Research Center, dubbed "Market Wu" by the hardliners, is editor of the monthly Comparative Economic and Social Systems, associated with the Communist Party Central Translation Office Marxist-Leninist Literature. (41.) "Must View Sluggishness Correctly," Economic Daily, 7 November 1989, p. 1. (42.) "On How to View the Sluggish Market," ibid., 6 September 1990, p. 1. (43.) "On the Correct Understanding of the Relationship Between Rectification and Reform," ibid., 21 February 1991, p. 1. (44.) The Farmers' Daily is sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture. See "Helping Farmers Increase Income in a Concrete Way," Farmers' Daily, 14 May 1990, p. 1, and "Must Be Responsible for Reducing Levies on Farmers," ibid, 11 June 1991, p. 1. Even now, the slow increase in Chinese farmers' net income has remained a serious problem. See, for example, "State-Issued IOUs Continue to be Issued, in Other Forms," The China Press, 12 May 1993, p. 28. (45.) "Grain Procurement Prices Fall; Grain Acreage Decreases in Jiangxi and Anhui Provinces)," China Business Times, 11 May 1991, p. 1, and New China News Agency, 15 March 1992. (46.) Yan Kalin, "Pay Attention to the |Weather of June,'" Economic Daily, 27 June 1990, p. 2. (47.) Yan Kalin, "Grain Debt: Why When Old Debts are Paid do New Debts Increase?" Economic Daily, 19 December 1990, p. 2. (48.) Asian-Pacific Economic Times, 30 December 1990, p. 1. (49.) Wu Hongren, "On Mainland's Economic Trends in 1991," China Business Times, 18 May 1991, p. 2. (50.) "NPC Preview," China Daily, 19 March 1990, p. 4. (51.) Zhang Xiaogang, "Top Academics Showcasing Reform Theories," ibid., 11 October 1990, p. 1. (52.) For the first and second of the series of the Liberation Daily editorials from 2 March 1991 and 22 March 1991, see Reform, no. 3 (1991) pp. 184-7. (53.) See, for example, "We Must Ask Whether Reform and Opening to the Outside World Follows Socialism or Capitalism," People's Daily, 2 September 1991, p. 1. (54.) "Economic Reform: An Urgent Need," China Daily, 9 March 1991. (55.) Fang Sheng, "On Opening Up to the Outside World and Making Use of Capitalism," People's Daily, 2 February 1992, pp. 1-4. (56.) The regime has apparently restrained -- without explanation -- the debate regarding the prospects for China's reentry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) though the exchange has been going on for some time. It has also continued to censor any questioning of its building of a huge dam on the Yangtze River, an environmentally controversial project. (57.) It is the author's impression that foreign news service reports on the Chinese economy have become far more substantive since late 1992. (58.) After Deng stopped the hardliners from condemning market economy in the name of socialism, socialist market economy was adopted by the Chinese Communist Party 14th National Congress in October 1992. See Jiang Zemin, "Accelerating the Reform: The Opening to the Outside World and the Drive for Modernization to Achieve Greater Success in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," China Daily, 20 October 1992, p. 1 and 4. (59.) For more on press debates and the revolutions of the eighteenth century, see Smith and Eisenstein, noted in footnote 2. (60.) "United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights," in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Human Rights Reader (New York: New American Library, 1989) p. 200. (61.) As Tom Paine proclaimed: "Ignorance is of a peculiar nature; once dispelled, it is impossible to reestablish it.... It has never yet been discovered how to make a man unknow his knowledge or unthink his thoughts." Eisenstein, p. 192. (62.) A number of cases are examined in Human Rights Watch, Indivisible Human Rights: The Relationship of Political and Civil Rights to Survival, Subsistence and Poverty (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992). (63.) See ibid, pp. 9-10. For more on the relationships of the media and developmental disasters, see P. Kane, Famine in China 1958-61: Demographic and Social Implications (New York: 1988); and Article 19, Starving in Silence: A Report on Famine and Censorship (London: Article 19,1990). (64.) "Political Reform Called for in Central China Normal University," World Journal 12 (February 1992) p. 20. (65.) "Shanghai Periodically Advocates Free Press," ibid., 27 April 1992, p. 18. (66.) "Four Editors Resign in Protest from the People's Literature," World Journal 7 (September 1992) p. 13, (67.) United Press International, 9 September 1992; Associated Press, 10 September 1992. (68.) Associated Press, 11 November 1992. (69.) The Shanghai Legal News has loose state associations. (70.) This was one of the points raised by the writer Anne Thurston at the Committee to Protect journalists' Conference on the Press in China and Hong Kong held in New York on 27 January 1993. For more on the broadcast media in Guangzhou and Shanghai, see "The |Warring States' Period for Shanghai Broadcast Media" (China News Service, 26 October 1992) World Journal, 27 October 1992, p. 15. (71.) For the text of one of the two articles, see Xu Liangying, "The Reform Cannot Succeed Without Political Democratization," reprinted in China Spring, January 1993, pp. 61-3. (72.) Many of the critiques contained in the books have been reprinted in magazines. The two books themselves were published despite the ban and were likely to be distributed through underground book distribution channels. See Agence France-Presse, 9 December 1992. For the condition of China's underground book distribution, see Sophia Woodman and Zhang Xiaogang, Report on the Suppression on Freedom of Expression Since Tiananmen (New York: Asia Watch and Human Rights in China, forthcoming). (73.) Jiang Xi, "Life Weekly's 6 December Edition Confiscated for not Publishing Correction of Report of Changes of High-Ranking Military Personnel," World Journal, 8 December 1992, p. 14. Life Weekly has only loose state associations. Agence France-Presse, 19 January 1993. (75.) China News Agency, 20 September 1992. (76.) See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973) pp. 249, 363, 462-3; Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Systems (trans. Valence Ionescu) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990) p. 195; and Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes (New York: Random House, 1973) pp. 74-5. (77.) According to a sociologist's unpublished survey, the so-called model soldier was hardly mentioned as among the 20 personalities in contemporary China best known to Chinese secondary school students. (78.) See, for example, John Gray, "Authority's Ghost," New York Times Book Review, 13 September 1992, P. 26. (79.) For a longer history of Chinese democratic traditions, see Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley, CA: university of California Press, 1986). (80.) "State Calls for Faster Growth of Rural Firms," China Daily, 1 March 1993, p. 1. (81.) Agence France-Presse, 28 January 1993; and China News Agency, 4 February 1993. (82. State Council Information Office," China's Human Rights Conditions," People's Daily, 2-5 November 1991. (83.) Rohwer, p. 9. (84.) Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1922) p. 229. (85.) "Symposium on the Institutional Reform in Zhuozi County, Inner Mongolia," New Observer, 25 April 1989, pp. 4-27.
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Title Annotation:Power of the Media in the Global System
Author:Zhang Xiaogang
Publication:Journal of International Affairs
Date:Jun 22, 1993
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