The justice-home affairs diplomacy: the Palermo convention, ten years after--towards the universal criminal justice.
1. JHA Diplomacy: From Isolated Instruments to the Solid International Regime
A major breakthrough in the efforts of universal organization of the UN has been achieved in the last few decades. The sporadic international instruments (that accommodated expressed interests of member countries on rather ad hoc bases) are turning by number and scope into the new quality: more structured and interlinked set of rules and provisions of international law (often pre-supposing the advanced development of both institutions and instruments). Therefore, we can safely say that, by now, these instruments are creating a (new) practice of states which theory usually labels as the International Regime. (1 ) We are indeed witnessing a progressive development of International Criminal Justice Regime.
Among the essential instruments, few of the fundamental ones are brokered at the Office on Drugs and Crime (ODC)--Vienna based part of the UN Secretariat that primarily deals with Crimes and (Narcotic) Drugs, including corruption and a small branch department on terrorism prevention (TPB). Consequently, the UN ODC is a guardian of the Narcotic Drugs Treaty System (2) as well as the Organized Crime--Corruption Treaty System. (3)
Since dealing with the problems of crime and narcotic drugs confronts us with clandestine, illicit, illegal therefore trans-border criminal activity, we have first of all to make an important distinction between two legal terms: (i) international crime and (ii) transnational crime.
(i) the former refers to offences prescribed by international law, which can be prosecuted (previously by the international tribunals, including the Ad Hoc tribunals for the former YU as well as for Rwanda, and now) by the standing International Criminal Court, as the Rome Convention entered into force in July of 2002;
(ii) the later rather refers to more conventional (nationally proscribed) crimes which do involve more than one national jurisdiction, and therefore require a transnational or/and cross-border response.
When dealing with issues of transnational crime, the usual response is a treaty or (multilateral/trilateral, bilateral) agreement between the state parties as to ensure that:
--the very conduct involved is a crime proscribed by domestic law;
--each state party has adequate jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and punish offences which occur only partly in their territory or which have other links, such as the involvement of citizens as either offenders or victims;
--state parties agree to provide necessary forms of cooperation to each other.
These are the basic functions of the multilateral legal instruments such as the Palermo Convention and the UN Convention against corruption.
As the transnational organized crime grows, sophisticates and proliferates, there is an evident need to create a larger body of international legislation of this kind. These requests are not without controversies, as the experience with the International Criminal Court illustrates;
--it is still understood that international treaties cause certain erosion of national sovereignty and that they do hinder domestic political priorities for crime-control;
--treaties are expensive to administer and moderately effective in the monitoring of compliance mechanisms;
--finally, treaties are usually negotiated on consensus, which ensures wide agreement basis, but a "lowest common denominator" on substance--the provisions are what everyone could agree upon and often do not go as far as some state parties would like (or have domesticated in their own legislation).
However, the crime treaties will almost certainly be expanded, as pressures to deal with global problems are gradually overcoming national reluctance. Consequently, we may see further stipulations against varied sorts of transnational organized crime in the form of additional protocols to the (Palermo) Convention. Having dealt with the Narcotic Drugs, Organized Crime, Terrorism Financing and Corruption related treaties, the international community is now turning its attention to forms of the private/corporate sector and of individual or non-organized crime. Future possibilities do include instruments on environmental and cyber crimes (- offences related to computer information and communication networks) as well as on the abuses of Genetics, Nano, and Bio, technologies.
Let us now quickly elaborate on the current state of the International Criminal Regime (its universal and regional European bodies), with the brief overview on the peculiarities of each of its main constituting elements.
Text-book examples of how migrants can become illegal;
A. By crossing the international border without the required travel documents (solely or by using the services of professional traffickers):
--either far away from regular border-points, via the green (land/woods), blue (river/lake/sea) or white (aboard of flying object) borders;
--or via the regular border-crossings, but hidden (in truck/car/ship/train/ aircraft).
B. By crossing the international border de facto legal, although using:
--either falsified or stolen document;
--or regular document displaying a forged/falsified visa.
C. Each host-country usually issues several types of visas (entry/stay conditions) for different purposes and most of them have a time and activity limit. A person becomes illegal or undocumented by violating any of these limits:
--either by overstaying the permit-period granted to the entering individual;
--or otherwise violating the entry-conditions and visa-purpose (student visa for employment, pro forme marriage, false family-reunion etc.).
Illegal Migrants in Figures
There are roughly some 6 million irregular immigrants in the USA and around 4 million in Western Europe (EU-15 + EFTA) alone. (4) Annual arrivals of illegal migrants are estimated to vary between 250,000 and 300,000 for the United States, and between 350,000 and 500,000 for Western Europe. (IOM/ ICMPD estimations)
Immigration--Building up the Policy
Although closely following the agenda on common, harmonized (and supranational) policy in many aspects, the EU member states still (as their main overseas counterparts: the US, Canada and Australia) take their political action on immigration entirely on the national level. Actually, the only electorate politics that matter are on the national-state level. (5)
1. Organized Crime in General
Although visibly evident on the old continent over decades, the issue of Organized Crime has attracted very little attention at higher political and economic levels in Europe in the last decades of 20th century. Simultaneously, the radical changes in CEE/SEE countries of the late 1980s implied growing possibilities for organized crime to carry out transfrontier operations throughout Europe. Consequently, the criminal markets have become very mobile, more flexible, transnational and trans-continental, highly accumulative and increasingly aggressive.
2. Multilateral Efforts in Fighting Organized Crime
Activities on a supranational and intergovernmental level to combat organized crime have actually existed since 1923 (Interpol). Present international/regional foras trying to combat transnational organized crime and to improve criminal justice are: The European Union/Commission, EUROPOL, Council of Europe; as well as the global/universal ones: Interpol-ICPO and UN ODC, formerly ODCCP (CICP and DCP). (6)
Before the Maastricht Treaty, there was no specific EU framework for dealing with matters related to organized crime (only informal police co-operation between Member States, initiated in the mid 1970s, which was gradually expanded to deal with organized crime--among others in the context of the TREVI group).
The Maastricht Treaty and its Third Pillar made specific provisions in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), leading to the establishment of a formal co-operation structure for Customs and Police matters, as well as for criminal and judicial issues. Within the framework of this structure, working groups on police co-operation, drugs and organized crime, corruption, money-laundering, terrorism and judicial co-operation were established. Since the Maastricht Treaty, and especially since the provisions of the Amsterdam (and Nice) Treaty entered into force at a special JHA meeting of the European Council with the EU heads of states/governments in Tampere, Finland in October 1999 (also the Seville European Council of June 2002), the European Union has further strengthened its structures as well as its cross-EU and pan-European cooperation. Currently, there are a sets of legal instruments related to the fight against organized crime, such as: the JHA Action Plan/s (the first such a plan with its 30 recommendations was prepared in April 1997; and the actual one--Action Plan 2001-2003/2006-09, the Commission communicated in May 2001, and in 2005 and 2008/10 respectively); as well as the specific JHA programs of practical/operative nature (such as the exchange and training--FALCONs and STOPs Programs as well as the GROTIUSs platform the Legal Practitioners incentives and exchange Programs).
Pre-accession Pact (resting upon the Copenhagen accession criteria of 1993) on organized crime between the EU Member States and the EU candidate countries (7) was approved as early as 1998 (after the Amsterdam and shortly before the Nice treaty). The main purpose of this Pact was to develop a joint annual strategy to identify the most significant measures against organized crime (including a two-way flow of information, the exchange of liaison officers, joint investigative activities and special operations carried out with the Europol's support). (8)
The Maastricht Treaty and other EU regulations created the opportunity for wider Police co-operation in the field of combating (the transnational) organized crime--something that has been reaffirmed in the Reform/Lisbon treaty of 2007).
EDU (European Drug Unit), a first step towards the establishment of Europol, has been staged up by the decision of the European Council in 1993. EDU was mandated to cover: (i) illicit drugs trafficking; (ii) immigration networking; (iii) theft-vehicle trafficking, and finally in 1996, EDU got an additional mandate to cover (iv) trafficking in persons. The Europol Convention entered into force on 1 October 1998, mandating this agency to follow illegal/ illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances; in persons, vehicles and drugs, as well as the money laundering related to it. Since January 1999, Europol is additionally charged to cover terrorism, cybercrime and child pornography (eventually through SIRENE system).
As far as drugs are concerned, the Europol supported operational projects against Turkish, Latin American and indigenous criminal groups. As a direct result of the European Union Action Plan on Drugs 2000-2004 (2008), the Collection Model for Drugs Seizure Statistics was drafted by Europol, in close co-operation with experts from Member States and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).
Further incentives were brought about at the EU Council summit in Nice, France on 9 December 2000 as it agreed to establish the EUROJUST. (9) Complementary to Europol, this EU embryonic prosecution agency is meant to gather the national prosecutors, magistrates (or police officers of equivalent competence), detached from their Member State.
Finally, Europol aimed at to establish a future co-operation (with the Council of Europe, UN and other relevant foras) in relation to cybercrimes (covering matters such as the creation of a network of cybercrime units, the launch of a monitoring centre at Europol, the improvement of intelligence gathering as well as the setup of the working group with a private sector).
Council of Europe
The Council of Europe, as single pan-European fora, has its own inter-governmental work program against crime that is channeled through the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC). Recently it strengthened the cooperation between Member States in combating corruption, its links with organized crime and money laundering, and the trafficking in illicit drugs & smuggling of medical drugs (incl. all sorts of exploitation and child pornography).
Among the major outcomes of this "principal legislative machinery of Europe" (which since 1945 has brokered over 200 conventions and treaties), the Council of Europe lately adopted the Convention on Cyber Crime (10) in 2001 and the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cyber Crime in 2002 (111th Session of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE), (11) as well as the Trafficking in Human Beings Convention in 2005 and the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in 2006.
Interpol--ICPO (International Criminal Police Organization)
Interpol enjoys a membership of 188 countries and a world-wide telecommunication network which links each member's National Crime Bureau (NCB) by I-mail (intra-mail: closed telecom system), (12) and gives automated access to a centralized data base (and the basic back-ground information) on international crime and criminal gangs. The NCBs are (as an exchange mechanism) a key element in the services Interpol provides to its member countries. The NCB serves as a link between law enforcement agencies of one country and the law enforcement agencies of other member countries. The growth and threat of criminal organizations has been elaborated in various resolutions and other deliberations adopted by the Interpol General Assembly (GA) sessions during the '70s and '80s. By the Interpol GA Resolution in 1987, a working group on Organized crime was created in 1988. This resolution noted that "... Organized crime does not limit itself to one form of criminal activity".
As a result of this resolution, Interpol later created the Organized Crime Branch at the General Secretariat in 1989. A subsequent Resolution adopted at the 1993 General Assembly further emphasized the need for international co-operation in combating organized crime, by recommending that "the ICPO-Interpol should continue to encourage police efforts and to intensify cooperation between countries and their police services, ... seeking to improve the exchange of information between countries, and analysis of that information, and to promote participation by all countries in the structure created within the ICPO-Interpol to deal with this subject." The long-term aim of the Organized Crime Branch was to create an extensive and comprehensive data base of organized criminal enterprises and persons who are engaged in continued, illegal activity in order to generate (illicit) profits.
The Organized Crime Branch realized that organized crime groups are increasingly active in alien smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Therefore, in 1996, Project 'Marco Polo' was initiated to produce a study on the routes, modus operandi and organized crime groups involved in irregular migrations from any country to Western Europe.
The Marco Polo study, published in 1997, clearly showed that the largest number of non-European illegal immigrants coming to Western Europe between 1992 and 1997 had originated from either Iraq, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, or one of the African countries (such as Nigeria, Rwanda or Somalia). Several routes utilized in the smuggling of Chinese nationals to Western Europe were also noted in the Marco Polo study, etc.
The Organized Crime Branch is currently collecting and analyzing several other, but equally important cases of illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. Upon evaluation, Interpol intends to send its specialized officers and analysts to assist local police units during the ongoing investigations (which are of relevance at an international level).
The current intention of Interpol is to provide its member countries with a better insight into the linkage between organized crime groups, on one hand, and the illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings, on the other hand (description of groups, their membership, ordinary routes, methods and means of transportation, location of safe houses, identity of escorts, suppliers of forged documents, as well as visa fraud methods). Special emphasis will be put on the collection and dissemination of information related to the post-smuggling/trafficking networking of organized crime groups (involving trafficked persons into activities such as: forced labor, organized begging, pickpocketing, prostitution, pornography, terrorism, etc.)
As to the refocusing attention on the Public and Private sector corruption as lately given by the UN, World Bank (WB), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other foras, (13) the ICPO (jointly with the International Commission against Corruption--ICAC) co-organized the International Conference against Corruption in Hong Kong, China (2003), and several subsequent meetings on cybercrime, piracy and terrorism.
The United Nations and its Vienna-based Office for Drugs and Crimes (ODC), formerly ODCCP; including the Drug Control Program--UNDCP, and the Centre for International Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice--CICP, (14) play a significant global role in combating organized crime and in strengthening criminal justice. As a result of the recent restructuring of the work of the United Nations Office in Vienna, a new Director-General was appointed in September 2010 (15) (including the ODC Executive Director post).
The first important step with regard to the relevant United Nations activities was the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which contains provisions requiring the development of international co-operation in the fields of extradition, asset forfeiture, mutual legal assistance, co-operation among the law enforcement agencies of Member States, control of precursors, essential chemicals and crop eradication.
In order to better address the problem of the internationalization and sophistication of criminal groups, UN Member States adopted the Naples Political Declaration and the Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime (16) (at the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime held in Naples in 1994). The Naples Action Plan lays emphasis on member states' national combating capacities as well as on international co-operation against transnational organized crime and its effective prevention.
Moreover, the UN CICP was requested (by the resolution of the UN GA 53/111, December 1998) to further its tasks by preparing and conducting an Open-ended Intergovernmental Ad-Hoc Committee(s) on Elaboration of a comprehensive International Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and three additional instruments, to which Poland made a first draft in 1998. Between January 1999 and the end of October 2000, as many as 11 Ad Hoc meetings (minimum two-week duration each) were held in Vienna, with an average participation of some 140 delegations of states and organizations.
Thus, the final text of Convention was verified on the closing day of the 10th Session of Ad Hoc Committee (its 177th meeting), on 28th of July 2000. (17)
Additional instruments include: (i) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish Trafficking in persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized crime (to which Argentina and the US took the initiative); (ii) Protocol against the Smuggling of migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the same Convention (to which Austria and Italy took the initiative); and finally (iii) Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition supplementing the same Convention.
The High-level Political Signing conference was scheduled for December 11-15, 2000 (UN GA Res. 54/129), following September's Millennium Assembly Convention approval.
So far, over 150 countries have signed the Convention (and first two protocols with over 100 parties, respectively), many at the spot in Palermo. (18) Consequently, the Convention and two protocols entered into force between late 2003 and early 2004. (19) The only exception was the "Firearms" protocol, entering into force as late as mid 2005 (with only 83 parties). (20)
2. Corruption in the Focus of UN ODC--UNCAC
In its resolution 54/128, the General Assembly asked the Ad Hoc Committee then still negotiating the Palermo Convention to consider whether a further instrument elaborating solely corruption was desirable (prior to or parallel with the Expert group on Explosives). Upon the extensive consultations, the Committee expressed that a separate instrument is needed because much of the corruption-related problems felt by member states were not covered by the forthcoming Palermo Convention. It was subsequently reported back to the General Assembly (A/AC/254/25), which resulted in the UN GA resolution 55/61 deciding to create a further instrument and to establish an expert group to consider terms of reference. The Expert group convened in 2002 in Vienna, produced draft terms of reference, which were then transmitted to the GA, via the CICP (Crime Commission) and the ECOSOC. The General Assembly has adopted these terms of reference, clarifying the issues under negotiation, by its resolution UN GA 56/260, and it appeared before the Ad Hoc Committee at its second meeting. (21) As stipulated by the Resolution, the Ad Hoc Committee was about to resolve many critical issues in all together seven sessions producing the final text of Convention by the end of 2003. Among the most tantalizing were the following two issues: (i) the very definition of corruption--determining the basic scope of application of the forthcoming instrument (whether to include private-sector corruption or not, etc.); and (ii) the political and legal implications of the "grand corruption" cases involving the high level officials (mostly from third world countries such as Nigeria, Philippines, etc.)
That time, a newly arrived Executive Director Mr. Costa and his ODC secretariat has managed to close the Corruption Convention with astonishing speed--it still remains one of the fastest ever concluded UN conventions. However and regrettably enough, the Corruption instrument did not include the private sector corruption at all, and therefore should be regarded as an instrument of rather partial success. Some of the most influential countries were not supportive to the idea to tackle both private and public sector corruption by a single instrument (?!?). So, member states got an exception and the Secretariat gained a speed--compromise resulting in rather weak and incomplete instrument.
As the UNCAC does not provide for a definition of corruption at all (be it private or public sector, or both), and as there is no comprehensive (and at the same time simple) definition of corruption available, I am operating in my classes with the following self-coined definition: Seemingly victimless, hidden trade-off between the influence and gain. (22)
However, in conformity with Article 2 of the UN Charter, the UNCAC provides in its Article 4 for the protection of national sovereignty of the States Parties.
In April 2002 the CICP (Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice) at its 11th annual session in Vienna welcomed the offer made by the Government of Mexico to host a High-level Political Conference for the purpose of signing the UN Convention against Corruption (endorsed by the GA), that soon after was adopted in Merida/Mexico (31 X 2003).
Talking about the main deliberations, the 11th CICP Commission additionally accepted the offer of Thailand to hold the 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Thailand in 2005 (with the theme: "Synergies and responses: strategic alliances in crime prevention and criminal justice"). Following the ODC recommendation, the UN General Assembly (res. 62/173 of 18 December 2007) accepted the offer of Brazil to host the 12th Con gress in April 2010 (with the theme: "Comprehensive strategies for global challenges: crime prevention and criminal justice systems and their development in a changing world").
3. Defining Organized Crime
This definition is jointly defined by the EU Commission and the Expert Group on Organized crime of the Council of Europe (quite similar to the existing Europol and Interpol criteria).
The mandatory criteria (essentialia) of that definition includes the following: (i) collaboration of three or more persons; (ii) for a prolonged or indefinite period of time; (iii) suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences; and finally (iv) with the objective of pursuing profit and/or power.
Among the optional criteria (eventualia) are: (v) having a specific task or role for each participant; (vi) using a form of internal discipline and control; (vii) using violence or other means suitable for intimidation; (viii) exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, law enforcement, the administration of justice or the economy by corruption or using other means; (ix) using commercial or business-like structures; (x) engagement in Money laundering; and (xi) operating on an international level.
Both the UN 1994 Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan specified the following six characteristics of organized crime (which might be transnational: point 5 and 6): (i) there has to be group organization to commit crime; (ii) hierarchical links or personal relations which enable leaders to control the group; (iii) the use of violence, intimidation and corruption to earn profits or control territories or markets; (iv) the laundering of illicit proceeds to further criminal activity and to infiltrate the legitimate economy; (v) a potential for expansion into any new activity beyond national borders; and finally (vi) co-operation with other Organized Transnational criminal groups.
4. Trafficking in/Smuggling of Persons on the Agenda of Organized Crime
Different criminal groupings have met existing opportunity with demands by incorporating the Trafficking in and Smuggling of persons in their agendas, as it turns out to be:
(i) minimum investment undertaking, (ii) maximum profit gained, (iii) lenient punishment (e.g. compared to drug trafficking, the penalties for Trafficking in and Smuggling of persons are considerably lower or even non-existent in many countries).
5. The Distinction between Smuggling of and Trafficking in Persons
Both trafficking in and smuggling of persons represent a form of irregular migration. Usual distinctions utilized by Interpol and Europol, we may interpret as such:
Trafficking in Persons
The English legal term "trafficking" means trade or illicit trade. Thus, trafficking in persons is a form of trade in human beings, which occurs illicitly. Notion of trafficking in persons:
(i) an intermediary, a trafficker, who provides the necessary services facilitating migration;
(ii) the traffickers are paid under long-term arrangements;
(iii) crossing of border is either illegal or seemingly legal (well established legal structures within the host-countries, such as language summer schools or vocational institutes, that actually cover their real (illegal) intentions);
(iv) upon their arrival in a host-country, the migrants, with or without their consent, are introduced into illegal activities or criminal circles;
(v) the profit in trafficking business comes (not solely from a transportation fee but) from long-term exploitation;
(vi) in most cases trafficked persons actually make a seemingly free choice to enter or stay in a country illegally.
Smuggling of Persons
The English legal term "smuggling" means an illicit/illegal import or export. Consequently, smuggling of persons means illegal transportation of human beings from the source country (export) to the country of destination or the host-country (import).
Features of the smuggling of persons:
(i) an intermediary, a smuggler, who facilitates the border crossing but the clients are not provided with further extensive services as in the trafficking business;
(ii) crossing of border is either illegal or seemingly legal;
(iii) smuggling does not include a component of extended exploitation (the escort-fee is always paid under short-term arrangements).
Four differentiating elements that separate trafficking in from smuggling of persons are:
(i) an exploitation and usage of the trafficked person over a long period of time;
(ii) inter-dependency that forms a strong (brothers-in-arms like) linkage, between trafficked victim and organized crime groupings;
(iii) eligibility for further networking (recruitment for criminal purpose);
(iv) very often trafficking itself is not a voluntary movement, but in the case of smuggled persons it always occurs voluntarily.
6. Linkages and Interdependencies
Organized crime groups are vertically (hierarchically) and horizontally structured in such a manner that different sub-groups (chambers) are specialized in specific activities. The level of diversification of tasks inside the criminal organization is high and aims at to meet both: higher specialization and sophistication as well as better protection from the police ride or sting operations (cell or ship-chamber system).
In the business of trafficking in persons (long-lasting horizontal interdependency is very high), organized crime groups yield a profit from both (i) the trafficking escort service itself, and (ii) from the following exploitation of the trafficked persons as manpower, that is upon the transfer, basically recruited for criminal purposes. This double use, makes the business of trafficking in persons competitive to drugs smuggling and other highly (lucrative) accumulative criminal activities, and finally it explains why even the biggest and most structured organized crime groups (especially transnational) have incorporated trafficking in persons into their activities.
Transnational expansion requires permanent networking of the organization. In order to set up a new or to improve the existing network, additional recruitment has to be done repeatedly. Therefore, in most cases, not the trafficked person but the organized crime groups make the final decision about: (i) how many people to traffic, (ii) which ethnicity, gender, skills or profile to traffic, and finally (iii) to which destination(s)--one or several countries. It has been already noticed that after the need for recruitment of a certain profile or gender in one country is successfully met, the traffickers will not traffic in but rather smuggle more people (driven only by a one-off financial gain without further recruiting and networking).
Nowadays, the organized criminal groups actually regulate illegal flows to a great extent. As a strong horizontal interdependency remains between the trafficked persons and the group behind it, it is to say that illegal migration too, further contributes to organized crime.
7. Nature of the Business of Trafficking in and Smuggling of Persons
Organized crime groups basically function as any legal economic entity. (23) Consequently, the ultimate goal of organized crime is similar to that of an ordinary commercial enterprise: to gain profit. As any profit depends on the market, criminal groups are strengthening their productivity, efficiency, sophistication and organization, cutting costs and risks, widening their territory, and trying to set up an exclusive monopoly in certain fields and/or on certain territory in order to maintain and to optimize their profits. (24) Furthermore, in the face of growing demand, internal competition among organized criminal groups is rising and leading to increased violence which is exercised on both levels; internally (towards its own members) and externally (towards other gangs as well as towards the wider society).
Wishing to cover their illegal activities in trafficking and smuggling, as well as to launder generated assets afterwards, the organized crime groups often expand their activities into legitimate businesses (such as: travel agencies, language seasonal/summer schools, vocational institutes, shipping companies; non-governmental humanitarian and other illicit or converted charities--nonprofit organizations). Therefore, it becomes very hard to distinguish overt from covert activities of those groups. By doing so, the organized crime groups are fulfilling several ultimate goals: (i) better protection from eventual raid and coverage for their illegal activity (risk spreading/burden-sharing); (ii) money laundering; (iii) gradual legalization and respectability; (iv) more prominent and powerful positioning within the given society.
Finally, the lasting achievement of any parallel structure (parallel society) as organized crime tends to be (when phases of accumulation, stabilization, expansion and monopolization are successfully met), is to legalize itself. In order to do so, the organized crime group will use all means that are at its disposal (ranging from hard means: blackmailing, extortion, assassination, kidnapping, discreditation, intimidation and racketeering, to soft means, such as: corruption, humanitarian contributions, sponsorship and voluntary donations for political and other societal campaigns, and the like).
8. New Tendencies
Facing increasing competition, the organized crime groups are forced to undergo certain specialization, or/and diversification as well as company-like fusions/synergies.
Specialization, diversification and fusions are creating a higher vertical line (along with a wider horizontal line). Apart from enlarging their market and profit shares, it allows the Organization (i) better damage control possibilities, and (ii) minimizes law enforcement risk.
Together with operational, organizational and management mobility, transferability, adaptability and flexibility, are what make the organized crime groups so successful and (if ever penetrable) almost non-detectable in their full scope as a corporate mechanism.
9. Structures of Criminal Rings
These rings range from single individuals, to smaller or larger networks composed of family members (or of persons from the same region, of shared language or religion), up to strictly organized, hierarchically structured and trans-continentally tied organized crime rings.
The majority of the operating groups are of the same ethnic origin either in their core staff or entirely. Functionally, these groups are horizontally structured from several sub-units that are specialized in particular part or sequence of the smuggling/trafficking operation.
10. Diversification and Sophistication
The tasks are diversified, the organization clustered of different units or elements, which then independently carry out their particular criminal sequences. Each unit or element, consists of one or more persons that are highly specialized, independent and with little knowledge about other parts of their own organization (in most cases, vertically they know only their direct supervisor whereas their horizontal knowledge is practically non-existent).
A typical criminal organization involved in the business of Trafficking in and Smuggling of persons is comprised of the following elements or units (cells):
A. Recruitment unit (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)
Advertises the organization and recruits the new clients by using informal exchange of information (locals, friends, relatives, countrymen), up to announcements in the press or on the internet, including various kinds of overt agencies (travel agencies, summer schools, etc.);
B. Escort unit (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)
Deals with transport by land, air or waterways and takes care during every particular stage of transportation (from the sending country, throughout transiting country/ies and to the destination--a host-country). Very often, this unit has sub-units which further specialize in particular sub-tasks; territory or transportation means;
C. Corrupted Officials (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)
These officials, although not necessarily interconnected or known to each other, are basically acting as an integral (corrupted) unit together with members of the organized crime ring that are corrupting them. Co-operation of local officials plays a critically indespensive role in setting up, maintaining and further permanent networking of trafficking/smuggling structure. Thus, bribed officials in the sending, transiting or/and host-country are essential for the safe transfer of illegal migrants. As in other fields of organized criminal activity, corruption is an elementary part (25) of the trafficking/smuggling business;
D. Guiding/navigation unit (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)
Mostly comprised of local agents and informants who know very little about the organization. This in turn minimizes the risk of law enforcement and effects damage control possibility (Ship-chamber structure-like damage control is a preventive measure of organization against any eventual raid or penetration);
E. Supporting/Logistics unit (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)
The task of this unit is to provide all the supporting services (safe shelter, accommodation, food, etc.). This is to prevent the illegal migrants from having any contact to the ordinary society (keeping them totally at the mercy of their traffickers). By doing so, both aims will be fulfilled: (i) protection of the operation from any police interception and eventual information leakage; as well as (ii) creating interdependency at an early stage between those trafficked and the traffickers thus enabling further long-term exploitation;
F. Debt collecting unit (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)
This unit is responsible for keeping illegal migrants in the safe houses and collecting the transportation fees. Unlike the Smuggling of persons business in which a unit collects a one-off escort service fee from smuggled persons, in the business of Trafficking in persons that unit is permanently collecting revenue from all illegal (or overt) businesses that the trafficked persons are recruited for. Usually, the debt rate is purposely set high which then transforms into a debt-bondage that proves to be the most effective control mechanism (creating additionally strong dependency between the trafficked and the traffickers);
G. Exploiting unit(s) (Traffickers only)
The number of units or sub-units depends on the number of activities that any particular organization is involved in (such as: exploitation of prostitution, drugs and organ smuggling, shop-window restaurants/cafes/gambling houses for money laundering, pick-pocketing, car theft, forging, begging, etc.). Naturally, this unit operates entirely within the host-country/ies;
H. Re-escort unit (Traffickers only)
As mentioned before, most of the victims of trafficking are re-escorted to several countries, irrespective of their will. This is especially evident in cases of exploitation of prostitution, cybercrime, terrorism-related espionage and drug smuggling.
I. Management/Supervising unit (common for both traffickers and smugglers)
This is the single vertical unit in the explained structure, whereas all others (from A to H) are horizontal. This unit drafts, plans, finances, manages, chains and supervises the whole operation and maintains a criminal structure that is both operable and profitable in its covert and overt segments. This unit is rarely known to the horizontal units and is hardly visible to or penetrable from the outside world (very often camouflaged by the well established legal business, or/and protected by the prominent public figures).
Channels and Routes
There are several channels and routes for Trafficking in and Smuggling of persons in Europe. The channeling is permanently changing or oscillating according to several factors such as: geographical position, distance between countries of departure and destination, political and economic situation, law enforcement efforts in different areas, and an achieved degree of corruption. Organized crime groups are flexible and adaptable to any change of circumstances (sometimes changing their routes from one day to another).
When expanding into new criminal areas, the new activities are often channeled through the old and already tested routes (for example routes used for drug trafficking are now further being used for Trafficking in and Smuggling of persons or human organs, or lately by the terrorist cells).
By doing so, the Trafficking and Smuggling organizations are directly influencing both: (i) the direction as well as (ii) the intensity and patterns of general criminal flows.
In Northern Europe, the problem of Trafficking in and Smuggling of persons is of a much smaller magnitude than elsewhere in Europe. The Northern (green and blue) routes go through Russia and the Baltic States (such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or Finland, and from there (mostly) transiting through the Nordic countries, ending elsewhere in Europe. In the CEE/SEE region, the Balkan (green and blue) route is probably the most notorious one that is used by criminal organizations (Turkey-Greece-former Yugoslavia-Hungary/West; Black Sea-Romania-Serbia-Hungary/West; Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Slovakia-Czech Republic/West-Poland/ West; Turkey-Bulgaria-Macedonia-Albania-Italy/North or Turkey-Greece -(Albania)-Italy/North).
Furthermore, Poland having its attractive (very long and practically nonprotectable) green border with Germany (and Schengen Europe) has become a major transit country of the eastern route (which continues to Belarus or/ and Ukraine and leads further to Russia and Mongolia/China or to Caucasus and to Central Asia, and is used to transport both Asians and Africans). Budapest and Prague are becoming important transit points for Smugglers and Traffickers from the Middle and Far East, Balkans and former Soviet
Union. Highways like Minsk--Warsaw--Berlin and Bucharest-Budapest-Vienna are very popular routes where the Traffickers and Smugglers are concentrating.
The Mediterranean blue-route crosses the Mediterranean and brings people from Africa and Asia through Middle East and/or North Africa to Europe. The flow from the south to the north is mostly via Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Italy, France and Spain. Greek and other islands of the Mediterranean have proved to be excellent transit points or last stops on the way to Western Europe or/and overseas. Further on, the Mediterranean ports of Genoa, Trieste or Marseille as well as the Atlantic ports of Rotterdam, Bremen and Hanover are among the most exposed.
Across the Atlantic Ocean, of course, the US remains traditionally the most desired final destination country. Some undocumented individuals are entering via blue or green Canadian border, but the largest numbers by far pour into the US via the southern green border. Close proximity to the US, puts Mexico into a very specific and extremely difficult position: the major sending, major transiting and major receiving country in all Latin America.
11. Going Trans-continental
The political developments and the socio-economic conditions of the last decades in Europe have led to the fact that, in addition to more traditional organized criminal rings (such as Italian and Asian syndicates or the Latin American Drugs cartels), there are several new transnational organized criminal structures that are present and operable in Europe (such as groups from the former Soviet Union, from the Central Eastern European /CEE/, South Eastern European /SEE/ countries and Africa).
There are clear traces that the criminal syndicates from Afghanistan, China (Triads), Iran, Kosovo, Thailand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Columbia, Turkey (mostly Kurdish rings), and Japan (Yakuza) have been involved in the following: the drugs and precursors, firearms and explosives, human organs, radiological and illicit bio-chemical materials, and stolen car trafficking as well as in Smuggling of persons into Europe and overseas.
Moreover, non-European organized crime groups have already established their branches in Europe (or have made connections/synergies with the existing European groups in Italy, Greece, Ireland, CEE/SEE, Germany, France etc.), sometimes through networks of illicit or converted charities, 'investment' banks, offshore firms, and the like. That was a new impetus in dealing with illicit drugs and narcotics, firearms, vehicle theft, black labor, fraud, false documents and credit-card manufacturing, counterfeiting, money laundering (partially through legally established chains of gambling houses), extortion. Some of these groups are connected to (or even formed by) the political radicals and therefore also involved in terrorism, (politically motivated) blackmailing, kidnapping, assassinations, sabotages and diversions, etc.
Preempting the EU enlargement and subsequent accession in 2004 and in 2007, many of these non-European clan-cartels (particularly the bigger and more sophisticated ones) have established their 'legal' businesses by registering companies in CEE/SEE countries (as well as in Macao prior to its authority-transfer from Portugal to China), or/and laundering money by participating in the privatization and the foreign investment process in CEE/ SEE countries or in the post-Soviet republics.
List of the Core International Instruments
1904 International agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic
1910 International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic
1921 International Convention (Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children)
1926 Slavery Convention
1930 ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced Labor
1933 International Convention (Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age)
1945 United Nation Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice
1947 Protocol to amend the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children and the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age (a/m conventions No. 3 and 6)
1947 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1949 Protocol amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic and the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Trade (a/m conventions No. 1 and No. 2)
1950 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others
1950 Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic of Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others
1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1950 Protocol amending the Slavery Convention of 1926
1951 The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Geneva Convention)
1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery
1956 European Convention on Extradition
1966 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
1966 Protocol relating to the Status of refugees (NY Protocol to the Geneva Convention)
1972 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters
1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
1981 European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
1989 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
1990 European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime
1990 European Convention on the Implementation of the Schengen Agreement (including the related provisions of the Maastricht treaty of 1993 and of Tampere Provisions of the Amsterdam treaty of 1999; of the Nice of 2000 and of Seville of 2002)
1995 EUROPOL Convention
1995 Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime, report of the UN Secretary-General
1997 EU Convention on the fight against Corruption
1999 UN General Assembly: Guidelines for Reporting by governments on the implementation of the Global program of Action 2003-2008, UNOV/CND
1999 Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice of the 10th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
2000 UN (International Palermo) Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (and additional instruments/protocols)
2001 Council of Europe (Budapest) Convention on Cyber Crime (23 XI 2001)
2002 Council of Europe additional Protocol to the Convention on Cyber Crime
2003 UN Anti-Corruption Convention
1. Terrorism in General
The English word terror literally means: extreme fear. Thus, according to the Oxford dictionary terrorism means: the use of violence for political aims or to force a government to act, especially because of the fear it causes among the people.
Consequently, it is easy to linguistically define terrorism, but the real problem starts when the terrorism as a phenomenon (including its range and scope) has to be politically and legally determined and effectively defined.
Low or high scale atrocities, domestic violence or terrorism; international terrorism; state (sponsored) terrorism; special war, secession and self-determination; armed conflict; declaration of war; social unrest, proscribed organization and undermining the constitutional order; upheaval and revolutionary movement;--all these terms, as such, are somehow defined at the national level, incorporated in and treated by the national legislations. However, to define them more universally, by achieving a wide international consensus over the scope, wording and very definition turns out to be a delicate and complex problem.
2. Terrorism--Struggle to Define
As defining terrorism in any particular case implies a political component this very category becomes quite extensive and subject to different readings and understandings. Having permanent (primarily political) disputes over the category and scale of 'conflict', contemporary international community repeatedly failed over decades, to agree upon the single and comprehensive but universal instrument determining, prescribing and combating terrorism. As a consequence of these, mostly political and less legal implications, we today are confronted with two dozen international (universal and regional) instruments, which are good, but far from being standardized and harmonized.
Thus, the tentative political definition of (international) terrorism could be as follows:
Terrorism is the use of violence politically as a means of pressuring a government and/or society into accepting a radical socio-political or/and socioeconomic change (ideological or/and territorial). The word terrorist is obviously self-incriminating (demonizing and alienating), and consequently most terrorists would not apply the label to themselves. (26)
The targets of terrorist groups are traditionally the Combat (army and police) forces of the state. Lately, the tactics are aiming at undermining domestic economic capacity, destroying civil moral and calling upon the widespread civil disobedience. Terrorist groups are (or claim to be) motivated by a number of different ideologies. Thus, nationalism is a frequent cause of terrorist activity (incl. anti-colonial struggles, irredentism); a whole spectrum of ideologies from right-wing (anti-Semitic, neo-fascist) to left-wing (Maoists, Marxist-Leninists) etc.
Although most terrorist groups, especially in Europe and Latin America, have not in fact achieved their political ends, elsewhere the situation is different. Many groups, particularly in Africa and Asia, formerly labeled as terrorist, which began as opponents of colonial regimes, have legitimized themselves by forming the post-colonial governments.
3. Terrorism--Some Legal Provisions
Terrorism--the use of violence for political ends, including the use of violence for putting the public in fear. The act of terrorism, thus, defines a terrorist as a person who is or has been concerned with committing or attempting to commit any act of terrorism (such as: sabotage by explosion or fire; killing or otherwise endangering people and/or property either by misuse of nuclear, biological, chemical materials or by conventional means and devices; hijacking of aircraft, ship or other transportation means; kidnapping or taking hostages; serious cyber-attacks) or directing, organizing, recruiting or training people for the purpose of terrorism.
Additionally, the vast majority of national legislation considers it a serious criminal offence if a person fails to disclose information which may assist the authorities in the prevention of an act of terrorism. Criminal offences also prescribed by law are acts of collecting information or possession of information likely to be useful to (foreign or domestic) terrorists.
4. Terrorism--Linkages to Political Parties
The aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy marked nearly universal outrage, and revealed a worldwide sympathy for the American people. However, this barbaric act (and later, the European "11th"--a bloody Madrid's March 2004) also turned the old phenomenon of terrorism into a newly illuminated topic, which was then prolifically dealt by the wide spectrum of individuals and institutions. Many governments have passed special legislation (unfortunate tradeoff: more 'security' for less/restricted privacy). (27) Some governments have gone further by introducing a war on terror as the main (or a single) foreign policy objective. Thus, the Administration of G.W. Bush having repeatedly approached the US Congress with the extra-budgetary military spending pledge of a fantastic 420 billion dollars!
Without any attempt to problematize here the 'asymmetric threats', 'nonstate actors' and 'wining the hearts and minds' theories or preemptive doctrines (28) that appeared after 9/11, let me quickly state the following: the difference between political party and terrorist group is in means--they are always criminal (on the side of terrorist groups) vs. legitimate, constitutionally prescribed means used by ordinary political parties. However, the very aim is identical: political influence. Political agenda is always national and aims at either ideological or territorial change on a specific, clearly defined territory and population. As there is no international political party (although the Anarchists, Spanish Civil-war volunteers and early Bolsheviks shortly believed so), there is also no international terrorist group. There is a sporadic transnational cooperation (logistics, exchange of operative information or tools), but the core ideas and members are always and only national. (Al Qaida is also a national--Moroccan and Yemeni Arab are still both Arabs. Throughout most of their history, Arabs lived within one state entity /Caliphates, the Ottomans/. Living in two-dozen states is rather a historical novelty for Arabs--a shock, which they are still absorbing.) Finally, terrorism is not an ideology per se; it can eventually be a method of political action--a radicalism of an (subjectively or objectively) excluded group which is justified by a projected political aim.
5. Terrorism--Linkages to Organized Crime Groups
Establishing a line of critical similarities and differences between the legitimate political party and clandestine (prescribed by law) terrorist group, we can now endorse--following the same token--the link between the criminal group and corporate entity. Thus, the essential similarity between the (trans-national) organized crime group and the legitimate business enterprise is that both are profit driven--either operates to gain, maintain and enlarge the market and profit shares. The critical difference is in the means used. On the side of organized crime grouping, the means used are always (predominantly) criminal, whereas the legitimate enterprise will operate respecting the national legal framework.
However, the lasting, ultimate ambition of any parallel structure, as organized crime (gray economic sector) or terrorist grouping (gray political sector), will be a gradual, well-orchestrated eventual legalization. It is not only a relative strength of particular state, capacitation of its judiciary and effectiveness of its legal enforcement that matters. The ability of state to achieve and maintain the social cohesion by including all segments of society to participate coherently will be essential. (29)
6. Multilateral Efforts and Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism
Since the existing international conventions against terrorism did not adequately address the issue of State responsibility to prevent and refrain from acts of terrorism all through the 1990s, the UN Security Council has adopted several times the resolutions imposing sanctions on certain states accused of sponsoring terrorism. At that point, it became evident that a legal instrument adopted by the UN General Assembly would provide a more internationally legitimate basis for combating international terrorism and avoid political controversies arising from unilateral or selective actions. To this end, a draft of a comprehensive convention against international terrorism appeared during the 53rd session of GA. Most of the parties concerned, contributed to strengthening the global consensus on combating international terrorism.
As a result of these efforts, the UN GA, by its resolution 53/108 reaffirmed the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee (established by Res. 51/210), to elaborate a draft intl. convention for the Suppression of terrorist financing to supplement existing intl. instruments on terrorism.
Finally, in December 1999 the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism has been approved. This Convention expands legal framework for international co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in (financing) terrorism. Additionally, elaboration of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism has successfully closed in 2005 in Vienna--further strengthening the body of universal legislations in matters related to terrorism.
On the regional level too, there has been considerable progress recorded. Thus, two new instruments appeared in 1999 only: OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combat Terrorism (and its protocol of 2004) and the OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism, followed by the 2002 Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, the 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and finally the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism.
In addition to the instruments adopted (or still under elaboration) on a global and regional level, there is a wide scope of measures that have been taken to suppress and eliminate international terrorism. Following is just a brief overview of some of the ongoing activities:
Together with the WCO (World Customs Organization) and Interpol, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) conducts a detection and response training programs for custom and other officials (programs mostly emphasized on the prevention of nuclear smuggling).
Further on, IAEA assists CEE/SEE, Central-East Asian and Pacific countries in establishing their domestic legal frameworks to comply with the intl. standards, incl. the national laws governing the safe and peaceful usage of nuclear energy (nuclear legislation & regulations, including non-proliferation and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities).
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) very successfully carries on the financial, technical and material assistance to states with regard to aviation security (aircraft and airports serving international civil aviation security strengthening measures).
IMO (International Maritime Organization) organizes specially designed training programs to combat crimes connected with international terrorism (safety of maritime navigation, safety of fixed platforms, open-seas piracy, etc.).
TPB of CICP/ODCCP (Terrorism Prevention Branch, special division, created in 1999) is a clearing-house for matters related to international terrorism. It is very active in research (e.g. the questionnaires regularly sent to each of the Institutes of UN criminal justice network). As regards the legal assistance, TPB has a well-established cooperation and permanent consultations with the UN 6th committee and UN Office of Legal Affairs in NY (particularly with a Codification Division of the LA Office, which gathers data on national laws and regulations regarding the prevention and suppression of intl. terrorism).
UN DCP, Europol, UNESCO, OAS, OIC, OAU, LAS, SAARC, EU/EC, Council of Europe and other affiliated or non-affiliated bodies, agencies and regional organizations are, also, taking their measures to prevent; detect; collect, disseminate and exchange information on; suppress; punish and eliminate international terrorism.
Example (of non-affiliated but committed and competent entity) includes the Naif Arab Academy for Security Studies in Riyadh, which annually offers dozen of comprehensive training courses on combating terrorism for the Arab JHA community.
Finally, the UN Secretariat is ending the process of preparing a publication containing the texts of international global and regional instruments (including the appropriate commentary) related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism. (30)
7. International Instruments against Terrorism
There are several comprehensive global and regional international instruments directly or indirectly subjecting the issue of (international) terrorism:
Global International Instruments
The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (including the stipulations on Jurisdiction; Powers of the Aircraft Commander; Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; Powers and Duties of States)
--Tokyo Convention (September 14, 1963); applies to acts affecting in-flight safety
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 40 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 185 states (ratification instruments deposited with the International Civil Aviation Organization).
The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
--Hague Convention (December 16, 1970): applies to hijackings
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 76 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 185 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Governments of USSR/Russia, UK and USA).
The 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
--Montreal Convention (September 23, 1971): applies to acts of aviation sabotage such as bombings abroad aircraft in flight
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 59 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 188 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Governments of USSR/Russia, UK and USA).
The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including diplomatic agents
--UN Convention (NY December 14, 1973): Protects senior governmental officials and diplomats
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 25 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 173 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).
The 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
--UN Convention (NY December 18, 1979): applies erga omnes Status of the Convention:
Signature: 39 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 168 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).
The 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
--Vienna Convention (March 3, 1980): Combats unlawful taking and use of nuclear material
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 45 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 116 states (ratification instruments deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency, UNOV).
The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation
--Montreal Protocol (February 24, 1988): Extends and supplements the Montreal 1971 Convention on air safety
Status of the Instrument:
Signature: 68 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 171 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Governments of USSR UK USA and with ICAO).
The 1988 UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
--Rome Convention (March 10, 1988): applies to terrorist activities on ships
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 41/17 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 39/156 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).
The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
--Rome Protocol (March 10, "88): refers to terrorist attacks on fixed offshore platforms
Status of the Instrument:
Signature: 39 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 145 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).
The 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (including the stipulations on Plastic and High Explosives; Detection agent; Manufacturing and Marking; Duly authorized military devices; Description of Explosives, etc.)
--Montreal Convention (March 1, 1991): applies to chemical marking for international identification of plastic explosives, e.g. to combat aircraft sabotage
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 51 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 144 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Intl. Civil Aviation Org. at HQ in Montreal).
The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (including the stipulations on State or government facility; Infrastructure facility; Explosive or other lethal device; Cause of death, serious injury or substantial material damage; Impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins, radiation or radioactive material; Military forces of a State; Place of public use; Public transportation system; Mutual legal assistance, etc.)
--UN Convention (NY December 15, 1997): expands legal framework for international co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons who engage in terrorist bombings
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 58 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 164 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).
The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (including the stipulations on Funds; State or governmental facility; Proceeds; Exchange of information; Extraditable offences; Mutual legal assistance, etc.)
--UN Convention (NY December 9, 1999): expands legal framework for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons who engage in financing terrorism
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 131 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 173 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).
The Security Council Resolution 1373 on International Cooperation to combat threats to International Peace and Security caused by Terrorist attacks (2001).
--The 2001 SC Resolution 1373
Status: unanimously--SC members (5+10)
The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (including the stipulations on definition of nuclear facilities and of nuclear materials; Crimes and Offenders; Proceedings and Extraditable offences; Mutual legal assistance, etc.)
--UN Convention (Vienna, 2005): designated to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism and expands legal framework for international co-operation in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in these acts
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 115 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 76 states (ratification instruments deposited with the IAEA, Vienna).
Regional International Instruments
The 1971 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the Act of Terrorism taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance
--Organization of American States Convention (Washington, February 2, 1971): expands the scope of the OAS GA Resolution on Acts of Terrorism with special regards to the Kidnapping of persons and Extortion in connection with that Crime
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 19 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 18 states (ratification instruments deposited with the OAS General Secretariat).
The 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (all EU member states agreed to application of this convention as on December 04, 1979)
--Council of Europe Convention (Strasbourg, January 27, 1977): as a wider basement for the 1992 EU Maastricht Treaty and its provisions on Co-operation in the spheres of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 32 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 30 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe).
The 1987 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism
--South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Convention (Kathmandu, November 4, 1987): applies only to Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka but recalls the UN Resolution 2625 (XXV) as well as the Dhaka SAARC Summit of 1985
Status of the Convention:
Signature:--states; Ratification, accession or succession: 7 states (full) (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of SAARC).
The 2004 Additional Protocol to the SAARC Convention
--SAARC Additional Protocol (Islamabad, 2004): framework for regional mechanisms of implementation and information exchange relevant to the acts of terrorism (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of SAARC).
The 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
--League of Arab States Convention: expands legal framework for intl. co-op. in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist activities
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 22 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 10 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of LAS).
The 1999 OAU/AU (31) Convention on the Prevention and Combat Terrorism (including the stipulations on Terrorist act definition; Areas of co-operation; State Jurisdiction; Extradition; Extra-territorial investigations and Mutual legal assistance, Extraditable offences, etc.)
--Organization of African Unity Convention (Addis Ababa, 1999): expands legal framework for prevention and combating of and international co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist activities
Status of the Convention:
Signature: no data; Ratification, accession or succession: no data available (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of AU/African Union).
The 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
--African Union Protocol (Addis Ababa, 2004): legal framework for regional mechanisms of implementation, prevention and combating of acts of terrorism (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of AU). The 1999 OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism (including the provisions on Contracting state; Terrorism definition; Terrorist Crime; Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorist crimes; Exchange of Information and Expertise; Investigation; Education and Information Field; Extradition and extradition procedures; Rogatory Commission; Judicial co-operation; Seized assets and proceeds of the crime; Exchange of Evidence; Implementation Mechanisms; Protection of Witnesses and Experts)
--Organization of the Islamic Conference Convention (Ouagadougou, July 1, 1999): expands legal framework for intl. co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorism within the OIC member states
Status of the Convention:
Signature: verified by the OIC Foreign Ministers at the 26th Session of Organization in Burkina Faso; Ratification, accession or succession: no data available (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of OIC).
The 2002 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (including the stipulations on Terrorist act definition; Areas of co-operation; State Jurisdiction; Joint Investigation, Extradition; Extra-territorial investigations and Mutual legal assistance, Extraditable offences, etc.)
--Organization of American States Convention (Bridgetown/Barbados, 2002): sets the legal framework for prevention and combating of and regional co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist activities
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 33 (of 34 active); Ratification, accession or succession: 22 (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of OAS).
The 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (including the stipulations on Terrorist act definition; Areas of co-operation; State Jurisdiction; Indictment and Investigation, and Exchange mechanisms; Mutual legal assistance; Extraditable offences, etc.)
--Council of Europe Convention (Strasburg, 2006): expands legal framework for prevention and combating of and regional co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist activities
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 17; Ratification, accession or succession: 26 (opened in Warsaw, ratification instruments deposited with the CoE).
The 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (including the stipulations on Terrorist offences; Strong reference on non-interference principle; Areas of co-operation; Rehabilitative programs; Political Offences Exceptions; State Jurisdiction; Mutual legal assistance, Extraditable offences, etc.)
--ASEAN Convention (Cebu/Philippines, 2007): expands legal framework for prevention and combating of terrorism; Foresees designation of Central Authorities or Coordinating structures: clearing-house mechanism
Status of the Convention:
Signature: 10; Ratification, accession or succession: 4 (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN). (32)
As earlier stated, the lasting and ultimate ambition of any parallel societal structure is to legalize itself. After phases of accumulation/recruitment, stabilization, expansion and monopolization, the parallel structure will make all necessary efforts to legitimately establish itself within the given society. This is where corruption, organized crime (including money laundering, cybercrime and trafficking) and terrorism come to a dangerous interplay. There is no successful transition through the phases for neither organized crime nor a terrorist group without support from a corrupted official. That is the way corruption is used from neutralization (lowering the legal enforcement risk) to naturalization (legalisation of criminal group). Once successfully conducted, the corruption--nearly automatically--keeps presenting itself as an opportunity. That's how the corruption evolves from a sporadically attempted, ad hoc condition into a systematically used, well-established and powerful instrument, which in the long run seriously undermines, deeply penetrates or even sometimes overtakes the state structure. In order to respond adequately to these challenges, the sub-national and national (states) level as well as the supranational (international community) one have to be effective and decisive, but also inclusive and cohesive.
An average (uniformed) spectator would colloquially associate the UN work with esoteric and naive/ altruistic, endless activities, and would describe the Organization of the UN itself as a mystic, non-transparent global octopus, which is overcrowded with overly paid and underworked officials enjoying the tax-free status and diplomatic immunity. Well, maybe ... Just a quick look at the Organization's budget would indicate that the UN expenditures are considerably smaller than the annual spending of companies such as BP (British Petroleum), Chevron, or nearly 500 other corporations worldwide. The UN Secretariat annually consumes a rather modest amount of some $13.7 billion (both combined: 'regular' and 'extra-budgetary' annual spending). (33)
With all its specialized agencies, funds and programs (including the WB Group and IMF), the 64,700 people-strong UN system annually spends an amount equal to less than 3% percent of the world's acknowledged military spending. To pay the December 2010 estimated (secondary) market value of cyber-social platform FaceBook, (34) the UN Secretariat would need six consecutive years of its total annual spending. Frankly, the United Nations system, by its depth, timing and outreach, does not live to all of our expectations, but so far the member countries haven't invented any other universal forum to express the common concerns of mankind. Maybe the concert of peoples and nations indeed managed to undergovern the world today. However, without the OUN that offers an indispensable platform for common agreed action, we cannot move forward. If charisma of a person is measured by a degree of his presence when the person is absent from the meeting room, than the maturity of plenary in that meeting room is measured by the speed and accuracy of a just multilateral endorsement. (35)
Last summer, Mukhriz Mahathir (36) made a good point by telling me: "Two things we shouldn't lose from a sight: global problems and fundamental consensus on how we deal with them."
The existence of a standing international forum, and of an unhindered funding to it, is a formal sine qua non, still not a substantive guaranty for a multilateral advancement. Tentatively, we can describe multilateralism as a special sort of constant, refined diplomatic bargaining among states.
Multilateralism is also about the fine tuning, filtering and clustering of interests of individual states (which are promulgating their respective national interests through the foreign policy formulation that rests upon the rational, political and emotional element), and is about building up the momentum. Finally, multilateralism is not a linear, one-directional, irreversible upward process of (agreed or imposed) compromise. It often suffers serious setbacks (sometimes, despite the existing solid institutional framework and its steady financial cover). The story of the EU and its so-called Third Pillar is very instructive. There was a far more multilateral/supranational JHA momentum achieved in Maastricht in 1992 (maybe not of a complete deepening, but for sure of an impressive widening), then the EU member states were ready to reconfirm and mandate Brussels with in Nice of 1999 or by the Reform Treaty in Lisbon of 2007.
The Justice and Home Affairs diplomacy keeps up its brave, silent, accorded and sustained work towards the establishment of a viable, lasting and comprehensive international regime on universal criminal justice. We cannot be bystanders all.
ANIS H. BAJREKTAREVIC
IMC University of Applied Sciences-Krems
NOTES AND REFERENCES
(1.) We can tentatively define the international regime as: Any set of norms of behavior and of rules and policies, which extensively cover relevant international issue, and facilitate substantive or procedural arrangements among the States (and IOs) they address. (It is a self-coined definition that I use in my lectures on International Public Law).
(2.) This "system" is composed of: The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) and the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), in force since 1990 with over 175 parties to the instrument. The UN (ODC) Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) also oversees the comprehensive list of precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacturing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (which are by the letter of instrument kept under international control).
(3.) This "system" is composed of: The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (known as the Palermo Convention of 2000, in force since September 2003, with 159 parties by February 2011), to it attached three additional instruments: (i) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, (ii) Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and (iii) Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, as well as the UN Convention against Corruption of 2003 (in force since December 2005, with 145 parties by January 2011).
(4.) Currently, the EU annual intake is about 5% of the world refugee/asylum seeker population. This, low-profile intake, suggests that Europe's biggest challenge is an integration of its existing foreign nationals, even if authorities prefer to concentrate on the more (politically) dramatic tasks of stopping new ones from coming in. Actually, the EU and EFTA states are still preoccupied with the 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants, originating from the unrestricted flows in '960s and '970s when the Western Europe was in a desperate need for manpower.
(5.) Faced with aging domestic populations and following the logics of corporate expansion, the Western markets need migrants, but the ordinary citizenry do not want them. What indeed changes is the capacity of the society (not always of economic conjuncture) to absorb those immigrants--and closely related to that--the psychological state of domestic populations. Therefore, many European political parties extended their agendas with more restrictive immigration policies. Short-sighted and opportunistic as it might be--it ignores the golden rule of migration: "once you cut off legal means, would-be immigrants just turn to smugglers".
(6.) Although ABA (American Bar Association) with its CEELI (Central and Eastern European Law Initiative) is not a multilateral body, its NGO-like role in technical legal assistance to almost each of the CEE/SEE countries deserves to be highlighted. By posting its Liaison officers and other expert-staff in many CEE/SEE countries, by organizing seminars and trainings, by providing domestic legislatures with a world-wide legal expertise and assessments--all that in continuity for over decade ABA through its CEELI program, has made a paramount effort and considerable contribution to the CEE/SEE countries' judiciary system and criminal justice.
(7.) The Commission and the Council of Europe are jointly running the OCTOPUS program against corruption that is entirely designed for CEE (candidate and noncandidate) countries. Additionally, for the new EU 10+2 CEE countries, the PHARE program, managed by the Commission's Enlargement Directorate-General, has also section devoted to JHA projects.
(8.) In this regard should be understood the frequent visits of Mr. Costa to Brussels, where he regularly met with the Prodi's JHA Commissioner Mr. Antonio Vitorino, and later with several Barroso's Commissioners.
(9.) Article 31 of the Treaty of Nice stated: "The Council shall promote cooperation through EUROJUST by promoting support for criminal investigations in cases of serious cross-border crime, particularly organized crime, taking account, in particular, of analyzes carried out by Europol; ..."
(10.) In 2005 e.g., the worldwide losses from software piracy were estimated at $ 14 billion, with 25% of that coming from Europe (according to the OECD experts estimates). Russia and Eastern Europe are particularly notorious: an estimated 67% of all software installed there were illegitimate. Simply, the cyber-crime profits are unusually high (exceeding the drugs by far) and the risks are very low.
(11.) The Convention deals in particular with offences related to infringements of copyrights, computer-related fraud, child pornography and offences connected with network security. It also covers series of procedural powers such as searches and interception of material on computer networks. Its main aim, as set out in the Preamble, is to pursue "a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against Cyber crime, by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation."
On the other hand, the prime focus of the Protocol follows the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems.
(12.) It is rather a same sort of communication modus used for the Schengen related SIS and SIRENE systems within the European states, parties to the Schengen acqui.
(13.) Hereby the reference has to be made on Transparency International (TI), the leading global anti-corruption NGO. Its annual Global Corruption Reports provide extremely valuable, otherwise missing, overview of the state of corruption around the globe. The GCRs of the Transparency International and to it related Corruption Perception Index--although unofficial--turned to be a very effective and practical anti-corruption tool.
(14.) TPB--A special division "Terrorism Prevention Branch" is attached to the CICP/ODC UN Vienna Office.
(15.) In March 2002, the former Secretary General of EBRD Mr. Antonio Maria Costa replaced Dr. Pino Arlacchi (both Italian nationals) as the Director General of the UN Office Vienna (UNOV) and the ODC Executive Director. Finally, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon closed the "Italian lead at the UNOV" by appointing the former Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Yury Fedotov as the new UNOV and ODC head.
(16.) About the same recommendations were adopted at the 9th UN Congress in Cairo in 1995 as well as at the 10th UN Congress held in Vienna, in April 2000 (including the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice as the biggest outcome of the Congress, chaired by South Africa's Justice Minister, Mr. P.M. Maduna).
(17.) The issues covered by the Palermo Convention (many for the first time covered globally) are as follows:
(i) Statement of purpose; (ii) Use of terms; (iii) Scope of (the Convention's) application; (iv) Protection of sovereignty; (v) Criminalization of participation in an Organized Crime Group; (vi) Criminalization of the Laundering of proceeds of crime; (vii) Measures to combat Money-laundering; (viii) Criminalization of corruption; (ix) Measures against corruption; (x) Liability of Legal persons; (xi) Prosecution, adjudication and sanctions; (xii) Confiscation and Seizure; (xiii) Intl. co-operation for purpose of confiscation; (xiv) Disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime or property; (xv) Jurisdiction; (xvi) Extradition; (xvii) Transfer of sentenced person; (xviii) Mutual legal assistance; (xix) Joint investigation & special investigative techniques; (xx) Transfer of criminal proceedings; (xxi) Establishment of criminal record; (xxii) Criminalization of obstruction of justice; (xxiii) Protection of witnesses and victims; (xxiv) Measures to enhance co-operation with legal enforcement authorities; (xxv) Collection, exchange and information analysis on the nature of Organized Crime; (xxvi) Training and technical assistance; (xxvii) Other measures: economic development and technical assistance; (xxviii) Prevention; (xxix) Conference of the Parties to the Convention; (xxx) Implementation of Convention; (xxxi) Relation with Protocols; (xxxii) Final Provisions; and finally: Travaux Preparatoires (Interpretative Notes).
(18.) This was a summit with the tightest security I was ever attending. Italians practically sealed off the Palermo (and Catania) downtown. The only unplanned surprise was a moderate volcanic activity of Etna (outskirts of Catania city) which didn't hinder program at all. Among the well-remembered historic moves, the Italian host (on idea of Dr. Arlacchi) arranged that Secretary-General Kofi Annan meets the delegations and symbolically puts his own signature on the convention in the nearby village of Corleone--birthplace of many mafia bosses.
(19.) By February 2011, there are as many as 159 parties to the Convention. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, entered into force by December 2003 (with 143 parties by Feb. 2011); the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, in force since January 2004 (127 parties by Feb. 2011), and (iii) Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition entered into force by July 2005 (83 parties).
(20.) I still freshly recall the dramatic closure of the Ad Hoc Committee work. The Firearms protocol was the most controversial of all 4 instruments negotiated. It indeed dealt with 'trafficking in' and' smuggling of' elements but was essentially sensitively touching upon the 'legitimate' states sells of ammunition and firearms (traditionally dealt by the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, if at all). Consequently, several delegations were (intentionally but tacitly) attempting to erode the clear wording of this protocol. By the end of the last day of the last Ad Hoc Committee in 2000, the Chinese delegation rejected to bless the final wording of the Firearms protocol justifying it with the absence of the final instruction from its government. Facing the imminent collapse, the Secretariat symbolically stopped the clock on Friday 6pm (CET), and the whole plenary was simply to wait 8 a.m. in Beijing in order to close the instrument's wording, and to finally put an end to all 4 instruments. Everybody that night was bad with Chinese. Sometimes after midnight (few ambassadors, long suspecting the nature of the game, and wishing to keep the spirits high even in such a grave circumstances), passed the rumour that Chinese will however accept the present wording. As this fabricated "news" reverberated through the lobby of UNOV's 4th floor rotunda, several western countries' delegations turned visibly nervous. Understanding that Chinese had rather stiff position from the very beginning, many states let Chinese to play "icebreaker role". De facto shielded by Chinese restrictive stance, they have themselves cynically advocated the strong wording for the "Firearms" protocol. Still, today this protocol has only 52 signatories (mostly G77, and very few OECD countries, with China being among the first countries to sign--December 2002, without reservations).
(21.) The first session of the Ad Hoc Committee for the negotiation of a Convention against Corruption was held in Vienna (21 January-01 February 2002). It made the first reading of the draft convention (issues emerging: definition of "public official", definition of corruption and the questions implying the private sector corruption). The second session of the Ad Hoc Committee was held between 17-28 June 2002 with the opening statement of Mr. Costa (that time Executive Director of UN ODCCP) who noted "strong political will and high levels of commitment of member states for a convention against corruption". At the second session of Ad Hoc Committee the first reading of the draft text was completed, covering issues such as: sanctions, confiscation, intl. co-operation, asset recovery, prevention of the transfer of funds of illicit origin. One of the key (and quite controversial) aspects discussed by the third session of the Ad Hoc Committee (13-24 January 2003) was the corruption within the private sector and the assets recovery. From the 4th to the 7th session the Ad Hoc continued with the second and third reading of the draft (examining once more core definitions and other stipulations of the draft). The Ad Hoc Committee closed its work by 01 October 2003.
(22.) Interestingly enough, some critical terms used in the UNCAC are defined in conformity with the previous conventions and some appeared anew (e.g. 'public official', 'foreign public official', and 'official of a public international organization'). The very body of instrument is organized in following way: (i) General Provisions (Chapter I, Articles 1-4); (ii) Preventive Measures (Chapter II, Articles 5-14); (iii) Criminalization and Law Enforcement (Chapter III, Articles 15-44); (iv) International Cooperation (Chapter IV, Articles 43-49); (v) Asset Recovery (Chapter V, Articles 51-59); (vi) Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (Chapter VI, Articles 60-62); (vii) Mechanisms for Implementation (Chapter VII, Articles 6364), and (viii) Final Provisions (Chapter VIII, Articles 65-71).
(23.) In his speech to the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa in September 2002, that time Executive Director of UN ODC, Mr. Costa warned the delegates: ".We at ODC believe there cannot be sustainable development unless the concerns which are at the heart of our mandate crime, corruption, narcotics, terrorism, trafficking in human beings--are also well addressed... "
(24.) Money Laundering component is here of crucial importance for the very outcome; or as the play-writer Bertolt Brecht effectively says in his The Three-penny Opera (staged in 1928)--"what is the bank robbery in comparison with the foundation of a new bank".
(25.) Corruption as a societal phenomenon represents deviant relationship within or between government, citizenry and businesses that seriously departs from generally accepted legal or/and moral social conduct. From the legal point of view corruption can be defined as a clandestine trade off between the influence and (material or in-kind/intangible favour) gain that is seemingly victimless. (Both def.--A.B.)
(26.) Expert estimates claim that for every apprehended/detained terrorist another 9 remain at large (rating it to 10%). Therefore many describe terrorism like a balloon: squeeze one end, and it expands at the other.
(27.) "They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety", Benjamin Franklin's prophesized in 1775.
(28.) Around that time, the grand wiz of American geopolitics, Henry Kissinger has coined his famous and thereafter frequently quoted term: "confrontational nostalgia".
(29.) As the 10th UN Congress already recorded (and 11th and 12th Congress confirmed), there are growing serious linkages between Terrorism and Organized Crime as well as dangerous similarities between the two of them (such as: money-laundering through illicit or covered charities, covert and overt offshore banking; trafficking/smuggling of fire-arms, of human beings; kidnapping; various sorts of plundering of property, etc.) Tediously enough, unlike drugs money or any other laundering of proceeds of crime, the terrorist funds must be traced before, not after, the crime has been committed.
(30.) To end this, the (increasing) critical links between Organized crime, corruption, money-laundering, drugs trafficking and terrorism have been noted in Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), and recalled/reaffirm by numerous reports of many UN and non-UN Foras in 2002-2007 period.
(31.) Organization of African Unity (OAU) is renamed into African Union (AU).
(32.) Kindly thanking to Mak Bajrektarevic for the update on the status of global and regional instruments (December 2010-February 2011) and to Phillip Judkins for a proof-reading.
(33.) For the sake of comparison, the Coca-Cola Company has 92,800 employees worldwide. Its reported net profit for 2009 was equal to a half of the UN Secretariat annual expenditure.
(34.) British writer Graham Green in his 1955 novel "The Quiet American" wondered: "I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused... "
(35.) If a force is measured by the speed of coercion of a brute power over an argument, and if the anti-intellectualism is a sum of arrogance and ignorance, than the absence of common sense must be a presence of anti-intellectualism aided by a sum force of stiffness and blindness/short-sightedness.
(36.) Malaysian Minister Deputy of International Trade and Industry, son of the longest serving Malaysia's Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003). Referred talks were taking place July 2010, during the EU-ASEAN seminar (socalled BFA2), that I organized in Jakarta (together with the Indonesian Diplomatic Academy and the ASEAN Secretariat) and in Kuala Lumpur (together with the Malaysian Diplomatic Academy/IDFR and Federal Parliament), to which Minister Deputy was a key-note speaker.
[c] Anis Bajrektarevic. The present article appeared for the first time in 1999 (in a considerably shorter form, as the working document dealing only with the critical similarities and differences between 'smuggling of' and 'trafficking in') before the ICMPD Steering Board--Ministerial.
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|Author:||Bajrektarevic, Anis H.|
|Publication:||Geopolitics, History, and International Relations|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2011|
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