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The destruction of Convoy PQ17: 27 June-10 July 1942.

EXECUTION

Convoy PQ17, now consisting of thirty-six ships plus one rescue ship, sailed from Hvalfjord at 1600 on 27 June. (168) (See maps 4 and 5.) It proceeded at six knots. The next day the convoy encountered heavy fog and ice floes in the Denmark Strait. One merchant vessel ran aground and an oiler was so heavily damaged by ice that it had to return. Several other ships suffered slight damage from ice. (169)

The Home Fleet's Battle Force sailed from Scapa Flow on 29 June. It followed a course northward so as to provide support to both the PQ17 and QP13 convoys. (170) Convoy PQ17 was fully formed at 1200 on 30 June when the long-range escort force (six destroyers, four corvettes, two auxiliary AA ships, and two submarines) under Commander Broome plus two rescue ships joined the convoy. (171) The convoy was then some one hundred miles southwest of Jan Mayen Island. (172) The next day, the Cruiser Covering Force sailed from Seydisfjord. (173)

Operation E.S.'s dummy convoy sailed on 29 June. It carried out its movement eastward toward the Norwegian coast on 30 June and 1 July. However, the Germans' reconnaissance aircraft did not observe it, and hence they did not react at all. (174) The entire deception plan was a failure.

At 1640 on 30 June, Luftwaffe aircraft detected westbound Convoy QP13, consisting of thirty-nine ships and ten escorts, some two hundred nautical miles north of North Cape. However, because of heavy fog, the aircraft were unable to maintain contact. (175) At 1050 on 1 July, Convoy QP13 was sighted by U-88 some 250 nm northeast of Jan Mayen, but was not attacked. (176)

At 1615 on 1 July, U-255 was the first to detect Convoy PQ17. The reported position of the convoy was some sixty nautical miles east of Jan Mayen. U-255 reported that the convoy consisted of thirty-eight steamers and ten to twelve destroyers and other escort vessels. The convoy's speed was estimated at eight knots; B-Dienst later confirmed this. (177)

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At noon on 1 July, the British first noted German shadowing aircraft over Convoy PQ17. The weather was calm. All the Allied destroyers had been refueled. The convoy was then some two hundred miles west of Bear Island. (178) The PQ17 and QP13 convoys passed each other at latitude 73 degrees N, longitude 3 degrees E, at a distance of some ten miles, on the afternoon of 1 July. (179) The Cruiser Covering Force overtook Convoy PQ17 and sailed parallel to it some forty miles north, so as to avoid German detection. (180)

In the meantime, Bletchley Park learned that the Luftwaffe had detected Convoy PQ17. (181) The OIC began to decrypt special intelligence traffic, extending from noon on 1 July to noon on 2 July. The OIC learned that the Narvik group had arrived at Altafjord that morning. It also knew that Tirpitz had sortied from Trondheim the previous night. This was confirmed by a British aircraft. Yet Tirpitz was not actually located by air reconnaissance that day. (182)

On 2 July, one fleet tanker and one destroyer left the convoy to join westbound Convoy QP13. On the evening of the same day, Convoy PQ17 ran into fog, which persisted until the forenoon of 3 July. Bad weather prevented Allied aircraft from reconnoitering the Norwegian ports for several days. (183)

Despite the failure to detect the Allies' heavy surface ship group, Admiral Carls believed that the pending German operation, including the incorporation of heavy surface forces, was fully justified. Deployment of the German ships would start after the enemy PQ convoy crossed longitude 5 degrees E, anticipated by the evening of 2 July. (184) Hence, in the forenoon of 2 July, Naval Group Command North requested that 1./SKL issue "execute" orders for the operation. This request was approved, and signals were sent at 1257 on 2 July. At 1200, the Trondheim group received an order to be in three-hour readiness. (185) On the basis of reports from U-266, Admiral Arctic decided to keep four U-boats in continuous contact with the convoy. By 1400 on 2 July, a patrol line of six U-boats was established halfway between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. (186)

As planned, the Trondheim group sortied at 2000 on 2 July for Gimsoystraumen, and four hours later the Narvik group left for Altafjord. (187) Lutzow ran aground in the Tjeldsund after it left Ofotfjord and did not take part in the operation thereafter. Likewise, three destroyers (Lody, Riedel, and Galster) of the Trondheim group touched ground in Gimsoystraumen and returned to Trondheim the next day. (188) The Germans believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that the enemy did not notice the deployment of the Trondheim and Narvik groups. (189)

About midnight on 2/3 July, the U-boats and aircraft lost contact with Convoy PQ17. (190) At 0700 on 3 July, the convoy changed course to due east to pass Bear Island, entering the Barents Sea. The Admiralty reported that the ice boundary was farther north than had been anticipated. Hence, Admiral Hamilton suggested to Commander Broome that he change to a more northward course. Yet Broome did not entirely accept that suggestion, because he was more anxious to make progress eastward. (191) He changed the convoy's course only slightly northward (to 021). (192)

At 1600, Admiral Carls asked for a decision regarding ROSSELSPRUNG. He shared his intent to deploy the Tirpitz group to Altafjord with Raeder and the SKL. Afterward, Admiral Krancke was directed to transmit Raeder's approval of Carls's intent to Hitler. At the same time he was instructed to explain to Hitler that movement of the Tirpitz group to Altafjord was only a preliminary redeployment, and did not constitute execution of Operation ROSSELSPRUNG. In a message sent at 1720, Carls ordered Schniewind to carry out the redeployment. (193) By deploying the Tirpitz group to Altafjord, only a few hours would be lost if Hitlers approval for the larger operation came before midday on 4 July. (194)

In the early morning of 3 July, the Admiralty informed CINC Home Fleet that a PBY-2 Catalina seaplane, backed by one B-24 Liberator heavy bomber if necessary, would patrol the area between latitude 71[degrees]30' N, longitude 19[degrees]10' E and latitude 71[degrees]55' N, longitude 23[degrees]40' E from 1530 on 3 July to 0300 on 5 July. This patrol was intended to cover the approaches from Altafjord to the convoy's route. Aircraft from Sullom Voe would conduct some additional searches westward of Lofoten. The plan also included having five Catalinas available at Arkhangelsk to provide searches for the convoys passage after it crossed longitude 35 degrees E. (195)

At 0130, PQ17 changed course to 091. It sailed into an area full of heavy ice growlers. (196) At 0415, Luftwaffe aircraft detected Convoy PQ17 some eighty nautical miles northeast of Bear Island, equidistant from that island and Spitsbergen. (197)

At 0450, Convoy PQ17 suffered its first loss when a single enemy aircraft torpedoed the American merchantman Christopher Newport of seven thousand gross registered tons (in German documents, Bruttoregistertonnen, or BRT). (198)

During the day on 4 July, German aircraft maintained contact with PQ17, with only short interruptions caused by bad weather. (199) As of 1700, the Germans still did not have definite information regarding the presence of an enemy heavy covering group with--probably--one battleship, two to three cruisers, and three destroyers, reported as of 1352 as being northeast of Convoy PQ17 and sailing on a southeasterly course. (200) At 1745, Admiral Carls reported to the SKL that the area north of latitude 71 degrees N was not continuously observed. The 1st and 2nd Combat Groups were in a three-hour readiness status at Altafjord. Admiral Carls believed that, because of the situation, Operation ROSSELSPRUNG should be launched no later than 1700 on 5 July. (201)

In the meantime, at about 1230, the Admiralty gave Hamilton permission to sail east of longitude 25 degrees E should the situation require it. However, the Admiralty had no intelligence that justified changing Tovey's plans. So Tovey qualified the Admiralty's message by directing Hamilton that "once the convoy is east of 25[degrees] E or earlier at your discretion, you are to leave the Barents Sea unless assured by Admiralty that Tirpitz cannot be met." (202) At 1520, Hamilton signaled that he would stay with the convoy until the enemy surface situation had been clarified, but certainly no later than 1200 on 5 July. (203) These messages sent by the Admiralty marked the beginning of increased interference by Admiral Pound in the decisions and actions of his subordinate commanders during the operation, including bypassing Admiral Tovey to send messages directly to Tovey's subordinate Hamilton. (204)

During the afternoon of 4 July, British aircraft reported that Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper had left Trondheim. Admiral Tovey's force was then some 180-200 miles northwest of Bear Island. That position was within the mutually supporting distance for aircraft from the carrier Victorious to respond in case of enemy attack on Convoy PQ17. (205) At 1640, Hamilton ordered the convoy to change course from 090 to 045 to open distance from the enemy airfield at Banak to four hundred miles. (206)

That afternoon, Bletchley Park asserted that, although there was no verification via photographic reconnaissance, it was "tolerably certain" that Admiral Scheer and Lutzow had been in Altafjord since 1400 on 3 July (when it became known they had left Trondheim). By the afternoon of 4 July, all four German heavy ships might have been at sea heading toward the convoy. (207)

At 1809, Admiral Hamilton replied to the Admiralty that he intended to withdraw to the westward of Convoy PQ17 at about 2200 on 4 July, upon completing the refueling of his destroyers. (208) Another message from the Admiralty, received about 1839, informed Hamilton that further information might be available shortly, and directed him to remain with the convoy "pending further instruction." (209) At that time, Hamilton's force was some ten to twenty miles ahead of the convoy. (210) Some 350 miles away from the Cruiser Covering Force, the Battle Fleet was in a hovering position southwest of Spitsbergen. (211)

Over the course of the day, the weather north of Bear Island steadily improved; however, the cloud ceiling was low (300-500 meters), making it easier for the enemy aircraft to attack the convoy. (212) The first attack with a few bombers came at 1930, but scored no hits. Luftwaffe aircraft carried out a series of more deadly attacks during the evening of 4 July. At about 2020, approximately twenty-three Heinkel (He) 111 torpedo bombers attacked the convoy. They torpedoed three ships; two had to be sunk, while one was damaged but was able to continue the voyage. Four enemy planes were shot down. (213) Convoy PQ17 came out of the heavy Luftwaffe air attacks remarkably well--its antiair defense proved very effective. (214)

At 2325, Bletchley Park sent the Admiralty an intercepted message: "Most Secret Source (Ultra): 1. Germans located westbound convoy from Russia on North Cape meridian P.M. yesterday July 2nd and have since lost in fog. 2. Eastbound convoy is expected to be sighted shortly and will be attacked in accordance with plan; 3. Warships are expected to move from Trondheim and Narvik (?36) hours before convoy reaches meridian 5 deg E. Main attack to be concentrated during passage between 15th and 30th meridian; 4. U-boats already on station close to Arctic. A two repeat A two." (A2 was the level of reliability of this part of the report.) (215)

Decision to Scatter the Convoy

In the evening on 4 July, Admiral Pound personally went to Bletchley Park to get a close look at the stream of decrypted messages. (216) The OIC received good news at about 1900: that the code "break-in" had been accomplished, so the decrypts for the twenty-four hours that had ended at noon that day could be expected very shortly. (217) At 1918, Bletchley sent a message to Tovey that the German "CINC of the Fleet in Tirpitz arrived to Alta(fjord) 0900/4. Destroyers and torpedo boats complete with fuel at once. (Admiral) Scheer was already present at Alta(fjord) [so were Hipper and Liitzow], At 1623/3 two U-boats were informed their main task was to shadow convoy." (218) Commander Norman Denning of the OIC wanted to add to this message regarding Tirpitz's arrival in Altafjord that morning and the directive to the destroyers and torpedo boats to refuel that the evidence indicated that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord. However, after some discussion with Admiral Pound, Denning's added text was deleted from the message before it was sent at 1918. (219)

It was not known how long refueling the destroyers would take. Although expected, receipt of the information about the German ships' arrival in Altafjord further reinforced the view that a move against the convoy, in accordance with the original plan, was imminent, if not already under way. (220) But Denning was not convinced the German ships had sailed out of Altafjord. He was supported in his view by his superior, Jock Clayton, the deputy director of the Intelligence Centre. (Clayton was a rear admiral on the retired list, but had been brought back onto active service as a captain.) Further support came from Harry Hinsley, the German traffic analyst at Bletchley. For Denning, the absence of any signal from Naval Group Command North to Tirpitz was an indicator that the heavy ships were still at Altafjord. The comparison was to Tirpitz's foray against Convoy PQ12 in March. There also were no reports from the British submarines. However, Pound gave Denning no opportunity to explain his reasons; he instead asked direct questions, and expected to receive short, factual answers. Among several other questions, Pound asked Denning whether he knew that Tirpitz was not out to sea." (221) Denning responded that, on the basis of the experience of the German sortie against Convoy PQ12, the Germans would not risk Tirpitz if it might be in danger from the "Home Fleet, particularly its aircraft carriers." (222) He also tried to reassure Pound that "if Tirpitz has put out to sea you can be sure that we should have known very shortly afterward within four to six hours." (223)

Denning also pointed to several "negative" indicators that Tirpitz was not at sea. For example, Bletchley Park knew that the Germans had sighted CS 1 but had reported erroneously that it included a battleship. That would indicate a larger force, and therefore the Germans would decide not to send Tirpitz to sea. Bletchley had found no evidence the Germans had detected the heavy covering force. Another piece of evidence that Tirpitz was not out to sea was that the Germans did not warn their U-boats to stay clear of the convoy. Neither had the German wireless telegraphy (W/T) traffic since noon shown any extraordinary activity. The British and Russian submarines off North Cape had reported no sightings. Collectively, all these "negatives" were a good indication that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord. (224)

Nonetheless, to Admiral Pound's question, "Can you assure me that Tirpitz is still at anchor in Altafjord?" Denning responded, "No. I shall have information only after the Tirpitz has left." (225) On this question, in fact, hung the entire future of Convoy PQ17. Yet Denning was not in a position to give the desired assurance. (226) Pound then asked, "Can you at least tell me whether Tirpitz is ready to go to sea?" To this Denning responded, "I can at least say that she will not leave in the next few hours. If she were on the point of sailing, the destroyer escort would have preceded her and made an antisubmarine sweep. They have not been reported by our submarines patrolling the Altafjord." (227)

A stream of decrypts began to reach the OIC at 2000. However, they provided no new "positive" information bearing on Admiral Pound's question. By then, Clayton was due to attend a staff meeting at 2030 convened by Pound. (228) (Coincidentally, that meeting was held just when Convoy PQ17 was repelling enemy air attacks.) (229) At 2031, a decrypt timed 1130 on 4 July was received at the OIC. It confirmed that Tirpitz had not left Altafjord as of noon on 4 July. This signal was included in the summarized Ultra message timed 2110. It had informed the U-boats that no German surface ships were then in their operating area, and that the British heavy ships, if encountered, should be their main targets. However, this information did not change the situation, because an assumption had already been made that the destroyers and torpedo boats accompanying Tirpitz would not have completed refueling until about noon on 4 July. (230)

At the 2030 meeting, Admiral Pound and his staff opined that the enemy attack could occur any time after 0200 on 5 July; if that happened, Admiral Hamilton's cruisers would be destroyed. They also (falsely) believed that the more widely merchant ships were dispersed, the better their chance of escape; once the alarm was given, the enemy would wish to spend no more time than necessary in the vicinity to pick off some ships. However, an eight-knot convoy might require a lot of time to disperse over a large area. The air and U-boat attacks had already started and were certain to continue. (231)

When Clayton returned to the OIC at about 2130, he informed his staff of Admiral Pounds view that the convoy had to be dispersed because Tirpitz had sailed and could reach the convoy by 0200 on 5 July. However, his staff disagreed with that assessment. They persuaded Clayton to go back to Admiral Pound and make the case that Admiral Tovey should be advised instead that Tirpitz had not sailed, and would not sail until the Germans obtained information on the strength of the Allied heavy covering force. (232) The naval section at Bletchley Park agreed with Denning's assessment that the weight of negative evidence suggested that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord. However, Clayton was unable to convince Admiral Pound, who had already made up his mind. (233)

The fate of Convoy PQ17 was decided by three short messages sent by the Admiralty. At 2111 on 4 July, Pound sent a signal to Hamilton (repeated to Tovey): "Cruiser force withdraw to westward at high speed." Pound sent another message directly to Broome (repeated to Hamilton) at 2123. It read: "Owing to threat from surface ships convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports." This was followed by another at 2136: "My 2123/4th. Convoy is to scatter." (234)

At the time Admiral Pound made his decision, Convoy PQ17 was some 130 miles north-northeast of Bear Island; from North Cape, the convoy was almost due north (bearing 008) at a distance of about 240 miles. (235) The Allied ships had some 450 miles before they would reach Novaya Zemlya. The Battle Force was then some 230 miles from the convoy and four hundred miles from the Tirpitz group. In other words, it was too far away from both the convoy and the enemy heavy ships. (236)

At 2215, Commander Broome passed the signal to scatter to the convoy commodore. The convoy was then at 75[degrees]55' N, 28[degrees]52' E. Broome, with his destroyers (other ships of the A/S screen remained with the convoy), steamed away to join Admiral Hamilton's force. (237) Commodore Dowding sent a message to Broome: "Many thanks. Goodbye and good hunting"; Broome replied, "It's a grim business leaving you here." (238)

At 2230, Hamilton turned his force onto a westerly course, passing southward of the convoy--that is, between the convoy and the probable direction from which the enemy would approach. The visibility was extremely variable, with numerous fog patches. The Cruiser Covering Force, with the destroyers, withdrew westward at twenty-five knots. (239)

Both Hamilton and Broome were affected less by the content of Pound's three messages than by the quick succession in which they were sent. The cumulative effect of the three signals--especially since the last signal had a more urgent priority marking than the middle one--was to imply that danger was pressing on them. (240) They believed an attack by Tirpitz was imminent. Commander Broome never forgave himself for obeying the order to scatter the convoy. (241) (The third message's order to "scatter" the convoy was actually merely a technical amendment of the term "disperse" that had been used in the second signal; but Hamilton and Broome could not have known this. Later, the official Royal Navy history would explain the two terms in a footnote. "Disperse" meant ships should break formation and proceed at a convenient speed toward their destination, remaining for some hours in close proximity to each other. By contrast, the term "scatter" meant they should begin sailing on different bearings, in accordance with a scheme laid down in the convoy instructions.) (242)

Officially, the decision to scatter the convoy was later explained thus: Convoy PQ17 still had thirty ships intact. The combined threat of air and U-boat attacks was considerable. The convoy had reached a positon beyond the effective range of the Battle Fleet, even if that force was put at risk to engage Tirpitz and the enemy's other heavy ships. In the Admiralty's view, if the convoy continued on its way, it would be harassed by enemy U-boats and aircraft. Any enemy heavy ships would most likely be encountered east of North Cape. The enemy would need no more than ten hours to reach the convoy, and could return to safety in less than that time. Hence, the decision was made to scatter the convoy, with the intention of minimizing the greater losses anticipated from a surface attack compared with those inflicted by U-boats and aircraft. But as it turned out, the convoy lost twenty ships after the signal to scatter was given, and only twelve ships reached Russian ports. (243) This reasoning was faulty because of the proven effectiveness of Luftwaffe bombers and Kriegsmarine U-boats in attacking individual merchant ships. The threat of enemy aircraft to PQ17 could be neutralized only by having superior airpower in the area--unlikely to be provided by the Soviets.

This was only the second time an Allied convoy had received the order to scatter. In the first instance, Convoy HX84 (bound from Halifax to Liverpool) received such an order on 5 November 1940 when Admiral Scheer was about to attack it. However, there were significant differences: the area in which HX84's thirty-seven ships could disperse was much larger, and neither German aircraft nor U-boats were attacking the ships. The earlier convoy was also protected by only a single escort ship (Jarvis Bay). Admiral Scheer subsequently sank five ships, including the escort. (244)

The order to scatter Convoy PQ17 was given in glaring contravention of the "Atlantic Convoy Instructions and Orders" issued by Admiral Tovey in March 1942. They stipulated that in the face of enemy heavy ships, convoy escorts should remain in the vicinity to track and, if circumstances allowed, even to attack enemy surface ships. Tovey in his report noted that Convoy PQ17 had already completed more than half its voyage (when the decision to scatter was issued, PQ17 was some eight hundred miles away from Arkhangelsk) yet had lost only three ships. In his view, the decision to scatter was premature--and disastrous. (245)

In a personal letter to Admiral Sir Percy Noble of the Western Approaches Command on 12 July 1942, Admiral Tovey placed responsibility for the destruction of Convoy PQ17 squarely on the Admiralty for "scattering of convoy unnecessarily early and ... the appalling conditions of panic suggested by the signals they made." He also sent an officer "down to the Admiralty to make clear to them what the reactions at sea were to the information passed out and to those three signals in particular." Tovey also told the Admiralty on the phone that he considered it "wrong for the Admiralty to issue definite orders to the convoy and escort." The Admiralty should "give them information by all means and, if they wish make a recommendation, but leave it to the fellow on the spot to decide the action to be taken." The Admiralty's response was that it "considered] it putting an unfair responsibility on to an officer of Commander's rank." (246) However, this did not absolve Admiral Pound from bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey also wrote that Hamilton was entirely responsible for the lack of action because he "failed completely to appreciate the altered situation due to his imagining that there was still a strong likelihood of his being brought to action by the Tirpitz." Hamilton also believed that the best course of action would have entailed the destroyer escort operating together with his three destroyers as part of the screen for CS 1. Tovey stated in his letter, "I deeply regret this mistake of his [Hamilton's] as there was not the slightest doubt that if the destroyers had returned to the convoy within a reasonable time they could have helped materially in its defence and in rescuing survivors." (247) Yet while the presence of destroyers obviously would have strengthened Convoy PQ17's AA defenses, it was unlikely they would have reduced significantly the number of merchant ships sunk.

At 0115 on 5 July, Admiral Hamilton sent the following message to Commodore Dowding, addressing both the convoy's merchant ships and the remaining escorts:
   I know you will all be feeling as distressed as I am at having to
   leave that fine collection of ships to find their own way to
   harbor. The enemy under the cover of his shore-based aircraft has
   succeeded in concentrating a far superior force in this area. We
   were therefore ordered to withdraw. We are all sorry that the good
   work of the close escort could not be completed. I hope we shall
   all have a chance of settling this score with them soon. (248)


Hamilton was very much concerned about the effect the escort force's apparent desertion of the merchant ships might have on morale. If he had known that the Admiralty had no more information regarding the enemy heavy units than he himself possessed, he would have remained in a covering position until the convoy had widely dispersed. (249) It was later claimed that Admiral Pound would not have made his fateful decision except for the presence of two U.S. cruisers; the U.S. ships were operating under British command for the first time, and he did not want to lose them. (250)

On 5 July, the weather in the operating area was variable, between four-tenths and fully overcast, with fog banks. Atmospheric disturbances interrupted radio traffic sporadically. Convoy PQ17 was continuously shadowed by Luftwaffe aircraft. (251)

At 0238, Admiral Tovey received an Ultra message that read: "1. It is not repeat not known if German heavy forces have sailed from Altenfjord [Altafjord], but they are unlikely to have done so before 1200/4th. 2. It appears that Germans may be in some confusion whether a battleship is in company with CS 1. Germans do not repeat not appear to be aware of position of C-in-C Home Fleet." (252)

At 0322, the Admiralty sent a message to Admiral Miles in Moscow informing him that, on the basis of air reconnaissance,
   enemy heavy units have moved from Trondheim to Narvik and believed
   to be using a base in Alta fjord area from which to operate against
   PQ17. British forces other than close escort for PQ17 have been
   withdrawn west of Bear Island and convoy ordered to scatter in
   approximate position 76 degs North 28 degs East at 2200B/4 to
   proceed to North Russia ports. British submarines are being moved
   from previous patrol positions to area between latitudes 73 degs
   and 72 degs N and longitudes 23 degs and 32 degs E. Catalina
   aircraft temporarily based in Arkhangelsk will carry out
   reconnaissance between positions 74 degs N 28 degs E and 73 degs N
   32 degs E.


The Admiralty requested that Miles try to arrange with Soviet authorities for regular air reconnaissance of the Altafjord area, air attacks against enemy heavy units in harbor or at sea, and the bombing of enemy airfields, "which is of added importance with convoy scattered." (253)

At 1625, an ULTRA message was sent to Rear Admiral Richard Bevan, the senior British naval officer in north Russia, advising him to anticipate that "most likely time of enemy surface attack is now tonight 5/6 July or early hours of tomorrow 6th July." The "enemy may strike on 065 degs direction from North Cape. Submarine and Catalina aircraft might sight enemy. Request striking force may be at short notice from 2000 today 5th July." (254)

In the meantime, German air reconnaissance reported at 0655 the presence of the enemy force, composed of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, one (possible) battleship, four heavy cruisers, eight destroyers, and two torpedo boats, proceeding on a westerly course at fifteen knots. (255) This force was some five hundred miles away from the convoy, which had already scattered. For the Germans, this confirmed the accuracy of the aircraft report concerning the enemy cruiser force received the previous afternoon (on 4 July) to the effect that no enemy heavy units were anywhere near the convoy. It was this report that enabled Admiral Raeder to get Hitler's final permission for the Tirpitz foray. (256)

During the forenoon of 5 July, the operational situation for the Germans was mixed. On the positive side, the convoy had been dissolved, probably because of the aerial and U-boat attacks. Most of the ships were still to be found within an area approximately sixty nautical miles on a side; however, the convoys composition could not be precisely determined, because of the large size of this dispersal area. (257) The Germans mistakenly believed that the enemy cruiser group had moved westward because it had lost a heavy cruiser. The heavy covering force was located well to the west of Bear Island, and was making full use of fog banks to disguise its location and makeup. The distance from this group to the convoy was 450 nm, and to North Cape also about 450 nm. This distance was sufficient that there would be minimal danger to the German forces if they approached the convoy unobserved and got the engagement over quickly. If the enemy heavy covering forces were spotted during the German forces' approach to the convoy, there would be sufficient time to turn away. (258) In sum, the Allied heavy covering force was too far away to pose a threat to the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups moving to attack Convoy PQ17. (259)

General conditions for an attack by the German heavy ships on 5 July were less favorable than they had been on the previous day. The convoy was farther away-- the area of combat would be eastward of North Cape. And during the withdrawal phase, the distance to the enemy heavy forces would be steadily reduced. But the risk was still bearable. (260)

Admiral Carls believed that (1) if any enemy battleships close to the convoy were damaged by U-boats and aircraft by 1200, he would be justified in carrying out the operation regardless of the presence of an enemy carrier; and (2) the carrier aircraft would have less of an impact if the convoy was attacked north of latitude 72 degrees N. The latest time for carrying out ROSSELSPRUNG was 1300 on 5 July; otherwise, the attack would take place too close to the Russian coast. (261) Carls essentially requested that Admiral Raeder issue the code word for executing the operation, with no option to cancel those orders later (Ruckrufbefehle). However, Raeder refused to do so, because of Hitler's precondition that the enemy carrier must be taken out of the equation first. This was communicated to Admiral Carls at 0915. Thus, everything depended on the quality of the air reconnaissance. The enemy was unwilling to operate its heavy covering group within the effective range of the Luftwaffe torpedo bombers and heavy bombers. According to Admiral Carls, the enemy carrier group had already been at sea on 1 July, and he doubted it could continue to operate for too long. It was possible that the heavy covering group would be withdrawn to refuel and take up a waiting position. Therefore he did not believe the enemy carrier group would pose a threat to the German heavy ships. (262)

Hitler finally gave permission for the operation during the forenoon of 5 July. This was the latest favorable time for the attack on the convoy, before it entered Russian coastal waters. The code word for the execution was issued at 1137. At the same time, Naval Group Command North took over operational control of the U-boats operating in Arctic waters. (263) Raeder communicated to Carls that the conditions for the execution of ROSSELSPRUNG did exist unless the enemy carrier was detected or the German combat groups were detected by enemy aircraft. The fuhrer's approval for the operation was transmitted to Admiral Carls at 1140. Forces that had been in one-hour combat readiness after 0900 were directed at 1052 to be in immediate readiness to sortie. At 1141, the combat groups received the requisite code word from Naval Group Command North. At 1230, Naval Group Command North took over control of the entire operation. It directed Admiral Schniewind to sortie by North Cape, passing Breisund and escorted by minesweepers. (264)

At 1700, the Soviet submarine K21 reported (inaccurately) the presence of Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, and eight destroyers at latitude 71[degrees]25' N, longitude 23[degrees]40' E, or some forty-five miles southwest of North Cape, sailing on a northeasterly course. The same submarine claimed to have hit Tirpitz with two torpedoes. (265) However, British intelligence believed that, in view of subsequent sightings, these claims seemed "improbable." (266) Despite the Soviet claims, Tirpitz had not in fact been hit; nevertheless, K21's sighting report was of great value to Admiral lovey. (267)

At 1816, Allied reconnaissance aircraft reported eleven ships at latitude 71[degrees]31'N, longitude 27[degrees]10' E on a northeasterly course at ten knots. The British submarine Unshaken (P54) shifted its original station farther east, and at 2029 it reported Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper, escorted by at least six destroyers, in latitude 71[degrees]30' N, longitude 28[degrees]40' E, steering course 060 at twenty-two knots. (268)

At 1700, the Germans received an important message, an interception of an Allied submarine sighting report of two battleships at latitude 71[degrees]25' N, longitude 23[degrees]40' E, sailing a northeasterly course. Along with the intercepted 1816 message, these reports left no doubt that the enemy had detected the German combat groups. (269) Also, starting at 1945 the enemy systematically began to disrupt radio communications on all channels, making the transmission of orders difficult. (270) A report from B-Dienst at 2006 indicated that enemy reconnaissance aircraft had sighted German combat groups in the North Cape area at 1700 and 1816. (271)

ROSSELSPRUNG Is Canceled

Naval Group Command North concluded at 2000 on 5 July that the enemy heavy group was in generally the same position as on 4 July. The enemy heavy cruisers were detected at 1745 on 5 July sailing a westerly course. This group was observed until 2010, when it disappeared in fog. The Germans assumed that the enemy heavy covering group would have to reduce distance from the German combat groups to about two hundred nautical miles to attack, but not less than that, because of the danger of attacks from Luftwaffe aircraft based in northern Norway. This meant that ROSSELSPRUNG could only be carried out within the time window from 2000 on 5 July to 0200 next morning. Although the attack on PQ17 might have beneficial psychological effects for the Germans, its chances of success in attacking a now widely dispersed convoy were small. Hence, it was not worth justifying the risk of engaging an enemy carrier force. (272) Carls believed that once the enemy had sighted the German combat groups, the entire operation had to be aborted. A clash with the enemy heavy covering group must be avoided in any case; the possibility that the enemy carrier might cut off the combat groups' withdrawal was unacceptable. (273)

Raeder and Carls conferred by phone at 2035 and 2103. They agreed that, given where the enemy heavy covering group had been sighted, the enemy would be able to bring it to bear against the German combat groups during their return to base. (274) On that basis, Raeder made the decision to abandon the entire operation; at 2132, Admiral Carls sent a message to Admiral Schniewind aborting ROSSELSPRUNG. (275) Schniewind was directed to sail with Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper, and five destroyers for North Cape, and afterward through the "Inner Leads" (the channel between Norway's mainland and the outer island chain) to Vestfjord. Operational control of the U-boats was turned over to Admiral Arctic. (276) Lutzow, two destroyers, and the torpedo boats were directed to Trondheim, and were put under the control of Admiral Arctic. (277)

Raeder's decision was based on Hitler's view that Germany could not afford to put its few remaining heavy ships at risk. Because the Allied air reconnaissance had prematurely detected the German combat groups, it was highly possible that the Tirpitz group would be attacked by enemy carrier aircraft. Another factor in Raeder's decision was that the convoy had already widely dispersed, and the risk that would be entailed in employing the fleet forces would not be commensurate with the remaining mission elements--i.e., finishing off the enemy convoy would be better left to the U-boats and aircraft. (278)

At 0230 on 6 July, the Admiralty sent a message to Convoy PQ17's escorts stating that an "attack by enemy surface forces is probable in next few hours. Your primary duty is to avoid destruction to enable you to return to scene of attack and pick up survivors after enemy have retired." (279) Shortly afterward, the Admiralty radioed that, in case of attack by the enemy's surface ships, when it was clear "that enemy heavy ships have retired to westward, request you will arrange for a search for survivors by all available means including my Catalinas in north Russia not required for searching and shadowing enemy." (280)

At 1946, the Admiralty sent a message to the PQ17 escort that the "risk of attack by enemy surface vessels is now greatly lessened." The escort vessels were directed to return to pick up survivors. (281) Those unable to do so but in contact with several merchantmen should form them into a group and escort them to Yokanga "unless otherwise directed by S.B.N.O. North Russia [Rear Admiral Bevan]." Escorts short on fuel should proceed to Arkhangelsk, where they would be refueled. The two auxiliary AA ships should not run the risk of taking part in rescue operations, but instead should proceed without delay to Arkhangelsk. (282)

At 1040 on 6 July, Admiral Hamilton's force joined the Battle Fleet. The weather in the area was unfavorable for air reconnaissance. Tovey felt that nothing was to be gained by steering northeastward. Hence, Hamilton's cruisers and eight destroyers were detached to Seydisfjord at 1230 on 6 July. Shortly afterward, the Battle Fleet turned southward. All the ships reached their home bases on 8 July." (283) In the meantime, the Germans continued their efforts to detect and attack what was left of Convoy PQ17. On the morning of 6 July, the convoy's remnants were dispersed east of longitude 40 degrees E and over a 300-by-60 km (186 x 37 miles) area. The U-boats at that point had no contact with the remnants of PQ17. They were directed instead by Admiral Arctic to search for enemy ships in the area between longitudes 42 degrees and 48 degrees E. Two U-boats returned to Narvik during the night of 6/7 July; two other boats were under way to Kirkenes, where they would arrive on the evening of 6 July." (284)

On 7 July, Commodore Dowding (who survived the sinking of his ship by a U-boat on 5 July) organized a convoy of five merchant ships plus one rescue ship at Matochkin Shar (Strait), Novaya Zemlya, to head for Arkhangelsk. They were accompanied by two auxiliary AA ships, three corvettes, three minesweepers, and three trawlers, all remnants of Convoy PQ17's escort force. They formed up and sailed out on the evening of 7 July. (285)

Admiral Bevan's plan was to send one British corvette to reinforce the escorts and bring the ships to Arkhangelsk by transiting close to the east coast of Novaya Zemlya, south of Kolguyev Island, and around Cape Kanin. Bevan also informed the Admiralty that "C. in C. White Sea [commander of the White Sea Flotilla] is requesting C. in C. Northern Fleet that additional cover may be provided by 3 Soviet Union destroyers. Catalina leaves for reconnaissance 1000 B 8th. 4 more Flying boats approaching Svyatoy Nos." (286)

The ensuing voyage was full of accidents. The ships encountered heavy fog and ran into a solid ice barrier south of Byelushya Bay, Novaya Zemiya (the British had not known about the ice, but the Germans did). This forced several ships to head for Yokanga anchorage. Admiral Bevan was completely unaware that the remnants of PQ17 had left Matochkin Shar until some ships reported entering Yokanga. This was because the Soviet Northern Fleet failed to inform Bevan about the ships' departure. The Soviets also provided no information to Bevan about ice conditions. (287)

During the night of 8/9 July, German aircraft reconnoitered the area west of Novaya Zemlya, the Kanin Peninsula, other western waterways, the piers at Yokanga, the Murmansk-Leningrad railway, and airfields in the Byelomorsk area (Onega Bay). (288) Because of heavy fog, they did not fly north of latitude 72 degrees N on 8 or 9 July. However, at 1151 on 9 July German aircraft reported the presence of a group of five enemy merchant vessels. Attacks by thirty-eight aircraft in two groups from 1st Group, 30th Air Wing (I./KG 30) at Banak followed. The Germans claimed that one seven-thousand-ton vessel and another of eight thousand tons were damaged. Because of fog at Banak upon the flyers' return, I./KG 30 was diverted to Petsamo, while II./KG 30 reached Banak. (289)

During the night of 9/10 July, some forty German bombers carried out a high-level attack against these ships for four hours, ending at 0230. The Luftwaffe received information on the convoy from U-boats operating in the area. Two Allied merchant ships were sunk, while four enemy aircraft were believed to be shot down. The surviving ships reached Arkhangelsk on 11 July. (290) Also on 10 July, German aircraft attacked docking facilities and fuel tanks at Rost and airfields in the Murmansk area, and suppressed coastal batteries on the Rybachy Peninsula. (291)

On 16 July, Commodore Dowding returned with three corvettes to organize another convoy from the remnants of PQ17 and bring it to Arkhangelsk. He arrived after a stormy voyage to Byelushya Bay on 19 July, where five merchant ships were at anchor plus two British trawlers and one Soviet icebreaker. Another merchant ship joined the convoy at Moller Bay, Novaya Zemlya, on the morning of 21 July. The convoy's defenses were reinforced by one auxiliary AA ship, one corvette, two minesweepers, and two Soviet destroyers on 22 July. Two days later, the convoy arrived in Arkhangelsk having suffered no losses. (292)

To sum up: between 2 and 10 July, the 5th Air Fleet employed 130 Ju 88s, forty-three He Ills (twenty aborted), and twenty-nine He 115s (six aborted) in attacking Convoy PQ17. In many cases, U-boats were able to sink heavily damaged ships initially hit by the Luftwaffe. The 5th Air Fleet stopped its attacks on Convoy PQ17 only when no further ships were sighted. (293) German losses in these attacks were only five aircraft: one BV 138, two He 111s, one He 115, and one FW 200. (294) In the aftermath of their attacks, the Germans grossly exaggerated their successes. Largely from B-Dienst radio intercepts, they claimed that between 4 and 11 July their aircraft and U-boats had sunk thirty-seven ships of 231,090 (actually 244,028) combined BRT. (295) They claimed positive information that U-boats had sunk sixteen ships of 107,947 combined BRT, while the 5th Air Fleet had sunk twenty-one ships of 136,081 combined BRT. (296)

The true losses were heavy enough without exaggeration. The attacks by the Luftwaffe and the U-boats resulted in the destruction of twenty-two merchant ships (fourteen American) of Convoy PQ17's thirty-four that tried to get through (or 65 percent). (297) The ships sunk carried 430 tanks, 210 aircraft, and 3,350 motor vehicles, plus 99,316 tons of other cargo. (298)

The almost total destruction of Convoy PQ17 had significant military, psychological, and political effects. In purely military terms, the Germans accomplished a major tactical objective. The decision of the British chiefs of staff on 13 July to recommend that convoys "should not be sent to Northern Russia in present circumstances" had a negative operational effect. The Royal Navy suffered a major loss of confidence regarding its ability to protect convoys to northern Russia." (199) Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin on 17 July informing him that further convoys to northern Russia would be postponed. This, in turn, had major political and psychological consequences. Stalin became intensely suspicious about Churchills true motives. He believed that Britain might seek a separate peace with Nazi Germany. (300)

CONCLUSION

The decision to send badly needed supplies to the Soviet Union was made purely for political and strategic reasons. Admirals Pound and Tovey were opposed to that decision. Their main concern seems to have been the lack of adequate forces to support such an effort, and the possibility of large losses in naval ships and personnel. (The Soviets, for whatever reasons, were either unable or unwilling to provide much support in defense of the Allied convoys.) The British admirals' concerns were well founded. Not only was the convoy route to northern Russia long, but it was also open to deadly attacks by the Luftwaffe and U-boats. The problem was compounded by the prevalence of bad weather and ice conditions, and the long daylight hours in summer. Yet in retrospect, the decision to help the Soviet Union was sound, and fully justified strategically. It played a critical role in the Soviet ability to withstand the German offensive on the eastern front in 1941-42.

The Allied operational command organization seemed fairly simple and straightforward. However, for some reason the Home Fleet's area of responsibility was not formally defined. The Home Fleet was the single largest British naval command available for keeping the Kriegsmarine in check. However, its forces were never adequate, because of competing demands from other theaters. In fact, it was forced repeatedly to provide ships to other fleets. The Home Fleet was primarily composed of heavy surface ships and carriers; it lacked an adequate number of smaller ships suitable for convoying duties. That was why Western Approaches Command provided most of the A/S escorts for Allied convoys to northern Russia. The U.S. Navy also reinforced the Home Fleet by sending its newly formed TF 39.

The German operational command organization in Norway and the adjacent area was highly unsatisfactory. No multiservice command was established in that theater throughout the entire war. This meant that each service prepared and executed its own operational plans. An effective employment of naval forces and the Luftwaffe was almost entirely dependent on close cooperation among mid- and low-level commanders. For the Kriegsmarine, the problem was not made much easier by having the Fleet Command forces within the area of responsibility of Naval Group Command North. In addition, the headquarters of Naval Group Command North was located too far away from its subordinate commands in Norway. To make things worse, the Kriegsmarine had a penchant for making numerous changes, in both titles and the subordination relationships among the various forces. This was especially the case with the Fleet Command. Another major problem was the insufficient freedom of action allowed to subordinate naval commanders, the result of too-close supervision by higher commanders. This was especially the case in the relationship between Naval Group Command North and Admiral Arctic.

Both the Allies and the Germans, in preparing plans for and employing their respective forces in combat, were greatly dependent on having well-organized and effective intelligence apparatuses. British naval intelligence proved to be much more effective because of the superb abilities of the decoders at Bletchley Park, especially at decrypting German naval messages. Despite widely held beliefs to the contrary, this task was never easy, because the German codes were difficult to crack; there were many times when Bletchley and the OIC were in the dark about German intentions, plans, and movements. This was especially the case for a large part of 1942, during which Bletchley Park was unable to read coded messages to U-boats.

German Naval Intelligence was well organized and quite effective at providing naval commanders with fairly accurate and timely intelligence on the Allied OOB, convoys, and the losses inflicted by U-boats and the Luftwaffe. B-Dienst was especially effective at reading messages regarding the composition, departure dates, and routes of Allied convoys. This proved invaluable to the Kriegsmarine, and its U-boat arm in particular.

The Allies developed their plans for convoying to northern Russia over time. Although some changes in plans were made for each convoy, the pattern was consistent. The fact was that the geography and ice conditions in the Barents Sea gave planners little or no choice in selecting routes and defense forces for each convoy. Admirals Pound and Tovey were strongly opposed to sending convoys during the summer months, when they were highly vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft and U-boats; yet they had to execute the decisions made by the British and U.S. governments. Purely political reasons dominated Allied planning for convoys to northern Russia.

The German plans for Operation ROSSELSPRUNG were the result of numerous studies prepared by all the major naval commands in Norway concerning the possibility of employing heavy surface ships and U-boats in the Arctic. As usual in the German military, the operational-level command issued an operational instruction, while subordinate commanders issued operation orders. However, the lack of joint-force commanders resulted in the lack of a single plan for the employment of heavy surface ships, U-boats, and Luftwaffe aircraft.

The operational instruction issued by Naval Group Command North on 4 June envisaged employing both the Trondheim and Narvik groups of surface ships. A major flaw in the plan was the unnecessarily complicated command relationship under which the Trondheim group was subordinate to Naval Group Command North, while the Narvik group was under Admiral Arctic. Only during the second phase of the operation were both groups under the operational command of Naval Group Command North.

A major prerequisite for the success of ROSSELSPRUNG was comprehensive air reconnaissance of the potential operating area, followed by the weakening of the enemy heavy covering force. This would have meant the 5th Air Fleet's acquiescence to the request by Naval Group Command North to assign more aircraft for reconnaissance--but the 5th Air Fleet simply refused to do so.

But perhaps the single greatest problem was Hitler's unwillingness to risk any heavy surface ship to attack enemy convoys. This risk aversion, in essence, precluded any effective employment of the German heavy surface ships based in Norway, most notably to prevent the Allies from running convoys to northern Russia. The German ships retained value only to the extent that they inhibited a possible enemy amphibious landing and invasion.

Convoy PQ17 went ahead as planned. Although detected and tracked by German U-boats and aircraft, it suffered almost no losses until the evening of 4 July. Admiral Pounds decision to "scatter" the convoy at that point was perhaps understandable, but cannot be considered sound. No convoy should be left to proceed independently without its direct and distant covers. If the convoy was faced with destruction by a superior force, it should have been directed to withdraw temporarily to a safer distance or return to a safe port. Admiral Pound also violated some of the basic principles of sound naval command and control by directly interfering with and bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey's criticism of the Admiralty was fully justified. The higher commander should normally leave the subordinate commander sufficient freedom of action for him to exercise the initiative in the course of an operation.

Positioning of the Home Fleets Battle Fleet in relation to Convoy PQ17 on 5 July was clearly unsound: it remained too far away to provide distant cover and support to the convoy, and also too far away to engage the enemy heavy surface group effectively.

Admiral Raeder's decision to cancel ROSSELSPRUNG on the evening of 5 July was unavoidable because there was little to gain from using heavy surface ships to try to destroy the widely dispersed ships of (the former) Convoy PQ17. The time to employ those heavy surface ships was prior to 5 July. Yet doing so was clearly impossible, given the strictness of Hitler's conditions for employing Tirpitz and its ilk. Yet Tirpitz's presence in Altafjord and the ever-present possibility of its attacking PQ17 were the most important factors in the fateful decision to scatter Convoy PQ17, with the subsequent horrendous losses of Allied merchant ships from Luftwaffe and U-boat attacks.

ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE

CONVOYPQ17

(Commodore John C. K. Dowding)

Total: 39 Ships 36 merchant ships (23 U.S., 8 U.K., 2 Soviet, 2 Panamanian, 1 Dutch); 3 rescue ships (U.K.)

MERCHANT SHIPS

Alcoa Ranger (U.S.) (sunk)

Azerbaijan (Soviet)

Bellingham (U.S.)

Benjamin Harrison (U.S.)

Bolton Castle (U.K.) (sunk)

Carlton (U.S.) (sunk)

Christopher Newport (U.S.) (sunk)

Daniel Morgan (U.S.) (sunk)

Donbass (Soviet)

Earlston (U.K.) (sunk)

El Capitan (Panamanian) (sunk)

Empire Byron (U.K.) (sunk)

Empire Tide (U.K.)

Exford (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavik)

Fairfield City (U.S.) (sunk)

Hartlebury (U.K.) (sunk)

Honomu (U.S.) (sunk)

Hoosier (U.S.) (sunk)

Ironclad (U.S.)

John Witherspoon (U.S.) (sunk)

Navarino (U.K.) (sunk)

Ocean Freedom (U.K.)

Olopana (U.S.) (sunk)

Pan Atlantic (U.S.) (sunk)

Pan Kraft (U.S.) (sunk)

Paulus Potter (Dutch) (sunk)

Peter Kerr (U.S.) (sunk)

Richard Bland (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavik)

River Afton (U.K.) (sunk)

Samuel Chase (U.S.)

Silver Sword (U.S.)

Troubador (Panamanian)

Washington (U.S.) (sunk)

West Gotomska (U.S.)

William Hooper (U.S.) (sunk)

Winston-Salem (U.S.)

RESCUE SHIPS (U.K.)

Rathlin

Zaafaran (sunk)

Zamalek

CONVOY SCREEN

(Commander John E. Broome, RN, in Keppel)

LONG-RANGE ESCORTS

6 destroyers: Fury, Keppel, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa, Wilton

2 submarines: P614, P615

AIS SCREEN

4 corvettes: Dianella, Lotus, Poppy; La Malouine (Free French)

4 A/S trawlers: Ayrshire, Lord Austin, Lord Middleton, Northern Gem

2 auxiliary AA vessels: Palomares, Pozarica

4 minesweepers: Bramble, Britomart, Leda, Salamander

SUPPLY GROUP--FORCE Q

2 fleet oilers: Grey Ranger (damaged by ice on 28 June; replaced by Alders dale), Aldersdale (sunk)

1 fleet oiler: Gray (for QP13)

1 destroyer: Douglas

CRUISER COVERING FORCE--CRUISER SQUADRON 1 (CS 1)

(Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, RN, in London)

4 heavy cruisers

2 British: London, Norfolk

2 U.S.: Tuscaloosa (CA 37), Wichita (CA 45)

3 destroyers

1 British: Somali

2 U.S.: Rowan (DD 405), Wainwright (DD 419)

BATTLE FLEET

(Admiral Sir John Tovey, CINC Home Fleet, in Duke of York)

2 battleships

1 British: Duke of York

1 U.S.: Washington (BB 55) (Rear Admiral R. C. Giffen--TF 39)

1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser)

1 heavy cruiser: Cumberland

1 light cruiser: Nigeria

12 destroyers

10 British: Ashanti, Biankney Escapade, Faulknor, Marne, Martin,

Middleton, Onslaught, Onslow, Wheatland

2 U.S.: Mayrant (DD 402), Rhind (DD 404)

SUBMARINES

8 British: Sahib (P212), Sea Wolf(47S), Sturgeon (73S), Tribune (N76),

Trident, Unrivalled (P45), Unshaken (P54), Ursula (N59)

1 Free French: Minerve

5 Soviet

Sources: Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57; Dowding, "Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of 'Scatter,' 4th July"; Commanding Officer to the Chief of Naval Operations, "War Diary U.S.S. Washington, for Period from July 1, 1942, to July 31, 1942," folder BB 56 Washington War Diary--with Home Fleet, box 1554, Wasatch to Washington, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA; Harriman (NAVCOM LONDON) to OPNAV, 2148/29TM (29 June 1942).

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

(F = flagship)

1ST COMBAT GROUP (I KAMPFGRUPPE) (TRONDHEIM)

1 battleship: Tirpitz(F)

1 heavy cruiser: Admiral Hipper

5 destroyers:

5th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-14 (F) Friedrich Ihn, Z-4 Richard Beitzen

6th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-20 (F) Karl Galster, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-6

Theodor Riedel

2 torpedo boats: T-7, T-15

2ND COMBAT GROUP (II KAMPFGRUPPE) (NARVIK)

1 pocket battleship: Lutzow

1 heavy cruiser: Admiral Scheer

8TH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

5 destroyers: Z-28 (F), Z-24, Z-27, Z-29, Z-30

1 oiler: Dithmarschen

9 U-boats: U-88, 17-257, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-456, U-457, U-703

5TH AIR FLEET, LUFTWAFFE

103 Ju 88 bombers

42 He 111 torpedo bombers

15 He 115 torpedo bombers (on floats)

30 Ju 87 dive-bombers

74 reconnaissance aircraft (including FW 200 Condors and BV 138s)

Sources: Flottenchef/B.d.S., "Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkraefte im Nordraum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug," p. 6; translation of the final report on operation (Attack on PQ17) submitted by Admiral Carls (Gruppe Nord) on the 12.7.1942 "Final Report on PQ17," p. 234; Admiral Norway, B. Nr. Gkdos. 295 Al Chefs, 8 January 1942, "Die militaerische Lage Norwegen," p. 30; Irving, The Destruction of Convoy PQ.17, p. 40.

NOTES

(1.) Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, repr. 1984), p. 159.

(2.) Robert W. Coakley, "The Persian Corridor as a Route for Aid to the USSR," in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000), p. 229.

(3.) James P. Levy, The Royal Navy's Home Fleet in World War II (Basingstoke, Hampshire, U.K. / New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 108-109.

(4.) Ibid.

(5.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," supplement, London Gazette, 17 October 1950, p. 5139.

(6.) Admiral Norway, B. Nr. Gkdos. 295 AI Chefs, 8 January 1942, "Die militaerische Lage Norwegen," Aufgaben und Schlussfolgerungen fuer die Kriegsmarine, Kriegstagebuch [KTB] 1. SKL Teil CIIa Nordsee-Norwegen Januar 1942-Dezember 1942, RM 7/127, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv Freiburg in Breisgau [hereafter BA-MA], p. 3.

(7.) Ibid., p. 4.

(8.) Ibid., p. 5.

(9.) Ibid., p. 6.

(10.) Walter Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegsftihrung 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, 2nd rev. ed. (Koblenz, Fed. Rep. Ger.: Bernard 8c Graefe Verlag, 1983), p. 163.

(11.) Friedrich-Wilhelm Mueller-Meinhard, "Der Einfluss der Feindlagebeurteilung auf Operationsplanung, Entschlussfassung und Operationsfuehrung (I)," Marine Rundschau, no. 9 (September 1970) [hereafter Mueller-Meinhard], p. 516.

(12.) Ibid., p. 517.

(13.) Vorlaeufige Meldung ueber Besprechung beim Fuehrer 22. Januar 1942, Kriegstagebuch (KTB) Teil C VII, Bd. 3 (Jan 1942-Oct 1943), RM 7/186, BA-MA, p. 11.

(14.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys: A Naval Staff History, with preface by Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 2.

(15.) Vorlaeufige Meldung ueber Besprechung beim Fuehrer 22. Januar 1942, p. 12.

(16.) Ibid.

(17.) Ibid., pp. 13-14.

(18.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 133.

(19.) Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe, "Operative Verwendung der Flottenstreitkraeften im Nordraum," 30 May 1942, Akte VIII, 13 (PQ 17) May 1942-July 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-MA, p. 6.

(20.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord, B. Nr. Gkdos. 740/42 Chefs Aop, Seekriegsleitung, Chef des Stabes to Admiral Fricke, 28 May 1942, "Geleitzugkampfung," Akte VIII, 13 (PQ 17) May 1942-July 1942, RM7/1024, BA-MA, p. 6.

(21.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 133.

(22.) Ibid.

(23.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord, B. Nr. Gkdos. 740/42 Chefs Aop, Seekriegsleitung, Chef des Stabes to Admiral Fricke, 28 May 1942, "Geleitzugkampfung," p. 3.

(24.) C. R. Burgess, "Climate and Weather in Modern Naval Warfare," Geographical Journal 111, no. 4/6 (April-June 1948), p. 244.

(25.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 133.

(26.) Burgess, "Climate and Weather in Modern Naval Warfare," p. 244.

(27.) Ibid., p. 245.

(28.) Mueller-Meinhard, pp. 514-15.

(29.) Burgess, "Climate and Weather in Modern Naval Warfare," p. 244.

(30.) Ibid.

(31.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord, B. Nr. Gkdos. 740/42 Chefs Aop, Seekriegsleitung, Chef des Stabes to Admiral Fricke, 28 May 1942, "Geleitzugkampfung," p. 6.

(32.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 3.

(33.) Bernard Edwards, The Road to Russia: Arctic Convoys 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), map after p. xii.

(34.) Mueller-Meinhard, pp. 2-3.

(35.) Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. 1,

The Defensive, History of the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), pp. 16-18.

(36.) Ibid., pp. 583-84.

(37.) Robert J. Cressman, The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1999), pp. 172-73.

(38.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5139; Arnold Hague, The Allied Convoy System 1939-1945: Its Organization, Defence and Operation (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 187.

(39.) Patrick J. Ryan, "The Royal Navy and Soviet Seapower, 1930-1950: Intelligence, Naval Cooperation and Antagonism" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hull, January 1996), p. 139.

(40.) John Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, Bletchley Archive 2 (Milton Keynes, U.K.: Military Press, 2003), p. 9.

(41.) Ryan, "The Royal Navy and Soviet Seapower," p. 140.

(42.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5139; Hague, The Allied Convoy System, p. 187.

(43.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 160-61.

(44.) "The Murman Coast: Arctic Gateway for American and Allied Expeditionary Forces in Northern European Russia," National Geographic 35, no. 4 (April 1919), p. 331.

(45.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 9.

(46.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 159.

(47.) Ibid., p. 161.

(48.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 3.

(49.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5140.

(50.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 3.

(51.) David Irving, The Destruction of Convoy PQ.17 (London: Panther, 1985), p. 31.

(52.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5139.

(53.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 3.

(54.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," pp. 5140-41.

(55.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 4.

(56.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5143.

(57.) Ibid., p. 5140.

(58.) Ryan, "The Royal Navy and Soviet Seapower," p. 141.

(59.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5141.

(60.) Ryan, "The Royal Navy and Soviet Seapower," p. 139.

(61.) V. I. Achkasov and N. B. Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 297.

(62.) N. A. Piterskiy, Die Sowjet-Flotte im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Oldenburg/Hamburg, Fed. Rep. Ger.: Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1966), p. 129.

(63.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5144.

(64.) Mueller-Meinhard, p. 517.

(65.) Walter Lohmann and Hans H. Hildebrand, "Marinegruppenkommandos, Ost-NordWest," main chap. 4 in Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945: Gliederung, Einsatz, Stellenbesetzung (Bad Nauheim, Fed. Rep. Ger.: Podzun Verlag, 1956; 15th reprint 1964), vol. 1, p. 3.

(66.) Ibid., p. 6.

(67.) Bodo Bullwinkel, Kooperation Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine dargestellt am Luftkrieg ueber See im Nordmeer 1942 (Hamburg, Fed. Rep. Ger.: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Abteilung Marine, 5 January 1971), pp. 23-24.

(68.) Lohmann and Hildebrand, "Unterseeboote (B.d.U.-Bereich)," main chap. 7 in Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945, vol. 1, p. 71.

(69.) "Auszug aus KTB Admiral Nordmeer 16.3.42," in Bericht ueber die Reise in Norwegen Februar/Maerz 1942, 20.03. 1942, RM 7/127, BA-MA, p. 409.

(70.) Bullwinkel, Kooperation Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine, p. 24.

(71.) Mueller-Meinhard, pp. 515-16, 519.

(72.) "Vermerk 1. Ski Ib von 5. Mai 1942," in Bericht ueber die Reise in Norwegen Februar/Maerz 1942, p. 410.

(73.) Bullwinkel, Kooperation Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine, p. 24.

(74.) "Lagebesprechung den Chef der Seekriegsleitung," 18 May 1942, KTB 1. SKL Teil Clla Nordsee-Norwegen Januar 1942-Dezember 1942, p. 176.

(75.) Bullwinkel, Kooperation Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine, p. 22.

(76.) Ibid., p. 23.

(77.) Ibid., p. 22.

(78.) Mueller-Meinhard, p. 520.

(79.) Bullwinkel, Kooperation Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine, pp. 17-18.

(80.) Mueller-Meinhard, pp. 520-21.

(81.) Field Marshal Wilhelm List, Bericht ueber die Reise in Norwegen, p. 283.

(82.) Mueller-Meinhard, pp. 520-21.

(83.) Roskill, The Defensive, p. 18.

(84.) Ibid., p. 20.

(85.) Colleen Carper, "Bletchley's Secret War: British Code Breaking in the Battle of the Atlantic" (statesmanship thesis, Ashbrook Center, Ashland University, 2009), p. 32.

(86.) Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977), p. 140.

(87.) Ibid., p. 131.

(88.) Ibid., p. 132.

(89.) Carper, "Bletchley's Secret War," p. 32.

(90.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp. 132-33.

(91.) Ibid., p. 140.

(92.) Ibid., pp. 132-33.

(93.) Carper, "Bletchley s Secret War," p. 32.

(94.) C. I. Hamilton, "The Character and Organization of the Admiralty Operational Intelligence Centre during the Second World War," War in History 7, no. 3 (2000), p. 296.

(95.) Lohmann and Hildebrand, "Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine in Marinegruppenkommandos, Ost-Nord-West," main chap. 3 in Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945, vol. 1, p. 2.

(96.) "History, Development, Organization and Success of the German 'Marine-Funkaufklarung' (Naval Radio Intelligence) during the Period between the Two World Wars," folder 1571, box 604, HCC, Record Group [RG] 457, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD [hereafter NARA], p. 8; Organization of the Communications Service of the German Navy, 4/SKL, Armed Forces Security Agency, DF-225, NARA, pp. 6-13.

(97.) Markus Faulkner, "The Kriegsmarine, Signals Intelligence, and the Development of the B-Dienst before the Second World War," Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 4 (August 2010), p. 542.

(98.) Ibid., p. 538.

(99.) Ibid., p. 521.

(100.) OP-20-G, German Naval Communications Intelligence, SRH-024, vol. 3 of Battle of the Atlantic, p. 8, available at www.ibiblio.org/ hyperwar/.

(101.) Stephen Budiansky, "German vs. Allied Codebreakers in the Battle of the Atlantic," International Journal of Naval History 1, no. 1 (April 2002), p. 4.

(102.) Mueller-Meinhard, p. 521.

(103.) Ibid.

(104.) Ibid.

(105.) Ibid., pp. 521-22.

(106.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 53.

(107.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, p. 134.

(108.) "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5144.

(109.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, pp. 54-55.

(110.) Ibid.

(111.) Ibid., p. 55; "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5145.

(112.) "Status of P.Q. 17 as Reported to 7/16/42," folder PQ 17, Tenth Fleet, Convoy & Routing Files, RA 51-57--PQ Russia Convoys, box 209, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA, p. 1. Other sources claim thirty-five merchant ships. Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57.

(113.) Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. 2,

The Period of Balance, History of the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 143.

(114.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57.

(115.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 180.

(116.) Piterskiy, Die Sowjet-Flotte im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 129.

(117.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57.

(118.) Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 137.

(119.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 179; Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57.

(120.) "First Cruiser Squadron Operation Orders," 25 June 1942, folder PQ 17, Tenth Fleet, Convoy 8; Routing Files, RA 51-57--PQ Russia Convoys, box 209, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA, p. 1.

(121.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 55.

(122.) Ibid.; Levy, The Royal Navy's Home Fleet in World War II, p. 121; S.B.N.O. (Senior British Naval Officer) (Rear Adm. R. H. L. Bevan), Archangelsk to Admiralty, 1237/13th July,

"PQ 17 Escorts," folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom [hereafter TNA], p. 1.

(123.) CINC Home Fleet to A.I.G. 47 and S.B.N.O. North Russia, 2327 28 June 1942, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(124.) Jurgen Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuropaischen Gewdssern 1941-45 (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1958), p. 178.

(125.) F.O.S. (Flag Officer Submarines), 1320, 27 June 1942, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(126.) Piterskiy, Die Sowjet-Flotte im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 135; A. Kozlov and V. S. Shlomin, Krasnoznameniy Severny Flot (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1983), p. 114.

(127.) "First Cruiser Squadron Operation Orders," p. 1.

(128.) Ibid.

(129.) "D-Day" signified the planned departure date of Convoy PQ17.

(130.) "First Cruiser Squadron Operation Orders," p. 1.

(131.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 13; "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5145.

(132.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 55.

(133.) Ibid., p. 56.

(134.) Admiral Miles to Admiralty, 1822C/16 June, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(135.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord, B. Nr. Gkdos. 770/12 Chefs Aop, 4 June 1942, "Operative Weisung fuer Einsatz der Drontheimund Narwik-Gruppe gegen einem PQ-Geleitzug," (Deckname Rosselsprung), Akte VIII, 13 (PQ 17) May 1942-July 1942, RM7/1024, BA-MA, pp. 1-2.

(136.) Ibid.

(137.) Ibid., p. 3.

(138.) Ibid., pp. 2-3.

(139.) Ibid., pp. 4-5.

(140.) Ibid.

(141.) Ibid., p. 6.

(142.) Ibid., pp. 5-6.

(143.) Ibid., pp. 7-8.

(144.) Ibid., p. 8.

(145.) Vice Adm. Kurt Assmann, Die deutsche Kriegfuehrunggegen den englisch-russischen Geleitverkehr im Nordmeer 1941-1945, RM 8/126, BA-MA, p. 2.

(146.) 10 June, Luftflotte 5 Gefechsstab Kriegstagebuch Mai-Juni 1942 Durchschlage, RL 7/495, BA-MA, p. 14; "Convoys to North Russia, 1942," p. 5144.

(147.) Flottenchef/B.d.S., "Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkraefte im Nordraum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug," (Deckname Rosselsprung), 14 June 1942, in Operationen und Taktik. Auswertung wichtiger Ereignisse des Seekrieges, Heft 13: Operationen von Flottenstreitkraeften im Nordpolarmeer im Jahre 1942, Teil 1, RMD 4/601, BA-MA, p. 97.

(148.) "Appendix: Operation Roesselsprung," in Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 286.

(149.) Flottenchef/B.d.S., "Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkraefte im Nordraum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug," p. 99.

(150.) Ibid., pp. 102-103.

(151.) Ibid., p. 105.

(152.) Ibid., p. 106.

(153.) "Appendix: Operation Roesselsprung," pp. 286-87.

(154.) Flottenchef/B.d.S., "Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkraefte im Nordraum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug," p. 21.

(155.) Ibid., p. 107.

(156.) "Appendix: Operation Roesselsprung," p. 287.

(157.) Flottenchef/B.d.S., "Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkraefte im Nordraum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug," p. 108.

(158.) Admiral Nordmeer, B. Nr. Gkdos. 203 AI Chefs, 2 June 1942, "Operationsbefehl Nr. 17: Verlegung Panzerschiffsgruppe von Narvik in den Altafjord (Stichwort Konzert)," Akte VIII, 13 (PQ 17) May 1942-July 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-MA, p. 3.

(159.) Ibid., pp. 5-6.

(160.) Irving, The Destruction of Convoy PQ. 17, p. 45.

(161.) Luftflottenkommando 5, "Fuehrungsabteilung la, B. Nr. 208/42 Gkdos. Chefsache (14 June 1942) Befehl fuer gemeinsamen Einsatz der Luftflotte 5 und der Seestreitkraeften im Unternehmen," Akte VIII, 13 (PQ 17) May 1942-July 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-MA, p. 1.

(162.) Ibid.

(163.) Ibid.

(164.) Ibid., pp. 1-2.

(165.) Ibid., p. 2.

(166.) 6 June 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, Heft 34, 1-30 June 1942, RM 7/37, BA-MA, pp. 102-103.

(167.) Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945, vol. 2, 1942-1945 (Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fuer Wehrwesen, 1975), pp. 44-45.

(168.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57; Harriman (NAVCOM LONDON) to OPNAV, 2148/29TM (29 June 1942), folder PQ 17, Tenth Fleet, Convoy & Routing Files, RA 51-57--PQ Russia Convoys, box 209, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA, p. 1.

(169.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 181; Commodore John C. K. Dowding, "Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of 'Scatter,' 4th July," 13 July 1942, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(170.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 181.

(171.) Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 137.

(172.) Jackson, Ultras Arctic War, p. 14.

(173.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 181.

(174.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 55.

(175.) Norwegen-Nordmeer-Feindlage, 30 June 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, Heft 34, 1-30 June 1942, p. 537; 29 June 1942, 1. SKL, Teil B VI: Nachrichtendienst 1. Januar 1942-31. Dezember 1942, RM 7/105, BA-MA, p. 108; Assmann, Die deutsche Kriegfuehrung gegen den englisch-russischen Geleitverkehr im Nordmeer 1941-1945, p. 3.

(176.) Lageuebersicht Norwegen und Nordsee 1-15.7 1942, RM 7/87 Heft II: Lageberichte Nordsee/Norwegen, Marinegruppenkommando Nord 1. SKL. Teil B II & Ha Entwicklung der Lage in der Nordsee, Lageueberblick Nordsee/Norwegen 25 August 1939-Dezember 1943, BA-MA, p. 2.

(177.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," Akte VIII, 13 (PQ 17) May 1942-July 1942, RM 7/ 1024, BA-MA, pp. 237-38.

(178.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 181.

(179.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57; Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 137.

(180.) Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 137.

(181.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 16.

(182.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, p. 140.

(183.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 58.

(184.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," p. 238.

(185.) Ibid., pp. 1-2.

(186.) Assmann, Die deutsche Kriegfuehrung gegen den englisch-russischen Geleitverkehr im Nordmeer 1941-1945, p. 3.

(187.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," pp. 2-3; 3 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, RM 7/38, BA-MA, p. 34.

(188.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," p. 238; Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 58.

(189.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," pp. 2-3.

(190.) 3 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, p. 35.

(191.) Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 137.

(192.) Dowding, "Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of'Scatter,' 4th July," p. 1.

(193.) 3 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, p. 35.

(194.) Translation of the final report on operation (Attack on PQ17) submitted by Admiral Carls (Gruppe Nord) on the 12.7.1942 "Final Report on PQ17," NID/X 106/47, folder PQ 17, Tenth Fleet, Convoy 8; Routing Files, RA 51-57--PQ Russia Convoys, box 209, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA, p. 231.

(195.) Admiralty to CINC Home Fleet, 0731B/3rd July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(196.) Dowding, "Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of'Scatter,' 4th July," p. 1.

(197.) Assmann, Die deutsche Kriegfuehrung gegen den englisch-russischen Geleitverkehr im Nordmeer 1941-1945, p. 5.

(198.) S.B.N.O. Archangelsk to Admiralty, repeated to Home Fleet, 1237/13th July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1; Dowding, "Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of'Scatter,' 4th July," p. 1.

(199.) Luftflotte 5 Gefechsstab Kriegstagebuch MaiJuni 1942 Durchschlage, p. 8.

(200.) SSD MKYG 013135 situation at 1745 4 July 1942, Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chiefs, "Abschlussbericht," p. 187.

(201.) Ibid.; 4 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, p. 46.

(202.) Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 138; Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 59.

(203.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 17.

(204.) John Winton, ULTRA at Sea: How Breaking the Nazi Code Affected Allied Naval Strategy during World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1988), p. 68.

(205.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 58.

(206.) Ibid., p. 59.

(207.) Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 139.

(208.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 18.

(209.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, p. 145.

(210.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 59.

(211.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 20.

(212.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 183; Assmann, Die deutsche Kriegfuehrung gegen den englisch-russischen Geleitverkehr im Nordmeer 1941-1945, p. 5.

(213.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, pp. 59-60. The Germans claimed four ships with 24,000 combined BRT, while five other ships of 37,000 combined BRT were heavily damaged, and a further six ships of 29,000 combined BRT were slightly damaged. Assmann, Die deutsche Kriegfuehrung gegen den englisch-russischen Geleitverkehr im Nordmeer 1941-1945, pp. 5-6.

(214.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 60.

(215.) Message 1237/13th July 1942, Naval Cypher A One by W/T, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(216.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 20.

(217.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, p. 145.

(218.) Jackson, Ultras Arctic War, p. 20.

(219.) Winton, ULTRA at Sea, p. 69.

(220.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp. 141-42.

(221.) Ibid., pp. 142-43.

(222.) Jackson, Ultras Arctic War, p. 20.

(223.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp. 142-43.

(224.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, pp. 20-21.

(225.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp. 142-43.

(226.) Jackson, Ultras Arctic War, p. 21.

(227.) Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp. 142-43.

(228.) Cited in Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 21.

(229.) Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 139.

(230.) Cited in Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, p. 21.

(231.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 62.

(232.) Jackson, Ultra's Arctic War, pp. 21-22.

(233.) Winton, ULTRA at Sea, p. 69.

(234.) Ibid., p. 68.

(235.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 60.

(236.) Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 185-86.

(237.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 63.

(238.) Dowding, "Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of 'Scatter,' 4th July," p. 2.

(239.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 63.

(240.) Ibid., p. 62.

(241.) Winton, ULTRA at Sea, p. 68.

(242.) Cited in Jackson, Ultras Arctic War, p. 22.

(243.) Ibid., pp. 22-23.

(244.) Ibid., p. 23.

(245.) Ibid., pp. 23-24.

(246.) Tovey to Noble, 12 July 1942, "Personal Letters between CinCWA & CinCHF," folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 2.

(247.) Ibid., p. 1.

(248.) CS 1 to General, 4 July 1942, folder PQ 17, Tenth Fleet, Convoy & Routing Files, RA 51-57--PQ Russia Convoys, box 209, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA, p. 1; Irving, The Destruction of PQ17 Convoy, pp. 135-36.

(249.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 63.

(250.) Bernard Edwards, The Road to Russia: Arctic Convoys 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), p. 124.

(251.) 5 July 1942, Luftflotte 5 Gefechsstab Kriegstagebuch Mai-Juni 1942 Durchschlage, pp. 11-12.

(252.) Winton, ULTRA at Sea, p. 70.

(253.) Admiralty to Admiral Miles 84, 0322B/5th July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(254.) Message to S.B.N.O. North Russia 345, 1625B5 July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(255.) 5 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, p. 55.

(256.) Winton, ULTRA at Sea, p. 70.

(257.) 5 July 1942, Luftflotte 5 Gefechsstab Kriegstagebuch Mai-Juni 1942 Durchschlage, pp. 11-12.

(258.) Translation of the final report on operation (Attack on PQ17) submitted by Admiral Carls (Gruppe Nord) on the 12.7.1942 "Final Report on PQ17," pp. PG/32508 and 231.

(259.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," p. 3.

(260.) Ibid., p. 240.

(261.) 5 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, p. 56.

(262.) Ibid.

(263.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," p. 4.

(264.) 5 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, pp. 56-57.

(265.) S.B.N.O. North Russia to Admiralty, 1904B/5th July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(266.) Daily Summary of Naval Events No. 1935, 1500 6 July 1942, Daily Summary of Events, July-Dee 42,1030-1212 ADM 223/862, TNA, p. 1.

(267.) Ryan, "The Royal Navy and Soviet Seapower," pp. 148-49.

(268.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 65; Submarine P54 to Admiralty, 2029B/5th July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1; Daily Summary of Naval Events No. 1935, 1500 6 July 1942, p. 1.

(269.) 5 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, p. 57.

(270.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," p. 4.

(271.) 5 July 1942, 1. SKL Teil B VI: Nachrichtendienst 1. Januar 1942-31. Dezember 1942, p. 106.

(272.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," p. 241.

(273.) 5 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, p. 58.

(274.) Ibid.

(275.) Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, 20 July 1942, B. Nr. Gkdos. 940/42 AI Chefs, "Abschlussbericht," p. 241.

(276.) Ibid., p. 5.

(277.) 5 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, pp. 58-59.

(278.) Ibid., p. 58.

(279.) Admiralty to Escorts of PQ17, 0230B/6th July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(280.) Admiralty to S.B.N.O. North Russia, 0231B/ 6th July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(281.) Admiralty to Escorts of PQ17, 1946B/6th July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(282.) Admiralty to Escorts of PQ17, 1947B/6th July, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(283.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 66.

(284.) 6 July 1942, KTB, 1. SKL, Teil A, 1-31 July 1942, p. 68.

(285.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 68.

(286.) S.B.N.O. Archangelsk to Admiralty, CINC Home Fleet, 0109M/8 July 1942, folder PQ 17, ADM 237/168, Admiralty: Naval Staff: Operations Division: Convoy Records, Second World War, TNA, p. 1.

(287.) Ryan, "The Royal Navy and Soviet Seapower," p. 150.

(288.) Luftflotte 5 Gefechsstab Kriegstagebuch Mai-Juni 1942 Durchschlage, p. 15.

(289.) Zusammengefasster Kampfbericht ueber die Einsaetze gegen PQ 17, RL 7/496, BA-MA, p. 33.

(290.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 68.

(291.) Luftflotte 5 Gefechsstab Kriegstagebuch Mai-Juni 1942 Durchschlage, p. 19.

(292.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, pp. 68-69.

(293.) Bullwinkel, Kooperation Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine, p. 44.

(294.) Zusammengefasster Kampfbericht ueber die Einsaetze gegen PQ 17, p. 35.

(295.) Uebersicht Nordmeer/Atlantik, 6 July 1942, Teil B VI: Nachrichtendienst 1. Januar 1942-31. Dezember 1942, p. 110; this number included twenty-three American ships of 142,058 BRT, ten British of 62,017 BRT, two Russian of 14,039 BRT, one Dutch of 7,168 BRT, and one Norwegian of 5,808 BRT; Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, 3. SKL FH (c) B. Nr. 13623/42 24 July 1942, Betr Vernichtung des Geleitzuges PQ 17, Akte VIII, 13 (PQ17) May 1942-July 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-MA, p. 1.

(296.) Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, 3. SKL FH (c) B. Nr. 13623/42 24 July 1942, Betr Vernichtung des Geleitzuges PQ 17, p. 2.

(297.) Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 53.

(298.) Roskill, The Period of Balance, p. 143.

(299.) Cited in Ryan, "The Royal Navy and Soviet Seapower," p. 151.

(300.) Ibid.

Dr. Milan Vego has been a professor in the Joint Military Operations Department at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, since August 1991. A native of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he obtained political asylum in the United States in 1976. Dr. Vego was an adjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College (1984-91) and a senior fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia (198587), and at the former Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (1987-89). He earned a BA in modern history (1970) and an MA in U.S. / Latin American history (1973) at the University of Belgrade and his PhD in European history from the George Washington University (1981). He holds a license as a master mariner. Dr. Vego has published ten books, including the textbooks Operational Warfare (2001) and Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (2008; reprint 2009), plus numerous articles in professional journals. He published his most recent book, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control, in December 2015.
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Title Annotation:pp. 114-142
Author:Vego, Milan
Publication:Naval War College Review
Geographic Code:0ARCT
Date:Jun 22, 2016
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