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The common wisdom about Russia is not wise: looking beyond the propaganda.

I WRITE HERE first about the popular narrative of Russia as an aggressive marauder; second, about Ukraine on the brink; third, about the plans for detente of President Trump; and, along the way, about Canada's roles in all this drama.


I encourage readers to take a hard, sceptical look at the prevailing, ubiquitous Western narrative that Vladimir Putin is a demon, killer, thief, dictator, war criminal and fixer of U.S. elections and that the Russia he's led for 17 years is a malignant, aggressive marauder bent on domination in eastern Europe and far beyond.

Vladimir Putin is no choirboy; no great power leader ever is. The president of Russia is many other things: a patriot, a patriarch --Tsar Lite, say--formidably intelligent, informed and articulate, pragmatic above all, a proven leader tough enough to run the vast Federation, ruthless if need be in serving its interests, and genuinely popular. Putin is also, proudly, a spy--and deception is an essential tool of espionage. So, of course, those "little green men" were Russian--but, of course, Moscow won't say so. As Putin explained at a Munich Security Conference, "We're all adults here."

What's more, beyond its leader, there is much we may not like in Russia's domestic politics or in the unapologetically brutal, few-holds-barred way it wages war.

But still, I find the current narrative about Russia's role in the world overblown, full of exaggeration about Russia's record, motives and capabilities, while blind to its obvious economic, demographic and security vulnerabilities and its necessarily defensive strategic posture.

That narrative is also notably ahistorical, blithely ignoring the provocations which have led to what's labelled Russian "aggression"--the vast expansion of NATO, a congenitally Russo-phobic nuclear military alliance; the unilateral abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, messing with Moscow's perception of its nuclear security, and the forward deployment of missile defence (in Romania and Poland, to counter a threat from Iran, we'd have Moscow believe); and the billions spent stoking anti-Russian sentiment and regime change in Russia's neighbourhood.

There has been much blood shed since the Maidan picked a fight with Moscow three years ago--a fight it can't win--but the facts remain that Kyiv can't make the (increasingly distracted and exasperated) West care more--and can't make the Kremlin care less. We are not going to fight World War III for the Donbas. And the Kremlin, under any sensate leader, is not going to stop defining the geostrategic orientation of Ukraine, all of Ukraine, as a matter of fundamental national security. Call Russia's reaction "aggression" if you will, but as we grew NATO by leaps and bounds, what did we expect? That Russia would just roll over in the face of obvious strategic calamity and meekly agree to rent historic Sevastopol, the Crimean base of its Black Sea Fleet, from a member of NATO?

Like them or not, theory aside, major powers' zones of influence are real. We Canadians know that; we live in one. In the real world, Kyiv has about as much freedom to undermine Moscow's security as Ottawa has to undermine Washington's.


Take a hard look too at the catastrophic circumstances of Ukraine and at the record and results of a quarter century of massive, sustained Western intervention, including our own. They must surely lead you to humility about our comprehension of Ukraine and our ability to mind its business.

In brief, the U.S. colony in Kyiv, the multibillion-dollar Western project there, of which we're a vocal part, is a heartbreak, a corrupt oligarchy, unreformed, highly centralized (without even elected regional governors), littered with arms, full of hard men without jobs, ready recruits for private militias, and dominated by ethnic nationalists bitterly opposed to vital national and regional reconciliation.

More of the same from us will make no sense. In a hole, stop digging. At the very least, do no more harm. Our record proves we don't have a clue how to solve Ukraine's problems. They'll have to be solved--or not--by Ukrainians.

For President Petro Poroshenko, meanwhile, let us spare a prayer. With a 13 per cent approval rating, the economy in tatters, and U.S. and EU support fading, Poroshenko knows he has to do a deal with Russia, has to implement the Minsk peace plan. Yet he dare not even say so, let alone act. The Rada (Ukraine's parliament) is adamantly opposed. In Kyiv these days, federalism and decentralization, at the core of Minsk implementation, are four-letter words.

We should do what we can to help him. We have no influence in Moscow--and it will be some time before we recover much--but we do have some clout in Kyiv. We should use it to counter lethally exclusive ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, to which we should stop pandering. We should use it as well to suggest proven Canadian solutions such as inclusion, accommodation and federalism.

And we should use it to promote essential reconciliation with Russia. No country in the world has more profound interest in good relations with Russia than Ukraine. None has more interest in East-West accord. None has more to gain by an end to this ruinous East-West tug of war. None has more interest in a better fence between Russia and NATO--a "mending wall" in Robert Frost's phrase. Canada should aim for a new deal in which Ukraine, rather than having to make an impossible choice, gets to trade well with both Europe and Russia, while posing a security threat to neither, a deal in which Ukrainians get the space and peace and quiet they need to reunite, to recover, to reform and to succeed. By all means, bilateral and multilateral, that should be our goal.


Despite entrenched bipartisan opposition, President Trump has appeared determined to achieve a measure of detente with Russia, to fight ISIS with it, to trade with it, to seek peace in Ukraine with it--to lower the temperature and tension and head off more Cold War. For the good of all concerned, especially Ukrainians, we should help him do so. Far from "sacrificing" Ukraine, as critics will claim, detente would permit its salvation.

We should help Trump deter Russia too, responding to his demand--and that of General James Mattis at NATO in Brussels --by spending more on defence. In my view, we have to do so anyway, if only to build a Navy and Coast Guard fit for the three oceans we have to sail.

As NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg insists, there is no contradiction between detente and deterrence. One day, one may eliminate the other, but we're not there yet. NATO's not going away any time soon. It will go on balancing and deterring Russian power and ambition.

Meantime, as we do our bit for deterrence, we should also do our bit for detente--and keep our priorities straight about the two. As Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said at last year's NATO Summit in Warsaw, the work behind the scenes to re-establish a NATO dialogue with Russia "really is the most critical piece. We need to make sure the tensions are reduced because it doesn't help anybody."

Exactly. Detente is a lonely cause these days--and Donald Trump may turn out to be the worst friend it ever had--but the last thing our sorry world needs now is this new Cold War we're waging. We've got too much else on our plates and face far greater threats to our security and welfare than any posed by Russia--which faces them too. The Cold War blighted half of the 20th century. If we can avoid it--and I think we can, if we try harder--let's not let Cold War blight any more of the 21st.

Chris Westdal served as Canada's Ambassador to Ukraine from 1996-98 and Canada's Ambassador to Russia from 2003-06, This is a slightly edited version of remarks he gave to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 16, 2017.

Caption: In September 2015, neither Russian President Vladimir Putin and American President Barack Obama were too happy to have their picture taken shaking hands after a United Nations meeting to discuss the disintegration of Syria. But with the election of Donald Trump to the White House, will a reduction in America's animosity towards Russia thaw the new Cold War? (WIKIPEDIA)

Caption: Violent clashes between civilians and government forces in Kyiv, Ukraine on February 18, 2014--known as the Maidan Revolution--resulted in the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. In its aftermath, the ethnic Russian population in the Crimean region held protests and eventually a referendum to secede from Ukraine.

Caption: On August 25, 2015 Canadian Armed Forces personnel began Operation UNIFIER, Canada's military training mission in support of the Ukrainian armed forces. The CAF's role is but one of the tools the government has at its disposal, and our approach has to be designed to improve the situation between Russia and the West, not destabilize it. (DND)


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Title Annotation:PERSPECTIVES
Author:Westdal, Chris
Publication:Esprit de Corps
Geographic Code:1CANA
Date:Apr 1, 2017
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