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The Stakhanov movement and the fight against sabotage on the soviet far eastern railway in the 1930s.

The Stakhanov movement is the best known of the "political-production" campaigns of the 1930s in the Soviet Union, the aim of which was the maximum increase of economic production as well as the greater integration of the working class into an accelerated modernization process. (1) The movement is all the more remarkable because it was accompanied by the struggle against so-called "sabotage" [Russian: vreditel'stvo, sometimes translated as "wrecking" in English, trans.]. On the basis of archival materials and writings by authors from several countries, the following essay will attempt to assess and analyze the specifics of this movement.

The campaign propagating the Stakhanov movement and the agitation against wrecking in the Soviet Union were connected to each other. The country's leadership, emphasizing the revolutionary quality of the Stakhanov movement, contrasted it with "counterrevolutionary wrecking." The head of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) in 1937 and 1938, Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov (1895-1940), stated in his July 1937 report on the the discovery of a conspiracy of saboteurs that "the scope of the wrecking is so significant, that the country finds itself on the verge of a civil war." (2)

During the existence of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), a great amount of writing about the Stakhanov movement was published. In this historiography, however, hardly any reference is found to the interdependence of the Stakhanov movement with the "repressive practices" [i.e., political persecution, trans.] in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in the contemporary speeches by the Communist leaders this link did not remain covert. In the late winter of 1937 at a plenary meeting of the Communist Party's leadership, the Central Committee, it was said how,
   During all stages of ... socialist construction, not only in times
   of hardship, but also in periods of growth, we, comrades, see how
   wreckers among us become more active. ... We do not doubt that our
   enemies will respond to the growth of the Stakhanov movement with
   sabotage. (3)

The question may be asked whether the Stakhanov movement became a weapon with which "wrecking" was fought. Did the politics of terror transform the workers into an obedient mass, capable of being manipulated in any way? (4)

Current researchers of the Stakhanov movement, including South-Korean scholar Chun Be Cho, point out that the crucial fact that the Stakhanov movement was chronologically followed by the Great Terror cannot be ignored. (5) Investigators answer the question against whom the Stakhanov movement was aimed differently. S. Shattenberg points out how the Stakhanov movement was a "true prelude to the persecution of engineers," while Fel'dman and Postnikov conclude that the Stakhanov movement was directed not merely against engineers or the older cadres of workers, but against all workers without exception. (6) The study of the Stakhanov movement has yielded a number of contradictions. Khlevniuk and Davies suggest that one of the possible causes of the transition toward a more measured and realistic economic policy in the latter stage of the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37) was the collapse of a new upsurge through the tidal wave of the Stakhanov movement. (7) In appreciating workers' motivation, N.B. Arnautov concluded that an important source of motivating shockworkers [that is, those who produced more than their colleagues, an earlier version of the Stakhanovites, trans.] was, besides the expectation of receiving material rewards, the fear of being considered a wrecker. (8) The Siberian historian A.V. Gaidamakin, through looking at the railroad workers of the Omsk railways, has succeeded in showing how the fierce Party policy of class conflict of the purges [of 1936-1938, trans.] had a ruinous effect on the development of "socialist competition [between shockworkers of Stakhanov workers across the country or within enterprises, trans.]" and led to the decrease of its dimensions. (9)

In the following article on the basis of materials about the Far Eastern Railroad (DVZhD, before 28 February 1936 known as the Ussuri railways), the relationship between the Stakhanov movement and the terror will be investigated using a complex dynamic tracing political and economic developments, within the specific circumstances of the Far East: the remoteness and backwardness of the region, the instability of the labor force, and the militarization of the railroads.

The overall reconstruction of the Ussuri railroads from 1934 to 1936 was executed at great pace. In a short period, the number of workers grew from 41,095 in 1933 to 67,700 in 1934. (10) The skills of these laborers of the DVZhD concomitantly changed. Many people arrived in Vladivostok incapable of work, as instead of 15-20 days they had traveled often 45 (and sometimes 50) days, and had hardly been given any food. (11) The deputy chair of the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Soviet Union, Ian B. Gamarnik (1894-1937), who inspected the Far East in 1933, gave a negative assessment of the commanding cadres of the Ussuri railways in 1933 in a report to Communist Party General Secretary Josef Stalin (1878-1953) and Prime Minister V.M. Molotov (1890-1986), noting that they were drunkards, hooligans, and class-hostile elements, who had been dismissed at other railroad administrations. (12)

Indubitably, the use of hired hands hailing from the western and central parts of the country was an expensive and not particularly effective way of organizing things for many reasons. The cost of hiring and the expense of keeping these people ran into the millions of rubles and proved not to be worth it. (13) The labor contracts were of short duration, six or eight months, and only rarely one year. The shallow allegiance of the new workers to their location led to a large wave of returning migrants. This migratory movement further strengthened the marginalization of the urban population in the Far East during those years.

On the causes of this "suitcase mentality" a source about the newly arrived experts says: "The man arrives, lives without an apartment in a lousy passenger (train-) car, without any supplies, and bolts." (14) Repeatedly, the People's Commissariat of Transport (NKPS) sent to the Far East the illiterate, those who could not care less, and even ill people:

They come to the Far East to receive their travel allowance and costof-living reimbursement and bolt as soon as possible. Many of those who have been sent consider themselves guests and live out of their suitcases. (15)

This indicates that in many cases people were dispatched to the Far East who were not needed there. These workers' low qualifications and lack of motivation further increased the already existing problems.

The first instances of wrecking were officially recorded in a report of the militray tribunal of the Ussuri railways, at the Voroshilov steam-locomotive repair works, which took care of major repairs of the rolling stock of the Ussuri railroad. At one point a locomotive engine arrived to change a cylinder. It was necessary to drill a twelve-millimeter hole to attach a connecting pipe for a reverse valve to let out condensed water. The chief of the locomotive department, Kurbatov, did not indicate where the hole needed to be drilled, as a result of which not one but two were made, and,
   A metalworker began to beat the hole with lead. Kurbatov did not
   check the metalworker's efforts, and when the locomotive departed,
   the leaden plug flew away while the engine moved [and the
   locomotive broke down]. After the court's examination of this case
   Kurbatov was excluded from the Communist Party by a party collegium
   of the Ussuri railways, and the Military Tribunal sentenced him to
   five years of incarceration for "the dulling of class vigilance and
   for allowing the repair of the locomotive to be wrecked." (16)

In this way a technical mistake that had caused an accident was redefined as deliberate wrecking.

This singular incident involving shop-master Kurbatov echoed the case of a Far-Eastern branch of the "Industrial Party," concocted by the OGPU [United State Political Administration, name of the security police from 1923 to 1934, trans.], which saw more than thirty "old" [i.e., having received their education in prerevolutionary time, trans.] engineers, headed by N.V. Denisov and M.A. Malishevskii, brought to trial for contacts with the White emigration, espionage and sabotage. (17) It appears as if the case of Malishevskii was so badly fabricated that even the experts of the OGPU Collegium of the Far-Eastern Region decided not to abide by the verdict rendered on 18 August 1931, which sentenced him to ten years of corrective-labor camp [i.e., concentration camp, trans.]. As result of a revision of the case on 16 August 1932, the case was closed for lack of conclusive evidence. It is possible that a role was played by the advanced age of the 73-year-old engineer.

A second "counterrevolutionary wrecking group" was discovered by the OGPU transport department in 1933 in the directorate of the railroad operations (ekspluatatsiia) and in its second operational district; its leaders were the directorate's deputy chief N.I. Fuzik, the deputy chief of the second district K.I. Bashlykov, and the chief of the Skovorodino station A.I. Tatarinov. (18) Those who conjured up this case involved the complicated Far-Eastern international situation, and did not hesitate to throw the most absurd and fantastic allegations at the suspects: links with the Japanese general staff; transmission to Japan of information on the state of the railroads; preparations for a foreign intervention that even included taking over the railroads.

The situation at the Voroshilov works did not improve after the unmasking of this group of "wreckers." The "young Soviet experts" who became its leaders did not "manage the factory adequately," and engaged in "whipping up things and organizing storming episodes [frantic spells of work to meet planning targets, trans.], merely aiming at the quantitative fulfillment of the plans with whatever means necessary." (19)

The growing volume of shipments on the railroads led to an increase in accidents and crashes, while the technical state of the rolling stock and the quality of reparations remained poor. Take for example the most common causes of the break-down of engines that had to go to the shops. These were the breakdown of springs and suspended springs; damage to boiler fittings; and breaks and leakages to pipes. (20) In addition, only half of the tools needed for repairs were available, and this equipment was worn out. As a result, the reparation of locomotive engines was slow and had to be often repeated. In the "Pervaia Rechka" case an incident was described of one engine from July 1932 onwards being repaired 37 times during the remainder of the year, twelve times in January and February 1933, and breaking down repeatedly again in March! (21) The proceedings at this depot came to the attention of the transport department of the OGPU, which reported on 1 December 1933 that "the depot chief of Pervaia Rechka Egorov and the secretary of the Party organization Bantsevich did not manage operations, but engaged in drinking bouts, lining their own pockets and displayed a self-seeking attitude toward the workers." (22) The depot bosses were dismissed because of their "inertia and lack of sensitivity, and at times even direct sabotage" and sent to court. (23) It is possible that the true cause of their dismissal was the lack of success of the depot's managers in the all-Union competition of locomotive brigades [a contest in which the various shops competed for the best results in meeting their tasks, trans.]. (24)

Still, in 1932 and 1933 the accusations of "wrecking" on the Ussuri railways had not yet reached massive proportions. Various signs of wrecking had not yet been codified and in the indictments some pre-industrial [pre-Soviet-Union is meant, trans.] terms were still being used, such as negligence (khalatnost'), bungling (golovotiapstvo), or sabotage (sabotazh).

The year 1934 saw the beginning of a massive project to reconstruct all subdivisions of the Ussuri railways and the construction of new lines and depots and the transition to the carrying of new, heavier types of freight. The Ussuri railways became one of the most accident-prone parts of the Soviet railways as a result. On 11 June the Bureau of the regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Far East [Biuro Dal'kraikom, the highest local Party body, from here kraikom, trans.] raced out the resolution "On the crashes on the Ussuri railways." (25) It noted that a large number of incidents, and particularly a number of crashes causing victims in the previous twenty days, were symptomatic of the excessively low labor discipline and absence of a "Bolshevik state of affairs" at the railroad. And it announced the following measures:

1. L.V. Lemberg and M.A. Rutenberg needed to warn the chiefs of the depots, of the car and all other divisions as well as all Party organizers that the interruptions of traffic through inadequate throwing of switches and other reasons were the result of negligent work by the administrative-technical and service personnel of the district and that they would be liable to the strictest norms of Party behavior and to criminal responsibility.

2. To ask T.D. Deribas to mobilize the best part of the OGPU staff to conduct a decisive purge of the railroads of Japanese agents, diversionists, wreckers, hooligans, counterrevolutionary social alien and disorganizing elements in order to comply with the Party Central Committee's and the Council of Poeple's Commissars decree of 1 June 1934.

3. To oblige the regional committee of the Komsomol (the Communist Youth League) to assign within the next twenty days 150 trustworthy Komsomol members to the political department of the railways to train them as lower-level transport workers (as switchmen, greasers, maintenance staff, and dispatchers). (26)

The grandiose decisions of the kraikom were not, however, executed. Thus, on 20 June 1934 the kraikom noted: "Despite the fact that nine days have passed since the measures responding to Stalin's telegram were announced, no steps in this matter have been made and the kraikom's decree is not implemented as is required by the situation that has arisen." (27) And on 1 July 1934 the kraikom once more noted: "The situation on the line remains acutely hazardous and no improvement in this respect has been undertaken." (28) At the same time, the managers of the railroads called on local Party committees and soviet executive committees [the formal local government, trans.] to introduce order along the tracks (by improving poor railroad bedding or cleansing ditches, trenches, and slopes), and by assigning "for two months to the discretion of the section heads of the lines labor forces, including women and youth (molodezh') of in total 1400 people." (29)

Toward December 1934 because of the problems on the Ussuri railroads the plans for the transport of grain, coal, wood, and fish failed. The kraikom secretary [i.e, local Party chief, trans.] L.I. Lavrent'ev on 16 December 1934 warned Lemberg and the regional Party secretaries Tanygin, Slinkin, and Chepel' that, if they did not succeed in meeting the transport plan targets, they would be subjected to the strictest measure of Party penalties. (30) Subsequently, the Party organizer Sidorov remembered that the orders from the People's Commissar of Transport L.M. Kaganovich (1893-1991) were not fulfilled: "We responded toward his decrees by organizing campaigns (kampaneiski). A decree appeared, we made noise, mobilized, drew up plans and that was that, and we proceeded to wait for the next decree." (31) Together with the heed paid to technological problems, the political pressure began to mount on the various units who worked on the railroads. Dismissal and persecution of railroad workers that occurred because of the Party purges in 1929 and 1933, the checking of the Party documents in 1935 and 1936, and the campaigns against Trotskyism markedly worsened the difficulties in finding qualified workers, which already had been a problem without such campaigns, for those dismissed or arrested were predominantly workers who had professional expertise. And the political department of this railroad branch further aggravated the situation in diffusing the opinion about "the extremely choked-up nature of the Ussuri railroads with class-alien elements," stating (32):
   Vladivostok is a city in which the largest neighborhood contains
   old ... White-Guardist nests. ... It needs to be placed under sharp
   surveillance. ...

   We have many Communists from the Chinese Far Eastern Railway. One
   needs to check with whom they are in contact. We need to loosen the
   tongues of these Communists, and not have them fear to talk about
   everything. (33)

Especially frequent were the firings and arrests among station and depot chiefs and Party organizers. On 17 October 1935 at a meeting of the Vladivostok junction and the stations of Vladivostok and Egershel'd, news came out about the arrests of the chief of Vladivostok station A.D. Davydov and the manager of the same station, Golyntsev, as well as of O.A. Timoshuk, F.A. Dmitrov, S.P. Il'iashevich, D.S Istomin, and Chzu Tin Fin. (34)

In the second half of 1936 massive repressions [repressii, the Russian term used for the mass arrests under Stalin, trans.] began at the Far Eastern railroads. The most senior employees at the Voroshilov works were accused of Trotskyism: Grigorii Pavlovich Artiushin, Efrem Danilovich Batsyga, Ivan Artemovich Fisenko, Aleksandr Maksimovich Dudich, and Vasilii Karpovich Gorpenko were among them. (35) Exclusion from the Communist Party led to dismissal from the factory. Within a year, 600 communists were dismissed from the Far Eastern railroad personnel, half of whom were arrested. Four-fifths of the managing staff of the Far Eastern railroad was replaced. (36) Even chief-manager E.V. Lemberg was threatened with arrest.

Against the background of the political trials, the first references to the Stakhanovites are made in the materials of Party meetings that are extant. In January 1936 at the fifteenth railroad division and works of the Ussuri railroads, workers discussed the manner of introduction of Stakhanovite methods:
   Belenshyshev: "We speak very often about the Stakhanov movement,
   but we do very little about it.... Communists do not take the lead
   in this movement ..."

   He added: "The Stakhanov movement has been going on for three
   months, and our engineer and technical experts did not suggest one
   proposal toward rationalization or invention, and that is frankly
   shameful." (37)


   Gornostaev: "Communists need to become Stakhanovites, need to lead
   that movement and at the same time wage a merciless battle with
   saboteurs ... we need to find those who put the brakes on and beat
   them with force." (38)

At the Ussuri railroads, the chief of the steam-engine department A.A. Zavistovskii became a target for abuse when he did not immediately support the initiative of the Stakhanovite Asaulov. What follows are episodes from the meeting that was called regarding this matter. First we have parts of Zavistovskii's speech, and then we hear from his critics:
   [Zavistovskii:] "I admit that I did not take into account the
   situation in which our country at the moment finds itself. ... I
   needed to understand, that 'life became better, life became
   happier, and when one lives happier, the work also goes on
   swimmingly' [this is quoting something that Stalin had said in a
   speech in 1935, see also below, trans.]. On 1 February 11936,
   authors] we sent to the Obluch'e depot a brigade to study Asaulov's
   system on the spot and to diffuse his expertise along the entire
   line. ... One cannot introduce his method along the entire line as
   the new system of work without studying the matter." [critic:]
   "Zavistovskii did not understand the essence of the Stakhanovite
   movement. He made it appear as if routine jobs are one thing, and
   the Stakhanovite movement is another thing. He did not understand
   that on the basis of the Stakhanovite movement one needs to
   organize the fulfillment of the plan, that the Stakhanov movement
   is a deeply revolutionary movement."

   [second critic:] "Zavistovskii exhibited a thoughtless,
   bureaucratic (cbinovnich'e) attitude toward the Stakhanov movement,
   in the same manner as a class enemy displays. The difference is
   that an enemy does this in secret while Zavistovskii as a communist
   with a Party card in his pocket does this openly."

   [third critic:] "Zavistovskii is not dangerous to us, but
   Zavistovskiilike behavior (zavistovshchina) is." (39)

The above indicates how the Party meeting supported the policy to work to the utmost possible limit.

Later in early 1937, People's Commissar Kaganovich called this sort of attempt to dampen the enthusiasm one of the kinds of wrecking: "In using such norms, spies and wreckers made their way of work legitimate, and they fought against the possibilities of fulfilling the state plans in a legal fashion, and they convinced, and, unfortunately, still convince a great many ... that the transport system with the current technology cannot ship more." (40)

Within a short while, the Stakhanov movement took on an anti-managerial attitude. For example, the participants in the third ten-day Stakhanov competition at Vladivostok station pointed at shortcomings that in their opinion hindered Stakhanovite labor. The managers of the station Egershel'd, "despite the warnings of the first wave of Stakhanovites did not change its work methods." (41) The head of the cargo office of Vladivostok station Dvinskii "instead of taking the lead over the Stakhanov movement, points at objective causes at work and establishes limits, which mandate that no more than fifty cars can be unloaded at the cargo terrain, when in fact the actual unloading during the Stakhanovite ten days reached 157-165 cars." (42)

At a meeting on technology of engineers-Stakhanovites in 1936 in which the shipping of heavy goods was discussed, it turned out that among the experts, too, not all had the same opinion in this regard:
   "One can do this once in a while but not continually; he who does
   not want to be some sort of upstart, will not transport such heavy
   loads." (43)

   "If an engineer carries 2000 tons of weight on his train and the
   locomotive is not ready for that, then the engineer will refuse to
   drive that train and that is then called sabotage of the transport
   of heavy loads." (44)

   "One can only drive normally if one has normal trains."

   "One should never carry heavy-weight loads at great speed, as that
   will become a grave for both engine and people." (45)

The engineers were especially disturbed that they were often used "blindly," which endangered the time tables and manner of shipping and the lives of the workers themselves. The managers of stations and depots deliberately increased the weight of the trains or assigned wholly unsuitable engines to pull heavy loads. For instance, the train-driver Mikheev was assigned to a train earring 1500 tons, but when he checked the weight it turned out to be 2000 tons. (46)

In general, negative assessments prevailed along the railroad regarding the Stakhanov movement. Workers saw the Stakhanov movement as a tool used by the state to exploit them, which constituted a denial of socialism. Erokhin, an office-clerk of Vladivostok station, said that "we are not a non-capitalist country in order to squeeze all energy out of the workers." (47) The workers were convinced that the record-breaking results were orchestrated from above. This explains why many of them looked critically at the Stakhanov movement. The senior dispatcher Sobolevskii straightforwardly stated that "they needed a Stakhanov and they created him." (48) And the specialist of the Ugol'naia station Klimenko had a similar idea: "The Stakhanov movement is a useless scrap of paper (fil'kina gramota)." (49)

Among the railroad workers the opinion could he encountered that Stakhanovism might lead to unemployment: "If everyone becomes a Stakhanovite, overproduction will be the result." (50) A master working at the Khabarovsk railroad car department responded to the statement of a turner that he would begin to work in a Stakhanovite manner that "if you begin to introduce Stakhanovite methods, then we will have nothing to do anymore tomorrow." (51) Shipanov, a deputy master, criticized in a dormitory of the railroads the high wages of the Stakhanovites: "They squander wages.... Soviet power brags to the capitalist countries, saying that workers live well in the USSR, while in fact it is the other way round." (52)

Stalin's phrase, which he pronounced at the first congress of Stakhanovites in November 1935, that "life has become better, comrades, life has become happier," equally became a subject of mockery for many. They reworked this formula in all sorts of ways, showing little shame in coming up with versions. At the Pervaia Rechka station Party member Vasin was excluded from the Party from making fun of Stalin's words. (53)

It appears paradoxical, but there were fewer Stakhanovites among the Communists than there were among people who were not Party members. This explains why there were constant calls from higher Party organs to demand that the Communists lead the movement. Many Stakhanovites refused to join the Party as they believed that membership in the Communist Party would lead to additional burdens and responsibilities.

Meanwhile, Stakhanovite records did not have an infuence on the general labor results on the railroad. The Far Eastern Railroad's management was obliged to admit this. At the end of May 1936 the kraikomburo of the regional Communist Party adopted a resolution that the situation at the railroad was "extremely bad," while kraikom secretary L.I. Lavrent'ev accused the railroad managers of a panicky mood, the recurrence of the inclination to push everything to the limit. (54)

The poorly thought-through intensification of labor in a zone of aggravated danger such as a railroad led, however, to deplorable consequences. In particular, from January to June 1936 within the Voroshilov division of the railroad occurred 748 cases of accidents and crashes, some of which involved casualties. Depot chief V.V. Shchepinin ill-advisedly pointed at the "indirect" cause of the crashes, "shifts of more than 20 to 30 hours by the locomotive teams." (55)

If on 1 September 1936 at the Pervaia Rechka depot the number of engines under repair was fifteen, it reached twenty-seven on 15 October, whereas the norm was a mere eight. The experts acknowledged that melted axles, previously a phenomenon only occurring infrequently, now had become ordinary. The engineers did not comply with the most basic rules of technical maintenance. (56) This was on the one hand caused by the low qualifications of the railroad workers, and on the other by the increased demands from the higher-ups. During the autumn of 1936 the sixth department here did not succeed in organizing a timely loading and unloading of Suchansk coal. The department accumulated 2,300 cars, but nonetheless fell below the loading targets for coal, having almost 28,000 tons sitting on its piers at Artem and 16,000 tons at Suchan, which "threatened to stop the coal winning in the mines." (57)

A typical decree of railroad manager L.V. Lemberg regarding the leaders of the Vladivostok unit we render below almost without abbreviations, inasmuch as all staff mentioned in this decree was repressed (that is, arrested or executed) in 1937:
   The manager of the sixth division Kubyshkin [who was subsequently
   executed by firing squad, authors], 'in the period before 10
   October has to push the whole damaged fleet, remove the remainder
   of the unloaded coal, needs to deliver ten trains to the fifth
   division and unload I 100 cars, and load up to 6000 cars with coal
   and needs to organize two train convoys per twenty-four-hour
   period. The manager of the steam locomotive department Kalashnikov
   [also executed later, authors] and the chief of the Pervaia Rechka
   depot Lunev [arrested afterwards, authors] are ordered to safeguard
   the daily deployment of three powerful engines at the
   Egershel'd-Voroshilov platform to replace damaged equipment.

   To introduce the strictest discipline among the engine brigades,
   not to permit one case of stoppage of trains that are being readied
   in the absence of a shift because of the laxity of a station master
   ... The manager of the Vladivostok station Avdeev [also
   subsequently shot, authors] needs to introduce in an uncompromising
   manner my order regarding the readying of passenger trains from the
   Vladivostok station within a forty-minute span with the engines
   with which they arrived.

   The manager of the ninth railroad-section Panfilov [shot as well,
   authors] needs within three days to bring order to the movable and
   inoperative materials at the station Egershel'd, and Kalashnikov
   needs to ensure the use of those materials." (58)

As is evident, in this purely technical document no reference was made to "wrecking," even if the managers of the sixth division Kubyshkin and the engine division Kalashnikov received the warning of being held "strictly accountable."

For the sake of objectivity it should be said that the competence of the managers at all levels of the Far Eastern Railroads stood at a very low level. A generational change and the purges had led to a deterioration of the quality of the managerial and technical experts in 1933 when compared to 1928. Thus, if in 1928 such 76 per cent of staff had enjoyed specialized education, then in 1933 only forty five per cent had received such schooling. Especially sharply, from twenty two to six per cent, did the percentage of experts who had been educated as engineers fall; the number of practitioner-technicians (vydvizhentsy, trans.) who had not enjoyed specialized education grew from twenty three to sixty four per cent. (59)

In the years 1932, 1933, and 1934 the deficit of cadres with expertise only increased:
   "Among five divisions of the railroad, three do not have managers
   ... [t]wo of the largest stations along the track, Vladivostok and
   Khabarovsk-2 have no manager.... The Party leaders of the important
   depots of Skovorodino, Obluch'e, Zavitiia and In are politically
   illiterate and feeble types," as A.M. Rutenberg, the chief of the
   political department of the Ussuri railways, described the
   situation among the cadres. (60)

An investigation of the biographies of such "vydvizhentsy" indicates that their meteoric careers could sometimes turn them into bureaucrats and abusers of power. This, for example, happened with the chief of the engine department Kalashnikov. From documents of the Party collegium of the Ussuri railroad in January and February 1935 we encountered in the archives some specifics about his biography become apparent. He began working in 1913 as a common metalworker. In 1917, he joined the Bolshevik party and served as a volunteer in the Red Army and the Red Guards until 1922. He was jailed in 1925 for revolutionary activities in China. In the same year, he received a severe reprimand with a warning [that he might face dismissal from the Party, trans.] for drunkenness and scandalous behavior with regard to his family [ in the language of the day, this often meant adultery, trans.]. In 1934, Kalashnikov received further warnings for violations of labor discipline and a poor management style. As head of the depot Pervaia Rechka in 1935, Kalashnikov was censured by the railroad chiefs Lemberg and Zavistovskii. For a most serious violation of military and Party discipline on 1 January 1935 Kalashnikov was issued a strong reprimand. He was warned that if he continued to behave in future as a "grandee" and a "dissolute petty bourgeois," he would be excluded from the Party and be subject to dismissal from his job. (61) Meanwhile, the chief of the Far Eastern Railroads, L.V. Lemberg, was like Kalashnikov a practitioner without any specialized education who had become a foremost leader of the transport operations along the railroad.

In the winter of 1936 a collapse of transport necessitated the kraikom to take extraordinary measures. One-hundred-and-forty communists were dispatched to work in various depots. To bring the stoppages to a swift end ten engines with the best drivers were assigned to the track. These locomotives needed to expedite the dispatch of trains and end the piling-up of goods. Every engine has a Communist Party member on it. As a result, in a fifteen-day period, 45 trains traveled some 750 kilometers each on average. The engineers of the Ruzhinskii depot and the Voroshilov depot traversed without taking in any water from the station of Volochaevok to Birobidzhan, some 117 kilometers, with an average speed on 37.7 kilometers per hour. (62) This singular action removed the clogging of traffic at the most crucial stretch of the track, and led to a temporary improvement of the situation among the various units.

The situation at the Far Eastern Railroads was typical for that of transport's plight in the Soviet Union at the time, as was highlighted during the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee in Moscow. In an uninterrupted report to this meeting, then People's Commissar of Transport Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich accused many of the managers and deputy managers of the railroads of sabotage, wrecking, and diversionary actions. (63) Thus he named the former chief of the Moscow-Donbas railroads, A.I. Eshmanov, a "Trotskyite-wrecker." (64) He spoke about Aleksandt Efimovich Fufriansk in the following way: "He is an unbelievable conservative, an impossible keeper of limits [..., since h]e is one of those senior machinists, who considers himself smarter than everyone." (65) About Aron Markovich Arnol'dov he said: "That is a dodger ... a key operator among those who want to keep to the old limits." (66) And regarding I.N. Mironov, the first deputy people's commissar of transport, he remarked that "he is a bad worker, a conservative, forever moaning, before anything I had considered him a Rightist [and i]t turned out that he was a Right deviationist and a Trotskyite, and the devil only knows what he truly is...." (67).

After the February-March 1937 Plenum, the collapse of transport on the Far Eastern Railroads in the winter of 1936-1937 was recognized as a "deed of the Trotskyite-Japanese espionage-diversionary brigade under the lead of Lemberg." (68) The wrecking gang, apparently, organized within a year fourteen bloody crashes, including some involving army trains. The sudden suicide of the Far Eastern Railroad chief L.V. Lemberg on 1 April 1937 provoked complex discussions among the workers along the railroad, but no one believed in his alleged wrecking. The deputy chief of the administrative department of the Far Eastern railroads Gartung said that "there is no way that Lev Vladimirovich can be accused of wrecking and ties with the Trotskyites," while the deputy managers of the railroads Kozlov stated that he would allow his head to be chopped off if Lemberg had been a wrecker. (69) The head of the cargo service Rodin said: "Only one thing is clear, the Party organization was worried sick regarding Lemberg, but offered him very little help in his work." (70)

Kaganovich, meanwhile, warned those transport workers who still doubted the wisdom of Party decrees and directives: "There may still be some difficulties, but those are only encountered with respect to those cadres who have not understood the proper lessons of wrecking. As we, however, hope that all will understand the lessons to be learned from the wrecking, we do not doubt that a further elevation of the Stakhanov movement will be the response to the wrecking committed by our enemies." (71)

Kaganovich's warning was heeded in practice. Thus, already in February and March of 1937 on the instigation of the political department of the Far Eastern Railroad at a number of emergency meetings at the various workplaces Party cells were alerted that "they had not yet engaged in a struggle with the elimination of the consequences of wrecking, and poorly recognized enemies." (72) In addition, Party organizers who did not understand this were dismissed and given severe reprimands with the warning that they might be excluded from its ranks.

In following the resolutions of the Central Committee Plenum, the political department of the Far Eastern railways increased the pressure on lower-level Party organizations, fabricating "facts" and pinpointing the names of "counterrevolutionary elements." This information was formalized in the form of decrees of the head of the Far Eastern railways' political department, which suggested their rigorous execution through a militarization of the railroads' operation. In a nine-and-a-half-hour-long speech by the head of the railways' political department D.T. Bobryshev the main varieties of "wrecking" were defined. In his report, Bobryshev presented Moskou's view of the situation, noting how the People's Commissar of Transport had said that many spies and diversants worked on the railroads in the Far East, and that the presence of many people from the borderlands could be decisive in case war broke out. Bobryshev's department sent around telegrams warning Communists and members of the Communist youth league (Komsomol) not to wait to execute the orders issued by the February-March Plenum. Grodekovo station received a telegram which openly stated how "after February every Communist signaled the presence of hostile elements and how the political department needed to be helped in unmasking enemies of Soviet power." (73)

The management of the Voroshilov works responded as well reluctantly to the news about wrecking at the plant. The head of the works M.T. Gavrilov was excluded from the Party "for political blindness, the loss of vigilance, and the lack of a struggle against the consequences of wrecking"; together with him, the head of the technical staff Glukhov, the master of the foundry shop Ianek, the pattern maker Slobodeniuk, the inspector Tkachenko, and the brigadier S.G. Dvoenko (1876-1938) were excluded from the Communist Party. (74) The arrest of the factory's former Party organizer Tabachkov provoked a negative response among the plant workers: "They arrest the innocent, for those whom they arrest are not enemies and those who shoot will soon get to our ranks." (75)

Starting in March 1937, arrests began at the Vladivostok division. Still, at the Pervaia Rechka depot the occurrence of wrecking kept on being denied: "We have no wrecking in our depot, and the damages to the engines and boilers was caused by technical problems." (76) When in early April 1937 evidence from confessions was diffused that a criminal group in the Party committee had been active that included Kalashnikov, Sidorov, Vasil'ev, Lebedev, and Troitskii, an enlarged meeting of the Party committee of the Vladivostok division was called during which Party members actively participated in unmasking and self-unmasking exercises. (77) Below an excerpt from the stenographic record of the session:
   Sidorov: "The work by wreckers was facilitated by the absence of
   any leaership within the depot in the course of seven months."
   Worker: "You Sidorov, nowhere and never unmasked any wrecker at a
   time when they were and are active in the depot."

   Nutovt (a Stakhanovite [see below for more on him]): "As far as the
   appearance of cracks in the connecting rods in the production
   process is concerned, I could not check that."

   [A proposal to exclude Sidorov, Kalashnikov, Lunev, and Taran from
   the Party produced a stormy response from the accused:] Taran: "I
   conducted for many years the wrecking practice of destroying the
   engines ..., following the orders of the head of the depot
   Kalashnikov and the former Party organizer Sidorov. I was
   surrounded by enemies."

   Kalashnikov: "My directions were intended to wreck things. Could I
   have worked differently? I was taught by the wrecker Tomlenov, and
   the rules about repairing locomotives the wrecker Kashchaev taught
   me. My work was done under the lead of the wreckers Zavistovskii,
   Kislik, and Simbirin."

   Lunev, the head of the Pervaia Rechka depot: "The situation was
   difficult, as there were no masters in the boilermakers' or
   cleaning shops, and everyone had to do things on their own. At the
   same time, I changed the unit's chief and it literally broke into
   pieces, and I was grasping for straws in order to drag the depot
   out of its torpor. None of the Communists to whom I turned for help
   did anything. Gorshenin, when he was asked to take on the task of
   deputy, stated that he did not want to go to jail." (78)

On 20 and 21 April 1937, the meeting looked into the case of the twenty-eight-year-old head of the seventh car shop, V.N. Gegeshidze. The atmosphere of a mass psychosis caused the Party comrades to behave in an anti-humane fashion with the young man:

"Gegeshidze cried when they shot Lemberg." ... "Who can vouch for such a chief, who was so close to Lemberg?" ... "Gegeshidze has faults, but one cannot consider him a wrecker." ... "He bemoaned Lemberg who he called a good person." (79)

V.N. Gegeshidze was shot on 5 September 1937. He was rehabilitated after Stalin's death.

In 1937 the entire managerial staff of the Vladivostok division was arrested. According to the evidence of the political department, 42 people were arrested of whom twenty were shot. (80) In spite of the complete destruction of Vladivostok division's leading personnel, the regional Party leadership demanded "to develop before 18 July 1937 concrete plans to remove the consequences of wrecking on the basis of decree no. 21 is of the People's Commissar." (81)

In September 1937, the first secretary of the kraikom I.M. Vareikis informed Stalin in a letter that more than 500 railroad workers in the Far East had been shot. (82) "After this," Vareikis noted, "the railroads began to operate significantly better ... but work in this regard is not completed and the purging of enemies from the railroads continues." (83) In reality, however, all these measures did not lead to an improvement of the manner in which the railroads were run.

Among the sharp directives issued by People's Commissar of Transport Kaganovich, the decree of 16 June 1937 appears odd, because it suggests concrete measures to finance housing at the stations Obluch'e, Khabarovsk 1, and Khabarovsk 2, and public works at the railroad settlements at the stations Pervaia Rechka, Arkhara, Obluch'e, Bira, Birobidzhan, In, and Viazemskaia. Those measures needed to alleviate social problems at a number of problematic stations along the Ussuri railways. This belated worry about the failed promises of Soviet power in the Far East was also expressed by the transport of 700 cows, four brass bands, and five pianolas there. (84)

In January 1938, almost a year after the Central Committee Plenum at which Kaganovich had bemoaned the state of the Soviet railroads, the Far Eastern Party Control Commission again noticed the unsatisfactory state of the sixth division and especially the Vladivostok unit in terms of fundamental operative statistics, among which were the number of accidents and crushes: They had not decreased, but increased. (85) At the Voroshilov unit of the Ussuri railroads it was recognized that "we do not witness a broad development of the Stakhanov movement in the first quarter of 1938." (86) As some of the main causes weak propaganda and the poor promulgation of the Stakhanovites were named, to which was added "it is necessary that our Communist-commanders understand that they will answer with their heads for the Stakhanovite movement." (87)

Together with the customary denunciation of the engineering and technical staff and of the managers of the stations and units, an impartial analysis of the operational statistics for the first quarter of the Voroshilov section showed that the planning targets were not fulfilled. For example, while the schedule called for the delivery of 97 locomotives, they did 77; simple repairs of engines took 118 hours instead of 24 hours. At the same time, regarding the dispatch of heavily loaded trains plan targets were overfulfilled: In January 572 trains with heavy cargo were sent on their way, 453 in February, and in March 691. (88)

The causes of the lack of plan fulfillment in the area in the lagging categories were the low labor discipline and the poor diffusion of a minimum of technical expertise. They attempted to improve labor discipline with the aid of the Stakhanov movement: "If all Communists continually occupied themselves with the strengthening of labor discipline and the Stakhanov movement, then we would liquidate the remnants of the consequences in the unit of the wrecking work of the enemies of the people." (89)

To fight alleged wreckers, Stakhanovites, "Khetagurovki," (90) and demobilized Red Army soldiers were enlisted. The Stakhanovites were called "the people most dedicated to the Motherland," and they were offered social mobility because they could join the Party's ranks, or were promoted within the Party or in terms of their work. In a way, the Stakahnovites played a political role, as a sort of Stalinist version of the oprichnina [tsar Ivan the Terrible's praetorian guard of the 1560s and 1570s, trans.]. Nonetheless, the Stakhanovite machinists and workers of the Voroshilov depot Sergei Eduardovich Pogranitskii, Nikolai Ivanovich Zharov, Viktor Vasil'evich Shchepinin, and Roman Grigor'evich Rubakhov were shot as enemies of the people. This caused a shock among the railroad workers. Many were perplexed, for these had been after all Stakhanovites who had been unmasked and turned out to be enemies of the people.

And among the arrested "enemies of the people" working for the railroads were those who had been awarded with the highest state honors:
   L.V. Lemberg, chief of the Ussuri railroads had received the Lenin
   Order, as had the head of its political branch, A.M. Rutenberg. The
   Pervaia Rechka depot master P.Kh. Taran, its traffic dispatcher
   A.I. Shilo, and the chief of the locomotive department of the
   Ruzhino staion N.O. Grekhnev had all received the Order of the Red
   Banner. A.I. Egorov, the chief of the Ruzhinskii
   traffic-maintenance division, G.I. Biron, the manager of the Far
   Eastern trest (a factory complex in which a number of goods are
   produced, trans.), E.A. Lapinskii, the deputy chief of the labor
   assignment department, G.N. Viatkin, the senior inspector of Far
   Eastern railroad-track construction, V.N. Gegeshidze, the chief of
   the car unit at Pervaia Rechka station, N.I Zharov, the
   assistant-manager at the fourth locomotive division at Ruzhino
   station, S.E. Pogranitskii, a machinist of the Voroshilov depot and
   others had been recipients of the "honored railroadworker"

There were a considerable number of cases in which Stakhanovites were excluded from the Party because of their arrest by the NKVD [the security police's name in 1937-1938, trans.], who afterwards were reinstated when the height of the purges subsided in late 1938. In August 1938 the locomotive engineer Sapetskii of the engine depot Khabarovsk-2 was excluded for the simple reason that "no one is arrested in vain," but he was reinstated in the Party's ranks in January 1939. The cause of his reinstatement was that it had become apparent that it was precisely Sapetskii who had been the initiator in operating locomotives without interruption from cleansing stint to cleansing stint [which maximized their use, apparently, trans.]. (91)

Another notorious example of this was rather more tragic. At the Ussuri railroads everyone knew the name of Ivan Aleksandrovich Nutovt (1882-1938), an engineer of the Pervaia Rechka depot, a holder of the Lenin Order and of the Red Banner Order. Already in 1931, Nutovt, receiving engine no. 317 in a state that made it unsuitable to run, managed with his assitant Polezhaev to repair the locomotive and took second place in a competition between locomotive engineers in the Soviet Union [so-called socialist emulation or socialist competition, a sort of forerunner to Stakhanovism, already became popular in the First Five Year Plan of 1928-32, trans.]. Nutovt was nominated as a candidate for the Seventeenth Party Congress All-Union Honorary Board in 1934). (92) An engineer of the highest skill, he made sure that several dozen mechanics were counted as exemplary workers, so that no one in his department was considered as performing poorly. (93) His followers were called "Nutovtovtsy" along the railroad.

But, on 29 July 1937, Nutovt was excluded from the ranks of the Communist Party "for having ties with the unmasked enemies Kalashnikov and Sidorov." (94) Nutovt was compromised by his Polish citizenship during the time of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920-1921 and his connections abroad (he was a native of Lithuania, although ethnically he counted as Polish). The key cause of the calumny against the Stakhanovite was his brave civil posture, his solidarity with his work colleagues. He "did not unmask any, and stood up in defence of many innocently convicted and did not believe in any scenario that held them to be wreckers." (95) He responded to the accusations before the Party meeting that was to exclude him as follows:
   (Nutovt): "... I have lived in the Far East since 1908 and have
   worked honestly until today. It would undo the highest recognition
   by the Lenin Order I have received ..."

   "But it is said that you did not truly deserve the order?"
   (Nutovt): "I reckon that I deserved it, for in the course of 27
   years of work I have not had any accident."

   "Why did you stand up at the Party committee's meeting in defence
   of enemies of the people and propose to have them stay in the
   Party?" (Nutovt): "That was my mistake." (96)

The celebrated 56-year-old engineer I.A. Nutovt was arrested on the basis of a deceitful accusation against him and sentenced to death for anti-Soviet agitation on 20 August 1938 and shot on the same day in the environs of Vladivostok. After Stalin's time, he was rehabilitated.

The case of Nutovt and other Stakhanovites who had been selected among senior workers indicates that they were not the facilitators of terror, but that they became its first victims. The acclaim of the Stakhanov movement sharply declined among Communist Party members: No more than one or two Stakhanovites were to be found among every one hundred Communists. (97)

The Stakhanov movement, similar to "wrecking," was linked to the technical development of the railroad sector. In 1936 and 1937, the Soviet Far Eastern railways underwent an industrial spurt, when a modernization of the wornout industrial infrastructure occurred. The campaign to eradicate "wrecking" aimed at finding concrete individuals who had been responsible for the decay and the break-down of the fulfillment of the ambitious plans. It seemed sensible to propose that all, from high to low, in the railroads' organization were responsible for the problems. Since wrecking became, however, a massive phenomenon in the railroad transport sector to which a high number of regular workers fell victim, why was this?

One can affirm that the Stakhanov movement and the fight against wrecking were two sides of the Stalinist system's inclination to mobilize through fomenting conflict. In order not to be counted among the wreckers, one needed to become a Stakhanovite, but even the status of a Stakhanovite was an insufficient safeguard against arrest. Accusations of wrecking against the best Stakhanovites indicate once more that wrecking was in fact a myth, which was rooted in a bevy of deficiencies and inconsistencies and the lack of know-how of managers of industry with marginal expertise who occupied the key positions in the Communist Party and the Soviet economy. Furthermore, as we saw, in a majority of the cases in which people were accused of wrecking, problems had been caused by the low skill level of workers, by the extraordinary work pace demanded by administrators, and by run-of-the-mill negligence.

Elena N. Gnatovskaya is candidate of sciences (Kandidat naukj and Professor, Department of Philosophy and social-humanitarian disciplines, at the Primorye State Agricultural Academy (Russian Federation). Alexander A. Kim is a Visiting Scholar, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. His e-mail address is This article has been translated from the original Russian by Kees Boterbloem.

(1.) The movement derived its name from collier Aleksei Stakhanov (1906-77), who in 1935 during one shift in his mine in the Donbas managed to dig up a record-breaking amount of coal (see for more, for example, R.W. Davies and O.V. Khlevniuk, "Stakhanovism and the Soviet Economy," Europe-Asia Studies 6, 2002, 867-903; and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988).

(2.) N.B. Arnautov, "Obraz vrcditelia v gazcte 'Pravda' (dekabr' 1034--dekabr' 1938)," Vestnik Novosibirskogo gosudarstvemiogo universiteta, series Istoriia, filologiia, vol. 9, no. 1, 2010, 292-8:295.

(3.) "Materialy fevral'sko-martovskogo plenuma TsK VKP(b)," Voprosy istorii 9, 1993, 3-33: 31.

(4.) S.P. Postnikov and M.A. Fel'dman, Sotsiokul'turnyi oblik promyshlennykh rabochikb Urala (1900-1941), Ekaterinburg: Institute of History and Archeology of the Urals Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2006, 173.

(5.) Chzhun Be Chzho, "Stakhanovskoe dvizhenie o soverskie profsoiuzy v 1935-1936 gg.," Voprosy istorii 12, 2014, 51-68: 54.

(6.) S. Shattenberg, lnzhenery Stalina: Zbiz' mezhdu tekhnikoi i terrorom v 1930-e gody, Moscow: Rosspen, 2011; Postnikov, Fel'dman, Sotsiokul'turnyi oblik.

(7.) See R. Devis and O.V. Khlevniuk, "Vtoraia piatiletka: Mekhanizm smeny ekonomicheskoi politiki," available at: = 5748#, accessed 15.07.2015.

(8.) N.B. Arnautov, "Ideologiia 'stakhanovskogo dvizheniia' v sovetskogo politicheskoi propagande (po materialam tsentral'noi periodicheskoi pechad), Istoricheskoe issledovaniia v Sibiri:problemy iperspektivy, Novosibirsk: Parallel', 2009, 223-230.

(9.) A.V. Gaidamakin, "Sotsiokul'turnye aspekty sovetskoi kontseptsii zheleznodorozhnogo transporta," Vestnik Omskogo universiteta 2, 2012, 298-307.

(10.) Russian State Archive of the Khabarovsk Region (GAKhK), fond P.78, opts' 1, delo 3, list 41. [from here indicated as P.78/1/3, 1.41],

(11.) O.P. Elantseva, L.I. Medvedeva, and S.P. Chuikova, "DVZhD v 1930-e-gg.," in V.F. Burkova, V.F. Zuev, eds, Dal'nevostochnaia magistral' Rossii, Khabarovsk: Chastnaia kollektsiia, 1997, 76-83:78.

(12.) K. Teriama, "Voenizatsiia (militarizatsiia) zheleznykh dorog na Dal'nem Vostoke SSSR (1931-1934 gg.)," GumanitarnyenaukivSiberia, 1999, 35-39: 35.

(13.) N.G. Kulinich, Pousedneimaia kul'tura gorozhan sovetskogo Dal'nego Vostoka v 1920-30-e gg., Khabarovsk: Izdatel'stvoTikhookeanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 2010, 82.

(14.) GAKbK, P.78/1/3, 1.41.

(15.) GAKbK, P.78/1/33, 1.40.

(16.) GAKbK, P.78/1/43, 1.10.

(17.) E.E. Aurilene and Tsybin, Mech proletarskoi diktatury: Dal'nevostochnye organy GPU-OGPU v bor'be za ekonamicheskuiu bezopasnost' SSSR, Khabarovsk: Chastnaia kollekstiia, 2010. A.V. Sergievskii was arrested and convicted twice for the same case, in 1930 and 1931. His final sentence of ten years corrective labor was rendered by the OGPU Collegium on 18 August 1931.

(18.) Ibid. Fuzik and Bashlykov were sentenced to death, which the Special Board of the OGPU for the Far Eastern Region commuted to ten years of corrective-labor camp on 5 May 1933.

(19.) Russian State Archive of the Maritime Region (GAPK), P. 11/1/39, 1.87.

(20.) GAPK P.5/1/32, 1.136 (verso).

(21.) GAPK P.5/1/32, 1.140.

(22.) GAPK P.3/1/445, 1.44.

(23.) Ibid.

(24.) GAPK P.3/1/490, 1.66.

(25.) GAPK P.1/1/203, 1.18.

(26.) GAPK P.1/1/203, 1.46.

(27.) Ibid.

(28.) GAPK P.1/1/203, 1.86(verso).

(29.) GAPK P.1/1/203, 1.89(verso).

(30.) GAPK P.1/1/42, 1.100.

(31.) GAPK P.86/1/37, 1.50(verso).

(32.) GAPK P.86/1/26, l.29(verso).

(33.) Ibid.

(34.) GAPK P.86/1/26, 1.29.

(35.) GAKhK P.78/1/556, 1.28.

(36.) M.A. Koval'chuk, Istoricheskii opyt' formirovaniia transportnoi otrasli Dal'nego Vostoka Rossii (70-egg. XX v.-iiun 1941), Khabarovsk: Chastnaia kollektsiia, 2003, 121.

(37.) GAPK P.86/1/34, 1.92.

(38.) Ibid.

(39.) CAKhK P.113/1/74, 1.7. Artur Andreevich Zavistovskii was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court in a assize session of 20 June 1937, convicted of crimes defined in articles 58-la, 58-8, 58-9, and 58-11 of the Russian Soviet Federation's criminal code. He has since [either in the 1950s after Stalin's death or in the 1980s or 1990s, trans.] been rehabilitated.

(40.) "Materialy fevral'sko-martovskogo plenuma," 5.

(41.) GAPK P.86/1/26, 1.55.

(42.) Ibid.

(43.) GAPK P.1/1/557, 1.3 (verso).

(44.) GAPK P.82/1/49, 1.9.

(45.) GAPK P.82/1/21, 1.1(verso).

(46.) GAPK P.82/1/49, 1.9.

(47.) GAKbK P.78/1/285, 1.59.

(48.) Ibid.

(49.) Ibid.

(50.) GAKbK P.78/1/667, 1.110.

(51.) Ibid.

(52.) GAPK P.86/1/61, 1.111.

(53.) GAPK P.86/1/36, 11.1-2.

(54.) GAPK P.1/1/557, 1.31.

(55.) GAPK P.82/1/6, 1.50.

(56.) GAPK P.1/1/557, 1.52.

(57.) GAPK P.1/1/557, 1.78.

(58.) GAPK P.1/1/557, 1.81.

(59.) GAKbK, P.78/1/69, 1.62.

(60.) Ibid.

(61.) GAPK P.86/1/25, passim.

(62.) GAPK P.1/1/557, 1.97.

(63.) For more on him, see E.A. Rees, Iron Lazar: A Political Biography of Lazar Kaganovich, London: Anthem Press, 2012.

(64.) "Materialy fevral'sko-martovskogo plenuma," 24.

(65.) Ibid.

(66.) Ibid.

(67.) Ibid.

(68.) GAKhK, P.78/1/503, 1.74.

(69.) Aleksandr Suturin, Delo kraevogo mashstaba: O zhertvakb stalinskogo bezzakoniia na Dal'nem Vostoke, Khabarovsk: Khabarovskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1991,56.

(70.) Ibid.

(71.) "Materialy fevral'sko-martovskogo plenuma," 32.

(72.) GAKbK, P.78/1/507, 1.130.

(73.) GAPK P.82/1/23, 11.3 and 25.

(74.) GAKhK, P.78/1/559, 1.11.

(75.) Ibid.

(76.) GAPK P.1/1/675, 1.24.

(77.) Ibid.

(78.) GAPK P.56/1/125, 11.5 and 78.

(79.) GAPK P.56/1/111, 1.5.

(80.) GAPK P.86/1/52, 1.82.

(81.) GAPK P.1/1/674, 1.44.

(82.) N. Dubinina, "Tragediia lichnosti," Dal'nii Vostok 7, 1989, 128-136: 132.

(83.) Suturin, Delo kraevogo mashstaba, 50.

(84.) GAKbK P.78/1/503, 1.74.

(85.) GAPK P.86/1/52, 1.15.

(86.) GAPK P.82/1/26, 1.41.

(87.) Ibid.

(88.) GAPK P.82/1/26, 1.43.

(89.) Ibid.

(90.) "Khetagurovki" were female mainly participants in the Khetagurov movement. V.S. Khetagurova (Zarubina; 1914-92) was a deputy in the USSR Supreme Soviet (the official Soviet legislature, trans.) who in 1930 called on girls in all of the Soviet Union to go to the Far East in order to help the region advance. In those days there were relatively few women in the Far East, which is why all Soviet mass media supported this call. Having girls work alongside men in enterprises would improve morals and motivation of male workers. Even if organizing this migration proved complicated, more than 60,000 girls initially responded to Khetagurova's call.

(91.) GAKbK 1155/1/1, 1.18.

(92.) GAKhK P.78/1/87, 1.79.

(93.) Elantseva, Medvedeva, and Chuikova, "DVZhD," 206.

(94.) GAPK P.56/1/125, 1.5.

(95.) Ibid.

(96.) Ibid.

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Date:Jun 22, 2017
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