The Movement That Dare Not Speak Its Name: The Return of Left Nationalism/Internationalism.
Before France pulled out of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), thus killing the deal, it issued the Lalumiere Report. The report argued that the MAI "marks a step in international economic negotiations. For the first time, we are witnessing the emergence of a 'global civil society' represented by non-government organizations, which are often active in several countries and communicate across borders. This is no doubt an irreversible change." After making this bold claim, the report does a volte-face and argues that the main basis for civil society's objections to globalization is the threat to national sovereignty.  Paul Hawken, writing about the World Trade Organization (WTO) battle in Seattle sixteen months later, makes a similar point:
Those who marched and protested opposed the tyrannies of globalization, uniformity, and corporatization, but they did not necessarily oppose internationalization of trade.... Globalization refers to a world in which capital and goods move at will without the rule of individual nations.... Nations do provide, where democracies prevail, a means for people to set their own policy.... Globalization supplants the nation, the state, the region, and the village. While eliminating nationalism is indeed a good idea, the elimination of sovereignty is not. 
If we combine the French formulation and the Hawken formulation, then the aim of global civil society is to defend national sovereignty without nationalist attachments. These are apparently contradictory propositions. But upon closer examination, it becomes clear that they are, rather, convoluted attempts to avoid the "nationalist" label, because of its unfortunate association with racism. Many left-wing intellectuals call for popular sovereignty and social solidarity (that others would call nationalism/international ism) while at the same time condemning all forms of nationalism. Look at the lengths Chantal Mouffe goes to avoid labeling her radical democracy strategy "civic nationalism":
While it is important to defend the widest possible pluralism in many areas--culture, religion, morality--we must also accept that our participation as citizens in the political association can not be located on the same level as our other insertions in social relations. To recover citizenship as a strong form of political identification presupposes our allegiance to the principles of modern democracy and the commitment to defend its key institutions. Antagonistic principles of legitimacy cannot coexist within one single political association; to accept pluralism at that level automatically entails the [disappearance] of the state as a political reality. 
Identification; allegiance; the state; the indivisibility of political association: such terms come out of the French Revolution, the first popular expression of civic nationalism. But instead of paying her debts to this tradition, Mouffe writes a paragraph to avoid the nationalist label. For much of the Left today, positive nationalism is a term that dare not speak its name.
In the past fifteen years, there has been a flowering of literature on rethinking nations and nationalisms. In philosophy, a de bate has opened on the compatibility between liberal (or social liberal) nationalism and cosmopolitanism.  But there has been little exploration from a historical perspective of the antiglobalism potential of left nationalism. The sorts of nationalisms I am referring to involve attachments to and support for the (relative) sovereignty of the political community to which one belongs. Since nationalisms get most of their content through the associations they keep,  Left nationalisms are those that seek deep democratic transformation of global corporate capitalism through their conjunctions with anticolonial, socialist, feminist, ecological, or antiracist movements. Primarily they work at the level of the nation, the state, and through international solidarity ties with similar movements abroad for national and popular sovereignty.
In this article,  I argue that the retrieval of left-wing nationalism is essential in the current campaign for popular sovereignty and against corporate globalism. I first look at how left globalism and left localism tend to crowd out left nationalism. Then I explore the New Right's assaults against deep democracy and national sovereignty and probe why many in the Left fail to defend the need for strong citizen commitment to the national polity and its sovereignty. The heart of the article is a historical analysis and critique of civic and ethnocultural nationalisms and an evaluation of their positive and negative features. A historical section on English-speaking Canada examines how, contrary to much European experience, recent nationalisms and racism have been opposing tendencies. I argue that the relative immobility of labor provides a class base for most wage earners and peasants to oppose neoliberal globalism and support positive nationalisms. Racist nationalisms are best resisted, I argue, not with detached cosmopolitanism, but with positive nationalisms that are committed to inter-national, people-to-people solidarity. The article concludes with a discussion of the role of left-wing nationalism, especially in English-speaking Canada, in defeating the MAI.
Right-wing and Left-wing Globalism
Neoliberal globalism is not the same as globalization. It is an ism an ideology and a regime of governance. Whereas globalization includes rapid technological and cultural changes, more or less new, globalism is an ideological spin about governing a more tightly integrated world economy, along neoliberal principles. Several terms are used to describe the New Right mantra of cutting public expenditures, balancing budgets, lowering corporate taxes, deregulating businesses, encouraging foreign ownership and control, the selling off of public enterprises, and securing private property monopolies under law--terms such as the Washington consensus or the Wall Street Treasury complex.  The intent of the Washington consensus is to transfer power from governments and non-elite people to corporations and the rich--that is, entities that are constructing a single set of international rules to replace the many bilateral, regional, and multilateral investment treaties.
Globalism and globalization are said to do contradictory things simultaneously. Power has shifted up from the national to the supranational level and down to regional and local levels.  Power has also moved sideways from the public sphere to the "unaccountable and tyrannical" corporate sector, as Noam Chomsky puts it.  Critics on the left worry about the democratic and egalitarian implications of these trends, but many inadvertently boost the neoliberal agenda by either ignoring or attacking all forms of nationalism. Through neglect or opposition, they undermine the potential for nationally based, anti-imperialist resistance to the Washington consensus.
Most recent discussion of democratic alternatives to global corporate rule fall into two tendencies that I call "left globalism" and "left localism," which for analytical purposes I draw as ideal types. These tendencies appear to be opposites but are often different sides of the same coin. It is not my attention here to critique these tendencies in depth. My goal is to make the case that, while important, they both neglect the national level.
Left localists see the main benefits of globalization as opening up new spaces for local actors. "Think globally, act locally" is the overused catchphrase. Warren Magnusson sees globalization as an opportunity to weaken the state and empower social movements: "The political space of the municipality is much more akin to the political space of the world in which we live than is the artificial construct of the state."  Those left localists who want to turn to new forms of barter and locally based currencies see the development of the local as breaking down corporate globalization by thousands of acts of secession around the globe.  You might call it postmodern neofeudalism, with a multitude of jurisdictions and cross-connecting loyalties, but where Enlightenment goals of equality and democracy prevail.
Left globalists, on the other hand, accept that economic globalization is inevitable. Although fraught with danger, it is desirable because it presents opportunities for the establishment of cosmopolitan, democratic governance that can counter the current resurgence of right-wing politics, the intensification of racism, and the spread of ethnic and political separatism. As Todd Gitlin argues, Marx was the original left globalist who, too quickly, identified nationalisms with the bourgeois state. The universality of capital will lead to the universality of labor. The revolutionary communist's role, no matter his origins, was to overcome his nation and class. "A revolutionary Communist prefigured the working men of the future, who 'have no country' ... the proletariat was the Communist's nation," writes Gitlin. "Like the emigre Marx, he was a denationalized world citizen." 
Communists in Europe were an important strand of left cosmopolitanism, which still carries some residues in left-wing thought today. Because they were reductionist about nationalism, they continually underestimated its strength.  Eric Hobsbawm's 1991 Nations and Nationalism is part of this tradition. Writing at the time of the nationalist explosions in Eastern Europe that ended communist rule, Hobsbawm blithely stated that the post-1918 era was the first and only time the map of Europe was redrawn according to the principle of nationality. In the new supranational restructuring, he added, "nations and nationalisms will play only subordinate, and often rather minor roles."  This was a case of history overtaking the historian as he wrote.
Many social-democrats in Europe are cosmopolitan antinationalists because of reactions against fascism and the horrors of racist nationalism, revived in today's far Right in Europe. Another strand in social-democratic cosmopolitanism is the European strategy to counter the deregulation that freed capital from national control, by collaborating across borders and fostering a European consciousness to reinstate Keynesian full-employment policies or pre vent "social dumping."  David Held hopes that the nation-state will "wither away," in the sense that it would be but one focus of power and authority.  Left globalists argue that it makes sense to globalize or continentalize democratic structures and civil society to keep transnational corporations in check.
Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism
Kant coined the word cosmopolitan to mean a citizen of the world who has no state or national attachments. I use the word in Kant's sense, which has been updated by neoliberal globalists to mean one-worlder cosmopolitanism. But some use the term cosmopolitanism in ways that are compatible with left nationalism. Postcolonial cultural studies, which emerged from a disenchantment with nationalism, especially in India, has recast the older definition. Bruce Robbins and Pheng Cheah give cosmopolitanism an almost opposite meaning to Kant's, one that embraces multiple belonging, particularity, and attachment to collectivities. Robbins sees the new cosmopolitanism as compatible with nationalism. Cheah sees it as an alternative.
"New nationalists" in philosophy argue that liberal nationalism is compatible with some forms of cosmopolitanism. Jocelyne Couture distinguishes between moral and legal cosmopolitanism. Both stress allegiance to the worldwide community of humans, but the former endorse the moral values of autonomy and equality, while the latter design legal and political institutions in which nation states or multination states cease to play a central role. 
Postcolonial theorists are unlikely to dislodge the dominant, neoliberal version of globalization to mean cosmopolitanism in Kant's sense. That is the whole point of globalization talk--to pro mote national disintegration in order to achieve corporate global reintegration. As Herman Daly argues, the nation and international federations of nations must not be sacrificed to the ideal of "'globalization,' which, when examined, turns out to be unfettered individualism for corporations on a global scale."  Detaching citizens from their home political community fits perfectly with the agenda of corporate globalizers.
Some left globalists replace the term internationalism with transnationalism. In their hands, transnationalism, cultural hybridization, and global consciousness mean solidarity ties, intercultural under standing, and respect for diversity at the citizen level.  These words are almost synonyms for internationalism. But there is a crucial difference. Transnationalism wipes out the national part of internationalism. Held is right that people maintain several identities, including those of national citizenship and belonging to all humanity, and have no need to choose one above the other. But transnationalism involves non-elite people identifying as "citizens of the world" without reference to their nation or country that is to say, becoming people who have a cosmopolitan consciousness of having a home everywhere and nowhere. The basic distinction I make is between national and inter-national, on one side, and transnational, one-worlder cosmopolitanism and globalism, on the other. I doubt that millions will sing an ode to transnationalism the way they did to the "Internationale."
Left globalists and left localists  have more similarities than differences. Anthony Giddens sees globalization and localization in a dialectical process in reshaping time and space.  Roland Robertson used glocalization (originally a Japanese business-jargon word) to mean how globalization involves the creation and incorporation of locality.  The point of agreement between left globalists and left localists is their analysis that state sovereignty is eroding, combined with their indifference or opposition to nationalisms. To avert wars, racism, and national prejudices, they want to limit the sovereignty that allows states to deprive their citizens of human rights.  Left globalists and Left localists see the decline of national sovereignty as opening spaces for intense, participatory democracy at local levels. Both tendencies propose essential strategies to multifaceted efforts to combat corporate globalism. But by accepting corporate globalizers' attacks on all forms of nationalism and attempts to weaken national sovereignty, they inadvertently give up on rooted national solidarities, which can act as mediators between the local and the global. 
Neither left globalism nor left localism can mount effective resistance on its own or in combination. Citizen-based democracy requires the long-term mobilization of tens of millions, and this is unlikely at the level of six billion people. Most mass mobilizations remain national, subnational, or local. Even if we achieved Held's model of global governance through a strengthened United Nations and an international democratic assembly rather than through US domination, it would be by representatives even farther removed from the people than national governments. For more democratic global governance, David Held and Kevin Danaher advocate the use of global referenda, a formula the moneyed would surely use to manipulate the divided and unorganized.  Left globalists have yet to convincingly articulate how global citizens democracy would work.
On the other hand, local governments and local economies are too small to stand up to the massive blackmail power of the transnationals and speculators. As Hobsbawm notes, "the most convenient world for multinational giants is one populated by dwarf states or no states at a11."  It may be possible to achieve a partial move away from consumer culture, but it is farfetched to hope that in isolation from other strategies a myriad of local secessions will be so complete and widespread that they will break down world capitalism.  It is a pipe dream that ignores state capacity for repression or transformation.
The state is not the only place where rooted communities can achieve deep democracy. But, while recognizing differential capacities amongst peripheral and core countries, the state is a more equal adversary of transnational capitalism than any other institution. The crucial battle is whether citizens will succeed in turning corporate-oriented states into citizen-oriented states. Without the solidarity of positive nationalism, the state's potential role as regulator of capital and provider of public services is more likely to become a servant of transnational capital.
States in the South have less autonomy than core states. They lack the resources to gain legitimacy by providing public services and alleviating poverty. As a result, many base state power on one group, leading to divisive ethnic tensions. Rooted communities like the Zapatistas have little choice but to seek support at national and international levels, beyond their indigenous base. 
Most existing countries are ethnically and racially diverse and are ideal sites for both confronting corporate rule and building bridges across ethnic and cultural diversities.  Instead of Daniel Bell's dictum that the nation-state is becoming "too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life,"  in most cases, countries are big enough to challenge global corporate power, but small enough to have the potential for effective, bottom-up democracy.
The 1998-1999 financial crises led to the first breaks from neo liberal orthodoxy in East Asia, Russia, and even in Washington Consensus institutions.  Currency and capital controls and other forms of economic nationalism are returning,  signaling the possibility of a paradigm shift and the return of left nationalisms.
Dual Enemies: Democracy and Nationalism
The shift in power away from nations was not inevitable. The United States has worked toward this end in many parts of the world. At a Western Hemisphere conference in 1945, Chomsky notes, the United States was deeply concerned with "the philosophy of the new nationalism" that was spreading across Latin America and the world. That philosophy, according to US internal records, now available, aimed to bring about a wider distribution of wealth and raise the living standards of the masses. "Radical" or "economic nationalism" operated on the heretical principle that the first beneficiaries of a country's resources are the people of that country rather than US and other foreign investors, plus locally allied elites. The US view prevailed and the conference called for an end to economic nationalism in all its forms. Chomsky concludes that in the cruel and bloody half century since, these remain central themes. 
Similar concerns reappeared in the early 1970s. After emancipation from colonial rule, national liberation movements con fronted the "neoimperialism" of multinational corporations. Citizens were mobilized by appeals to democracy and nationalisms, couched in anti-Western or anti-United States discourses. In Canada, the Waffle movement for an Independent Socialist Canada, the Committee for an Independent Canada, and the New Democratic Party urged the takeover of foreign-owned oil and potash companies and campaigned against "corporate welfare bums."  Such campaigns in the Third World, Europe, and Canada resulted in 336 takeovers of transnationals during the first half of the 1970s. 
Corporate leaders and bankers were alarmed at the wave of activities that were deglobalizing the transnationals. They counterattacked, founding many New Right organizations, such as the Trilateral Commission, set up in 1973 by David Rockefeller, Zbigniew Brezinski, and other "eminent private citizens" drawn from transnationals, banking, government, academia, media, and conservative labor, to create ruling-class partnerships in North America, Western Europe, and Japan.  Trilateralists decried an "excess of democracy" in which "the democratic spirit is egalitarian, individualistic, populist and impatient with the distinctions of class and rank."  Nationalism was the other target. Rockefeller called for "a massive public relations campaign" to explain the necessity for the "withering of the nation-state"--exactly the phrase used by David Held two decades later.  Peter Drucker wanted to "defang the nationalist monster." George Ball, former US undersecretary of state, declared the multinational corporation "ahead of, and in conflict with existing political organizations represented by the nation states."  Recent talk about the "borderless world," the "end of nations and nationalisms," and the "inevitability of globalization" shows the effects of these campaigns, even on the Left. Nor have attacks on national sovereignty subsided. In 1996, Lawrence Summers, US secretary of the treasury, disparaged all critics of Washington's "globalist economic policy" as "separatists." 
The Left Shares Antinationalism with the New Right
Now is a difficult time to write positively about nationalisms. Aijaz Ahmad notes that the prominent nationalisms of the fourth quarter of the twentieth century were narrowly ethnic, and often racist and vicious, leading the Left to dismiss nationalisms as irrational, masculinist, Western, and reactionary. This contrasts with the period from 1950 to 1975, when national liberation was seen as essential in breaking from colonial and neocolonial rule and in making socialist societies.  Ironically, left-wing critiques of nationalisms as reactionary fit closely with New Right discourses that deified Adam Smith's antinationalist critique of mercantilism. Free trade was "directed precisely against [the] concept of national economic development," writes Hobsbawm. Economic theory was based on the individual enterprise and world market and there was "no place for the nation, or any collectivity larger than the firm." 
Today economic nationalism is denounced almost everywhere by the mainstream New Right as xenophobic, backward-looking, and opposed to the invigorating winds of technological advance and global competition.  Liberal-democratic procedures may be the norm, but rather than citizens and wage earners rooted in egalitarian national communities, people are now portrayed as global consumers, investors and stakeholders acting as individuals in the private market. In denying the self-determination of political communities, the New Right has appropriated the Left's language. Revolution, rights, and internationalism now serve to open borders to global capital. All this is bewildering for the Left, who from the 1880s to the 1970s believed that, despite temporary setbacks, history was on their side. No longer. The New Right captured the future, castigating the Left as the last fearful defenders of the status quo. Left postmodernists assume qualitative breaks from the past, throwing history into the dustbin.
Threats to democracy used to come from unabashed antidemocrats such as fascists, royalists, and military juntas. Communists had democratic pretensions, belied by vanguardism. Though by no means dead, especially in the Third World land the revived racist Right in Europe), these incarnations waned in the 1990s. Antidemocratic tendencies may strengthen under conditions of world depression and the defeat of the moderate Right in Europe. But the main threat to deep democracy comes from neoliberals who advocate freeing transnationals from obligations to democratic polities. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States chant "democracy" mantras even as they cover up authoritarian practices. Transnationals, financiers, and money traders are the main enemies of democracy, substituting the discipline of the "market" for the sovereignty of nations. 
The Left has long believed that "progress" will sweep aside nationalisms. The "Communist Manifesto" was lyrical about what we now call globalization: change a few discordant words and sections of it sound like contemporary New Right liberalism: 
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.... The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. 
Many current left-wing intellectuals have similar views. Like Marx, they are usually emigres from the locales, if not always the countries, where they grew up. They are personally and psychologically antinationalist. Cosmopolitanism has positive connotations such as attachment to the world community of humans, sophistication, travel, and freedom from parochial prejudices, but it can also mean freedom from national attachments. If detached from wage earners and peasant communities of place, cosmopolites can stand in the way of anti-imperialist nationalisms.
Immobile Labor: The Class Basis for Left Nationalism
That capitalists are the true globalists became evident as corporations broke ties to place and gained citizenlike rights of entry and nondiscrimination clauses in "trade" agreements. In the WTO, corporations gained nationlike rights, including the right to sue foreign governments. Hot money evades taxes and finds anonymity in offshore banking.
If capital is increasingly mobile across borders, labor is not. International migration has never exceeded, relatively, the "great migration" from Europe from the 1880s to 1914.  Labor mobility is a basic characteristic of capitalism, and much of it has been coerced: indentured workers, slaves, prison labor, and political and economic refugees. People more readily emigrate to reunite with family already abroad, but most wage earners do not want to leave their country of origin permanently; that is, if--and this is a big if--home is safe, democratic, and provides decent work. Home and community have a definite place, cherished in nonmarket attachments.
Most nationalisms and democracy are rooted in territorial communities, cultures of particularity, and commonwealths of immobile wage earners. Bottom-up democracy is contingent on vibrant communities where there are common memories of citizens' struggles and gains against national and local power structures. Civil societies, independent of the state and of the transnationals, are essential to the democratic practice of citizens over rulers.  So are antiracism and international ties of social movements. But it is naive to think that a united global civil society of six billion people can act in concert to control corporations. A more realistic strategy is to deglobalize and break up transnationals into parts --parts that would be controlled by democratic communities, such as Marx's "associated producers" or local subnational or national governments.
With the exception of the US entertainment industry, most popular cultures are not easily translated, coordinated, or moved across borders. In contrast, transnationals have unique corporate cultures but, from New York to Santiago to Beijing, speak the same language of profits. Corporations need active state protection for the maintenance of property rights and stable market conditions, but these need not come from a "home" state. For corporations to be basically stateless may be an advantage;  for a growing number of refugees, it is a nightmare.
With the United States as the world's only hegemon, US state power, popular US nationalism, and globalization discourse fit fairly harmoniously. Stephen Gill argues that the United States is the least likely to submit to "the new constitutionalism," the at tempt to make transnational liberalism the sole model of future development.  The problem is not capitalist ideology but external constraints on domestic policies that the United States insists be applied systematically to others, but not to themselves. Nationalisms were the voices of the powerful; now they are more often popular voices raised against the powerful. This is especially true in Western countries,  where official state nationalisms are becoming relics of the past. Rather than use bourgeois nationalism against international socialism, the New Right now employs the language of globalization and the market against unions, sovereignty, and political "barriers" aimed at promoting equality and social justice. As states abandon social-security and full-employment roles, diverse nationalisms return to their roots as voices of non-elites. This was evident in the anti-free trade and anti-EU campaigns in Canada, Sweden, and Norway. 
As in other populist expressions, nationalist voices range from the acutely reactionary, as in Iran, to inclusive and transformative. The Zapatistas are a national liberation front of indigenous groups in Chiapas who let other Mexicans and foreigners living abroad vote on Zapatista demands.  Assumptions about nationalisms necessarily contradicting internationalism must be rethought.
Today's Lefts are fractured among "new" and "old" Movements, parties, and visions. There is a need to find common ground. To confront the power of the transnationals successfully, the Lefts must be able to encompass class and nonclass movements and show they can represent the whole political community better than the elites. There are precedents for such positive nationalisms.  The Left reached its zenith in the West during World War II, when its program was associated with internationalist nationalisms. Few saw a contradiction between their patriotism and commitment to international socialism. Whereas, as Hobsbawm writes, "a part of numerous ruling classes appeared to opt for an international political alignment of the right in support of fascism,"  the Left effectively branded them "traitors" to the nation. Left parties from British Labour to Communist resistance movements in France, Italy, and Yugoslavia took up the cause of antifascist patriotisms and combined them with appeals for social transformation. They fought for "France" or "Norway" against the "Quislings" who collaborated with international fascism and official racism. Hobsbawm characterizes antifascist patriotism as the triumph of a kind of Left internationalism, fought around essentially domestic issues reflecting class as much as a national dimension.
Today the New Right attacks democracy on two levels. First, there is a widespread assault on public life because of its emphasis on equality, universal citizen rights, and collective decision making. If health care, education, crown corporations, and public services are turned over to the private sector, they are no longer subject to the egalitarian and collective ethos of democracy. Second, by replacing country sovereignty with corporate sovereignty, the demands of most citizens cannot be met.
Many issues keep the various Lefts apart, but several others bring them together. The strongest is the common threat from the transnationals' globalism agenda that focuses on culture as much as on production. Making common cause against a common enemy is the basis for what I call "negative coalitions." More difficult are making "positive coalitions" around an alternative way to run society. But some of the grounds for a positive coalition are at hand. Most Left groups want to expand the boundaries of the public sphere. National and regional identities facilitate understandings and alliances among those sharing a political culture. If nationalisms are to again serve transformative ends, we must examine the main traditions to determine helpful and harmful elements. The article now turns to this task.
Civic vs. Ethnic Nationalism Reconsidered
In 1882, Ernest Renan distinguished between race and nation. Nation was a term arising out of the French Revolution signifying a voluntary democratic community based on a "daily plebiscite," whereas race is a chimera. There is no pure race.  F. Meinecke made a similar distinction between "political" and "cultural" nations. In favoring the latter, he expressed the traditional German view that a "natural core based on blood relationship must be pre sent in a nation" and "only on this basis can a rich and unique intellectual community" develop.  Today, the distinction is usually made as "civic" versus "ethnic," or "ethnocultural," nationalism. Civic nationalisms have usually been associated with the Left,  ethnocultural nationalisms with the Right.
Modern nationalisms are children of the Enlightenment. Anthony Smith uses the term ethnie to describe premodern communities where people shared a distinctive culture, had a historical sense of community associated with a specific territory, and external relations with outsiders.  But they were not nations with nationalist ideologies; they were undemocratic and economically unintegrated; kingdoms, not ethnies, were self-governing.  Although some modern nationalisms built upon myths reinterpreted from ancient ethnies, modern nationalisms break from the past. It took Enlightenment ideals to conceive that sovereignty should be held by the people rather than hereditary rulers. "Popular sovereignty" and "independence" of the people "whatever the number of individuals who compose it and the extent of territory it occupies," as the Parisian sansculottes proclaimed in 1795,  provided dominant conception of nationalisms in the West. This conception has been variously referred to as "civic-national," "populist-democratic," "patriotism," "state-nation" (as distinct from nation-state), "pluralist," and "territorial" nationalism. 
French and the Creole (white settler) nationalisms of the Americas were the founding civic nationalisms in the late 1700s and early 1800s, while in Germany and eastern Europe, ethnocultural nationalisms rose from the 1830s.  Civic nations based membership on territorial birth and conceived themselves as countries of immigration, restricted by race. Foreigners were admitted and naturalized on the assumption that their descendants would be culturally assimilated by birth, upbringing on the soil, and socialization in schools and by the army. In contrast, ethnocultural nations based membership on descent. They assumed that national culture was transmitted primarily through the family and blood.  Foreigners were excluded from the nation because they could not be assimilated.
Hobsbawm notes that socialist and nationalist appeals were not mutually exclusive:
"Nation" and "class" were not readily separable. If we accept that class consciousness in practice had a civic-national dimension, and civic-national or ethnic consciousness had social dimensions, then it is likely that the radicalization of the working classes in the first post-war Europe may have reinforced their potential national consciousness. 
Civic nationalisms were an integral part of contests for equality, solidarity, and democracy.
On the other hand, until the 1848 revolutions in Europe showed that the democratic tide could not be stopped, the Right resisted the idea of the nation as the people. But the independent emergence of ethnocultural nationalisms gave the Right the opportunity to turn a different kind of nationalism to their political advantage. Ethnocultural nationalisms developed among nondominant ethnic communities and those without a state. In their beginnings, according to Miroslav Hroch, these nationalist movements were led by a few in tellectuals in search of a "national culture based on the local language," "the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration," and "the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group."  Only later did these movements demand an independent state to coincide with ethnocultural boundaries. Once popular, these movements were often incorporated into official nationalisms.  Although civic nationalisms emerged first, modern ethnocultural nationalisms are often assumed to be the dominant or natural form. 
Observers today tend to view ethnocultural nationalisms negatively and civic nationalisms positively. But nationalisms cannot be neatly evaluated as "civic good, ethnic bad." Every nationalism is unique, continually evolving, and gets much of its content by association with other movements. Civic nationalisms have negative characteristics and not all ethnocultural nationalisms are negative in all respects. I present ideal types to evaluate existing nationalisms. These dimensions are similar to Joseph Carens's principles of citizenship based on ideals of consent, participation, toleration, and respect for diversity. 
First, how inclusive are nationalisms? There is a built-in contradiction between current inhabitants (all long-term residents) and would-be inhabitants (all desiring to live there). All states restrict who can enter and who has full rights.  Stateless nations have informal membership rules. However, within these parameters there are great differences. How open are they to in-migration and how color blind are they? Do nations base membership/citizenship on presumed descent or long-term residency? Are these issues decided by ideology or economic pressures for in-migration? Second, how much respect is there, in law and in practice, for "deep diversity"?  This question may revolve around the strength of minority nationalisms rather than ideology. Are unity and conformity compulsory and in which areas of social-political life? Are they nation-states or multination states? If the latter, what collective rights and recognition do minority nations have? Do they have the right to secede? Third, how deeply democratic are they? Fourth, are they expansionist, sovereignty seeking, or neither? Do they respect the self-determination of other nations? Fifth, are they inward-looking or inter-nationalist in the antifascist sense?
I view as positive nationalisms that come closest to inclusiveness, embracing deep diversity, being substantively democratic, refraining from expansionism, and supporting inter-nationalism. Negative nationalisms are closer to the opposite on these dimensions.
The Contradictory Legacy of Civic Nationalism
Civic nationalists usually saw no contradiction between love of country and love for all humanity. In the French and American (US) revolutions, popular sovereignty, patriotism, and internationalism were seen to go together. But their revolutionary civic nationalisms should not be romanticized. First, equality and political rights were restricted to propertied, white, adult males. Women, slaves, minorities, and, usually, proletarians were excluded. Edward Said notes that Western national identities arose in conjunction with classical European imperialism. National identities were constructed so that races and languages were placed hierarchically, with imperial powers at the top.  Similarly, Creole nationalisms in Latin America and the US South were based as much on white settlers maintaining property rights over conquered and enslaved peoples as about independence from their European-born rulers for whites born in the Western Hemisphere. 
Second, the idea of the nation as "one and indivisible" led to oppression of internal minority nations, minority political views, and to cultural assimilation. Post-Revolution France waged a war against its many languages, disparagingly called patois, which the state considered "remnants of the barbarism of past ages." As late as 1911, it was said that "for peasants and workers, the mother tongue is patois, the foreign speech is French."  In the United States, pressures to conform were more society based. Non-Protestants and those who clung to ancient prejudices or European loyalties were not considered full Americans.  "The American revolutionary nation built its original ideals on a double repression," argues Etienne Balibar, "that of the extermination of the Amerindian 'natives' and that of the difference between free 'white' men and 'black' slaves."  The third repression was that of women.
Third, French and US civic nationalisms quickly turned into imperialist expansion. By associating their republics with the cause of world freedom, they justified subjugating foreign nations and negating their self-determination. M. Guiral notes that
Jacobinism leads naturally to an affirmation of superiority, not according to ethnic characteristics but because the French people as a group is the bearer of a message that Napoleon called the noble idea of civilization. 
"Manifest destiny" emerged from the Protestant sense the United States' divine mission,  justifying the removal of Amerindians and the seizing of half of Mexico to make way for the liberty of white settlers. Universalist declarations such as the "Rights of Man" or "we are the world" abound, but the assumption that France's or the United States' peculiar national experiences apply to all humanity does not respect other cultures.
The founding civic nationalisms also harbored "nativist" tendencies that rejected the foreign-born and those failing to integrate fully. As J. Higham wrote, "seeing or suspecting the failure of as similation" the US nativist "fears disloyalty."  This was also true of French "nativists," who attempted to racialize citizenship and compromised the long-standing principle of citizenship by birth: in 1993, the Right ended automatic citizenship for second-generation "immigrants."  To gain citizenship, children born in France of noncitizen parents must make a declaration of intent between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three to show evidence of assimilation. Third-generation "immigrants" are automatically citizens at birth. These measures were aimed mainly at Algerians, although France in fact has a larger population of Portuguese than Algerians.
California's Proposition 187, if upheld by the courts, will deny health care, education, and US citizenship to the children of illegal immigrants born in the United States. Employers wish to exploit Mexican labor, but border states want federal funds to pay for services (such as health care), and there is fear of Spanish-language threats to national unity and presumed homogeneity.  Proposition 187 has been contested in the courts, by marches, walkouts, and refusals by officials to turn illegals in. 
How well do civic nationalisms stand up to our ideal of positive nationalisms? Despite persistent racism, the record of including foreigners has been much better than that of self-defined ethno cultural nationalisms. One has only to contrast German citizen ship, based on the kaiser's 1913 law,  with the French, US, and Canadian conceptions-at least until Schroeder's Social Democrats were elected in 1998. Before that date you were a German citizen if you were the child of a German citizen-one born anywhere in the world or of German ancestry in eastern Europe-but not a German citizen if you were born in Germany as the child or grand child of a foreigner. Naturalization of nonethnic Germans has been discretionary, difficult, and uncommon.  Non-Germans seeking "asylum" in West Germany were treated as labor migrants and foreigners, while ethnic Germans born in eastern Europe were "returnees," with automatic rights of entry, suffrage, and naturalization. Foreigners were labor; ethnic Germans were citizens. Germany was more exclusionary than most European countries, but most have restrictions based on descent. Only Portugal automatically turns second-generation "immigrants" into citizens.  Germany's Social Democrats promise to recognize Germany as "multi ethnic," a "society of immigrants," and pledge to give automatic citizenship to German-born children of foreigners, if one parent has lived in Germany since age fourteen.
"Settler societies" retain the spirit of civic nationalisms better, at least in law. Canadian and US citizenship is conferred on everyone born within borders of those countries. In the United States, legal immigrants can become naturalized citizens after five years, in Canada, after three years. Their histories of systematic racial exclusions, and conquest, displacement, or annihilation of aboriginals show that practice has fallen far short of ideals; nevertheless, they have been more inclusive than most countries. French, American, English-Canadian, and Quebec civic nationalisms have not generally respected deep diversity within their borders. France forced national unity on its diverse peoples and the United States enforced indivisibility through civil war. English Canada encourages the fracturing of the country by refusing to accept the obvious: that sociologically, Quebec is a "nation." The dominant tendency of Quebec nationalists is "integrationist" and assimilationist.
Democracy is what citizens of civic-nations share and is the glue holding together diverse nations. Democracy may be valued as much in some ethnocultural nations, but the nation will carry on through presumed kinship ties, common language, or common religion, even if consent vanishes. In contrast, civic nations may die when democracy weakens. 
Civic nationalisms have had strong contenders in ethnocultural nationalisms. When questions of accommodating ethnonational diversity within a state arise, writes W. Connor, they pit national against state loyalty. The recent history of separatist movements shows that when the two loyalties are seen to be irreconcilable, state loyalty loses. 
German ethnocultural nationalism was the archetype. J. Plamenatz contends that "nationalism came to the Slavs from the Germans."  Herder (1744-1803), the intellectual father of ethnocultural nationalisms, states that "Every volk is one people having its own national culture, as well as its language." In Herder's generous conception, each national culture is in a unique organic unit with a national soul and makes its unique contribution, with language as its central expression, to the history of humanity as a whole. Herder gave no quarter to master races or imperialism, that later often became associated with such nationalisms. Europeans must realize, Herder wrote, that they have no monopoly on culture.  Intent on inquiry into the history of the Germans, Herder was a cultural, not a political, nationalist. He wrote of the great future that awaited Slavic peoples once they threw off the chains of slavery. Ethnocultural nationalisms became dominant in eastern Europe, partly through Herder's influence and partly because, as Hroch argues, an "exogenous" group tended to rule when these societies emerged from absolutism. 
With their Herderian emphasis on unique national cultures, ethnocultural nationalisms should respect deep diversity. But one is hard pressed to find current examples. Hindutva nationalism demands the subordination of minority religions in India and has made steady gains against Nehru's "secularist" idea of nationalism, which accorded equal respect to all religions. 
Ethnocultural nationalisms, most often associated with the Right, have challenged the civic varieties, usually associated with the Left and Center, ever since. Some civic nationalisms have moved toward ethnocultural nationalisms, and vice versa. Neo liberal globalism weakens civic nationalisms by dismantling state policies supporting equality and by reducing the sovereignty of democratic polities. These conditions encourage ethnocultural nationalisms as substitutes. 
The article next explores the contest between positive and negative nationalisms in Canada.
Positive Canadian Nationalisms vs. Nativist Continentalism
"Nativism" is a relationship between nationalism and hostility to ward minorities. "Underlying all the different varieties of nativism was a distrust of difference," writes Howard Palmer-"a sense that minority groups which attempted to maintain separate identities diminished the national sense of identity."  Nativism in Canada attached itself at times to a pro-British, conservative nationalism that was powerful in English-speaking Canada before 1945. The Orange Lodge, with its "one flag, one school, one language" slogan,  and other Protestant, Loyalist organizations offered anti-Catholic, anti French, and antiradical versions of reactionary ethnic nationalism.
Anglo Protestant "nativism" in Canada exhibited a second strand of "nativism," if it can still be called that, in continentalism, the Canadian counterpart of US Manifest Destiny. The latter asserted the United States's "manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the ... great experiment of liberty." Many Canadian continentalists emphasize the common membership space that Canadians share with white Protestants in the United States.  Continentalists appeal to a negative, conformist English-Canadian nationalism in rejecting Quebec's and native peoples' national right to self-determination. It is the only "nativist" strand that survived into post-1967 Canada, and it finds a tolerant home for such elements in the right populist, Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance.  In contrast to Europe, where populist nationalism and racism are joined in FarRight movements, most of the racist Right in English-speaking Canada is opposed to Canadian independence and is pro-United States. Racism and the leading forms of nationalism in English speaking Canada are adversaries, rather than natural allies.
A century ago, Goldwin Smith wanted Canada-Outside-Quebec to join the United States, to create "a moral federation" of "the English-speaking race." A major virtue of continental union was the opportunity to get rid of Quebec.  This way of thinking has had resonance in Right populism in western Canada from the Ku Klux Klan of the late 1920s to the Reform Alliance today.  Such nativism cannot, because of the importance of Quebec, attach itself easily to the Canadian state. The Reform Party supported NAFTA and the MAI and Reform Party members are the strongest opponents of Canadian independence vis-a-vis the United States. Their neoliberalism coincides with that of the most recent New Right populist parties in western Europe. 
Quebec has its own nativisms, captured in the phrase pure laine, in which the descendants of French inhabitants who lived in New France before the British conquest of 1760 are deemed the only true Quebeckers. As in English Canada, Quebec's Right and Left nationalist variants have coincided quite closely with ethnic and civic nationalisms, respectively. Before the 1960s, both variants were conceived as French-Canadian. The Quebec nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s had a social-democratic bent and led to a sea change in Quebeckers national conception. The idea of French Canadian membership space across Canada was replaced by a Quebec-centered, territorial nationalism. This was a major step from an ethnic to a civic view of the diversity of who belonged. But the statements of Parti Quebecois leaders before and after the 1995 sovereignty referendum show that inclusion of those not of ancien Canadien origin has not been easy. As Louis Balthazar argues, Quebec nationalists "condemned the unwillingness of some groups to speak French and integrate, but did little to encourage them to do so."  The main animus for many of those who seek a separate Quebec is the reactionary idea of an ethnocultural "nation-state," which Parti Quebecois leaders call a "normal" nation.
The dominant strand of Quebec nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s traced its roots to the Rouges tradition of civic nationalism, but with the rise of a sizable Francophone bourgeoisie in Quebec, and the decline of social democracy, ethnocultural nationalism made a comeback. It is more difficult to turn an ethnocultural nationalism into a socially transformative one. Through a globally oriented Quebec nationalism, Daniel Latouche hopes "this ethnic based nationalism can someday evolve into a more civic one, incorporating anglophones, allophones, and aboriginal peoples in a society project." 
Recent English-Canadian nationalism has been remarkably free of nativism, for several reasons. The Cold War, continental economic integration, and the decline of Britain killed the pro-British, anti-United States conservative nationalism, a matter of lament for George Grant.  On the other hand, the Canadian Left, which be fore 1946 was generally pro-United States (international industrial unions, FDR, Left populist ties), picked up the anti-United States mantle, in tandem with the US New Left,  as the United States came to represent reaction in the world. The Left and much of the political center advocated Canadian independence, in part to de fend Canada's more advanced social programs, stronger unions, publicly owned corporations, and less-aggressive foreign policy. The positive nationalism that ensued has been relatively inclusive of immigrants and minorities  and is largely internationalist. Left nationalists view Canada as having only two realistic alternatives: sup port continental union and get fully drawn into the United States' New Right politics and self-absorption or resist the continental pull, pursue social-democratic policies, and reach out to other parts of the world in true inter-nationalism.
The issue of foreign, largely US, ownership animated much of Canadian Left nationalism prior to NAFTA and the MAI. It recently reemerged as a public issue. Popular opposition to foreign ownership and control led the Canadian Left and Center Left to understand, earlier than elsewhere, that "free trade" agreements were essentially corporate-rights agreements, whose main purpose was to forbid domestic economic control. Foreign ownership in the United States often sparks nativist reactions: anti-British in the late 1800s, and anti-Japanese recently. As Mira Wilkins put it:
It was said in the late nineteenth century that we were losing to British investors what we won in 1776 and it's said in relationship to Japanese investment in the United States today, the Japanese are now buying Pearl Harbour. 
In Canada, nativism has never been tied strongly to foreign owner ship, because most foreign corporations have been owned by US and British capitalists, who, as George Grant put it, "incarnate themselves as an indigenous ruling class." 
Finally, because of its great heterogeneity, Canadians had much difficulty agreeing upon the usual symbols of a nation, one and in divisible-a national flag and anthem. Canada still lacks its own, separate, head of state. Wars, which often create the strongest basis for national sentiment and mythology, divided Quebeckers from other Canadians. Instead of those bases for nationalism, Canadians identify most strongly with the geography and territory of Canada. Although racism is still pernicious in Canada, these symbols are inclusive of everyone already living in the country.
The next section explores whether the concept of positive nationalism is useful in explaining citizen opposition to the MAI.
Positive Nationalisms and the MAI: Canada and France
Some, including the government of France, interpreted the anti MAI campaign as the emergence of an effective, global civil society, whose main purpose, strangely, was to maintain national sovereignty.  Is this the right interpretation of the anti-MAI opposition? What would an effective global civil society look like if one came across it?
A global civil society would look much like the most vibrant, national civil societies, which at times have curbed the power of nationally based economic and political elites. The difference would be the scope of membership, activity, and consciousness. In an effective global civil society, non-elite people would feel part of a transnational community, without reference to national or territorial units. They would belong to an imagined global political community with a cosmopolitan consciousness. The distinction drawn here is between a global civil society, on the one hand, and national civil societies with inter-national solidarity ties, on the other.
Did the opposition to the MAI have the characteristics of a global civil society? The alliances established between the OECD countries and organizations in the South were a key element to the opponents' defeat of the MAI. [lll] Martin Khor, head of the Third World Network, which had close ties with governments in the South, was the first to warn of the coming MAI. The supranational opposition to the MAI first coalesced in meetings of nongovernment organizations in Paris in October 1997 that coincided with the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) talks. To show it was open to dialogue after the MAI draft had been leaked that spring, the OECD invited moderate groups to make presentations. Radical individuals, from many countries, joined their ranks. In an act of solidarity, the NGOs took a unanimous and uncompromising position.  However, Tony Clarke, for mer head of the anti-free trade group the Pro-Canada Network, and Lori Wallach, of Public Citizen, in the United States, neither of whom had been at the Paris meetings, felt that to defeat the MAI an opposition based on transnational NGOs would be ineffective. Clarke reasoned that such groups had absolutely no relationship to an authentic constituency, and that they were the ones that make compromises, such as NAFTA's ineffective, sidebar deals on the environment. Clarke observed that
one of the most fascinating things was that as time went on in 1998, you could see what had started out to be something organized by international NGOs to begin with, as some form of op position, was gradually finding itself losing its ground to the country-based campaigns, where the real strength was. Why? Be cause resistance that was building up to the MAI, as it went through stage by stage, was coming from the countries that were sitting at the table. 
The shift to nationally based oppositions occurred because citizens' movements tend to be organized most densely and effectively at national levels, and in the end it is governments that make the decisions. They care about domestic, not foreign, public opinion.
That the greatest opposition to the MAI came from Canada and France is not surprising. Both are countries where Left nationalism and cultural nationalism are highly developed. To investigate whether there was a relationship between these nationalist traditions and effective opposition to the MAI in these countries we will start with Canada.
The nationalism that supports Canadian economic, cultural, and political independence from the United States is associated with progressive internationalism. The leading proponents of Canadian nationalism/internationalism--Maude Barlow, head of the Council of Canadians, and Tony Clarke--took the initiative in defeating the MAI. Clarke found the draft text of the MAI, analyzed it, called it the "Corporate Rule Treaty," and released it to the world. Barlow and Clarke wrote the first books on the MAI. After completing a Canadian edition, subtitled, "Threats to Canadian Sovereignty," they wrote the first US book on the MAI, changing the wording to "threats to American freedom." Clarke and Wallach spearheaded the international coordination of sixteen nationally based campaigns against the MAI. 
Noam Chomsky wrote that "in Canada and Canada alone, the veil [of secrecy about the talks on the MAI] was broken in mid 1997 and since then it has been a big issue nationally."  Only in France and, perhaps, Australia was public consciousness of the issue at anywhere near a comparable level. Although not a major campaign issue, the MAI was raised critically in the English-language television debate in Canada's June 1997 federal election. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation sent two television crews to cover Maude Barlow and the MAI opponents' meetings in Paris in October 1997. No other country sent television crews to cover them. Elizabeth Smythe and Jay Smith examined the four hundred web sites focusing on the MAI in English, French, German, and Spanish. The OECD had the highest number of website links-but the next four were Canadian sites.  Six of the top twelve sites were Canadian, all in opposition. Ralph Nader called the anti-MAI opposition "another Canadian first." 
Clarke attributes the greater resonance of the issue in Canada to the fact that "we are still the first country to have gone through a comprehensive free-trade agreement with the US... and the first country to be exposed to the investor-state mechanism in chapter 11 of NAFTA."  He might have added that, in part due to his own efforts as head of the Pro-Canada Network, the anti-free trade coalition, a small majority of English-speaking Canadians voted for the Liberal and New Democratic parties, both of which opposed the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in the federal election of 1988. For Canadians, the trade agreement was widely seen as a threat to Canada's distinctiveness and its continued existence as a separate country. The coalition opposing the Free Trade Agreement was broadly based, and when the MAI issue arose it was not difficult to reactivate the coalition around the themes of corporate rule and the threat to Canadian sovereignty.
In France, opponents of the MAI formed a coalition of seventy associations, but did not work together very well. Opposition came largely separately from the cultural community, including the nation's minister of culture, environmentalists, and the Communists, junior partners in the Socialist government. The sum of oppositions built to the point where France pulled out of the MAI talks in October 1998. The strongest resistance came from France's cultural community, which like English-speaking Canada's cultural community has long fought a tenacious battle against Americanization of its culture. The emcee of the Cesar's, France's Academy Awards, read a statement to millions of television viewers condemning the MAI, and he got prolonged applause from the audience.  The French Collective against Clones of the MAI supports the right of each country to subsidize diverse cultural expressions and opposes applying the "national treatment" clause to the cultures of other countries. 
It is no accident that Tony Clarke and Maude Barlow alerted the world to the dangers of the MAI. Their embeddedness in positive nationalist circles enabled them to be effective internationally. There is no contradiction. Positive nationalism and internationalism were complementary. It is unlikely that one-worlder cosmopolitans and Left globalists would have led an anti-MAI struggle against the loss of national sovereignties. But Clarke's and Barlow's nationalism was not the "my country right or wrong" variety. In fact, Barlow proudly states that whenever they were able to find out the secret negotiating position of the Canadian government on the MAI, they happily shared it with their counterparts in the antiglobalism network, on the basis that "you need to know this: it is going to hurt you."
The anticorporate networks eschew the term nationalism, or even national sovereignty, especially in countries like Germany, where such terms have very negative associations with racism. In stead, the supranational activist formulation is that the movement will work for the right to citizen-led democracy wherever it exists, whether it is to maintain local laws, provincial or state laws, or a federal presence.  In the face of the threat of corporate rule, the thinking goes, every political community has a right to popular sovereignty. In most cases, though, popular sovereignty coincides with national and subnational sovereignties. Civil-society movements are primarily nationally and regionally rooted and bring their own wisdom to the international community by virtue of their roots in communities of place. As Benjamin Barber writes, "democracies are built slowly, culture by culture, each with its own strengths and needs, over centuries." 
Instead of globalization from above to uphold corporate rights, we need not globalization from below but positive nationalisms and genuine internationalism from below. The global market is the arena for transnationals, business professionals, and the rich, where power is based on unequal command of property. For most wage earners and peasants, the political arena is a country or region where aspirations for democracy and equality are widely held--even if, in many cases, this is not the reality.
Although he immigrated to Canada as a teenager, Bob White, former head of the Canadian Labour Congress, agrees that few workers seek global mobility:
Workers really don't, except for a few, want mobility. They want security... they want their families to grow .... The problem we have today is capital is mobile, will move within the country or move from country to country and leave workers on the scrap heap.... I think capital is about making bucks--workers [are] about building the society.
If most people are relatively (in global terms) immobile, then the sovereignty of their political communities is fundamental to democracy. Imagine the alternative: internationally mobile labor on a scale a hundred times as great as now; workers roaming the world in search of work and aggregations of transients with no common memory and little ability to communicate across language and cultural barriers. These conditions exist in many Persian Gulf states and are the ideal conditions for manipulation and dictator ship.  As Milan Kundera said, "The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory versus forgetting." [l26]
Opponents of corporate globalism dream of a world where national rivalry, war, domination, and exploitation cease, and where popular sovereignty flourishes. Can they effectively counter neoliberal globalism if they dare not support what is the main bulwark against this agenda: the commitment to left nationalisms?
(*.) Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
(1.) France, "Report on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI): Interim Report-September 1998," Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry. Report authored by Catherine Lalumiere (MEP),Jean-Pierre Landau, and Emmanuel Glimet. This version was posted in English on the Council of Canadians website.
(2.) Paul Hawken, "The WTO: Inside, Outside, All Around the World." Published on the internet by Hawken, Natural Capital Institute, Jan. 16, 2000. See p. 10.
(3.) Chantal Mouffe, "Democratic Politics Today," in Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1992). pp. 11-12.
(4.) For an entry into this debate, see the July 1999 issue of the Monist 82, no. 3.
(5.) David Lloyd, "Nationalisms against the State: Towards a Critique of the Anti-nationalist Prejudice," in Timothy P. Foley, et al., eds., Gender and Colonialism (Galway: Galway University Press, 1995), pp. 256-281.
(6.) I am grateful to Jose Johnston for most incisive and challenging comments on several drafts of this article. Amory Starr's tough review was also very helpful.
(7.) John Williamson, "In Search of a Manual for Technopols," in Williamson, ed., The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington: Institute for Economic Research, 1993), p. 18.
(8.) Bob Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State," in Ash Amin ed., Post Fordism: A Reader (London: Blackwell, 1994); J. Brodie, "Glocal Citizenship: Lost in Space?" in E. Isen, ed., Cities in a GlobalAge (London: Routledge, 2000).
(9.) Noam Chomsky, "Who's World Order? Conflicting Visions," lecture, University of Calgary, Sept. 22, 1998.
(10.) Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 10.
(11.) Susan Meeker-Lowry, "Community Money: The Potential of Local Currency," in J. Mander and E. Goldsmith, eds., The Case Against the Global Economy (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996), pp. 446-459.
(12.) Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams (New York: Henry Holt, 1995), p. 91.
(13.) Ephraim Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism (London: Pinto Press, 1991).
(14.) Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalisms since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 3, 182.
(15.) Jan Edling's "The Future of the European Welfare State," a paper presented May 10, 1993, at Swedish trade union confederation meeting, is typical of this perspective.
(16.) David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. ix, x, 233. Daniele Archibugi's cosmopolitan democracy envisages the continuation of powerful states: "From the UN to Cosmopolitan Democracy," in Archibugi and Held, eds., Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p. 157.
(17.) In Pheng Cheah and Bruce Roberts, eds. Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). Robbins depicts Kant's cosmopolitanism as opposed to nationalism, whereas Cheah argues it was opposed to absolute states. Robbins, "Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism," ibid., p. 2; Cheah, "The Cosmopolitical-Today," ibid., p. 22.
(18.) Jocelyne Couture, "Cosmopolitanism and Liberal Nationalism," Monist 82, no. 3: 491-515. See also Kai Nielsen, "Cosmopolitan National ism," ibid.: 446-468.
(19.) Herman Daly, "Globalization versus Internationalization: Some Implications," draft of talk given in Buenos Aires, Nov. 1998, p. 7.
(20.) Pheng Cheah, "Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism," in Cosmopolitics, note 17, 291.
(21.) Some writers include "the national" as a prototype of the particular. L. Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
(22.) Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stan ford University Press, 1990), p. 64.
(23.) Roland Robertson, "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity Heterogeneity," in Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson, eds., Global Modernities (London: Sage, 1995). p. 40.
(24.) Held, note 16, p. 279, advocates the permanent shift of nation states' coercive capacity to regional and global institutions.
(25.) C. Calhoun, "Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity, and Self-determination," International Sociology, 8, no. 4, 407.
(26.) Danaher, in Kevin Danaher, ed., Fifty Years Is Enough: The Case against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Boston: South End Press, 1994).
(27.) Hobsbawm, as quoted in Tom Nairn, "Breakwaters of 2000: From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism," in New Left Review 214, p. 97.
(28.) See the Lilliput strategy of Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello, in Global Village or Global Pillage? Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom-up (Boston: South End Press, 1994), chap. 6.
(29.) Based on discussion with Josee Johnston.
(30.) This is not to imply that separatist movements are never legitimate.
(31.) Daniel Bell, "The World and the United States in 2013," Daedalus 116, no. 3 (1987): 14.
(32.) Joseph Stiglitz, "The World Bank at the Millennium," Economic Journal 109 (Nov. 1999): 591.
(33.) Martin Khor, "Tide Turning against Free-Market Orthodoxy," In stitute for Global Communications, Sept. 16, 1998.
(34.) Chomsky, note 9. See also Chomsky, Profit over People (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999), pp. 21-23.
(35.) The New Democratic Party is a social-democratic party with strength outside Quebec. Since its inception in 1961, it has played a prominent role in Canada's House of Commons, especially in pressing for a universal public-health-care system, and its provincial wings have formed governments in four provinces and one territory.
(36.) J. M. Stopford, Susan Strange, and John S. Henley, Rival States, Rival Firms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 121.
(37.) H. Sklar, Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management (Montreal: Black Rose, 1980), p. 2.
(38.) M. Crozier, et al., The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975), p. 162.
(39.) Joyce Nelson, "The Trilateral Connection," Canadian Forum (Dec. 1995): 5-9.
(40.) Cited in Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), p. 98.
(41.) Lawrence Summers, "America's Role in Global Economic Integration," Brookings Conference, "Integrating National Economies: The Next Step," Jan. 9, 1996, p. 3.
(42.) Aijaz Ahmed, "Nationalism: Between History and Ideology," lecture, University of Alberta, Mar. 13, 1998.
(43.) Hobsbawm, note 14, p. 26.
(44.) K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York: Harper Business, 1990); S. Ostry, Governments and Corporations in a Shrinking World (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990).
(45.) P. Adams, Odious Debts (Toronto: Earthscan, 1991); B. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 230.
(46.) In two graduate seminars, students asked to identify the author of this Marx/Engels quote guessed Frances Fukuyama and Robert Reich.
(47.) Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986 ), pp. 37-38.
(48.) Hobsbawm, note 14, p. 91. Reliable statistics on historical migration are difficult to obtain, and this claim is disputable: a number equivalent to 41 percent of the 1900 population of the British Isles (including Ire land) emigrated between 1846 and 1924; a comparative figure for Norway is 3 percent: P. Stalker, The Work of Strangers (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1994), p. 16.
(49.) Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," in C. Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 109-142.
(50.) Gordon Laxer, "Social Solidarity, Democracy, and Global Capitalism," in Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 32, no. 3 (1995): 287-313.
(51.) R. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ohmae, note 44; R. T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1994).
(52.) Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," Journal of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1995): 412.
(53.) Nationalisms still have liberating potential in the Third World, but they must compete with powerful official state nationalisms such as those in China, India, and Indonesia.
(54.) Gordon Laxer, "Opposition to Continental Integration: Sweden and Canada," Review of Constitutional Studies 2, no. 2 (1995): 342-395.
(55.) Josee Johnston, "Defending and Reconstructing Emancipation: Using the Zapatista Uprising as a Guiding Heuristic," master's thesis, University of Alberta, 1997, pp. 204-205.
(56.) Gitlin, note 12; Hobsbawm, note 14, argues that the opposite to nationalism was the original revolutionary idea of "patriotism."
(57.) Hobsbawm, note 14, p. 146.
(58.) Ibid., pp. 146-148.
(59.) Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?" in H. Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 19. In Deconstructing the Nation (London: Routledge, 1992) (p. 20), M. Silverman notes that while Renan clearly distinguishes between race and nation, his imagery is close to romanticism and race. Edward Said argues that Renan's views on "degenerate" races as opposed to the "superior" white race cannot be separated from his ideas on nationalism. "Nationalism, Human Rights, and Inter pretation," Raritan 12, no. 3 (1993): 34.
(60.) F. Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970 ), p. 9.
(61.) Aboriginal nationalisms may be exceptions. Many did not have to go through the Enlightenment to conceive of government as inhering in the people. Zapoteca nationalism in Mexico draws upon indigenous Zapotec culture but is associated with peasant, working-class, feminist, and student resistance: H. Campbell et al., eds., Zapotec Struggles: Histories, Politics, and Representations from Juchitan, Oaxaca (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993).
(62.) Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
(63.) Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 188-189.
(64.) Roger D. Thomas, "French Revolutionary Socialists and the Revolutionary Tradition, 1789-1871," in Cahm and Fisera, eds., Socialism and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, vol. 2 (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979), p. 13.
(65.) Hobsbawm cites the first three of these terms as having "the op posite meaning to 'my country right or wrong"' (see Hobsbawm, note 14, pp. 145, 89, 87).
(66.) Lord Acton, "Nationality," in The History of Freedom and Other Essays (London: Macmillan, 1907 ), p. 286.
(67.) R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cam bridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 210, n. 48.
(68.) Ibid., p. 145.
(69.) Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation," New Left Review 198 (Mar.-Apr. 1993): 6.
(70.) The ethnic conception triumphed over Bismarck's statist view that minority Poles belonged "to no other state and to no other people than the Prussian, to which I myself belong": Brubaker, note 67, p. 127.
(71.) Hobsbawm (note 14, p. 164) does not trace the origin of nations to preexisting ethnicities but argues that recent, racist nationalist movements insist on "ethnicity" and linguistic differences. Anthony Smith endorses the recent convergence of literatures on nationalism and ethnicity: Ethnicity and Nationalism (Leiden: Brill, 1992).
(72.) J. Carens, "Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States," in R. Brubaker, ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), p. 35.
(73.) R. Brubaker, in introduction to Brubaker, note 72.
(74.) "Deep diversity" is Charles Taylor's phrase for different ways sociological nations can belong to the same state: "Shared and Divergent Values," in Watts and Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 75.
(75.) Said, note 59: 33.
(76.) Allan Knight, "Peasants into Patriots: Thoughts on the Making of the Mexican Nation," Mexican Studies 10, no. 1 (1994): 142.
(77.) Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 72, 73, and chaps. 6, 7, 18.
(78.) Kenneth Karst, Belonging to America (New Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 31, 83.
(79.) Etienne Balibar, "The Nation Form," Review 13, no. 3 (1990): 358 359.
(80.) Cited by Silverman, note 59, p. 22.
(81.) Karst, note 78, p. 179.
(82.) J. Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860 1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 4.
(83.) Silverman, note 59, chaps. 3 and 4; Brubaker, note 67, chap. 7.
(84.) Y. Abu-Laban, "The Nation-state in an Era of Regionalism and Globalization: A Comparative Study of the Politics of Migration in the United States and France," doctoral thesis, Carleton University, 1995, pp. 88-112, 172-188.
(85.) Linda S. Bosniak, "Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immi grants and the National Imagination," Connecticut Law Review 28, no. 3 (1996): 555-619.
(86.) Germany, German Imperial and State Nationality Law (London: Harrison & Sons, 1914).
(87.) Thomas Faist, "How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partition Discourse, 1978-1992," West European Politics special issue (1994). Kay Hailbronner, "Citizenship and Nation hood in Germany," in Brubaker, note 72, pp. 67-68.
(88.) R. Brubaker, note 67, p. 224; Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 2.
(89.) Gordon Laxer, "Surviving the Americanizing New Right," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 37, no. 1 (2000): 55-75.
(90.) W. Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Prince ton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 81.
(91.) J. Plamenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in Eugene Kamenka, ed., Nationalism: The Nature of an Idea (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), p. 30.
(92.) Robert Ergang, Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), p. 82. F. M. Barnard, Herder's Social and Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 10.
(93.) Hroch, note 69, pp. 5, 12.
(94.) Uprendra Baxi, "The Struggle for Redefinition of Secularism in India: Some Preliminary Reflections," Social Action 44 (Jan.-Mar. 1994): 18.
(95.) Laxer, note 89, 56-75.
(96.) Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice (Toronto: McClelland & Stew art, 1982), p. 10.
(97.) The flag was British; the school was public, rather than Roman Catholic; and the language was English.
(98.) Speech by John L. O'Sullivan, in A. Schlesinger Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), p. 427. Shadia Drury, University of Calgary, argues that the Reform Party is a US neoconservative import and holds an ideal of ethnic, racial, religious cultural homogeneity. Interview, March 25, 1998.
(99.) Interview with Jan Brown, former Reform Party Member of Parliament in Calgary, March 25, 1998; Tim Nieguth, "The Trouble with NEW CANADA: Neo-conservatism, the Reform Party, and the Internal Logic of Civic Nationalism," M.A. research essay, Carleton University, 1996. The Re form Party changed its name to the Alliance Party (Reform Conservative Alliance Party).
(100.) Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).
(101.) Link Byfield, "If Unity Becomes the Big Theme, Reform Can Make Healthy Gains," British Columbia Report, vol. 8, Oct. 7, 1996, p. 8.
(102.) Jean-Yves Camus, "Europe's New Fascist Order," Le Monde, Mar. 2000, pp. 4-5.
(103.) Louis Balthazar, "The Faces of Quebec Nationalism," in Alain Gagnon, ed., Quebec: State and Society, 2d ed. (Toronto: Nelson, 1993), p. 15.
(104.) Daniel Latouche, "Quebec, See under Canada: Quebec Nationalism in the New Global Age," in Gagnon, note 103, p. 53.
(105.) In 1964, George Grant, an influential conservative philosopher, published Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism, a land mark book that mourned the passing of Canada's traditionally conservative features, which distinguished the country from the individualism of the liberal-capitalist United States.
(106.) Gitlin, note 12, p. 71.
(107.) R. Breton, "From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Quebec," Ethnic and Racial Studies 11, no. 1 (Jan.): 85-102.
(108.) Gordon Laxer, Countries for Sale: Foreign Ownership in a Global Economy (Toronto: CBC Ideas Transcripts, 1991), p. 8.
(109.) George Grant, Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965), p. 43. The issue of foreign ownership has recently taken on nativist overtones, especially in Vancouver, with the rise of Asian investment and business-class immigrants. Peter S. Li, "Unneighbourly Houses or Unwelcome Chinese," International Journal of Comparative Race and Ethnic Studies 1, no. 1 (1994): 14-33.
(110.) France, report, note 1; Elizabeth Smythe and Jay Smith, "Globalization, Citizenship, and Technology: The MAI Meets the Internet," paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association Meeting, June 6, 1999, Sherbrooke, Quebec.
(111.) James Goodman, "Stopping the Juggernaut: The Anti-MAI Cam paign," in Goodman and Patricia Ranald, eds., Stopping the Juggernaut: Public Interest versus the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 2000).
(112.) Among those invited were the World Wildlife Federation, Friends of the Earth, and Consumers International: interview with Maude Barlow, Ottawa, Aug. 4, 1999.
(113.) Tony Clarke now heads the Polaris Institute, based in Ottawa. Clarke interview, Ottawa, Aug. 4, 1999.
(114.) Clarke interview, note 113.
(115.) Noam Chomsky, "Power in the Global Arena," New Left Review (1998): 28.
(116.) Smythe and Smith, note 10.
(117.) Maude Barlow, The Fight of My Life: Confessions of an Unrepentant Canadian (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1998), p. 220.
(118.) Clarke interview, note 113.
(119.) Jeffrey Ayres, Defying Conventional Wisdom: Political Movements and Popular Contention against North American Free Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1998).
(120.) Barlow, note 117, p. 219.
(121.) Collectif Francais contre Les Clones De L'Ami, "Accord Des Citoyens et Des Peuples Sur Les Investissements et les Richesses," 6th version, 1999, p. 23 (from Susan George home page).
(122.) Interview with Barlow, Aug. 4, 1999.
(123.) Barber, note 45, p. 278.
(124.) Laxer, note 108, p. 19. White was later head of the Trades Union Advisory Committee at the time of the OECD talks on the MAI.
(125.) Stalker, note 48, 240-41. In 1990, foreign workers were 70 percent of the labor force in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. Many left the region before the Gulf War.
(126.) M. Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, trans. M. H. Heim (Markham, Ont.: Penguin, 1986), p. 3.
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|Publication:||Alternatives: Global, Local, Political|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2001|
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