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The Integration of Intelligence with Operations during Danger Express.

This article was first published in, and is reprinted from, Fires, a joint publication for U.S. artillery professionals, March-April 2017.

The field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) played a key role in the effective employment of Fires in the 1st Infantry Division's Warfighter exercise (WFX), April 5-14. With a new commanding general and staff, and facing a WFX against a near-peer adversary, 1st ID focused on building mastery through multiple repetitions, conducting three command post exercises (CPXs) during an eight-month train up. Over the course of the train-up and through the execution of the Warfighter, the techniques, tactics, and procedures used by the FAIO continued to evolve, with the enduring objective being the timely nomination of relevant, targetable intelligence for action by the Joint Air Ground Integration Center. This article highlights the lessons learned and best practices of the FAIO during the 1st Infantry Division Warfighter, which enabled the team to "win with Fires."

First Infantry Division utilized the decide, detect, deliver and assess methodology as outlined in Figure 1. Throughout this process, the FAIO's roles and responsibilities were essential to the successful link between intelligence and targeting.

Decide function

During the decide function of the targeting process one of the responsibilities of the FAIO is to provide target criteria to the analysis and control element (ACE), ensure the ACE understands and follows the high payoff target list (HPTL), target selection standards (TSS), and attack guidance matrix (AGM) demonstrated in Figure 2. The ACE targeting analysts along with supervision from the FAIO are responsible for the accurate and timely data base entry into the Distributed Common Ground System-Army incorporating the attack guidance matrix and target selection standards. The FAIO works with the G2/J2 in the development of the high value target list (HVTL) throughout military decision making process.

As stated in Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting, "a high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of a high-value target would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest."

The HVTL is then analyzed by the targeting officers and developed into the recommended HPTL in order to be briefed and approved by the commander. The approved HPTL is then used to focus information collection efforts, and when required, for the execution of a dynamic target, see Figure 3.
Figure 1. The targeting process and intelligence operations.
(Information from FM 2-0, Intelligence, April 15, 2014, page 1-13)

Key Input                       Targeting  Key Output
* Commander's Intent                       * High-payoff target list
* Completed Intelligence        Decide     * Target selection standards
preparation of the                         * Attack guidance matrix
battle-field                               * Input to information
products                                   collection plan
* Targeting Requirements
* Information collection tasks  Detect     * Intelligence operations
* Decision to attack target                to identify and track key
(with lethal or non-lethal                 targets for delivery of Fires
weapons)                        Deliver    * Intelligence Operations to
                                           continue to identity and
                                           track targets
* Attack guidance matrix        Assess     * Intelligence operations to
* Delivery of fire (lethal                 determine the effects of
or non-lethal)                             tires for combat assessent
* Information collection tasks

During intelligence preparation of the battlefield the FAIO needs to work with the All Source Intelligence technician in the development of the enemy situational template. The FAIO also assists the division artillery S2/targeting officer in the terrain analysis to template the location of the fire support/target acquisition targets on the HPTL. The FAIO works with the collection manager to develop the specific information requirements (SIRs) for the areas that will be a focus of collection and makes recommendations to the commander on the priorities for collection during the targeting working group as well as requesting and synchronizing the resources available to conduct target refinement. These SIRs become the information on the collection deck for the assets that are requested and later resourced. The sensor operators use these requirements during the detect phase; conducting the information collecting and the passing of that specific information that pertains to the HPTL to the FAIO utilizing the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) section.

The FAIO, fire support officers (planners) along with the DIVARTY targeting officer or Fires planner need to conduct offensive fire planning for all of the objectives and develop a target list worksheet (TLWS) for each. This will aid in receiving collection priorities, and targeting guidance from the commander during the targeting process. This integrated planning aids the DIVARTY in the development of the Field Artillery Support Plan and those triggers associated with the employment of the firing units and target acquisition assets required to service planned targets on the TLWS. The target synchronization matrix is one of the outputs during this phase and is the primary tool (if used properly) in executing current operations or the detect, deliver, and assess phases of targeting.

Detect function

Once Warfighter 16-04 (Danger Express) commenced, 1st Infantry Division was executing the detect function of the targeting process. One of the key intelligence collection sections in the ACE is the Geospatial Intelligence. This section provided the intelligence targeting officer (ITO), collection manager, and FAIO situational awareness of ground moving target indicators in the area of operations. If multiple intelligence disciplines had additional information pertaining to the moving target indicators the ACE chief then requested the chief of operations (CHOPS) to dynamically retask other collection/target acquisition assets to confirm or deny activity in that area. If the request was approved the collection manager would re-allocate assets based on the decision of the CHOPS. Once the assets confirmed the activity and positively identified HPTs, the PED section (as discussed during the decide function above) passed all targetable information to the FAIO for vetting and validation of that target. Once all HPTL criteria was met for the FAIO validated and passed the dynamic target to the JAGIC for execution (deliver phase of targeting process). The Army Techniques Publication 3-60 Targeting states that a key point to remember is that "not all of the information reported would benefit the targeting effort, but it may be valuable to the development of the overall situation. Targets that we cannot or choose not to attack in accordance with the attack guidance should be tracked to ensure they are not lost. Tracking suspected targets expedites execution of the attack guidance as well as keeps them in view while the targets are validated. Planners and executers must keep in mind that assets used for target tracking may be unavailable for target acquisition."

The process above was utilized for the full suite of intelligence collection/target acquisition assets which provided targetable data within the published targeting standards and assisted the FAIO in providing recommendations to ACE chief on changes to high value targets. The JAGIC received and executed over 400 calls for fire/fire mission requests from the FAIO and the targeting cell in the ACE during Warfighter 16-04. The results were seen at the final after action review with the destruction of 90 percent of all air defense artillery systems, 85 percent of the Operational Strategic Command-2 (OSC-2) fire support assets destroyed, and 70 percent of the remaining OSC-2 Target Types destroyed.

The DIVARTY counter-fire cell's target acquisition radars located and identified the enemy's indirect fire weapons locations. The DIVARTY counter-fire officer passed those locations to the FAIO and the ACE. The FAIO relayed the targetable information to the JAGIC and the air interdiction coordinator (AI COORD) using the process that will be discussed in the next paragraph.

The FAIO established a link with the AI COORD within the JAGIC after the initial 48-72 hours of the exercise. In order to open the line of communication the FAIOs created a Transverse Chat window with the AI COORD and the controlling joint terminal air controller in the JAGIC. This chat window allowed the FAIO to request non-tasked intelligence collection from the JAGIC. This process reported target information and situational awareness to available aircraft that were transiting in or through the battlespace, were mission complete on their assigned task or had remaining time on station the ability to be sent over a historic sites of enemy fire support assets or air defense radar locations. In addition to the 400 calls for fire/fire mission requests sent from the FAIO with the dynamic targeting process; the FAIO additionally passed 100 targets to the JAGIC and AI COORD using this technique. The battle damage associated with this process was the most effective for the 1st Infantry Division Warfighter.

Throughout 1st Infantry Division Warfighter 16-04 the FAIO's workstation was located in the ACE next to the entrance. The FAIO's location granted easy access to the JAGIC and the current operations cell. The FAIO was then able to conduct face-to-face engagements with the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), deputy FSCOORD, fire support officer, JAGIC chief, and the targeting officers throughout the day and more importantly when the FAIO had specific information from the ACE that could affect the current operations. The FAIO's primary tools for mission success were the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, the Effects Management Tool and the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS) in conjunction with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System located on the current operations floor in the joint air ground integration cell. This network of systems proved to be a vital for the integration of multi-intelligence resources into the operations process. This combination of knowledge management systems and physical position within the ACE enabled the FAIO to efficiently communicate and share information horizontally across the staff war fighting functions.

A key lesson learned during the Division Main Command Post jump to the secondary position was the FAIO's physical location. The FAIO along with the JAGIC chief along with multiple JAGIC Air Force personnel, the ACE targeting section, the PED section, and other intelligence sections moved to the DIVARTY Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and assumed the dynamic targeting process. The positioning of these key positions allowed the establishment of the direct sensor to shooter link. There was no loss of efficiency in the dynamic targeting process, however staff enablers such as public affairs, cyber electro-magnetic activities and civil affairs were not included in the move to the DIVARTY TOC. Although we did not see a significant result from this short-fall the lesson learned will be to include all staff sections for the transition of command posts.

During the detect phase of the targeting process the FAIO's primary responsibility was the vetting and validation of those HPTs that were identified using those tools specified above. Keeping in mind that all of the targets identified were not HPTs but would still be reported for situational awareness for the collective targeting effort.

Deliver function

The deliver function of the targeting process begins with and without the FAIO. During Warfighter 16-04 there were numerous instances when the ACE targeting analysts began the vetting and validation process without the FAIO or ITO present. The targeting analysts were developed and mentored by the FAIO and ITO to conduct operations in their absence and executed superbly during the exercise. This allowed the FAIO the flexibility to walk around and engage multiple different staffs during current operations. The FAIO makes target execution recommendations to the JAGIC chief based from the target type, and the activity associated with the target based from the approved and published attack guidance matrix (Figure 2) when passing the dynamic targets (Figure 3) to the JAGIC. During this time the FAIO is also the fire supporter responsible for advising the ACE on the fire support capabilities available for execution in current operations. The overall selection of assets used to execute the dynamic target relies on the JAGIC Chief based on available assets and the most efficient time to execute the target. Once the target was approved and resourced to be executed the FAIO maintained situational awareness and provided predicted battle damage assessment to the ACE Chief on the results from the target execution.

The FAIO had to set time aside during the deliver phase for the refinements of those targets nominated, approved, and tasked on the air tasking order (ATO) for close air support and air interdiction at the 48 hours and 24 hours prior to ATO day as well as those priority targets eight hours and four hours prior to mission time. The FAIO's ability to use JADOCS to track and face-to-face discussions to coordinate updates with the air liaison officer on targets submitted to the battlefield coordination detachment worked efficiently during Warfighter 16-04.

The FAIO continued to nominate dynamic targets during the detect and deliver phase of the targeting process and remains heavily involved with the intelligence collection efforts in the ACE ensuring that those "shiny objects" do not interrupt and divert the collection priorities set forth by the commander.

Assess function

The FAIO's responsibility during the assess function of the targeting process is to assist in the conduct of battle damage assessment that is orchestrated by a tactical and operational BDA collection team. Initial BDA is conducted utilizing the collection asset over the target area. At times those assets may have been reallocated to higher priority missions and the mission report (MISREP) from the pilot of a fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft is used to determine of the desired effects were achieved. An alternate method to determine predicted BDA is the utilization of the joint weaponeering system along with the fire mission information containing the munition type and number of munitions expended in executing the target. If the desired effects were not achieved the FAIO in conjunction with the JAGIC can make recommendations to the commander for a reattack of the target.

"The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decision points throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations." (Army Techniques Publication 3-60 Targeting, 2015).

Planning for the assess phase begins well before the targeting working group which identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and also when the commander makes a decision during the targeting decision board.

"Commanders adjust operations based from this initial assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved." (Army Techniques Publication 3-60 Targeting, 2015).

If future combat assessments reveal that the commander's guidance or conditions of operational success have not been met, the detect and deliver functions of the targeting process must continue until the desired effects are met.

The FAIO battle rhythm

The FAIO and the intelligence targeting officer ensured that one or the other was present in the ACE targeting cell at all times to maintain oversight of target vetting, validation, and authority. The FAIO's duty day was broken up into two 12 hour shifts (extended longer during peak times and key meetings) associated with the two targeting analysts on shift with the FAIO. The ITO typically attended the targeting decision board every morning which allowed the FAIO to remain in the ACE for the passing of dynamic targets. The night shift FAIO had the responsibility to attend the targeting working Group and pass all information included in the targeting FRAGORD to the FAIO in the morning during the battle hand over. Always considering that the battle rhythm needs to be nested with the higher headquarters' to allow the right information to be shared and understood at the right time.

The FAIO played a key role in the successful employment of Fires during WFX 16-04. The FAIO's fusion of multiple means of collection to develop targets through shared understanding of the HPTL and focus of Fires, along with the seamless handoff of targets to the JAGIC ensured success of Fires in the division fight.

CW3 Michael Rider is currently assigned to the Headquarters and Support Company, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS. As a Chief Warrant Officer he has served as a radar section leader, target acquisition platoon leader, battalion and brigade targeting officer, and is currently serving as the division field artillery intelligence officer.

Dr. William Rierson, Ed.D., is a retired Field Artillery Officer with over 23 years of active-duty enlisted and commissioned service. He holds an earned Doctorate of Education from the University of West Florida. Rierson is currently a contractor with CGI Federal, assigned to the TRADOC G27, ISR Integration Training Team. He served as a Mission Command Training Program Fires observer/coach/trainer during Warfighter 16-4

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Rider with contributions from Dr. William Rierson
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Author:Rierson, William
Publication:Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
Article Type:Reprint
Date:Oct 1, 2017
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