The Cyprus Crisis: Examining the Role of the British and American Governments During 1974/Kibris Krizi: Ingiliz ve Amerikan Hukumetleri'nin 1974'deki Rolunun Incelenmesi.
(Andreas Constandinos, Devon, PL48AA, UK, 2012, University of Plymouth Press, 407 Pages)
The book is the product of a five year archival work that was carried out between 2005 and 2010. It is indeed an admirable research based solely upon government records found in both the British and American National Archives.
The main objective that led the author Andreas Constandinos to give his own account of the Cyprus Crisis was the death of academic research currently available, which is based on convincing and relevant historical facts and events as given in the recently released the British and American documents.
Andreas Constandinos, with this clear opinion of his embarks on this academic research which involves a keen look into the details of the events of the period under study. In his book, in short, Andreas attempts to ascertain whether Whitehall and Washington were responsible for what happened in 1974 by virtue of acts of omission or commission. In other words the author tries to find an answer to the following question: "Was Cyprus the victim of a calculated conspiracy or a foreign policy failure?"
This is how Dr. Zenon Stavrinides from the School of Law, University of Leeds, describes the book:
"this book is one of a very small body of historical works, which attempts to provide accounts of various aspects of the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 based, as far as possible, on properly attested historical evidence concerning the background, the course and effects and long-term consequences of the coup d'etat by the National Guard against President Makarios and the Turkish invasion that followed it".
Stavrinides goes on to say that works of evidence based history are a scarce commodity in Cypriot studies, and arguably they are more often than not received with suspicion and--when they challenge entrenched prejudices- indignation by conventionally minded readers. Dr. Stavrinides is actually accepted as an academic and writer who looks at the Cyprus Question with a moderate perspective. His general evaluation here about several studies and books on Cyprus is absolutely correct and he deserves a creditable respect for his admission. He praises the author for his herculean effort to find, study and evaluate a wide range of primary material- mostly diplomatic documents- in archives in both sides of the Atlantic.
The book consists of 407 pages and 9 chapters. A short history of Cyprus is given in a rather long introduction. For the Ottoman period the author mentions very briefly that the two communities were never geographically separated and that there was 'considerable intermingling' and a harmoniously way of living together. This state of affairs was of course due to the freedom and tolerance given to the Greek Cypriots by the Ottoman administration under the millet system.
The author goes on to argue that both communities regarded the Zurich/London agreement as a transitory place, and had in place contingency plans; the Greek Cypriots still wanting ENOSIS and the Turkish Cypriots advocating a 'Cyprus Republic outside Zurich agreements'.
As far as I know the Turkish Cypriot side had no such contingency plan other than insisting on the implementation of the articles of the constitution and the reuse of veto right of the vice-president. For instance the Greek Cypriot side never put into practice the Greek Communal Chamber like the Turkish side did. About the inter-communal talks that began in 1968 between Mr. Denktas and Mr. Clerides, the author argues that despite moments where a breakthrough seemed likely, by 1974, the talks had reached deadlock. But somehow he refrains from giving the reason of deadlock. Mr. Clerides in his four volume book, named "My Deposition" explains why a deadlock was reached. Actually the two negotiators had agreed on a semi-cantonal structure, but Makarios vetoed the set-up with the excuse that the rights given to the Turkish Community were beyond minority right.
In the ensuring nine chapters, the author embarks on the discussion and analysis of events that took place in Cyprus together with Greece and Turkey, trying to pinpoint the role of Britain and America in the development of events, with a consistent suspicion of an American accomplice.
He puts forward the arrangement that the Cyprus crisis of 1974 is associated by many with Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of the island. However, he bluntly admits that it was an anti-Makarios Greek coup that triggered the crisis. But somehow he does not realistically explain the root of the crisis. It was the sinister approach of President himself to the very young partnership state, with always the vision of 'Enosis' in his mind. The author hints at the possibility of a CIA involvement in the coup and he argues that declassified documents reveal that the US government was aware of the possibility of coup being launched in Greece. He goes further to say that many Greeks believe the US sponsored the coup. But eventually he concludes that the leader of the coup Colonel George Papadopoulos acted without warning and launched the coup d'etat by modifying a NATO contingency plan named "Prometheus", which had been designed in case of a Communist takeover.
In his research work after dealing with the American relationship with Greece and Turkey in 1960s and the American interest over Cyprus, the author brings Grivas into picture, who he says, felt betrayed by both Makarios and the Greek Government by accepting the Zurich/London agreements. From then on Grivas became a pivotal figure in Cyprus affairs between Makarios and the Greek Government until 1974. He kept the Cyprus crisis boiling by initiating military attacks against Turkish Cypriots and later against Makarios himself by his militias under EOKA B. In the meantime America carried out the role of pacifying reactions from Turkey toward Greece. US Government's primary concern has always been to prevent any conflict between the two NATO allies and to keep the Soviet Union outside Cyprus. The author carries on his evaluation of events and comes to a conclusion where he points out that Washington should have realized that both Greece and Turkey would not prioritize the cohesion of NATO over their rational prestige, a mistake, which the Americans repeated a decade later.
The historical statement of Makarios towards 1970s was the turning point in his sensitive relations with the military government in Greece and his former EOKA aides like his interior minister Georkadjis. The statement read as follows: "A solution by necessity must be sought within the limits of what is feasible, what does not always coincide with the limits of what is desirable".
This statement, the author says, was interpreted as a betrayal by all Emotists (followers of ENOSIS). The first attempt on his life was on 8 March 1970, when shots were fired at his helicopter. Both Washington and Whitehall concluded that assassination attempt had been planned by Junta.
The sequence of events is discussed in more detail in the following chapters. In Chapter 1- the Junta, Cyprus and the United States- Greco-Turkish relations, during the rule of Junta leader Col. Papadopoulos are descriebed as friendly and positive. Both sides took care to avoid any conflict. But later relations between the two motherlands were to change to reach a dangerous level, after Dimitrios Ioannides replaced the Colonel by a bloodless coup.
In Chapter 2-Dramatis Personae- policy of Washington and Whitehall towards Greece under Ioannides and Turkey in discussed within which certain scenarios including the partition of the island are put on the table. The author gives the first hint of the deteriorating relations between Makarios and Ioannides who, while serving in Cyprus in early sixties, suggested Makarios to eliminate the Turkish Cypriots once and for all, was refused causing animosity between the two since then.
During the inter-communal talks between 1968 and 1974 Kissinger and Callaghan are involved in the negotiations process. The author is of the opinion that they were both after their own country's interests. He goes further to claim that Kissinger had little interest as what solution was reached on Cyprus, provided it did not threaten NATO and was agreeable to both Greece and Turkey.
Chapter 3- An unavoidable Coup?- reviews the relation between Athens-Washington-Nicosia. Both Britain and America were privy to considerable evidence corroborating that Grivas had returned to Cyprus to prevent an inter-communal settlement that would preclude ENOSIS. With the EOKA B terrorist actions against rule of law and order in the country, the relationship between Grivas and Makarios reached an all time low. The Greek Cypriot eminently became as divided as ever. Both Makarios and Clerides believed that Cyprus now faced a greater threat from Athens than it did from Ankara.
This disturbing situation eventually led Makarios to write his famous letter on 2 July 1974 to General Gizikis, the President of Greece, demanding the withdrawal of all Greek officers serving in Cyprus. Apparently, this letter was the beginning of the end of Makarios and the cause of all developments that followed. But despite increasingly available warning signs, including warning from the U.S, Makarios continued to reject the idea that the Junta might be planning a coup. The inevitable coup took place on 15th July 1974, but Makarios luckily escaped to Malta with the help of the British. The coup against Makarios was greeted by wild Jubilations in Athens, but led Ankara to invade (intervene) to the expectations of all parties except loannides, who always estimated that Turkey would not react to that extend.
Andreas all through this chapter tries to investigate if the events took place in Cyprus and elsewhere could be prevented by Washington and Whitehall. Because the mindset in Greece was that the US via CIA had colluded with Junta in executing the coup against Makarios.
In Chapter 4-The coup- the tragic events of the coup against Makarios and the reaction of the British and US governments, and the steps taken afterwards are given in great detail. The preoccupation of both governments was to call for restraint from Greece and Turkey. Their main concern was that Greece and Turkey might go into war, which might be detrimental to NATO.
Chapter 5- Turkey Invades- is about the Turkish invasion (intervention) of Cyprus. The author is persistently after finding any sign of collusion or cooperation of Kissinger with the Prime Minister Ecevit. He seeks an answer to the question of "Why America did not intervene as Johnson did with his threatening letter to Inonu in 1960s.
Chapter 6- First Geneva Conference and Chapter 7- Second Geneva Conference- are about the first and second Geneva Conference, where an immediate solution to the Cyprus conflict was hotly discussed but could not be reached. Callaghan undertook effective role in these two consecutive conferences between the four parties. The conference were called by the UNSC Resolution 353. It is interesting to note that during the second conference after the parties were given time to think over, the Turkish Delegation accepted a cantonal federal solution, but met once again with the refusal of the Greek Delegation. The deadlock once again led to the second phase of Turkish military operation, which ended with the capture of about one third of the island in the North.
The author summarizes the situation in Geneva by the following words:
"Progress could only be made via compromise and a prerequisite for compromise in international diplomacy was negotiating from a strong and unified position. Realistically, neither Greece nor Turkey could do this at the time".
Whereas the cantonal solution supported even by Kissinger then although accepted by the Turkish side, was refused by the Greek side, the consequence of which was the complete geographical partition of the island. Under the present circumstances, with no sign of a solution to the problem, the Greek side must be blaming themselves for not accepting the cantonal structure proposed in Geneva.
Chapter 8- Makarios- sets out the flow of event in Cyprus just before and after the return of Makarios. It covers the period between 1975 and 1977. The most significant event of this period is of course the first High Level Agreement between Makarios and Denktas on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. After the death of Makarios on 3rd August 1977, the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Donald McDonald Gordon, would comment in the following fashion:
"Whilst Makarios had been regarded by many as a major obstacle, he now appears to represent the best of hope of realizing a settlement of the Cyprus problem".
The author directly points out that before Makarios died he had publicly declared that there was no evidence that the U.S had supported the Junta in their attempt to murder him. So Makarios himself sheds light on the facts and evidence, which this book has been after. In this chapter Andreas finally gives a high credit to Makarios by saying that in his abandonment of the goal of ENOSIS and his acceptance of the "four points" for a Cyprus settlement, he displayed a considerable measure of statesmanship. He goes on to say that even Kissinger acknowledges that along with Makarios the best of hope for settlement had died. But there are historians who claim that he died because of his grief for signing the agreement with Denktas.
In Chapter 9- Lessons learnt- Andreas discusses the 'lessons learnt' by quoting Literary Critic Ivor Armstrong Richards, who says that: "History is simply a record of things, which ought not to have happened".
But don't we learn from history that once a mistake was made, as in the case of Cyprus, dangerous and harmful repercussions will follow sometime with fatal results. This was exactly the case in the Cyprus Crisis and the consequences were multiple. After first years an acceptable solution to both sides is not still in sight. A Turkish proverb is a most appropriate simile to the Cyprus Question: A fool comes along and throws a stone into a well, but one hundred wise men are unable to bring it out.
In conclusion to this book Andreas puts blame partly on Whitehall and Washington for not formulating a coordinated Cyprus policy as a consequence of which the whole people of Cyprus suffered and the island had been brutally partitioned in two.
Once again he reminds us that the intention of the book was to establish whether the British and American government had been responsible by virtue of omission or commission for these disastrous ramifications. He carries on to claim that in 1964 there existed a definite attempt to solve the Cyprus problem by dividing the island between Greece and Turkey, thereby eliminating any possible communist threat, which had caused 'clear concern' in both Whitehall and Washington. He goes on to claim that instead of partitioning the island the independence formula in a way imposed on Cyprus by a loquacious triglomerate of treaties, which gave Cyprus the ignominious honour of being the only member--state to have limitations. He continues to add that many years later, Whitehall recognized that the Zurich/London agreements 'would have presented a sever challenge for even the most sophisticated and experienced political community', whilst Kissinger described them, 'doomed from the start'. But is this really the case when we very well know that Makarios, after his return from London in 1960 to the island, declared, before the ink of his signature was dry, that Cyprus was a Hellene island and the agreements were only a stepping stone to ENOSIS totally disregarding the existence and legitimate rights of the Turkish Cypriots, who were the co-partners of the new independent state.
Andreas concludes that the action of the Greek Junta led directly to the Turkish invasion. It is rather ironic that Court of Athens decided afterwards that the Turkish invasion was legitimate when certain families brought a case against the Greek Government for the loss of their sons during the war.
Finally the findings of the author show that there is no evidence whatsoever that Turkey would have invaded Cyprus, had Ioannides not given Turkey the pretext Ankara sought under article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee.
The author Andreas Constandinos finishes his book with the following words:
What this book hoped to achieve was to answer some of the questions and confirm and/or dispel some of the myths that surrounded and plagued the history of Cyprus for the past thirty six years. Its intention was to show that conspiracy theories can prevent and hinder serious and accurate appraisal of history and that until both Cypriot communities are able to take responsibility for the events of 1974 and accept the roles played by their respective motherlands, the prospect of the two communities peacefully co-existing in a unified island will continue to look bleak.
Kibris Krizi Ingiliz ve Amerikan Hukumetleri'nin 1974'deki Rolunun Incelenmesi
(Andreas Constandinos, Devon, PL48AA, Birlesik Krallik, 2012, Plymouth Universitesi Yayini, 407 Sayfa)
Rum- Yunan ikilisi, dunya kamuoyuna, israrla ve inatla, Kibris meselesinin 1974'de Turkiye'nin adayi isgal etmesi ile basladigini ve meselenin bir isgal sorunu oldugunu kabul ettirme gayreti icindedir. Halbuki gercek onlarin anlattiklari gibi degildir.
Kibris sorunu, Rum-Yunan ikilisinin Megali Idea'nin ongordugu hedeflerden biri olan Kibris'i Yunanistan'a ilhak etmek istemesinin ve adada yasayan fakat Yunanistan'in bir parcasi olmak istemeyen Kibris Turk halkini azinlik olarak gormesinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya cikmistir. Bu nedenle, adada bugune kadar yasanan olaylardan, dokulen kandan, cekilen acilardan, dogrudan dogruya Rum-Yunan ikilisi sorumludur. Simdi, Rum-Yunan ikilisi bu sorumluluktan kurtulmanin arayisi icindedir. Gecmisi, 1821 Yunan Ihtilali'ne kadar uzanan Kibris sorununa, Rum-Yunan ikilisi 1955'de adada EOKA yer alti teskilatini kurarak ENOSIS Savasi'ni baslatarak; o tarihe kadar siyasi ve diplomatik alanlarda surdurdugu ENOSIS savasina bir de askeri boyut getirmisti. Bu durumda, adadaki varliklarini tehdit altinda goren ve Rum-Yunan ikilisinin silahli saldirilari ile karsi karsiya kalan Turkler mesru mudafaaya gecmislerdi.
Andreas Constandinos, "The Cyprus Crisis" adli kitabinda, Kibris sorununun, yukarida kisaca arz etmeye calistigim ozune deginmekten ozenle kacinmakta; dunya kamuoyunun dikkatlerini Turkiye'nin, 1974'de Kibris'a asker cikarmasi ile basladigi olayi uzerine cekmeye calismaktadir. Bilindigi uzere, Akritas Plani, Turkiye'nin adaya asker cikarmasi engellenemezse, Rum-Yunan ikilisinin dunya milletleri nezdinde "Turkiye adayi isgal etti" mucadelesini baslatmayi ongoruyordu. Dikkat edilirse, Andreas Constandinos kitabinda Rum-Yunan ikilisinin planli amaclarina hizmet eden bir davranis sergilemektedir. Kibris'ta, 1974 oncesinde Rum-Yunan ikilisinin Kibris Turk halkina yapmis oldugu mezalimi--butun gercekler belgeleri ile ortadaykenhatirlamamasi ve kitabinda o surece hic deginmemesi cok ilginctir. Kisaca Andreas Constandinos, 200 yillik bir gecmisi olan Kibris sorununun, maksatli olarak, sadece 1974'e ait kesitini ele almis; Rumlari aklamak icin Yunanistan'daki Askeri Idare'yi gunah kecisi ilan ederek, Rumlar'in Kibris'ta isledikleri butun gunahlari ona yuklemistir.
Rum-Yunan ikilisi Kibris'ta surdurdugu ENOSIS Savasi'nda uc siyasi ve stratejik yanlis yapmistir. Askeri alanda yapmis olduklari yanlis bunlarin basinda gelmektedir. Cumhurbaskani Makarios ile Yunanistan anlasarak 1963'de, Kibris Turkleri'ni ortagi bulunduklari devletten dislayarak Kibris Cumhuriyeti'ni silah zoru ile ele gecirmislerdi. Bununla yetinmeyen Yunanistan, mevcut milli gucu ile Kibris'i elinde tutmasi mumkun olmadigi halde adaya, Akritas Plani'nin ongordugu sekilde, yasa disi yollardan ve gizlice takviyeli bir tumenini sizdirmis; harp ilan etmeden, kurnazca, sesiz sedasiz Kibris'i fiilen isgal etmisti. Ayrica, Yunanistan, altina imza koydugu Zurih-Londra Antlasmalari ile Garanti ve Ittifak Antlasmalari'ni dikkate almadan Kibris'i isgale kalkismakla telafisi imkansiz bir siyasi hataya dusmustu.
Unlu Alman askeri dusunurlerinden Clausewitz "politikada yapilan bir hatayi strateji; stratejide yapilan bir hatayi taktik duzeltemez" der. Yunanistan'nin, Garanti Antlasmasi'nin Turkiye'ye tanidigi mudahale hakkini ve Turkiye'nin bolgesinde sahip oldugu askeri, ekonomik ve siyasi gucunu hesaba katmadan bir tumenden fazla askeri bir kuvveti, hava ve donanma destegi veremeyecegini ve ona yeterli ikmal saglayamayacagini bile bile, ana karadan 800 km., Girit'ten 555 km.; Turkiye'nin guney sahillerinden sadece 70 km. uzakta bulunan Kibris'a gondermesi anilan tumeni kendi kaderine terk etmekten baska bir sey degildi.
Burada konuya aciklik getirmek istiyorum. Yunanistan'in, bu cagda, hicbir askeri ve siyasi kurala sigmayan Akritas Plani ile Kibris'i topraklarina katmak icin adayi isgale kalkismasi zannettikleri kadar basit ve kolay bir harekat degildi. Rum-Yunan ikilisi gerceklerle hayalleri birbirine karistirmisti. Goruldugu uzere, Rum-Yunan ikilisinin baslattigi Kibris'i isgal harekati askeri kurallar; sevk ve idare prensipleri; komutanlik/liderlik nitelikleri ile bagdasmadigi gibi, diplomasinin temel tasi olan "ahde vefa" prensibini de ayaklar altina almistir. Bu durumda, Rum-Yunan ikilisi Kibris'ta baslattigi ENOSIS Savasi'ni daha en basinda kaybetmisti.
Rum-Yunan ikilisinin yaptigi, anlasilmasi cok zor olan, siyasi ve askeri stratejik yanlislar Kibris sorununun odak noktasi olup; sorunu icinden cikilmaz hale getiren en onemli faktordur. Andreas Constandinos kitabinda bu konuya deginmeden dogrudan dogruya Turkiye'nin adaya asker cikarmasindan bahsederek, egemen bir devletin topraklarini isgal etmekle suclamaktadir. Halbuki, Turkiye adaya asker cikarmadan on bir sene once Yunanistan, Rumlar ile anlasarak Kibris'i isgal etmisti. Bu durumda, Turkiye'nin 20 Temmuz 1974'de adaya askeri mudahalede bulunmasi bir isgal degil, Yunanistan'in isgali altinda bulunan Turk topraklarinin kurtarilmasi ve uluslararasi antlasmalarla Kibris Turku'ne taninan, fakat Rum-Yunan ikilisi tarafindan gasp edilen haklarin ve ozgurluklerin Turkler'e iadesi harekatindan baska bir sey degildir. Bu konu, uzerinde onemle durulacak bir konudur.
Rum-Yunan ikilisinin, Kibris'ta surdurdukleri ENOSIS surecinde yaptiklari stratejik yanlislardan biri de Rum-Yunan ikilisinin 15 Temmuz 1974'de Cumhurbaskani Makarios'a karsi yaptiklari hukumet darbesidir. Bundan daha vahim olani, Rumlar'in 2004'de yapilan halk oylamasinda (Referandum) Annan Plani'na hayir oyu kullanmalaridir. Bunlar, Rum-Yunan ikilisinin nedenlerini halkindan sakladiklari konulardir. Bunlara hic deginmeden Kibris sorununu anlatmak eksik olur. Rum-Yunan ikilisi, Yunan Juntasi'ni ve Turkiye'yi suclayarak gecmiste Turkler'e yaptiklari mezalimi unutturabilirler mi? Onu zaman gosterecek.
AB, ABD ve Ingiltere'nin Kibris uzerinde stratejik cikarlari bulundugu bir gercektir. Bununla beraber, Andreas Constandinos'un kitabinda ABD'nin Ingiltere ile anlasarak, Turkiye'nin adaya asker cikarmasina engel olmadigina iliskin dusuncesi mesnetsiz bir iddiadan oteye gecemez.
1. Yunanlilar ve Rumlar dunyanin neresinde olurlarsa olsunlar Kibris meselesinin gidisatindan haberdardirlar ve kendilerini Kibris davasina hizmet etmekle yukumlu sayarlar. Aldiklari direktifle Kibris meselesi hakkinda dunya kamuoyunu, ulusal gorusleri dogrultusunda sekillendirmeye calisirlar. Ayrica, Kibris meselesini, gercekleri carpitarak surekli dunya kamuoyunun dikkatine getirmek ve gundemde tutmak icin her yolu denerler ve her vasitayi kullanirlar.
Kibris meselesinin uzerinden elli yil gecmesine ragmen sorun henuz cozulememistir. Bu sure zarfinda, Turklerin onemsemedigi, fakat Rum-Yunan ikilisinin buyuk onem verdigi adi gecen kitap ve benzeri calismalar semeresini vermis; dunyada, Kibris sorununa iliskin, Rum-Yunan ikilisinin lehine kamuoyu olusmustur. Bunun yani sira, Rum-Yunan ikilisinin Kibris Turk halkina yaptiklari zulum, ve uyguladiklari soykirim bu sekilde dunya kamuoyuna unutturulmustur.
2. Batili buyuk devletlerin yardimlari ve destekleri ile Edirne Muahedesi (1829) ve Berlin Protokolu (1830) hukumleri ile egemen bir devlet olarak tarih sahnesine cikan Yunanistan, o tarihten gunumuze kadar her zaman bahse konu devletlerin desteklerine ve yardimlarina mazhar olmustur. Rum-Yunan ikilisi, soz konusu tarihi geleneksel destege guvenerek 1955'den sonra ve ozellikle de 1963'de, Kibris'ta, acikca, askeri harekata girismislerdir. Kibris'in bir Helen adasi ve Yunanistan'in bir parcasi oldugu dusuncesi Rum-Yunan ikilisinde bir saplanti haline gelmistir. Bu nedenle, Rumlar ve Yunanlilar Kibris meselesine hep bu acidan bakmayi kotu bir aliskanlik haline getirmislerdir.
Andreas Costantdinos da, Kibris meselesine bu gozle bakmis ve Rum-Yunan ikilisinin yaptiklari askeri ve siyasi stratejik yanlislari goz ardi ederek, adada surdurdukleri ENOSIS Savasi'na destek vermedikleri ve Turkiye'nin adaya asker cikarmasina engel olmadiklari icin acikca ABD'ni suclamakta ve Kibris'a ENOSIS'in ABD'nin ihanetine ugradigini ima etmektedir. Kitabin yazari, lafi, ortulu bir sekilde ve Yunanli kurnazligi ile "Yunanistan Hiristiyan ailesinin bir parcasidir. Hiristiyan aleminin buyuk, kucuk her ulkesi Yunanistan'a yardim etmekle yukumludur. Hiristiyan dunyasinin yardimlari ve destekleri sayesinde Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri'ni adadan atacak ve Kibris Cumhuriyeti'nin hukumranligini Kibris'in kuzeyinde de hakim kilacagiz" noktasina getirmek istemektedir. Rum-Yunan ikilisi, hala, bu beklenti icinde olduklarindan toplumlar arasi gorusmelerde bugune kadar bir uzlasiya varilamamistir.
3. Son zamanlarda Rumlar, Kibris'ta Turkler'e yaptiklari kotuluklerin gunahlarini baskalarina yukleyerek aklanmaya calistiklarina; Kibris Turk halkini sucsuz ve gunahsiz olduklarina inandirmaya calistiklarina ve bu amacla Guney Kibris'ta Rumca yazilan ve Rumlarin goruslerini yansitan kitaplarin Turkce'ye cevrilerek Kuzey Kibris'ta satildigina sahit oluyoruz. Hedefleri, Kibris Turklerine yaptiklari kotulukleri unutturmak ve Kibris Turku'nun adadaki gelecegini ipotek altina almaktir. Bu nedenle, Rumlar butun gayretlerini, kendilerini zor durumda birakan gecmislerini unutturma uzerinde yogunlastirmislardir. Bu amacla, yumusak gucun bir araci olan "fikir uretme merkezlerini" kullanmaktadirlar. Bu baglamda, Andreas Constandinos'un "The Cyprus Crisis" adli kitabi Rumlarin gecmislerini unutturma gayretlerinin bir urunu olarak degerlendirilmektedir.
Cagdas dunyada, artik, kendi basina hareket etmek gecerliligini yitirmis, yerini birlikte hareket etmeye, isbirligi yapmaya ve dayanisma icinde bulunmaya birakmistir. Bu durum muvacehesinde, Dogu Akdeniz Universitesi Kibris Arastirmalari Merkezi munferit calisma yapma yerine, Dogu Akdeniz Universitesi catisi altinda kurulan ve ayni amaca hizmet eden Dogu Akdeniz Universitesi Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi ile birlikte hareket etmesi ve esgudum icinde bulunmasi calismalari daha etkili ve guclu kilacaktir. Ayni cati altinda bulunan ve ortak hedeflere yonelmis iki fikir uretme merkezinin Kibris Turk halkinin ada uzerindeki haklarina ve hukukuna iliskin bilgileri dantel isleyen genc bir kizin sabri ve titizligi ile belgelere dayali olarak, birlikte, ortaya cikarmasi; Kibris Turk gencligi ile dunya kamuoyunun dikkatine getirmesi ve Rum-Yunan ikilisinin sozu edilen "unutturma" cabalarini bosa cikarmasi en basta gelen gorevlerinden biridir.
Bunun yani sira, Kuzey Kibris'ta faaliyet gosteren universiteler, stratejik arastirma merkezleri, bilimsel calismalar yapan sivil toplum kuruluslari ve bilim adamlari uretecekleri Kibris meselesine iliskin fikirlerle Kibris Turku'nun ada uzerindeki hak ve menfaatlerini savunan ulusal ortak gorusun sekillenmesinde ve izlenecek politika ile stratejinin belirlenmesinde kilit rol oynayabilirler.
Hakki Atun Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Eastern Mediterranean University Fmr. Prime Minister and Speaker of the TRNC
Ali Fikret Atun E. Tumgeneral Ankara
Eastern Mediterranean University Center for Cyprus Studies
Director: Prof. Dr. Naciye Doratli
Members of the Executive Committee: Prof. Dr. Turgut Turhan, Prof. Dr. Salih Katircioglu, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Netice Yildiz, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Besim, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sibel Dincyurek, Ahmet Tolgay
Center for Cyprus Studies has been established in 1995 at the Eastern Mediterranean University with an aim to make research or encourage and support scholarly research on Cyprus in a wide range of diversified fields such as: archaeology, anthropology, architecture, cultural heritage, history, art, art history, language, literature, music, law, economy, sociology, folklore, gender studies, psychology, politics, international relations, and environment. The Centre is also working to develop documentation centre on all aspects of the history of Cyprus. Also, as part of its mission, performs some collaborative projects aimed at the development and preservation of the historical and cultural heritage of the island. The centre also is fostering close contacts with other institutions involved in related research areas. As the Centre grows, its resources will include online bibliographical services, audiovisual facilities and archives such as videotapes, dia-positives, photographs and microfilm of rare book and manuscript collections. Currently the art archive project of TRNC artists is one of these which have a rich collection of documentation for the researchers. The Centre for Cyprus Studies coordinates research projects and hosts scholars in fields of study relevant to its mission. The Centre also organizes a congress and seminars on Cyprus-related studies, and issues the biannual Journal of Cyprus Studies, JCS.
Dogu Akdeniz Universitesi Kibris Arastirmalari Merkezi
Baskan: Prof. Dr. Naciye Doratli
Yonetim Kurulu Uyeleri: Prof. Dr. Turgut Turhan, Prof. Dr. Salih Katircioglu, Doc. Dr. Netice Yildiz, Doc. Dr. Mustafa Besim, Doc. Dr. Sibel Dincyurek, Ahmet Tolgay
Kibris Arastirmalari Merkezi 1995 yilinda Dogu Akdeniz Universitesi catisi altinda, Kibris'a iliskin, Arkeoloji, Antropoloji, Mimarlik, Kulturel Miras, Tarih, Sanat, Sanat Tarihi, Dil, Edebiyat, Muzik, Hukuk, Ekonomi, Sosyoloji, Halk Bilimi, Cinsiyet Arastirmalari, Psikoloji, Politika, Uluslararasi Iliskiler, Cevre vb. konularda arastirmalar yapmak, arastirmalari desteklemek ve tesvik etmek amaciyla kurulmustur. Merkez catisi altinda kongre, sempozyum, panel ve sergi duzenlemek; kongre, sempozyum bildiri kitaplari ve dergi yayinlamak; gorsel sanatlar arsivi olusturmak vb. etkinlikler gerceklestirilmekte olup, 1996 yilindan bu yana her iki yilda bir Uluslararasi Kibris Arastirmalari Kongresi ve biyografi ve sosyal tarih alaninda yeni bilgiler sunma hedefi ile Iz Birakmis Kibrisli Turkler Sempozyumunu donusumlu olarak duzenlenmektedir. Kibris Arastirmalari Merkezi'nin yayin organi olan Kibris Arastirmalari Dergisi, Kibris ile ilgili disiplinlerarasi Turkce veya Ingilizce ozgun ve evrensel boyutta calismalara yer veren hakemli bir dergi olup yilda iki kez yayimlanmaktadir.
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|Author:||Atun, Hakki; Atun, Ali Fikret|
|Publication:||Journal of Cyprus Studies|
|Date:||Mar 22, 2014|
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