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The Cost of Terrorism in Kenya.

Introduction

Despite the significant attention given by governments in the Horn of Africa and their allies to counter and prevent terror activities and radical ideologies, Al-Shabaab remains the most dreaded of the extremist groups in the region. In addition to the erratic attacks in the counties along the Kenya-Somali boarder ahead of the 2017 general elections, by extrenist gruups among other attacks by extremist groups that have lingered in the memories of Kenyans include periodic attacks on the Coastal and North Eastern provinces; on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi on September 21, 2013; on Garissa University College on April 2, 2015; and on troops of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in El-Adde inside Somalia on January 15, 2016. These have killed hundreds of people and injured hundreds more. These attacks have been seen as the watershed of Kenya's security crisis. The effects have included (1) individual civilian/military casualties; (2) continued psychological and emotional suffering for the directly affected families; (3) trauma and anxiety amongst Kenyans and its visitors; (4) a crippling of the tourism sector and the Kenyan economy; (5) an increased cost of running business due to the installation of sophisticated surveillance gadgets and personnel; (6) a rising cost of living due to an increased commitment of the national budget to the security sector. This study examines these phenomena and assesses the extent to which they have become entrenched in Kenyan society, politics and economics.

Terrorism

The concept of terrorism remains vague. No clear definition has been widely accepted. Arechaga calls it:
   Acts which in themselves may be classic forms of crime-murder,
   arson, the use of explosives--but differ from classical
   criminal acts in that they are executed with the deliberate
   intention of causing panic, disorder and terror within an organized
   society, in order to destroy social discipline, paralyze
   the forces of reaction of a society and increase the misery and
   suffering of the community.


The United Nations understands terrorism within an international context. According to Article 3(2) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, a crime is to be considered of transnational nature if:

(a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.

Terrorism is commonly understood as a means to an end, and not as end in itself. Those who perpetrate acts of terror use it as a means to force governments to withdraw, or refrain from acting upon certain decisions.

Jenkins defines terrorism as the use of violence by criminals to push a government, (whether locally or internationally) to alter its course of action. This force is seen as restrictive, where the terror gang uses extreme violence, (mostly against innocent civilians) to force a government to withdraw the implementation of a certain policy or directive, or abstain from executing a proposed decision. In order to accomplish their mission, terrorists pressure the government of the day directly through blatant threats and attacks, and indirectly by spreading fear amongst the population, which impacts negatively the nation's productivity.

Commonly, the trend has shown that terrorists target population more than physical infrastructure such as buildings or energy plants. Their main objective is to spread fear and attract media attention, both locally and internationally. Consistently with this, Jenkins has laid a claim that terrorists' main agenda through their atrocities is to create publicity and get the attention of those that it is directed to, mostly governments, to their cause. Terrorists put governments under pressure to accept their conditions, and present themselves as a fierce force to be reckoned with. Most terrorists create an impression that they are bigger and more powerful than they actually are by spreading fear. Most often, victims of terror attacks are not really of interest to the terrorists, but their being targeted paralyzes the people who are watching. Leurdijk rightly pointed out that most often than not, victims of terror attacks are ordinary innocent civilians with no issue or connection with the issue under dispute. What adds to the complexity of terrorism is that it is difficult to 'predict the type, extent, timing, or precise locale of the attack'.

It was in the 1970s that international terrorist systems began to take shape and define terrorism's character. Of course this assertion is not to mean that there were no international terrorist movements before the '70s. Some notable networks existed. Modern international terrorism has largely been fueled by technological and media advancement. Localized resistance movements and terror gangs began to create networks and established international connections.

Cronin pointed out that terrorist networks enjoyed the sponsorship of states like Iran, Libya, North Korea and the Soviet Union largely because they used them to accomplish their goals beyond their borders, while at the same time those countries created anti-terror mechanisms to avoid potential terrorist attacks from their own perceived enemies. When states sponsor terrorists, it adds to the complexity of understanding and combating the threat. State-sponsored terrorists enjoy an abundance of resources that includes: munitions, connections, recruits, mobility, and an easier access to information.

The emergence of most individual terrorist groups is commonly motivated by local contexts. However, in order to seek relevance, they form alliances with already established international terrorist organizations. These international terrorists are, by their nature and motivations, defined and regulated by the international terrorist movements they associate with. Acts of international terrorism have played a big role in reigniting the terror threat from the enemy within. As a state heightens the fight against the enemy beyond the borders, sympathizers of the same terror groups, mostly agitated groups of youths, continue to coordinate threats within, thus reinforcing the terrorists' network.

Rationale behind the aggression of terrorists against Kenya

Kenya has become a soft target to international terrorism due to an array of regional, historical, political, religious and social/cultural factors. Otiso has identified some of the most notable direct causes for international terrorism aggression against Kenya, namely: (1) Kenya's allied diplomatic relations with Israel and the U.S.--with the former being blamed for the persecution of the Palestinian people and its strong ties with the latter; (2) the vibrancy of the tourism industry that threatens the coastal (local) Islamic culture; (3) and the perception that the Christian population in the country is a hindrance to the Islamisation of the East African region.

Pope Francis 1 has found a significant link between poverty and terrorism. In his opening speech during the first visit to Africa in Nairobi, Kenya, the head of the Catholic Church vividly pointed out that experience has shown that the acts of violence, conflict and terrorism are deeply rooted on fear, mistrust, and despair born of poverty and frustration.

One of the most contributing factors to the infiltration of terrorist groups into Kenya remains the longstanding regional conflicts in many countries around the horn of Africa. Some of these include:

* the enduring civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan (in fact, Sudan became a haven for Islamist militants after the government financed the operation of terrorist groups, and Osama bin Laden used the country as a ground to plan and manage support for various jihadist groups elsewhere, such as training Somali factions responsible for the 1993 killing of 18 American soldiers);

* ongoing tribal and civil strife in South Sudan;

* the perpetual collapse of central authority in Somalia;

* the longstanding conflict in Uganda under Id Amin, and now with the failure of the ruling government to neutralize the Lord's Resistance Army under Joseph Kony in the Northern part of Uganda; and

* the Eritrean warfare of independence, and the persistent belligerent relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Shina has argued that the hostile neighboring environment within surrounding countries renders them exposed and unable to control their borders. He referred to Somalia, Kenya's immediate neighbor, as a 'hotbed of terror' and a favorable environment for any terrorist with 'money and a plan'. Simons and Tucker have maintained that an assortment of researchers and experts from critical security sectors have concluded that failed and failing states are becoming a favorable ground for terrorists to recruit, plan and operate. According to the US Government's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, terrorists take advantage of failed states and often use them to manage their operations. It is argued that failed states act as havens for international terrorists and offer a favorable environment for breeding and recruitment.

As has been indicated, Kenya has come under attacks from radical Islamist groups due to its close association with Israel and mainly the U.S. (2) in particular, viewed as the greatest forces against radical Islamisation and the expansion of the Islamic state. Israel is generally despised by many Muslims around the world due to its perceived persecution of the Palestinian people (3), who are largely followers of the Islamic faith. The diplomatic ties with the western countries came about during the colonialisation that founded trade relations between African countries and their colonialists. Kenya in particular has aligned itself to western capitalist ideology since independence (4). In fact, Kenya is a host to numerous installations of western interests including the headquarters of major international development and humanitarian agencies such as the UN5. The Kenya's political culture, relative stability and strategic positioning in the region have attracted much Western investment. According to Somerville (6) and Harman (7), many Western corporations and nations coordinate their operations in the continent from Nairobi, largely due to its comparatively well-developed infrastructure, financial system, and relatively stable economic base. Its favorable tropical weather and attractive geography and wildlife, coupled with a vibrant culture, have made Kenya a hub for tourists. In the light of all this, it is critical to note that Kenya is a strategic partner of the West. It is no wonder that strong aggression is hurled against it by terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.

The presence of Al-Qaeda in Kenya is now almost two decades. One of the main reasons they, together with their affiliates, have been able to easily target Kenya is the country's proximity to the Arabian Peninsula (8). In the horn of Africa, Kenya is one of the countries that have sustained extremely violent terror attacks in recent years. The gravity of horror fueled by international terror agents was not known in Kenya prior to the 1998 twin bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Even though these gruesome attacks targeted American nationals in foreign embassies, a lot more Kenyans and Tanzanians were killed than Americans. As reported by Onyango (9), about 244 Kenyan civilians and 12 American nationals were killed in the attacks, leaving many others severely injured. The Al Qaeda network claimed responsibility. Kenya was seen by Al-Qaeda as a soft target against American establishments, and caught local authorities unware and totally unprepared to handle such a menace. (10)

Onyango (11) has argued that the reason behind the proliferation of attacks by Al-Shabaab (12) in Kenya is as a retaliatory tactic geared to force Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to withdraw its forces from Somalia. Kenya, in 2011, moved its KDF forces into Somalia as an attempt to neutralize the operations of the terror group and aide the Somalia transitional government regain control over its territory. In recent years, it is apparent that the Al-Shabaab terrorists are not invading Kenya with an aim of attacking the American interests and establishment, but against the sole interests of the Kenyan government. However, such debate has remained contentious because the Al-Shabaab had staged several gruesome attacks within the Kenyan boarders even before the occupation of the KDF in Somalia.

Limited funding and support by government for local intelligence and security forces are regarded as major contributing factors to the failure of the antiterrorist campaign. These forces are ill-equipped and unable to match the tactics of the fast-growing sophistication of the terrorist networks.

The Muslim community is considered as one of the few minority groups in Kenyan demographics. Their representation in high political structures of power is very insignificant. They have largely been economically and/or politically excluded, a fact that has weakened their position from influencing policy regarding the country's development agenda. In pursuant to the foregoing, some members of the Muslim community in Kenya have created links with jihadist groups internationally, making government's effort to crack down on terrorists' network more complex. (13) Thus, their political exclusions have rendered these communities susceptible to manipulation by external terror agents.

For his part, Otiso has argued that among the more aggravating factors for terrorist aggression against Kenya are: (1) the proximity of the coastal region relative to Europe, Asia, and other African neighboring counterparts; (2) porous borders attributed to poor surveillance; (3) political instability in neighboring countries like Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia; (4) a relatively open and multicultural society; (5) relatively good transport and communication infrastructure and a leading regional economy; (6) a relatively large Muslim population, particularly in the coastal region; and (7) social, political, and economic political marginalization of the Muslim community relative to the rest of the country.

Effects of terrorism in Kenyan society

The number of victims of international terrorism in Kenya has continued to rise in recent years with the increased sophistication in weapons of mass destruction and the development of the information and communication technologies industry. Both civilians and security agents continue to lose their lives, while many others succumb to permanent injuries. In addition to explicitly Al-Qaeda staged terror attacks in Kenya, recent years have seen the Al-Shabaab kill and maim civilians. As Jenkins (14) construes, terrorism is not merely measured by the number of people that have lost their lives, those that have sustained permanent injuries, or the value of property destroyed. Instead, it is more concerned with instigating negative psychological effects such as spreading stifling fear, and creating an unstable political environment. Terrorists may be small groups with very limited resources. However, this does not mean that they are unable to cause fear and panic. They are opportunists who most often than not threaten to cause more harm than they are capable of in reality. They aim to capture headlines on media platforms to cause panic widely and fail to engage in direct negotiations (15).

Soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos (16) administered a public poll in the U.S. and tested Americans' reactions to the attacks. A number of Americans were reported to have taken specific actions as a response to the attacks: about 10% were reported to have altered their travel plans, avoided overcrowded public places, stock-piled goods, bought a weapon, and studied some terrorist precautions online. In tandem with Oriol's (17) findings that many tourists became uncomfortable while travelling after the 9/11/ terror attack, this study maintains that after the terrorist attack in Westgate Mall in Nairobi on September 21, 2013 (where four Al-Shabaab allied terrorists attacked and killed 67 people, both national and international, and left more than 175 injured) many Kenyans have since avoided going to shopping malls and remain suspicious in crowded public spaces. In a similar manifestation, after the Al-Shabaab militants attacked Garissa University College (which killed 147 people, mostly students, and left more than 79 injured), it ignited another fatal incident when several students of Kikuyu Campus got injured and one died after a 'bomb-like' bang from a transformer explosion caused panic amongst students who thought the explosion to be another Al-Shabaab attack, with the Garissa attack still fresh in their memories. Some jumped off their dormitories as high as the 6th floor. This scenario evidently indicates that fear of terror attack is deeply entrenched amongst Kenyans following a series of recent terror attacks hurled by the Al-Shabaab militants.

The media play a role in the dissemination of fear by terror groups. This is a critical element in defining the effects of terrorism. Nacos (18) has argued that publicity has been the central objective for terrorists and they have taken advantage of the media and technological advancement to spread their propaganda. In fact, in the recent past, 'the World Wide Web has emerged as a new and perhaps the most potent propaganda vehicle for terrorists' (19). Furthermore, Krause and Otenyo (20) have argued that reporting on acts of terrorism by the media in Kenya has had a huge bearing on intensifying fear and helplessness among the general public.

Central to public opinion regarding the government's performance in response to acts of terrorism is the role played by the media. Wood and Peake (21) have maintained that the media are one, if not the main, influential force towards building public opinion and perception on social, political and economic attitudes. The power of the media, as argued by Iyengar and Kinder (22), is anchored on its potential to analyse and interpret issues, thus making them more or less relevant depending on the time dedicated to the issue and the angle from which they present the argument. Krause and Otenyo (23) have argued that media in Kenya play a critical role in influencing and consolidating public opinion regarding the extent of government's commitment to fighting and containing acts of terrorism. The way the Kenyan media report the acts of terrorism subject political leadership to criticism and lack of trust by the general public. In effect, the political leaders become more vulnerable and begin to lose their political support. In order to retain their grip on power, political leaders have been argued to become more paranoid and attempted to reclaim more government control on the media reporting, a subject that has raised controversy in the recent past.

Terrorism has a potential to alter the perception of citizens, bringing them to oppose their governments. In most cases, governments have very limited chances to play the hero. The citizenry mostly criticize their governments for failing to tighten security systems and protect them. Governments are perceived as incompetent and impotent and the intelligence system is disregarded as corrupt and inept. When the citizens feel that their government cannot protect them, they begin to revolt against it and its security agents. Mostly, they are blamed for failure to anticipate or detect acts of terror or having failed to act swiftly to divert the threat. (24)

Other than the psychological effects on the general population, children watching are often the most affected. Even before terrorism was able to capture the media as a medium for spreading threats and fear, earlier research had identified a strong relationship between viewing TV and anxiety amongst children and youth. Wilson et. al. (25) has found that about 75 percent of elementary school children had been scared by something they had watched on TV. After sampling children in their early stages of between 4 and 12 years, Muris et. al. (26) showed that about 70 percent of them pointed that what was contained in their scary dreams were terrifying episodes they had seen on TV. Cantor and Nathanson (27) have also found that about 37% of the sampled children in grade 6 were reportedly frightened by television news, particularly with violence between strangers. The above research outputs have identified a significant relationship between media coverage of unpleasant news and anxiety among children and youth. Recent terrorist attacks by the Al-Shabaab militia have been highly televised. The intensity of the killings and torture, and perceived lack of ability by their parents or government have aggravated anxiety amongst Kenyan children and youth. Scenes from acts of terrorism that have been extensively televised recently have shown vivid scenes where children and youth are taking cover or being ambushed by terrorists. The sense of safety and security among these juveniles has been significantly challenged, even in the presence of security agents like the Kenya police or the Kenya Defence Forces.

Taylor and Toohey (28) have argued that the mounting terrorist threats in many parts of the world have incredibly impacted public event organizers. These have led to a complete overhaul and establishment of sophisticated security surveillance systems. Industries like the travel sector in the airports, high commissions, public parks and stadiums have been forced to invest more money both in more advanced equipment and personnel. In Kenya, particularly in major cities, there are security personnel who run security checks on members of the public situated in major buildings and in shopping centers.

International terrorist groups have already begun to lure Kenyan youth. Many Kenyan youth, particularly from the coastal and North Eastern areas, are continually reported joining the Al-Shabaab militias. Writing for the Daily Nation, Atieno (29) has contended that the increasing number of youth who continue to disappear and join the Al-Shabaab is alarming. Wanjohi (30), the boss for the Coastal regional police, has reiterated that the 200 youth who had previously been arrested for being linked with the Al-Shabaab militia group have gone missing. It is alleged that they may have rejoined the group. Atieno (31) has further noted that the Al-Shabaab have identified a soft target for the youth in Kenyan secondary schools. They are now targeting the young boys and girls in high schools and are allegedly wooing them to join the militia or to be wives of the jihadists, respectively.

International terrorists have discovered that targeting the tourism industry by attacking international visitors is so far the strategy that seems to produce the greatest impact on the country's economy. According to PwC Hospitality Outlook 2015 (32), Kenya's hospitality and tourism has been the hardest-hit sector of the Kenyan economy in the recent past, with a cumulative fall of the total revenue in the industry of 16% since 2011. The data have shown that the coastal region was the most hit, and a number of hotels have notably closed. The PwC report has indicated that more than 100 people have been killed in the coastal region alone, with Somali jihadist Al-Shabaab militants claiming responsibility. In 2014, there was a decline of about 5.3% in stay unit nights (33). According to the report, the trajectory indicates that the tourism industry had been on the decline for the last three years and was expected to degenerate further in 2015. However, there are signs of stability and growth forecast for the near future if the security remains under check and with no imminent threats (34).

In 2002, the Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group (Al-Shabaab) exploded a bomb against the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, believed to be a haven for international tourists on the Kenyan Coast. The hotel was severely damaged, leaving 16 people dead. At the same time, two rocket-propelled grenades were fired at an Israeli airliner at the Moi International Airport, Mombasa, which missed their target by a small margin. (35) Agutu (36) has argued that the two dreadful events intensified fear amongst Kenyans and negatively affected the hospitality sector. The number of international visitors fell significantly and many people lost their jobs as the government significantly lost revenue. In fact, after the 2002 Al Qaeda linked attack, the governments of the United States, Britain, and of numerous European countries issued travel advisories warning their citizens not to travel to Kenya in 2003 due to the terror threat. This, coupled with the closure of the British Airways route to Kenya, resulted in up to a 90% loss of the Kenyan overseas market. This led to a whooping loss of about Kshs. 1 billion per week with close to about 500,000 direct job losses and an additional 250,000 indirect jobs. (37)

Following their mentors, the Al Qaeda, the Al Shabaab adopted similar tactics of targeting international tourists as a means to destabilize trade relations between Kenya and the international community. Historically, Kenya has enjoyed a vibrant tourism industry with the sector being one of the major contributors to the Kenyan economy (38).

The bombings of the US embassy in 1998 in Nairobi saw about 90 per cent of incoming international flights being cancelled, a phenomenon that caused serious detriment on the local economy that was significantly reliant on international tourism (39). Using a dynamic panel data model, Buigut and Amendah (40) analysed the effects of terrorism on the demand for tourism in Kenya, using 2010 to 2013 annual data covering tourists visiting Kenya from 124 countries from Europe, Asia, the America's and Africa. The outcome of the study showed that in the same period there was a significant reduction of about 2,507.5 visitors per year and roughly 157.1 million Kenya shillings loss in tourism-generated revenue per year for every one person increase in fatality. The study also showed that other associated variables such as casualties produced similar effects. Ringa (41) has made attempts to analyse the economic meltdown witnessed in Lamu and the coastal region in general. He contended that there has been the closure of many hotels, and low tourists turnouts. These were purely linked to concerns on security risks and travel advisories by some of the Western countries. The county government in the region is making efforts to revive the sector by organizing annual festivals that are intended to showcase the coastal cultural heritage. The festival is expected to attract local and international visitors (42). However, in cognizance of the fact that that the annual festival has a huge potential to revive the tourism industry, this study contends that it will take more role players than the cultural revival and the county government to restore 'business-as-usual' for the tourism industry on the Kenyan coast.

Conclusion and recommendations

This study has shown that failed states, failing states and countries evolving from conflicts contain significant risks in sheltering terrorists that pose a threat to regional security. Hitherto, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab terrorists have launched terror on Kenyan soil. Al-Shabaab terrorists (aligned to Al-Qaeda) who have lodged attacks in Kenya have been recruited, trained, or had contacts with terrorists in Somalia. The proliferation of terrorist groups into Kenya, and their negative effects on its population, must be mitigated. The Kenyan government must play a pivotal role in seeking viable solutions that have the potential to restore peace and protect its citizens from terrorism orchestrated by violent extremists --particularly Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. If the Kenyan government is to curb the mounting alliance between international jihadists and some members of the local Muslim community, it will have to create more inclusive social, political, and economic spaces in the mainstream national agenda. Furthermore, the government should come up with strategies of engagement with the Muslim leadership and their respective communities in monitoring, reporting and campaigning against terrorists' activities. If the government is to curb the effects of cross-border terrorism, key areas must be prioritized: (1) reinforce its border surveillance through properly training and equipping its security agencies, which include the Kenya Police, the Kenya Defence Forces, and other specialized forces; (2) introduce rigorous migratory policies with comprehensive scrutiny of visitors to Kenya; (3) establish public programs aimed at spreading awareness and create platforms where citizens can report suspicious characters, and ways to protect themselves in case of a threat; (4) provide financial, emotional and psychological support for bereaved families and those directly after by acts of terrorism; (5) encourage and promote dialogue that support the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in the neighboring countries, particularly in the warring Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan; (6) advance the reform and implementation of counter-terrorism acts and policies; and above all, (7) detect, disrupt and dislodge networks that supply terrorists with arms, equipment, and money; and (8) tackle corruption that thwarts the process of gathering intelligence and other antiterrorism combat strategies.

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(1) Goway, 2015. Essential Kenya Super special. Available on: http://www.goway.com/trip/ africa-and-middle-east/essential-kenya-super-special/ Accessed on 11 November 2015.

(2) Otiso, K. M. (2009). Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global terrorism: Fighting terrorism at the periphery. Kenya Studies Review, 1(1), p. 111.

(3) Otiso, K. M. (2009). Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global terrorism: Fighting terrorism at the periphery. Kenya Studies Review, 1(1), p. 112.

(4) Ibid., 111.

(5) Soke, H. A. (2003). In: Otiso, K. M. (2009). Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global terrorism: Fighting terrorism at the periphery. Kenya Studies Review, 1(1), p. 111.

(6) Somaville, (2002). In: Otiso, K. M. (2009). Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global terrorism: Fighting terrorism at the periphery. Kenya Studies Review, 1(1), p. 111.

(7) Harman (2002). In: Otiso, K. M. (2009). Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global terrorism: Fighting terrorism at the periphery. Kenya Studies Review, 1(1), p. 111.

(8) Ploch, L. (2011). Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The US Response. DIANE Publishing, p. 4.

(9) Onyango, P. (2015). Kenya Entangled in Proscribed Crimes of Terrorism and Violations of Human Rights Law. Sociology and Anthropology, 5(1), 2, 1-5.

(10) Shinn, D. (2004). Fighting terrorism in East Africa and the Horn. Foreign Service Journal, 81(9), 37.

(11) Onyango, P (2015), p. 2.

(12) Al-Shabaab is an Islamic jihadist group primarily in Somalia and Kenya. Its recent affiliation with al-Qaeda has led to an internal struggle for power that has been marked by the assassination of certain of its leaders who were independent of Al-Qaeda.l

(13) Simons, A., & Tucker, D. 2007, p. 399.

(14) Jenkins, B. M. (1985), p. 21.

(15) Jenkins, B. M. (1985), p. 21.

(16) Huddy, L., Khatib, N., and Capelos, T. 2002. The polls-trends: reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Public Opinion Quarterly, 418-450, p. 423.

(17) Oriol, P. S. (2004). Fear and fantasy: the elsewheres of post-9/11 tourism. e-Review of Tourism Research (eRTR), 2(4), p.1. http://lertr.tamu.edulcommentaries.cfm/?articleid=42

(18) Nacos, B. L. (2000). Accomplice or witness? The media's role in terrorism. Current History, 99(636), 174.

(19) Nacos, B. L. (2000). Accomplice or witness? The media's role in terrorism. Current History, 99(636), 174.

(20) Krause, V., & Otenyo, E. E. (2005). Terrorism and the Kenyan Public. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28(2), 99-112, p. 99.

(21) Wood, B.D. and Peake, J.S. (1998), In: Hall, C. M. (2002). Travel safety, terrorism and the media: the significance of the issue-attention cycle. Current Issues in Tourism, 5(5), 458-466, p.458.

(22) Iyengar, S. and Kinder, D.K. (1987), In: Hall, C. M. (2002). Travel safety, terrorism and the media: the significance of the issue-attention cycle. Current Issues in Tourism, 5(5), 458-466, p.458.

(23) Krause, V., & Otenyo, E. E. (2005). Terrorism and the Kenyan Public. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28(2), 99-112, p. 106.

(24) Jenkins, B. M. (1985), p. 21.

(25) Wilson, B. J., Hoffner, C., & Cantor, J. (1987). In: Comer, J. S., & Kendall, P. C. (2007). Terrorism: The psychological impact on youth. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 14(3), 179-212.

(26) Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Gadet, B., & Moulaert, V. (2000). In: Comer, J. S., & Kendall, P. C. (2007). Terrorism: The psychological impact on youth. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 14(3), 179-212.

(27) Nathanson, A. I. (1999). In: Comer, J. S., & Kendall, P. C. (2007). Terrorism: The psychological impact on youth. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 14(3), 179-212.

(28) Taylor, T., & Toohey, K. (2005). Impacts of terrorism-related safety and security measures at a major sport event. Event Management, 9(4), 199-209, p199.

(29) Atieno, W. (2015). Alarm as youth vanish, kin point finger at police. Daily Nation, Monday November 9, 2015, p. 17.

(30) Wanjohi, F. (2015). In Atieno, W. 2015. Alarm as youth vanish, kin point finger at police. Daily Nation, Monday November 9, 2015, p. 17.

(31) Atieno, W. (2015). Al-Shabaab now targeting secondary school students for radicalization, says coast police boss Robert Kitur.

(32) PwC, (2015). Hospitality outlook: 2015-2019, South Africa,-Nigeria-Mauritius-Kenya, 5th edition. Available on: http://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/hospitality-outlook2015.pdf Accessed on 5 November 2015, p. 49.

(33) Ibid. 49.

(34) Ibid. 11.

(35) In Kuto, B. K. and Gloves, J. L. (2004). The Effect of Terrorism: Evaluating Kenya's Tourism Crisis. e-Review of Tourism Research, 2(4), pg. 88.

(36) Agutu, M. (2003). In Kuto, B. K. and Gloves, J. L. (2004). The Effect of Terrorism: Evaluating Kenya's Tourism Crisis. e-Review of Tourism Research, 2(4), pg. 88.

(37) Gitu, N. D. (2003). In Kuto, B. K. and Gloves, J. L. (2004). The Effect of Terrorism: Evaluating Kenya's Tourism Crisis. e-Review of Tourism Research, 2(4), pg. 88-89.

(38) Gitu, N. D. (2003). In Kuto, B. K. and Gloves, J. L. (2004). The Effect of Terrorism: Evaluating Kenya's Tourism Crisis. e-Review of Tourism Research, 2(4), pg. 88.

(39) Kuto and Gloves (2004). In Korstanje, M. E., & Clayton, A. (2012). Tourism and terrorism: conflicts and commonalities. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes, 4(1), 8-25.

(40) Buigut, S., & Amendah, D. D. (2015). Effect of terrorism on demand for tourism in Kenya. Tourism Economics. IP Publishing Ltd.

(41) Ringa, M. (2015). Festival to give region's tourism sector new lease of life. Daily Nation, Tuesday November 10, 2015, p. 20.

(42) Ibid., p. 20.

Wilson Muna *

Kenyatta University, Nairobi

* Dr. Wilson Muna is a Lecturer at Kenyatta University, Kenya and a Consultant at Africa Policy Institute. He specializes in Public Policy, Governance and Countering Violent Extremism. wmunah2007@gmail.com / muna.wilson@ku.ac.ke

Caption: Figure: The relative threat of insecurity from Kenyan neighbors
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