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The Bamboo Fleet: how a ragtag airlift operation supported besieged U.S. forces in the Philippines in World War II.


The history of airlift has often been characterized by courageous Airmen employing innovative leadership and resourcefulness to accomplish the mission. At the beginning of the Cold War in 1948, Airmen employed innovation and physical courage to break the Soviet blockade of Berlin by successfully airlifting sufficient, food, fuel and other supplies often under difficult conditions to the citizens of that beleaguered city. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Berlin Airlift, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley paid tribute to "Men of innovation and resilience ... men of courage and honor ... men who would accomplish the mission regardless of the challenges before them" (1) This historical example of airlift innovation and courage established by a strategic need is renowned throughout the Air Force and the general public. Less well known but perhaps more astounding is an innovative airlift operation born of sheer desperation to resupply military forces in the Philippines in the earliest days of World War II. Cut off from any land supply, blockaded by sea, and with no conventional military airlift assets available, brave Airmen under extremely austere and grueling conditions, displayed the hardiness of spirit to procure, maintain, and fly an eclectic group of military and civilian aircraft dubbed the Bamboo Fleet to ferry supplies and personnel to and from Bataan and Corregidor. While all the Philippines eventually fell to the Japanese, the efforts of these pilots and mechanics saved lives and bought the Allies additional time to prepare for offensive operations against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific theater of operations. The Bamboo Fleet was by all accounts an example of courageous Airmen and leadership employing resourceful airlift innovation in extremis.

Following the December 7, 1941, attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Japanese armed forces moved to secure their sea lines of communication with the Dutch East Indies by invading and occupying the Philippine Islands. The rapid advance of Japanese ground forces convinced General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), he could no longer defend the entire island of Luzon. On December 23, he instead directed the remainder of his forces retreat to the more defensible Bataan province. (2) Jutting thirty miles south from the island of Luzon, this mountainous peninsula forms the northern boundary of the mouth of Manila Bay. Together with Corregidor, a tadpole-shaped island fortress two miles off the southern tip of Bataan, American and Filipino forces were to guard the entrances to Manila Bay while awaiting reinforcements that would never arrive. U.S.-chartered interisland blockade runners managed to resupply Bataan and Corregidor until late February 1942, when the Japanese Navy virtually isolated American forces. By the first week of March, heavy shipping losses from Japanese attacks forced Brig. Gen. Richard Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, to order cessation of further attempts to resupply Corregidor or Bataan by surface ship. (3) Supplies were still arriving to the southern islands of Cebu and Mindanao, but the problem was getting them to the forces on Bataan and Corregidor.

No conventional airlift aircraft were available to resupply the besieged forces. The B-17 bombers at Clark Air Base had been evacuated first to Mindanao and then to Australia, leaving only the Seversky P-35s and Curtiss P-40 Warhawks from the 24th Pursuit Group. By the time they deployed to Bataan airfields, combat losses resulted in only a single P-40 and two P-35s remaining in the inventory. Despite their unsuitability, these fighter aircraft were often used for airlift missions. They were soon transporting passengers and performing courier service, delivering official dispatches and mail to ground units throughout the islands. The P-40s were also used in airdrop missions, delivering medical supplies and ammunition to guerrilla forces. They were even involved in psychological operations, dropping propaganda leaflets. (4) To supplement their fleet on these noncombat missions, the pilots enlisted the use of a Stearman PT-13 (O-1 in Air Force nomenclature), an open cockpit biplane trainer appropriated from the Philippine Army Air Corps. (5) They also utilized a Stinson 0-49 observation aircraft. (6) These fighters and trainers, however, had limited space for passengers and cargo. Two passengers often had to crowd into the rear cockpit of the PT-13, and two people sometimes squeezed into the cramped P-35 and P-40 baggage compartments. One pilot even had two passengers in his P-40 baggage compartment while performing a bombing mission. (7) An attempt at using the P-40 as a transport by filling every nook and cranny with supplies resulted in overloading the small aircraft to the point that it nearly crashed on takeoff. (8) In order to augment their limited air transport capability, more capable local civilian aircraft were commandeered and a military aircraft was salvaged for use. These aircraft would become the Bamboo Fleet.

While fighters and trainers performed similar missions, only four aircraft were specifically considered to have comprised the Bamboo feet. One of the civilian aircraft was obtained through barter. On March 7, 1942, Capt. William Bradford flew a Stearman O-1 biplane trainer to the island of Panay on a courier mission and to survey the Iloilo airfield. While there, he noticed a 1933 Bellanca Skyrocket he had previously flown as a civilian pilot for an air transport company and later sold to the Filipinos. The island's commanding officer had been using the Bellanca as an observation aircraft. The closed-cockpit of the six-seat Bellanca offered limited visibility for reconnaissance; conversely the open-cockpit O-1 offered increased visibility but, with only the additional seat, limited cargo and passenger carrying capacity. Bradford, therefore, successfully negotiated a trade. (9) His old Bellanca, however, was not in the best shape; in fact, it had previously been condemned for flight. (10) There were only about 200 flying hours left on its single engine, the battery was out, and it had no radio. (11) An intelligence officer stated just as he was about to be evacuated on the Bellanca that the plane was "woefully small, fragile, and entirely inadequate." (12) A senior air officer opted to be evacuated on a PT boat through mine-infested waters patrolled by Japanese naval vessels rather than trust his life on the airworthiness of the decrepit Bellanca. (13) This much maligned aircraft would prove to be the workhorse of the Bamboo Fleet.


The fastest plane in the fleet was the Beechcraft Staggerwing, a four-place single engine biplane. Whereas the other aircraft in the fleet were limited to a velocity of less than 100 miles per hour (mph), the Beechcraft's 450-horsepower engine could propel the aircraft to a respectable 170 mph. (14) The Staggerwing was also previously owned by Bradford's company. (15) Someone had flown it into Bataan airfield, so it was pressed into service.

The least capable aircraft in the fleet was a vintage 1934 Waco biplane. This aircraft was provided by a Philippine Army Air Corps officer who initially flew the Waco down to Del Monte Field on the southern island of Mindanao as emergency backup air transportation for the B-17s that were evacuating MacArthur and his staff to Australia. (16) Bradford had also sold the plane to the Philippine Bureau of Aeronautics prior to the war. (17) As it had the smallest cargo capacity of the four aircraft, the Waco was the least utilized aircraft of the Bamboo Fleet.

The only military aircraft considered part of the Bamboo Fleet was a single-engine Grumman F2J4 Duck, a U.S. Navy amphibian aircraft. The Navy accepted delivery of these aircraft in 1934, and used them primarily for antisubmarine patrol, target-towing, and sea-rescue. (18) Three Ducks were found run aground and submerged in Mariveles Harbor on the southern tip of Bataan after being strafed by Japanese fighters. After determining one of the Ducks to be salvageable, Mariveles airfield commander Capt. Joe Moore directed his engineering officer, Lt. Roland J. Barnick, to recover and repair the aircraft. (19) Barnick was described as a "North Dakotan farm boy with a resourceful mind and an engaging grin." (20) He employed "ingenuity and a lot of hard work," in leading his repair team to employ a barge, runway cable and a crane to hoist the derelict Duck out of the bay and get it into flyable condition. (21) Pilots complained the aircraft engine was temperamental and prone to cutting out at altitude. (22) Out of all the dilapidated aircraft in the Bamboo Fleet, Barnick assessed the Duck as "particularly lame" and held together "mostly by faith." (23) When Philippine journalist Carlos Romulo first gazed upon this aircraft that was to fly him out of Bataan, he thought, "It was the funniest looking plane I had ever seen. It looked like something reclaimed from the city dump." (24) Nevertheless, this funny looking plane would be his last, best hope for escaping Japanese capture.


Despite media reports at the time, bamboo was never used as fuselage patching material as the fleet's moniker suggests. The sturdy plant indigenous to the region was actually a euphemism for many local operations, such a the communication grapevine being called the Bamboo Telegraph, or the later Bamboo Curtain used as the East Asian version of the East European Iron Curtain. (25) Given the lack of available supplies and spare parts, however, the pilots and mechanics did perform some equally innovative maintenance that kept the fleet flying for one more day. Native Philippine wood other than bamboo was used as large patches for the fuselage. (26) The bullets holes in the salvaged Navy Duck were patched not with bamboo, but with scraps of rubber from inner tubes. (27) After the Duck experienced a cracked cylinder head on a mission, Barnick was able to cannibalize the part from one of the other submerged Ducks. (28) Ground crews replaced landing wheels on both the Beechcraft and the Duck with common truck tires. (29) Even a wheelbarrow tire was used to replace a tail wheel. (30) As a joke, a pilot submitted a supply requisition that included bailing wire, chewing gum, and bicycle tape. (31) It seemed no idea was too outrageous to keep the Bamboo Fleet flying.

The Bamboo Fleet was the brainchild of Brig. Gen. Harold Huston George. The then Colonel George, V Interceptor Commander, was ordered to Australia with his staff on December 24, 1941, to organize defense air bases. As the senior officer after the December 24 departure of Far East Air Force (FEAF) Commander Lt. Gen. Lewis Brereton, George took command of the remnants of the FEAF in the Philippines, which now consisted primarily of fighters on airfields at Bataan and Mindanao. As such, he was promoted to brigadier general on January 30, 1942. (32) George saw the possibility of creating a ferry service to fly supplies into besieged Bataan. Prior to evacuating with MacArthur to Australia, George briefed Bradford on his aerial supply plan, in which long range bombers would fly supplies from Australia to Mindanao, and then the Bamboo Fleet would fly these supplies to forces on Bataan. (33) Bradford unofficially assumed command of the Bamboo Fleet operation. (34)

Capt. William Bradford was the perfect choice to lead the Bamboo Fleet. Nicknamed "Jitter Bill" because of his rapid-fire speech and nervous idiosyncrasies, his expertise and experience were critical to the success of the operation. (35) Bradford was an Army Reservist who arrived in the Philippines in 1931, as general manager and senior pilot of the Philippine Air Taxi Company. That position gave him the opportunity to fly all three civilian aircraft that would become part of the Bamboo Fleet. (36) He had flown more than 3,000 hours in the Bellanca alone. (37) He was also considered the most experienced pilot in the Philippines, having logged over 5,000 flight hours and flown into virtually every airfield in the islands. Believing war with Japan was inevitable and that the Philippines would be a vulnerable target, he volunteered to reactivate his commission in 1940. When the Japanese invaded, Bradford was tasked to fly one of the six unarmed Beechcraft aircraft of the Philippine Air Lines to transport personnel, deliver payroll, and supply drugs and medical supplies to the front lines near Lingayen Gulf, oftentimes against the threat of Japanese air attack. (38) Bradford's experience and courage had a calming effect on the other pilots, thus belying his reputation for nervousness.


With the notable exception of Bradford, the Bamboo Fleet flyers were primarily fighter pilots and not airlifters. Fifteen pilots remained on flying status at Bataan field, while others were incorporated into infantry units for ground defense. (39) Of the remaining flyers, six Airmen were designated as dedicated Bamboo Fleet pilots, although other pilots t flew a few missions. They alternated flying various aircraft of the Bamboo Fleet, plus their own fighter aircraft. Flying these diverse aircraft under such adverse conditions definitely challenged these pilots' skills because, except for Bradford, few of the other Army pilots were experienced in flying the aircraft of the Bamboo Fleet. Moore's flight training for the Navy Duck consisted of a single briefing with the former Navy pilot of the aircraft who by happenstance was recuperating from his wounds in the Corregidor infirmary. (40) Other pilots were not even that fortunate. As Moore flew the last P-40 out shortly before Bataan fell, Barnick was then slated to fly the last evacuees out of Bataan in the Duck on April 8, 1942. Having never flown the plane before, he now had to pilot a strange aircraft at night using a flashlight to read the instruments with a propeller stuck at the lower power setting of full pitch against enemy antiaircraft fire. On top of all these technical and operational problems, an earthquake hit Bataan just as they were taking off (Barnick initially thought his passengers were shaking the aircraft). Barnick managed to barely lift off when he started receiving fire from American forces on Corregidor who mistook his unfamiliar plane for a Japanese aircraft. (41) Fortunately, he completed his mission.

As with the fighter aircraft, the initial missions of the Bamboo Fleet were comprised mostly of transporting passengers. Between 100 and 120 personnel were evacuated through the Bamboo Fleet. (42) Bradford alone evacuated twenty-two key personnel from Bataan. (43) Some of the more interesting Bamboo Fleet evacuees included a Chinese emissary from Chiang Kai-shek caught on Luzon when the Japanese invasion commenced. (44) Also evacuated on the same flight were two Nisei American spies who had been undercover among the Japanese community in the Philippines gathering intelligence. (45) Had they been taken prisoner, their ethnicity and status as spies would have made them subject to treason in the eyes of the Japanese. Had the Bamboo Fleet not gotten them out, they would have most probably been executed. Most of passengers, however, were fellow pilots. Although fighter pilots served in infantry units while on Bataan, their skills and experience would be needed in cockpits for the future air operations. Some were ferried to airfields in Mindanao to fly up some of the three fighter aircraft shipped in from Australia, but most were being evacuated to Australia to serve in other flying units.

While the fleet flew out passengers, the return trip would usually bring extra food and ammunition to Bataan. As the siege wore on, medical supplies became the more vital cargo, particularly quinine to ward off and treat malaria. By the end of January, most of the troops were infected with malaria parasites. By March 23, 1942, 750 cases of malaria were reported daily. The Bamboo Fleet's flying in 758,000 quinine tablets helped alleviate the situation, but three million tablets per month were required to prevent the spread of malaria. (46) Despite their efforts, whatever supplies the Bamboo Fleet could fly in was never enough.

Besides flying out passengers and trying to keep forces on Bataan supplied, the Bamboo Fleet airlift also served to help maintain the morale of the forces. Personal cablegrams from an operating station in Cebu often made it through to individual soldiers and airmen. Less than three weeks prior to Bataan's capitulation in the midst of Japanese bombing, weak from lack of food, and wracked with malaria, one fighter pilot noted in his diary how two cables from his wife and parents lifted his spirits. (47) With increasingly bad news from the Philippines reaching the home front, soldiers and airmen could also get word to their anxious families on their status. Coveted luxury items would occasionally make it through to the forces. The fleet flew in sugar and confections, some made by the Filipinos. (48) Joe Moore often brought in candy with the Duck, so the aircraft was christened The Candy Clipper. (49) The fleet sometimes brought in liquor. (50) The nurses in the hospitals anxiously awaited underwear, makeup, and other feminine products. (51) Warding off despair during a military situation that was becoming increasingly hopeless was perhaps one of the greatest services performed by the Bamboo Fleet


As the need was great, the aircraft were routinely in danger of being overloaded by carrying more passengers and cargo than was allowed. Aircraft designed to carry between 250 to 600 pounds were regularly hauling 500 to 1,400 pounds of cargo and passengers. (52) Bradford often had to forego taking his own parachute along when flying in enemy skies to conserve weight. (53) Limitations on the amount of cargo were geared more toward volume as opposed to weight. Joe Moore was sure his Duck was always overloaded due to the lack of climb performance. As the Duck's boat hull made an acceptable cargo compartment, it was always filled to capacity. "Being a fighter pilot, I didn't know much about weight and balances," he said. "We just filled every nook and cranny full, including the rear cockpit." (54) It once took three attempts to get the overloaded Duck to liftoff. (55) When Barnick flew the Duck out of Bataan for the last time, he found that he had to jettison equipment and cargo just to keep airborne. Carlos Romulo recalled, "We threw overboard our baggage, our tin helmets, our parachutes, even our side arms." (56) Floorboards and anything else considered nonessential that could be stripped from the hull were tossed overboard by the Duck's worried passengers. The lightened Duck was then barely able to climb to altitude to complete its final mission. (57) Overloading these aircraft did seriously jeopardize flight safety but, given the alternatives, such as malnutrition, more deaths from disease or capture by Japanese forces, it was a risk the pilots were willing to take.

Flying under these extreme conditions demonstrates that this innovative airlift plan would not have succeeded absent the raw physical courage of the Bamboo Fleet pilots. Indeed, piloting overloaded aircraft appeared to be the least of the hazards these airmen faced. Flying mostly at night under blackout conditions with little illumination into these unimproved runways was hazardous enough, but the occasional missions flown in daylight made these unarmed aircraft nearly defenseless against Japanese fighters. One particular mission was especially perilous. After the fall of Bataan, Corregidor's increasingly desperate situation for more medical supplies in the closing days of the siege forced MacArthur's replacement, USAFFE Commander Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, to insist that an emergency supply flight be made to the island despite everyone's belief that the sortie would be most likely be a suicide mission. If the aircraft was able to dodge Japanese patrols and somehow make it to Corregidor, the pilot would then be forced to land at Kindley Field, a 1,600-foot irregular, uneven and crater-pocked runway that fellow pilot Richard Fellows described as a "terrible field" even by Bamboo Fleet standards. (58) Two pilots who had flown out of Kindley Field in the smaller Waco and O-1 aircraft deemed a landing on the field to be almost impossible. (59) Due to blackout conditions to avoid Japanese bombs and shelling, the only runway lighting for night flights was a searchlight that would dip its beam long enough to momentarily illuminate the landing strip. Wainwright considered landing on this strip "was as dangerous as over-water flying and Corregidor shelling." (60) Even if the pilot could successfully land the plane on Corregidor's single landing strip, the chances of making a flight back out were slim. Hence, the best the pilot might hope for would be to be taken prisoner by the Japanese after Corregidor's inevitable capitulation. Understanding the risks, the pilots agreed to draw cards to determine who would fly the Bellanca, the Bamboo Fleet's remaining aircraft, to the island. Bradford shuffled the deck and supposedly drew the low card, the two of diamonds. (61) The other pilots immediately suspected he already had taken the low card prior to the draw to ensure he would be the one to fly the mission. Bradford denied the allegation, but did acknowledge that his flying experience both in the Bellanca and in the Philippines made him the logical choice. He successfully made the flight to Corregidor and landed at the field, but his Bellanca veered off the side of the runway and crashed when attempting a takeoff the next day. Bradford and his passengers survived but the Bellanca was a total loss. To show his gratitude for making the flight, Wainwright arranged for Bradford to fly out on one of the last two Navy Catalina flying boats to fly into Corregidor prior to its surrender to the Japanese forces. (62) Bradford's miraculous one-way flight into Corregidor marked the final mission of the Bamboo Fleet.




The pilots' physical courage was reinforced by their hardiness of spirit, given they were tasked to make these flights under deteriorating health. Malaria and dysentery on Bataan were wreaking havoc on the pilot force. Above the door of the thatched hut that served as the Bataan Field clubhouse read a placard, "The Dysentery Cross Awarded to the Quartermaster by the Men of Bataan Field." (63) Bataan Airfield Commander Capt. William Dyess stated, "... I was fighting on two fronts that day--both against the [Japanese] and diarrhea." (64) The lack of food was also taking its toll on the pilots. Bradford had lost forty pounds. (65) By the middle of March 1942, 60 percent of the pilot force was deemed incapable of flying their aircraft due to malnutrition, and those who could fly were completely spent after a mission. The situation became so unsafe that the flight surgeon threatened to ground every pilot unless they received ample food. As a result, extra rations for the pilots were arranged to be transported from Corregidor. (66) The Bamboo Fleet pilots were somewhat more fortunate than other pilots on Bataan in that they could eat better when flying down to Del Monte or Cebu. Capt. Moore made it a point to shuttle extra pilots to these supply points for two days so they could regain their health by eating more and better food. (67) When a pilot was flown to Cebu on April 3, en route to Mindanao to pick up a P-35, he was amazed to find that only a trickle of the available supplies was getting to Bataan. He noted in his diary "It seems impossible that 400 miles north of here about 70,000 men are starving to death when there is so much of everything down here." (68) His frustration only seemed to further motivate the Bamboo Fleet pilots to bring much more into Bataan.

Strategically, the Bamboo Fleet made little difference in the war. Despite their best efforts, there was little the four small aircraft and tenacious pilots could do to prevent Bataan and Corregidor from falling to the Japanese. The Bamboo Fleet, however, did have an impact in the defense of the Philippines. There is no doubt these flights saved many lives, both through the evacuation of personnel and the delivery of medical supplies. Every person they evacuated was one less potential combat casualty, or victim of the Death March or Japanese prison camp. Many of the pilots they evacuated would go on to fly and fight again in the Pacific and other theaters of the war. The delivery of medicine, particularly quinine, also made a critical difference between life and death for many military personnel. Lt. Col. William Kennard of the Medical Corps, himself a Bamboo Fleet evacuee, claimed that "through the initiative and sheer guts of the Air Corps pilots" the drugs they delivered enabled the treatment of several malaria cases and prevented morbidity. He also contended that treating malaria maintained the fighting force and delayed Bataan's surrender by at least two weeks. (69) Those two weeks helped keep resistance alive in the Philippines for a total of six months, four months longer than the Japanese had planned. Those extra months required the Japanese to invest additional manpower and resources in the Philippines as opposed to other areas of the Pacific theater, thus buying MacArthur more valuable time in preparing his forces to repel and eventually counterattack the enemy. In novelist and historian Walter Edmonds' assessment of the overall effort in the initial months, he stated "Their accomplishment, little as it may have seemed in that enormous area of island-studded seas, was probably the deciding factor that kept the Japanese from trying to isolate Australia before we were able to prevent him." (70) As President Franklin Roosevelt started in his May 6, 1942, message to Wainwright shortly before the fall of Corregidor and the surrender of the Philippines, "The American people ask no finer example of tenacity, resourcefulness, and steadfast courage." (71)


(1.) Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley, "The Value of the Berlin Airlift" (address, Berlin Airlift Veterans Diamond Jubilee reception and dinner, Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2009).

(2.) Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), p.163.

(3.) Robert L. Underbrink, Destination Corregidor (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1971), p. 152.

(4.) Maj. William E. Dyess, interview, Aug. 20, 1943, transcript, 4, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

(5.) AAF in the Philippines, Master Copy, New York, N.Y.: Headquarters Army Air Forces Personnel Narrative Division, Office of Information Services, nd, p. 86.

(6.) William H. Bartsch, Doomed at the Start: American Pursuit Pilots in the Philippines, 1941-1942 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1992), p. 262.

(7.) General Order 26, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, Aug. 28, 1942, p. 2.

(8.) Bartsch, Doomed at the Start, p. 292.

(9.) AAF in the Philippines, pp. 86-7.

(10.) Capt. Roland J. Barnick, "The Bamboo Fleet," in Air Force Diary: 111 Stories from The Official Journal of USAAF, ed. Col. James H. Straubel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947), p. 251.

(11.) Lt. Col. William R. Bradford, interview by G. A. McCulloch, March 28, 1944, transcript, p. 3, San Antonio, Tex.; Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(12.) Lt. Col. Allison Ind, Bataan, the Judgment Seat: The Saga of the Philippine Commando of the United States Army Air Force, May 1941 to May 1942 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1944), p. 339.

(13.) Bradford interview, p. 4.

(14.) Barnick, Air Force Diary, p. 251.

(15.) Bradford interview, p. 2.

(16.) AAF in the Philippines, p. 88.

(17.) Bradford interview, p. 5.

(18.) William T. Larkins, U.S. Navy Aircraft, 1921-1941 (New York: Orion Books, 1961), p. 72.

(19.) Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, interview by Capt. Mark C. Cleary, Sept. 24 and 27, 1984, transcript, p. 60, San Antonio, Tex., USAF Oral History Program located at Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(20.) Col. Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1943), p. 290.

(21.) Capt. Roland J. Barnick, "The Bamboo Fleet" Air Force 26, No. 1 (January 1943): 19.

(22.) Bartsch, Doomed at the Start, p. 354.

(23.) Barnick, Air Force Diary, p. 251.

(24.) Romulo, Fall of the Philippines, p. 289.

(25.) Bradford interview, p. 6.

(26.) Barnick, "The Bamboo Fleet," p. 18.

(27.) Moore interview, p. 60.

(28.) Lt. Roland J. Barnick to Carlos Romulo, letter, nd, in I Saw the Fall of the Philippines (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1943), pp. 295-96.

(29.) Bradford interview, 8.

(30.) Barnick, "The Bamboo Fleet," p. 18.

(31.) Bradford interview, p. 8

(32.) Army Air Action in the Philippines and Netherlands East indies, 1941-1942, Army Air Force Reference History 11 (Washington DC: Assistant Chief of Air Staff Intelligence, Historical Division, March 1945), p. 180.

(33.) Bradford interview, p. 5.

(34.) Lt. Col. William E. Dyess, The Dyess Story: The Eye-Witness Account of the Death March from Bataan and the Narrative of Experiences in Japanese Prison Camps and of Eventual Escape, ed. Charles Leavelle (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), p. 48.

(35.) Ibid., pp. 48-49.

(36.) Bradford interview, p. 20.

(37.) Ibid., p. 3.

(38.) Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had: The Story of the Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1942 (1951; Rept., Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1992), pp. 141-42.

(39.) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1948), p. 405.

(40.) Moore, interview, 61.

(41.) Romulo, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 299-300.

(42.) Barnick, Air Force Diary, p. 251.

(43.) AAF in the Philippines, p. 124.

(44.) Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps (New York: Franklin Watts, 1989), pp. 85-6.

(45.) James C. McNaughton, Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service During World War H (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2006), p. 80.

(46.) Morton, War in the Pacific, pp. 378-79.

(47.) Quoted in diary of Lt. John P. Burns, March 22, 1942, "I Wonder at Times How We Keep Going Here": The 1941-42 Philippines Diary of Lt. John P. Burns, 21st Pursuit Squadron" by William H. Bartsch in Air Power History 53, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 45.

(48.) AAF in the Philippines, p. 91.

(49.) Dyess, Dyess Story, p. 47. Fantasy of Flight, a vintage aircraft museum in Florida, honored the Bamboo Fleet by naming its restored and flyable Grumman J2F6 Duck The Candy Clipper.

(50.) AAF in the Philippines, p. 123.

(51.) Bartsch, Doomed From the Start, p. 359.

(52.) Barnick, Air Force Diary, p. 251.

(53.) Bradford interview, p. 3.

(54.) Moore interview, 63.

(55.) Bartsch, Doomed at the Start, p. 354.

(56.) Romulo, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 293-94.

(57.) Barnick, "The Bamboo Fleet," p. 19.

(58.) Col. Richard W. Fellows, Personnel and Administration Division, War Department General Staff to Walter D. Edmonds, letter, Dec. 12, 1946.

(59.) AAF in the Philippines, p. 142.

(60.) Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story: The Account of Four Years of Humiliating Defeat, Surrender, and Captivity, ed. Robert Considine (1946, Rept., Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 107.

(61.) AAF in the Philippines, p. 141.

(62.) Bradford interview, pp. 14-18.

(63.) Dyess, Dyess Story, p. 50.

(64.) Ibid., p. 55.

(65.) Ind, Bataan, p. 302.

(66.) Dyess, Dyess Story, pp. 61-2.

(67.) Moore interview, p. 61.

(68.) Diary of Maj John H. Posten, April 3, 1942, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., p. 22.

(69.) Lt. Col. William J. Kennard, Report on Philippine and Australian Activities (Medical Corps, nd), pp. 10-11, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

(70.) Edmonds, They Fought with What They Had, p. xvii.

(71.) Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 118.

John F. Farrell is Associate Professor of Expeditionary Leadership at Air University's Squadron Officer College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, where he is developing graduate-level professional military education courses for Air Force officers. Prior to his retirement from the Air Force in 2004, he logged over 3,400 hours in the T-37 Tweet, T-38 Talon, C-130 Hercules, and the UV-18 Twin Otter, and served in staff positions for the Pacific Air Forces and as a liaison officer with the United States Army. He taught world, military, area, and American history courses at the Air Force Academy and at several colleges in Hawaii, Arkansas and New Mexico, as well as graduate courses in Korean Security Studies for American Military University. He has published in Air and Space Power Journal and in proceedings for the United States Air Force Academy's Military History Symposium.
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Author:Farrell, John F.
Publication:Air Power History
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Geographic Code:9PHIL
Date:Jun 22, 2012
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