The 'Organon' of Aristotle in the medieval oriental and occidental traditions.
The first article is Sebastian Brock's "The Syriac Commentary Tradition" (pp. 3-18). In this paper, Brock gives a condensed yet valuable overview of Syriac scholarship in the field of Aristotelian logic from the sixth to the thirteenth century. This overview is divided into the following sections: a) the Syriac translations of the Organon, b) the Syriac commentary tradition (where "commentary" is used in the widest sense of the term, ranging from general introductions to discourses in verse), c) a note on two prominent commentators: Probus and George, Bishop of the Arabs, and d) a brief listing of some outstanding problems. Here, I would like to make just three remarks.
First, it might be of interest to note that it was probably for theological rather than logical reasons that Syriac scholars in late antiquity restricted their studies to the Categories, the de Interpretatione and Prior Analytics I.1-7 (see Brock, p. 3). This, at any rate, seems to be the implication of Abu Nasr al-Farabi's (d. 950) account on the appearance of philosophy as preserved in Ibn Abi Usaybi a's thirteenth-century bio-bibliographical dictionary, the Uyun al-anba fi tabaqat al-atibba, from which the following passage deserves quotation:
The bishops assembled and took counsel together on which parts of the teaching of philosophy should be kept and which should be abolished. They decided that the books on logic could be taught up to the assertoric figures, but no further, since they believed that everything beyond would harm Christianity, whereas the permitted material could be used for the promotion of their creed.(2)
At page 4, in the entry on the Prior Analytics, 1 or 2a, Brock, with Nagy, describes the work in question as being by an anonymous author. But see also Anton Baumstark's Geschichte der syrischen Literatur, in which he suggested attributing this treatise to Probus (sixth cent.?).(3)
In connection with the dating of Probus' works (Brock, p. 7), I would draw attention to H. Suermann's "Die Ubersetzungen des Probus und eine Theorie zur Geschichte der syrischen Ubersetzung griechischer Texte," Oriens Christianus 74 (1990): 103-14 (which might be added to the references given in note 30). In essence, Suermann draws the same conclusion as Brock, namely that Probus' linguistic usage would appear to belong to the sixth century rather than to the fifth.
Last, attention should be drawn to Brock's appendix (pp. 11-15), which contains a systematic and chronological series of references to Syriac translations of the Organon and the main commentary tradition. These references inform us about manuscripts as well as about available studies and editions. Together with the main text, this listing (which does not pretend to be exhaustive) will prove very useful as a tool in future research.
Next, there is the article by Henri Hugonnard-Roche (hereafter H.-R.), entitled "Remarques sur la tradition arabe de L'Organon d'apres le manuscrit Paris, Bibliotheque nationale, ar. 2346" (pp. 19-28). In this brief but interesting and thought-provoking contribution, H.-R. invites us to take another look at some of the interlinear and marginal glosses and notes to the Arabic translations of the Organon as preserved in this famous manuscript. According to H.-R., Richard Walzer, in his classic "New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle,"(4) was wrong to stress the supposedly merely philological character of these glosses and notes because in many instances they give evidence of a different understanding of the logic of Aristotle, be it at the level of concepts or at the level of logical theory.
Challenging though it is in proposing a new perspective, I am not entirely convinced that the examples given by H.-R. on pp. 22-27 provide him with a water-tight case. True, his remarks on the alternative renderings of the expression ex hypotheseos syllogismous at Top. I.18 108b 12 (see pp. 22-23) and the various translations of the definition of the syllogism and its explanation at APr. I.1 24b 18-22 (see pp. 23-24) seem to be well taken. But in the majority of the cases, H.-R.'s analyses and comments suggest differences in understanding where in fact they do not exist. Let me explain.
At page 22, H.-R. suggests interpreting the alternative translations of dialektike (methodos) at Top. 1.2 101b 2 by sina at al-mantiq and (sina at) al-jadal (given as a marginal gloss) as two different ways of looking at the relation between dialectic and the art of logic. H.-R.'s line of reasoning is based on the otherwise correct observation that, at least from al-Farabi onward, jadal in Arabic logical terminology refers to dialectic proper as a specific part of the art of logic in general, which is invariably referred to as mantiq. Yet I think he is begging the question where he intimates that the translator of the Topics, Aba Uthman al-Dimashqi, did not distinguish the two because he used the compound sina at al-mantiq in translating dialektike (methodos), whereas the glossator must have regarded dialectic as a subspecies of the art of logic in general since he preferred the compound (sina at) al-jadal. After all, elsewhere in the Topics, e.g., at Top I.14 105b 23, Aristotle uses the adjective logikos in the sense of dialektikos. Therefore it is not at all inconceivable that it was with this particular acceptance of logikos in mind that al-Dimashqi felt free to render dialektikos sometimes as jadali(5) and at others as mantiqi, which would then be a translation ad sensum rather than ad litteram. Now the interesting thing is that, at 105b 23, al-Dimashqi translates logikos as mantiqi(6) without being corrected by the glossator, which can only mean that the latter, or rather the ancient translator(s) upon whose (Syriac) translation(s) he drew in making his comments,(7) did not understand mantiqi (only) as referring to "logical" in the general acceptance of that term. Given these findings, I am inclined to regard al-Dimashqi's use of mantiqi for dialektike as explainable in terms of a translation ad sensum, whereas the glossator's source appears to have preferred a translation that is both ad sensum and ad litteram (i.e., dialektikos = jadali and logikos = mantiqi). Accordingly, I conclude that the translations differ only from a philological point of view (ad litteram) and not from a logical one (ad sensum), as intimated by H.-R.
The second case (see pp. 24-25) concerns the translation of the phrase ek gar tes antistrophes perainetai to anagkaion at APr. I.14 33a 20 ("for that which is necessary [i.e., the conclusion] results from a conversion").(8) In the Arabic translation of the Prior Analytics by Theodorus, this phrase was rendered as follows: li-anna-hu in-nama tajibu l-natija an-hu min al-ruju,(9) whereas the glossator gives the following alternative translation taken from the Syriac: wa-dhalika anna l-daruri innama ya-kunu min al-ruju al-idtirari.(10)
As stated by H.-R., Walzer explains the difference between these two translations by assuming that Theodorus read perainetai ("results") in the Greek (giving rise to the remark [endorsed by H.-R. but not so by me, on which see below, n. 14]) that we should read tantiju ["results"] rather than tajibu ["is necessary"]), whereas there must have stood ginetai ('comes about') in the text that was at the basis of the Syriac version that is quoted in Arabic translation in the margin.(11) According to H.-R., this assumption is wrong: in his view, the translations are much more likely to differ as a result of a difference in understanding the word anagkaion. For where Theodorus took this (rightly) to refer to the necessity, i.e., the inevitability with which a conclusion follows from a set of premisses (logical necessity), the Syriac translator must (mistakenly) have understood it in the sense of the modal or existential necessity of the connection between a subject and its predicate (e.g., "necessarily: every man is an animal"), a necessity which he must have regarded as affecting both the premisses and the conclusion.
H.-R.'s interpretation rests on his reading and subsequent translation of the phrase quoted in the margin of the manuscript. He reads this phrase as follows: wa-dhalika anna l-daruri (not al-daruriyya as quoted by H.-R.) in-nama yakunu min ruju al-idtirari, which he translates thus: "c'est h dire: 'parce que le necessaire ne provient que de la conversion du necessaire.'" According to H.-R., ruju must be read without the article (cf. my quotation above) because the conversion is by itself not necessary.(12) In point of fact, in his view it is only by skipping the article in al-ruju that we get the right meaning, which according to him is "la conversion du necessaire."
Ingenious though it is, I think this interpretation is open to question. Indeed, it should only be as a last resort that we suggest changing the wording of a text as we find it in a manuscript, especially in delicate cases such as the one under discussion. For let us take a closer look at the problem as H.-R. understands it: a) at the end of the phrase quoted in the margin we find the two words al-ruju al-idtirari; b) these words belong together; but c) al-ruju al-idtirari is out of the question since there is no "necessary conversion"; therefore, d) we must read these two words in idafa by excising the article in al-ruju as resulting from a simple mistake by a copyist or by the glossator as he translated the Syriac. On the basis of this new reading, one must conclude that the Syriac translator has completely misunderstood Aristotle by taking anagkaion in the sense of modal necessity.
First of all, I see no point in positing one "mistake" (the introduction of the article in al-ruju al-idtirari) in order to lead us on to yet another "mistake" (ruju al-idtirari), especially since APr. I.14 contains no reference at all to syllogisms with necessary premisses and conclusions. If the first "mistake" were really to exist, why could it not have been made by the Syriac translator himself, since H.-R. assumes that he could and in fact did make the second? But instead of haggling over the question of whether or not one mistake is more likely to have been the Syriac translator's "true" mistake than the other, I would rather direct the force of my argument at step b) in H.-R.'s train of thought as reproduced above, namely the assumption that al-ruju and al-idtirari belong together. In my view, they need not belong together at all. Indeed, as I see it, al-idtirari should rather be read together with yakunu as the predicate of the sentence in which al-daruri is the subject and min al-ruju an adjunct. Seen thus, the sentence might be translated as follows: "That is (wa-dhalika anna, Gr. gar), that which is necessary (i.e., the conclusion) (al-daruri, Gr. to anagkaion) comes to be necessary (yakunu . . . al-idtirari (acc.), Gr. perainetai) only (innama, no direct counterpart in the Greek) through a conversion (min al-ruju, Gr. ek . . . tes antistrophes)."(13) In other words: yakunu and al-idtirari are to be understood as together rendering perainetai (or ginetai, which makes no difference for my interpretation) rather than yakunu alone, as tacitly assumed by H.-R. Now even though one might object to the introduction of necessity in the translation of perainetai (or ginetai), this appears to have been the way in which this verb was understood in this context, as may also be inferred from Theodorus' translation quoted above, in which perainetai (ginetai) is (via the Syriac) translated as tajibu, a verb which conveys this same notion of necessity.(14)
Given these findings, I conclude that in this instance, too, the alternative translations are only alternatives from a philological point of view and that they do not constitute evidence of a difference in understanding the original, Greek text (i.e., different ad litteram, converging ad sensum).
The third case concerns H.-R.'s extensive analysis (see pp. 25-26) of five alternative translations of APr. I.12 32a 6-7: "It is evident then, that there is no deduction of belonging unless both the premises express belonging. . . . "(15) Here, I would like to make the following comments.
H.-R.'s unfavorable judgment on what is referred to as the "third translation" (which may be found at p. 25, n. 24) is based on the fact that he reads kiltay al-muqad-damatayn as a predicate of al-thalatha al-hudud. However, as I see it, one could read al-thalatha al-hudud just as well or even better in idafa with kiltay al-muqad-damatayn ("the three terms of both premisses") and regard this compound as the subject of a sentence that is, for whatever reason, left unfinished. As possible reasons I would suggest the absence of the words en toi hyparchein at 32a 7 in the copy of the Greek text which formed the basis of this translation (less likely), a lacuna in the MS used by Yahya Ibn Adi by whom this translation was (probably) quoted or, and this would appear to be the most plausible explanation, a lacuna in the MS from which the glossator quoted Yahya. It might be completed, however by adding a phrase like (in lam takun al-thalatha al-hudud kiltay al-muqaddamatayn) bi-ma huwa mawjud (" . . . (if the three terms of both premisses do not) express belonging") as found at the end of the second of the translations cited by Yahya Ibn Adi (see p. 25, n. 23, second part). I would on this basis qualify the "third translation" as one which, though not being entirely ad litteram, is acceptable as a rendering ad sensum, but unfortunately incomplete. A similar judgment applies to Yahya's "second translation" which has the advantage of being complete. In connection with the reference to three terms, though unparalleled in the Greek of Ross's edition, it might be of interest to note that in one of the copies of John Philoponus' commentary on the Prior Analytics as edited by Wallies, the phrase phaneron oun hoti tou men hyparchein ouk esti syllogismos at APr. 32a 6 has dia ton trion horon ("through the three terms") added after syllogismos (CAG vol. 13, part 2, 145.13, apparatus) which might somehow explain the mentioning of three terms in the Syriac translations under discussion. Therefore, I think H.-R. is rash to conclude that the Syriac translators "completely" (transl. no. "3") or "probably" (transl. Yahya no. 2) misunderstood Aristotle. Indeed, in my view, this is not at all the case.
In connection with the first translation quoted by Yahya (see p. 25, n. 23, first part), I would draw attention to the fact that, in the Prior Analytics, the term syllogismos is sometimes used in the sense of a conclusion or symperasma.(16) This may be explained by the fact that if there is a syllogism, then there is a conclusion and vice versa. This being the case, H.-R.'s observation that this translation "a le merite de clarte et elle parait fidele a Aristote, a ceci pres toutefois que la condition qui s'y trouve enoncee se rapporte a la production d'une conclusion existentielle, et non a la formation d'un syllogisme existentiel" (p. 26) does not seem to touch upon the real issue, which concerns a very specific but altogether legitimate interpretation of the term syllogismos. In other words, the use of the term "conclusion" (natija) rather than syllogism (qiyas) at 32a 6 may not be interpreted as implying a lack of understanding on the part of the person whose translation is reproduced in the margin.(17)
As for H.-R's observation on the use of the term wujudi ("existential," "hyparctic") and cognates (p. 26, 1st para., end) as an alternative to Theodorus' mutlaq ("absolute") in translating Aristotle's hyparchein in 32a 7, I think he should have given the translator the benefit of the doubt rather than raising unfounded suspicions by stating that "on dispose de trop peu d'information pour juger si la distinction y est clairement percue entre les valeurs d'existence et de simple attribution." In point of fact, wujudi and cognates are perfectly intelligible in their relation to hyparchein. Therefore it would seem to be ill-advised to raise any questions about the meaning of these Arabic terms where we do not raise the question as to whether Aristotle himself in his use of hyparchein was clear about the meaning of that term in this particular context.
According to H.-R. (p. 26), Theodorus' use of the expression mutlaq ('absolute') for hyparchein "leve toute ambiguite . . ." as concerns the assertive (= predicative) rather than (purely) existential connotation of that term at APr. I.2 25a 1-2 and elsewhere. Unfortunately, he does not explain why this should be so. And in fact I do not think that the link between the Arabic and the Greek is as obvious as H.-R. suggests. Indeed, it is only through Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the Prior Analytics that one can understand the provenance of this term, it being an elliptical rendering of his haplos hyparchein as it is sometimes used in interchange with hyparchein in referring to plain belonging, without qualification, as contrasted with belonging that is expressed in terms of necessity or contingency.(18) I would therefore have expected H.-R. to raise a question here rather than in connection with the alternative and (in the light of Aristotle himself) perfectly clear expression wujudi and cognates referred to above.
Given these considerations, I would say that Theodorus' use of mutlaq and cognate expressions aims at giving a translation ad sensum that has its ultimate basis in the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias, whereas the alternative wujudi and cognates found in the margin of the Arabic Prior Analytics must be qualified as being both ad sensum and ad litteram.(19)
In this same context I have difficulties also in following H.-R. in claiming that the use of the term mujib ('affirmative') for tou hyparchein in the translation that is reproduced at p. 25, n. 25 fails to capture the true sense of Aristotle's hyparchein, which in this context refers to assertions in general rather than just to affirmations. For even though it is true to say that in the Aristotelian passage concerned (I. 12 32a 6-7), hyparchein is used in this extended sense (see also APr. I.2 25a 1 ff.), in the context of his syllogistics it relates au fond to (the) belonging (of a predicate to a subject), i.e., to a state of affairs that is expressed affirmatively, negations belonging to the realm of me hyparchein or not-belonging (APr. I. 1 24a 16-20, I.4 25b 40 ff. et passim). Therefore I see no reason to deny the glossator, who correctly rendered tou hyparchein as mujib, what we do not deny Aristotle, namely the use of hyparchein c.q. awjaba in a very specific, extended sense.
In view of the considerations presented above, I conclude that the majority of the examples given by H.-R. do not support his thesis that in a significant number of cases the marginal and interlinear glosses and notes as contained in the MS Bibliotheque Nationale ar. 2346 provide evidence of a difference in understanding the logic of Aristotle, be it at the level of concepts or at the level of logical theory. Indeed, as far as the above cases are concerned, there are very strong indications that we are dealing with alternative translations that, though different ad litteram, are always converging ad sensum. Accordingly, I find myself obliged to side with Walzer rather than with H.-R. in that I would stress the philological character of the glosses discussed above.
Yet one might wonder whether the glossators themselves were clear about the fact that the alternative translations which they recorded did not differ ad sensum from the translations to which these were added by way of comment. For if this were the case, H.-R. would still have a point, namely that by the time at which the glossators came to insert their glosses and notes, Aristotle had ceased to be understood as well as he had been in the age of the translators. However, I do not think that there is any hard evidence that would point in this direction. For the glosses and notes discussed above are either corrective or explanatory, or merely "for the record." Now since it is only in the case of corrective notes that a case could be made against any of the glossators concerned (Ibn Adi, Ibn Suwar, or another person), and given the fact that there is no indication whatsoever that any one among the notes and glosses discussed earlier was indeed corrective,(20) I think we should give them the benefit of the doubt by assuming that they, too, understood their trade.
The third article in the collection under review is Dimitri Gutas' "Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works" (pp. 29-76). In this excellent essay, Gutas first analyzes the semantic range of application of the various Arabic terms indicating the literary form of commentaries in the field of Aristotelian logic as these evolved over time from the early to the late middle ages (pp. 31-43). In so doing he succeeds in bringing clarity in an area where this was much needed. For only now are we in possession of a well-documented study on such much discussed but often misunderstood qualifications as tafsir, sharh, mukhtasar, jami, talkhis, and tajrid. The remainder of Gutas' article treats Christian scholarship in Arabic and "Eastern" and "Western" logic before and after Avicenna (pp. 43-64). This part, too, will by its richness and clarity, open a lot of avenues to those interested in this particular field of studies. This having been said, let me just make a few remarks en marge.
P. 29, no. 3. Here one might add D. Black, Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Texts and Studies, vol. 7 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990) [Rev. by J. Lameer, "Aristotelian Rhetoric and Poetics as Logical Arts in Medieval Islamic Philosophy," BIOR 50 (1993): 563-82]; R. Wursch, Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik: Ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 146 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1991).
P. 29, n. 5. Commercial edition: J. Lameer, Al-Farabi and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, Texts and Studies, vol. 20 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).
P. 30, n. 14. See now also the sequel to this article in G. Endress, "Die wissenschaftliche Literatur," in Grundriss der arabischen Philologie, vol. 3 (supplement), ed. W. Fischer (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 1992), 3-152.
P. 34. Given Gutas' remarks on the colophons of two copies of al-Farabi's commentary on the de Interpretatione (Teheran and Istanbul), it might be so that copy alpha in the stemma made by Zimmermann has below it alpha 1 for T and alpha 2 for A.(21)
Pp. 34-35. In connection with the expression ta liqat or, alternatively, ta aliq ("notes," "annotations"), it might be of interest to remark that these annotations sometimes circulated independently of the text(s) to which they were written. As an example of this I would mention the Ta a-liq of the Christian scholar Yahya Ibn Adi (10th cent.), which contains sixty such notes, mostly to Aristotle's Categories, de Interpretatione, and Prior Analytics. So far this treatise remains unedited.(22)
Pp. 35-36, para. 10. In connection with the distinction between "short," "middle" and "long" abridgements and the current confusion around these qualifications, it might be worthwhile to consider the possibility that the predicate "long abridgement" was only applied to a set of abridgements which included the entire Organon.(23)
P. 45, n. 74. Whether or not Avicenna's (negative and hostile) reaction to Ibn al-Tayyib's logical works was "justifiable" can only be determined by studying the contents of these works (and, of course, by subsequently comparing the results with Avicenna's views on these matters), something which has so far been done for his commentary on the Eisagoge alone.(24) Of his other works in the field of logic, the following are still extant but have been neither edited nor studied: a running commentary on the Categories (mentioned by Gutas, see also the reference to Endress given in n. 74) and epitomes of his commentaries on the Eisagoge, Categories, de Interpretatione, and Prior and Posterior Analytics. For those interested in the works of Ibn al-Tayyib, and in view of the lack of a systematic inventory of his extant works on logic, here follows a complete listing of all the copies of the aforementioned epitomes that are known to have survived:
Eisagoge, 2 copies:
1. London, British Museum Ar. 1561, fols. 143r-158r
2. London, India Office Ar. 3832, fols. 252r-261r(25)
Categories, 4 copies:
1. London, India Office Ar. 3832, fols. 261r-286r(26)
2. Hyderabad (Deccan), Andhra Pradesh Governmental Oriental Manuscripts Library and Research Institute, Falsafa 63 (= Arab. 371), fols. 155r-181r(27)
3. Rampur, Raza Library, Arab. Mantiq 3217 (389 D.), fols. 1v-29v(28)
4. Calcutta, Buhar Library, Arab. Logic 283, fols. 14-3(29)
de Interpretatione, 3 copies:
1. Hyderabad (Deccan), Andhra Pradesh Government Oriental Manuscripts Library and Research Institute, Falsafa 63 (= Arab. 371), fols. 181v-200v(30)
2. Rampur, Raza Library, Arab. Mantiq 3217 (389 D.), fols. 30r-51r(31)
3. Calcutta, Buhar Library, Arab. Logic 283, fols. 44-79(32)
Prior Analytics, 3 copies:
1. Hyderabad (Deccan), Andhra Pradesh Government Oriental Manuscripts Library and Research Institute, Falsafa 63 (= Arab. 371), fols. 200v-236v(33)
2. Rampur, Raza Library, Arab. Mantiq 3217 (389 D.), fols. 50r-88v(34)
3. Calcutta, Buhar Library, Arab. Logic 283, fols. 80-149(35)
Posterior Analytics, 4 copies:
1. London, India Office Ar. 3832, fols. 286r-309r(36)
2. Hyderabad (Deccan), Andbra Pradesh Government Oriental Manuscripts Library and Research Institute, Falsafa 63 (= Arab. 371), fols. 237r-261v(37)
3. Rampur, Raza Library, Arab. Mantiq 3217 (389 D.), fols. 89r-114v(38)
4. Calcutta, Buhar Library, Arab. Logic 283, fols. 150-197(39)
P. 48, second paragraph. The proemium to al-Farabi's commentary on the Rhetoric has survived in Latin and was edited by M. Grignaschi in M. Grignaschi and J. Langhade, Al-Farabi: Deux ouvrages inedits sur la Rhetorique, I: Kitab al-Khataba; II: Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabii, Recherches publiees sous la direction de l'Institut de lettres orientales de Beyrouth, serie I: Pensee arabe et musulmane, tome 48 (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1971), 123-274.
P. 48, para. 25, with n. 94. Gutas is right in stating that it is by no means certain whether al-Farabi ever envisaged his abridgments of the Organon as making up a single work. But some of them certainly belong together, for which see the incipits of treatises nos. 8 and 9 of Gutas' list on p. 49. From these incipits I infer that items 6, 7, 8, and 9 at least were written as part of a set, in that order. It might further be of interest to note that most of the extant copies of al-Farabi's abridgments of the various books of the Organon (contained in eleven MSS in Bratislava, Istanbul, Tehran, and Hyderabad) have been transmitted as part of a set containing either 5, 7, 9, 10, or 12 such abridgments. This I take to mean that the phenomenon of these treatises forming a set represents a strong tradition that, as we have seen, must have been initiated by al-Farabi himself. Yet the question of the likely scope of the set in its original form remains to be answered. It would seem that this set contained fewer items than the ones listed by Gutas on p. 49. Item 2, for instance, appears to have been written as an independent treatise.
P. 49, n. 100. Prof. Turker edited this text under the name Kuyel. See also: M. Turker-Kuyel, "L'abrege de Peri Hermeneias fait par al-Farabi," Arastirma 6 (1968): 25-34.
Pp. 56-57, para. 32. For an example of Avicenna's having become the focal point of later Aristotelianism in the East, see the commentary of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi on his Kitab al-Isharat wa-l-tanbihat, as contained in S. Dunya's edition of the Isharat, mentioned in Gutas' bibliography.
P. 57, n. 146. See now Wael B. Hallaq, tr., Ibn Taymiyya Against the Logicians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
Finally, I would suggest adding a few items to Gutas' extensive bibliography given on pp. 65-76:
Avicenna's al-Najat (see p. 71) is now also available in the edition by M. T. Daneshpazhuh, al-Najat min al-gharq fi bahr al-dalalat, Ebn-e Sina, Publications of the University of Tehran no. 1863 (Tehran: Mo assase-ye entesharat o-cap-e daneshgah-e Tehran, 1985/86).
In connection with the logical part of his al-Isharat wal-l-tanbihat, I would not recommend Inati's Remarks and Admonitions, but rather refer to the excellent French translation by A. M. Goichon, Ibn Sina (Avicenne): Livre des directives et remarques (Kitab al-isharat wa-l-tanbihat) (Paris: Librarie philosophique Vrin, 1951).
On a more general note, I would advise all those interested in Avicenna's logical works, be it in the form of editions, translations, or studies, to have a look at Jules L. Janssens, An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sina (1970-1989), Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, series 1, vol. 13 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991).
A similar remark applies to Averroes, where there is now available Philipp W. Rosemann's "Averroes: A Catalogue of Editions and Scholarly Writings from 1821 Onwards," Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 30 (1988): 153-221.
Finally, in connection with Yahya Ibn Adi's Uber den Nachweis der Natur des Moglichen (Gutas, p. 75), see now also C. Ehrig-Eggert's Die Abhandlung uber den Nachweis der Natur des Moglichen von Yahya Ibn Adi (gest. 974 A.D.), Ubersetzung und Kommentar, Veroffentlichungen des Institutes fur Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften, series A, vol. 5 (Frankfurt a.M., 1990).
The last two articles in the collection are John Marenbon's "Medieval Latin Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts, before c. 1150 A.D." (pp. 77-128) and Stan Ebbesen's "Medieval Latin Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries" (pp. 129-77). Given that my own work has been mainly on the history of medieval Arabic logic in relation to the Greek and Syriac traditions, I can lay no claim to expertise on the subject of medieval Latin logical tracts. I therefore restrict my comments on the contributions by Marenbon and Ebbesen to the observation that these two articles, which are very similar in the way they organize the material, are thorough and stimulating state-of-the-art inventories of the various types of glosses and commentaries written in the Latin middle ages. In addition, I would like to make two remarks on parallels in the layout of some Latin medieval glosses and commentaries as described by Ebbesen and the medieval Arabic tradition.
At p. 134, Ebbesen refers to the Anonymus Aurelianensis, in which lemmata from Aristotle are underlined, which he thinks may very well be "a Western invention." In this connection it may be interesting to note that in the Arabic medieval commentary tradition, too, it was not uncommon to mark lemmata in quotation by "overlining" them or by overlining the phrase or expression that would introduce such a quotation (e.g., qala . . . "he said . . . ") and the commentary proper (e.g., tafsir . . . "explanation" or yuridu . . . "he means . . ."). As an example of the latter kind (the overlining of words or phrases marking off the beginning of lemmata and commentary), I would refer to Averroes' commentary on the Metaphysics as preserved in the MSS Leiden OR 2074 and 2075.(40)
Grosseteste's numbering of chapters referred to at p. 143, too, was not uncommon in the medieval Arabic tradition. In this connection I would, by way of example, refer to the metaphysical part of Avicenna's Book of Healing (Kitab al-Shifa), which was translated into Latin in the twelfth century (edited by Simone van Riet as part of the Avicenna Latinus) and in which Avicenna's numbering of chapters and sections was reproduced as well.
In conclusion, I would say that with the publication of Charles Burnett's Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts (which also includes extensive indexes), an invaluable collection of essays has seen the light. Indeed, in my view, this work has everything that it takes to become the kind of classic that will inspire all those who are working in this field.
1 M. Wallies, Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium, CAG, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1883).
2 Ibn Abi Usaybi a, Kitab Uyun al-anba fi tabaqat al-atibba, ed. A. Muller, 3 vols. (Konigsberg: Selbstverlag, 1882), 2:135, 11. 10-13; F. Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 51.
3 A. Baumstark, Geschichte der syrischen Literatur (Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Webers Verlag, 1922), 102.
4 In R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy, Oriental Studies, vol. 1 (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer 1962), 60-113.
5 E.g., at Top. I.1 100a 22-23, A. Badawi, Mantiq Aristu, 3 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-misriyya, 1948-52), 2:469, 1.10.
6 Badawi (above, n. 5), 2:490, 1. 1.
7 See Badawi (above, n. 5), 2:532.
8 Nota bene: 'conversion' here refers to converting a negative, universal possibility statement into an affirmative one. As an example, consider the conversion of "possibly: no man can write" into "possibly: every man can write."
9 H.-R. translates: "c'est a dire: 'parce que la conclusion en resulte seulement du fait de la conversion.'"
10 For H.-R.'s translation of this sentence see below.
11 This alternative reading is indeed recorded for some manuscripts in the apparatus to the Oxford edition of the Prior and Posterior Analytics by W. D. Ross.
12 Al-ruju al-idtirari = "conversion necessaire" as translated correctly by H.-R. at p. 24, n. 20.
13 For my translation of al-daruri . . . yakunu . . . al-idtirari as "that which is necessary comes to be necessary," compare my translation of a sentence like the following: ra is al-wuzara yakunu ra is al-wuzara ala asas natijat al-intikhabat, "the prime minister will be prime minister on the basis of the outcome of the elections."
14 I think that Walzer's (and H.-R.'s) emendation of tajibu into tantiju on the basis of APr. II.18 66a 23 (see Badawi [above, n. 5], 1:284, 1. 11) is premature in the sense that it does not take into account the fact that there are good reasons to assume that Theodorus' translation of 33a 20 was based on the Syriac version of Hunayn Ibn Ishaq, whereas his Syriac model of 66a 23 probably stemmed from Ishaq Ibn Hunayn. Furthermore it should be noted that the copy of an earlier version of Theodorus' translation as contained in the MS Istanbul, Topkapi Sarayi Ahmad III 3362 has the same reading at 33a 20 (fol. 76r 1. 13) as does the one in Paris. Unfortunately, I have so far been unable to retrieve 66a 23 in this disorderly and incomplete manuscript (Walzer [above, n. 5]), 87; J. Lameer, Al-Farabi and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, Texts and Studies, vol. 20 [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994], 2-5).
15 Tr. R. Smith, Aristotle: Prior Analytics (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 17.
16 See G. Patzig, Die aristotelische Syllogistik, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, phil.-hist. Kl., dritte Folge, no. 42 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969 [3rd ed.]), 103 and 148, n. 2.
17 On the use of natija for syllogismos by Theodorus, see Lameer (above, n. 14), 71.
18 See Lameer (above, n. 14), 55-56.
19 A similar observation applies in the case of Theodorus' use of mutlaq and bi-l-itlaq in translating to me anagkaion at APr. I.3 25a 38 and me ex anagkes at 25b 5, which are glossed as alladhi/ma laysa min al-idtirar (H.-R., 26-27), for it is in the commentary of Alexander (and John Philoponus) that these expressions are said to refer to (plain) belonging (W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980 (rpt.)] 295).
20 H.-R. for his part would appear to consider at least some of the glosses and notes discussed above to be of a "corrective" nature, as may be inferred from his statement, "Outre que de telles "variantes" ou "corrections" [emphasis mine] ne sont pas de pure critique textuelle, mais representent des traductions differentes de memes mots grecs, elles impliquent parfois des conceptions differentes touchant des points de logique" (H.-R., p. 22). As for Badawi's (bracketed) addition of the qualification sh (for tashih, 'correction') in his note to Top. I.2 101b 2 (Badawi [above, n. 5], 2:472, n. 7) discussed above, it deserves to be noted that this addition appears to be his own and, as far as I can make out on the basis of a microfilm of this Ms which I have at my disposal, without any basis in the manuscript itself.
21 F. W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's de Interpretatione, The British Academy, Classical and Medieval Logic Texts, vol. 3 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981), cxlv.
22 G. Endress, The Works of Yahya Ibn Adi. An Analytical Inventory (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1977), 8796. Pages 42-52 of this invaluable study contain a listing of many more notes and discussions by Yahya on matters of logic. See also Gutas, 52, (9) and 56, (4) for similar notes and discussions by Avicenna and Averroes.
23 Lameer (above, n. 14), 13 (bottom) -14.
24 K. Gyekye, Ibn al-Tayyib's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge, Recherches publiees sous la Direction de l'Institut de lettres orientales de Beyrouth, nouvelle serie B: Orient chretien, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1975). For Gyekye's translation of this work, see Gutas' bibliography.
25 S. M. Stern, "Ibn al-Tayyib's Commentary on the Eisagoge," BSOAS 19 (1957): 425.
26 Stern (above, n. 25), loc. cit.
27 H. Daiber, "New Manuscript Findings from Indian Libraries," MME 1 (1986): 31, no. 54.
28 I. A. Arshi, Arshi's Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in Raza Library, Rampur (Rampur: Raza Library Trust, 1971), 4:242-43.
29 Sh. M. Hidayat Husayn, Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Buhar Library (Catalogue Raisonne of the Buhar Library) (Calcutta: Imperial Library, 1923), 2:312-13. Nota bene: the information provided by Hidayat Husayn is to be treated with great caution. See also A. Badawi, "Un commentaire inconnu sur 'l'Organon' d'Aristote," in Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language, ed. M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu, Wisdom of Persia series, vol. 8 (Tehran, 1974); 63-82. Even though Badawi does not disclose his source, it is evident that his findings are based on the copy kept in Calcutta.
30 Daiber (above, n. 27), 31, no. 55.
31 Arshi (above, n. 28), loc. cit.
32 Hidayat Husayn (above, no. 29), 313-14.
33 Daiber (above, n. 27), 31, no. 56.
34 Arshi (above, n. 28), loc. cit.
35 Hidayat Husayn (above, n. 29), 314.
36 Stern (above, n. 25), loc. cit.
37 Daiber (above, n. 27), 31, no. 56.
38 Arshi (above, n. 28), loc. cit.
39 Hidayat Husayn (above, n. 29), 314-15.
40 M. Bouyges, Averroes: Tafsir ma ba d al-tabi a, 3 vols., Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, serie arabe, vols. V.2, VI, VI.1, VII (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938-52), xlviii-xlix.
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Publication:||The Journal of the American Oriental Society|
|Date:||Jan 1, 1996|
|Previous Article:||Are There Really Tannaitic Parallels to the Gospels? A Refutation of Morton Smith.|
|Next Article:||Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions.|