Printer Friendly

Takeover and corporate restructuring: an overview.

*J. Fred Weston is Cordner Professor Emeritus of Money and Financial Markets at the Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, and an Associate Editor of this journal.

**Kwang S. Chung is a Professor at the College of Business Administration, Chung-Ang University, Seoul, Korea.

The restructuring activities of the 1980s were driven by globalization of markets, technological and financial innovations, deregulation, tax changes, fluctuating exchange rates, other changes in environments and modified antitrust policies that recognized the new realities. At least a dozen theoretical explanations are involved, most are efficiency enhancing. Mergers, tender offers, joint ventures, sell-offs, LBOs, security repurchases and exchanges all show net gains. Takeover defenses sometimes help shareholders, sometimes entrench management. Excesses, overbidding, and other mistakes have also occurred. Government should avoid distorting the takeover process, but should correct policies that create wrong incentives.

MERGERS, TAKEOVERS, industrial restructuring, and corporate control conflicts have raised important issues for business decisions and for public policy formation.[1] In this paper we seek to provide perspective on these developments. HISTORICAL COMPARISONS

Four major merger movements have taken place in the United States. The first was at the turn of the century, 1898-1901, when horizontal mergers brought together substantial segments of industries into dominant national firms. These mergers were stimulated by the completion of the transnational railroads that established the United States as the first large common market in the world.

The merger movement of 1926-29 was characterized by mostly vertical mergers. These were associated with the development of the radio, which made national advertising possible, and the automobile, which permitted more effective geographic sales and distribution organizations. Vertical mergers enabled manufacturers to control distribution channels more effectively. The period 1965-69 was characterized by conglomerate mergers. Antitrust restrictions against horizontal and vertical mergers were so effective that for the period 1948-77 conglomerate mergers represented 75 percent of the total assets acquired.

Data on the merger movement of the 1980s are presented in Table 1. The constant dollar consideration paid in acquisitions rose to more than $200 billion by 1988. The number of transactions declined from as high as 6,000 in earlier years to under 3,000. But the size of the transactions greatly increased in the 1980s. Antitrust policies restricted large mergers before 1980 and financial innovations facilitated them after 1980.

Mergers in the peak years 1968 and 1988 represented less than 2 percent of total corporate assets. Mergers were 7 percent of the market value of equities in 1988 compared with 4 percent in 1968 and under 3 percent in the intervening years. During the 1970s mergers were generally below 2 percent of GNP as was the case for the 1926-30 period. Merger activity in relation to gross national product was about 5 percent in both years. Mergers at the turn of the century represented about 13 percent of GNP, dwarfing all subsequent merger movements.

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS

While the merger movement of the 1980s fits into a broad pattern of historical episodes, it also has new characteristics and new impacts. We now treat the forces and potential explanations behind the merger movement of the 1980s.

The Changed Antitrust Environment. Some hold that the magnitude of takeover and restructuring activities in the U.S. in the 1980s is explained by more permissive antitrust policies. Historical perspectives cast doubt on this view. By the 1920s court decisions had emasculated the original provisions of Section 7 of the 1914 Clayton Act, which prohibited the acquisition by one company of the stock of another if adverse effects on competition resulted. From 1920 through 1950, when the loopholes in the 1914 Act were closed, there were no effective antitrust laws in the U.S. to prevent merger activity. Yet this period had about the same amount of merger activity as the next thirty-year period when antitrust restrictions were tough. Also, major increases in merger activity have occurred in the 1980s in other countries where antitrust policies were becoming more restrictive.

The Rise of International Competition. The revolutions in transportation and communications have produced world markets with increased international competition. The completion of the transnational railroads in the U.S. in the 1880s created a large common market that stimulated horizontal mergers and national firms. The emergence of world markets in the 1980s has stimulated transnational mergers that increase the size and number of large multinational enterprises. The prospect of Europe's 1992 integration has started another wave of mergers.

Changing Technologies. The pace of technological change accelerated after the end of World War II, increasing the degree of interindustry competition. Threats of losing markets and customers in an increasingly dynamic world have grown.

Management Adjustments. External environments have changed in many dimensions. As a consequence, firms have had to readjust their management systems, their selection of product markets, their research and manufacturing methods, their methods of marketing, and their management of human resources.

Deregulation. Deregulation has taken place in airlines, banking, the savings and loan industry, in other financial services, broadcasting, cable, communications, transportation, and oil and gas. These industries accounted for 37 percent of merger activity by value during the years between 1981 and 1986.

Fluctuating Exchange Rates. Fluctuating exchange rates affect the prices of raw materials, the prices of goods sold, and the prices of buying and selling foreign companies. Fluctuating exchange rates require continuous readjustments in the selection of production methods, marketing activities, and growth strategies.

Innovations in Finance. Deregulation in the financial services industry permitted greater freedom and flexibility, which encouraged an inflow of capital, resulting in excess capacity. Excess capacity placed pressure on profit margins and stimulated new types of activities, some highly speculative in part because of perverse incentives created by government policies such as deposit insurance.

Increased Use of Debt. One of the innovations in the financing of takeovers and mergers was the use of junk bonds, which played a pivotal role in takeovers and restructuring. Their declines in value during 1989-90 are expected to dampen takeover activity.

Changes in Tax Policy. Four major revisions in the tax laws were enacted during the 1980s, shifting the relative advantages of the use of debt and equity. The changes also stimulated new tax-planning strategies.

THEORIES OF RESTRUCTURING

As a foundation for analyzing the many forms of restructuring that have emerged, we review alternative theoretical explanations of their motives and consequences.
 1. Inefficient Management - Removal of poor
 managers to increase efficiency.
 2. Operating synergy - Economies of scale,
 scope and coordination.
 3. Financial synergy - Lower cost of capital;
 also bidders have excess funds, targets need
 funds for growth opportunities.
 4. Strategic realignment - Changing environments
 require adaptation.
 5. Undervaluation - If the market emphasizes
 short-term earnings performance (myopia),
 corporations with long-term investment programs
 may be undervalued. Firms sometimes
 can buy a company more cheaply than
 it could add capacity by constructing new
 assets.
 6. Information and signaling - Announcement
 of a restructuring may signal that future profitability
 will increase.
 7. Agency Problems and Managerialism
- Agency theory holds that in corporations
 with widely dispersed ownership, individual
 shareholders do not have sufficient incentives
 to monitor the behavior of managers.
 The managerialism theory states that managers
 are motivated to increase the size of
 their firms to increase their salaries and for
 the satisfaction of commanding bigger empires
 - management entrenchment and aggrandizement.
 Jensen's free cash flow theory
 argues that firms should pay out their free
 cash flows and increase their debt to avoid
 unsound investments.
 8. Realignment of Managerial Incentives - By
 altering managerial compensation contracts,
 the motives of managers to improve common
 stock values for shareholders may be
 strengthened.
 9. Winner's Curse - Hubris - When bidding
 takes place for a valuable object with an uncertain
 value, the winning bid is likely to
 represent a positive valuation error. Hubris
 is one of the factors that causes the winner's
 curse phenomenon to occur in takeovers.
 10. Market Power - Takeovers may improve a
 firm's market position.
 11. Tax Considerations - Tax considerations are
 important in designing mergers and other
 forms of restructuring, but are not a dominant
 causal factor. Large tax benefits from
 net operating losses and tax credits occur
 infrequently.Asset step-ups to increase the basis
 for depreciation deductions are not a
 strong general influence. Higher leverage increases
 interest deductions, but a firm can
 increase leverage without mergers. Also empirical
 studies show that when all parties are
 taken into account, the U.S. Treasury gains
 rather than loses even in highly leveraged
 LBOs.
 12. Redistribution - To some extent gains may
 represent redistribution among stakeholders.
 We next present the results of research studies
that provide tests of the alternative theories. An
important objective of the empirical work is to determine
whether social value is enhanced by restructuring
activities. If restructuring activities
improve efficiency, they produce social gains regardless
of the theory that explains their source.


FORMS OF RESTRUCTURING AND THEIR RESULTS

Table 3 provides an overview of the many forms of restructuring activities (M&As) and their returns. Most achieve positive returns - some quite large. The few negative returns are small. To explain these results we describe the forms of restructuring and their rationale.

Expansion

Mergers and tender offers. On average the gains to target firms in mergers are about 20 percent and about 35 percent in tender offers. Bidding firms had only normal returns in earlier years, but with government regulations and sophisticated merger defenses in the 1980s they have experienced negative returns. The combined net gains to bidders and targets have averaged 7 percent to 8 percent over the past two decades.

The premiums and gains stem from a number of factors: (1) Tax benefits account for only a fraction of the gains; (2) some gains come from efficiency increases resulting from turnaround improvements; (3) some price gains take place because the takeover or restructuring activity signals that future performance will improve; (4) some wealth redistribution from bondholders to shareholders occurs, but represents only a small fraction of the premium. In some cases "give ups" by workers may also be involved; (5) the winning bidder often pays too much.

joint ventures. joint ventures are new enterprises owned by two or more participants. They are typically formed for special purposes for a limited duration. Each participant expects to gain from the activity but also must make a contribution. When scaled to the size of investments, joint ventures achieve a 23 percent return. joint ventures appear on average to make important contributions to the well-being of business firms and to the economy as a whole.

Sell-offs

Spin-offs. In a spin-off the parent distributes shares on a pro-rata basis to its existing shareholders, creating a new legal entity. A spin-off represents a form of dividend to existing shareholders. Studies of spin-offs find positive gains to the parent of 3 percent to 5 percent.

Divestitures. A divestiture involves the sale of a portion of the firm to an outside third party. Event studies of divestitures have found significant positive abnormal two-day announcement returns of between 2 percent to 3 percent for selling firm shareholders, higher when the percentage of the firm sold is larger.

Equity carve-outs. In an equity carve-out the parent sells a portion of the firm via an equity offering to outsiders. A new legal entity is created. Equity carve-outs on average are associated with positive abnormal returns of 2 percent. This is in contrast to findings of negative returns of about 2 percent when parent companies publicly offer additional shares of their own stock.

The reasons for the positive returns in spin-offs and in equity carve-outs relate to management incentives. Homogeneous organization units may be managed more effectively and be evaluated more accurately by financial analysts. In addition, managers may receive incentives and rewards more closely related to actual performance when their segment's results are not obscured in consolidated financial reports. For divestitures the gains result from the shift of resources to higher valued uses.

Changes in Ownership Structure

In share repurchases the corporation buys back some fraction (on average 20 percent) of its outstanding shares of common stock. They result in significant positive abnormal returns to shareholders of about 13 percent. A number of hypotheses have been advanced to explain the gains. Tax effects appear to be a partial explanation. Increased leverage may account for some of the shareholder wealth increase. By increasing leverage, management also signals that cash flows will be higher in the future. Because corporate insiders typically do not participate in the repurchase, they increase their percentage ownership in the firm, another signal that they are optimistic about the firm's prospects. The share repurchase premium and increased insider holdings also provide a takeover defense.

Exchange offers usually involve the exchange of debt or preferred stock for common stock. The theories related to positive returns from exchange offers are similar to those for share repurchase: (1) The exchange offer increases leverage; (2) it implies an increase in future cash flows; and (3) it implies that the common stock is undervalued by the market.

Going private and leveraged buyouts. "Going private" refers to the transformation of a public corporation into a privately held firm. A leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition, financed largely by borrowing, of the stock or assets of a hitherto public company by a small group of investors. The buying group may be sponsored by buyout specialists (for example, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.) or by investment bankers. A variant of the LBO going-private transactions is the unit management buyout (MBO), in which a segment of the company is sold to members of management. Unit MBOs have represented more than 10 percent of total divestitures since 1981.

The early studies of LBOs found gains of 40 percent to 50 percent. These results attracted excess capital in relation to available good "deals." In 1988 and 1989 some LBOs encountered difficulties and filed for bankruptcy. What are the sources of gains in well-conceived LBOs? An LBO is unique in that it combines increased leverage with large equity positions for key personnel, thereby strengthening incentives. Improvements in performance have resulted. Some corporations or divisions of corporations that had been taken private go public again. These "reverse LBOs" also have achieved substantial gains to date.

ESOPs and MLPs. An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is a type of stock bonus plan that invests primarily in the securities of the sponsoring employer firm. By 1989 over 10 thousand ESOPs had been established embracing about 12 million employees. Successive legislative enactments provided tax advantages to ESOPs. Payments by corporations to the ESOP to meet both its interest and principal payments to the lender are fully deductible by the corporation. From the standpoint of the lender, one-half of the interest received is excluded from taxable income. In closely held corporations a chief executive can sell a substantial proportion of stock to the ESOP, maintain control of his company and obtain various tax subsidies as well.

ESOPs have been increasingly used as a takeover defense. Stock is placed in the hands of the ESOP, which is either controlled by management or by workers who are opposed to the takeover. ESOPs have provided some ownership participation to workers. However, the motivational influences have not been sufficient to improve company performance on average, because ESOPs are often seen as a tool of management. Federal revenue losses from ESOPs have averaged more than $2 billion per year. Questions have been raised whether these tax subsidies are serving a useful purpose.

Corporate Control issues

Unequal voting rights. Some corporations have classified stock. Typically class A stock has superior rights to dividends, but inferior rights to vote. Class B stock has superior voting rights, but limited dividends. Often dual classes of stock are observed in corporations where the family founders seek to maintain or increase their control position.

A motive for superior voting rights is to enable the management control group to achieve continuity of future plans and operating programs. Some argue that holders of superior voting rights are likely to receive higher benefits in a merger or takeover. Empirical studies show that securities with superior voting rights sell at a premium of about 6 percent. One way to establish two classes of stock is by dual class recapitalizations. The evidence suggests that such recapitalizations are undertaken by firms that are more susceptible to takeovers and that they serve to entrench managers. Nevertheless, exchange offers to effect dual class recaps have enjoyed increased popularity in recent years and are voluntarily approved by shareholders.

Proxy contests. Proxy contests are attempts by dissident groups of shareholders to obtain board representation. Studies of proxy contests indicate that they are associated with positive abnormal returns on the order of magnitude of about 8 percent. The positive shareholder gains indicate that there may have been agency problems or potentials for improved management performance. Even if conflicting groups on the board result from a proxy contest, the benefits of adversarial mutual monitoring between the groups outweigh the costs.

Premium buybacks. Payment of greenmail and associated standstill agreements are harmful to current shareholders in that the raider offers a premium over the current market price. A counter argument is that existing management can develop multiple offers, initiate a bidding contest for the firm, and obtain higher values for shareholders. Examples can be cited of large increases in shareholder values in subsequent years after raiders had been held off by greenmail and standstill agreements.

Takeover Defenses

Along with the financial innovations that stimulated takeovers and restructuring, counterforces in the form of merger defenses have proliferated. Defenses may be grouped into five categories: defensive restructuring; poison pills; poison puts; antitakeover amendments; and golden parachutes.

Defensive restructuring. One form is a scorched earth policy by incurring large debt and selling off parts of the company, using the newly acquired funds to declare a large dividend to existing shareholders. A second involves selling off the crown jewels, that is, disposing of those segments of the business in which the bidder is most interested. A typically formed for special purposes for a limited duration. Each participant expects to gain from the activity but also must make a contribution. When scaled to the size of investments, joint ventures achieve a 23 percent return. joint ventures appear on average to make important contributions to the well-being of business firms and to the economy as a whole.

Sell-offs

Spin-offs. In a spin-off the parent distributes shares on a pro-rata basis to its existing shareholders, creating a new legal entity. A spin-off represents a form of dividend to existing shareholders. Studies of spin-offs find positive gains to the parent of 3 percent to 5 percent.

Divestitures, A divestiture involves the sale of a portion of the firm to an outside third party. Event studies of divestitures have found significant positive abnormal two-day announcement returns of between 2 percent to 3 percent for selling firm shareholders, higher when the percentage of the firm sold is larger.

Equity carve-outs. In an equity carve-out the parent sells a portion of the firm via an equity offering to outsiders. A new legal entity is created. Equity carve-outs on average are associated with positive abnormal returns of 2 percent. This is in contrast to findings of negative returns of about 2 percent when parent companies publicly offer additional shares of their own stock.

The reasons for the positive returns in spin-offs and in equity carve-outs relate to management incentives. Homogeneous organization units may be managed more effectively and be evaluated more accurately by financial analysts. In addition, managers may receive incentives and rewards more closely related to actual performance when their segment's results are not obscured in consolidated financial reports. For divestitures the gains result from the shift of resources to higher valued uses.

Changes in Ownership Structure

In share repurchases the corporation buys back some fraction (on average 20 percent) of its outstanding shares of common stock. They result in significant positive abnormal returns to shareholders of about 13 percent. A number of hypotheses have been advanced to explain the gains. Tax effects appear to be a partial explanation. Increased leverage may account for some of the shareholder wealth increase. By increasing leverage, management also signals that cash flows will be higher in the future. Because corporate insiders typically do not participate in the repurchase, they increase their percentage ownership in the firm, another signal that they are optimistic about the firm's prospects. The share repurchase premium and increased insider holdings also provide a takeover defense.

Exchange offers usually involve the exchange of debt or preferred stock for common stock. The theories related to positive returns from exchange offers are similar to those for share repurchase: (1) The exchange offer increases leverage; (2) it implies an increase in future cash flows; and (3) it implies that the common stock is undervalued by the market.

Going private and leveraged buyouts. "Going private" refers to the transformation of a public corporation into a privately held firm. A leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition, financed largely by borrowing, of the stock or assets of a hitherto public company by a small group of investors. The buying group may be sponsored by buyout specialists (for example, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.) or by investment bankers. A variant of the LBO going-private transactions is the unit management buyout (MBO), in which a segment of the company is sold to members of management. Unit MBOs have represented more than 10 percent of total divestitures since 1981.

The early studies of LBOs found gains of 40 percent to 50 percent. These results attracted excess capital in relation to available good "deals." In 1988 and 1989 some LBOs encountered difficulties and filed for bankruptcy. What are the sources of gains in well-conceived LBOs An LBO is unique in that it combines increased leverage with large equity positions for key personnel, thereby strengthening incentives. Improvements in performance have resulted. Some corporations or divisions of corporations that had been taken private go public again. These "reverse LBOs" also have achieved substantial gains to date.

ESOPs and MLPs An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is a type of stock bonus plan that invests primarily in the securities of the sponsoring employer firm. By 1989 over 10 thousand ESOPs had been established embracing about 12 million employees. Successive legislative enactments provided tax advantages to ESOPs. Payments by corporations to the ESOP to meet both its interest and principal payments to the lender are fully deductible by the corporation. From the standpoint of the lender, one-half of the interest received is excluded from taxable income. In closely held corporations a chief executive can sell a substantial proportion of stock to the ESOP, maintain control of his company and obtain various tax subsidies as well.

ESOPs have been increasingly used as a takeover defense. Stock is placed in the hands of the ESOP, which is either controlled by management or by workers who are opposed to the takeover. ESOPs have provided some ownership participation to workers. However, the motivational influences have not been sufficient to improve company performance on average, because ESOPs are often seen as a tool of management. Federal revenue losses from ESOPs have averaged more than $2 billion per year. Questions have been raised whether these tax subsidies are serving a useful purpose.

Corporate Control issues

Unequal voting rights. Some corporations have classified stock. Typically class A stock has superior rights to dividends, but inferior rights to vote. Class B stock has superior voting rights, but limited dividends. Often dual classes of stock are observed in corporations where the family founders seek to maintain or increase their control position.

A motive for superior voting rights is to enable the management control group to achieve continuity of future plans and operating programs. Some argue that holders of superior voting rights are likely to receive higher benefits in a merger or takeover. Empirical studies show that securities with superior voting rights sell at a premium of about 6 percent. One way to establish two classes of stock is by dual class recapitalizations. The evidence suggests that such recapitalizations are undertaken by firms that are more susceptible to takeovers and that they serve to entrench managers. Nevertheless, exchange offers to effect dual class recaps have enjoyed increased popularity in recent years and are voluntarily approved by shareholders.

Proxy contests. Proxy contests are attempts by dissident groups of shareholders to obtain board representation. Studies of proxy contests indicate that they are associated with positive abnormal returns on the order of magnitude of about 8 percent. The positive shareholder gains indicate that there may have been agency problems or potentials for improved management performance. Even if conflicting groups on the board result from a proxy contest, the benefits of adversarial mutual monitoring between the groups outweigh the costs.

Premium buybacks. Payment of greenmail and associated standstill agreements are harmful to current shareholders in that the raider offers a premium over the current market price. A counter argument is that existing management can develop multiple offers, initiate a bidding contest for the firm, and obtain higher values for shareholders. Examples can be cited of large increases in shareholder values in subsequent years after raiders had been held off by greenmail and standstill agreements.

Takeover Defenses

Along with the financial innovations that stimulated takeovers and restructuring, counterforces in the form of merger defenses have proliferated. Defenses may be grouped into five categories: defensive restructuring; poison pills; poison puts; antitakeover amendments; and golden parachutes.

Defensive restructuring. One form is a scorched earth policy by incurring large debt and selling off parts of the company, using the newly acquired funds to declare a large dividend to existing shareholders. A second involves selling off the crown jewels, that is, disposing of those segments of the business in which the bidder is most interested. A third is to dilute the bidder's voting percentage by issuing substantial new equity. A fourth is share repurchase without management sale. A fifth is to issue new securities to parties friendly to management, including the creation or expansion of an ESOP, allied with or controlled by management. A sixth form of defensive restructuring is to create barriers specific to the bidder. For example, antitrust suits may be filed against the bidder or the firm may purchase assets that will create antitrust issues for the bidder.

Poison pills. Poison pills are warrants issued to existing shareholders giving them the right to purchase surviving firm securities at very low prices in the event of a merger. The effect of poison pills is to dilute share values severely after a takeover. These risks may cause bidders to make offers conditional on the withdrawal of the poison pill. The poison pill gives incumbent management considerable bargaining power, because it can also set aside the warrants if, for example, later bidders offer higher prices and other inducements.

Poison puts. A third type of merger defense was stimulated by the decline in bond values as a result of the RJR-Nabisco leveraged buyout in December 1988. It permits the bondholders to put (sell) the bonds to the issuer corporation or its successor at par or at par plus some premium. It is too early to know the extent to which poison puts will be used and how effective they will be.

Antitakeover amendments. Fair price provisions provide that all shareholders must receive a uniform, fair price - aimed as a defense against coercive two-tier offers. Supermajority amendments require two-thirds or more shareholder approval for a change of control. A staggered or classified board of directors may be used to delay the effective transfer of control. Another type of charter amendment is reincorporation in a state with laws more protective against takeovers. Or the charter amendment may provide for the creation of a new class of securities (often privately placed) whose approval is required for a takeover. In addition, lock-in amendments may be enacted to make it difficult to void the previously passed antitakeover amendments. While antitakeover amendment proposals are typically associated with small negative impacts on stock prices, shareholders have approved 90 percent of proposed amendments.

Golden parachutes. Golden parachutes are separation provisions in an employment contract that provide for payments to managers under a change-of-control clause. The rationale is to help reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. While the dollar amounts are large, the cost in most cases in less than 1 percent of the total takeover value. Recent changes in tax laws have limited tax deductions to the corporation for golden parachute payments and have imposed penalties upon the recipient. A theoretical argument for golden parachutes is that they motivate managers to make firm-specific investments of their human capital and to take a longer-term view in seeking to enhance values for shareholders.

Whether takeover defenses harm or benefit shareholders has not been resolved. Defenses may give management time to find competing bidders or otherwise increase values for shareholders. But takeover defenses may also discourage some bids and foster management entrenchment. In a series of cases the courts have held that shareholders have delegated important powers to management. The courts have adopted the business judgment rule, which supports management when they reject attractive offers on grounds that they can do better for their shareholders in the longer run.

CONCLUSIONS

Mergers and takeovers have introduced a new dynamism into the U.S. economy, producing gains from increasing incentives for efficiency improvements. Management is challenged to demonstrate continuing value increasing contributions to shareholders. But many examples of mistakes and excesses can also be cited.

The merger movement at the turn of the century was followed by economic development and growth in the U.S. M&As in the 1980s have also been associated with a long period of economic expansion. Obviously M&As have not been the only important economic factor operating. But neither have they been a major negative or destructive force to date.

Competitive markets have exacted penalties for failures in takeover and restructuring activities. Government policies against takeovers and restructuring would distort competitive processes. Government policies should avoid creating artificial influences. For example, reducing the incentives for the use of debt in capital structure decisions by corporate enterprise is desirable.

FOOTNOTE

1 This paper draws on our book with S. E. Hoag, Mergers, Restructuring and Corporate Control, published in March, 1990, by Prentice-Hall, Inc. To save space we omit references since citations for the evidence summarized here are in the book.
COPYRIGHT 1990 The National Association for Business Economists
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 1990 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Author:Weston, J. Fred; Chung, Kwang S.
Publication:Business Economics
Date:Apr 1, 1990
Words:5043
Previous Article:Joseph A. Livingston.
Next Article:Corporate leverage and the restructuring movement of the 1980s.
Topics:

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2022 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters |