THE U.S. COMMERCE DEPARTMENT AIDS HOLLYWOOD EXPORTS, 1921-1933.
Although a number of recent historical studies have dealt with the success of American films in foreign markets, relatively scant attention has been paid to specific government contributions to that success. This study focuses on the 1920s because that decade witnessed the most concerted and also the most well-documented effort by the U.S. government to aid Hollywood exports. Throughout the 1920s, the Commerce Department and its Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce both encouraged and facilitated Hollywood's overseas prominence. The purpose of this article is to discuss the extent of the government's assistance and the reasons why such assistance was given.
The U.S. cinematic push into foreign markets began in earnest during World War I, although, as Kristin Thompson notes, deliberate attempts by U.S. producers to challenge European competitors internationally dated back to 1909.(2) In the course of the war, American distributors moved aggressively to exploit markets not only in Europe, where the conflict had all but halted domestic production, but also in Latin America. As a result, one producer, George Kleine, sensed as early as 1919 "an enormous demand for American films in the foreign market."(3) In several markets, films from the United States already dominated as the 1920s dawned. A 1921 article in Scientific American claimed that Hollywood films held "first place" in Britain, Western Europe, and South America and were poised to do the same in Africa, Central America, Eastern Europe, and Asia.(4) These claims were confirmed by the official trade statistics of the Department of Commerce; a few years later, an official of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (BFCD) surveyed field reports from consular officers around the world and was struck by "the way America dominates the motion picture market nearly everywhere."(5)
The worldwide triumph of Hollywood filmmaking soon attracted the interest of U.S. government officials, who saw in it a way to further American foreign policy objectives and consequently took steps to support it. While U.S. government assistance to American exporters in general dated to the turn of the century, it grew in significance after World War I for two main reasons. The first was a tendency of the three Republican administrations of the 1921-32 era to eschew direct political intervention overseas and instead use the strong position of American finance, industry, and mass culture abroad as a means to achieve its foreign policy goals of preventing war and promoting economic and political stability. The second reason trade promotion increased in intensity in the 1920s was the appointment of Herbert Hoover as secretary of commerce. Hoover brought a great deal of international experience and recognition to his position, and he was a firm believer in the power of American foreign trade and in government assistance.(6)
To that end, Hoover paid particular attention to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, the agency responsible for trade promotion. He greatly expanded the bureau, boosting the number of foreign offices from 23 in 1921 to 58 in 1927 and quadrupling the overall agency staff. Hoover also made certain that trade promotion became the sole responsibility of the Commerce Department. Rivalry between Commerce and State caused some friction as the 1920s began, but the abolishment of the latter's Office of the Foreign Trade Adviser in 1921 and the permanent establishment of a BFDC foreign service in 1927 settled the issue in favor of Hoover's department.(7)
The commerce secretary took a great deal of interest in motion pictures, which he considered vital both to promoting other exports and to supporting foreign policy objectives. Testifying before a U.S. Senate committee in 1925, Hoover claimed that the success enjoyed by the American film industry abroad bore "very materially on the expansion of the sale of other goods throughout Europe and other countries."(8) Equally important, films played a decisive role in acquainting citizens of other countries with American identity and way of life, or, as Hoover put it in a 1927 speech, in transmitting "intellectual ideas and national ideals" from the United States to other nations.(9)
In various forums, officials of the BFDC elaborated on both the secretary's points. Extolling the power of motion pictures as trade booster, bureau director Julius Klein wrote a 1923 editorial in the agency's official publication Commerce Reports, where he imagined an Argentinean husband who admired the clothes worn by the male stars in a Hollywood film while his equally fictional wife was "in rapt contemplation of the leading woman's gowns." As a result, Klein assured his readers, "two prosperous residents of Buenos Aires now purchase their clothes in New York rather than Paris."(10) Addressing the film's potential as a vehicle for ideas, bureau employee Clarence Jackson North claimed in 1926 that "through American motion pictures, the ideals, culture, customs and traditions of the United States are gradually undermining those of other countries," resulting in a "subtle Americanization process."(11)
North wrote with particular authority on the subject, for he oversaw BFDC assistance to the American motion picture industry. A career bureaucrat assigned the film industry by his superiors, North apparently had no previous experience with films but proved eager to learn; after he was assigned his new duties in 1924, he claimed to have "worked up a tremendous interest in motion pictures and spend as much of my spare time as possible learning about them both from a production and a distribution viewpoint."(12) North's tenure as the bureau's "motion picture specialist" was, in fact, to coincide with the agency's most active involvement with film exports, from 1924 to 1933.(13)
Initially, North answered questions from the film industry in consultation with other bureau divisions and routinely relayed general statistics and reports from abroad to trade organizations. Such information, which typically entailed a country-by-country review of facts such as the number of theaters, the identity of distributors, distribution fees, possible improvements that U.S. producers could make, and the general popularity of motion pictures, had been gathered by the bureau since the World War I years, but it changed in nature soon after North's appointment to become more specific and to take into account the increasingly dominant position of American films. In a memo to Commerce Department officials around the world in late 1924, North's immediate superior, Specialties Division Chief Warren Hoagland, told them to pay particular attention to
[n]ew laws and restrictions, actual or threatened; the activities of local producers; censorship regulations, particularly changes; combinations or re-alignments of film distributors or theater owners; new theatre construction or consolidations; changes in the attitude of the public or the exhibitors toward American and foreign productions, any action threatened, either governmental or public, which would prove inimical to American pictures.(14)
Hoagland's memo demonstrates the more active stance taken by the BFDC in providing its industry clients with commercial information. Such information had been available previously through official publications such as Commerce Reports, but North also began sending reports, many of them confidential, directly to industry representatives, and he frequently took the initiative to meet with them to ascertain what information they needed. In that process, he eagerly pointed to the bureau's fact-gathering capacities, boasting that it had at its disposal "forty offices in the capitals or commercial centers of nearly every country in the world" and could, in addition, rely on "valuable assistance from the more than 400 consular officials of the Department of State."(15)
For all the government's ability to collect information, North realized his agency was serving an industry that was firmly established abroad by the mid-1920s and thus frequently knew foreign conditions better than the bureau. That was particularly true of markets where Hollywood clearly dominated, such as Canada, Australia, and Britain, and in these instances North frequently acknowledged that the government's information in all probability was inferior to what the industry already had at its disposal or could gather itself.(16) For that reason, it was important to North that communication between the government and the industry flow both ways. He stressed early on to one industry organization, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), that he was "particularly anxious to have us keep pace with the increased activities your members are taking in foreign trade" and asked for export statistics and lists of company offices abroad.(17) In 1925, the bureau sent questionnaires concerning the foreign business of American companies both to the Independent Motion Picture Producers and Distributors and to the MPPDA in order to generate reliable statistics.(18)
Although North's 1925 survey thus included two trade associations, it was with the MPPDA, the so-called Hays Organization, that he had the most contact. Formed in 1922 and nicknamed for its president, Will Hays, the MPPDA often has been regarded as concerned primarily with industry self-censorship in order to stave off government regulation. As Ian Jarvie argues, however, and as the organization's records show, foreign market issues such as overseas competition were high on the MPPDA agenda from the start. For the BFDC, the Hays Organization's dominant position in the mid 1920s simplified industry contacts because it allowed North to deal essentially with a centralized bureaucracy on the industry side. Judging from North's correspondence, he occasionally dealt with other trade associations and answered queries from individual companies, but the bulk of his communication was with his MPPDA counterpart, Frederick Herron, head of the organization's foreign department.(19)
North's frequent contacts with Herron and other Hays Organization representatives convinced him that although the industry in some cases could gather information on its own, it still valued what the government provided. He believed there was general agreement among MPPDA members that the bureau's reports and statistics had "the great virtue of absolute impartiality and that they contain concrete suggestions which are timely."(20) In contrast to the companies' own European representatives, commercial attaches and trade commissioners did not have to worry about losing their jobs if, for instance, they produced pessimistic market forecasts.
North's correspondence shows frequent concern with obtaining favorable publicity about the bureau's work, so his assessment of the value of that work may have been biased. It is clear from MPPDA sources, however, that the film industry indeed found the government's assistance useful. Will Hays himself praised the "knowledge of general film conditions" among trade commissioners and commercial attaches and their valuable contacts, and he noted in a letter to Secretary Hoover that MPPDA representatives in Europe had been "most materially assisted' by Commerce officials.(21)
North built up an extensive system for distributing that information to the film industry from 1925 on. He continued to publish motion picture items and reports in Commerce Reports, but he also produced more comprehensive publications dealing specifically with the film industry, so-called foreign market bulletins and trade information bulletins. Moreover, North established a close relationship with the motion picture trade press, and by 1927 his section was sending its papers a weekly press release. The most important result of the press-government contact was a joint effort initiated in 1926, the annual publication of detailed statistics and other information from most countries of the world in a yearbook put out by Film Daily. In exchange for a brief section promoting the service of the Commerce Department to the motion picture industry, bureau representatives abroad gathered commercial information such as film legislation and names of domestic distributors, trade journals, and theater chains.(22)
The securing of such information was aided immensely by the 1926 appointment of George Canty, a BFDC employee with experience as a congressional aide and a State Department official, as a trade commissioner based in Europe. Dealing exclusively with the motion picture industry, one of Canty's major tasks was to set up "a definite reporting system from the different offices," as North put it.(23) The new trade commissioner functioned as a central clearinghouse for information that he then sent on to Washington. Where staffing permitted, he also assigned individual clerks to cover film-related matters. In addition, Canty, who had previously worked for the motion picture trade press, wrote many reports himself.(24)
The new trade commissioner's job entailed more than information gathering, however. In 1925, both Hoover and Klein had argued before a Senate subcommittee for a $15,000 BFDC appropriation to establish Canty's position. As justification, the secretary and the bureau director pointed to an increasingly hostile attitude toward American films among European governments in the mid-1920s.(25)
At first glance, that hostility seemed to have primarily economic reasons: Europeans worried that Hollywood's overwhelming success was harming domestic film industries that might generate substantial revenue both home and abroad. What gave resistance to American films added force, however, was the fear that the influx of images, themes, and stories from America was detrimental to national culture and community, a concern that gave rise to complaints about American imperialism through film "propaganda," as one French writer put it.(26) European governments therefore supported domestic production by forcibly limiting the number of American imports: Germany led the way with quota legislation in 1925, and within the next three years seven more countries took similar action, among them such major markets for American films as Britain and France.(27)
Like Hoover and Klein, Hays Organization officials voiced concern over such developments abroad. From Europe, MPPDA representative Oscar Solbert reported as early as 1925 that "every nation is groping around for some method to keep our pictures out"(28) Always attuned to industry concerns, North instructed all the bureau's European offices to follow film legislation very closely.(29)
In the spring of 1925, before Canty's appointment, Hoagland instructed the U.S. commercial attache in Stockholm to "get in touch with the proper parties and bring out unofficially" that a Swedish government proposal to tax foreign film companies "would do more harm than good to the very interests it was supposed to protect."(30) Some months later, his colleague in London was asked
to contact officials at the Board of Trade (Britain's counterpart to the Commerce Department) "for the ostensible purpose of learning the details of the proposed plan, but incidentally to indicate that the Department is naturally interested and somewhat concerned" over British proposals to restrict imports of American films.(31)
In other instances, bureau foreign representatives took a more indirect approach. In Vienna, the assistant U.S. commercial attache protested formally against proposed quota legislation to the Austrian commerce and finance ministries, but he also met with representatives of that nation's film industry and Chamber of Commerce and supplied them with a resolution suitable for the formal comment that the Government had solicited when contemplating import quotas.(32)
Part of George Canty's mandate from Klein was to "uncover the official source of agitation against American films and to do what he [could] to minimize its effects"(33) and under his tenure BFDC contacts with government representatives increased. As an at-large representative of the U.S. government, he became the primary BFDC official to combat European quotas. By 1927, commercial attaches in countries where restrictions seemed imminent routinely requested that Canty be allowed to meet informally with government representatives, and his presence was also requested by the European representatives of American companies. At times, the trade commissioner went outside official channels in his fight against restrictions; in Austria, for instance, he conducted a publicity campaign against the government's import-quota plans in 1927.(34)
Since Germany had initiated quota legislation, Canty devoted a great deal of time to that country, and his activities there provide a good illustration of his efforts. The German legislation was revised periodically, and an important aspect of Canty and commercial attache Fayette Allport's work was to interpret proposed revisions to the American distributors in Berlin and to bring them together with German government officials. Allport, whose ability was lavishly praised by all involved, managed to secure "distinctly advantageous modifications" for the American industry on at least one occasion.(35)
By late 1928, standard procedure was for Allport to call a meeting of American trade representatives in his office, solicit their views, and present them to the German government. Rather than negotiating with the government themselves, Hollywood representatives abroad as well as at home put their trust in Canty and the Berlin commercial attache. As U.S. attention shifted from Germany to France in 1929, a similar role was played by the Paris commercial attache, Daniel Reagan, to whom North jokingly related that the industry viewed him as the "grand high arbitrator of their difficulties"(36)
As the importance of Canty and the commercial attaches grew, their role vis-a-vis the industry changed from being aides to being leaders. To North and Canty, it was essential for the American film industry to present a united front in negotiations with European governments, acting in effect as a cartel. On several occasions, for example, they recommended that Hollywood studios respond to quota legislation by ceasing to distribute any films in countries with restrictions, a threat that was often effective because of the wide popularity American films enjoyed with European audiences and cinema owners.(37)
While Commerce Department officials strongly advocated the cartel approach, the policy was actually a long-standing objective of Hays himself, although one that had been difficult to achieve; film companies often viewed each other as competitors abroad as well as at home. What government representatives offered was, as with market reporting, impartiality: they represented no one producer and had no stake in the outcome other than maintaining the overall flow of American films into Europe.(38)
On occasion, Department of Commerce staff efforts met with success in unifying motion picture studios. When Canty and Allport persuaded the American companies to stand united in Germany in 1928, for instance, the former reported it as "an accomplishment."(39) After the American companies responded to quotas in Czechoslovakia by boycotting that market in 1932, they promised the commercial attache in Prague to stand firm and report any competitor who violated the boycott, and the united front held.(40) In each case, the government in question yielded to some of the American film industry's demands.
Still, North harbored few illusions about the solidarity of the MPPDA member companies. As the need for unity became urgent in Czechoslovakia, he remembered past actions of the industry with little hope. North believed the fault lay with the Hays Organization in New York, since when it came to the American distributors in Europe, Canty and the commercial attaches had had some success in "getting the boys together and keeping them in line." In contrast, the company export managers in New York acted under the threat of quotas "just as though no other film company was in existence except their own."(41)
Moreover, the industry consistently ignored BFDC field staff warnings and failed to take "concerted action" until legislation had already been passed; then, when it was too late, studio heads reacted with "much excitement, with frantic appeals for aid from this Department"(42) The industry had, North thought, brought the quotas on themselves, since they had "failed to see that legislation of this kind was in the air and therefore did not modify their course to meet it."(43) The repeated appeals from the BFDC for "some sort of definite policy" were largely fruitless.(44)
Despite such frustrations, the last years of the 1920s saw the bureau's motion picture unit at the height of its powers. In 1929 the BFDC was made a division in its own right, placing films on the same level as major export commodities such as machinery, minerals, automobiles, textiles, chemicals, and electrical products. While the change in status brought no new resources, it was, as North saw it, nevertheless a recognition of the importance of his work both from the government and from Hays, who had lobbied vigorously for the promotion.(45)
The conversion to sound film had put new demands on the division, which now served not only the traditional motion picture companies but also sound equipment manufacturers such as RCA and Western Electric, and the rapidly changing market conditions made speedy and accurate information more necessary than ever. Assistant Chief Nate Golden and research assistant E. I. Way in Washington were assigned to assist North and Canty. For several years, the bureau sought funding for a counterpart to Canty in the Far East, but that position never materialized, despite a somewhat belligerent statement in the government section of the 1929 Film Daily Year Book that it was "necessary for the proper functioning of the section that additional personnel be added."(46)
The onset of the Depression dimmed division prospects considerably. As the federal government looked for ways to cut spending, North was ordered to practice "the most rigid economy possible" forcing him to limit Motion Picture Division publications.(47) Another worrisome effect of the cutbacks was the abolishment of all travel funds for the last half of 1932, which substantially reduced Canty's effectiveness. By 1933, even the remaining publications had to be reduced in volume. When the division was downgraded back to section status after 1 July 1933, North chose to leave the unit.(48)
Because North headed the motion picture department during its most active phase, his departure is an appropriate point at which to conclude by discussing the significance of Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce activities during the 1920s. Clearly, the U.S. government valued assistance to motion picture producers as a venue for promoting other American-made goods abroad and carrying the values and spirit of the United States to other nations. While the Washington-based staff of the BFDC motion picture unit was never very large, the unit had the support and attention of both Secretary Hoover and bureau Director Klein, as is evident from its rise to division status in 1929. Moreover, North and Canty had at their disposal the overall resources of the Department of Commerce foreign service, and they made frequent use of them.
Moreover, regardless of its manpower, the bureau played a substantial role in helping American film exporters to solidify and defend their strong position abroad. For an industry where competition for market shares among member companies was intense both at home and abroad, the disinterested perspective of government representatives was essential both in providing information and negotiating with foreign governments. The bureau's role, however, was an accommodating one, with virtually no imposition of policy on the industry: even the government's plea that companies present a united front abroad was only what their own trade organization had first advocated.
That the U.S. government assisted the film industry rather than dictated policy to it can be explained by the fact that it was offering aid to an industry already solidly established abroad when government officials began to take an interest in it. Consequently, Hollywood's needs were confined to market information and, when conflicts arose, negotiation discipline. The Hays Organization, the industry's own trade organization, had been formed to deal with such issues, but as Jarvie has shown, it remained relatively ineffective during the 1920s, allowing the government to take a more active role. The MPPDA's growing influence over member companies after 1930 was a major reason why the BFDC's assistance subsided, as well as the government budget cuts mandated by the onset of the Great Depression.(49)
Although the BFDC motion picture division's efforts in the 1920s are not easily traced to the present time, it can be argued that they contributed to establishing as government policy that films were an important export commodity deserving of assistance. Because Hollywood products continued to enjoy a great deal of success abroad in the decades after 1930, the greatest need for such assistance was, as in the 1920s, when conflicts arose with foreign governments. That was the case in the late 1980s, for instance, when American film and television producers found themselves facing European Community legislation intended to limit imports of American television programs. U.S. trade officials once again came to Hollywood's aid, filing a formal complaint that the restrictions violated free-trade agreements, thereby following a precedent set in the 1920s.(50)
(1) Film Daily Year Book (New York, 1930), cited in Kristin Thompson, Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market, 1907-1934 (London, 1985), 94-99, 219-23; Ian Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign: The North Atlantic Movie Trade, 1920-1950 (New York, 1992), 276, 305, 323-26.
(2) Thompson, Exporting Entertainment, 28, 35-36, 42-43.
(3) George Kleine to J. H. Maher, 27 June 1919, Kleine papers, Library of Congress.
(4) O.R. Geyer, "Winning Foreign Film Markets" Scientific American, 20 August 1921, 132.
(5) Henry H. Morse to Henry Howard, 8 January 1923, "Motion Pictures, General" file, record group 151/281, National Archives (hereafter BFDC motion picture records).
(6) Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca, 1984); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York, 1982).
(7) Annual Report of the Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce to the Secretary of Commerce (Washington, 1921-29); David Burner, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life (New York, 1978), 18384; Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, 140-41; Louis E. Van Norman, "Selling Our Goods Abroad" North American Review 244 (June 1927): 295; Laurence F. Schmeckebier and Gustavus A. Weber, The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce: Its History, Activities, and Organization (Baltimore, 1924), 39.
(8) Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Labor Appropriations Bill, 1926, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 68th Cong., 2d sess. on H.R. 11753 (Washington, 1925), 44.
(9) Address by Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce. Introduction by Will Hays, President, Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Inc., at the Seventh Annual Dinner of the Associated Motion Picture Advertisers, Hotel Astor, New York City, 2 April 1927, 87, pamphlet, Will Hays Papers, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, part 1, reel 32; "U.S. and Banking Leaders Laud Industry at Paramount Dinner." Exhibitors Herald and Moving Picture World, 12 May 1928, 87.
(10) "Trade Follows the Motion Pictures" Commerce Reports, 22 January 1923, 191.
(11) C.J. North, "Our Silent Ambassadors" Independent, 12 June 1926, 699.
(12) North to J. Homer Platten, 19 January 1924, BFDC motion picture records, "General."
(13) Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 310.
(14) Warren Hoagland, memo to "All Commercial Attaches and Trade Commissioners" 24 November 1924; C. J. North to J. Homer Platten, 9 January 1924, all in BFDC motion picture records, "General"; Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 276.
(15) North to Bert New, 29 July 1925; North to J. H. Smiley, 30 November 1927; North to George Canty, 31 July 1928, 18 February 1930, 20 November 1930, and 29 September 1931, BFDC motion picture records, "General."
(16) Herron to Hoagland, 27 February 1925; Herron to North, 13 June 1925; Elwood Babbitt to Klein, 22 October 1925, "Australia" file; Hugh Butler to North, 28 January 1926, "United Kingdom" file; North to Toronto Office, 21 October 1930, "Canada" file, all in BFDC motion picture records.
(17) North to Platten, 29 April 1924; Herron to North, 17 April 1925; North to Susan Martin, 1 May 1925, all in BFDC motion picture records, "General."
(18) North to Platten, 23 May 1925; Klein to Hays, 25 May 1925; Klein to I. H. Chadwick, 25 May 1925, all in BFDC motion picture records, "General."
(19) Herron to Jeanette Calvin, 17 October 1924, BFDC motion picture records, "General"; Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 279, 285-301; Annual Report of the Director, 1925, 44; "Report of the President for the Regular Quarterly Meeting of the Board of Directors, September 7, 1923" reel 12, part 1, Hays Papers.
(20) North to Canty, 20 November 1930 and 29 September 1931, both in BFDC motion picture records, "General."
(21) Unsigned MPPDA memo, April 1927, 4, reel 33; Hays to Herbert Hoover, 1 September 1925, reel 23; "President's Annual Report, 28 March 1927," 25-26, reel 31, all in part 1, Hays Papers.
(22) North to Canty, 9 June and 24 June 1927; N. D. Golden to William Cooper, 21 December 1929; North to Herron, 10 June 1927; North to Joseph Dannenberg, 31 July and 18 December 1925; North to Maurice Kann, 26 October 1927, "General" file; North to Charles Baldwin, 13 June 1928, "Australia" file, all in BFDC motion picture records; Film Daily Year Book (hereafter FDYB), 1926-31.
(23) North to Herron, 9 April 1927, BFDC motion picture records, "Sweden"; Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 333.
(24) North to Canty, 21 September and 15 October 1926 and 20 May 1927; Douglas Miller to North, 31 August 1926; Klein to H. C. Maclean, 17 August 1926, BFDC motion picture records, "General"; Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 353.
(25) Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, 44-45.
(26) Max Frankel, "La dispute du cinema: I. Le cinema francais sous l'oeil des barbares," Les Annales 86 (27 June 1926), 694-95; Victoria de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960," Journal of Modern History 61 (March 1989): 55-54; Rene Jeanne, "L'Invasion cinematographique americaine," Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 February 1930, 857.
(27) john Carter, "Hollywood Has a Foreign War," New York Times, 4 March 1928, sec. 10, p. 13; Thompson, Exporting Entertainment, 211-12.
(28) Oscar Solbert to Hays, 2-4 July 1925, reel 22, part 1, Hays papers.
(29) North to commercial attaches and trade commissioners in Europe, 10 August 1926; North to Canty, 15 October 1926, "General" file; North to Herron, 16 January 1926, "Czechoslovakia" file, all in BFDC motion picture records.
(30) Hoagland to T. O. Klath, 23 March 1925, BFDC motion picture records, "Sweden."
(31) North to Mowatt Mitchell, 5 November 1925; North to Herron, 5 December 1925, BFDC motion picture records, "United Kingdom"
(32) Elbert Baldwin to Klein, 4 December 1925 and 6 February 1926; North to Herron, 14 April 1926, all in BFDC motion picture records, "Austria."
(33) Klein to H. C. Maclean, 17 August 1926, BFDC motion picture records, "General."
(34) North to Herron, 21 March and 12 April 1927 and 2 November 1928; North to Canty, 10 November 1928, "Czechoslovakia" file; Raymond Miller to North, 24 June 1927; Canty to Klein, 9 January and 2 March 1928, "France" file; Canty to Bureau, 29 January 1929, "Germany" file; North to Bruce Johnson, 30 December 1927, "Sweden" file; North to Canty, 20 December 1927, "General" file, all in BFDC motion picture records.
(35) Canty to Klein, 9 January 1928, "France" file; North to Walter Miller, 9 February 1928; North to Fayette Allport, 17 January 1928; North to Herron, 8 November and 20 December 1928; North to Transportation Division, 14 December 1928; Canty to Bureau, 29 December 1928, "Germany" file, all in BFDC motion picture records; C. C. Pettijohn to Hays, 28 March 1928, reel 39, part 1, Hays papers.
(36) Reagan to BFDC, 4 June 1929; North to H. C. Maclean, 23 May 1929; Maclean to North, 1 March 1929, "France" file; Allport to North, 15 September and 28 November 1928; Canty to North, 5 November 1928; North to Transportation Division, 10 November 1928, "Germany" file; North to Daniel Reagan, 19 June 1929, all in BFDC motion picture records.
(37) North to Herron, 9 November 1926; North to Douglas Miller, 13 November 1926, "Germany" file; Golden to North, 14 July 1927, "Austria" file; North to Herron, 14 April 1927, "General" file, all in BFDC motion picture records.
(38) Solbert to Hays, 2-4 July, 1925, reel 22 part 1, Hays papers.
(39) Canty to Klein, 1 November 1928, BFDC motion picture records, "Germany."
(40) Don Bliss to Canty, 22 June 1932; North to BFDC Prague Office, 17 October, 1932; North to Herron, 10 March 1933; North to Canty, 18 February and 10 March 1933, BFDC motion picture records, "Czechoslovakia."
(41) North to Canty, 18 November, 1932, BFDC motion picture records, "Czechoslovakia"
(42) North to Canty, 26 September 1927, BFDC motion picture records, "Sweden"
(43) North to Montreal Office, 9 December 1927, BFDC motion picture records, "Canada."
(44) North to Canty, 15 September 1927, BFDC motion picture records, "General"
(45) Annual Report of the Director, 1930, 37; North to Charles Baldwin, 30 July 1929, "Australia" file; North to Maclean, 12 June 1928; North to Canty, 12 June 1928, "France" file, all in BFDC motion picture records.
(46) FDYB, 1928, 937; North to J. H. Seidelman, 28 November 1927, BFDC motion picture records, "General"; FDYB, 1929, 1005.
(47) North to Herron, 26 March 1932; North to AmerAnglo Corporation, 14 June 1932; North to Canty, 11 February 1933; North to William Orr, 13 February 1933, all in BFDC motion picture records, "General."
(48) North to Canty, 9 July 1932 and 31 January and 11 February 1933; Golden to Arthur Eddy, 28 August 1933; Golden to Commerce Department foreign offices, 21 September 1933, all in BFDC motion picture records, "General."
(49) Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 303-65.
(50) Paul Farhi, "U.S. to Fight EC Directive Limiting Foreign TV Shows," Washington Post, 11 October 1989, sec. F, pp. 1-2; Timothy M. Lupinacci, "The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities in the European Community: Cultural Preservation or Economic Protectionism?" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 24 (1991): 113-54.
Ulf Jonas Bjork is an associate professor of journalism at Indiana University-Indianapolis.
Ulf Jonas Bjork discusses the assistance that the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in the U.S. Commerce Department gave to American film exporters during the silent-film era. That assistance consisted mainly of compiling trade statistics but, on occasion, officials intervened on behalf of Hollywood studios in negotiations with foreign governments.
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|Author:||BJORK, ULF JONAS|
|Date:||Mar 22, 2000|
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