Printer Friendly


DISCUSSIONS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS of Plato's forms too often take for granted that immanence and transcendence are opposed to each other: if the forms are in instances then they are not separate from them, while if the forms are separate then they are not in instances.(1) This assumption is sometimes associated with the theory that there is a change in Plato's thought between the early or Socratic dialogues, in which forms are regarded as immanent, and the middle dialogues and Timaeus, in which they are seen as separate.(2) I will argue, however, that immanence and transcendence are not opposed but that, on the contrary, the former implies the latter. That is to say, precisely in that the forms are present in their instances, they are ipso facto also separate from them in all the senses which Plato claims. The idea of sensibles as images of the forms, in turn, is an expression not of transcendence alone, but rather of the conjunction of immanence and transcendence: the paradigm is at once transcendent to and immanent in the image. The movement from the early to the middle dialogues, then, is not the rejection of one position and the adoption of another, but simply the express articulation of what was implicit in the original position. Thus we find, not a fundamental change in Plato's thought from one period to another, but a single consistent and coherent theory of forms which is developed throughout these dialogues.


The Early Dialogues. The theory of forms, in the early dialogues, arises from the problem of staleness and difference: How can many things which, qua many, are different from each other, nonetheless be the same, and so truly bear the same name? Thus the discussion of a form begins with the observation of many different things which are the same in some respect: courageous actions (Laches); pious actions (Euthyphro); beautiful things (Greater Hippias); virtues, bees, or shapes (Meno). Socrates then demands to know what is the same about all of them, in virtue of which these different things are the same. Thus, in the Laches, he says, "Try to say, first, what is courage, which is the same in all these ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] ... [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])?"(3) Laches attempts an answer: "It seems to me that it is a certain endurance of the soul, if it is necessary to say about courage what is by nature through all these ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] ... [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])."(4) Similarly, in the Euthyphro, Socrates says, "Is not the pious itself the same as itself in all actions, and the impious again, the opposite of all that is pious, itself like to itself, and everything which is to be impious having some one look ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) with regard to its impious-ness?"(5) Most plainly of all, in the Meno, Socrates says of the virtues, "Although they are many and diverse, they yet all have some one same look ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) through which they are virtues."(6) An [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] or [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], a form, is the "look," the character or nature, which is present in and displayed by the many instances. Hence it must itself be numerically one and the same, in order to account for the many different instances being the same: if they are in fact the same, and thus can truly be called by the same name, they must have something in common, that is, there must be something one and the same ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) in all of them. With regard to these dialogues, then, the forms can rightly be regarded as "immanent universals." That is to say, each form is one same nature which is displayed by many different things as the property or character of each, the determination by which each of them is such as it is: courageous, pious, beautiful, a virtue, and so forth.

From this starting-point, we can immediately draw the following conclusions about these forms or universals: (1) A form is other than each and all of its instances. For whatever is one and the same about many different things must itself not be any one of them. In the Greater Hippias, when Hippias is asked "What is the beautiful?(7) that is, what is the common character of all beautiful things, he replies, "A beautiful maiden is beautiful."(8) Socrates' first response is simply to point out that there are other beautiful things,(9) which are not the maiden but are beautiful. In other words, since the beautiful maiden is one among the many beautiful things, she cannot be that which is common to them all. Similarly, in the Meno, Socrates remarks, "If someone asked you ... `What is shape, Meno?' if you said to him, `Roundness,' and if he then said to you `Is roundness shape or some shape?' surely you would say, `Some shape.' ... For this reason, that there are also other shapes."(10) Socrates then says, "Since you call these many things by some one name, and you say that none of them is not a shape ... what is this which occupies ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) the round no less than the straight, which you call shape?"(11) Since the instances are many and different from each other, no instance can be what is one and the same about them all. This seemingly straightforward and obvious observation has in fact the most profound and far-reaching implications. For it means that the immanent universal, the nature which is present in all the instances, is by that very fact also transcendent to them, at least in the minimal sense that it is other than each and all of them.

(2) The forms are intelligible ideas. Socrates often insists that these unitary "looks" or forms must "be something"(12) in order to account for the different instances being the same; but what sort of things are they? Clearly, they are not sensible objects. Consider the universal characters that have been mentioned in these dialogues: courage, beauty, virtue, shape, piety, impiety--to which we may add quickness(13) and perhaps even bee-ness(14). If we ask of any of these, "How big is it? What color is it? Where (among other objects in space) is it?" we are obviously asking the wrong kind of questions. Even so-called sensible properties such as colors are not themselves objects of the senses. What we perceive by sight is not a color, as a universal feature which is displayed by many different things, but a particular colored object.(15) A form, in short, is an idea, a "look" which is apprehended not by the eyes but by the mind. This is not to say that a form is merely a concept, existing only within the mind of the thinker. Rather, it is an idea in the sense that it is an intelligible content, an object for the mind rather than the senses. The identifying "looks" or determinations of things, by which they are what they are, are ideas, that is, universal natures or characters grasped by thought. The forms, then, are the intelligible contents which are present in and displayed by instances as their determining properties.

(3) The forms are in instances as their properties. In these early dialogues, Plato indicates that a form is "in" ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) its instances;(16) that it is "through" ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) the instances;(17) that the instances "have" ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) the form;(18) that the, form "comes to" ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) the instance.(19) Such expressions are usually, and rightly, taken to mean that Plato conceives the forms as immanent or present in the instances. But what, exactly, does "present in" mean in this context? It must mean, first, that the instance "has" the form as its nature or determination, the property or feature in virtue of which it is such as it is.(20) The form is not only the one-over-many, that which is the same for all the instances, but also the one-in-the-many, that by which each of the many is of such a kind. Indeed, the central point of the whole notion of forms as they are presented in these dialogues is that what is one and the same for all the instances is a quality which is present in each one of them. Thus the form is effectively present, as that "by which"(21) the instance is such an instance. Further, to say that the form is "in" the instances also indicates that it is cognitively present. The instance presents the form to us, so that in seeing the instance we become aware of the form as the "look" which it "has," the intelligible nature which it displays.

From these points, it follows that the forms are both immanent and transcendent. For the very presence of the form "in" an instance as its property also implies an absolute otherness of the form from the instance. To say of two terms, A and B, that A is in B, or that B has A, involves saying that A is not B. As we have seen, precisely in that the form is one and the same in all the instances, it is other than all of them. Thus "in" implies not only presence but also a certain kind of absence: we never encounter the form in our experience. The forms are "in" the world which we experience with our senses, but they are not parts or members of it. Thus an instance, precisely in that it has or displays some intelligibility, some identity, is thereby pointing beyond itself to the intelligible nature which it has but which it itself is not. When the early dialogues indicate that the forms are in the instances, then, this very "in" implies the presence of the absolutely other. That which is the same in all the instances, that which they have in common, is an intelligible nature which is other than all of them. As soon as we recognize that the forms are the universal intelligible natures of sensible particulars, we are able to break free from spatial metaphors, from thinking of immanence and transcendence in terms of the local presence or separation of one sensible thing to another. Thus the apparent opposition between them disappears. Where, among all the beautiful things in the world, is beauty? Everywhere and nowhere: everywhere, because wherever a beautiful thing is, there is beauty, as a property which it has and by which it is beautiful; nowhere, because we cannot point to any one of them and say, "There it is!" as if it were identical with or confined to that one instance.

Without going beyond these dialogues, then, but simply by thinking out what is implied by many instances having the same "look," having some nature in common, we have arrived at the conception of the forms as incorporeal, intelligible ideas which are both immanent or present in their instances and transcendent to them. The presumed opposition between "in" and "separate," between immanence and transcendence, vanishes, as soon as we think carefully about what Plato means by the forms, about what they are and what must be the relationship between instances and forms. As we turn now to the middle dialogues, where Plato is traditionally said to "separate the forms"(22) from the instances, we will find that what is claimed for the forms is in fact neither more nor less than what follows from their being in instances, as in the early dialogues.


The Middle Dialogues. In what sense, in the middle dialogues, are the forms "separate?"(23) First, they are clearly distinct from sensibles in that they are apprehended by the mind, not by the senses.(24) Yet as we have seen, this is an obvious (although not therefore trivial) point. The natures which are common to many sensible things are not themselves objects of the senses, which always perceive characterized particulars, not universal characters. Thus, although they are "in" sensible bodies as their determining characters, the forms themselves, as intelligible universal ideas, are incorporeal. Again, in the Phaedo, a form is causally prior to its instances, in that the instances are such as they are by participating in the form, or simply by the form itself.(25) But this too is no more than what is said in the early dialogues, where the form is that "by which" the instances are such as they are: the presence in a thing of a certain universal character as its property or determination is what makes it to be such a thing.

More suggestive of separation, perhaps, are the frequent references to the forms as being "themselves by themselves."(26) But this means that the form, qua universal, as one and the same in all the instances, is not itself subject to the individuating factors which make it to be the character of one or another instance. Largeness, for example, is a unitary intelligible "look" which can be displayed by various different things in relation to others, but is not itself conditioned by such relations. The largeness of Simmias in relation to Socrates is one and the same intelligible content as the largeness of Phaedo in relation to Simmias: Simmias in relation to Socrates displays the same look as Phaedo in relation to Simmias. Largeness itself, as that one same intelligible content, does not bear any particular limiting conditions. Thus a form, as a single universal idea, is and can be known "itself by itself," without including such individuating features, and to know a form by the intellect, as an idea, a unitary look present in many instances, is to know it in this way. That a form is and is known [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] does not deny that it is; in its instances, but rather indicates that precisely since it is the same in all the instances, it is itself unconditioned by them.

Thus, without going beyond what is already implied by the discussion of forms in the early dialogues, we arrive at the conception of the realm of the forms as it is usually presented in the middle dialogues: "Reality which really is, colorless and shapeless and intangible, visible to the intellect only, the guide of the soul ... has this place."(27) The forms are incorporeal, intelligible realities, which are other than, unconditioned by, and causally prior to their sensible instances. If this is what is meant by "separate," then the forms are separate from their instances. But none of this denies or contradicts the forms being in instances as their properties, as the intelligible determinations which they have and display. On the contrary, such "separation" is implied by and required for one and the same form being present in many different instances. It is a strict logical inference that if many things have the same property, then that very property itself is (in this sense) separate from them. If, for example, many things are beautiful, that is, have beauty as a property, then beauty is separate from them in the sense we have specified. Precisely in order that it may be one and the same in all the instances, the form must transcend them all. The transcendence of the forms which we find in the middle dialogues is thus not a denial but rather a consequence of the immanence of the forms which we find in the early dialogues, of their being universal characters which are present in many instances. Physical, sensible things have and display incorporeal, intelligible natures which transcend them, and only by having such transcendent principles present in them as their properties or determinations do they have any intelligibility, any identity, any reality at all.


Appearance and Reality. This entire argument for the coincidence of transcendence and immanence clearly rests on the assumption that in the initial premise that many different things have the same property, the word "same" indicates numerical identity, so that the very character which is present in each instance as its property is a single transcendent idea. But this, it will be objected, is impossible: the property of one particular, precisely because it is "in" or belongs to that particular, is numerically distinct from the property of another. The largeness of Simmias, for example, is numerically distinct from the largeness of Phaedo, and hence these two largenesses cannot be identical with the unitary "largeness itself."(28) This leads to a distinction between the many "immanent characters,' or properties of particulars, and a unitary "transcendent form" which is other than all of them. And in fact, Plato seems to make just this move in the Phaedo, where he distinguishes between "the largeness in us" and "largeness itself" or "in nature."(29) This distinction might even be regarded as precisely what sets apart the middle dialogues, in which the forms are regarded as transcendent but not immanent, from the early dialogues, in which they are immanent.

This interpretation of Plato's metaphysics, however, is contradicted by other passages in the middle dialogues which indicate that the forms are in instances. Moreover, the passages which seem to support this interpretation are open to another reading which is at once better supported by the texts, consistent with the early dialogues' doctrine of immanent forms, and more philosophically coherent. For if many different things are the same, for example, are all large, because each has its own largeness, a property belonging uniquely to that thing, then there is in fact nothing the same about them, and we must ask how these many different largenesses are all the same, that is, are all largenesses. Ultimately, if many different things really are the same in some respect, and so can truly be called by the same name, there must, as Socrates insists in the early dialogues, be something ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) which is numerically one and the same about all of them, a real universal which they all have in common. The so-called "reification of attributes" or "hypostasization of universals," not as additional ontological items over and above particulars with their properties but precisely as the unitary, numerically identical properties possessed by the many different particulars, is necessary to account for the real sameness of different things.

What we discover in the middle dialogues, in fact, is that a unitary, intelligible universal appears in sense-experience as the differentiated properties of many particulars. "Each [form] is itself one, but, as they appear everywhere by communion with actions and bodies and each other, each appears many."(30) Let us note carefully what is said here: each form is one, but appears many, in association with various different instances. This is to say that the properties of instances, apprehended not "themselves by themselves" but in connection with the limiting conditions whereby they belong to those instances, are appearances of the unitary forms. They are less adequate presentations of the forms, presentations of them not as they are, as unitary universal ideas, themselves by themselves, but rather as subject to conditions which are not intrinsic to them. The largeness of Simmias and the largeness of Phaedo, largeness apprehended as it is found in this or that particular man, are two different appearances of the one form largeness itself, which is not intrinsically subject to such particularizing and differentiating conditions. It is the same reality, the form, which both is one and the same, as an intelligible universal nature, and appears many and different, as the property of each of the instances.

This is an expression of the fundamental intentionality of Plato's metaphysics, in which levels of reality are levels of presentation and cognitive apprehension. As he goes on to say in the Republic, "That which altogether is is altogether knowable, while that which in no way is is in no way knowable"(31) and again, "If something should appear ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])(32) such as at once to be and not to be, this will lie in between that which purely is and that which wholly is not, and neither knowledge nor ignorance will be about it, but again what appears in between ignorance and knowledge," that is, opinion.(33) The forms, grasped by the intellect not as they appear but as they are, as ones, are "altogether real" or "really real," [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII],(34) because only they, as unitary intelligible ideas, can be definitively grasped by the mind. Their complete reality consists in their perfect intelligibility.(35) Conversely, the differentiated properties which make up the content of sense experience(36) are less than fully real in that they are appearances of the intelligible forms. If Plato thought of sensible particulars as beings, then the claim that they are "in between" being and nonbeing would be self-evidently absurd. That which is cannot be "in between" that which is and that which is not. But if we understand this "in between" in intentional terms, as the status of appearance, these passages make perfect sense. An appearance is neither the reality which is appearing nor another reality alongside it; but neither is it simply nothing, or sheer illusion To take in appearances, then, is not to apprehend reality "itself by itself," but neither is it to apprehend something other than reality, or nothing at all. Rather, it is to apprehend reality, but in a deficient, inadequate way, not as it is but as it appears.

Because the same form both is one and appears many, then, it may be cognized in either way: as it is, as one, "itself by itself," or as it appears, as many, not by itself but as a property of some particular, in association with the differentiating factors by which it belongs to this or that instance. Thus the description of the form of beauty in the Symposium is in fact an account of how beauty presents itself to the philosopher at the peak of his erotic ascent. "The beautiful will not appear to him as some face or hands or any other of the things which body shares in, nor as any discourse or any knowledge, nor being somewhere in some other, as in an animal or in earth or in heaven or in any other, but being itself by itself with itself always uniform."(37) Note that the repeated participle "being" is dependent on the verb "appear." Thus the passage as a whole is making a distinction between two modes in which beauty may present itself to the soul: "in some other" or "itself by itself." The philosopher comes to "see" beauty, or beauty shows itself to him, "itself by itself," not as a property of some particular thing. But this does not deny, but on the contrary rather implies, that the same form, beauty itself, also appears and is seen, by those who are lower on the cognitive ladder, as the beauty of this or that thing. Thus, as Socrates says in the Phaedrus, "It is necessary that man understand what is said according to form, going from many sense-perceptions to a one gathered together by reasoning...."(38) The ascent from the world of sense to the place of the forms is not a passage from one reality to another, but a cognitive ascent from appearance to reality, from the apprehension by sense of the many appearances, to the apprehension by intellect of the one form which is appearing.(39)

What Plato presents in the middle dialogues, then, is not two worlds, a world of sensible instances on the one hand and a world of transcendent forms on the other, but rather one world, that of intelligible form, and the appearances of that world which constitute sensibles. It is this understanding of the properties of instances as appearances of the forms that enables us to reconcile immanence and transcendence.(40) The form is in the instance in that it appears and may be cognized here, in this particular association, as the property of this instance; and it is transcendent, that is, is not itself conditioned by the particularities of this or any other appearance and can be known apart from them. Since the same, form may be apprehended as it is, as one, itself by itself, or as it appears, as many, as the property of each of the instances, it is both transcendent and immanent. The transcendence of the forms, then, so vividly presented in the middle dialogues, is not the separation of one world, one set of objects, from another, but is rather the priority and independence of intelligible reality in relation to the sensible appearance of that reality, and is thus a transcendence which does not contradict but rather both implies and is implied by immanence.

Indeed, the understanding of the properties of instances as appearances of the forms allows us to explain in what sense the forms, while being in the instances, are independent of them. The "capacity for independent existence" is often taken as the essential meaning of the "separation" of the forms: the forms are separate if and only if they can exist without instances.(41) Yet a more careful consideration shows that "independent" cannot be equated with "able to exist without," and that while the forms cannot exist without instances, they are not therefore dependent on them. From what we have already seen, in both the early and the middle dialogues, a form is nothing but the common character of many instances, that which appears in them all. Nowhere in the dialogues does Plato mention any uninstantiated forms, or even suggest that there could be such forms.(42) Socrates summarizes his procedure in Republic 10: "We are accustomed to posit some one form for each many to which we apply the same name."(43) Observing many different things which are the same, only then do we posit a form as that which they have in common. Since a form is nothing but the common nature of many instances, there can be no form without instances. Yet this does not mean that it is dependent on the instances, for the form, as we have seen, is not conditioned by them. Since the form is the universal determination by which the instances are such, the instances can do nothing for the form, while the form does everything for the instances.

The assumption that if the forms are the properties or natures of instances they are therefore dependent on the things which have them reflects the common and Aristotelian view that it is characterized particulars, rather then universal characters, that are fundamentally real. We ordinarily think of a property as dependent on that to which it belongs, but in fact the reverse is true. Since it is only by having certain properties that a thing is what it is and thus is anything at all, the particular is totally dependent on its properties, while the properties, as intelligible universals, are not dependent on the particulars which have them.(44) Instances are constituted by the multiple appearances of unitary forms, and unitary forms are nothing but that which appear multiply. Because the forms appear, they cannot exist without having instances. Yet this does not imply that the forms are dependent on their instances, the reality on the appearance. The necessity of the instances does not impose a condition on the forms, but on the contrary proceeds from them. An object standing in the sunlight cannot not cast a shadow; an object set before a mirror cannot not have a reflection. Yet this does not mean that the object is dependent on its shadow or reflection. In the same way, a form, as that-which-appears, necessarily implies its instances, but does not therefore depend on them.(45) Once again, it is only the dualist interpretation, which regards the instance as one real being and the form as another, which therefore equates "independent of" with "able to exist without." The understanding of instances as appearances of universal intelligible natures, on the other hand, enables us to see how a form is ontologically independent of its instances even while it cannot fail to have them.(46)

The distinction in the Phaedo between "largeness in us" and "largeness itself," then, must be understood as a distinction not between two entities or ontological "items"(47) but between appearance and reality.(48) The "largeness in us" is an appearance of largeness itself, largeness cognized not "itself by itself" but "in some other," that is, along with the differentiating features by which it is the largeness of this or that person. This preserves the point which Socrates is making in this passage without distinguishing between "immanent characters" and "transcendent forms:" as a distinct intelligible content, set over against smallness as its opposite, the idea of largeness, whether cognized "itself by itself" or in association with extraneous factors, excludes the idea of smallness. Moreover, this reading accords not only with Republic 476a, and with the original reason for positing the forms (as that which is one and the same in many different instances),(49) but also with subsequent statements in the Phaedo itself. At 104d6, Socrates remarks that "whatever the form ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) of three occupies ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), it is necessary that these be not only three but also odd." Here it is unequivocally the form itself which [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]--occupies, possesses, fills--the instances.(50) Socrates goes on to say that "the idea of even will newer come ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) to three."(51) Here again, it is plainly the form itself which would "come to" an instance. Thus, immediately after distinguishing between "largeness in us" and "largeness itself," Plato reverts to the language of the early dialogues, speaking of the form itself as present in its instances. This clearly indicates that the distinction in question is a cognitive one, between two modes of apprehending one and the same form, rather than a distinction between two ontological items.(52)

Nowhere in the middle dialogues, then, does Plato reject or abandon the idea that the forms themselves are present in instances as their properties.(53) They are at once, without contradiction, transcendent and immanent, and the middle dialogues merely highlight more vividly the transcendence of universals which is the inevitable implication of their immanence.


Image and Paradigm. The conception of the forms as "paradigms" of which the instances are "images" or "likenesses," which becomes prominent in the middle dialogues and in the Timaeus, is often taken both to differentiate these dialogues from the early ones and to indicate that Plato now considers the forms to be transcendent and not immanent.(54) But in fact, the relation of image to paradigm represents not separation alone but rather the same coincidence of immanence and transcendence which we have found in the relation of instance to universal. We need not expand on how this relation expresses transcendence: obviously, a real thing is other than, prior to, and independent of any image of it. To use Plato's analogies, a man is in this sense "separate" from a picture, or a reflection, of himself. How an original is present in the images of it is less obvious, and to explain this we must carefully consider what it means to be an image.

"Image," like "appearance," is an intentional term: it designates a mode in which a reality itself is presented and apprehended. For just as an appearance is not another reality alongside that which is appearing, so also an image is not a copy, that is, is not another thing of the same kind as the original. A picture of a man is not another man; a portrait of Socrates is not another Socrates; when I stand before a mirror making a reflection, there remains only one man in the room.(55) This is indeed precisely the point of Cratylus 43265-c6: "Would there be two things, that is Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, if some god copied not only your color and shape, as painters do, but ... all the things you have--if he set another such alongside you? Would there then be Cratylus and such an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?--Two Cratyluses, it seems to me, Socrates." Here Plato clearly distinguishes between what we may call a "copy" or a "duplicate" and an image. But because an image is not another reality, the original reality is presented by, and in this sense is present in, the image. When Socrates looks in a mirror, he sees, not a second Socrates, nor some other man, but himself. What is being presented to him, although in a less adequate way than if he could see himself directly, is himself. Seeing an image of a thing is a way of seeing the thing itself, although not "in itself," or, as Plato would say, "itself by itself."

Hence the reality is in the image, in that it is cognitively presented by it. Socrates himself is in the mirror in that he himself can be seen there, although not as he is but only as he appears.(56) Once again, by understanding Plato's metaphysics of images in intentional terms we can see how the paradigm is in the image. An image presents, or, better, is a presentation of, the reality. "Image," then, means precisely the presence of the other, the presence of that which the image itself is not. And it is in this sense that instances are images of the forms. They are such as they are because they have as properties, and present to the mind, universal intelligible natures or ideas, which they themselves are not. The form is present in the instance, the reality is present in the image, as the idea which it presents. Thus, already in the Euthyphro Socrates says both that the pious is in pious actions and that it is their paradigm.(57) Just as the forms being in instances as their properties implies not only immanence but also transcendence, so the instances being images of the form implies not only transcendence but also immanence. These two formulations of the relation between instance and form bear the same meaning, for both are ways of indicating the property of the instance as the presentation or the appearance of an intelligible idea which transcends it.

The presence of the paradigm in the image is often obscured by the interpretation of Plato's term [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as "model," that is, model to be copied. Consider, for example, Patterson's illustration of this usage of the term. "[T]he architect of a temple requiring, say, twenty-four Corinthian capitals would have one made to his own specifications, then instruct his masons to produce twenty-three more just like it."(58) Such a model is not present in its "images" (which are in fact not images but copies), and the model itself is one-among-the-many: when we have the original and the twenty-three copies, we have twenty-four capitals of the same kind. It is precisely this interpretation of Plato's "paradeigmatism" that opens him to the Third Man Argument.(59) But [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] need not mean "model." It can also mean "plan," "pattern," "design." Let us return to the same illustration. The architect, instead of giving the masons a model capital and instructing them to produce twenty-three more, could give them instead a plan, a diagram, or even simply a set of specifications, and tell them to produce twenty-four "such capitals." In this case, the paradigm is the plan or design, which is not itself a capital at all. Indeed, Plato often says that the instances are or strive to be "such" ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) as the form,(60) a phrase which is usually mistranslated as "be like" or "resemble."(61) In our example, the capitals do not resemble the paradigm, although they are images of it and "are such" as it specifies. A paradigm of this kind is at once transcendent to and immanent in its images. It is transcendent in that it is absolutely other than, prior to, independent of and irreducible to them. In fact the true paradigm is the architect's idea, of which the diagram is itself only a representation. Yet that same idea, the same intelligible content, is also present in each of the resultant capitals, as the structural features which each one displays and in virtue of which it is such a capital.(62) And the same paradigm can be cognized either in itself, intellectually, as one single idea, or as the structural features of each of the many capitals.

It is in this sense, as ideal patterns to be followed rather than as models to be copied, that we should understand Plato's forms to be paradigms. What other meaning, after all, could the notion of sensibles as images of intelligibles possibly have? The sensible, precisely in that it is sensible, spatial, and temporal, obviously cannot be a copy, a duplicate, of that which is intelligible, nonspatial, and eternal. We must remember that the forms are ideas, the objects and contents of thought. While the notion of an idea as a model of which sensible things are copies is manifest nonsense, the conception of a plan or design captures precisely the sense in which a single intelligible idea, that which is grasped by thought, can serve as a paradigm for many sensible things. This interpretation of Plato's paradeigmatism is confirmed by the discussion of the shuttle at Cratylus 389a-c.(63) The carpenter looks, not to a model shuttle which he copies, but to the form or idea of shuttle, "what a shuttle is," that is, the structure or design a thing must have in order to function as a shuttle. Socrates then says that the shuttle has this form, and that the carpenter gives such a nature to his product. Here, the form or idea, which is the paradigm to which the carpenter looks, is also the form which the product has. The paradigm is present in the image as the intelligible structure or pattern whereby it is such as it is.

The interpretation of the paradigm as an ideal pattern rather than a model allows instances to be images of their forms while having no common properties with them, and thus avoids the Third Man Argument. The twenty-four capitals have no features whatsoever in common with the idea which is their paradigm, but they are truly images of it, in that they are such as it, that is, they possess the specifications contained in the paradigm and thus present it to the mind. It may be objected that this understanding of image is fundamentally different from, and in conflict with, the understanding of the image as a reflection, which may and perhaps must have some properties in common with the original.(64) But here we must remember again that the levels of reality which Plato is articulating in terms of the concept of image are levels of presentation and cognitive apprehension. Both the analogy of a reality and its reflection and the analogy of a design and its product make the same intentional and cognitive point, which is that sensibles are presentations of intelligible contents which they themselves are not.(65) The relevant features of the relation between an image and its paradigm hold true and are the same in both cases.

Once again, then, we have overcome the false opposition between transcendence and immanence. What is in all the instances, as their determining character, is the transcendent idea which they present, and hence of which they are images. The forms are thus at once immanent universals and transcendent paradigms--or, since we have overcome these oppositions, we can equally well say that they are at once transcendent universals and immanent paradigms. As the universal character which is common to all the instances, the form is the paradigm of which they are images and is both present in and transcendent to them.


The "Timaeus." Finally, we must turn to the Timaeus, for here if anywhere Plato seems expressly to deny that forms are in anything, and definitively to substitute the idea of imitation or imaging (implying transcendence only) for the idea of immanent presence.(66) Form, says Timaeus, "is the same, ungenerated and indestructible, neither receiving into itself anything other from without nor itself going into any other, invisible and otherwise insensible, that which intellection apprehends."(67) But what does this mean? Timaeus is here distinguishing intelligible form from that which is "sensible, generated, always moving, becoming in some place ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and again perishing from there."(68) Sensibles, then, occur "in some place," while forms do not. Yet as we have seen, forms, as pure ideas, "themselves by themselves," unlike sensibles, are not located in space and are not limited or conditioned by the sensibles in which they appear. The present passage need mean no more than this, and hence need not be taken to deny that the forms appear as the properties of sensibles. A further consideration of the Timaeus shows that they do in fact so appear.

At the beginning of his speech, Timaeus expressly says that only eternal, intelligible forms, and not temporal, sensible bodies, are [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], beings: "What is that which always is, having no becoming, and what is that which always becomes, but never is? The former is apprehended by intellection with reason, being always the same, while the latter is opined by opinion with irrational sense-perception, becoming and perishing, but never being."(69) He later indicates that sensibles, or bodies, are in fact images or likenesses of the forms, describing the receptacle as "the nature which receives all bodies ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] ... [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and saying that "it always receives all things, ... but what go in and go out are likenesses of the eternal beings."(70) Bodies, then, are likenesses of the forms, coming into and departing from the receptacle.(71) Since we have already been told that sensibles are not beings, these likenesses cannot be understood as copies, additional beings alongside of the forms. They are rather presentations or appearances of the forms, cognized together with limiting conditions which do not belong to the forms "themselves by themselves."

Because the appearances are spatially located ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] while the realities themselves are not, Timaeus identifies the receptacle of these likenesses as "space," [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].(72) He then explicitly confirms that these images are appearances by saying, "To an image, since it is not the very [original] of itself on which it has come to be,(73) but is always borne as an appearance ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])(74) of some other, it is therefore proper to come to be in some other."(75) This passage parallels Symposium 211a5-b2, discussed above: as appearances, the individuated properties which constitute sensibles are "in another," that is, subject to the limiting conditions of this appearance. The beauty of or in Helen is an image, or appearance, located in place and time, of beauty itself. Here again, therefore, "image" refers to a mode of presentation and apprehension of form, not to another reality besides the form. Thus the forms themselves, as unitary ideas, are not in space or "in any other;" but they "appear everywhere,"(76) that is, here and there in space, as the properties which constitute bodies. In this sense, in the Timaeus just as in the early and middle dialogues, the forms, without "themselves by themselves" being "in any other," appear in their instances as the properties which they display.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that the insistence that in all periods of Plato's thought the forms are present in instances does not in any way compromise or diminish their transcendence. As incorporeal, changeless, intelligible realities, the forms remain as transcendent to the world of physical, mutable, sensible things as the strongest proponent of separation could maintain. But this transcendence must not be conceived in dualistic terms, as the positing of another world over and above sensible things, an additional set of beings located elsewhere. The fundamental point of Plato's theory, rather, is that transcendence is not elsewhere but in our very midst. What is present in sensible things, as their properties, is transcendent form. The presence of the forms in their instances implies that our experience is shot through with intelligible ideas, with thought-contents. In one sense, we cannot see the forms: they are not themselves objects of the senses. In another sense, we never see anything but forms: they are the very "looks" which our sense experience is always presenting to us, what is present in it for the mind. The forms are separate, not here, in the world experienced with the senses, in that they are not members of it; but they are here in that they are the very natures which sensibles things have and display. And it is in this sense that everything we encounter with our senses is not reality itself but an image, an appearance, a presentation, of the intelligible, eternal, divine reality.

The Catholic University of America

Correspondence to: The School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. 20064.

(1) This assumption is so deeply embedded in the interpretive tradition, and so seldom explicitly formulated, that it is difficult and perhaps unnecessary to offer specific examples. We may cite as illustrations, however, John Burnet and Reginald Allen. Burnet, understanding the forms to be in sensibles as their "predicates," or properties, then says, "It is in that sense that Sokrates--the Sokrates of the Phaedo and the Republic--does not separate the forms from the world of sensible particulars"; J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy. Part I. Thales to Plato (London: Macmillan, 1914), 165; conversely, Allen, claiming that "Forms in the early dialogues are separated from their instances, in that they are not identical with them and ontologically prior to them," assumes that this "militates against the claim that they are `in' their instances"; R. Allen, Plato's "Euthyphro" and the Earlier Theory of Forms (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 154, 145. Both Burnet and Allen are right in their positive claims, but err in thinking that these claims exclude each other. Gaff Fine, in the twin articles "Separation," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. Julia Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and "Immanence," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. Michael Woods (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), analyzes these terms in a more sophisticated way such that they need not conflict. But neither her interpretation of separation nor her interpretation of immanence is the same as that which I defend here.

(2) For a survey of such interpretations, see N. Fujisawa, "[GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], and Idioms of `Paradeigmatism' in Plato's Theory of Forms," Phronesis 19 (1974): 46-7. Fujisawa himself argues for a different version of this thesis, but still sees a significant shift; away from the immanence of the forms.

(3) Laches 191e10-11.

(4) Laches 192b-c.

(5) Euthyphro 5d1-5.

(6) Meno 72c6-8.

(7) Greater Hippias 287d11-e1.

(8) Greater Hippias 287e4.

(9) Greater Hippias 288a-c.

(10) Meno 7464-c1.

(11) Meno 74d5-8.

(12) For example, Greater Hippias 287c3-d2.

(13) Laches 192a1-b3.

(14) Meno 7261-c5.

(15) See W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 4:355.

(16) Euthyphro 5d1, and Laches 191e10 and 192a10.

(17) Laches 192c1 and Meno 74a9.

(18) Euthyphro 5d3 and Meno 72c7.

(19) Greater Hippias 289d4. For a more complete list of passages in the early dialogues where Plato uses these and other equivalent locutions, see Fujisawa, "[GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]," 42.

(20) See Fine, "Separation," 84; Allen, Plato's "Euthyphro," 146. But there is no reason to trivialize this meaning of "in," as do both Allen and (to a lesser extent) Fine. The presence of a property in a thing is an ontologically significant kind of immanence.

(21) Note the instrumental dative, used in Greater Hippias 287c1-d1, 289d2, and 29461-5; Euthyphro 6d11; [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], Greater Hippias 288a10, Meno 72c8.

(22) For the history of this claim, which ultimately goes back to Aristotle's reports (Metaphysics 13.4.1078630-2 and 13.9.108663-7), see Fine, "Separation," 31-3 and 56-7.

(23) As Fine points out, "nowhere in the middle dialogues ... does Plato use `choris' or its cognates of the Forms"; Fine, "Separation," 57. This term does occur at Parmenides 129d7 and 13062-4, and at Sophist 248a7; but by itself it need mean no more than that the forms are distinct from their instances. Nor in the middle dialogues does Plato ever expressly deny that forms are in instances. See Fine, "Separation," 61.

(24) For example, Phaedo 65d9-66a5 and 79a1-4.

(25) Phaedo 100d4-8, 100e5-6, 101a1-5, and 101c2-7.

(26) For example, Phaedo 66a2 and 78d5-6; Symposium 21161; see also Parmenides 129d7-8 and 13068.

(27) Phaedrus 247c6-d1.

(28) This is in effect the argument of Parmenides 131a-e, which contends that one and the same form cannot be present in many different things, for if it were it would be "separate from itself" (131b2). Plato's genuine doctrine, as we shall see, is not subject to this objection. The same kind of thinking leads Aristotle to his doctrine of immanent individuated forms. From this point of view, Plato's transcendent unitary forms become, as Aristotle argues, nugatory and incoherent.

(29) Phaedo 102d6-8 and 10365. Such a reading of this passage has been commonplace since F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), 78. See R. Hackforth, Plato's "Phaedo" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 153-5; R. G. Turnbull, "Aristotle's Debt to the `Natural Philosophy' of the Phaedo," Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1958): 131-2; G. Vlastos, "Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo," Philosophical Review 78 (1969): 298-9; G. M. A. Grube, Plato/"Phaedo" (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), 53 n. 20; F. C. White, "Plato's Middle Dialogues and the Independence of Particulars," Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1977): 196; Fujisawa, " [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]," 45 and 45 n. 42.

(30) Republic 476a5-7.

(31) Republic 477s2-4.

(32) Note Plato's pun: that which "appears," or, as we might say, "shows up," in between being and nonbeing is none other than appearance itself.

(33) Republic 478d5-11.

(34) Phaedrus 247c7.

(35) This point is exceptionally well articulated by J. N. Findlay: "[W]hile we may be inclined to look in the direction of particular embodiment for a paradigm of what is, we soon find that we cannot successfully pin down such particularity in its purity, or identify it in varying contexts and occasions. All that is substantial, invariant in it is a pattern, a character, a set of suches which we hail and name on every occasion of their appearance. This character or pattern is all that we can grasp and handle in thought on many occasions, and introduce to and consider with others: the existence of an individual seems to be no more than the fact that certain identifiable, recognizable universals are instantiated and reinstantiated"; J. N. Findlay, "Towards a Neo-Neo-Platonism," in Ascent to the Absolute (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), 252. Thus we must practice what Findlay calls "the Platonic inversion" ("Neo-Neo-Platonism," 253), recognizing that "Platonism ... regards the so-called things in the world as things only in a qualified, derivative sense, while the only true things in the world, the only things that truly are or can be, are natures or characters such as being alive, being just, being equal, and so forth"; Findlay, "Neo-Neo-Platonism," 251.

(36) This intentionality implies that there can be no "formless matter" or "bare particular" underlying the properties of an instance. Since the properties of a thing are all that is given to cognition, the thing apart from its properties is nothing at all; it is constituted by the intelligible features of which it is the instantiation. Hence we need no longer insist on a distinction between the instance and its properties: the instance consists of its properties, or particularized appearances of forms. For this understanding of instances, see Burnet: "The predicate of a proposition is always a form, and a particular sensible thing is nothing else but the common meeting-place of a number of predicates, each of which is an intelligible form ... "; Burnet, Greek Philosophy, 165. Compare A. E. Taylor: "The sensible `thing' had been treated in the Phaedo and Republic as a sort of complex `partaking' at once in a plurality of forms--in fact, as a bundle of `universals'"; A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 7th ed. (London: Methuen and Co., 1960), 388.

(37) Symposium 211a5-b2.

(38) Phaedrus 24966-c1.

(39) For a more extensive treatment of this theme, see my "Sense-Perception and Intellect in Plato," Revue de philosophie ancienne 15 (1997): 15-34. Compare also J. Sallis: "[T]he distinction between the knowable and the opinable is not fundamentally a distinction between two kinds of things, between which some relation would subsist, but rather a distinction between two ways in which an eidos can show itself. It is a distinction between a showing in which an eidos shows itself as it itself is (as one) and a showing in which an eidos shows itself as it is not (as many). In both cases what shows itself is the same thing (the eidos)--which is to say that the knowable and the opinable are not two parallel regions of things"; J. Sallis, Being and Logos: The Way of Platonic Dialogue, 2nd ed. (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press International, 1986), 394.

(40) See J. N. Findlay, Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 36.

(41) See Fine, "Separation," 33.

(42) Fine argues that the forms of (at least some) artefacts were probably regarded by Plato as uninstantiated at some time; Fine, "Separation," 74-6. This attributes a temporal status to the forms, saying that the form of bed, for example, existed at some time in the past when there were no beds. Yet the forms, qua ideas, are not everlasting within time, but strictly atemporal (Timaeus 37e-38a). Thus the form of bed, from its own, atemporal point of view, simply is instantiated, even if at a particular point in time there happen to be no beds.

(45) Compare Findlay: "Multiplicity of `presence' and diversity of location of the same `presence' are, we may say, part and parcel of what it is to be a Form, its extensional as opposed to its inner, intensional aspect ... [T]heir instantiation is after a fashion an outlying phase of their being"; Findlay, "Neo-Neo-Platonism," 255.

(46) Indeed, if a form could be without appearing, then its appearing would be an affection, an accidental feature of the form additional to its simply being itself. Such a form would be conditioned by its own instantiation. True, absolute independence requires, on the contrary, that the form's appearing be intrinsic to the form itself, such that given the form, the instances inevitably follow. Thus the absolute independence of the forms is not only different from, but in contradiction with, a supposed ability to exist without instances.

(47) Vlastos refers to them as "two distinct entities"; Vlastos, "Reasons and Causes," 298 n. 25. Fujisawa speaks of them as "the two ontologically distinct items into which the undifferentiated `X' of the Socratic `What is X?' question ... has developed"; Fujisawa, [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]," 45 n. 42.

(48) For denials of the distinction between "immanent characters" and "transcendent forms," see W. J. Verdenius, "Notes on Plato's Phaedo," Mnemosyne ser. 4, 11 (1958): 232-3; Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, 353-5; D. O'Brien, "The Last Argument of Plato's Phaedo. I," Classical Quarterly 17 (1967): 200-3; Findlay, "Neo-Neo-Platonism," 254-5. Fine offers, but does not wholly endorse, the interpretation defended here: "What may seem to be numerically distinct immanent characters are just many appearances of the same Form, in its entirety"; Fine, "Immanence," 76-7. (She adds, "Republic ... 476a might, I think, be read this way"; Fine, "Immanence," 77 n. 10.) Compare Burnet: "[T]he doctrine of participation makes the sensible identical with the intelligible, except that in sensible things the forms appear to us as a manifold instead of in their unity.... We should not be entitled to predicate the form of the thing unless the form were really in it"; Burnet, Greek Philosophy, 166.

(49) Compare Guthrie: "Ever since the Lysis ... the presence of the Forms, and possession of them, has been necessary to account for the qualities of particulars"; Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, 353-4.

(50) Hackforth arbitrarily translates [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] here as "character" rather than "form"; Hackforth, Plato's "Phaedo."

(51) Phaedo 104e1.

(52) The only other passage in the entire corpus which makes such a distinction is Parmenides 130b4. But it is too seldom observed that it is not Socrates but Parmenides who makes this distinction, and that he thereby misrepresents Socrates' position. Socrates has simply distinguished between forms and participants--between likeness, for example, and the things which are alike (128e6-129a3). Parmenides first repeats this distinction (13062-3), and then inaccurately reformulates it as a distinction between "likeness itself" and "the likeness which we have." Socrates, being "young," foolishly lets this pass, thus enabling Parmenides to make the first Third Man Argument (132a-b). Here again (compare above n. 28) we find that the arguments of the Parmenides are directed not against Plato's actual theory of forms but against a misinterpretation of that theory. On this see my "Sense-Perception and Intellect," 28-9; R. Patterson, Image and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 51; Findlay, Plato, 235-6; and Findlay, "Neo-Neo-Platonism," 255.

(53) It is sometimes argued that here and elsewhere in the middle dialogues, when Plato uses language which suggests that forms are in instances, he is speaking loosely, and actually referring to the "immanent characters" rather than the forms themselves (for example, Fujisawa, [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]," 42 and 45 n. 42). But this assumption has no textual basis, and is merely a forced reading aimed at bringing the many passages which speak of the forms as immanent, making no reference to any such distinction, into accord with a preconceived interpretation of Phaedo 102e. Evidently many interpreters favor such a distinction because, falling to appreciate Plato's fundamental concept of appearance, they cannot accept the plain statements that sensibles, with their individuated properties, are less than fully real.

(54) For a survey of such interpretations, see Fujisawa, "[GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]," 46-7.

(55) See Patterson, Image and Reality, 3-4, 20-2, 29-31.

(56) T. F. Morris rightly argues that the idea of image is the answer to the question posed in the title of his article; T. F. Morris, "How Can One Form Be in Many Things?" Apeiron 19 (1985): 53-5. But Morris does not explain in what sense the original can truly be said to be in the image.

(57) Euthyphro 5d1-5, 6e3-5. There is no textual or philosophical reason to follow Fujisawa in dismissing this passage as "not ... a case of the genuine paradeigmatism we find in later dialogues"; Fujisawa, "[GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII," 43 n. 34. This again is to force the interpretation to fit with a preconceived notion that paradeigmatism first occurs in the middle dialogues, as part of an altered theory of forms.

(58) Patterson, Image and Reality, 13-14.

(59) See Patterson, Image and Reality, 14-15.

(60) Phaedo 74d7, 74e1, and 75a2.

(61) By for example, H. Tredennick, in Collected Dialogues, ed. Hamilton and Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University, 1961); Hackforth, Plato's "Phaedo"; Grube, Plato/"Phaedo"; Gallop, Plato/"Phaedo."

(62) Patterson asserts that if the forms are immanent patterns or structures which are "formal aspects of participants," then they are not "separate from" them, and conversely that if a form is a pattern or structure which is "a separate, independent, abstract object embodied in or conformed to by things ... in this world," then it is "neither literally present to them nor guiding them in any sense from the inside"; Patterson, Image and Reality, 18. Here again we encounter the erroneous assumption that if the forms are "in" sensibles they are not "separate" and vice versa.

(63) Fujisawa rightly includes this passage on his list of passages representing paradeigmatism, (Fujisawa, "[GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]," 42), although, as he remarks "the word itself for paradeigmatism ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], etc.) does not occur" in it; Fujisawa, "[GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]," 43 n. 34.

(64) Thus White, discussing images as reflections, contends, "We might reasonably claim that it is only because images have properties univocally in common with their originals that they are images at all"; White, "Plato's Middle Dialogues," 208. He concludes that "many properties are univocally attributed with complete correctness to reflections and to their originals"; White, "Plato's Middle Dialogues," 212. For replies to this argument, see Patterson, Image and Reality, 60-1.

(65) See Sallis: "A beautiful thing is just that which stands forth in a showing in which the beautiful itself shows itself as it is not ... ; this--and only this!--is the proper sense in which a beautiful thing is an image of the beautiful itself"; Sallis, Being and Logos, 394.

(66) See for example, R. D. Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato (London: Macmillan and Co., 1888), 182.

(67) Timaeus 52a1-4. This is the only passage in the Platonic corpus which Fine can find to cite as an express denial that forms are in sensibles; and she rightly argues that even this does not unequivocally imply separation; Fine, "Separation," 61-2.

(68) Timaeus 52a5-7.

(69) Timaeus 27e6-28a4.

(70) Timaeus 5066-c5.

(71) This accords with the interpretation (above, n. 35) of sensibles as constituted by the appearances of forms which are their properties.

(72) Timaeus 52a8.

(73) For this reading of [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] see Archer-Hind, Timaeus, 185.

(74) This word is all too rarely translated in such a way as to show its connection with [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and thus with the central Platonic concept of "appearing."

(75) Timaeus 52c2-4.

(76) Republic 476a.
COPYRIGHT 1999 Philosophy Education Society, Inc.
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 1999 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Author:PERL, ERIC D.
Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Article Type:Critical Essay
Geographic Code:00WOR
Date:Dec 1, 1999

Terms of use | Copyright © 2018 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters