THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: Vol. 69, No. 275, April 2019.
Hillel Steiner argues that a necessary and sufficient condition for the compossibility of a set of rights is that those rights be extensionally differentiable. However, given that two or more actions can extensionally overlap without thereby being mutually unperformable, if such actions are specified in the relevant rights, then those rights will not be incompossible, notwithstanding their extensional overlap. The set of compossible sets of rights then is greater than the subset of extensionally differentiable rights, and extensional differentiability is a sufficient but unnecessary condition of compossibility.
The Formulation of Disjunctivism About cp-ing for a Reason, J J CUNNINGHAM
We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S cps because v with those of the form S cps because S believes that v. According the common kind view, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The disjunctive view denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the common kind theorist asserts, but the disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. The author suggests that, in the light of the distinction between kinds of explanation and particular explanations, the relevant sameness thesis is ambiguous, thus giving us two distinct versions of the common kind view. The author argues that the only direct arguments for disiunctivism available in the literature fail because they succeed only in undermining one version of the common kind view. The author finishes, however, by providing a fresh argument for the disjunctive view which aims to undermine both versions of its competitor.
Grounded Disease: Constructing the Social from the Biological in Medicine, SHANE N. GLACKIN
Social constructivism about the disease concept has generally been taken to ignore the fundamental biological reality underlying diseases, as well as to fall foul of several apparently compelling objections. In this paper, the author explains how the metaphysical relation of grounding can be used to tie a socially constructed account of diseases and their classification to their underlying biological and behavioral states. The author then generalizes the position by disambiguating several varieties of normativism, including a particularly strong "placeholder" version of social constructivism, and showing that the grounding approach is available to each. The author goes on to provide what he believes to be the first attempt at a full semantics for disease-talk and disagreement, before using the placeholder to demonstrate on that basis that the most troublesome objections to normativism can be avoided even by very strong versions of the position.
Quantifier Variance, Ontological Pluralism and Ideal Languages, A. ARTURO JAVIER-CASTELLANOS
Kris McDaniel has recently defended a criterion for being an ontological pluralist that classifies the quantifier variantist as one. In this paper, it is argued that this is a mistake. There is an important difference between the two views, which is sometimes obscured by a common view in the metaphysics of fundamentality. According to the simple analysis, a language is ideal--it allows for a maximally metaphysically perspicuous description of reality--just in case all its primitives are perfectly natural. The author argues that this analysis struggles to distinguish quantifier variance from ontological pluralism, and then he discusses various accounts that can do better. The author then proposes a criterion for being an ontological pluralist that does not misclassify the quantifier variantist. Finally, the author discusses some additional advantages of his proposal.
Responsibility Unincoyporated: Corporate Agency and Moral Responsibility, LUIS CHENG-GUAJARDO
Those who argue that corporations can be morally responsible for what they do help us to understand how autonomous corporate agency is possible, and those who argue that they cannot be help us maintain distinctive value in human life. Each offers something valuable, but without securing the other's important contribution. This paper offers an account that secures both. It explains how corporations can be autonomous agents that we can continue to be justified in blaming as responsible agents, but without it also being the case that corporations are morally responsible for anything that they do. The upshot is that we can make sense of the reality of corporate agency and the value that we derive from our sophisticated interactions with them as autonomous agents, while vindicating the idea that they are not members of the moral community.
Comparative Pride, CHRISTOPHER MORGAN-KNAPP
Comparative pride--that is, pride in how one compares with others in some respect--is often thought to be warranted. In this paper, it is argued that this common position is mistaken. The paper begins with an analysis of how things seem when a person feels pride. Pride, the author claims, presents some aspect of the self that one identifies as being worthy. Moreover, in some cases, it presents this aspect of the self as something one is responsible for. The author then goes on to argue that when the focus of one's pride is comparative, things are never as pride makes them seem. The core problem is that if the performance in which one takes pride is really valuable, the fact that it is superior to the performance of others does nothing to contribute to that value. This paper concludes with a discussion of why so many are inclined to validate comparative pride and a response to those who claim that comparisons are essential to pride because they must be used to set standards of excellence.
Kripkean Meta-Semantics and Generalized Rigidity, CHRISTIAN NIMTZ
The classification-cum-explanation Kripke assigns to rigidity requires the notion to apply to singular and general terms alike. But Kripke's own notion of rigidity is tailor-made for singular terms, and an extensive debate has not secured a general notion of rigidity apt to provide the classification-cum-explanation Kripke aims for. The author proposes that we look for a Kripkean alternative to generalized rigidity. He argues that on Kripkean premises, natural kind terms and proper names belong to the meta-semantic category of paradigm terms. He also argues that the property of being a paradigm term effects precisely the classification-cum-explanation Kripke attributes to rigidity. He concludes that Kripkeans should acknowledge that being a paradigm term, rather than designating rigidly, plays the role Kripke delineates, and that we can stop worrying about generalizing rigidity. Kripke's notion works fine for singular terms. And there is no need for rigidity to apply beyond these.
The Subjective Authority of Intention, LILIAN O'BRIEN
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the "hold" that an intention has on an agent--a hold that is palpable from his first-person perspective? In this paper, the author argues that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, she maintains that the subjective authority of intention can be explained in terms of the inner structure of intention. In adopting an intention, the agent comes to see himself as criticizable depending on whether he executes the intention. This allows us to explain in first-personal terms why the agent becomes disposed to act and deliberate in ways that are characteristic of intention. As intention-formation involves profound changes to reflexive evaluative attitudes, this is the selfevaluation view of the subjective authority of intention.
Two Misconstruals of Frege's Theory of Colouring, THORSTEN SANDER
Many scholars claim that Frege's theory of coloring (Farbunq) is committed to a radical form of subjectivism or emotivism. Some other scholars claim that Frege's concept of coloring is a precursor to Grice's notion of conventional implicature. This paper argues that both of these claims are mistaken. The paper also proposes a taxonomy of Fregean colorings: for Frege, there are (1) purely aesthetic colorings, (2) communicative colorings or hints, and (3) noncommunicative colorings.
Scotism about Possible Natures, THOMAS M. WARD
This paper motivates and develops a view, found in John Duns Scotus, concerning God's explanatory role in the possibility of possible natures. A possible nature is a nature that can be instanced. The view is that possible natures have their possibility due to the coherence of their simple parts, but the simples that make up natures are themselves ex nihilo productions of divine intellect.
Do Constancy Mechanisms Save Distal Content? JUSTIN GARSON
Schulte develops a novel solution to the problem of distal content: by virtue of what is a mental representation about a distal object (say, a snake) rather than a more proximal cause of that representation fsay, a snake-shaped retinal impression)? Schulte maintains that in order for a (sensory-perceptual) representation to have a distal content, it must be produced by a constancy mechanism, along with two other conditions. The author raises three objections to his solution. First, a core component of Schulte's solution is just a restrictive version of Dretske's solution, but Schulte gives no argument for his restriction. Second, his proposed solution to a disjunction problem (his "naturalness" condition) is ad hoc. Finally, his "far-out" version of the distality problem is not a version of the distality problem at all. The author concludes that Dretske's solution is preferable to Schulte's.
Questions Under Discussion and the Semantics/Pragmatics Divide, JUMBLY GRINDROD and EMMA BORG
The "question under discussion" (QUD) framework is a pragmatic framework that draws on work in the semantics of questions to provide an appealing account of a range of pragmatic phenomena, including the use of prosodic focus in English and restrictions on acceptable discourse moves. More recently, however, a number of proposals have attempted to use the framework to help settle issues at the semantics/pragmatics boundary, fixing the truth-conditions of what is said by a speaker ("which many theorists take to be a semantic matter"). In this discussion piece, the authors suggest that this kind of putative extension of the work to be done by the QUD framework is illegitimate, as the framework ultimately seems to depend on a prior grip on semantic content. To see this, the authors first outline the QUD framework and then raise their concern.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Jun 1, 2019|
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