THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: Vol. 67, No. 269, October 2017.
One unchanging feature of John Rawls's thought is that we theorize about well-ordered societies. Yet, once we introduce justice pluralism--the fact that reasonable people disagree about the nature and requirements of justice, something Rawls eventually admits is inevitable in liberal societies--then a well-ordered society as Rawls defines it is impossible. This requires we develop new models of society to replace the well-ordered society in order adequately to address such disagreements. To do so, we ought to remain faithful to those reasons Rawls has for introducing the idea of the well-ordered society in the first place. It is shown that two models that resemble closely Rawls's model of the well-ordered society but are also capable of dealing with justice pluralism do not perform well when judged against such criteria. Yet a new model of the well-ordered society--one that looks radically different from what Rawls originally imagined--does succeed.
Why Should Welfare 'Fit'? DALE DORSEY
One important proposal about the nature of well-being, prudential value or the personal good is that intrinsic values for a person ought to resonate with the person for whom they are good. Indeed, virtually everyone agrees that there is something very plausible about this necessary condition on the building blocks of a good life. Given the importance of this constraint, however, it may come as something of a surprise how little reason we actually have to believe it. This paper does two things: first, it illustrates just how philosophically tenuous this thesis is, despite its apparent attraction, and it corrects, or at least begin to correct, this state of affairs. The argument-- which the author calls the "relationship to value" argument--focuses in part on what it means to be a valuer--specifically, the peculiar relationship valuing agents bear to objects of value.
Explaining the Actuality Operator Away, JOHN MACKAY
The author argues that "actually" does not have a reading according to which it is synonymous with the actuality operator of modal logic, and proposes an alternative account of actually. The cases that have been thought to show that actually is synonymous with the actuality operator are modal and counterfactual sentences in which an embedded clause's evaluation is held fixed at the world of the context. In these cases, though, this embedded clause's evaluation is not due to the presence of actually. As an alternative, the author proposes that actually is a presupposition trigger along the lines of "even" or "too," and it signals that presupposed information states in the discourse are evolving in a nonstandard way.
Interacting with Emotions: Imagination and Supposition, MARGHERITA ARCANGELI
A widespread claim, which the author calls the Emotionality Claim (EC), is that imagination but not supposition is intimately linked to emotion. In more cognitive jargon, imagination is connected to the affect system (that is, the mechanisms that produce emotional responses), whereas supposition is not. EC is open to several interpretations that yield very different views about the nature of supposition. The literature lacks an in-depth analysis of EC that sorts out these different readings and ways to carve supposition and imagination at their joints. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. The author argues that existing readings of EC fail to properly account for the emotional asymmetry between imagination and supposition. The tendency is to start from narrow conceptions of both imagination and supposition. The author argues for a novel interpretation of EC pivoting on different ways a mental state can connect to the affect system.
Why the One Cannot Have Parts: Plotinus on Divine Simplicity, Ontological Independence, and Perfect Being Theology, CALEB M. COHOE
The author uses Plotinus to present absolute divine simplicity as the consequence of principles about metaphysical and explanatory priority to which most theists are already committed. He employs Phil Corkum's account of ontological independence as independent status to present a new interpretation of Plotinus on the dependence of everything on the One. On this reading, if something else (whether an internal part or something external) makes you what you are, then you are ontologically dependent on it. He shows that this account supports Plotinus's claim that any entity with parts cannot be fully independent. In particular, he lays out Plotinus's case for thinking that even a divine self-understanding intellect cannot be fully independent. He then argues that a weaker version of simplicity is not enough for the theist since priority monism meets the conditions of a moderate version of ontological independence just as well as a transcendent but complex ultimate being.
A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence, KRISTIE MILLER
This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterization that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct; thus, affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed toward metaphysically equivalent theories in such a way that nonideal agents can bear different propositional attitudes toward metaphysically equivalent theories.
Introducing Recursive Consequentialism: A Modified Version of Cooperative Utilitarianism, EVAN G. WILLIAMS
This article proposes Recursive Consequentialism: the moral theory which gives agents whatever advice will produce good consequences by being given. It can be thought of as a version of Donald Regan's Cooperative Utilitarianism to which two additional elements have been added: allowing people with differing conceptions of good consequences, for example, a utilitarian and a nonutilitarian, to cooperate with one another, and taking into account the full consequences of accepting, not just complying with, moral guidance. The theory is motivated by a series of game-theoretic examples in which adherence to alternative consequentialist moral theories produces bad consequences.
Epistemology Personalized, MATTHEW A. BENTON
Recent epistemology has focused almost exclusively on propositional knowledge. This paper considers an underexplored area of epistemology, namely, knowledge of persons: if propositional knowledge is a state of mind, consisting in a subject's attitude to a (true) proposition, the account developed here thinks of interpersonal knowledge as a state of minds, involving a subject's attitude to another (existing) subject. This kind of knowledge is distinct from propositional knowledge, but it exhibits a gradability characteristic of context-sensitivity, and admits of shifty thresholds. It is supported by a wide range of unexplored linguistic data and intuitive cases, and it promises to illuminate debates within epistemology, philosophy of religion, and ethics.
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Title Annotation:||CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES: PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Dec 1, 2017|
|Previous Article:||JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 55, No. 4, October 2017.|
|Next Article:||THE MONIST: Vol. 100, No. 4, October 2017.|