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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 116, No. 4, April 2019.

Acts and Alternative Analyses, ARVID BAVE

This paper shows that the act-type theories of Soames and Hanks entail that every sentence with alternative analyses (including every atomic sentence with a polyadic predicate) is ambiguous, many of them massively so. The author assumes that act types directed toward distinct objects are themselves distinct, plus some standard semantic axioms, and infer that act-type theorists are committed to saying that "Mary loves John" expresses both the act type of predicating (loving John) of Mary and that of predicating (being loved by Mary) of John. Since the two properties are distinct, so are the act types. Hence, the sentence expresses two propositions. The author also discusses a nonstandard "pluralist" act-type theory, as well as some retreat positions, which all come with considerable problems. Finally, the author extrapolates to a general constraint on theories of structured propositions, and finds that Jeffrey King's theory has the same unacceptable consequence as the act-type theory.

Predicativism about Classes, KENTARO FUJIMOTO

Classes are the objects of the second sort of second-order set theory. They have sets as their members and behave like sets, but paradoxes tell us that many classes cannot be sets. Then, what are classes? Predicativism about classes suggests that classes are predicates of sets, and this article investigates the question from the predicativist point of view in light of recent developments in the use of classes in set theory. Predicativism has been considered too restrictive and unable to accommodate the use of classes in set theory. This diagnosis, however, is true only of a certain specific type of predicativism. This article proposes a new type of predicativism, which the author calls liberal predicativism, and argues both that predicativism is still a highly viable option and that his liberal version provides a sufficiently versatile and workable nominalist concept of classes for set theory.

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Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Article Type:Abstract
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Jun 1, 2019
Previous Article:THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 116, No. 3, March 2019.
Next Article:JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 57, No. 1, April 2019.

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