THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 116, No. 3, March 2019.
Hurt Feelings, david shoemaker
In introducing the reactive attitudes "of people directly involved in transactions with each other," P. F. Strawson lists "gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings." To show how our interpersonal emotional practices of responsibility could not be undermined by determinism's truth, Strawson focused exclusively on resentment, specifically on its nature and actual excusing and exempting conditions. So have many other philosophers theorizing about responsibility in Strawson's wake. This method and focus have generated a host of quality of will theories of responsibility. What this paper shows is that if Strawson--and his followers--had focused on hurt feelings instead of resentment, not only would quality of will theories of responsibility be disfavored, but also none of our other theories of responsibility could adequately account for them. This paper concludes by exploring what a conundrum this poses for our methods and starting points in theorizing about responsibility.
Relaxing Realism or Deferring Debate? MICHAEL RIDGE
In this paper it is argued that so-called Relaxed Realism of the sort defended by T. M. Scanlon fails on its own terms by failing to distinguish itself from its putative rivals--in particular, from Quasi-Realism. On a whole host of questions, Relaxed Realism and Quasi-Realism give exactly the same answers, and these answers make up much of the core of the view. Scanlon offers three possible points of contrast, each of which the author argues is not fit for purpose. Along the way, the author argues that Quasi-Realists can provide a better account of practical rationality than Relaxed Realists can, so insofar as they are distinct Quasi-Realism is superior.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Jun 1, 2019|
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