THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 114, No. 7, July 2017.
Our Fundamental Physical Space: An Essay on the Metaphysics of the Wave Function, EDDY KEMING CHEN
The mathematical structure of realist quantum theories has given rise to a debate about how our ordinary three-dimensional space is related to the 3N-dimensional configuration space on which the wave function is defined. Which of the two spaces is our (more) fundamental physical space? The author reviews the debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists and evaluate it based on three criteria. The author argues that when we consider which view leads to a deeper understanding of the physical world, especially given the deeper topological explanation from the unordered configurations to the Symmetrization Postulate, we have strong reasons in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. The article concludes that our evidence favors the view that our fundamental physical space in a quantum world is three-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional. The author outlines lines of future research where the evidential balance can be restored or reversed, and draws lessons from this case study to the debate about theoretical equivalence.
A Neglected Ramseyan View of Truth, Belief, and Inquiry, BENOIT GAULTIER
For F. P. Ramsey, "there is no separate problem of truth," but rather substantive problems about the nature of belief and judgment and the place and function of truth in these propositional attitudes. In this paper, the author expounds and defends an important but largely overlooked aspect of Ramsey's view of belief and inquiry: his thesis that truth does not intervene at all in one's ordinary beliefs, nor in one's ordinarily inquiring into--in the sense of wondering, or reflecting on--whether or not something obtains. More specifically, he shows that this thesis can solve a particularly perplexing problem that Davidson helped to bring into focus: that of explaining how it is possible for one to inquire into any empirical issue, and to form any empirical beliefs, if one takes truth to be objective.
An Epistemic Norm for Implicature, ADAM GREEN
Timothy Williamson and others have made a strong case for the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Reasons to think that assertion has an epistemic norm also, interestingly, provide a reason to think that conversational implicature has a norm as well. This norm, it is argued, cannot be knowledge. In addition to highlighting an underexplored topic at the intersection of epistemology and linguistics, the discussion of conversational implicature puts dialectical pressure on the knowledge norm of assertion account. The fact that knowledge is not the norm of conversational implicature forces one either to claim that there is one epistemic norm for the conveying of information and that it is not knowledge, or else to embrace a heterogeneous picture of communicative norms generally that undercuts some of the grounds for thinking that the norm of assertion should be presumed to be a simple norm as Williamson argues.
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|Title Annotation:||CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES: PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Dec 1, 2017|
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