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In January 2018 at the World Economic summit, Chair of the G20 and Argentine President Mauricio Macri called on the world to view Argentina as a model for other emerging economies during its Fourth Industrial Revolution. (1) He optimistically discussed his agenda for the "future of work," including investment in education and training in the latest technological developments to maintain human capital and reduce poverty. (2) When Macri first assumed power in December 2015, Argentina was enjoying relative economic success, with rising GDP, increasing employment rates, and decreasing poverty levels, which fell from 30.3 percent of the population in 2016 to 25.7 percent in 2017. (3) In May 2018, however, Argentina experienced yet another major economic crisis. Severe drought destroyed crops and negatively affected soy exports, subsequently forced a reduction in public spending, and along with high inflation, led the value of the Argentine peso to fall, losing half of its value against the dollar by September 2018. (4) By October, surveyors found that the Argentine population was losing hope, believing the current crisis could turn into another devastating economic crash such as the one in 2001. (5) There was a silver lining, however. Fearing an economic collapse, owners and workers cooperated, and most people continued to work despite the crisis.

Given the frequency of crises, should we still look to Macri's promise to position Argentina as a model to sustain the future of work and provide quality jobs? The answer lies in understanding what it is behind the scenes that permits a volatile economy to remain the second largest South American economy and an important G20 member with the capacity to export and promise food security. (i) In spite and because of the crises of the 1980s, and especially after Argentina's economic collapse of 2001, grassroots changes to the structure of work came from an array of small-scale entrepreneurs, popular and labor organizations, and workers, including those leading the empresas recuperadas por los trabajadores (enterprises recovered by their workers). (6)

My exploratory research shows that despite social, political, and economic crises, small-scale farm technology factories adapted to reduce disruptions to their work and continue production. I conducted 50 interviews in-person and by email, and maintained contact via social-media messaging services. (ii) Drawing on interviews with different social groups across different classes from eight farm machinery factories in Santa Fe province between 2016 and 2018, this article illustrates how deep social and economic crises brought these groups together to reach "common good" decisions. (7) I visited five of the eight factories in San Vicente, Santa Fe. I argue that these groups developed both explicit and intuitive common good practices to reduce work disruption and keep factories operating. (iii) In this case study, a common good approach helps us understand groups and individuals who check their self-interests for the sake of sustaining work in an environment prone to frequent crises.

In a post-neoliberal world, studies about Latin American development and the future of work will be constantly evolving. (8) In a broad sense, the "future of work" may become a post-capitalist alternative of hybrid capitalism. Henry Veltmeyer's "social economy" comes to mind, which is an alternative to capitalist development and hybrid capitalism, including a social and solidarity economy owed to "a long history of cooperative movement" and diverse community responses to crises. (9) In my study, the factory groups chose to work for the "common good" to sustain work-life patterns and preserve their "lifeworld." Jose Itzigsohn and Julian Rebon use the "term lifeworld in the phenomenological sense of the 'taken-for-granted' subjective world of the individual." (10) Similarly to responses by workers in the study by Itzigsohn and Rebon, male and female respondents in my study believed that factory work was not only a source of income, but more importantly a source of identity and pride." My interviewees were not rejecting the notion of a market economy or capitalism. They expected to work well together to maintain production, make profit, and compete in domestic and international markets. They were aware that they needed to work together and be creative to sustain dignified work for the benefit of all in the factory.

In the following sections, I first discuss Argentina's economic cycles and how that has affected work in factories during the 20th century. Second, I examine the post-2001 economy to show how factory practices have established a model for what the future of work could become. The paper concludes with some thoughts on why Argentina remains relevant to any discussion about what the future of work will look like, particularly for Latin America.

Economic Cycles and Domestic Factory Practices in the 20th Century

According to 2018 World Bank data, Argentina's annual GDP growth rate is projected to rise through 2020. Although it is on an upward trend, its pace is uneven and relatively unpredictable, as it has been since the end of World War II. (12) Going further back to the start of the 20th century Argentina was one of the wealthiest countries in the world. Between 1860 and 1929, the country's GDP per capita grew more rapidly than any other country, including the United States, Canada, and Australia. (iv) By the 1920s, Argentina had become the fourth largest producer and exporter of wheat in the world and was among the leading global producers of corn and linseed. (13) This period of relatively stable growth (1861-1929), however, was followed by cycles of oscillating economic growth and decline. (v)

Similar to most Latin American nations, Argentina's economy has depended on its export sales to support its economy, and its reliance on environmental conditions and international markets partially explains the economy's long-term volatility during the 20th century. Beginning in the late 1800s, Argentina welcomed European immigrants to populate the country (the 1869 census recorded a mere 1.6 million inhabitants). (14) A rise in the rural population combined with extensive use of fertile grasslands known as the pampas allowed commercial crop farming for export to international markets; Argentina's primary export commodity was wheat, corn, and linseed before 1950. (15) Currently, although it has diversified its exports with items such as raw sugar, vehicle parts, and telephones, it primarily relies on agricultural productivity to support the export economy. (16) By 2016, commodities such as soybean meal, corn, and other agricultural products made up more than half of Argentina's exports. (17)

Given the importance of the agricultural sector, there was great demand for mechanized farm machinery and tools, particularly during cultivation and harvest periods to satisfy local and global demand for foodstuffs. Although foreign farm machinery took the lion's share of domestic markets, local blacksmiths or metal manufacturers supplied farmers with machinery, vehicles, and parts. They were critically important in the maintenance and repair of both foreign and domestic machinery. In several cases, they cannibalized old machinery or soldered new parts to extend the life of farm machinery. (18)

During the Great Depression and World War II, Argentine blacksmiths, repair shops, and factories in the interior and rural provinces of Santa Fe and Cordoba found ways to continue operating and maintain old machinery even though the economic decline had led to steel shortages or in some cases isolation from international markets and machinery. By expanding their know-how and learning-by-doing, they eventually developed their own farm machinery--especially harvest combines--to substitute for foreign machinery imports during periods of shortages. For instance, during the 1920s, the family-owned Senor Harvester Factory began offering repairs to sulkies (small two-wheeled tractors) and Ford and Deering tractor and combine models. However during the 1930s, out of necessity, the factory expanded its shop operations and began to develop its own harvester combine models (Bl, B2, B3, etc.) to avoid disruption during the local harvest season. (19) The model B3 was its most successful product, and one interviewee enthusiastically recalled that "it sold like hot bread" (se vendio como pan caliente!). (20) It was difficult to obtain sorely needed iron and steel for production once the harvest season was well underway, but the firm managed by pre-ordering and purchasing bulk steel at least several months before the harvest season. (21)

During brief upturns, manufacturers took advantage of access to credit to expand operations and build their networks. After World War II, the Argentine economy significantly grew again thanks to post-war demand for foodstuff. National policies changed with the aim of diversifying the economy Both military and civilian administrators followed policy recommendations made by the structuralist economists working in the newly created United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America. They had promoted strong state intervention in all Latin American economies, especially by import substitution industrialization (ISI). The goal was to strengthen Latin American economies by making them less dependent on the import of manufactured goods and machinery. In the first generation of these policy changes, Latin American economies grew. For example, "between 1950-81 ISI delivered a growth rate that was not only higher than in other developing regions, but also--and for the first time ever--higher than that of the OECD (4.2 percent)." (vi) Similarly to other nations, Argentina passed policies promoting industrialization, resulting in a relatively solid industrial base with high employment rates in urban areas. (22)

As a result of ISI policies through the 1960s, local manufacturers of farm machinery in rural areas were able to expand production and supply local markets. By 1949, there were more than 20 domestic factories producing and repairing only harvester combines. Given access to new business credit, new factories and farm machinery companies appeared in the dense farming region of Santa Fe province, such as Vassalli Metallurgical Establishment. (23) They took advantage of new credit lines to introduce new models of harvesters and farm machinery. Senor Harvester Factory also developed new models of harvesters, such as the V60, and it developed a transmission (powertrain) model specific for harvesters under the brand name Industrias Urvig. (24)

The government's ulterior motive in investing in national industrialization was primarily to sustain or increase employment rates. President Juan Domingo Peron (1946-1955), for instance, heavily taxed agricultural exports to support import substitution, redistribute income, and boost employment in large part to remain in power. (25) Soon after 1952, however, the post-war agricultural boom began to significantly wane, resulting in numerous student and labor strikes protesting rising inflation and deteriorating economic conditions. In 1955, the military removed Peron from power in a September coup d'etat. A year later in 1956, Argentina experienced a financial crisis and the military government settled the country's debts with public creditors in Paris, known as the Paris Club agreement. (26) By 1958, the newly elected President Arturo Frondizi, also known as the "developmentalist president", implemented austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund along with a domestic development package to increase growth and speed development processes. The plan included a reliance on foreign investment to push local industrialization. (27)

In addition to the economic opportunity of ISI policies, local manufacturers in Santa Fe province recalled that they viewed ISI policies, not any particular leader per se, as permitting them the social opportunity to provide dignified work for themselves, their engineers, and workers. During the 1950s and 1960s, owners used profits to create goodwill in the community. The Bernardin and Senor Harvester factories, for example, sponsored Christmas banquets for their workers and community festivals. (28) By 1958, the town of San Vicente became home to three factories producing harvester combines (Senor, Bernardin, and Boffelli). In 1958, Boffelli called on the others to raise funds for local schools by hosting the country's first Harvester Festival in 1960. At that time, they had invited President Frondizi to attend their festival and view the harvesters produced by 23 local factories. (29) Town members recalled that the president's arrival was exciting, enhancing their national pride knowing that their harvester companies' work was essential to the country's development. Interviewees were emotional when recalling the Harvester Festival. Their collective memory was that this event celebrated local ingenuity and made their town a part of national history. (30)

Between 1958 and 1989, financial and political conditions were precarious and volatile, but there was some access to credit both during brief upturns and during the depths of crises, and new companies emerged. The Senor Harvester Company took a risk and expanded its production to a second, larger factory, introducing new lines intended for foreign export in the 1960s. Senor's engineers designed and built unpatented combine models, including the V60 and JE50. They adapted the combines for harvesting soy and rice for export abroad to Venezuela and Brazil by the late 1960s, but the global petrodollar crises of the 1970s hurt Senor's experiment in export-led industrialization. (31) Though it tried to remain in business, the crises that began in the 1970s led to the company's eventual bankruptcy in 1987. (32)

In San Vicente, after the original three harvester factories filed for bankruptcy between 1978 and 1990, several San Vicente interviewees recalled the collective emotion of despair, a crisis in identity, and a shattering of their lifeworld. In response, between 1990 and 2017, the town council made choices to build a sense of community identity and culture around farm machinery. The council adopted a combine-harvester as the town symbol, and labeled official town correspondence with the phrase "San Vicente, La Cuna de la Cosechadora" (Birthplace of the Harvester). In 2003, the town enthusiastically brought back the celebratory national harvester festival, though only one domestic harvester company remained. The National Festival of the Combine (Fiesta National de la Cosechadora) was held four times between 1960 and 2003, but has been held every year since 2003. (33) In current times, every year at this festival, the mayor's office requests descendants of the original three factory owners to say a few words on the main stage about how their family's factory helped provide dignified work and shape the town's history.

The townspeople of San Vicente supported the sale and transfer of the bankrupt Bernardin factory to new owners in the late 1990s. A manager at the new Bernardin factory commented that when he first arrived in the 2000s, the newly renovated company under different owners did not know about local traditions. Among these traditions was the sound of the factory whistle. The local townspeople complained to the council and requested that the manager install a factory whistle and blow the whistle at key times during the day because it gave them a sense of time and space. It also reminded them of the past, when everyone had worked at the factories. Without the whistle, thev felt "lost." (34) Such rituals have permitted the San Vicente community to develop an identity based on their pride as producers of domestic farm machinery and providers of dignified work.

Soon after the return to democracy in 1983, hyperinflation shattered any industrialization programs, which drastically decreased investor confidence and encouraged capital flight. Between 1983 and 1989, the crisis deepened, leading to quadruple-digit inflation rates that competed only with Brazil for the highest rates around the globe. The community, however, stood together in the face of crisis. For instance, after the Senor Harvester Factory declared bankruptcy, several engineers from the company opened a new farm machinery business, named AgroAr, in San Vicente. During the hyperinflation period, they took advantage of cheap prices to start a new farm machinery factory that by 2016 produced 27 product lines by special order or contract only to eliminate over-production and remain solvent. (35)

Post-2001 "Common Good" Practices and the Future of Work

What does the future of work look like in Argentina? If the past and present are indicators, the future may in many ways appear similar to what goes on in Argentina in 2018, with workers, employers, and community members supporting work by any means to earn a living and provide meaning to their lifeworld. Major players are taking note of this possibility: The Global Commission on the Future of Work of the International Labor Organization has created an initiative and research paper series to understand how the future of work can be inclusive, allowing humans to have meaningful, decent work. (vii) There are a number of episodes in Argentina's recent past that illustrate how this might play out.

A number of factors led to the economic crash of 2001, including President Carlos Menem's neoliberal reform policies of the 1990s. He implemented a radical privatization plan to denationalize state enterprises, deregulate financial markets, and dismantle the income-redistribution and social-welfare programs. (36) It was soon after the 2001 collapse that factory owners, employees, and community members worked together to reshape a dignified work culture. Studies have shown how communities developed creative ways to continue working, including union techniques such as work stoppages, half-days, or half-crew days (where one-half of the work crew shows up one day and the other half the following day) to prevent laying off anyone.

During the Kirchnerista period (2003-2015), President Nestor Kirchner inherited a bankrupt country in 2003. He focused on policies that promoted economic growth through new trade partnerships with countries in South America, East Asia, and Africa. There was significant economic growth in spurts between 2005 and 2012. His wife Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) followed him into the presidency and remained in power between 2008 and 2015. She introduced popular redistributive policies to assist the poorest urban Argentines. Despite the relative success of these redistribution programs her government had become marred by scandal and corruption by 2014. That same year, international organizations revealed that her government had intentionally underestimated inflation levels since 2007. Most of the people I interviewed had not supported CFK and believed her policies worsened, not improved, work culture. Most people interviewed in 2016 perceived that the Macri government would not necessarily help the rural producers, but would, at the very least, not hurt them the way they believed the CFK government had.

President Macri called for education and specialized technological training to provide sustainable work for future workers at the 2018 G20 summit. (viii) Although his speech mentioned inequality and poverty, he failed to highlight what measures his administration would take to reduce the effects of inequality on vulnerable workers, especially those living in the countryside, who do not hold the "entitlements and capabilities" to succeed. (37) He also spoke little about the environment's vulnerability to climate change, especially prolonged drought, which incidentally preceded the recessions in 2009 and 2015 and current one in 2018. The media labeled each drought as the worst drought in 100 years, or the worst since the last. In addition to droughts, the Argentine government faces the same socioeconomic problems that other countries do, such as unequal income distribution, general inequality, and poverty. The central government may treat the symptoms of inequality by developing broad plans to train and educate workers. But history shows that it is local assistance and cooperation, not national policies, that help workers shape their work lives and sustain work.

The research for this paper suggests that regardless of peoples' attitudes towards automation and industrial progress, the appeal of common-good practices remains. Speaking off-the-record, one manager shared his preference for the old ways of being a "boss," reprimanding and firing workers at will. He said we would prefer to employ robots over people because of the current climate of constant renegotiation and union advocacy. Nevertheless, this manager agreed that cooperation was preferable over adversarial relations. For the most part, interviewees felt that they should do what is necessary to sustain work production and bring dignified work to the people.

A feature of 21st century factory work is the sharing economy. In Argentina, both owners and workers have taken advantage of the internet. They have expanded their reach into peer networks around the globe to stay globally connected and expand technological knowledge. Using common social-media platforms, Argentine factory owners communicate with other manufacturers around the globe to acquire, provide, and share knowledge and services. In some cases, they have partnered with U.S. farm machinery firms. Such was the case for the new GYR Senor Roto-Mix factory, which has developed connections with companies in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina. (38) Several interviewees also mentioned attending the annual meetings of the Produce Marketing Association and the Farm Machinery Expo in the United States to learn about new hybrid seeds, machinery, and packaging technologies. (39) A group of farm machinery producers, CNH Industrial, created an online guidebook called Guia Maquinac so outsiders can find domestic companies. (40) They list all available farm machinery producers, their products, and services, and they are connected through four different types of social-media platforms. (41)

Workers, for their part, have diversified their ways of work. During downturns, they have used the gig economy to take on temporary positions or become short-term, independent contractors who sometimes chose to remain in the gig economy for the long term. During the 1980s downturn, for instance, a worker named Edgardo Botta, who was trained by the Senor Harvester Factory in industrial design and engineering, took advantage of his new skills to contract to different companies as a half-day/half-crew member, until he eventually settled into a new position in another town. (42) In another instance, a mechanic named Gabriel Ardusso has chosen since 2001 to use his skills "on the road" rather than in a factory. (43) Argentina's agro-export economy has offered him the most security through year-round work as he follows the wheat, soy, and rice harvests from the northern to southern regions of the country from October to August. But when necessary, he has been willing to shift his skills to sustain work. With the most recent prolonged drought and flooding from October to December 2018, farmers fared badly and fields were bare. Ardusso could not find harvest contracting work, but rather than being frustrated, he quickly found work again with a company that farms local fields and repairs farm machinery. (44)

Another important feature is Veltmeyer's social economy or what I term the "common good" approach to an economy. Owners, engineers, and workers envision themselves as working together for a common cause: sustain dignified work. This was especially true at small firms with a long history of cooperation within the factory and with community engagement. Miguel Roatta, president of AgroAr in San Vicente, for instance, expressed his feelings that small provincial factories should not exist in Argentina. The economic crises are frequent, credit is scarce, and they simply cannot compete with giant, foreign-based companies such as John Deere, Massey-Ferguson, or Hollander. But with the help of the local communities, they have survived everything. He believed his factory remained open during crises because socially, it was "like a great big family" that valued work and their efforts to offer work during crises. (45)


In Argentina and Latin America, creative solutions or alternative hybrid models of development to sustain dignified, meaningful work begin at the community level. As Bernardin factory president Pasquetta stated, he owes his community for their support, and what he offers is "to give them certainty that they have work and that the firm is dynamic and looking toward the future." (46) Interviewees in the study were not seeking a socialist or communist model, in actuality, these models never materialized. In their lifeworld, there was no question that they would work in a market-led system and that there was an expectation of competition. Local-level owners, workers, and engineers simply developed common good approaches to weather the anticipated storm of frequent crises and to sustain work and lifeworld.

Argentina is not alone in developing a common good approach to build a hybrid capitalist or development model, but these practices may be more prevalent there because of a strong cultural inclination to sustain work by whatever means. Its focus on community and cooperation to weather downturns may help neighboring countries and its crisis and recovery efforts and/or economic restructuring often affect regional economies. In addition, as the second largest economy in South America, changes to the Argentine economy affect its smaller neighbors, including Paraguay, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Argentina's future of work model entails ensuring consistent, meaningful work through cooperation among social groups in a firm, engaging community, and training flexibility and adaptability to a workforce, though in the media we often see urban protests and outrage about Argentina's latest economic crisis. In rural regions, different groups are focusing on finding ways to sustain dignified work. (ix) Although interviewees agree that economic conditions are bad in 2018, their intuition tells them that it is likely that Argentina will weather this downturn, just like it did in previous years with the help of communities and partners through common good approaches.

Yovanna Pineda is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Central Florida and author of Industrial Development in a Frontier Economy: The Industrialization of Argentina, 1890-1930 (Stanford: 2009). Her upcoming second book, Harvesting Innovation: Rituals, Memory, and Invention of Farm Machinery in Argentina, examines ritual-making, use, and maintenance of agricultural machinery from the perspective of the Argentine rural classes. In addition, Dr. Pineda is directing and co-editing/co-writing with Scott Launier, The Harvester, a companion documentary that explores the rituals and pride of farm machinery producers and aficionados in Santa Fe province, Argentina.


(1) Klaus Schwab, "The Fourth Industrial Revolution," Foreign Affairs, 12 December 2015.

(2) Mauricio Macri, "Special Address by G20 Chair and Argentine President Mauricio Macri" (speech, World Economic Forum: January 2018),

(3) World Development Indicators (The World Bank Group: 2018),

(4) Natalio Cosoy, "Argentines Sacrifice Vacations, Internet, and Even Food as Economic Crisis Intensifies," Washington Post, 28 September 2018.

(5) Hugh Bronstein, "Argentina's Macri is Stuck Between the IMF and a Hard Place," Reuters, 19 October 2018.

(6) Henry Veltmeyer, "The social economy in Latin America as alternative development," Canadian Journal of Development 39, no. 1 (2018), 41.

(7) The common good approach in development studies typically applies to the natural environment and capitalism or is referred to in collective bargaining among unions. Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994).

(8) Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Design: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Gabriel Palma, "Latin America during the second half of the Twentieth Century: From the "age of extremes" to the age of "end-of-history" uniformity," Rethinking Development Economics, Ha-Joon Chang, ed., 125-151 (London: Wimbledon Publishing Company, 2003); Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth, and Roberto Cortes Conde, The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America: The Long Twentieth Century, Volume LI (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

(9) Veltmeyer (2018).

(10) Jose Itzigsohn and Julian Rebon, "The Recuperation of Enterprises: Defending Workers' Lifeworld, Creating New Tools of Contention," Latin American Research Review 50, no. 4 (2015), 178-196.

(11) Ibid., 179.

(12) The World Bank Group (2018).

(13) Julio Djenderedijian, El proceso economico. Argentina, 1830-1880 (Buenos Aires: Taurus, 2015); Julio Djenderedijian, Silcora Bearzotti, and Juan Luis Martiren, Historia del capitalismo agrario pampeano: Expansion agricola y colonizacion en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, volume 6 (Buenos Aires: Teseo, 2010); Theodore D. Hammatt, Factors in Wheat Marketing (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1927).

(14) Repiiblica Argentina, Comision Directiva del Censo, Primer censo de la Republica Argentina, verificado en los dias 15, 16, 17 de setiemhre de 1869 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Porvenir, 1872).

(15) Carlos Diaz Alejandro estimated that annual growth rates of rural output were 3.8 percent (gross output) between 1900 and 1929; Carlos Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic, 151; Argentina Ministerio de Agricultura, Censo Nacional Agropecuario, 1937 (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, 1939), 18-19.

(16) MIT Media Lab and Collective Learning, Observatory of Economic Complexity,

(17) Ibid.

(18) Yovanna Pineda, "Farm Machinery Users, Designers and Government Policy in Argentina, 1861-1930," Agricultural History 92, no. 3 (Summer 2018), 351-379.

(19) Jorge Senor Sr., owner of the Senor Harvester Factory (personal interview, Rosario, Santa Fe: 20 June 2017).

(20) Edgardo Botta, retired employee of Senor Harvester Factory (personal interview, Santo Tome, Santa Fe: 3 July 2016).

(21) Ibid.; Danilo Senor, salesman in the Senor Harvester Factory (personal interview, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 11 July 2016).

(22) Maria Ines Barbero and Fernando Rocchi, "Industry," A New Economic History of Argentina, Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 261-294.

(23) Andres Butta, Engineer and General Manager, Vassalli Fabril, S.A. (email interview: 20 September 2018).

(24) Jorge Senor Sr., former owner of Senor Harvester Factory (email interview, 29 May 2017).

(25) Ronaldo Munck, Ricardo Falcon, and Bernardo Galitelli, Argentina: From Anarchism to Peranum: workers, unions, and politics, 1855-1985 (London: Zed Books, 1987); Daniel James, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976 (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

(26) Raul Garcia Heras, El Fondo Monetario y el Banco Mundial en la Argentina: liberalismo, populismo y finanzas Internationales (Buenos Aires: Lumiere, 2008).

(27) Celia Szusterman, Frondizi and the Politics of Developmcntalism in Argentina, 1958-1962 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993).

(28) Jorge Senor Sr., former owner of Senor Harvester Factory (personal interview, Roldan, Santa Fe, 20-21 June 2017).

(29) Lilia Biancotti de Boffelli, wife of Boffelli (personal interview, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 16 July 2016); Frondizi Archive, "Visita a San Vicente, Santa Fe, 18 Septiembre de 1960;" "19-6 al 20-VI 1961, Visita a Rosario-Dia de la Bandera" Box 33.2.12 (video, Special Collections, Biblioteca Nacional, Buenos Aires, Argentina). The presidential visits were filmed in black-and-white and silent on an 8mm film camera. The author converted 8mm to HD, receiving permission to view and copy footage from Veronica Boffelli Biancotti and Lilia Biancotti de Boffelli, San Vicente, Santa Fe.

(30) Botta (2016); Sebastian Forni (personal interview, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 17 June 2017).

(31) Jose Luis Prosperi (interview by Damian Bil, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 11 February 2009); Mirando a traves de un nombre, n.d.

(32) Raul Jose Carletti, former accountant of the Senor Harvester Factory from late 1950s to 1987 (personal interview, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 2 July 2016).

(33) Juan Marcos Giordano, engineer and ex-employee at Bernardin and Senor Harvester Factory (personal interview, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 10 June 2017); Gonzalo Raul Aira, President communal of San Vicente (mayor) (personal interview, 19 June 2017); Daniel Bianchotti, President of Club Brown (personal interview, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 29 July 2016).

(34) Jose Luis Pasquetta, Bernardin Manager (personal interview, San Vicente, Sana Fe: 29 July 2016).

(35) Miguel Roatta, President of AgroAr (personal interview, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 29 July 2016).

(36) Luigi Manzetti, Privatization South American Style (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

(37) Amartya Sen, "Poverty as Capabilitv Deprivation," Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).

(38) Rodolfo Senor, Co-owner of RvG Senor Feed Mix Companv (personal interview, Roldan, Santa Fe: 20 June 2017).

(39) Produce Marketing Association,; National Farm Machinery Show,

(40) Guia Maquinac,; CNH Industrial,

(41) Maquinac website,; Maquinac Facebook,; Maquinac Twitter,; Maquinac Instagram,; and Maquinac YouTube,

(42) Botta (2016).

(43) Gabriel Hugo Ardusso, Mechanic and Harvest Contractor (personal interview, San Vicente, Santa Fe: 17 June 2017).

(44) Gabriel Ardusso (message via Facebook Messenger, 2 January 2019).

(45) Roatta (2016).

(46) Jose Luis Pasquetta, Bernardin Manager (personal interview, San Vicente, Sana Fe: 29 July 2016).

(i) President Macri's speech included crediting past economic recovery efforts to "bottom-up" changes that helped reduce poverty and maintain employment; see Macri (2018).

(ii) Interviews varied in length from one hour to several days of visits. The style ranged from formal, semi-structured to lengthv conversations, including ethnographic observations of work at the factories and in the home. Several interviewees have continued to stay in contact and provide more information via social media messaging programs such as Facebook Messenger and Whatsapp. 1 recorded in-person interviews in audio, video, and pnotography. University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board has reviewed the interview questions and procedures of this research (Exempt number, IRB ID: SBE-16-12483).

(iii) The interviews represent managers, skilled workers, owners, and engineers from eight factories located in Santa Fe Province: Senor Harvester Factorv (1921-1987); Boffelli (1958-1978); Bernardin; AgroAr; San Vicente; GYR Senor Maquinas, Roldan; Balanzas Vesta, Rosario; Cym in Soldini; and Vassali Fabril, Firmat, Santa Fe.

(iv) Indeed, this was particularly impressive given the great influx of immigration, accounting for 30 percent of the population by 1914. More than 6 million Europeans came to Argentina to work and live before 1932. Between 1857 and 1930, more than half of the immigrants were of Italian and Spanish origins. Approximately 53 percent of all immigrants remained in the country; Anuario geografico argentine (Buenos Aires, 1941), 186; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, third edition (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Yair Mundlak and Marcelo Regunaga, "Agriculture," A New Economic History of Argentina, Gerardo Delia Paolera and Alan M. Taylor, eds., (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 233-60; Carlos Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

(v) The latter characterized by high inflation rates through the 20th and 21st centuries. Adolfo Sturzenegeer and Ramiro Mova, "Economic Cycles," A Neiv Economic History of Argentina, Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Leslie Bethell, ed., Argentina since Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

(vi) Palma (2003), 127; From 1946 to 1955, President Juan Domingo Peron pursued five-year economic plans to raise industrial productivity, while agricultural producers paid the price through "export taxes on agricultural goods to finance the welfare and industrial programs, maintaining relatively low cost of living, price controls on foodstuff imposed, and limiting sales to the domestic market."

(vii) Major challenges to the future of meaningful work include globalization, climate change, technological advances, and rising inequality. "Global Commission on the Future of Work," International Labor Organization,

(viii) Macri argued that investment in education, training, and updating skills sets would sustain human capital and economic development, essentially, creating upward social mobility or an "equality of opportunity." Macri (2018).

(ix) According to the World Bank data, Argentina's population (44 million) is 92 percent urbanized. As of 2018, nearly 13 million or 30 percent of the population reside in or near the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires City.
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Author:Pineda, Yovanna
Publication:Journal of International Affairs
Geographic Code:1U8NM
Date:Sep 22, 2018

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