Swap-Shop: Time for a Deal in Kosovo?
Later, at a film showing to mark the anniversary, when I asked whether viewers were happy with what had been achieved in the past two decades, the replies were almost universally negative. Kosovars of all ages, classes, and political beliefs have lost confidence in their leaders, viewing them as corrupt and failing to advance either the domestic well-being or international standing of the new state.
A Hard Present and an Uncertain Future
Kosovo remains a poor country. According to some measures, average per capita GDP is only 3,500 Euros. Unemployment hovers around 30% and youth unemployment is near 60%--this in a state where the average age is 26.
Corruption is widespread. A recent UN study found that 11 % of the population reported paying regular bribes to officials in public administration and 28% reported having to pay or give a gift in order to get a job. Government contracts are widely believed to be awarded on the basis of political connections and the building boom that has swept Pristina and some other cities is generally considered to be fueled by money from corrupt leaders or from questionable sources abroad.
Against this backdrop, people are losing faith in Kosovo's future. Between 2007 and 2018, Kosovo's population fell by 15.4%--the largest decline in Europe. Last year over 17,000 young people left for Europe legally, including two thousand students who left Prizren, Kosovo's second city. Even the middle class seems to be losing hope. A friend who has occupied responsible positions since the war told me that if conditions do not improve, he will leave with his family for Canada. "I don't want my children to grow up here," is a refrain heard often.
Kosovo's international future remains uncertain. Serbia's patron, Russia, has blocked Kosovo's admission into the UN and five EU member states failed to recognize Kosovo's independence. Serbia has continued what amounts to an undeclared state of hostilities against the nascent Kosovo state--restricting the free movement of people and trade across its territory, blocking Kosovo's membership in many international organizations, and using Interpol to detain Kosovars when they travel abroad.
Viewed by Serbs as the cradle of their medieval civilization, Kosovo occupies a mythical status in the Serbian national psyche and a poisonous place in Serbian politics. A few years ago, then Serbian president Nikolic told me privately that all Serbs understood Kosovo was lost and that no one really wanted its two million Albanian inhabitants back to participate in Serbian political life. But if he acknowledged that fact publicly every Serbian politician would immediately label him a traitor--and he would do the same to any other politician who admitted it.
During negotiations toward Kosovo's independence the international community pushed the Kosovars into concession after concession in the hope of gaining Serbia's agreement to the loss of its former autonomous province. But when Belgrade refused to go along Kosovo was nevertheless saddled with the deal, including a constitution that allows the Serb minority, now less than 5 % of the population, the effective ability to block changes. Kosovars support the constitution's democratic institutions and sweeping protections for human and minority rights but many resent the way it was introduced and question provisions which seem to trample on cherished aspects of their Albanian national identity.
In an effort to break the stalemate a new dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina began in 2011, under EU auspices and with US backing. Its objective was to broker agreements between Belgrade and Pristina in a variety of practical areas, in the hope that these would create a favorable environment for a comprehensive agreement to resolve the underlying political problems between the two countries. The dialogue has produced 33 agreements, some of which have brought practical benefit to the people of the region, but most have not been implemented.
Territorial Swap Proves Controversial
Over the past year or so, President Hashim Thaci of Kosovo and Alexander Vucic, his Serbian counterpart, reportedly crafted the framework of a comprehensive agreement, intended to bring to an end the long-running confrontation between their countries. The draft is said to cover all areas of discord but its centerpiece--and its most controversial aspect--is an exchange of territory whereby some areas in Serbia with heavily Albanian population would go to Kosovo and some Serbian-populated parts of northern Kosovo would go to Serbia.
Senior Kosovo officials say there is no map delineating a swap but the two presidents have discussed specific areas that could be exchanged. Thaci presented three "red lines" which could never be part of a swap--the northern part of the divided city of Mitrovica, the Gazivoda reservoir on which much of Kosovo depends for water, and the Trepca mining complex. Remaining parts of northern Kosovo might apparently go to Serbia. In return, Kosovo would get Albanian villages in three "South Serbian" municipalities bordering on Kosovo but not areas where Serbs are a majority.
The notion of a territorial swap provoked strong--although not unanimous--international criticism. The Trump administration, by contrast, leaned strongly into the deal. Administration figures told the parties that the US has no "red lines" and Trump himself has written two letters to Thaci and Vucic promising US support for a deal that they can agree on together.
In Kosovo, opposition political figures sharply condemned a swap and it provoked a split in the governing coalition, with Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj coming out against any deal giving up an inch of Kosovo land. To give teeth to his position Haradinaj imposed a 100 % tariff on all Serbian goods entering Kosovo.
Haradinaj's move, aimed as much against Thaci's initiative as against Belgrade, provoked sharply negative reactions in Europe and the US. After two senior NSC officials visited Pristina the US Embassy issued a statement saying that the tariffs "undermine our partnership, and must be suspended."
Kosovo Albanians have a strong sense of loyalty toward the US, which they regard as primarily responsible for their liberation from Serbia. The threatening tone of initial US statements and still more the rumors--later debunked --that the US might withdraw its troops, hit the Kosovars hard. At pains not to be seen breaking with Washington, Haradinaj called himself "a soldier of the US." But he refused to lift the tariffs and his stance seems to have won broad support among the Kosovo population, even as most continue to profess undying love for America.
Why Not a Swap?
There are many reasons to question a possible territorial swap between Kosovo and Serbia, not the least of which is skepticism whether the two parties could actually agree on what to trade and on whether Serbs in Kosovo would go along. The majority of Kosovo Serbs actually live in the southern part of Kosovo and would not be part of any conceivable territorial swap. The heavily armed NATO detachments which guarded Serbs in these "enclaves" after the 1999 war have long since been withdrawn. Living and economic conditions have improved although the two communities still live largely separate lives. Senior Kosovo figures believe that most Serbs in the enclaves would not flee in reaction to a northern swap. Moreover, should Vucic actually agree to a swap he would have strong incentive to use the levers of control Belgrade possesses among Kosovo Serb communities to discourage flight.
The divided city of Mitrovica would certainly be one of the chief difficulties in any swap. After the 1999 war, Serbs fleeing revenge attacks by returning Albanians in the southern part of the country drove out Albanians who lived in the northern part of then ethnically mixed Mitrovica. NATO forces established an informal boundary along the Ibar River flowing through the city center. Twenty years later, the main bridge across the Ibar remains closed to vehicular traffic and the two communities live almost completely apart. There are, nevertheless, small signs of change. Albanians are moving back into some areas in the north and there are places where the two peoples seem to live peacefully along opposite sides of the same street. Serbs in northern Mitrovica walk across the central bridge to use the Kosovo court system and there is a vibrant mixed shopping center at another spot along the border.
A recent survey of Serbs living in the four Belgrade-controlled northern municipalities of Kosovo concluded that "Serbs in the north now more than earlier compare their status with the status of Serbs south of the Ibar and see the necessity of studying the experience of Serbs who have already completed the process of integration into Kosovo institutions." Fifty-six per cent of respondents supported the participation of Serbs in Kosovo institutions but 83% thought that agreements reached so far "did not advance the freedom and rights of Serbs in Kosovo." The survey also found that the institution that Serbs in the north trusted most was the quasi-underground "Civil Defense" force by which Belgrade exercised its control in Serb areas and that 40% of Serbian youth did not see themselves remaining in Kosovo in the future.
I have visited Mitrovica many times and have never found any Serb there willing to admit a readiness to live exclusively under Kosovo jurisdiction as a Kosovo citizen. When I asked a small sample recently about a swap which left them on the "wrong" side of the divide, the reaction was generally disbelief followed by some version of "fight or flight." A key part of the swap is said to be a provision that would unite the entire city of Mitrovica in some of joint status with international guarantees. With sufficient encouragement by the two presidents and international financial support this might work but Mitrovica would certainly remain a potential flashpoint
At present it is hard to find Kosovo Albanians, other than die-hard Thaci backers, who openly support the swap. Political opponents are unwilling to see any deal which would strengthen the president and what many regard as his deeply corrupt regime. There is also, of course, patriotic opposition to giving up any Kosovo soil, a sentiment Haradinaj has tapped into. Many Albanians also argue that an ethnically based swap would contradict the principles which have underlain the international approach to Kosovo since 1999 and fear that it could thereby begin to tilt internal political dynamics away from Kosovo's hitherto firmly democratic and pro-Western orientation.
What Comes Next?
Haradinaj's tariff gambit has stopped the swap, at least for the moment, but what comes next is unclear. Thaci continues to profess optimism, saying that an agreement is possible this year and that, "We have to sit down even with our arch enemies, but without any preconditions." The US continues to call for lifting the tariffs, although in more moderate tones, and to urge a resumption of moves toward a deal, while at the same time warning that its patience is not limitless.
The EU appears divided. Foreign policy chief Mogherini says dialogue will be impossible until the tariffs are lifted while EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Johannes Hahn reportedly "reignited" political battles in Kosovo by saying that exchange of territories could be an option if Kosovo and Serbia agree.
Kosovo has a complicated relationship to Europe. The Euro is the country's official currency and Kosovo leaders see eventual membership in the EU--and NATO--as critical to anchoring the country in the Western world. Yet Kosovo has still not been invited to join the EU and it remains one of only two European countries where a visa is still required to enter the EU. Skepticism about the EU has been growing in Kosovo since Brussels reneged on a pledge to provide "visa liberalization" to Kosovo in return for Kosovo giving up its opposition to a border demarcation deal with Montenegro which many Kosovars believed surrendered territory legitimately belonging to them.
Not a direct participant in the dialogue, Russia will be a factor in any final settlement by virtue of the veto it can exercise over Kosovo joining the UN through its position as one of the UNSC Perm Five. On the margins of a recent multilateral meeting in Paris, Thaci asked Putin if he would support a Kosovo deal that was acceptable to Serbia and if, in that case, he would drop his opposition to Kosovo joining the UN, reportedly receiving positive answers to both. Nevertheless, speculation is rife that Moscow might seek compensation for allowing Kosovo to join the UN, possibly in Ukraine or another of the "frozen conflicts" in the former USSR. Senior Kosovo figures say that the US has undertaken to deal with Russia on this aspect of the puzzle.
Doing Nothing is not an Option
Kosovo is not on the verge of revolt or violence, as it has been on other occasions in its recent history, but impatience is growing. Albin Kurti, the leader of Kosovo's most prominent alternative party, with a proven ability to bring supporters into the streets, recently said publicly that "In Kosovo, as well as in neighboring countries, a spring of political change can be expected." It is possible in Pristina to hear people mutter that what is needed is a Middle Eastern style "Kosovo Spring" of popular protests to replace the existing regime but Kurti said privately that this is not what he advocates. His Vetevendosje party has, however, sought to register a center under the same name in Albania to promote his left-wing national-populist campaign to unify Albanians in one country as an element, he says, of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.
Darker alternatives exist beneath the surface. In the heyday of the "Caliphate" Kosovo sent more fighters to ISIS on a per capita basis than other larger states. With the defeat of ISIS fears of Islamic radicalism have subsided but the underlying push-pull of poverty and well-funded efforts to spread a radical version of Islam in Kosovo remain worrisome. Turkey under Erdogan also continues to exert influence. In 2018 Kosovars were shocked when Turkish intelligence operatives, with the apparent knowledge of Kosovo counterparts, covertly allowed a number of Erdogan opponents resident in Kosovo to be secretly spirited out of the country to stand trial in Turkey.
The notion of a territorial swap as a supposed way to cut the Kosovo Gordian knot has appeared on previous occasions in the two decades since the end of the war but it has always been stopped by a combination of international pressure and suspicion between Belgrade and Pristina. Whether that will happen again remains to be seen but those who oppose a deal acceptable to the two countries have an obligation come up with an alternative.
German Chancellor Merkel and French President Macron have summoned Kosovo and Serbian leaders to a meeting at the end of April with the apparent intention of establishing a new European channel to broker a deal. Germany has strongly opposed a territorial swap and it will presumably present a different solution as part of this process.
One obvious alternative would be arrangements to allow Serbs broad autonomy to live and govern themselves within Kosovo. In 2013 the EU brokered the outline of a so-called "Association" granting broad rights to Serbs in Kosovo but key elements of it were later declared unconstitutional by Kosovo courts. The Association remains problematic among Kosovo Albanians, who see it as a veiled effort to create a separate Serb entity as a way station to separation--one reason why Thaci reportedly rejected the Association in the talks with Vucic.
Early indications that the apparent European alternative to a swap could be some form of "joint sovereignty" for Serb areas in the north have already been publicly rejected by Kosovo leaders. In past negotiations, when sufficient united international pressure was applied, the Kosovars generally gave in. If the broad Kosovar support for Haradinaj's defiance of US pressure is any indication, that might not happen now, especially if the US continues to implicitly support a swap.
As is so often the case in the Balkans there are no easy solutions and there may well be no good solutions. The US has a special responsibility in Kosovo by virtue of the active role it has taken for many years in supporting Kosovo aspirations. The Obama administration subcontracted this role to the EU but with the Trump administration, against the expectations of many, seemingly playing a responsible role in Kosovo, a return to US leadership, at least in this small Balkan country, is possible.
After a career in the Foreign Service, primarily in Soviet and Yugoslav affairs, Louis Sell served in 2000 as Kosovo Director of the International Crisis Group. In 2003 he was one of the founders of the American University in Kosovo and served as its Executive Director until 2007. He has a B. A. from Franklin and Marshall College (1969) and an M. A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Mr. Sell's second book, From Washington to Moscow: US-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of the USSR, was published by Duke University Press in August, 2016. His political biography of Slobodan Milosevic, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, was published in 2002. He is an adjunct professor at the University of Maine at Farmington. He lives in a 200-year-old farm house in Whitefield, Maine, where he is a member of the volunteer fire department.
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|Title Annotation:||exchange of territory with Serbia|
|Date:||May 1, 2019|
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