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Supreme Court develops new test for home office deductions.

Congress intended to severely limit home office deductions when it enacted Sec. 280A in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA).(1) Gradually, however, the courts broadened Sec. 280A's narrow passageway for deductibility by liberally interpreting, and ultimately abandoning, the restrictive focal point test often used to determine home office deductibility.(2) But before too many taxpayers stepped through this window of opportunity, the Supreme Court rendered its rule-tightening decision in Soliman.(3) Now, consultants, caterers, musicians and others who work at home because their businesses offer less than adequate office space must reassess their decisions to take home office deductions.

This article will revie'w the legislative and judicial development of the home office deduction; analyze the Supreme Court's recent decision in Soliman; determine if, and to what extent, taxpayers can still expect to benefit from the home office deduction; and discuss the judicially created focal point test used by the courts to determine home office deductibility - its development, erosion, abandonment and resurrection under a new name in Soliman.

The Home Office Deduction Under Pre-TRA Law

Before the TRA was enacted, no statute governed the deductibility of home office expenses. The courts allowed a taxpayer a deduction if the home office expenses were "ordinary and necessary" under Sec. 162(a), which the Tax Court interpreted to mean that maintenance of a home office was "appropriate and helpful" under the taxpayer's circumstances.

* Appropriate and helpful standard

The Tax Court first used the appropriate and helpful test in Newi.(4) Newi sold advertising time for the American Broadcasting Company (ABC). He attempted to deduct the rental, cleaning and lighting of a spare room in his apartment where he did work for ABC, claiming that these were "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under Sec. 162(a). Newi spent an average of three hours a night in his home office, and neither Newi nor his wife used this office for personal reasons. ABC did not request that Newi work at home; ABC's building was open and available for use during the evening hours. The Tax Court interpreted ordinary and necessary in Sec. 162(a) as meaning "appropriate and helpful"(5) and held that because Newi's home office was used for the business purpose of viewing and evaluating television programs and corresponding advertisements, the appropriate and helpful standard had been satisfied. The Tax Court noted that even if Newi's home office had been used on "rare and isolated" occasions for personal purposes, the outcome still would have been the same.

The Tax Court further liberalized the home office deduction requirements under the appropriate and helpful standard in Bodzin.(6) Bodzin, an IRS attorney, found that doing work at his home office in the evening and on weekends helped him expedite his case load. Bodzin's home office was not used to entertain friends or used by anyone other than Bodzin himself. He occasionally used the room for nonbusiness purposes, such as paying bills, reviewing bank statements and stamp collecting. As in Newi, Bodzin was not requested by his employer to maintain a home office and enjoyed access to his business office on evenings and weekends. The Tax Court determined that Bodzin's home office expenses directly related to his business and, thus, were allowable home office deductions.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in Bodzin, holding that if a taxpayer could show that his work office was not suitable for the purposes for which he used his home office, or if the work office was unavailable on evenings and weekends, the taxpayer could possibly qualify for a home office deduction. Because Bodzin had access to his office in the evenings and on weekends, the Fourth Circuit disallowed his deduction of home office expenses.

Congress's Dissatisfaction with the Appropriate

and Helpful Standard: Enactment of Sec. 280A

The decisions in Newi, Bodzin and other home office cases(7) soon convinced Congress that the appropriate and helpful test was too subjective and should be replaced with more definitive standards. Congress believed the existing judicial trend was transforming "expenses otherwise considered nondeductible personal, living, and family expenses . . . into deductible business expenses simply because, under the facts of the particular case, it was appropriate and helpful to perform some portion of the taxpayer's business in his personal residence."(8) To illustrate this point, it used the following example:

[I]f a university professor, who is provided an office by his employer, uses a den or some other room in his residence for the purpose of grading papers, preparing examinations or preparing classroom notes, an allocable portion of certain expenses might be claimed as a deduction even though only minor incremental expenses were incurred in order to perform these activities.(9)

Thus, Congress clearly wanted to halt deductions of items that, although appropriate and helpful to the business, would have been used in the home regardless of whether a home office existed. To achieve this goal, Congress created what it believed was a more objective test in Sec. 280A.

Sec. 280A(a) provides that "no deduction . . . shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence." This general rule, however, does not apply if a portion of the dwelling unit is used exclusively and regularly (1) as the taxpayer's principal place of business, (2) as a place of business used by patients, clients or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business, or (3) in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business and the home office is in a separate structure not attached to the taxpayer's dwelling unit.(10) For an employee who maintains a home office, a deduction is available only if that home office is maintained "for the convenience of his employer."

The Treasury issued proposed regulations under Sec. 280A in 1980 defining the principal place of business and interpreting the exclusive and regular use requirement.(11) The Tax Court, however, basically ignored the proposed regulations relative to the principal place of business requirement and instituted its own test for determining whether a taxpayer qualified for the home office deduction under this provision: the focal point test.

Development of the Focal Point Test

The Tax Court first used the focal point test in 1980 in Baie.(12) Baie operated a small foodstand near her residence. Because of limited space at the foodstand, Baie used a room in her residence for bookkeeping and her kitchen to prepare food for the stand. Although the Tax Court found the activities conducted at Baie's residence beneficial to her business, it concluded that the foodstand itself, where all the sales took place, was the focal point (principal place) of Baie's business operations. Accordingly, she could not deduct any of her residential expenses under Sec. 280A.

After Baie, the Tax Court consistently applied the focal point test to determine the deductibility of home office expenses.(13) Generally, the court held that the taxpayer's focal point was the place where goods and services were provided to customers or clients, or where income was produced. The number of hours spent on various activities and in different locations was held not to be controlling in determining the taxpayer's focal point.(14)

Erosion of the Focal Point Test

While the Tax Court continued to apply the focal point test, a line of appellate cases casting doubt on its application began to develop. First, in Drucker,(15) the Second Circuit accepted the focal point test, but disagreed factually with the Tax Court as to the location of the focal point of the activities of Drucker, a New York Metropolitan Opera concert violinist. Drucker used a room in his apartment exclusively, for approximately 30 hours per week, to practice for his performances at Lincoln Center. Using what was basically a " source of income" test, the Tax Court held that the focal point of Drucker's activities as an employee was the performance hall, not his apartment, and denied the deduction. The Second Circuit, however, emphasized the practice required of a musician and found that "[b]oth in time and in importance, home practice was the |focal point' of the appellant musician's employment-related activities."(16) Accordingly, Drucker was entitled to a home office deduction. Moreover, it was established that an employee's principal place of business was not necessarily his employer's principal place of business.

* Focal point test deemed inappropriate

Second in the line of cases undermining the focal point test was Weissman,(17) rendered less than one year after Drucker. This time, however, the Second Circuit seemed not to conclude that the focal point analysis was misapplied by the Tax Court, but rather that the focal point analysis itself was inappropriate.

Weissman was a college professor who, in addition to teaching, was required to do an unspecified amount of research and writing in his field in order to retain his teaching position. Although the college provided Weissman with an office, he had to share it with several other professors. Weissman worked 64 to 75 hours per week, yet, only 20% of that time was spent at the college; the other 80% was spent in his home office.

The Second Circuit not only had to determine whether Weissman's home office was his principal place of business, but also, because Weissman was an employee of the college, whether he maintained his office for the convenience of his employer. The Second Circuit found that the Tax Court's focal point test tended to focus unfairly on the location where the taxpayer performed his most visible tasks - in this case, his teaching functions. Invoking a standard emphasizing the location where the taxpayer performed the dominant portion of his work and rejecting the focal point test, the Second Circuit stated:

While this may be helpful in many cases, when a taxpayer's occupation involves two very distinct yet related activities, such as practice and performance . . . or writing and teaching, the "focal point" approach creates a risk of shifting attention to the place where a taxpayer's work is more visible, instead of the place where the dominant portion of his work is accomplished.(18)

Using this dominant portion of work standard, the Second Circuit held that Weissman's home office was his principal place of business. The court also determined that Weissman's home office was maintained "for the convenience of his employer" because it spared the employer the cost of providing a suitable private office.

* Further criticism of the focal point test

The third, and perhaps most serious, blow to the Tax Court's focal point test was delivered by the Seventh Circuit in Meiers.(19) Citing Weissman and Drucker, the Seventh Circuit joined the Second Circuit in criticizing the Tax Court's focal point test because it "places undue emphasis upon the location where goods or services are provided to customers and income is generated ...."20

Meiers owned and managed a seff-service laundromat. As manager, she spent approximately one hour each day at the laundromat, and two hours each day in her home office set aside exclusively for the administrative work associated with the business. The Tax Court denied the deduction, but the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision, holding that the taxpayer's principal place of business, in terms of hours worked and functions performed, was the home office and not the laundromat. The court maintained that when determining the principal place of business, the first consideration should be the length of time spent at the home office compared to other locations. In addition, the court stated that other factors "may from time to time weigh in the balance"; for example, (1) the importance of the business functions performed in the home office, (2) the business necessity of maintaining a home office and (3) the expenditures incurred by the taxpayer to establish a home office.

Abandonment of the Focal Point Test

The Tax Court chose the Soliman case to reconsider the focal point test. Soliman, a self-employed anesthesiologist, spent 30 to 35 hours a week providing services to patients at three hospitals. Because none of these hospitals provided Soliman with an office for conducting the administrative activities essential to his medical practice, he used one bedroom in his apartment "exclusively" and "on a regular basis" for patient and surgeon correspondence, hospital admission functions, billing record maintenance, and medical education preparation and continuation. Although Soliman spent two to three hours each day in his home office, he did not treat patients there. Thus, Soliman's deduction of home office expenses depended on establishing his home office as his principal place of business.

The Tax Court held that although Soliman provided all his medical services outside his home office, he was not precluded from taking a home office deduction. In the court's view, "where a taxpayer's occupation requires essential organizational and management activities that are distinct from those that generate income, the place where the business is managed can be the principal place of business."(21) The focal point test did not support this conclusion, however, leading the court to abandon it in favor of a facts and circumstances approach whenever the following conditions are present:

1. The home office is essential to the taxpayer's business.

2. The taxpayer spends substantial time working at his home office.

3. There is no other location in which to perform the office functions of the business.

Applying the facts and circumstances approach to Soliman, the court considered four factors: (1) the business exigencies for maintaining a home office, (2) whether the functions performed in the home office were essential to the conduct of the business, (3) whether the office was suitable for the essential business functions performed there and (4) the appropriateness of the office furnishings. The Tax Court noted that in his home office Soliman had maintained patient records, billed patients, collected payments and reviewed medical procedures - all of which were essential to his work. The court also concluded that because the hospitals with which Soliman was associated had not provided Soliman with office space, his maintaining a home office was a practical necessity. Although the Tax Court did not address whether Soliman's home office was suitable for the business functions performed there or whether the furnishings were appropriate, the contents of the office as described in the opinion suggest that the court believed these factors were also satisfied.

In determining substantial use, the Tax Court stated that the time spent in the home office is one of several important factors, but not necessarily the predominant factor. In Soliman's case, he clearly spent more time at the hospitals than he did in his home office. The court, however, felt it would be misleading to compare the amount of time Soliman spent at the hospitals with the amount of time he spent at his home office because the activities he conducted at the two locations were vastly different. Without the comparison, the court concluded that the two to three hours Soliman spent in his home office each day were substantial. On the basis of these facts and circumstances, the Tax Court, with six dissents, upheld Soliman's home office deduction. The dissenting opinions criticized the majority's failure to comparatively analyze Soliman's places of business to determine which one was his principal place of business.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision, as well as the facts and circumstances approach used to reach it. For further support, the court relied on Prop. Regs. Sec. 1.280A-2(b)(3), which would allow salespersons to deduct home office expenses "even though they spend most of their time on the road as long as they spend |a substantial amount of time on paperwork at home.'"(22) In the court's view, this proposed regulation, although not binding on it, "evince[d] a policy to allow |home office' deductions for taxpayers who maintain |legitimate' home offices, even if the taxpayer does not spend a majority of his time in the office."(23) The court concluded that the Tax Court's facts and circumstances test would lead to identifying the "true headquarters of the business." Again, however, as in the Tax Court's decision, a dissenting judge questioned the majority's failure to undertake a comparative analysis of Soliman's two places of business to determine which one was principal.

Supreme Court's Decision in Soliman:

Resurrection of the Focal Point Test?

On appeal by the Justice Department, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Soliman. The Court cited the lower court's failure to undertake a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's various business locations as the basis for its reversal. Using both a commonsense approach and a dictionary definition of "principal," the Court concluded that the "[c]ourts cannot assess whether any one business location is the |most important, consequential, or influential' one without comparing it to all the other places where business is transacted."(24)

Although acknowledging that it could not "develop an objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case," the Court held that two primary factors should be considered: "the relative importance of the activities performed at each business location and the time spent at each place." Additionally, the Court cautioned that contrary to the Fourth Circuit's suggestion, the statute requires more than the maintenance of a legitimate home office, which would be nothing more than a throwback to the pre-TRA appropriate and helpful standard.

* Relative importance of activities

The Court stated that the relative importance of the activities performed at each location should be analyzed in light of the particular characteristics of the business at issue. For example, "[i]f the nature of a trade or profession requires the taxpayer to meet or confer with a client or patient or to deliver goods or services to a customer, the place where that contact occurs is often an important indicator of the principal place of business."(25)

Perhaps realizing that this example sounded like a reincarnated focal point test, the Court promptly refused to reendorse the focal point test because the "phrase has a metaphorical quality that can be misleading, and ... no one test is determinative in every case."(26) Yet, the Court further hailed the usefulness of the focal point inquiry by asserting that "the point where goods and services are delivered must be given great weight in determining the place where the most important functions are performed"(27) and "the point where services are rendered or goods delivered is a principal consideration in most cases."(28) Not surprisingly, the Court found the actual treatment of patients the essence of Soliman's professional service and concluded that his home office activities were less important to this business than the tasks he performed at the hospital.

The Court's repeated references to the focal point test - without calling it by its name - led justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia), in an opinion concurring only with the result, to note that "if one were to glance quickly through the Court's opinion ..., one might think the Court was in fact adopting the focal point test."(29) Justice Thomas thought it would be better for the Court to unequivocally embrace the focal point test because of its ability "in the vast majority of cases ... [to] provide a quick, objective, and reliable method of ascertaining a taxpayer's principal place of business' ..."(30) He further believed that the Court's discomfort with the focal point test rested on "two fallacies - or perhaps one fallacy and a terminological obstinacy." The first fallacy was the Court's belief that the focal point test was5 always determinative. In justice Thomas's view, it was not always determinative; instead, a totality of circumstances approach was invoked as soon as the focal point analysis failed to provide a single principal place of business. The second fallacy, or terminological obstinacy, was the Court's rejection of the focal point test because its name had a metaphorical quality. justice Thomas thought it would be more prudent to rechristen the focal point test than to reject it outright.

The only other factor mentioned by the Court as helpful in determining the relative importance of the taxpayer's activities at each business location was the essentiality of the functions performed at home. However, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's treatment of essentiality as a controlling factor. It also rejected the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the availability of alternative office space as a consideration in determining the taxpayer's principal place of business.

* Relative time

The second primary factor mentioned by the Court, the relative time spent at each business location, seemed to be relegated to a secondary role in the Court's discussion:

This factor assumes particular significance when comparison of the importance of functions performed at various places yields no definitive answer to the principal place of business inquiry. This may be the case when a taxpayer performs income-generating tasks at both his home office and some other location.(31)

For Soliman, the Court found "[t]he 10 to 15 hours per week spent in the home office measured against the 30 to 35 hours per week at the three hospitals ... insufficient to render the home office the principal place of business in light of all of the circumstances of this case."(32)

Justice Thomas expressed concern about the Court's intent on the time factor by questioning how a court would determine the principal place of business if the facts in Soliman were altered such that the taxpayer spent 30 to 35 hours at his home office, compared with only 10 hours performing services at the hospitals. While the focal point test would still keep the home office from being the principal place of business, the Court's new standard would force a court to decide first whether the relative importance of the activities or the relative time spent at each location would take precedence. On how he would decide this issue, Justice Thomas concluded: "I am at a loss, and I am afraid the taxpayer, his attorney, and a lower court would be as well."(33)

Post-Soliman Tax Planning

The Supreme Court's decision in Soliman clearly makes it harder for some taxpayers to qualify for home office deductions. Taxpayers working out of their home offices, but usually performing services elsewhere, must now support their home office deductions by proving that they perform their most important and significant work at home. Taxpayers affected by the decision include:

* Contractors who work on bids and plans at home, but do the contracting work elsewhere.

* Musicians who practice at home, but perform elsewhere.

* Caterers who plan and cook at home, but serve meals elsewhere.

* Appliance and computer repair persons who do some repairs in their customers' homes and offices and some repairs in their own homes.

Soliman appears to rule out the deduction for those who use their home offices only for administrative tasks. The decision, however, applies only to taxpayers who claim their home offices as their principal places of business. It does not affect those who regularly use their home offices to meet or deal with clients, customers or patients in the normal course of business, or those who maintain their home offices in separate structures. And it probably does not affect those who work solely out of their homes (e.g., most freelance authors and editors) and most of those who work at home for others (e.g., freelance typists and word processors).

* IRS position

In Notice 93-12,34 the IRS stated that it will amend Publication 587, The Business Use of Your Home, to reflect the Soliman decision. The Service also provided three examples of the application of the comparative analysis test for 1992 and later years. Each example looks to the essence of the taxpayer's business in determining whether or not a home office is the taxpayer's principal place of business.

One example deals with an anesthesiologist and is based directly on the facts in Soliman. The other two examples deal with sales representatives. One, an outside sales representative, does paperwork in his home, but is not entitled to a home office deduction because the essence of his work is outside sales calls. The other sales representative is entitled to a home office deduction because the essence of his work is making sales by telephone calls or by mail from his home office.

* Prescription for success

A taxpayer working at home, but usually performing services elsewhere, may want to change

how and where he performs his work, such that the combination of time and functions performed at home justifies the home office deduction. The goal is to show that the work done at home and the time spent there make it the most important or significant place the taxpayer does business. The following steps may help the taxpayer decide on this right combination of time and functions:

* Break occupational or professional duties or services into separate functions.

* Rank the functions according to importance.

* Identify what is done at home and the time spent doing it.

* Note what is done elsewhere, and the time spent doing that.

* Determine the income generated by the work done at each location.

Even with a combination believed to be "right," each taxpayer must decide whether attempting to take the home office deduction is worth it. On the one hand, by the Supreme Court's own admission, its comparative analysis approach will not yield a definitive answer in every case, thus inviting IRS scrutiny. On the other hand, the amounts deducted for home offices are generally small - e.g., $841 in Soliman, $461 for each of two years in Drucker and $1,127 in Baie - and no benefit will be received by employees unless their itemized deductions, including home office expenses, exceed 2% of their adjusted gross incomes. In many cases, the potential tax savings simply will not justify the risks associated with an IRS audit.


The ideal home office deduction standard is one that is both fair to the taxpayer and satisfies the legislative purpose behind the enactment of more stringent rules in Sec. 280A. Simply put, in enacting Sec. 280A, Congress wanted to abolish the deduction of frivolous, personal expenses related to rooms used only occasionally for business - a possibility under the pre-Sec. 280A appropriate and helpful standard.

The courts' original interpretation of the Sec. 280A principal place of business requirement as the focal point of the business seemed to come down squarely in favor of furthering the legislative purpose of Sec. 280A. The focal point test virtually precluded taxpayers conducting the administrative aspects of their businesses in home offices from deducting their home office expenses.

The tide shifted, however, and after considering the work situations of taxpayers in Drucker, Weissman, Meiers and Soliman, the Tax Court realized the focal point test had outhved its usefulness. The test had been a reasonable response to the abuses brought about by the permissive appropriate and helpful standard, but it denied deductions to many taxpayers whose home offices were critical to their business success. The Tax Court's remedy for this inequity was the facts and circumstances approach adopted in Soliman, and upheld by the Fourth Circuit. The Supreme Court's recent decision to overturn Soliman, however, suggests that this time the Tax Court let the pendulum swing too far toward the taxpayer. Under the Court's comparative analysis approach, the taxpayer now must demonstrate that the business activities conducted in the home office are more important than those conducted elsewhere (the reincarnated focal point test?), and perhaps also that the taxpayer spends more time in the home office than at other locations.

Whether this comparative analysis approach will benefit more taxpayers than the rigid focal point test remains to be seen. The Court did not clearly indicate how much weight should be accorded the relative time factor, or whether it intended the relative activities factor to yield the same principal place of business as the focal point test. Such uncertainty probably indicates that the Supreme Court's decision in Soliman will not eliminate, and perhaps not even diminish, litigation in the area of home office deductions.

(1) See S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1976), for congressional intent to limit home office deductions. (2) See Nader E. Soliman, 113 Sup. Ct. 701 (1993)(71 AFTR2d 93-463, 93-1 USTC [paragraph] 50,014), rev'g 935 F2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991)(67 AFTR2d 91-1112, 91-1 USTC [paragraph] 50,291) (rejecting focal point test when administration of taxpayer's business was essential, and only available office space was in taxpayer's home), aff'g 94 TC 20 (1990) ; John Meiers, TC Memo 1984-607, rev'd per curiam, 782 F2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986)(57 AFTR2d 86-642, 86-1 USTC [paragraph] 9180) (rejecting test when there was no available office space on business premises for necessary administrative work); David J. Weissman, 751 F2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984)(55 AFTR2d 85-539, 85-1 USTC [paragraph] 9106) (rejecting test when office provided by employer was not suitable for professor's necessary research and writing), rev'g TC Memo 1983-724; Ernest Drucker, 715 F2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983)(52 AFTR2d 83-5804, 83-2 USTC [paragraph] 9550) (rejecting test, acknowledging Sec. 280A ought to be interpreted in such a way as to allow taxpayers engaged in nontraditional employment arrangements a deduction for legitimate home office expenses), rev'g and rem'g 79 TC 605 (1982). (3) Soliman, id. (4) George H. Newi, 432 F2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970)(26 AFTR2d 70-5696, 70-2 USTC [paragraph] 9669), aff'g TC Memo 1969-131. (5) The Tax Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Walter F. Tellier, 383 US 687, 689 (1966)(17 AFTR2d 633, 66-1 USTC [paragraph] 9319). (6) Stephen A. Bodzin, 509 F2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975)(35 AFTR2d 75-618, 75-1 USTC [paragraph] 9190), rev'g 60 TC 820 (1973), cert. denied. (7) See, e.g., Thomas C. Cadwallader, 919 F2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1990)(67 AFTR2d 91-301, 90-2 USTC [paragraph] 50,597), aff'g TC Memo 1989-356. The Seventh Circuit noted that Newi and Bodzin present the problem that "[w]ith so fuzzy a standard, taxpayers could claim the deduction on the flimsiest of grounds with no fear of a fraud penalty, and thus could pocket a tax savings except in the unlikely event of an audit." At 90-2 USTC 86,059. (8) S. Rep. No. 94-938, note 1, at 147. (9) Id. (10) Sec. 280A(c). (11) Prop. Regs. Sec. 1.280A-2. (12) Rudolph Baie, 74 TC 105 (1980). (13) See, e.g., Leonard A. Moskovit, TC Memo 1982-472 (teacher's focal point is school); Alexander Lopkoff, TC Memo 1982-701 (Veterans Administration administrative assistant's focal point is hospital); Howard F. Trussel, TC Memo 1982-680 (judge's focal point is the courtroom). (14) See John W. Green, 707 F2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983)(52 AFTR2d 83-5130, 83-1 [paragraph] 9387), rev'g 78 TC 428 (1982); Ethel C. Jackson, 76 TC 696 (1981); Drucker, note 2. (15) Drucker, note 2. (16) Id., 2d Cir., at 83-2 USTC 87,961. (17) Weissman, note 2. (18) Id., 2d Cir., at 85-1 USTC 87,026. (19) Meiers, note 2. (20) Id., 7th Cir., at 86-1 USTC 83,226. (21) Soliman, note 2, TC, at 25. (22) Id., 4th Cir., at 91-1 USTC 88,151. (23) Id. (24) Id., Sup. Ct., at 93-1 USTC 87,055. (25) Id. (26) Id. (27) Id. (28) Id., at 93-1 USTC 87,056. (29) Id., at 93-1 USTC 87,058. (30) Id. (31) Id., at 93-1 USTC 87,056. (32) Id., at 93-1 USTC 87,057. (33) Id., at 93-1 USTC 87,059. (34) Notice 93-12, IRB 1993-8, 46.
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Author:Knight, Lee G.
Publication:The Tax Adviser
Date:Jul 1, 1993
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